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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
28TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
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AVIC-WE

5 February 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

CLASSIFIED BY _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 76

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: Command Historian
APO San Francisco 96375

DOWNGRADED AT 1 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

TO: Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: OCMH (Mr. John Albright)
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
2. (U) INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 20 January 1970.
3. (U) LOCATION: Area near Bo Duc, RVN, northeast of An Loc. Map sheet 6331, XU9223. (RVN, 1:50,000)
4. (U) PERSONS INTERVIEWED:

LTC Grail L. Brookshire, 2/11th ACR Commander
 MAJ Frederick M. Franks, Jr., 2/11th ACR S-3
 MAJ Charles W. Abbey, Air Cavalry Troop Commander
 CPT Sewall H. Menzel, 2/11th ACR S-2
 CPT Peter Economos, Artillery LNO with 2/11th ACR
 CPT George R. Fish, 2/11th Howitzer Battery Commander
 1LT Kenneth Farah, Regimental Chemical Officer
 1LT Bruce E. Hilebrand, 2/11th ACR Assistant S-2
 MSG Robert Bolan, 2/11th ACR Operations Sergeant
 All aviators interviewed are listed in inclosure

5. (U) INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Regimental Historian.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: 2/11th ACR(-): F/2/11th ACR, G/2/11th ACR,

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H/2/11th ACR. Supported by How/2/11th ACR; Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR; Blue Max; TAC Air; and 4/919th Eng Co (Armored) (attached to H/2/11th ACR).

7. (U) GENERAL BACKGROUND: The Song Be isn't a sleepy little Asian River. Its waters run surprisingly clear and swift, cutting deep banks in the surrounding land. On its journey to the sea, it parallels the border that Vietnam shares with Cambodia, but after many miles, it finally turns south and flows away from the border. This area of the Song Be drainage basin is the meeting point of the boundaries of the political districts of Bo Duc, Loc Ninh, and Phuoc Binh; however, to speak of these man-made boundaries in this area seems pretentious, at best. This is a wild, physically harsh area. Its rolling hills are covered with jungle-- single, double, and triple canopy jungle. The huge jungle trees are surrounded with tangled, impassable thickets, and bamboo forests with trees three and four inches thick, yet growing like blades of grass. During the monsoons and much of the dry season as well, the ground underneath the hundred foot trees, the clinging vines, and the small bushes is wet and marshy. In the more open areas, the water can be seen, dark and murky. There are some very large grassy swamps-- all within a few miles of the border-- that become meadows during the dry season, but this area is dominated by the jungle. Flying over this area, one tends to remember the miles of seemingly endless jungle and soon forgets the occasional open areas.

There is some civilization in this area-- around Bo Duc and Bu Dop, and to the southwest, Loc Ninh. Little villages, fields, and rolling rubber trees cluster around these islands of civilization, but the ocean of jungle dominates even these areas. A road (QL14A) connects Bu Dop to QL13, Loc Ninh, and the rest of Vietnam, but it went unused for over a year and a half and, until November, 1969, was practically indistinguishable from the jungle itself. Because of the areas physical characteristics, it had proven to be almost impassable for our highly mechanized army. We would fly over, but not travel through the area on the ground. Because of this, and because of the proximity of Cambodia, the land had become a haven for the NVA. They have two major base areas, 350 and 351, in the region, and their large infiltration network known as Serge's Jungle Highway passes through it. Until rather recently, the NVA had operated freely in the area; but, slowly Allied forces began to restrict their movement.

The enemy countered this build-up with increased activity and pressure around Bu Dop. Late in November, F Troop was airlifted to Bu Dop to decrease this mounting threat. Soon after this, while operating OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM), an abortive attempt to reopen the road was made by 2/11th ACR, but they were forced to advance too rapidly and, consequently, lost many vehicles before they were finally halted. In December, the road and the jungle were assaulted again. This time, 2/11th ACR, reinforced with engineers and Rome Plows, slowly cleared the road and jungle, cutting a great swath to Bu Dop. In late December and early January, this worked continued rather uneventfully. The 2nd Squadron continued to secure the newly reopened road and the plows continued to cut an ever larger belt through the

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NVA lines of supply. At the end of 1969, it seemed that the enemy would not really contest this.

The idea was short lived. Near Bu Dop they attempted an attack during the NLF holidays in December, but B and F Troops surprised the battalion while they were still digging in and destroyed them. About two weeks later, north of Loc Ninh, our ground forces supported the Air Cavalry Troop in a large contact in which many NVA were killed. In January, although there was little significant action, there was a marked increase in enemy movement into the area. By mid-January, this movement had turned into contacts and the 2/11th ACR and the 1/11th ACR were engaged in heavy fighting in this area bounded by the Song Be and the Cambodian border.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: For about a week before the battle on 20 January, an increase in enemy activity was noticed. Gradually, reports filtered in of enemy soldiers in the area. The mechanical methods of detection also indicated a large shift in the enemy forces. Slowly these varied and isolated incidents were pieced into a picture of a large force opposing the 11th ACR forces in the area.

On 14 January, agent reports stated that the enemy was conducting squad size reconnaissance in the area around Bu Dop and the 2nd Squadron's area of operation. Two days later, seventy NVA soldiers were reported to be about three kilometers west of Bu Dop. The same day, more enemy were seen two kilometers farther north. Again, on 17 and 18 November, more reports came in of sighted enemy troops; also, a report of 100 and 500 soldiers camped on the border. Sniffer readings corroborated these agent reports with very high readings recorded south of Bo Duc along the Song Be.

Besides these reports, our intelligence people traced the movement of the enemy forces in Cambodia to areas immediately across the border from much of the 11th ACR area of operation. The 5th Division moved to a location north of Bu Dop and the 7th Division relocated to the area north of Loc Ninh. The 209th Regiment moved southwest to a location northwest of Bu Dop and five kilometers away. (Note: Besides the obvious fact that the battle indicated that the enemy's strength was large, many interesting indicators were found after the battle. Commo wire was found in the area. It ran south to north and southwest to northeast. Tire tracks were spotted on trails near the contact. During the battle, a large secondary explosion occurred when an enemy position was hit— indicating that perhaps this was also an ammo dump or supply area.)

9. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. General: 2/11th ACR had been operating for a long time in the area along QL14A to Bu Dop. They had airlifted an armored cavalry troop to Bu Dop to relieve the enemy pressure on that area. In November, they had tried to go up the road, but had been halted by the CG, 1st Air Cavalry

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Division (AM) when their losses caused by road mines became extreme.¹ They had not withdrawn from the area; instead they fortified and secured what they had. FSB Joel was developed and the stretch of road from FSB Joel to FSB Deb to QL13 was secured. In December, the next major push up the road began with Long Reach II. This time the Squadron was given the equipment to conquer the rugged terrain. A Rome Flow (Land Clearing) Company, in addition to the 919th Engineers, was placed under the control of the 2/11th ACR. With these resources, the Squadron cut a great swath to Bu Dop and cleared the road. They built a fire support base near Bo Duc named Ruth. Important strategically was the fact that now much of the enemy's primary line of communication had been severed and our second squadron was sitting astride it. Inevitably, the control of this vital link in the enemy effort would be challenged-- and of course it was.

b. Day of 20 January: The 2nd Squadron had the overall mission of conducting reconnaissance in their area of operation, securing the road, and acting as a ready reaction force. On 20 January, the individual troops had missions related to this overall mission. G Troop was securing QL14A and setting up strong points south to Deb. H Company was in the area northwest of Bu Dop to pick up C Company, 1-5, and recon in that area. F Troop was to move to Quan Loi for a stand down.

The early morning hours of 20 January were very uneventful, with all three units turning in negative situation reports, except at 0459 hours. At this time G Troop's AP#3 (located at 941210) reported hearing what they thought sounded like people chopping wood and digging positions about 200 meters from their location. The rest of the night was quiet.

The silence was shattered at about 0640 hours, when FSB Ruth began receiving incoming mortars.² Fifteen minutes later Ruth still was receiving mortars, which they suspected were coming from due west. Fortunately, all the rounds fell short-- hitting outside the perimeter. To counter the enemy fire, the 2/11th ACR TOC radioed for a pink team and Cobras to destroy the enemy gunners. Also, the organic 155mm Howitzer Battery radioed an artillery warning that they would be firing into the 912252 grid. Some artillery marker rounds were fired into the suspected area. The friendly troops in the area were

¹11th ACR was OPCON to 1st Air Cavalry Division. 2/11th ACR had been given orders to proceed up QL14A as rapidly as possible, accepting "some risk verses 100% sweep."

²The facilities at Ruth are well fortified. The FSB sits on top of a hill southwest of Bo Duc. The berm is about six to seven feet high and from outside one can only see the cupolas of the tanks and ACAV's that protect the perimeter. Inside, the ground is lower than outside causing a definite depression. Most of the men have bunkers of logs and sandbags, and the explosives are buried.

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asked to check these rounds to insure that they were clear. They were and the artillery pounded the area. Also Red Baron 7 and Blue Max struck the area after the artillery fire was checked momentarily. The enemy shelling ceased for a time.

The troops moved out on their respective missions and another routine day began. The routine was broken at 1040 hours when mortars again pounded Ruth. LTC Brookshire, who was up in the air at this time, was fired upon by enemy using .51 caliber machineguns and AK-47's, but his craft was not hit. Second Squadron sought to clear the area with the US advisor to the ARVN's, and since the area was free of friendly troops, was given the authority to fire. Blue Max gunships rolled in on the suspected area and the shelling ceased. In this second barrage, Ruth received 37 rounds with 4 duds --- they were a combination of 120mm and 82mm.

LTC Brookshire called in a pink team from the Air Cavalry Troop. They were flying over area trying to discover the enemy situation below (this was in the same area from which the mortars had been fired). The white element (LOH) had only been flying for about five minutes when it received fire. Its red element (Cobra) began to roll in and return fire but lost sight of the LOH and held its fire for fear of hitting the small helicopter. The next thing that the Cobra pilot remembered was hearing the LOH pilot on the radio, "I am hit". I am going down!" The Cobra pilot notified Second Squadron, telling them of the downed LOH, and at the same time made passes over the area trying to find the downed helicopter. Back at QUAN LOI, the Cobra pilots of the Air Cavalry Troop scrambled and were soon airborne on their way to the crash. Blue Max was also coming.

The situation had changed rapidly. At first, when only the mortars were coming in, the enemy strength appeared quite small. Now it appeared that they had a number of .51 caliber machinegun positions in the same area and probably a large number of troops. After assessing this situation, LTC Brookshire decided that he would bring in his three ground elements against the enemy. H Company would come in from the north, while F and G would move up from the south. At the time they were notified to move into the contact area, the troops were widely scattered. H Company moved overland to BO DUC, and then went westward on a secondary road. Fortunately the 4/919th Engineers were with them, and when the company came to a stream, they were able to quickly emplace an ALVB and cross. From the stream, H Company was forced to bust some jungle areas to the location where they set up a blocking position. During this last phase, MAJ Abbey, Air Cav Trp Commander, guided them from his command and control ship.

F Troop, which was on its way to QUAN LOI, had already turned on to QL13 and was heading south toward LOC NINH when it received the word to return. Since it had passed from the AO of 2/11th, LTC Brookshire checked through the Regimental Commander for permission to return F Troop. This was quickly granted and F Troop wheeled about and covered the distance in less than two hours, arriving in the contact zone immediately behind G Troop.

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MAJ Franks, 2/11th ACR S-3, was on the ground talking to the G Troop Commander about moving to the crescent to destroy the mortar positions. When the call about the downed LOH came over the radio, G Troop was able to quickly move north off QL14A and toward the contact. MAJ Franks immediately flew north over the landing zone. Since he was first on the scene, he took charge of the artillery and gunships working in the area. The CO, 2/11th ACR, in the meantime, concentrated on the overall picture — moving troops and getting fire support for the battle.

While this maneuvering was being planned and executed, the Air Cavalry Troop Cobras at the scene of the crash had located the LOH wreckage, and one Cobra, piloted by CPT Carl Marshall, had landed despite a heavy volume of enemy fire to rescue the lone survivor. This was over by 1326 hours. After this rescue, MAJ Franks had used the Cobras to fire on the western edge of the LZ. A few minutes later, the Howitzer battery at Ruth was firing. MAJ Franks shifted the Cobras to the north and used the artillery to pound the western woodline.

When the TAC Air arrived, MAJ Franks was able to ring the enemy in fire. He shifted the artillery fire to the northern woodline (the artillery was firing almost straight west from Ruth). The western woodline was now the target for the TAC Air jets coming in from the south. The eastern and southern portions of the crescent were covered by Air Cavalry Troop Cobras and Blue Max ships, both of which made a southerly pass flying over the artillery fire and then coming in low to strafe the ground.

This was the general pattern for the deployment of the various supporting fires during the afternoon. It was only changed when the TAC Air jets went off station to reload. At this time, some of the helicopters were shifted to the west. At about 1405 hours, MAJ Franks had to leave the area to refuel, so LTC Brookshire took over on location as well as continuing the overall coordination.

As the artillery, airstrikes, and gunships pounded the area, the troops of 2d Squadron were moving closer to the contact area. F Troop was thundering up dusty QL 14A. (One helicopter pilot later commented that even though he was flying far away from F Troop's location, he could see the dust they kicked up billowing skyward.) G Troop had moved almost straight north from QL 14 A and after a kilometer had hit Bau Ba Linh, a very large grassy area that is a swamp during the monsoons. It is dry now, and with its covering of four inch grass, looks quite similar to a well kept football field from the air. The troop sped across this, until they hit a stream on the northeast corner of Bau Ba Linh. The stream, which was not shown on the map, was about four feet deep and looked impassible. The B Troop commander, who was in the lead track, jumped from his vehicle and waded across the stream checking its banks and bottom. Discovering that it was fordable, he ordered his ACAV's across and then knocked down trees and placed them in the water to let the Sheridans cross. They then plunged into the single and double canopy jungle which lay between them and the crescent. Their speed was remarkable. In one and a half hours G Troop crossed the stream and busted about two kilometers of jungle to reach their objective. When MAJ Franks returned from refueling, LTC

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Brookshire directed that he guide G Troop through the jungle south of the crescent from his helicopter -- this probably speeded the movement considerably. Finally, G Troop burst out from the southern woodline, came on line, stopped, and began firing on the enemy across the field. F Troop who had followed G Troop into the area, came on line to the left of G Troop and also began firing.

Soon after the troops came on line, a helicopter filled with twenty-five E-158 CS Clusters, each weighing fifty pounds, came on station. LTC Brookshire stopped the artillery momentarily while the ship approached. As the ship flew in, he was directed toward the northside of the crescent by MAJ Abbey. The ship dropped the clusters so that they opened one hundred feet above the enemy bunkers. It was hoped that the gas would drive the conscious NVA out into the open. They dropped 13 clusters so that they opened and the men inside were preparing for the next run when they heard MAJ Abbey's voice over the radio say, "On the second run, come in just a little lower...no, wait... it's beautiful, they're running all over the place." The NVA had been driven from their bunkers and were retreating panic stricken.

LTC Brookshire immediately followed up the drop with gunships and artillery, pounding the enemy in the northern bunker positions. A few moments later at 1500 hours, G Troop charged across the open field, executed an echelon movement and swept the northeastern corner of the contact area. F Troop practically mirrored G Troop's movement, going to the northwestern corner. They maneuvered in the area until about 1730 hours when the darkness forced them to move to their night defense positions. (3)

H Company, to the north, had encountered four enemy withdrawing from the battle and had killed them. Nearby, a Pink Team had received fire and MAJ Abbey had called in artillery and Blue Max, but the results were unknown. Although the troops maneuvered for another hour, the major fighting was over by 1640 hours. The whole contact was finished by 1806 hours when MAJ Franks gave the artillery an "end of mission" radio transmission.

10. ANALYSIS: Coordination, both external and internal, was handled well and probably was the most significant reason why this was such a "textbook" battle. The contact was not in the 2/11th ACR AO, but permission to fire was quickly obtained from the US advisor to the ARVN's 3/9th Regiment, MAJ Wickham. There were no close friendlies (ARVN's). There was a company operating a few kilometers away. Initially, 2/11th ACR was not able to locate them by air, because when asked to pop smoke, they used green, which does not show against the jungle. To insure that the 2/11th ACR was firing safely, the squadron had the ground forces identify their distance from the impact area by sound. They said they were far away, so the firing continued. Also, there were no dismounted forces involved in the contact.

(3) Early the next day the 2/11th forces were called to reinforce 1/11th's contact. Because of this, 11th ACR forces did not return until two days later.

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Therefore, LTC Brookshire was able to bring in his fire support very close. A second advantage was that the troops carried enough ammunition so that no resupply was necessary during the contact.

The internal coordination was also very smooth. In effect, the man in the air over the contact controlled everything. The CO and S-3 were able to alternate with no loss in effectiveness. They were able to centralize all the actions in one C and G ship by talking to Arty and TAC Air on FM and Blue Max and Air Cav Troop on UHF. For most of the battle, the Air Cavalry Commander, MAJ Abbey, coordinated with the gunships, the CO and S-3 of 2/11 controlled the artillery and the FAC coordinated the air strikes. At different times however, LTC Brookshire had his subordinates perform special tasks (MAJ Abbey flew to the north and controlled H Company and the contact in that area. Also, at one point LTC Brookshire had MAJ Franks guide G Troop through the jungle.) At the scene of the battle, there were always between one and three Command and Control ships.

This tight control allowed the Squadron to maintain a heavy ring of fire around the enemy. They did not have to stop the artillery for the air strikes and gunships and vice-versa. These lasted during the whole contact—the airstrikes until about 1700 hours and the artillery until 1836 hours. In all, a large amount of fire support was used, as shown by this list of rounds expended: 155mm Howitzer (2/11 - 622 rds); 105mm Howitzer (ARVN's fired only in the morning - 230); Air Strikes - 14; Air Cavalry Troop Cobras - 47 strikes; Blue Max Strikes - 7.

Two very fortuitous events also made the contact go more smoothly. A few days before the contact, H Company had traveled west to a stream on whose banks they had practiced placing their ALVB. This was the same route and the same ALVB site they used on 20 January. They had, in effect, had a "dress rehearsal" a few days before. The second was that MAJ Franks had previously reconned the route over which G Troop moved to the contact.

The enemy probably consisted of two battalions. There were anti-aircraft elements, heavy mortars, and probably infantry. According to LTC Brookshire they were set up to ambush an airmobile force and "their plan almost worked." After the LOH was shot down, the Aero-Rifle Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop was notified and waiting at BU DOP. They were almost inserted in the area and if they had been "the results would have been devastating". It was difficult to determine the enemy's actual strength because after the contact the troops were only able to sweep a portion of the area. Because of fighting in other areas, 2/11th ACR did not re-enter the area until two days later, by this time the battlefield had been well policed. Unfortunately, no documents or prisoners were captured to accurately reveal the size of the enemy or his losses.

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BATTLE 65

To: REGT 0026 984th Land Clearing Co cut 121 acres. Have 34/27 plows. Starting cut at 013310, stopping cut at 003313.

Fm: E, F, G Trps, H Co 0459 Neg sitreps on $\frac{1}{2}$ hour to 0530, except at 0459 when G Trp (AP #3, 941210) reported hearing what sounds like wood being chopped and digging in on Az of 030-035 about 200-250 meters out. Will fire M-79. Neg results.

Fm: TOC 0640 Gave call to H Co. Receiving in-coming-- got fix about 1000m. Fired HE round twice-- moving fire team up now.

Fm: TOC 0655 Still receiving in-coming-- believed to be coming up by RVN Compound due west.

Fm: TOC 0700 Calling in Pink Team and Cobras.

Fm: RUTH (How Btry) 0710 Arty warning from RUTH-- firing into grid 912252.

Fm: TOC 0720 Airstrip also receiving and MAJ Wicker. No casualties.

Fm: TOC 0730 To fire marker round and have it to check if friendly clear the fire. Firing on grid 912252.

Fm: TOC 0732 Fired couple of canister rds. Neg results as yet. Still receiving in-coming.

Fm: F Trp 0735 "SPing" at this time.

Fm: Red Baron 7 0742 Going to fire on grid 912252. MAJ Wicker reports clear of his friendly.

Fm: TOC 0745 Cobras firing on grid target. How Btry to crank up on grids when air fire is clear.

Fm: Red Baron 7 0750 Spotted clearing--wants to work out there. Gave clearance to work out.

Fm: CPT Dickenson 0850 Making sweep toward east. Found mortar fins, bandages, AK rds, B-40 rds.

Fm: TOC 0920 Call in Blue Max. Checked all fire on Arty.

Fm: G Trp 0924 Sweep team moving 300m south of JERRI.

Fm: G Trp 0940 1 ACAV hit mine XU873184, 231b-- urgent dust off, back injury (was 16th vehicle in column, mine on south side of road).

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Fm: G Trp 0955 Vehicle #29 hit mine at JERRI. No casualties. Mine on right side of the road at grid 961222 (2nd vehicle in column).

Fm: G Trp Found 23lb mine 150m north of culvert on grid 853148-- wrapped in plastic, loose dirt.

Fm: G Trp 1016 Found mine (853147), new, wrapped in plastic. Found on north side, believed placed last night.

Fm: TOC 1040 Now receiving in-coming again. Told Arty to fire on same grids as before. Received about 20 rds in 3 min.

Fm: LTC 1055 Brookshire Receiving fire to his east-- no hits reported as yet. Believed AK & .51cal fire coming from 9184 and 922232.

Fm: MAJ 1100 Wicker Radar called in 930250-- MAJ Wicker clear it-- firing mortars.

Fm: Blue 1101 Max Arrived in our location, will proceed firing on grid 930250.

Fm: MAJ 1105 Wicker Confirmed location of his troops-- going to have them pop smoke.

Fm: LTC 1110 Brookshire Advising Blue Max of WP and where to fire. Adjusted fire.

Fm: TOC 1135 37 mixed with 4 duds, 120mm & 82mm from grid 930250

Fm: Red 23 1235 Believed LOH shot down grid 920231.

Fm: REGT 1245 Blue Max on the way.

Fm: TOC 1250 F & G Trps moving to where LOH shot down.

Fm: MAJ 1254 Franks .51cal located at 913235.

Fm: LTC 1305 Brookshire Get F Trp back here. Take same route as G Trp.

Fm: Blue 1315 Max Receiving ground-to-air fire 923233.

Fm: MAJ 1319 Franks Arty crank-up on grid 923210.

Fm: Red 7 1326 Picked up our downed LOH. Safe at Bu Dop.

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- Fm: RUTH 1330 Arty firing from RUTH in grid 923240.
- Fm: How Btry 1335 Requesting 80 pallets HE, 5 pallets GB, 2 pallets PD fuses.
- Fm: Blue Max 1355 Second set of Cobras have arrived.
- Fm: MAJ Franks 1405 Breaking station for fuel.
- Fm: REGT 1407 19 clusters of CS standing by.
- Fm: G Trp 1410 All vehicles across swamp at 921231.
- Fm: H Co H Co now at 935270.
- Fm: LTC Brookshire Arty check fire, bring in CS.
- Fm: LTC Brookshire 1500 G Troop charging across open area.
- Fm: H Co 1502 CPT Gilcrest-- dinks running in the open, killed two, at 933265
- Fm: H Co 1515 Report 2 more dinks killed.
- Fm: LTC Brookshire 1516 Leaving station for refuel.
- Fm: MAJ Franks & LTC Brookshire 1630 On the way back into RUTH.
- Fm: COL Starry 1640 KIA - 27, KBH - 54, KBA - 80, B Arty - 73. Total kill - 234. Dest 6 ea .51cal positions, 4 - 120mm, 4 - 82mm.
- Fm: LOH 1725 (927270) taking AK fire.
- Fm: S-3 Air 1735 Shadow ship will be on station at 1900.
- Fm: MAJ Franks 1836 Arty-- end of mission.
- To: REGT 2017 E Trp - 016295, HHT, How, 4/919 - FSB RUTH, F Trp - 924238, G Trp - 920215, H Co - 928266.
- Fm: REGT 2302 Message to LTC Brookshire: Maintenance parts and personnel requested will be at this location in morning.

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
20 January 1970: Movement during battle.

Initially, elements of 2/11th ACR were in the following locations: F Troop was on QL13, heading southward; G Troop was at coordinates 852147 at 1036 hours; H Company was located at YU018312. After the battle began, the units followed the general patterns indicated on the map. (1) This is the stream which G Troop had to cross. Soon after passing (2), F/2/11th ACR followed G/2/11th ACR into the area of the battle. When G Troop reached the area of (3), they received small arms fire. (4) indicates the location of an ARVN infantry company (from 3/9th). They initially volunteered to secure the downed LOH with a squad-- Second Squadron advised against it. The area near (5) is where H Company had their contact. (6) is the crossing site for H Company. They used an AVLB emplaced by 4/919th Engineers who were with H Company. That night the elements of 2nd Squadron were in the following locations: F Troop(XU924238); G Troop(XU920215); H Company(XU928266). The map also depicts FSB Ruth-- 2/11th ACR CP. The other lines partially the AO boundaries.

1 Sketch

SHEET - 6331
SCALE - 1:50,000

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
○ MAJ FRANK'S
holding pattern
in helicopter

NOTES:

Soon after LOH crash, MAJ Franks (2/11th S-3) arrived on site. He initially had Cobras firing into box #1. Then after artillery (How /2/11th AGR) was ready, he had artillery fire into #1. When this occurred, MAJ Franks shifted Cobras to box #2. (The artillery fire was lifted briefly when CPT Marshall, Cobra Pilot, landed in LZ to rescue the survivor of the LOH crash. During this time the Air Cavalry Troop Cobras covered him by shooting into boxes #1 and #2.)


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2 Sketch

SHEET: 6332 I
SCALE: 1:50,000



Notes:


1. Artillery (How/2/11th ACR) came from FSB Auth in an east to west direction).
 2. Cobras flew over the artillery (flying north to south), then rolled in at low altitude over targets in the eastern and southern woodland.
 3. TAC Air flew south to north, hitting targets on the western woodland. When TAC Air left, their targets were poured by helicopters which shifted over.
- (All this support was controlled from one helicopter (2/11th ACR command and Control Ship). Arty, TAC Air were on FM, while Blue Max and Air Cavalry Troop were on VHF)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3 Sketch

SHEET: 6332 I
SCALE: 1:50,000



Notes:


1. Cobras continued to fire into this area.
2. Artillery was stopped while C/S was dropped on area.
3. Immediately after C/S Drop, Artillery and Cobras strafed bunker area and to the north.
4. Soon after this, G and F troop crossed field toward bunkers.

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
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4 Sketch


SHEET: 6332 I
SCALE: 1:50,000





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
1. G Troop:  (a) Came to woodline and went on line, firing across into northern bunkers.
(b) Echeloned and moved off to the left

2. F Troop:  (aa) Followed G Troop into area. Then came on line
(bb) Moved across field and drove to the west.




ENEMY POSITIONS

SHEET: 6332 I
SCALE: 1:50,000



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NOTES:

- .51 caliber machine gun positions
- ↑ trail network
- ▨ Bunkers and fighting positions
(Had about 200 bunkers
and fighting positions)

