

RG 472
11th ACR, 53
AARs
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-DA

1 October 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report

1. (U) REFERENCE: FRAGO 19 to OPORD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR) (U)
2. (U) TYPE OF OPERATION: FRAGO 19 required A Troop, 1/11 ACR to make a tactical airlift of its men and equipment (less M551's) from FSB JON (LOC NINH) to the BU DUC/HU DOP area.
3. (U) DATE: This operation was conducted on 18 and 19 August 1969.
4. (U) LOCATION: A Troop departed the LOC NINH airstrip (XU 732032) and landed its vehicles at the HU DOP airstrip (XU 975290).
5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: The airlift of A Troop to HU DOP airstrip was planned and controlled by Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Colonel James H. Leach, Commanding. During this period the 11th ACR was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Upon closing at HU DOP (19:0000 August), A Troop was placed OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) for operations in the BU DUC (XU 965248) Sub-Sector.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

6. (U) GENERAL:
 - a. The requirement to move one recon troop to HU DOP was given to the 11th ACR by verbal order of the CG, 1st Cav Div (AM) on the afternoon of 16 August. The time for execution was the morning of 18 August. The Regimental Commander selected the First Squadron to provide the troop to be airlifted.
 - b. The Regimental and Squadron staffs had less than 40 hours to become experts on the techniques and requirements for air movement of a recon troop (a form of movement not within the military experience of any member of the staff), determine which vehicles and supplies could and should be taken, request the necessary aircraft, and prepare for the move.
 - c. The task was further complicated by the fact the key members of the Division Staff not only had not previously studied the feasibility of the move but were not even informed of the CG's decision until the Regimental S-3 section began placing demands on the Division Staff.

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d. Fortunately, the Division Engineers had already completed upgrading the BU DOP strip sufficiently to take C130's -- the aircraft required to move A Troop's vehicles. However, during the planning stages the Regimental Staff was never certain that the Air Force would approve use of the strip.

e. In addition to uncertainty about the ability of the airstrip to accommodate a fully-loaded C130, the information on vehicle weights was extremely ambiguous. For example, the units M113A1's were configured as ACAV's and also had additional body armor. However, it was impossible to learn the exact weight of these modifications. Furthermore, the vehicles TH's and TB 55-46 frequently did not agree on vehicle weights. Also, the modifications affected vehicle dimensions and hence, the cubes varied with source. Finally, due to extra flooring and load-bearing equipment on board, the size of the C130 cargo compartment was not the same as that listed in publications available at Regimental Headquarters. Such factors point up the need for Air Force technical assistance during the planning of an airlifted operation -- assistance which the Regimental staff requested but did not receive.

f. Probably the most difficult problem faced by the Regimental staff was communicating to higher headquarters and support units the sense of urgency existent in the Regiment. They often appeared to look at the operation as a mere contingency, rather than a move ordered for 18 August -- less than 40 hours away. Nevertheless, when the 18th arrived so did the aircraft, loadmaster, and control teams, and the necessary supplies. The Air Force and combat service support units did a magnificent job and the movement was made smoothly and efficiently, and every difficulty which arose was promptly and effectively handled. An observer who had not participated in the planning of the movement would have gained the impression that the move had been under discussion for weeks and had followed a period of extensive staff coordination and planning.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Due to the threat posed to BU DOP/BO DUC by the elements of the 7th NVA Div, especially the 165th Regiment, the CG of the 1st Cav Div (AM) ordered the reinforcement of the Cav Bn (AM) presently assisting the RVNAF units defending this area.

8. (C) MISSION: The 11th ACR was required to move one armored cavalry troop by air to BO DUC Sub-Sector Q/A 18 August, placing it OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) upon arrival.

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9. (C) CONCEPT: The vehicles of the armored cavalry troop plus the necessary attachments and supporting vehicles were assembled at LOC NINH and QUAN LOI airfields for movement by C130 to BU DOP airfield. The vehicles were to be moved on two separate days, 12 sorties each day. Initial Class III and V resupply for the vehicles, which were stripped of basic load and a part of their fuel for the movement, was sent by C130 from LONG BINH. Upon closing at BU DOP the troop was placed OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM).

10. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Vehicular airlift was planned as a two phase operation.

(1) Phase I - Airlift of command and control vehicles, logistical support vehicles, and some vehicles for local security of the airfield. Crews would accompany vehicles.

(2) Phase II - The airlift of the remainder of the combat vehicles and crews.

b. All vehicles that were to be airlifted on each day were prepositioned prior to the arrival of the first aircraft. The first three vehicles were stripped of their basic load, but due to tactical considerations, the remaining vehicles were not unleaded until the aircraft began the return trip from BU DOP. This procedure ensured that if an attack ensued during the lift and the aircraft did not land only a minimal number of vehicles would not be able immediately to participate in combat operations.

c. The preparation of the vehicles for airlift included unloading of all ammunition and draining the fuel tanks to 75% capacity. All antennas were removed and machineguns were lashed in place.

d. At 180730 the first C130 landed with the Air Force technical assistance team. The team provided technical advice on vehicle preparation and assisted in loading the vehicles.

e. At 0900 hours the first C130 cargo aircraft landed to begin the airlift. Each vehicle to be lifted was inspected by the technical assistance team, then loaded on the C130. After the first vehicle was loaded and personnel were trained, it took approximately 20 minutes to load each vehicle.

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f. Mid-way through the move 3d Bde, 1st ACD asked that the M106 mortar tracks be airlifted on the first day. This presented a problem. According to the plan, the M106's were to be moved on the second day; by that time 200 rds of 4.2" HE would have been prepositioned by C123 aircraft from Bien Hoa. Therefore, a request had to be made to the Air Force Technical Team, to move a portion of the 4.2" basic load with the vehicle. Fortunately, due to the lighter weight of the M106, 50% of the basic load could accompany the vehicle.

g. The plan scheduled the movement of a M548 and a M577 for the first day. However, due to the height of a C130 cargo compartment with damage, the movement of the M548 was post-poned until the 19th so that a specially configured C130 could be used in the airlift.

h. Total vehicles moved the 1st day:

2 M106 and 9 M113A1.

i. On the second day, the first C130 landed at LOC NINH at 0800 hours. The vehicles were prepositioned in the manner of the day before. The technical assistance team inspected the M113A1 AVLB and decided that it was too wide to be moved. A substitution was made and a M113A1 was moved instead.

j. This phase of the operation was also conducted by 3 C130 aircraft. The remainder of the vehicles were lifted from Loc Ninh commencing at 0900 and the last vehicle landed in BU DOP at 1710.

k. The total vehicles moved on the second day:

1 M548	1 M577A1	9 M113A1
1 M132A1	1 XM45E1	

l. Totals for the operation were:

18 M113A1
1 M577A1
1 M132A1
2 M106
1 M548
1 XM45E1

TOTAL = 24

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n. A total of 24 C130 sorties were required to move the unit.

11. (C) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

a. General: This operation included some unusual logistical problems in addition to the movement of vehicles. To move the vehicles by air the basic loading of ammunition had to be removed from each vehicle. This required the prepositioning of large quantities of ammunition in BU DOP before the arrival of the combat vehicles.

b. Planning: Annex A - (Movement Request Submitted to 1st ACD).

(1) Due to the fact that the airstrip at BU DOP could only accommodate 12 C130 sorties a day, the airlift of ammunition and POL was made by C123. In the initial planning, POL and ammunition required to reconstitute the basic loads and refill fuel tanks was requested to be shipped so as to arrive before the first vehicles were moved. (ANNEX A). Further, sufficient ammunition and POL to sustain the troop for an additional 72 hours was put on the ground in BU DOP during Phase II for the operation. (ANNEX A).

(2) Because the ammunition required would deplete the stock of the local ASP at Quan Loi, it was requested that the ammunition and fuel be shipped from the Long Binh Depot. An Air Force mobility team to assist in the handling of cargo at BU DOP was included in the request.

(3) An Air Movement Table (Annex B) was prepared at 220017 Aug by the Regimental S-4 and 1st Squadron S-4. This table was based on information obtained from DISCOM 1st Air Cav Div regarding number of aircraft sorties and time of aircraft arrival. This table also included movement of personnel and materials to be moved by CH47 prior to the arrival of Troop A vehicles. This included a 1/11 ACR logistical team to provide unloading of ammunition and fuel which would arrive prior to the arrival of the vehicles from Troop A 1/11 Cav. This logistical team would also establish communications with HQ 1/11 Cav at LOC NINH.

(4) After coordinating with the Troop Commander, Troop A, 1/11 Cav, a list of vehicles was prepared designating the priority of move, and times that the vehicles were to be ready for loading. (Annex C).

c. Execution: On the first day of the operation 9 C123 sorties of ammunition and fuel were flown to BU DOP. Except for the M106 mortar tracks this was sufficient to reconstitute basic loads of vehicles landing the first day.

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d. On the second day of the operation there were 7 C123 sorties of Class V and 2 C123 sorties of Class III. This was not sufficient Class V and 2 sorties of .50 cal. ammunition were flown from Quan Loi to BU DOP by CH47.

e. The only logistical problem was that of a heavy lift capability for the troop maintenance section. The M543 & M62 wrecker were too heavy to be flown in a C130 (34,000 lbs). At first a boom type lift was designed for the M543. This was unable to be prefabricated before the airlift because of a lack of materials. Assistance was requested from II FFORCEV G-4. They arranged for a 3 ton wrecker weighing 22,000 lbs to be transferred to the 11th ACR. This wrecker was flown to BU DOP on 30 Aug 69.

f. At 191700 August the logistical support of A Troop was turned over to 1/7 Cav. At that time the troop has its basic load of Class III & V on the vehicles and an additional three day supply of ammunition, fuel, water, rations and barrier materials on the ground.

12. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. An armored cavalry troop can make a tactical move by fixed wing aircraft in a combat environment.

b. The weights listed in air movement data guides (TB 55-46) and vehicular TM's do not agree. Further ambiguity is created as vehicles in RVN are configured differently than those described in the TM's. This requires considerable investigation and estimation by the unit submitting a request for air movement.

c. Air Force personnel should participate in initial planning stages of a move of this nature to provide technical assistance for planning.

d. A detailed plan for transportation of vehicles and supplies is extremely helpful in coordination of the move. The exact amount of ammunition and fuel to be moved each day should be listed on separate tabs to the plan. This allows for easier coordination of aircraft and supplies to be moved during the operation.

3 ANNEX

ANNEX A - Air Movement of
A Troop, 1/11 ACR From LOC
NIHE to BU DOP

ANNEX B - Air Movement Time Table

ANNEX C - Vehicle Movement Plan (6)

Joe G. Driskill
JOE G. DRISKILL
Major, Armor
Regt S-4

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Annex A to Letter: After Action Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-CA

16 August 1969

SUBJECT: Air Movement of A Troop, 1/11 ACR From LOC NINH to BU DOP

1. Request sufficient aircraft sorties to move the vehicles (Incl 1), personnel (Incl 2), and supplies (Incl 3) of A Troop, 1/11 ACR from LOC NINH to BU DOP on 18 August.
2. As this is a tactical move unit integrity must be maintained, that is personnel should arrive at BU DOP accompanied by or ahead of their vehicles.
3. If ammunition must be removed from the vehicles for air movement, the initial sorties must land vehicle basic loads to be put on vehicles as they arrive.
4. Request that a team visit 1/11 ACR at LOC NINH (FSB JON) on 17 August to advise this unit on the move and determine the order in which vehicles, personnel, and supplies will be airlifted to BU DOP.

3 Incl
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TOTALS

Inlosure 1

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Inclosure 2 to letter: Air Movement of A Troop, 1/11 ACR from LOC NINH to BU DOP

1. The TAB's to this inclosure contain the Class III and Class V requirements to support the move of A Troop, 1/11 ACR to BU DOP.
2. Request that the POL and ammunition be drawn from the Long Binh Depot and be delivered to BU DOP.
3. The ammunition listed in TAB C and D will not be required if the M551 Sheridans are not airlifted to BU DOP.

TAB's:

TAB A - M113A1 Basic Load to Proceed Vehicles
 TAB B - Additional Class V to Support an ACAV Troop for 72 Hours
 TAB C - Basic Load for 6 M551 Sheridans
 TAB D - Additional Class V to Support M551 Sheridan for 72 Hours
 TAB E - POL Requirement

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TAB A to Incl 2:

M113A1 Basic Load, To Preced Vehicles

	<u>DODAC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>CU FT</u>
1.	A357	.50 Cal.	17 Pallets	44,550	534.6
2.	A131	7.62mm	8 Pallets	16,280	261
3.	A165	7.62mm	6 Pallets	15,120	264.8
4.	A072	5.56mm	8 Pallets	6,220	66
5.	A475	.45 Cal.	1 Pallet	1,685	20
6.	K143	M18A1 Claymore	20 Cases	1,083	28.4
7.	G955	Smoke, Violet	20 Cases	1,180	31.20
8.	G945	Smoke, Yellow	20 Cases	1,180	31.20
9.	G950	Smoke, Red	5 Cases	295	7.80
10.	B568	M-79 HE	15 Cases	843	22.5
11.	B535	M-79 WSP	5 Cases	281	7.5
12.	B534	M-79 CAN	5 Cases	281	7.5
13.	G890	Grenade, Frag	8 Cases	487	15.2
14.	L312	White Star Parachute	6 Cases	133	11.15
15.	L495	Flare, Surface Trip	6 Cases	133	11.15
16.	K935	Thickner, Oil M-4	8 Cases	228	13.44
17.	G706	4.2 Ill	2 Pallets	3,300	83.4
19.	G705	4.2 HE	1 Pallet	1,334	39.1
			<u>TOTALS 164 Pieces</u>	<u>91,994</u>	<u>768.54</u>

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
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TAB B to Incl 2

Additional Class V to Support an ACAV Troop for 72 Hours

	<u>DODAG</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>CU FT</u>
1.	A557	.50 Cal.	8 Pallets	16,200	194.4
2.	A131	7.62mm	7 Pallets	11,396	186.9
3.	G955	Smoke, Violet	1 Pallet	2,125	56.4
4.	G945	Smoke, Yellow	1 Pallet	2,125	56.4
5.	G950	Smoke, Red	8 Cases	362	12.08
6.	B568	40mm HE	20 Cases	1,124	31.20
7.	G890	Grenade, Frag	16 Cases	974	31.04
8.	K143	M-18A1 Claymore	1 Pallet	1,950	51.3
9.	B535	40mm WSP	1 Pallet	1,350	54.4
10.	C706	4.2 HE	5 Pallets	8,250	208.5
11.	C705	4.2 Ill	<u>2 Pallets</u>	<u>1,668</u>	<u>78.2</u>
		TOTALS	71 Pieces	47,524	960.8

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TAB C to Incl 2

Basic Load for 6 Sheridans

	<u>DODAG</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>CU FT</u>
1.	D390	152mm CAN	13 Pallets	9,700	640.9
2.	D381	152mm HE MP	7 Pallets	5,600	348.1
3.	A557	.50 Cal.	3 Pallets	6,075	72.9
4.	A131	7.62mm	2 Pallets	3,256	52.2
5.	B568	M-79 HE	3 Cases	168	4.5
6.	B534	M-79 CAN	1 Case	56	1.5
7.	B535	M-79 WSP	1 Case	56	1.5
8.	G890	Grenade, Frag	4 Cases	243	7.6
9.	G945	Smoke, Yellow	3 Cases	135	4.5
10.	G955	Smoke, Violet	3 Cases	135	4.5
11.	G950	Smoke, Red	1 Case	45	1.5
12.	K143	M-18A1 Claymore	6 Cases	336	8.52
13.	L495	Surface, Flare Trip	1 Case	56	1.8
14.	L312	WSP	1 Case	56	1.8
15.	A475	.45 Cal.	6 Cases	678	7.8
16.	A071	5.56mm	6 Cases	468	7.32
			<u>TOTALS 63 Pieces</u>	<u>27,064</u>	<u>1,171.94</u>

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TAB D to Incl 2

Class V to Support M551 for 72 Hours

	<u>DNDAG</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>CU FT</u>
1.	D390	152mm CAN	16 Pallets	14,400	738.8
2.	D381	152mm HE MP	8 Pallets	7,200	394.4
3.	A557	.50 Cal.	3 Pallets	6,075	72.9
4.	A131	7.62mm	3 Pallets	4,884	78.3
5.	B568	M-79 HE	3 Cases	168	4.68
6.	B534	M-79 CAN	3 Cases	168	4.68
7.	B535	M-79 WSP	3 Cases	168	4.68
8.	G890	Grenade, Frag	10 Cases	690	19.4
9.	G945	Smoke, Yellow	6 Cases	271	9.06
10.	G955	Smoke, Violet	6 Cases	271	9.06
11.	G950	Smoke, Red	2 Cases	90	3.02
12.	K143	M-18A1 Claymore	6 Cases	336	8.52
13.	L495	Surface, Flare Trip	3 Cases	159	5.4
14.	L312	WSP	3 Cases	159	5.4
15.	A475	.45 Cal.	1 Case	113	1.13
16.	A071	5.56mm	3 Cases	234	3.66
			<u>TOTALS 79 Pieces</u>	<u>35,486</u>	<u>1,413.09</u>

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TAB E to Incl 2

POL Requirements

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
1. DF2	1,000 Gal Initially	4,000
2. DF2	3,000 Gal On Ground	12,000
3. Pump Liquid Dispensing 50 GPM	1	
4. OE 10, 55 Gal Drums	2	1,128
5. OE 30, 55 Gal Drums	3	1,692
6. OE 50, 55 Gal Drums	2	1,128
7. Mogas, 55 Gal Drums	3	1,692
8. LSA	3 Cases	75
9. PL Special	3 Cases	75
10. GAA, 5 Gal Pails	3	75
11. OHA	10 Gal	80
12. OHC	10 Gal	80
13. Mogas for M-132A1 & XM 45B1	1,000 Gal	4,000
50 Pieces Total		26,025

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Annex B to Letter: After Action Report

18 Aug 69

AIR MOVEMENT TIME TABLE

1. 1 CH47 SORTIE, 0800 Hours
LOG TEAM (COMMUNICATIONS)
MESS PERSONNEL
6000 SANDBAGS
5 SLEEVES CONSERTINA
2 BUNDLES PSP
2 BUNDLES STAKES
2 PALLETS "C" RATIONS
2. 1 CH47 SORTIE TO LOG NINH, 0800 Hours
LUMBER - SHORING MATERIAL
3. 9 SORTIES C123 FROM BIEN HOA
1 EA CLASS III
8 EA CLASS IV
1ST SORTIE ARRIVE 1000 HOURS
REMAINING SORTIES ON 30 MINUTE INTERVALS
4. 12 SORTIES C130
ARRIVE LOG NINH 1000 HOURS
12 VEHICLES

19 Aug 69

5. 9 SORTIES C123 FROM BIEN HOA
3 SORTIES CLASS III
6 SORTIES CLASS V
6. 12 SORTIES C130
VEHICLES
7. 1 SORTIE CH47
2 ACAV BRIDGES

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Annex C to Letter: After Action Report

VEHICLE MOVEMENT PLAN

D-DAY VEHICLE

A-26	ACAV			<u>PREPARATION</u>
A-24	"			1. Remove all ammo
A-23	"			2. Drain tanks to 3/4 full
A-20	"			3. Remove radio antenna
A-66	ACAV	10 ACAVS	TO BE READY	
A-2	"	1 M577	NLT	
A-55	"	1 M548	0900 18 AUG 69	
A-78	"			

FROM: LOC NINH TO BU DOP

A-16	ACAV
A-11	"
A-13	"
A-14	"

D-DAY + 1

A-99	M113A1	AVLB	QUAN LOI	TO BE READY NLT
A-48	MAINT	ACAV		0900, 19 AUG 69
HQ-35	M132A1			
HQ-65	XM45E1	READY	LOC NINH	NLT 0900
A-12	ACAV			19 AUG 69
A-10	ACAV			

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