

RG 472
28th MHD, AARs
68-70
Box 1

LTC Reed's
Notes

Time Period 30 Jan - 7 Mar 70

During this period the Squerda was primarily involved in Rome Plan operations. A scheduled cut of roadways was suspended early in February in favor of "tactical" cuts. There was however, no specific plan for these tactical cuts, ~~and~~ and as a result, we found later that we missed the main enemy base areas sometimes by as little as 100 meters. A key here is the necessity to know the area as well as the enemy. A reconnaissance squad can move into a fairly large area and in a matter of a week know most of the major trails and many of the bunker complexes. If the mission is to deny the enemy an area and kill as many as possible, then it is necessary to screen with troops working the same area. The familiarity gained will reduce mining incidents, increase kills, deny the area to the enemy, find his bunkers and caches and in general reduce his combat effectiveness. A point here is the enemy has the advantage of being able to choose when he wants to fight. For this reason troops must be ever alert, and when contact is made

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must push aggressively forward to achieve the intention.

During the Rome Plow operation, one good fight resulted ~~from~~ ^{as a result of} the plow breaching an occupied bunker complex while making tactical cuts. On 7 February, A troop and a platoon of plows (about 8) were engaged by RPB and small arms. This successful contact had its problems. The plow operator immediately dismounted their plows and crawled underneath. It took the Troop CO the better part of two hours to not only fight the enemy but to get the plow moved out of the way. Rome Plow operators working in hostile territory must be trained to stick with their plows and maneuver them as directed - even toward the enemy if necessary. For this reason each plow operator must have a radio and must be more than just a plow operator. He must be integrated into the combat team. Such a team of plows and armored cavalry could be devastating to the enemy in jungle terrain.

With no secure LOC overland the Gumbra survived marginally by use of the helicopter; however, the turn around time between northern WZC and Tay Ninh is too great

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for the hook time available. A minimum of 16 hours per day was needed and 20 would have been sufficient. We seldom had more than 12 and had to resort to TAC E and CE sorters, often flown at night. This endangered aircraft crews and the people who must work the L-2's at night. One method used to cut down on the tonnage hauled was extensive use of the truck mounted erillator. This item alone allowed us to haul enough class III + IV daily to operate. Water was usually available in a running stream. When ~~it~~ we were too far from the stream, we erilled out of B-5 bomb holes. This water tested out well and a hole would last for as long as a week because it refilled itself at night.

Maintenance and recovery operations

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LTC

Fd like to Z April - comment: In which we had
 no major contact at all - I was busy re-positioning
 forces. I put B Trp on the ^{for} fire across the
 river into the Dog's Head - D Co we moved
 out of C. Hazard into a n. position for
 a RRF and C Trp. which was cut back
 to us early the morning of the 2nd was moved
 up into the far eastern portion of AO with
 the mission of setting up a trap line of
 automatic ambushes to try to interdict
 enemy traffic moving south. D Co tried
 to go across the culvert we had established
 about 30 March and hit 2 mines getting
 across. The enemy has is mining that
 culvert and so far has managed to evade
 our automatic ambushes and booby traps
 that we've put on the culvert & they are not
 disturbing those. and. We hit 2 and found 1
 yesterday. The other mission we had for
 the day was to take a convoy of CBL and
 other vehicles for repair back to Tay Ninh
 and pick-up some replacement vehicles &
 bring them back up. Brigade tasked us

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with additional escort missions to bring
some 8" how up from Tay Ninh and to
to take 2 8" how from Dillingworth which
had been damaged in the attack on Dillingworth
on Easter Sunday (Mar 29), ~~and go~~

This whole exercise has turned into
a major fiasco. Primarily in my opinion,
because of lack of planning at brigade
level and lack of a full appreciation of the mine-sweepers problem in taking
convoy roads which have been mined
over many years. The bde. has absolutely
no concept of how long it takes to do
a minesweep or how much effort goes into it,
and what time element is involved when
a vehicle does hit a mine. We hit 2 mines
yesterday in an area we had been told
that had been swept. When we actually finished
checking the thing out we discovered that the
2 mine-sweepers teams had each assumed that
the other had finished the last few 100 meters
of road. Fortunately I think both vehicles
were already CBI being taken south
and so little problem there.

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The other problem we have had with the Bde. Engrs. is that their ability to build culverts that will withstand water. They do not seem to have a true appreciation of what size a culvert needs to be and what type of const. needs to be put into it for a lasting bridge that will take 60 ton vehicles. They are learning and with a little bit of help from us they are going to get the culvert problem solved. That was pretty much the action for the day of 2 April.

4 April morning

On day of 3rd April, the primary activity aside from the convoys moving north which was finally able to get through because we brought the AVLB up and put it down the culvert south of the airstrip. The primary activity was a small contact by C 7ys. C 7ys's mission was to set out a trap-line of automatic obstacles from our E. most boundary in the vic of 0889 south west down to the vic of the culvert across the Suoi Da Ha River at 030855. They were working

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up along the border and actually had
 got right along the edge of the border at
 about 062885 when they received 1
 rd of RPG from the woods on their south
 side. The RPG hit the TC's cupola
 on an ACAV - killed a Tiger Scout and
 severely injured the TC and both of the gunners.
 The AR A party were both brought in
 very rapidly on the positions. The 7ys
 turned south & headed into a bunker
 complex which was discovered by
 the S-3, Maj A. and a Pink Team which
 was on station. We brought in a couple
 of air strikes on the bunker complex and
 put a lot of 155mm howitzers and then
 moved C 7 up on in. C 7 found about
 a plat - or maybe Co-sized bunker
 complex, blood trails, some ammo, some
 documents. The initial read-out show
 I believe it is the 66th ST ward which
 is a COSVN headquarters guard outpost.
 The interesting part about the action, although
 we didn't ^{see} ~~see~~ the enemy and weren't able
 to count for any in bodies.

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Sometime during the period when C 7-ys was in the contact area, an enemy soldier went right out in the open in the general vic of OSPP 74 and laid 2 mines in the tracks that C 7-ys had made going north. When they began to return to their NPP they hit one of the mines with a Shep. and then found the other mine.

~~Not being able to get the Shep~~

April 4 was relatively quiet except for a few interesting things. C 7-ys on their way out of the contact area of 3 Apr had blown a pack on a Shep. and they were trying to tow it out when they hit a mine and it put them in a position where it was getting late of not being able to get the Shep that hit the mine back into their NPP. So I made a decision to leave it in place, it was within seeing distance of the border about 3 or 400 meters where the contact was. I told them to leave it, strip it of all ammo & guns that they could and looky trap it, leave apito - embushes nearby. They did this and came on in to

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their NCP. I went out the next morning
 to retrieve the reb. I see what happened
 to it. Sometime in the process of coming back
 to the NCP, somebody had dropped a case of
 C-rations, and there were 9 C-ration
 meals that had been eaten out of the case
 of C-rations by every soldier. Then
 they had set off the auto-ambush near
 the Sher. They had not made it to the
 Sher. although they were obviously headed
 in that direction. The auto-ambush evidently
 disengaged them. We didn't get any bodies,
 but there were 4 huge pools of blood w/
 the ambush & drag-marks leading away from
 it. We retrieved the Sher, and the only
 other activity of the 4th was 3 g-to-air firings
 at the following locations: near 0088, 015874,
 005870. These were one g-to-a-firing on me,
 one on MAT A, and one on the Pink Team working
 in the area. I think it was mostly AK although
 there may have been one SI cal. involved.
 A Trip moved in the area of the last one
 I mentioned but was unable to get anything
 out of it. We did fire quite a bit of arty in
 there but w/no results.

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The primary activity for the day of the 4th and 5th aside from just screening & checking auto-ambushes has been retrieving D Co. They had 4 veh down to mines & 2 to mech. problems.

It is now noon, 6 Apr. and we have had no enemy contacts. It would appear at this time that D Co by tonight will be able to drag out of their RDP and back into C. Hazard as a RPF and for main stand-down for them.

A Trip, which has now completed its main stand-down, is moving out operating w/ B Trip, in the vec of 7887. This will by tonight put us across the Northern portion of the Dog's Head with A Trip in west, B Trip in the center and C Trip in the east with D Co in the Camp Hazard. NOP.

We have had visitors.

Gen. Rossen 5th, Gen. Roberts, 6th - Regt CD, Col. Arkes, the Bde CO Gen. Shumacher, ADC of Operations are in for visits. It is expected

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One more activity for 5 Apr. We did run a re-supply convoy to Tay Ninh, brought up 5 replacement veh. The primary problem of resupply convoys continues to be mine-sweep assistance from the Inf. They seemed to have not yet learned to mine-sweep in a rapid manner and provide us the assistance we need there to cover the approach. 30 kilo of food load to Tay Ninh. We did finish the re-supply convoy, took the CP 8" from 32 field out, brought over our own veh. up and closed Camp Hazard about 2000A -

Afternoon of 6 Apr.

The after. of 6 Apr. was spent in trying to move B Co from their NPP to C. Hazard. We finally had to leave one tank, the VTR and other veh. with C 7th for the night and were able to get most of B Co into Hazard by around midnight Apr. 6.

The day of Apr 7 was spent trying to get B Co back in and to take 2 CB Gliders to Tay Ninh airstrip where

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we could get them later with low-log trunks. The same tips worked their onto ambushes & continued to screen across the border with no sig. activity.

On the day of the 8, we shifted 7ys ~~and~~ because we were having no act, we shifted tips, moving B 7ys further west into the very tip end of the DSH, as far west as we could go, -

Now night of 8 Apr, B 7ys is located in vic. 960885 with the mission tomorrow to move into a suspicious-looking area about of 1000 meters west of that. A 7ys remains in the vic of 9887 grid -

C 7ys we have ^{moved} northeast of their previous location where they were draining a blank into the gen. vic. 0007 They'll move W from there in the next 2 days.

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
1/11th ACRNOTES

3,4 April - shown on overlay

5 - about same location as 4th

6 - A Trip was at FSB Hagar
 B Trip - 6+ kilometers north west of Hagar.
 C Trip - 6 kilometers northwest of Hagar.
 D C - between B & C.

7 April - ?



During this time (3-6), there was a lot of rain in the Quan Loi to Dogs Neck area. It was almost like the monsoons with huge billowing clouds, reaching a highpoint in the late afternoon and evening - the rain, Quan Loi turned to mud (the dust left though). 1st Squadron LNO (1LT Ed. Greene) stated that if rain continued for a few days, 1/11th would not be able to move. LTC Reed was quite concerned. On 8 April it cleared up and looks as if the rains haven't really come yet.

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