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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-WE

8 Oct 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report of the First Battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry (Mech) during the Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province.

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

Transmitted herewith is the Combat After Actions Report of the First Battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry (Mech) which was under the operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from 7 August to 20 September 1969, during Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR.

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By <i>JP</i> NARA Date <i>5/8/01</i>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. (U) REFERENCES AND SOURCES:

- a. 11th ACR OPLAN's 6-69, 7-69, and 8-69.
- b. 11th ACR FRAGO's 11 through 32 to 11th ACR OPORD 6-69 (Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR).

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:

- a. The major action in this period was the Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province, 8-20 August. This battle was part of Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR.
- b. The First Battalion, 16th Infantry (Mech) moved to positions near AN LOC in response to the threat to that city. Following pre-emptive operations and a counterattack, the Battalion conducted combined reconnaissance and ambush operations with various units of the 9th Regiment (ARVN).

3. (U) INCLUSIVE DATES: The First Battalion of the 16th Inf. (Mech) was under the operational control of the 11th ACR from 7 August to 20 September 1969.

4. (U) LOCATION: The AN LOC District of BINH LONG Province.

5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11th ACR, QUAN LOI, RVN.

6. (C) GENERAL:

a. Purpose of the operation: Initially, the Battalion sought to preempt the planned enemy offensive against the populated areas near AN LOC and counter NVA/VC attacks made in its area of operations. Later the unit switched to reconnaissance and ambush operations designed to seek out and destroy NVA/VC forces remaining in the area.


b. Significant aspects of the operation: The 11th ACR had almost complete knowledge of the NVA/VC plan of attack and was able to prepare detailed plans for responding to the enemy attack.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

a. GENERAL: From 24 July to 6 August enemy activity was limited mainly to reconnaissance. There were occasional mortar or rocket attacks and mining incidents along with some small scale ground probes which tested defenses. However, there was little significant activity, and newspapers wrote frequently of the "lull."

On or about 6 August, the enemy forces moved from secure base areas in or near Cambodia to forward positions throughout BINH LONG Province, increasing the level of enemy activity throughout the Area of Operations (AO). The enemy's movement was rapidly detected and resulted in numerous contacts, ralliers, prisoners, and captured enemy documents. Thus, military intelligence soon had plans, probable area of operation, and unit identifications of the enemy forces.

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B. Unit identification:

(1) 9th VC Division:

a. 272nd VC Regiment: On July 28, C Company, Fifth of the Seventh Cavalry, engaged a small enemy force at XT 715758 and killed two NVA, capturing enemy documents which identified the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments, C/5-7, which was under the operational control (OPCON) of the 11th ACR, provided the first indication of 9th VC Division activity.

Nguyen Van An rallied to the 214th Regional Forces at BINH NINH on 31 July. After two days of interrogation An identified himself as the platoon leader of the H21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 272nd VC Regiment, a position he has held since 1964. According to An, about 20 June 1969, elements of all four main force divisions moved into Cambodia, with the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions in the Fishhook area.

After this relocation the divisions sent reconnaissance units to targets in the III Corps area. These units returned about 20 July to discuss the Allied situation. The battalion commanders of the reconnaissance elements of the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments accompanied their respective elements to the AN LOC area, to refine their original analysis. An was with the K6 Battalion Commander, 272nd VC Regiment, as the elements selected assembly areas, staging areas and avenues of approach. An's knowledge of the attack plans came from his association with the battalion commander.


An stated that the 272nd VC Regiment would leave its Cambodian base area, cross the Saigon river near XT 5696, and move along a trail that runs in an east-southeasterly direction to an assembly area near XT 6696, between the Prek Kong and Ton Le streams. The 271st VC Regiment would cross the Cambodian border near XT 5890 and proceed parallel to the 272nd VC Regiment, to establish blocking positions between LANG BAY (XT 705855) and LANG SAU (XT 690878). The 272nd VC Regiment would move into the rubber area near AP PHU LO (XT 6890) 24 to 36 hours after arriving in BINH LONG Province. The D368 Local Force (LF) Battalion would join the 272nd VC Regiment near BINH PHU (XT 715887).

The K4 and K5 Battalions, 272nd VC Regiment, plus the D368 LF Battalion were to attack AN LOC from the west, with supporting attacks from the north and south.

The 9th VC Division's plan was to seize and hold AN LOC for one day. An stated that he heard the 7th NVA Division would launch attacks at the same time against QUAN LOI airfield, LOC NINH and BU DOP. The 88th NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division and 1st NVA Division would be responsible for TAY NINH province.

The 25th Sapper Company, 272nd VC Regiment had the mission of taking BINH PHU, with a 15 to 20 minute mortar and/or rocket barrage preceding the attack. The mortars would be located near BINH NINH.

Nguyen Van Sen, an ARVN soldier until his abduction by a VC Local Force Squad in July 1968, rallied to the 399th Regional Forces (RF) at TAN HUNG (XT 863876) on 2 August 1969. Sen became a member of the 16-man Propaganda section of the Xa Co 28/ Xa Co Xit Local Force.



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This unit's mission, besides propaganda, was to tax AP HUNG PHAT (Xa Co 28) at XT 858848, and AP HUNG YEN (Xa Co Kit) at XT 890863. Sen's basecamp was located south of SUIO HEO, near XT 9286, about a half-hour's walk from SUIO HEO.

On 15 July 1969, two companies from the 9th VC Division visited Sen's basecamp. Sen was told by his Section Leader, Bay Tion, that the companies' mission was to reconnoiter the area. Sen talked with members of these units on three occasions. During one of these meetings Sen was told that the entire 9th VC Division would come to that area. The two companies set up a basecamp and remained near there until late July. He heard that they left the basecamp on 1 August and travelled in the direction of SOC TRANH (XT 843823).

On 1 August, 40 to 50 men from the D368 LF Battalion rested in Sen's basecamp for seven hours. When they departed, they headed toward SOC TRANH. Each of these units asked directions to SOC TRANH, Sen stated.

b. 271st VC Regiment: While conducting a bomb damage assessment mission on 9 August, the Aero-Rifle Platoon (ARPs) of the BLACKHORSE Air Cavalry Troop, captured Ngo Kuang Tri at XT 605905. Tri, a member of C6, K2, F51, (also known as C6 Company, K2 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment) said that the K2 Battalion moved to the Fishhook area on 28 July 1969, and remained there until two days prior to his capture. On 1800 hours, 8 August, the C6 Company received orders to send four men to Battalion Headquarters by 0400 hours, 9 Aug.

Tri and the other three men left the C6 basecamp at 0340 hours, 9 August and travelled east until they were at K2 Headquarters by 0400 hours. These four and twelve others (four from each of the other three companies) were briefed by the battalion commander and given the mission of finding a secure area for their respective companies. It is possible that these safe areas were to be used after the August 12 attacks.


Tri and the other fifteen men left the battalion headquarters at 0600 hours and proceeded west with enough rice for nine days. Two hours later the group was spotted; however, only Tri was captured. The POW heard from various members of the 16 man group that their unit was to attack an undisclosed area in the near future.

(2) 7th NVA Division:

a. General: During the period 6 August to 16 August, the 209th NVA Regiment was identified in contacts near LOV NINH. The 141st NVA Regiment was unidentified but at least one battalion may have participated in contacts northeast of LOC NINH, while the remainder of the Regiment was northeast of AN LOC. The 165th NVA Regiment also avoided identification; however it was believed to be in the BO DUC - BU DOP area.

b. 209th NVA Regiment: Nguyen Van Thien rallied to the 11th Popular Forces Platoon at XU 716050 on August 3, 1969. Thien, assistant platoon leader of the C21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 209th NVA Regiment, had been wounded in the leg of July 27 when F Troop, 2/11 ACR engaged 4 to 5 NVA at XU 726035.

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(They killed one, and documents found on the body identified the C21 Sapper Reconnaissance Company, 209th NVA Regiment).

Thien had managed to avoid capture, but his wound had become worse and he rallied. Although he changed his story several times, the following account remained unchanged throughout the questioning: Thien and seven other men were to reconnoiter two areas, SOC 10 (possibly village 10 at XU 710102) and a road junction along QL 13 (possibly at XU 739045). Thien, the assistant company commander and seven other men were briefed by the company commander and told to discover the size, strength, and position of the outpost at SOC 10. The other men were to reconnoiter a road junction along QL13 for a possible site for a battalion to ambush an armored column. Both groups were to return to their basecamp near bridge 40 to report their findings by July 29.

Thien's group was told that 5 to 6 days after their return the K7 Battalion would attack SOC 10, while the K8 Battalion ambushed an armored column (possibly to interdict reinforcements from QUAN LOI).

(3) 101D NVA Regiment: The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, killed 41 NVA and captured six NVA PWs at XT 605905 on 9 August. Five of these prisoners were from the K7, F12, (also known as the K7 Battalion, 101D NVA Regiment). Hoang Van Khe, a master sergeant in the signal platoon of the K7 Battalion, was told that K7 had been given the mission of ambushing armored convoys (Khe was told this by the platoon leader and was not told where they would occur; however he believed that they would be along QL 13). The K7 Battalion was enroute to the ambush site when it was hit by a B-52 bomb strike at 1630 hours August 8. Khe was told that K7 had aborted the mission and would remain dispersed in the area to regroup and resupply.


(4) Other Intelligence indicators: Visual reconnaissance missions flown by the Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, detected 25 newly constructed bunkers at XU 682197, near LOC NINH on August 9. Heavy trails that showed recent foot traffic headed east-southeast at XU 678169, XU 682197, and XU 675154 were also detected.

8. (C) OPERATIONAL SUMMARY:

a. General: In response to the threat against BINH LONG Province the First Battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry (Mech), B Company, First of the Ninth Cavalry, the 34th Rangers (ARVN), the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) and elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) moved into the BLACKHORSE AO during early August. Following the series of attacks on 11 to 13 August the 1-16 Infantry (Mech) remained in the 11th AC AO to perform reconnaissance operations until a new lull beginning in mid-September.

b. 7 August: On 7 August II FFORCEV directed the 1-16 Inf to leave FSB JIM and move north and become under the operational control of the 11th ACI A and C Company, plus the Battalion Headquarters departed FSB JIM, leaving behind the Battalion's reconnaissance platoon and B/2-33 Artillery.

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At 1430 hours, August 7, 1-16 reached LAI KHE and accepted operational control (OPCON) of A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry. This task force (TF) then continued the 30 mile march on Highway 13, stopping briefly at FSB THUNDER III (XT 769 665) to pick up C/2-33 Artillery. Following some difficulty on QL 13, the task force closed FSB ASPEN I at 0330 hours, August 8.

c. Pre-attack plans: At 0730 hours the same morning, TF 1-16 continued its move to its new AO. One platoon from A Company secured C/2-33 Artillery at FSB ASPEN I while the unit moved to FSB EAGLE I. TF 1-16 assumed responsibility for the Second Squadron, 11th ACR, AO, and the Howitzer Battery, 2/11 ACR was placed OPCON to it at FSB EAGLE I. The task force also established a combined command post with the 4th Battalion of the 9th Inf. Regt. (ARVN), which was also at FSB EAGLE I.

The Second Squadron moved south and occupied FSB ASPEN I, assuming responsibility for a new AO south and southeast of AN LOC.

At 1400 hours the same day TF 1-16 and 4/9 Infantry (ARVN) occupied the newly built FSB EAGLE II (XT 745929). This became the Headquarters for TF 1 16 and 4/9 Inf (ARVN). The reconnaissance company from the 9th Regiment (ARVN) assisted TF 1-16 in conducting reconnaissance operations, ambush patrols, and providing security and ready reaction forces for FSBs EAGLE II and THUNDER IV.

On the evening of August 8, an A Company ambush patrol observed movement near its location and requested a Light Fire Team (LFT) for the contact which developed. Shortly thereafter the enemy broke contact, fading into the jungle. Two US soldiers were wounded in the action. FSB EAGLE II received incoming mortars rounds.


On 9 August C Company found two 107mm rockets at XT 719920 while conducting a reconnaissance of the area from which they had received 82mm mortar rounds the evening of 8 August. Searching farther they found 14 bunkers, 24 cubic feet a piece with 1½ feet of overhead cover, 200 feet of communication wire and one more 107mm rocket, at XT 721922.

On 10 August an aircraft from the BLACKHORSE Air Cavalry Troop spotted an estimated VC Company in a lightly wooded area (XT 637972) while conducting a visual reconnaissance mission. The ARPs were inserted and later reinforced by C Company, 1-16, a company of 4/9 Inf. (ARVN) and the "Blues" of B/1-9 Cavalry.

The ARPs immediately accepted three NVA Chicou Hoi, while the US and ARVN forces swept the area and made contact with a company-sized force. The US/ARVN forces maintained heavy organic fire on the enemy positions as artillery and tactical air pounded the enemy positions. The enemy used small-arms and automatic AK-47 fire to withdraw into the jungle. When the contact broke the allied forces swept the area and found 31 NVA bodies, 4 POWs, 4 Hoi Chanhs and an assortment of NVA weapons and webgear. C Company was credited with 4 NVA POWs and 3 NVA killed. Interrogation of the prisoners proved the enemy to be from the the 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division, and the 58th Artillery Battalion. (See Intelligence Summary).

d. The battle: On August 11, TF 1-16 lost A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry which became OPCON to the Third Brigade, First Cavalry Division (AM). In return D

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Company, 5-7 Cavalry was placed OPCON to TF 1-16. A Company, TF 1-16 continued ground reconnaissance to the west of EAGLE II as C Company and 4/9 Inf (ARVN) headquarters moved from EAGLE II to establish and secure FSB ALLONS II at XT 728966. This move enabled How/2/11 ACR, DS to TF 1-16, to fire in support of the First Squadron, 11th ACR, at LOC NINH.

On the night of 11/12 August the enemy hit south and west of FSB ALLONS II and TF 1-16 was ordered to implement the counterattack plan for AN LOC. Upon executing the order, it almost immediately made contact.

In the early morning hours of August 12, A and C Company were conducting reconnaissance in the rubber west of AN LOC (XT 706903). When the K6 Battalion 272nd VC Regiment attacked the armored carriers of both companies with small-arms fire and RPGs, both companies' command tracks were hit by RPGs. D/5-7 Cavalry rapidly reinforced TF 1-16. US artillery, LFT, HFT, Blue Max, and tactical air were called to strike the enemy as well as likely avenues of escape. The battle continued until 1600 hours when the CO, 11th ACR ordered TF 1-16 to break contact with elements of the K6 Battalion and secure FSB THUNDER IV, and FSB ALLONS II in preparation for further attacks on AN LOC. There were two US killed and 27 wounded. Five armored carriers were also destroyed, but the enemy left 28 bodies.


On 13 August A and C Company made light contacts with elements of the 272nd VC Regiment west of AN LOC (XT 717894). This Regiment had suffered heavy losses the night before, and was not prepared to fight. The enemy withdrew, using evasive tactics, and hid in the rubber. After dusting off two US wounded, TF 1-16 continued to sweep the area to regain the contact. During the sweep TF 1-16 found 16 NVA bodies killed in the previous day's action.

On 14 August TF 1-16 conducted reconnaissance north and west of AN LOC and provided security for FSBs ALLONS II and THUNDER IV.

Just before dawn D Company received a VC ground attack on its night defensive position (NDP) at XT 703927. The enemy used 82mm mortar fire in preparation for the attack. D Company exchanged fire with the VC elements and at 0530 hours, A and C Company were called in to reinforce. C Company also escorted the companies' mortar tracks and by 0657 hours the combined forces of TF 1-16 assumed the defense of EAGLE I. Artillery, a LFT, Blue Max, and Spooky strafed the area with rockets and mini-gun fire in support of the FSB. As the intensity of the contact declined, 28 of the 66 wounded US soldiers were "medevaced." TF 1-16 continued to pursue the enemy, later identified as elements of the 9th VC Division. Again, the enemy melted into the jungle. The follow-up sweep produced 31 enemy bodies and numerous bloody trails leading into the jungle.

Following this contact C Company and D/5-7 Cavalry returned to the vicinity of FSB ALLONS II to conduct a planned ground reconnaissance. The two companies made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force at XU 725005. Blue Max, Spooky, and a LFT supported with fire on the likely avenues of escape, but the enemy made good his withdrawal. A sweep of the area showed 5 enemy bodies. The US forces suffered two wounded.

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e. The aftermath: On 15 August D/5-7 Cavalry moved to FSB KELLY and became OPCON to TF WRIGHT. C Company swept the area of the previous day's contact and encountered a small unit. The enemy fled as C Company fired and pursued. C Company swept the area afterwards and found 8 bodies, 5 from the previous night.

A Company had been conducting road clearing operations on QL 13 north of AN LOC and were near that village when they made contact with an enemy force. The enemy fled west into the rubber as A Company fired organic weapons and pursued. After the enemy fled, A Company swept the area and found nothing.

C Company and its mortar platoon continued ground reconnaissance from FSB ALLONS II north on QL 13 and to the west in their AO and found nothing.

On 17 August C Company made contact with a company-sized force while conducting reconnaissance along QL 13 north of AN LOC. A Troop, 1/11 ACR maneuvered to reinforce while artillery and Blue Max hit the enemy positions. An RPG round struck an APC, wounding the crew of four and causing the loss of the APC. The enemy withdrew into the jungle, and C Company pursued without further contact. The same day A Company conducted maintenance operations and furnished the ready reaction force for FSB ALLONS II.

f. A New Lull: On 18 August TF 1-16 continued combined operations with the 4/9 Inf. (ARVN). A and C Company conducted ground reconnaissance in the rubber northwest of AN LOC and southwest of FSB EAGLE I, while one company of the 4/9 Inf (ARVN) conducted clover leaf reconnaissance operations north, west, and south of FSB ALLONS II. Another company of the 4/9 Inf (ARVN) remained at ALLONS II as a ready reaction force.

C Company found what appeared to be a rest area (XT 694905) just east of the village of PHU LO. They later found documents which indicated that the C17 Recoilless Rifle Company, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division had been in the area.


A Company made contact with eight enemy soldiers north of the village of PHU LO at XT 68912. A Company pursued as the enemy fled to the northwest. A and C Companies made a coordinated sweep with C and B/1-5 Cavalry, but with negative results.

Later that afternoon A Company made contact while moving west of PHU LO to reinforce C/1-5 at XT 673905. B/1-5 moved south to reinforce and interdict the enemy withdrawal from its blocking position north of PHU LO. The artillery supported as A Company pursued the enemy into the jungle. A sweep of the area produced 3 NVL/VC dead and an assortment of weapons.

On 19 August an APC from A Company struck a 75-pound pressure detonated mine which wounded 4 men and destroyed the APC. The 4/9 Inf (ARVN) sent two companies to open QL 13 between FSB ALLONS II and the northern boundary of its AO.

On 20 August C Company found two VC bodies and destroyed 50 fighting positions while on combined operations with ARVN forces. The operations centered between PHU LO, in the rubber northwest of AN LOC, and AP PHU. The two VC bodies were credited to C Company for the action of 12 August.

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On 21 August the second platoon of C Company escorted a squad of the 919th Engineer Company along QL 13 from AN LOC to LOC NINH. About 300 meters south of the ambush site of 17 August (C Company) the US forces again were ambushed from east to west by an NVA company. C Company (-) moved from FSB ALLONS II north along QL 13 to reinforce while artillery, a LFT, and a Blue Max supported the column. However, the enemy force slipped into the jungle, leaving 11 dead and one NVA POW. The US forces suffered 4 wounded. Later interrogation of the prisoner identified the enemy unit as the C3 Company, K7 Battalion, 209th NVA Regiment. Throughout the day TF 1-16 secured FSB ALLONS II and THUNDER IV.

On 22 August A and C Companies conducted a combined reconnaissance in the rubber northwest of AN LOC. The 14th Company of 4/9 Inf (ARVN) remained at FSB ALLONS II as a ready reaction force while the 15th and 16th Companies conducted reconnaissance operations in the jungle to the far northwest of AN LOC and south of LTL 17. The day passed without incident.

Late in the afternoon of 23 August the TF 1-16 command and control helicopter received 50 caliber machinegun fire at XU 693018. Artillery, tactical air and a pink team saturated the area, but killed no enemy.

On 24 August TF 1-16 and one company of the 4/9 Inf (ARVN) conducted combined operations near XU 693018, but found nothing.

On 25 August TF 1-16 and 4/9 Inf (ARVN) conducted maintenance operations at FSB ALLONS II.


On 26 August M/3/11 ACR became OPCON to TF 1-16. A Company and one platoon of M Troop reconned north from FSB ALLONS II on QL 13. C Company and one platoon of N Troop transported the 14th and 15th Companies, 4/9 Inf (ARVN) along QL 13 to the rubber at XU 7604.

C Company and one platoon of M Troop made their reconnaissance west of QL 13 to just south of the 0-0 grid line. At that point an NVA platoon sprung an ambush. During the fire fight a tank from M Company struck a 50 pound pressure detonated mine which wounded three and caused the loss of the tank. Artillery and a LFT supported the contact and the ARPs were inserted. C Company, 1-5 Cavalry moved south to establish a blocking position. While pursuing the enemy, an APC hit a mine, wounding one and destroying the APC. A sweep produced 4 NVA killed. One Kit Carson Scout was also killed in the action. Documents found on the bodies identified the Z28 Sapper Reconnaissance Battalion.

g. Resource control point: On 27 and 28 August TF 1-16 continued combined US/ ARVN operations in the northern portion of its AO. On the 29th of August a resource control point was established on QL 13, supporting the South Vietnamese National Police while a thorough search of civilians and vehicles was made.

h. ARVN changes: On 30 August TF 1-16 moved south to recon the area north and west of AN LOC. Meanwhile the 14th and 15th Companies, 4/9 Inf (ARVN) conducted a foot march from FSB ALLONS II to AN LOC to become the AN LOC security force.

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On 31 August the 9th and 10th Companies, 3/9 Inf (ARVN) replaced the 4/9 Inf (ARVN), and began conducting combined operations with TF 1-16. The 3/9 Inf (ARVN) Command Post was moved to FSB ALLONS II and the 9th Company served as a ready reaction force with C Company. The 10th Company reconnoitered the northern AO while A Company conducted reconnaissance in the southern portion. M Troop, 3/11 ACR, was released OPCON this date.

On 3 September the 10th Company (ARVN) and the headquarters of 3/9 Inf (ARVN) left FSB ALLONS II to continue operations with 2/11 ACR while the 9th Company, 3/9 Inf (ARVN) reconnoitered the northern portion of the TF 1-16 AO.

i. New contact: On 5 September the S2 of the 1-16 was given the mission of checking villages to the west of AN LOC which had received mortar fire the previous night.

At 1443 hours that day the S2 and a platoon from A Company were ambushed by a platoon-sized enemy force while moving west on Highway near XT 723888.

A and C Company moved to reinforce but were ambushed by a battalion-sized force two kilometers west of AN LOC. Artillery supported while a Blue Max hit the area with LRA. The contact continued until 1757 hours, when the CO, 11th ACR ordered TF 1-16 to break contact and move to secure FSB ALLONS II and THUNDER IV. Two US soldiers were killed in the battle, and 25 wounded required evacuation. TF 1-16 moved back to FSBs ALLONS II and THUNDER IV leaving 63 dead VC in the rubber.

On 6 September TF 1-16, 4/9 Inf (ARVN) and 2/15 Cavalry (ARVN) swept the contact area of September 5. The 4/9 Inf (ARVN) captured a VC who identified the K9 Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment as the ambushing unit. During the sweep they also found 4 AM-47s and 3 anti-aircraft positions, a destroyed 50 caliber machinegun, 25 fighting positions with no overhead cover, 3 command bunkers, and 37 fighting positions with two to three feet of overhead cover.

From 7 to 10 September TF 1-16 continued US/ARVN operations and worked north and west of AN LOC with ambush patrols. On 10 September H Company, 2/11 ACR was placed OPCON to TF 1-16.


j. Move to FSB EAGLE II: On 12 September TF 1-16 received orders to close FSB ALLONS II, which had become extremely muddy due to monsoon rains, and establish FSB EAGLE II. The same day the 9th Company (ARVN) departed FSB ALLONS II for FSB EAGLE I to conduct operations with its parent battalion. TF 1-16 arrived at FSB EAGLE II at dusk and H Troop, 2/11 ACR secured FSB THUNDER IV.

On the 13/14 September the sterilization of FSB ALLONS II was completed and ambush patrols were placed in the rubber to the west of AN LOC.

k. The enemy stands down: From 15 to 17 September TF 1-16 continued operations in its AO without contact.

On 18 September the 1-16 Inf (Mech) received orders to be prepared to reassume operational control of A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry and to return to the First Infantry Division.

On 19 September A and C Companies remained at EAGLE I, conducting maintenance operations in preparation for the road march to LAI KHE.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

H/2/11 ACR and Howitzer Battery, 2/11 ACR, which had been DS to the 1-16 Inf since 8 August, became OPCON to TF 3/11.

On 20 September 1-16 Inf (Mech), A/1-4 Cavalry, and C/2-33 Artillery moved south along Highway 13 to LAI KHE, becoming OPCON to 1st Infantry Division.

9. (U) LOGISTICS: On 7 August the 1-16 Inf (Mech) became OPCON to the 11th ACR. The Regimental S-4 contacted the 1-16 S-4 at LAI KHE and gave him information on how re-supply would be conducted, and the general plan for the support of the 1-16.

Due to a shortage of space at QUAN LOI, the trains of the 1-16 Inf were initially placed at FSB THUNDER IV. The original concept was to re-supply the 1-16 Inf out of THUNDER IV, and re-supply by air from QUAN LOI. The maintenance team that came with the unit was to operate from THUNDER IV.

This arrangement was undesirable from the beginning because there were not sufficient people in the 1-16 Inf Support Platoon to operate from two separate locations. After one week's operations, it was decided that the train would have to be moved to QUAN LOI. A location was found and on August 15 the trains moved to QUAN LOI. This relocation improved the situation and the flow of supply continued without interruption.

TF 1-16 used an average of 7 CH-47 sorties per day for aerial resupply. Initially the unit experienced problems due to its lack of experience with aerial re-supply. However, in time the unit proved to be very proficient at helicopter re-supply.

The 1-16 Inf was supported by the maintenance contact team from the 701st Maintenance Battalion. This unit's maintenance section remained at LAI KHE to support the remainder of the unit. At first the 1-16 Inf experienced difficulty in communicating with LAI KHE and in turn with the 701st Battalion. The result was confusion. This problem was alleviated when the trains were moved to QUAN LOI where better communication facilities were available.


Ammunition resupply for the unit was provided by the QUAN LOI ASP. There were no major ammunition problems during the operation. However, the 1-16 Inf was operating under the First Infantry Division ASR, and therefore experienced more ammunition rationing than the other 11th ACR units.

10. (C) TOTAL RESULTS OF CONTACTS:

- a. 154 NVA/VC KIA
- b. 1 CHIEU HOI
- c. 6 FOWs
- d. 4 US KIA (1 Died of Wounds)
- e. 149 US WIA

NOTE: The statistics and accounts of contact contained in this report have been taken from the 11th ACR INTSUM. The above total results were submitted by 1-16 Inf (Mech). The differences are chiefly a matter of reporting.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

TASK ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST BATTALION OF THE SIXTEENTH INFANTRY (MECH)

7 AUGUST

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 A/1-4 Cav (OPCON)
 C/2-33 Arty (DS)

11 AUGUST

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 D/5-7 Cav (OPCON)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)

26 AUGUST

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 M/3/11 ACR (OPCON)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)

10 SEPTEMBER

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 H/2/11 ACR (OPCON)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)

8 AUGUST

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 A/1-4 Cav (OPCON)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)

15 AUGUST

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)

31 AUGUST


A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 How/2/11 ACR (DS)


20 SEPTEMBER

A/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 C/1-16 Inf (Mech)
 A/1-4 Cav (OPCON)
 C/2-33 Arty (DS)

Inclosure 1

C O N F I D E N T I A L





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
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By *SP* NAPA Date *5/8/01*

NOTE: Symbols on map represent contact or action of 1-16

- 1) 9 August
G/1-16 Inf
Cache
- 2) 10 August
C/1-16 Inf
ARPS, 11th ACR
B/1-9 Cav
4/9 Inf (ARVN)
272nd VC Regt
Contact
- 3) 12 August
A/1-16 Inf
C/1-16 Inf
D/5- 7 Cav
K6, 272nd VC Regt
Contact
- 4) 13 August
A/1-16 Inf
C/1-16 Inf
272nd VC Regt
Contact
- 5) 14 August
D/1-16 Inf
A/1-16 Inf
C/1-16 Inf
9th VC Division
Contact
- 6) 14 August
C/1-16 Inf
D/5- 7 Cav
Contact
- 7) 18 August
G/1-16 Inf
G17, 272nd VC Regt
Rest Area

- 8) 18 August
A/1-16 Inf
Contact
- 9) 18 August
A/1-16 Inf
C/1- 5 Cav
B/1- 5 Cav
Contact
- 10) 21 August
C/1-16 Inf
C3, K7, 209th NVA Regt
Ambush
- 11) 26 August
C/1-16 Inf
M/3/11 ACR
ARPS, 11 ACR
C/1- 5 Cav
Contact
- 12) 5 September
A/1-16 Inf
C/1-16 Inf
Ambush



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