

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RFVSW, DATE 2/12/96

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

Stencil

AVIC-WE

1 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

Commanding General  
 United States Army, Vietnam  
 APO San Francisco 96375

Commanding General  
 II Field Force, Vietnam  
 APO San Francisco 96266

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1. (U) REFERENCES: 11th ACR INTSUMS and SITREPS (24-28 Nov 69); OPLAN 63-70 (Texas Traveler); Third Squadron, 11th ACR, Journal and Log; S-3, 11th ACR, Radio Log; and interviews with LTC Reed, LTC Doyle, Maj. Slean, Maj. Abrahamson, CPT Marion night officer, and others named in report
2. (U) NAME AND INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: Operation Texas Traveler, 24-27 November 1969.
3. (U) LOCATION OF OPERATION: Within a square bounded by XT5880 and XT5585, Map Series I8020, Sheet 6232 II N.
4. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

a. Eastern War Zone C: There are two systems of supply and infiltration routes in this zone: the Saigon - Michelin corridor along the River Basin, and the trails and caches running diagonally from the "Dog's Neck" to the Saigon River (southeast to river junction at XT4553). Historically, War Zone C has been an invulnerable area, from which the enemy has provided manpower and materials to the battlefield. High level headquarters, rear service installations, training centers,

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNID 873541, BY RB/vsw, DATE 2/12/96

## CONFIDENTIAL

and hospitals are located in this area. Base areas 352 and 353, straddling the Cambodian border into War Zone C, not only contain the Headquarters of Central Office, South Vietnam, (COSVN) but also provide rest areas for Main Force enemy units. <sup>Main Force units also initiate ~~prep~~ the preparatory phases of</sup> ~~These base areas also are used by Main Force units to initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations from these base areas.~~

b. The Threat: From mid-September until early November, enemy initiated activity was characterized by scattered attacks by fire, light ground probes, ground to air firings and logistical operations. However, during the early morning hours of 4 November, FSB Ike and FSB Jamie received ground probes while FSB St. Barbara and FSB Vickie received attacks by fire. Although the K2 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment was identified as participating in the attack on FSB Ike, no other unit identification was obtained. On 20 November, the future intentions of the 9th VC Division were unknown; however, it was believed that the 4 November attacks, as well as others throughout III Corps, signaled the beginning of the first phase of the Winter - Spring Offensive. According to documents captured in III Corps, the initial phase of the campaign would be from 3 to 25 November. In War Zone C, the 271st VC Regiment was believed to be located in the central portion of the area of operations and <sup>prepared to attack</sup> ~~targeted against~~ fire support bases in the central <sup>and</sup> eastern areas. The 95C VC Regiment was thought to be located in the northwestern quarter of the area of operations, with the mission of attacking FSB's Carolyn and Ike. Although its exact intentions were unknown, the 272nd VC Regiment was tentatively placed in ~~the~~ southwestern War Zone C, and it <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ believed to be destined for Base Area 355. Attacks in War Zone C would be supported by 9th VC Division organic artillery and sapper units, and possibly the N-16 Armor Office, COSVN. Resupply activity continued and might increase along the Saigon Corridor.

5. (C) PLANNED OPERATION: On the basis of the above intelligence, the 11th ACR was placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNID 873541, BY RF/VSU, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

To accomplish this, Operation Texas Traveler was planned. The Third Squadron, 11th ACR, composed of I, K, and L Troops, M Company, and an organic Howitzer battery, was given the mission of conducting an area reconnaissance of the Eastern Sector of War Zone C. The First Cavalry Division (AM) <sup>was to</sup> provide two companies of 2/7 Cavalry and one platoon of C/8 Engineers, who were <sup>to be</sup> reinforced by four additional mine sweep teams. Also, under the operational control of the Third Squadron were <sup>to be</sup> two companies of CIDG from Minh Thanh and one platoon from the 919th Engineer Company (Armored).

In conducting their reconnaissance, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> operation demanded that the reinforced Third Squadron <sup>would</sup> conduct a multiple route, cross country penetration through AO Dallas along the axis of route 246, executing combat assaults along the road to clear it of obstacles. (See inclosure 2, Operational Map) <sup>be prepared to reinforce by moving in</sup> On order, The First Squadron, 11th ACR, would ~~move to~~ <sup>move to</sup> the Third Squadron's areas of operations, and conduct operations. Specific Instructions from the

First Cavalry Division (AM) Operational Guidance gave the Third Squadron the mission of locating, interdicting, and neutralizing base areas, cache sites, and the enemy LOC, emanating from Base Areas 350 and 352.

6. (C) OPERATION:

a. General: The operation began on the 24th of November with the armor column pushing into the operational area as planned. As they progressed, it became evident that the terrain would limit their speed considerably. Also, they encountered increasing signs of <sup>enemy presence</sup> ~~the enemy~~ and finally had a few minor contacts. On 25 November, the Third Squadron's advance greatly slowed, and they fell even further behind their timetable. Because of enemy harrassing action, they were forced into time consuming sweeps, generally to the north and away from their route of march. These enemy actions were very effective, for they slowed <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ advance, inflicted casualties and equipment losses, and took away the elements of tactical surprise and initiative that are so important.

On the morning of 26 November, disaster struck the Third Squadron. Enemy RPG's hit

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

several key vehicles in the Command Post NDP, and the ensuing explosions and fire destroyed a number of vehicles and caused numerous casualties. The remainder of the day was spent recovering from the pre-dawn attack and participating in small reconnaissance operations in the area. There was little contact the next day; however, <sup>in which there was some action.</sup> several mines and caches were discovered. In the evening, I Troop was hit by an attack but there was no ground probe there, nor anywhere else, that night. ~~That night~~ <sup>to FSB Jake</sup> The Squadron was ordered to return, which they did the morning of 29 November.

b. 24 November 1969: On 24 November, Third Squadron began their penetration and Operation Texas Traveler was underway. M Company, in the lead, rumbled across the bridge spanning the Saigon River at 0630 hours. Six minutes later, L Troop also was on the western bank and I, K, and HHT/3/11 ACR were crossing. By 0655 hours, the Minh Thanh CIDG had been airlifted by Chinook to FSB Jake, and the tracked vehicles of the Squadron were rolling forward in a column formation (L Troop on the right followed by I Troop, and M Company leading the left column followed by K Troop).

\* The column had moved about one and a half kilometers from the bridge when M Company discovered 8-10 fresh bunkers, located only 40 meters from the road. Continuing, they realized that the ground was becoming too soft to support the heavy M48's, and M Company was forced to travel on the road (246). They were then by-passed and the right hand column, with L Troop in front, took the lead. As the Squadron pushed forward, they found increasing signs of the enemy, but still there was no contact. Only twenty minutes after finding the bunkers, M Company found a 105mm round (XT603822) and tracks leading west. Nine minutes after this sighting, a Pink Team reported seeing fresh tracks and a one and a half foot hole near the road (XT596822). The farther the column traveled, the less trafficable the ground became, and by 0850 hours, two M Company tanks were mired in the marshy ground near 246. The tankers worked very quickly and efficiently to free the vehicles before the march was delayed. About an hour later, L Troop found footprints (XT585830) and at about the same time

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

I Troop, following L Troop, found a trail that had been used by five individuals-- the tracks were only 24 hours old. Minutes later, an aircraft spotted two recently evacuated .51 Caliber machinegun positions about 6 kilometers ahead of the approaching column. (XT534875).

During the remainder of the day, L Troop made most of the visual sightings and contact. At 1118 hours, one of their ACAV's hit a mine, which was planted about 50 meters from the road (XT552845). The mine blew a rear wheel from the track, but caused no casualties. The units rolled forward for about a kilometer where L Troop discovered a trail (XT538842) running north and south, which had been used by about 20 people. L Troop turned from the route of march, following the trail, until they discovered a dud, 250-pound bomb which they blew in place. About this same time (1300 hours), a forward air controller spotted a major bunker complex at XT502804 and called in artillery.

The westward move continued with L Troop still leading their column. At 1439 hours, they were in a brief fire fight in which one trooper was killed-- enemy casualties were unknown. The Troop moved forward in vigorous pursuit of the fleeing enemy, and finally, at 1507 hours, they regained contact and suffered no casualties in the short fight. Later, during a sweep of the area, they found one NVA killed, six 60mm rounds, 300-400 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of corn, pots and pans, two helmet liners and a bloody trail at XT538848. That afternoon K Troop, at XT563843, went to the LZ to pick up the 2/7 Cavalry. The 2/7th Cav would be divided so that one platoon of theirs was with one platoon of armored cavalry. The 2/7 Cav soldiers were to ride on the tracks until a contact developed or the tracks entered a bunker complex. At these times, the infantrymen would dismount and either search or assault, staying between the tracks.

In the early evening (1920 hours), a trip flare on the southern flank of an L Troop strong point (vic XT558840) was ignited. They engaged the enemy with their organic

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

## CONFIDENTIAL

weapons, also using illumination and ~~152mm~~ <sup>152mm</sup> canister rounds. Artillery supported by firing defensive concentrations in the suspected area, and a Light Fire Team, <sup>also</sup> supporting L Troop, reported receiving return fire. Twenty minutes later the enemy broke contact after inflicting no casualties on L Troop. Enemy casualties were unknown.

By the evening of 24 November, Third Squadron had entered the small area in which most of the action for the next three days would be centered. The terrain fluctuated between lightly and moderately wooded stretches. Most of the trees were dead from defoliation. The fallen trees and occasional gullies made armor operations difficult. When the bamboo and heavy underbrush thickets between the stretches did not cause detours, the swampy areas, which were surrounded by big trees, did. Besides these natural obstacles to armor operations, there were heavy concentrations of bomb craters in the area. "When I saw the area of operations, I did not think we would cover as much ground as the plans called for," commented First Lieutenant Claire A. Bidlingmaier, second platoon leader of K Troop. "What bothered me were the trails," First Lieutenant Wilbur C. Fuller, third platoon leader of K Troop, said. "Some of the recently used trails were well-used, two to three feet wide, hard-packed that showed up easily from the air. But the old trails, old but overgrown, were the most treacherous. The enemy knows that when armor enters an area, it doesn't use the road. Thus the trails parallel to the road were mined. Since they used pressure mines, infantry would not detonate them, and since the trails were overgrown, the mines could not be spotted. Those mines had been there a long time, and were probably the first line of defense."

c. 25 November 1969: The night of 24 November and the early morning hours of 25 November were quiet, but this calm was soon broken. About 0645 hours, an I Troop ambush patrol at XT543843 received RPG and small-arms fire from the north <sup>STW</sup> while they were returning to the NDP. They engaged the enemy, ~~and their third platoon reacted.~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~The~~ <sup>troops</sup> were supported

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

by a Light Fire Team and Blue Max. In the brief fight, 5 US personnel were wounded. After fifteen minutes, contact was broken and I Troop swept the area; however, an M551 Sheridan hit a 20-pound mine which blew a rear wheel and the track off. Fortunately, there were no wounded from the mine. Little was found during the sweep and enemy casualties were unknown.

As the day's operations began, L Troop swept the area of the previous day's contact (XT538840) and found nine 60mm rounds, one RPG Launcher with booster and <sup>one</sup> dead NVA soldier, who had an NVA uniform, Ho Chi Minh sandals, and carried a hammock. The sweep was completed by 0718 hours. About two hours later, I Troop received small-arms, automatic weapon, and recoilless rifle fire from their northern flank. The Troop, <sup>using their organic weapons,</sup> swept through the area and ~~after~~ by 1050 hours had overrun the ~~troop, countered with organic weapons, and the fighting lasted until about 1050 hours.~~ <sup>squad size unit,</sup> There ~~was one~~ <sup>were 2</sup> US killed and five wounded. Enemy losses were unknown. L Troop re-acted to support I Troop during this contact, but they were stopped when ~~a~~ <sup>one of their</sup> M551 Sheridans hit a mine in the center of a well-used trail at XT539844. The mine killed one trooper and wounded three others. It blew a hole in the hull, the track and rear wheel were blown off, and a large crater was left in the road.

While this action occurred, M Company received RPG fire from the north and small-arms fire from the south at XT560843. A Light Fire Team, Blue Max and artillery supported their contact. At 1020 hours, the PSYOP helicopter spotted a bunker complex at XT560845, and when M Company's contact finally ended, ~~the~~ <sup>their</sup> tanks moved to the complex and found one dead NVA soldier in a bunker holding a wire that led to a command detonated mine. M Company also found 1 AK-47, 4 AK-47 magazines, one B-40 round, one Chicom Claymore, and 3 pairs of sandals. M Company suffered one trooper wounded and one CIDG wounded in the contact. <sup>Also in the morning, an I Troop M551 Sheridan hit a 25-pound mine, placed about fifty meters from the road, pressure detonated</sup> In the afternoon, a K Troop ACAV hit a mine which wounded one US soldier at ~~XT562844. The 20-pound, pressure detonated mine~~ <sup>(vicinity XT562844).</sup> ~~and moderately~~ <sup>apoly</sup> damaged the ACAV. An I Troop M551 Sheridan hit a 25-pound mine at XT543844, ~~MA/1~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

~~about fifty meters from the right side of the road. The mine wounded one trooper and moderately damaged the Sheridan. Fifteen minutes later, within 25 meters of the previous mine,~~ another I Troop M551 Sheridan hit a mine which cracked the hull and ruptured the fuel tank. It caused no casualties, although it blew a 5' by 10' crater underneath the tank. The only enemy that were seen in the afternoon were spotted by a psyopa helicopter ~~which~~ <sup>which saw</sup> 15 NVA, who immediately moved off their trail ~~when they saw the helicopter at 1635 hours.~~ <sup>and did not make contact.</sup>

Meanwhile, the 3/11th ACR Command Post and Howitzer battery were moving from FSB Jake to FSB Rita. However, progress was slower than expected, and several dropped out of the march. At 1715 hours, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> march column was stopped at XT544846, and began to form the perimeter for the ~~complex.~~ <sup>HEADQUARTERS</sup> While the perimeter security was being established, the scout ship from the Air Cavalry Troop spotted 3 or 4 enemy within 100 meters of the northern perimeter. The scout thought the enemy was unarmed, and several troopers from the Command Post started out to bring them in. The ship was fired on (1820 hours) and called in his wing ship, a Cobra to expend. Captain Cole, Headquarters Company, then moved out to sweep the area with the headquarters ACAV's. They were sweeping the area, reconning by fire, when an RPG hit <sup>a</sup> the vehicle, wounding CPT Cole, a machinegunner, and CPT Robert Myers, who was dismounted at that time. All elements returned to the perimeter, <sup>where</sup> LTC Doyle, Third Squadron Commander, landed and led the Headquarters Troop <sup>back</sup> into the area ~~again~~ at 1855 hours. Specialist 5 Freyn, Track Commander of HQ ACAV 60 (one of five tracks <sup>sweeping</sup> on line), spotted the enemy and opened up, while closing on the enemy. I Troop elements also ~~were~~ <sup>joined</sup> the sweep, but were behind the Headquarters Troop. A Sheridan, 100 meters to the left of HQ 60, spotted

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

movement, and began firing. The I Troop tracks had come<sup>up</sup> behind the headquarters ACAV's, and in the dim light at dusk, did not see them. When the Sheridan fired, the I Troop elements did too, raking the back of HQ 60 with .50 caliber machine-gun fire. SP5 Freyn had stopped his track to re-load. "We dusted off the former track commander and two Engineers who were riding on the back deck. My track looked like Swiss cheese," he lamented. As I Troop advanced, it <sup>finally</sup> spotted the HQ Troop's tracks, and both elements swept the area, but found only a north-south blood trail. There were five US wounded. After Headquarters Troop and I Troop ~~crossed~~ the contact area, they continued to the east, southeast to secure the vehicles which had dropped out during the march. Meanwhile, CPT Emerson took over the command post security and had the men dig perimeter foxholes and prepare fighting positions. The security of the complex was insured by 11 ACAV's, 2 Sheridans, 1 Zippo, an M88 with a .50 caliber machinegun, an M578, and M577 with .50 caliber machineguns.

d. 26 November 1969: Because of the late sweep on the evening of <sup>25</sup> November, which lasted until 2200 hours, the 3/11 ACR Command Post and Headquarters Troop formed a hasty perimeter in the darkness. They set out no trip flares or Claymores. However, the men on guard were instructed to fire four M-79 high explosive rounds into the woodline at 2330, 0130, and 0330 hours. The enemy units, which consisted of the reinforced C1 and C3 Companies of the C170 Independent Battalion, were probably in position for the attack when the rounds were fired, and thus were not deterred by them. The C1 and C2 Companies, composed of a total of 90 men equipped with 24 B-40 rocket launchers and small-arms, had been reinforced for the attack by a seven-man, RPG team equipped with five B-40 and two B-41 rocket launchers from the C4 Company.

There were about 160 men in the NDP that night. One man in each track on the perimeter was on guard, but the rest were sleeping. The silence was broken only

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNW 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

by the whispered exchange of words as the guards rotated, the occasional crackle of the radios, and the thud and then explosion of the M-79 grenades. At 0330 hours, SP5 Freyn was asleep on his track, ready to relieve his track commander at guard at 0400 hours. Specialists Four Iasillo and Jones, RTO's of the 3/11 S-2 section, were on duty at the S-2 track. ~~Specialist~~ <sup>SSG</sup> Knox, track commander of HQ ACAV 62, was preparing to fire four rounds into the woodline. SSG Knox fired the rounds, and ~~at~~ at 0342 hours his shift was almost over. Suddenly, he saw two RPG rounds come from the northeast. These <sup>were</sup> followed immediately by six more RPG rounds. The first RPG hit a M548 ammunition carrier filled with powder for the Howitzers, and it burst into flames. The second projectile hit a ~~155~~ <sup>M109</sup> Howitzer, setting it afire. The fire in the M109 soon detonated the full load of ammunition that it was carrying, scattering burning white phosphorous inside the small NDP. About three RPG's were stopped by the mesh screening in front of the S-2 577, but another round struck an L Troop 577. Within minutes the quiet NDP had been transformed into a blazing ~~holocaust~~ <sup>hole caused</sup> tracks were burning, ammunition was exploding, and lethal, burning, white phosphorous covered the ground.

*PP* The men in the tiny NDP reacted immediately and skillfully to the sudden attack.

"We opened up, and when the ammo-carrier exploded, I moved the track forward 20 meters to the edge of a bomb crater. I couldn't go any further," commented SSG Knox.

"We took a lot of shrapnel."

*PP* SP5 Freyn, on the south side of the perimeter, helped the Howitzer Battery Commander radio his men and try to move a 548 and 577 ammo-carrier from the fire. "I was told then that my track was needed on the east side, so we moved and I got hit by shrapnel-- but not seriously," he said.

*PP* SP5 Schoolfield, senior medic, moved his track as the fire spread to the nearby Command Post. He dispatched one medic to the right of the perimeter where several troopers were wounded by <sup>an</sup> RPG round that hit a M551 Sheridan. He sent another to

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RB/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

the left, and he began moving through the middle of the perimeter, (ablaze from the exploding rounds). Another medic moved to the landing zone to assist in the dust-offs." The fire had started at 0352 hours, and by 0433 hours the white phosphorous rounds were burning alongside the Command Post, setting fire to the tent. Within eleven minutes after that, three Howitzers and several ammunition trailers and carriers were on fire. <sup>PP</sup> About this time, 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon of Troop was extracted from their strong point and sent to secure the northwest side of the perimeter. By 0456 hours, three troopers had been seriously wounded.

SP4 Iasillo said, "When SP4 Jones and I heard the explosion (the ammunition carrier), we thought they <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ RPG rounds. We crawled from the S-2 track and met Major John C. Sloan (S-3, 3/11ACR). SP4 Jones and Major Sloan started passing out the steel pots, flak jackets and weapons that hung from the hooks inside the Command Post. SP4 Jones told Major Sloan that he thought the S-2 track had been hit by an RPG round. Major Sloan went to check it. SP4 Jones crawled towards the S-3 track to see if they needed or had extra weapons or flak jackets." I couldn't find my rifle, but found a .38 and a .45 caliber pistols and put them on. I started to follow SP4 Jones, crawling slowly, but a Howitzer blew up (0501 hours) and I stayed down until the shrapnel passed. When I looked up and crawled over, I saw SP4 Jones. He had been hit by the blade of the Howitzer, and it had wrapped one of his weapons around his neck and shoulder. I called for a medic, but it was too late. He was dead."

SSG Knox commented, "When the second Howitzer blew, a piece from the side just cleared my track and landed in the bomb crater in front of us. I was hit by shrapnel in the arm. The fire had started the grass burning, and the flames were up to the edge of my track-- but we had no place to go. I don't think we were getting any incoming small-arms or RPG rounds by then, because with the fire to our backs we were silhouetted, and were good targets-- but we had no fire directly at us. With those explosions and the other vehicles on fire, it became a nightmare. Everyone was trying to get organized, and it didn't take them long to get organized."

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNID 873541, BY RP/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

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Master Sergeant Vray J. Primeaux of HHT/3/11 AGR, dived for a hole when the Howitzer blew up. "I was trying to work my way to a Sheridan that had been hit, to help my men evacuate the wounded," he said. "I was too close and in the open when it blew."

X LTC Doyle, the Squadron Commander, very coolly organized and led the defenders. In the midst of this confusion and destruction, he calmly gave his assessment of the situation over the radio to the Regimental Headquarters (the Unsecure radio was used because the secure mode had been destroyed in the fire). Answering the Squadron Commander's call, the dust-off ships came ~~in~~ despite the darkness and danger. Bringing in artillery and air support, LTC Doyle could be heard on the radio saying, "All our friendly forces are in the fiery area. Everything outside the fire is enemy." The action by everyone within the NDP prevented this attack from being more serious; but, even so, the enemy inflicted a heavy toll.

X By 0550 hours, there were 4 US killed and 34 wounded. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~. One 577, two 551's, four M548's, two M109's, five 1½-ton trailers, and two 1-ton ammo-trailers were combat losses. (There were 4 NVA killed; however, Nguyen Van Nguyen, who rallied to I Troop later in the morning, said that he saw 15-20 wounded men from the C1 Company being evacuated to Cambodia.)

X At 0640 hours, I Troop's Strong Point spotted two NVA soldiers (vicinity XT540848) and killed one. About two hours later, an Air Cavalry Troop helicopter spotted a NVA soldier, but the airstrike that was called in had negative results. Another airstrike was called in when an OH-6A, flying at 60-feet and 50 knots, received heavy-caliber, ground-to-air fire. Again the airstrike and artillery obtained no results. The scene was repeated at 1000 hours-- again with negative results. At 1116 hours, I Troop received RPG and small-arms fire from an estimated NVA platoon in bunkers at XT558858. Blue Max, an airstrike, and a Light Fire Team expended. I Troop and the dismounted D/2/7 Cavalry swept the area and found two

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NN/Q 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

.30 caliber machineguns, 3 AK-47's, 1 RPG Launcher, 6 Chicom grenades, and components of a .51 caliber machinegun. There was one US soldier killed (D/2/7) and

eight US soldiers wounded (D/2/7), and one CIDG wounded. Captain James T. Tuttle, I Troop Commander, ~~and an officer from D/2/7 Cavalry~~ <sup>and an officer from D/2/7 Cavalry</sup> apprehended a ~~Hot Chanh~~ <sup>Hot Chanh who had been fighting fiercely</sup> inside the hole ~~from which the~~

~~Hot Chanh~~ <sup>emerged</sup> were three dead NVA soldiers, literally blown apart by our .50 caliber machinegun. The rallier ~~pointed out~~ <sup>pointed out</sup> several base camp areas, and after which air strikes were called in and fire. According to Nguyen Van Nguyen, the rallier, he was part of the D170 Independent Battalion. ~~According to~~ <sup>In our files</sup> intelligent ~~holdings~~ <sup>holdings</sup>, however, D170 is also known

as the K1 Battalion of the 70th Security Guard Regiment, Central Office, South Vietnam. The 70th Regiment was disbanded in late 1966. The K3 Battalion, 70th Regiment, was incorporated into the 66th Base Security Regiment and ~~the~~ <sup>their</sup> K1 Battalion (D170) was incorporated into the 268th Regiment, SR1. (It is believed that D170 was reformed and is now part of the 66th Base Security Regiment, Central Office, Vietnam.)

At 1420 hours, an ~~ACAV~~ Troop ACAV hit a mine (XT525827). The 20-pound, pressure-detonated mine wounded two and moderately damaged the vehicle ~~at 1430 hours~~. In the same location, L Troop found and destroyed four 20-pound mines. Meanwhile, a M578 from L Troop struck another 20-pound mine ~~at 1500 hours~~, wounding two troopers and causing ~~causing the combat loss of the vehicle~~ moderate damage to the vehicle. At 1600 hours, an ACAV from K Troop hit a 20-pound mine at XT562842, wounding two and causing the combat loss of the vehicle. K Troop found a bunker complex at XT552860, at 1800 hours. In the bunkers they found .51 caliber brass and powder, and the bunkers appeared to be an ammunition assembly plant. Further sweeps produced 8 B-40 rounds and 2 NVA uniforms with documents. There were no other findings or contacts during the day and the evening of 26 November was uneventful.

e. 27 November 1969: During the early morning hours there was little action. The CIDG unit working M Company <sup>did spot two</sup> spotted two VC, which they engaged, <sup>but</sup> there

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RF/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

CONFIDENTIAL

*rest with the goal of <sup>leaving</sup> leaving AO Dallas  
by 28 November.*

was no return fire, and in the daylight, when M Company swept the area, nothing was found.

*→ ~~It~~ During the day, the squadron was instructed to begin movement back to the*  
 While searching the area of the bunker complex discovered on 26 November, K Troop found 1000 AK-47 rounds, one anti-tank grenade, 2 Chicom grenades, 1 Chicom Claymore, 1 US Claymore, 1 US mess kit, 4 RPG-2 rounds, rice, uniforms, and 1½ pounds of documents. The documents identified the D170 Independent Battalion. Searching further, K Troop found medical supplies and the fatigue shirt of Captain Cole, who had been wounded in the leg the day before.

About 0900 hours, M Company found a mine in the vicinity of XT543844, and at 1200 hours they discovered another, a Russian T46, at XT557861. Also at noon, K Troop found <sup>and searched</sup> some enemy bunkers about two kilometers north of 246. The ~~bunker~~ complex contained between 25 and 30 bunkers and little was found-- one bag of rice and some scattered .30 caliber ammunition. In the late afternoon to the southwest, I Troop found a small bunker complex in which they discovered a number of documents that were later evacuated for further research.

In the late afternoon, the Troops of the Third Squadron formed their separate night defensive positions. M Company was at FSB Jake, I Troop was located near the road at XT543846, K Troop was about one kilometer to <sup>the east of</sup> I Troop, and L Troop was located ~~to~~ <sup>near</sup> the west of K Troop. The only significant action during the night occurred at I

Troop's NDP, which was mortared quite heavily at 1930 hours. I Troop received <sup>about fifteen</sup> ~~60mm~~ recoilless rifle or RPG ~~fire~~ <sup>rounds</sup> ~~rounds~~, but there were no friendly casualties. Spooky, a Night Hawk, and aerial rocket artillery were called in for support.

Later that evening, Colonel Leach radioed Third Squadron's Commander and said that General Casey was disappointed and concerned that the Squadron had not made better progress. ~~Colonel Leach stated that he had explained the situation to General Casey but, he added, "You must finish up the demolition and have all your elements~~ <sup>Colonel Leach stated that he had explained the situation to General Casey but, he added, "You must finish up the demolition and have all your elements</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~thought~~ <sup>thought</sup> that they should be ~~farther~~ <sup>much</sup> nearer to the goal of leaving AO Dallas and returning to FSB Jake.

and thought that they should be ~~farther~~ <sup>much</sup> nearer to the goal of leaving AO Dallas and returning to FSB Jake.

*and thought that they should be ~~farther~~ much nearer to the goal of leaving AO Dallas and returning to FSB Jake*

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NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RB/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

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out and across the river prior to 1200 hours tomorrow. The river will be crossed prior to 1200 hours tomorrow."

On 28 November, elements of the Third Squadron returned across the river and Operation Texas Traveler ended.

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Enemy Contacts  
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- 241439  
1. 2 7up Contact
- 241930  
2. 6 7up SP 538840 req results - 1 NVA KIA at 0718H.
- 20645  
3. I 7up 550840 etc. 5 USWIA
- 250934  
4. I 7up 540835 etc. 2 US KIA, 3 US WIA
- 2500943  
5. I 7up 557843 etc 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA
- 251000  
6. M Co. ~~544845~~ etc 1 US WIA, 1 ARVN WIA, 1 NVA KIA  
560843
- 251830  
7. HQ, 13/11 etc 5 US WIA at 544845.
- 260352  
8. 3/11 CP, 545846: CA rec'd 3 US KIA, 34 US WIA, 1 NVA KIA,
- 260649  
9. I 7up 540848 - 1 NVA KIA (SA)
- 261116  
10. I 7up 558858 etc 1 US KIA (D/47) & US WIA  
CD(2/7) 1 CIDG WIA, 3 NVA KIA, 1 HC.
- 270317  
11. M Co + CIDG 548550. - 2 sappers spotted, extracted
- 271915  
12. I 7up 543845, SP in cont. 4 US WIA

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 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RB/vsw, DATE 2/12/96

1. In Eastern War Zone "C" there are two systems of ~~trails~~ of supply and infiltration routes: the Saigon Michelin corridor along the River Basin, and a system of trails and caches running diagonally from the Dog's neck to the Saigon River (southeast to XT 4553). Historically, the Zone "C" has been an inviolable area from which the enemy has provided manpower and materials to the battlefield. High level headquarters, rear service installations, training centers, and hospitals are located in this area. Base Areas 352 and 353, straddling the Cambodian border into Zone "C" not only contain the Headquarters of Central Office, South Vietnam, (COSVN) but also provide rest areas for main force enemy units. These base areas are also used by MF units to initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations.

2. From mid-September until early November, enemy initiated activity in War Zone "C" was characterized by scattered attacks by fire, light ground probes, ground to air firings, and logistical operations. However, during the early morning hours of 4 November, FSB IKE and FSB JAMIE received ground probes while FSB ST. Barbara and FSB VICKIE received attacks attacks by fire. Although the K2 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment was identified as participating in the attack on IKE, no other unit identifications were obtained. At present, the future intentions of the 9th VC Division are unknown; however, it is believed (1) that these attacks as well as others throughout III CTZ signalled the beginning of the first phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive. According to documents captured in II CTZ, the initial phase of the campaign will be from 3 November to 25 November. In War Zone "C", the 271st VC Regiment is believed to be located in the central portion of the AO and is targeted against fire support bases in the central and eastern areas. The 95C VC Regiment is believed to be

(1) 1st Air Cavalry Division General Guidance

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RP/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

located in the northwestern quarter of the AO, targeted against FSBs CM CAROLYN and possibly IKE. The 272d VC Regiment probably remains in southwestern War Zone "C", and although its exact intentions are unknown, it is believed to be destined for Base Area 355. Attacks in War Zone "C" will be supported by 9th VC Division organic artillery and sapper units and possibly the N-16 Armor Office, COSVN. Resupply activity continues and may increase along the SAIGON CORRIDOR.

3. On the basis of the above information, Operation TEXAS TRAVELER was planned. The third squadron was given the mission of the area reconnaissance of the Eastern Sector of War Zone "C". The First Cavalry Division (AM) of which the 11th ACR was OPCON, provided two companies of 2/7 Cavalry and one platoon of C/8 Engineers, plus an additional four mine sweeper teams. The third squadron also was <sup>OPON TO</sup> ~~given~~ <sub>were</sub> a platoon from the 919th Engineers, two companies of CIDG, <sup>along with</sup> ~~and~~ its howitzer battery. The operation called for the reinforced Third Squadron to conduct a multiple route, cross country penetration through AO DALLAS along axis of Route 246, executing combat assaults along Route 246 to clear it of obstacles. On order 1/11 ACR would move to 3/11 ACR AO and conduct operations in War Zone C. Specific instructions from the First Cavalry Division Operational Guidance gave 3/11 ACR the mission of locating, interdicting, and neutralizing base areas, cache sites and LOC emanating from Base Areas 350 and 352. N-S-E-W AOs <sup>1st Cav Missile + friendly forces</sup>

4. On 24 November, 0630 hours. TEXAS TRAVELER began, with 3/11 ACR crossing the river (<sup>check River</sup> Rubicon as it would turn out). At 0700 hours M Co 3/11 ACR found 8 - 10 bunkers at 608823. Five minutes later M Co was forced to use the road because of the soft ground. At 0721 hours M Co found 105mm round and fresh tracks leading W (608822.) Nine minutes later a Pink Team reported fresh tracks at 596822, and a recently used hole at

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 Journal  
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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNQ 873541, BY RB/vsw, DATE 2/12/96

598821. The hole was 1½-feet in diameter. At 0850 hours M Com had two tracks struck, but extracted them and went on. At 0944 hours I Trp found a trail used by 5 individuals within the last 24 hours at 595819. At the same time L Trp found foot-prints at 585830. At 1118 hours, An ACAV from L Troop hit a mine at 552845. The mine blew a rear wheel off, but there were negative casualties. The mine was 50 meters from the road.

At 1301 hours a forward air controller spotted a major bunker complex at 502804. Artillery was called in on the area. At the same time L Trp found a N - S trail used by 20 people at 538842. Following the trail, L Troop came into contact at 1439 hours. Eleven minutes later the contact broke, leaving one trooper killed, and unknown enemy losses. At 1507 L Troop regained contact at 538848. They found one NVA KIA, 6-60mm rounds, 300 -400 pounds of rice, 100 pounds of corn, pots and pans, 2 helmet liners and a bloody trail. At 1939 hours the L Trp strong point's trip flares went off, and they engaged the enemy, with Organic weapons and M55a canister. Illumination was fired, but L Trp received even heavier AK-47 fire. An LFT supported. The contact broke at 1949 hours, with negative casualties for L Trp and unknown enemy losses. The LFT received return fire, and the artillery fired defensive concentrations.

3/11/2009

②

5. At 0645 hours, <sup>November 25</sup> I Troop, while extracting from an ambush patrol at 543843 received RPG and small-arms fire from the North. They engaged the enemy, and a Light Fire Team and Blue Max supported. There were five US wounded with unknown enemy losses. At 0700 hours at 543843, an I Troop M551 hit a 20-pound pressure detonated mine. There were negative casualties, but heavy damage to the vehicle. At 0718 L Trp swept the area of the contact from the 24th and found 9 60mm rounds, 1 RPB-2 Launcher with booster and 1 NVA KIA. At 0943 hours I Troop received small-arms and automatic weapons fire from the North. The contact broke at 1050 hours

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RF/WSW, DATE 2/12/96

with 1 US killed and 2 US Wounded. There were unknown enemy losses. At 1000 hours M Company at 560843 received RPG fire from the North and small-arms fire from the south. A LFT, Blue Max and artillery supported. They swept the area and found 1 AK-47, 1 Bl1 round and 1 CHICOM claymore, 4 AK-47 magazines, and 3 pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals. There was 1 US wounded, 1 ARVN wounded and 1 NVA killed. At 1305 hours a K Trp ACAV hit a mine at 562844. The mine was a 20-pound pressure detnotated anti-tank mine that wounded one US and moderately damaged the ACAV. At 1615 hours a I Troop M551 hit a mine at 543844. The mine was a 25-pound pressure detnotated anti-tank mine which wounded one US and moderatelely damaged the vehicle. At 1820 hours an ACT OH-6A received small-arms fire, and called a cobra to expend in the area. At 1830 the HO/3/11 spotted movement around their NDP at 543846. The HO ACAV received small-arms and RPG fire. <sup>SP5 Richard FREYEN - after I Troop</sup> I Troop moved to sweep the area and received small-arms fire at 1845 hours. An LFT expended, and then a sweep of the area found a N-S blood trail. There were 5 US wounded.

include  
 MSG PRIMEAUX  
 SP4 JONES  
 SP4 IA SILLIO  
 SP5 John C. Schoolfield  
 SSG KNOX

6. On 26 November 1969, at 0352 hours, the 3/11 CP at 545846 received small arms, RPG and mortar fire from the north. Blue Max, a heavy fire team, Spooky and artillery supported the contact. A RPG round caused a ammo-carrier to explode, setting a drum of MO-gas on fire. The fire swept through the camp, causing the combat loss of 1 557, 2 551's, 4 M548's 2M109's, 5 1½ trailers, 2 1Ton ammo-trailers, 3 US killed, 34 US wounded. There were 4 NVA killed. At 0640 hours I Troop at 540848, spotted 2 NVA VC at their Strong Point. One NVA was killed. At 0820 hours an ACT ship, in support of 3/11 ACR, spotted an NVA. An airstrike and a Blue Max expended, but with negative results. At 0845 an OH-6A, flying at 60' altitude and speed of 50 knots, received large caliber fire. Artillery and an airstrike expended, but with neagative results. At 1000 hours, An OH-6A again received heavy fire, and artillery and the airstrike

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3, NND PROJECT  
 NUMBER NNO 873541, BY RB/VSW, DATE 2/12/96

again had negative results. At 1116 hours I Trp, at 558858 rec'd RPG and small-arms fire from an estimated NVA platoon in bunkers. Blue Max, an airstrike and a Light Fire Team expended, along with artillery. A sweep of the area found 2 30 caliber machineguns, 3 AK-47s, 1 RPG-2 Launcher, 6 ChiCom grenades and components of a .51 caliber machinegun. There was one US killed (D/2/7 Cav), 8 US wounded (D/2/7 Cav) and one CIDG wounded. There were three NVA killed, and one Hoi Chanh. <sup>7 give read-out</sup> At 1145 hours an AH-1G at 548856, flying at 1000' altitude and 140 knots received small arms fire. An airstrike and a light fire team were called in, but with negative results. At 1420 hours L Trp ACAV hit a mine at 525827. The 20-pound command anti-tank detnotated mine wounded two US and moderately damaged the ACAV. At 1453 525827 hours L Trp found and destroyed 4 20 pound pressure detnotated anti-tank mines. At the same time an M578 of L Troop hit another 20-pound mine, wounding two US and moderately damaging the vehicle. At 1600 hours a K Trp ACAV hit a 20-pound pressure detnotated mine, causing two US wounded and the combat loss of the vehicle, at 562842. At 1800 hours K Trp found a bunker complex at 552860. There was 51 caliber brass and powder there, and the bunkers appeared to be an ammo-assembly plant. Further sweeps found 8 Bl40 rounds, 2 NVA uniforms with documents. At 2000 Hours HQ/3/11 AER had their trip flares go off, but there was negative casualties and negative movement.

7. On 27 November at 0840 K Trp found 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 1 anti-tank grenade, 2 ChiCom grenades, 1 ChiCom claymore, 1 US claymore 1 US mess kit, 4 RPG-2 rounds, rice, uniforms and 1½-pounds of documents. At 0900 hours M Company found a mine at 543844. K Troop found medical supplies. At 1101 hours K Troop found CPT Coles' fatigue shirt, bloody from the wounds he received the day before. At 1220 M Co found a T46 Russian mine at 557861. At 1736 I Trp found a base camp with documents. I Trp was staying near 567849 as a night defensive position. At 1913 hours I Troop received 60mm incoming, Night Hawk, Spunky and ARA supported.

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Briefing Notes from LTC Reed, Regimental S-3:

Day	Mine Hit (Group)	Equipment loss by Contact (How)	Equipment Captured	Casualties			
				WIA (Friendly)	KIA	NVA KIA	
24 Nov	M 551 (ITrp)	<del>██████</del>			1		2
25 Nov	M 551 (ITrp) M 551 (L) M 113 (K) M 551 (I)	███ M 551 - RPG		22	3		2
26 Nov	M 113 (L) M 578 (L)	four M 548 two M 109 two M 551 one M 577 two 1-Ton trailers five 1/2-Ton trailers		53	4		7
- TOTALS -							
	CBD (Combat Damage)		Combat Loss	Casualties			
	m 551	(7)	(2)	(9)	U.S. KIA		
	M 548	(4)	(4)	(74)	U.S. WIA		
	M 109	(2)	(2)	(11)	NVA KIA		
	M 113	(2)	(1)	(1)	Ho Chi Chau		
	M 577	(1)	(1)				
	trailors	(7)	(7)				
	M 578	(1)					
		24	16				

RG 477 USA VN  
 11th AC  
 3d SQ  
 CP/Howitzer  
 Battery Complex  
 Jan

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 HEADQUARTERS, 3D SQUADRON  
 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
 APO San Francisco 96257

AVIC-ZT

2 December 1969

SUBJECT: 26 November 1969, Attack on 3d Squadron Command Post/Howitzer  
 Battery Complex

TO: Commanding Officer  
 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment  
 APO San Francisco 96257

1. Background

a. On 25 November 1969, the second day of Operation Texas Traveler, 3d Squadron had penetrated deep enough into Eastern War Zone C to relocate the CP/Howitzer Battery Complex from FSB Jake (XT625815) to a position where it could provide better support for the Squadron. Tentatively, it was planned to locate the Complex in the vicinity of XT500808; however, by 1715 hours the Complex was six (6) kilometers short of the planned position because of trafficability problems encountered by the M109 Howitzers and M548 Cargo Carriers. Since it takes approximately one and one half hours to establish the complex in a new location, I decided not to push on but to position the Complex at XT544846. This would have left approximately two hours of light to establish the Complex and to set out defensive devices.

b. At 1815 hours, while the perimeter security was being established, an Air Cavalry Troop Scout detected three to four NVA within a hundred meters of the northern edge of the perimeter. At first the scout thought that the NVA were unarmed, so a dismounted patrol was quickly assembled to capture the NVA. Shortly thereafter, the Scout was fired on. The Scout returned fire, and the Cobra flying cover immediately rolled in on the enemy. Concurrently, the Headquarters Troop Commander, CPT Cole, assembled the Provisional ACAV platoon and pushed out beyond the dismounted patrol to engage the enemy. The platoon swept into the area employing recon by fire as it moved. After travelling approximately 150 meters, the platoon was engaged by an RPG Team. In the ensuing fire fight, CPT Cole's ACAV was hit by an RPG and he was seriously wounded. His crew engaged the team and then returned with the rest of the platoon to the CP to prepare CPT Cole and two other wounded men for dustoff.

c. During this encounter, I was at FSB Jamie coordinating with the Commander of 2/7 Cavalry. In my absence, MAJ Sloan, the S-3, directed CPT Emerson, an Assistant S-3, to take command of Headquarters Troop elements.

50-8

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 Date: 1-16-00

A short time later I arrived at the CP and found that:

- 1) We had not pursued the enemy.
- 2) We had a small convoy of towed disabled vehicles to the southeast of the contact.
- 3) Preparations had not been completed for the night defense of the complex.

d. In response to the above, I directed CPT Emerson to fall out every available man from the CP to dig foxholes along the perimeter. Additionally, I reformed the Provisional ACAV Platoon and pushed back out into the area of contact. I also directed Troop I, minus one platoon, to join me as soon as possible. At this time, I was concerned about additional enemy being in the area of contact and the status of the small convoy of disabled vehicles to the southeast of the contact.

## 2. Organization of the CP/Howitzer Battery Complex

a. Immediately after taking command, CPT Emerson had men from the TOC and IPW team dig foxholes along the northeast sector of the perimeter. He employed recovery vehicles and Howitzer Battery ACAV's around the remaining portion of the perimeter. Concurrently, he had trip flares and claymores set out to the east and south of the perimeter. Trip flares and claymores were also set out to the north and west; however, these devices had to be placed close to the vehicles because of large grassfires burning in those areas.

b. At approximately 2130 hours, the sweep of the area of contact had been completed and the disabled vehicles were returned to the complex. CPT Emerson then placed the Provisional ACAV Platoon and disabled vehicles around the perimeter (Inclosure 1). Troop I, minus, was moved back to its original strong point position to the west of the Complex.

c. As noted in Inclosure 1, Starlight devices were operational around the perimeter. The troop is authorized four sensors but none were operational. Two radars were also employed on the northern side of the perimeter, however; they were too close to trees and heavy vegetation to be of any use. I had also authorized an H&I program with M79 during the night. The last firing took place at 0330 hours, ten minutes before the attack. Defense fires were also fired into the northeast at 2210 hours.

## 3. The Attack on 26 November 1969

a. At 260340 November 1969, two RPG rounds were fired from the south side of the perimeter. Almost simultaneously, RPG and small arms fire was received from the northwest side of the perimeter.

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By: [Signature] NARA Date: 1-16-00

One RPG round impacted on top of an M548 ammunition carrier causing the basic load of powder and 155mm projectiles to explode. Seconds later #4 Howitzer took an RPG direct hit. The vehicle exploded and scattered white phosphorus over the entire complex. The white phosphorus ignited an M551 Sheridan and later on it too exploded. Exploding ammunition also consumed the trailers that were destroyed. A short time later another Sheridan, a Troop L M577 CP Carrier and Howitzer #1 were hit and destroyed by RPG fire. The Command Post Carriers of the CP were also engaged; however, RPG screen prevented major damage to these vehicles.

#### 4. Casualties and Damage Caused by the Attack

a. As a result of the attack four men were killed and twenty four men wounded seriously enough to warrant dustoff. Of the four men killed, three were known to be killed trying to move burning vehicles out of the area of exploding ammunition. Of the twenty four men requiring dustoff, 13 men were returned to duty the next day and four are expected to return in the next 2-7 days. One officer slightly wounded was not returned to duty due to the proximity of his DEROS.

b. Major equipment losses for 26 November are as follows:

- 2 X M109 Howitzers (RPG)
- 2 X M551 Sheridans (1 RPG; 1 exploding ammunition)
- 1 X M577 Command Post Carrier (RPG)
- 4 X M548 Ammunition Carrier (1 RPG; 3 exploding ammunition)
- 8 X 1 1/2 Trailers (exploding ammunition)

#### 5. Actions During the Attack and Subsequent to the Attack

a. When RPG fire was initiated, a number of crews on the perimeter saw the fire and points from which the fire was directed from. These crews immediately engaged the enemy and continued to fire during the contact. The perimeter held.

b. Fires were immediately brought into the northwest from Mortar Battery. When ARA arrived on station, the Cobras fired close in to the north and northeast. At this time, Mortar Battery was shifted further to the northwest to interdict routes of withdrawal to ~~the area of contact~~ ~~the area of contact~~ Jake and Jamie were also brought in to interdict routes if withdrawal to the north and northeast. A short time later an Air Force "Shadow" arrived on station and fired from 150 to 1000 meters of the northern side of the perimeter. Prior to the "Shadow" aircraft moving off station, I directed Troop I to move one platoon to the area of contact and to team up with D/2/7 Cavalry at first light to pursue the enemy. The one armored cavalry platoon moved in the area of contact as the "Shadow" aircraft moved off station.

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By: [Signature] NARA Date: 1/16/00

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The platoon immediately started a sweep of the immediate area and found, on the northeast side of the perimeter, two dead NVA with RPG launcher and an AK-47. A short time later, I pushed Troop I and D/2/7 Cavalry to the northeast along a major trail system that appeared to be a likely source of withdrawal for the NVA.

c. As Troop I and D/2/7 Cavalry moved along the trail system, a Pink Team reconnoitered in front of the troops. At 0845 hours the Scout drew fire from XT550859. Artillery, mortars, light fire teams, ARA, and tactical air were employed against the suspected AA positions. At approximately 1100 hours Troop I arrived in the area, and engaged and overran the enemy positions. Four NVA died as a result of this action and one prisoner was taken.

d. The PW eventually provided the Squadron with directions to two basecamps used by the forces that attacked the Squadron on 26 November. Troop K and C/2/7 Cavalry found the basecamps late on the 26th and destroyed them on the 27th of November. The PW also gave additional details on the attack of 26 November. He stated that two companies, C1, and C3, of the DL70 (part of the 70th Security Regiment) had participated in the attack. Each company had forty men and each company was armed with 12 RPG-2 and 2 RPG-7 launchers. The two companies were augmented with 5 RPG-2 and 2 RPG-7 teams from C4 company. Each launcher had seven to nine rounds of RPG ammunition. He did not know the damage incurred by C3 company but he did know that one man had been killed and twenty seriously wounded from C1 company.

#### 6. Conclusions and Corrective Action

a. From the above, it is evident that in spite of the precautions taken by the CP/Howitzer Battery Complex, they were not enough because the enemy was able to initiate the action. It is also evident that RPG screens should have been used for the Howitzers and that more thought should have been given to the placement of the M548 Ammunition Carriers to insure that their destruction would not jeopardize all other vehicles in the complex.

b. To reduce the possibility of surprise, all units have been reminded that when conditions preclude covering avenues of approach by sensors or other surveillance devices that listening posts will be used. To reduce the vulnerability of Howitzer Battery, M548 Ammunition Carriers are dispersed and RPG screen is used for both the Howitzers and carriers.

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
DAVID K. DOYLE  
LTC, Armor  
Commanding

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Authority MD 873 541By SP8 NARA Date 1/16/00

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority ND 873541  
 By [Signature] NARA Date 11/16/00

- Trailer
- H548
- H113
- Sheridan
- Howitzer
- Fathole
- RPG screen
- Camouflage
- RADAR
- STARLIGHT SCOPE



\*H 548 for #2 was by PIC to allow the H 577.

Avg dist between perimeter vehicles - 20 meters

Dist between How By vehicles - 25-35 meters (How)  
 10 meters (How's and 548's)