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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D SQUADRON 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

AVIC-ZT

11 April 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report - ATLAS WEDGE

Commanding Officer
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
ATTN: S3
APO 96257

Attached is a reconstruction of 3d Squadron's participation in ATLAS WEDGE, forwarded for use by Regiment in preparing a recommendation for award of the Presidential Unit Citation.

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as

JOHN W. McENERY
LTC Armor
Commanding

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-88 BY SP-6
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Intelligence reports indicated that on or about 17 March 1969, the 7th NVA Division was located in the vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. It was believed at that time to consist of the following units with strengths as indicated:

141st Regiment - 1000 men

165th Regiment - 1400 men

320th Regiment - 1350 men

According to estimates, the 7th NVA Division would proceed south via the Saigon River Corridor and continue the protracted TET offensive of 1969 in the Saigon area. It was later learned that the mission of the 320th Regiment which was successfully engaged by the 11th ACR was to secure supply and infiltration routes north/south through the Michelin, the enemy's MSR from Cambodia to the Saigon area.

In response to this enemy threat, the 11th ACR was alerted on 17 March 1969 to move into the Michelin on 18 March 1969. The 11th ACR was to pre-empt a three division operation called Atlas Wedge, and was to move into the eastern part of the Michelin based on intelligence and contacts established by Air Cav Troop on 16 and 17 March 1969.

In response, the 3d Squadron departed AO BOOTS at 0500 on 18 March 1969, conducted a road march west along rte ZINC to rte 13 then north along rte 13 to XT793546 where it ran into the tail end of 1/11 ACR which was beginning the march southwest from XT793546 to the Michelin. The order of march was H/2/11, M/3/11, L/3/11, and the Squadron Jump CP and they had arrived vicinity XT793546 by 0730.

The Regiment (-) movement was slow because the cross country route into the Michelin, a distance of about 20 km, had three "choke" points. Each of

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these was secured by elements of A/2-28 Inf, combat air assaulted in ahead of the ground troops. As each squadron passed through each "choke" point, the A/2-28 Inf element there passed OPCON to that squadron.

The third and final "choke" point was vicinity XT615522 and as 1/11 ACR crossed that point, A/2-28 Inf fell back into an area vicinity XT617521 which it secured and later became FSB DOC.

The squadrons had been prepared to use AVLB's at these "choke" points, however none was required as the Engineer sweep teams were able to clear a path across these critical areas along an existing road throughout this 600 m wide rone plowed swath.

3d Squadron's move southwest along this swath which paralleled the Binh Long, Binh Duong Province boundary, behind 1/11 ACR was uneventful, but slow.

In the meantime, HHT closed out BANDIT HILL, vicinity XT862362, turned the control of AO BOOTS over to TF 2-28 Inf and began its road march by 1000. I Troop was passed OPCON to TF 2-28 Inf and remained at BANDIT HILL. How/3-11 was passed OPCON to TF 2-28 Inf and remained at FSB JIM vicinity XT883394. K Troop which had at the time of 3d Squadron's departure been OPCON to IIFPV securing Rome Flows east of Bien Hoa, was released from its OPCON at 1200 and returned to the Regimental AO, AO MUSTANG, OPCON to TF 2-28 Inf and had relocated by late 18 March in AO SADDLE.

HHT arrived at the new CP vicinity XT790545, set up, and the TOC was operating by 1335. Its move had also been uneventful, having traversed the same route of march.

By late afternoon, 1/11 ACR had deployed its two AVLB's vicinity XT613521 and XT604515, and had proceeded across them into its new AO.

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Likewise, 3/11 ACR had proceeded across the first AVLB, and headed toward the northwest (see Annex A). H Co proceeded along the east flank of the Squadron AO into a heavily wooded area vicinity XT598526 which allowed its progress. M Co moved parallel but to the west of H Co and found movement less difficult. L Trp followed M Co. The Sqdn CO overflowed the movement and directed ground elements.

While this movement progressed, a Fink Team in support of 3d Squadron found and located a base camp BC1 (Annex A) and M Co continued movement in this direction.

Meanwhile L Trp, a pure Recon Troop, following close behind M Company, was maneuvered by the Sqdn CO to a potential crossing point across a marshy streamline from which it was to be deployed against another base camp, BC2 (Annex A), that had been discovered earlier by the Fink Team.

By 1600, M Co having only two of its maneuver platoons, had established contact and engaged an unknown enemy force vicinity BC1 (Annex A). Exchanging heavy fire with the surprised enemy it became apparent that infantry would be needed to support this attack.

A/1/5 Cav had been operating in the Michelin for some time. It had not been engaged and was placed OPCON to 3d Squadron upon 3d Squadron's assumption of the eastern section of the Michelin. The Sqdn CO immediately called for lift support and two platoons of A/1/5 Cav were lifted from its RON position (Annex A) to an LZ vicinity XT579538. On the arrival of the initial infantry platoon it was placed OPCON to M Co and joined in the contact.

L Trp continued to move toward BC2 (Annex A) from the east. At the intended crossing site of the north/south stream to the east of BC2, L Trp saw and engaged a small VC/NVA element vicinity XT575538 and reported

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8 probable kills. The marshy ground along the stream prevented L Trp from crossing and the Sqdn CO moved the troop farther north to find another suitable crossing site.

Meanwhile, TM M continued its attack, now having gained an infantry platoon, and the continuation carried them on into BC4 (Annex A).

H Co by this time had broken out of the heavily wooded area and following the same route had reached the LZ where the second air inserted platoon of A/1/5 Cav was placed OPCON to H Co (-).

The Scouts from Air Cav Trp had found another active base camp vicinity BC3 (Annex A). Now having three maneuver elements TM H swept between BC1 and BC4 (Annex A) on into BC3 (Annex A). As TM H approached, it came under heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire. Though the battle lasted only from 1710-1730, it was furious and a good fight. Two tanks were hit by RPG's, one caught fire and burned becoming a combat loss. The other, though hit, was not a combat loss and was towed back to FSB DOC the next morning. Though 4 tankers sustained wounds, 6 NVA KIA's were found along with 1 RPG7 and launcher and 1 AK47. To evacuate the wounded, an LZ was cleared several hundred meters northwest of BC3 (Annex A) and this was later to become TM H's NDP for the night.

L Trp had continued north. About 1700, it reached a crossing point and turned west. As L Trp crossed the stream, it came into a dense blizzard of RPG fire, however most of the rounds were exploding in the trees due to the lack of fields of fire. The unknown size VC force put up a determined fight. The L Trp CO maneuvered one of his platoons to the north so as to envelop the enemy from a second direction. In the process, two troopers from the initial platoon sustained wounds and several ACAV's were ordered back to the east, to

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clear an LZ so that they could be evacuated. The ferocity of the contact picked up again as the dustoff arrived. Both platoons were receiving dense fire and 10 more casualties were sustained, one a platoon leader of the platoon hooking south, who was DOA upon arrival at the hospital in Lai Khe. He was the only US KIA on 18 March 1969. As darkness approached, the intensity of the contact subsided long enough for L Trp to identify 6 NVA KIA, but a complete sweep of the area was not possible until morning. L Trp pulled back to its LZ area after completing all its dustoffs and this became their NDP for the night.

By 1810, TM M's sweep had resulted in 34 NVA KIA and 5 POW's. The aggressiveness of TM M's initial contact had been overwhelming and it was rewarded by only 1 casualty who was evacuated early in the fight, and no losses in vehicles or equipment. Additionally TM M found a number of weapons and supplies including 2 heavy machineguns with spare barrel, 1 RFG with launcher, 6 bicycles, 1 Chicom machinegun, 1 AK47, several .51 Cal cans ammo, and assorted documents. As darkness fell, TM M pulled back to its LZ and set up its NDP for the night.

While this transpired, the CIDG Co from MINH THANH (XT630663), which had been OPCON to the Air Cav Trp and working in the jungle east of the Michelin vicinity XT5956, was led back into the rubber to RON. As the CIDG Co cleared the jungle, OPCON passed to 3/11 AGR as Air Cav Trp could not provide C&C during the hours of darkness. Then at 1700, the CIDG Co encountered an unknown size enemy force, engaged them, and killed 2 NVA while sustaining 2 casualties who were later dusted off. Thereafter, the CIDG Co proceeded to XT585567 where it established its NDP.

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Through this, A/1/5 Cav diminished in strength by 2 platoons, remained in its same location vicinity XT576563 which was to become its NDP.

A/1/5 Cav (-) had no contact on 18 March 1969.

By 1940 all 3d Squadron elements had secured their NDP's. This included A/2-28 Inf securing FSB DOC which contained 1 155 artillery battery SP (B/8-6), a 105 artillery battery towed (D/1-7), the 3d Squadron Jump CP, and unit trains. SPOOKY was called in and was on station providing illumination to the previously engaged TM's/Co's in the Michelin and fire support if required. However, the night was quiet and the NVA did not attempt counter-attacks.

The time of day had precluded a total accounting of results of the sweeps and renewed sweeps the next morning found many blood trails and drag marks which substantiated estimates that the actions had been considerably more successful than the total bodies and weapons/equipment found would indicate. One extremely valuable find on 18 March was a POW who had been a Co 1SG in the 320th Regiment, and the intelligence that he as well as others provided was exceedingly accurate and greatly predicated our actions in the days that followed.

As the sun rose the next morning, the sweeps began anew. Among the many finds, TM M found two more previously unaccounted for NVA KIA in its contact area. Likewise forces were shifted to strengthen each element. Trp L sent a platoon north to A/1/5 Cav (-) as well as a platoon to TM H. In exchange, TM H released a platoon of tanks (only 3 as 2 had been hit during the 18 March fight) which joined L Trp giving it the firepower it had lacked the previous day.

Upon completion of the re-alignment of forces, the sweeps were renewed

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in earnest along the routes shown (Annex B). Each element's RIF employed recon by fire and other techniques hoping to generate a good fight. The CIDG returned OPCON to Air Cav Trp and again departed the rubber into an area east of the Michelin vicinity XT5957.

At 1045 TM M received sporadic small arms fire and returned fire but no maintainable contact ensued. A sweep of the contact area did result in 1 NVA KIA without US casualties.


At 1120 TM H received small arms and RPG fire and by rapid and aggressive reaction was able to kill 5 NVA while suffering only 1 casualty. A sweep of the contact area vicinity XT584545 resulted in 3 AK47's, 2 RPG2 launchers, 10 RPG2 rounds with boosters, 9 Chicom grenades, 1 US grenade, 1 82mm mortar round, and assorted web gear.

Progress was slow throughout the day due to the extensive bunker complexes found by all elements. These bunkers demanded a cautious, thorough search and clearance as well as destruction.

At 1155, elements of A/2-28 tasked with the security of the vital AVLB's, received several RPG rounds vicinity the AVLB at XT604515. The volume of return fire apparently was sufficient to silence the enemy, but its strength, mission, and lack of rapid mobility precluded its sweeping the area. Aerial VR could not generate further contact nor identify any results of the return fires.

RIF's continued and many bunkers, most of which were relatively new with overhead cover, of varied dimensions, were discovered and destroyed without further contact.

Around 1300, the sqdn S-2 accompanied by the intel officer from 541st MI was conducting an aerial VR along the edges of the Michelin when their UH-1D



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drew heavy machinegun fire from several .51 Cal machineguns located vicinity XF554586. The aircraft applied evasive tactics and returned fire as it evacuated the area but not before being hit by at least one round which slightly wounded the right door gunner. It returned to FSB DOC where the ship was inspected prior to evacuating its own crewman.

Intelligence wheels were grinding and based on the latest input it was decided at a 1500 meeting to move 3/11 ACR elements north out of the rubber to BUICK (Annex C) from which elements would initially form a blocking force to cover planned B-52 strikes that would be conducted that night and early next morning (Annex C). Also 1/11 ACR was to move into what had been the 3/11 ACR AO and responsibility of FSB DOC was to be chopped to 1/11 ACR.

Although 3/11 ACR forces were well deployed for this move, the necessity for resupply impeached immediate redeployment as each of the combat troop's trains was at FSB DOC.

This change in mission also necessitated an early termination of the RIF's. The extent of each element's advance is shown by the arrowheads (Annex B). Each TM started its march south to the resupply point which was moved west of FSB DOC to expedite redeployment (Annex B).

Prior to TM M's move at 1505, vicinity XF582548, while searching at base camp, the troops found 2 12.7 heavy machineguns, 1 light machinegun, 1 AK47, 1 RRG2 launcher, 6 82mm mortar rounds, 4 rifle grenades, 500 7.62 rounds, 60 AK47 rounds, 300 12.7mm rounds, 8 protective masks, 2 lbs of documents, web gear, and assorted items of personal and field gear.

As each element arrived at the resupply point (Annex C), it was refueled, maintenance checks performed, personnel fed, etc. When this was completed, it headed north toward BUICK (Annex C) as soon as it was ready to go.

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The order of departure was M, L, A, each following the other along the route shown (Annex C). By 1800, each of these elements had departed the resupply point and H had arrived. TM H's delay was caused by some extensive base camp destruction it was required to complete.

In addition, Air Cav Trp had again returned the CIDG Co to 3/11 ACR OPCON for the night, leaving it vicinity XT564565 where 3/11 ACR would pick it up during the northward move toward BUICK (Annex C).

A SPOOKY was called in to support the move north as it would be long after dark before all elements would reach BUICK. Also, rather than letting the CIDG Co settle and become stationary, the Sqdn CO directed it to start moving north until the mounted elements caught up with them.

At 1900, as the CIDG Co marched north vicinity XT563569, they reported seeing a relatively good sized group of NVA moving south toward them vicinity XT562572. The CIDG Co was ordered into a hasty ambush, the LOH C&C orbited approximately 2 km's to the south, a LFT was called in to support and also orbited off to the south, TM's M, L, and A were pushed to move more rapidly and everyone awaited the ambush to be triggered.

By 1915, the ambush was popped and the CIDG Co killed 3 NVA and captured their weapons and equipment. Contact was established and maintained while supporting elements piled on. Shortly, TM M was deployed on line having moved from XT573568 at the triggering of the ambush and began to sweep north (Annexes C & D). Shortly thereafter, TM L joined them (Annexes C & D).

It was an excellent fluid operation, just as successful as had been hoped. TM M and L's pursuit was outstanding, being conducted after dark, with headlights on under SPOOKY illumination. By the time contact ceased, 10 more NVA KIA and 1 NVA POW (WIA) were added to the list including

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additional weapons and equipment, all without a single friendly casualty.

The northward move continued. By this time, C/1-11 which had also entered the AO OPCON to 3-11 ACR about 1500 was located vicinity XT580538, TM A had closed on TM M and L, and TM H had departed the resupply point.

Then, most abruptly, the march halted at 2050. Intelligence gathered by Regiment dictated a different move and adjustments would rapidly be forthcoming. Every unit was directed to hold in position for the night. TM's M, L, A and the CIDG Co formed a common NDP perimeter as shown (Annex C). TM H was ordered back to the resupply point to RON (Annex C) and C/1-11 was ordered to RON in position (Annex C).

The remainder of the night was quiet and uneventful save for the three B-52 strikes which fell in the boxes shown (Annex C).

At first light, TM H began its move north to join the other elements of 3-11 ACR vicinity the previous night's contact area (Annex E).

During the night, intelligence information was disseminated necessitating that 1-11 ACR return to its previous AO to 3-11 ACR's west and continue its previous mission and that 3-11 ACR would remain in its old AO.

The Regimental CO called an early morning meeting at FSB DOC to map out his intelligence finds and determine what the best response would be.

This in progress, the ARP's were inserted into the B-52 areas to conduct a BDA. The CIDG Co was similarly inserted in a different location vicinity XT590569 with a BDA mission again OPCON to Air Cav Trp.

Results of the Commander's meeting had C/1-11 returning to 1-11 ACR (Annex E) to join its westward and northwestward RIF through the rubber while 3-11 ACR was to gravitate southward throughout the day.

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By the time all was settled and the Sqdn CO had rejoined his troops in the field, TM H had moved to a location just south of the 4 other TM's/Co's RON position in the area of the previous night's contact (Annex E). Then, upon receiving guidance, each TM commander moved his troops southward generally along the axes shown (Annex E). Missions were to find the enemy, generate a fight, and destroy any base camps found enroute.

The TM's proceeded as directed. At 1045, TM L while searching a base camp area vicinity XT555568, found 1 Chicom grenade, 2 packs, and documents.

Nothing of significance occurred then until approximately 1400 when the ARP's came upon an active base camp that had not been hit by the B-52 strike the night before. The ARP's were engaged by intensely severe fire, suffered several casualties and were completely pinned down.

At 1426, upon request of the CO, Air Cav Trp, the Sqdn CO immediately turned TM A around and started moving them to relieve the ARP's. Within minutes, he added a platoon of tanks from TM M which, with a white element overhead, was directed to retrace its steps and join TM A as soon as possible. The white element guided them north (Annex E).

The multi-reaction was rapid and the tank platoon caught TM A as it turned southward and passed them by at this point in order to lead down a trail to the BDA site (Annex E).

Air Cav Trp covered the ARP's without further damage being sustained until the arrival of TM A, now consisting of one platoon each of tanks, ACAV's, and infantry.

Meanwhile, TM L at 1515, found a base camp at XT562545. Its search yielded 4000 lbs rice, 50 82mm mortar rounds, 1 120mm mortar tube and tripod, 44 120mm mortar rounds, 30 Chicom grenades, 2 bicycles, 10 107mm rockets, 50 charges for 120mm mortar rounds, and assorted gear and documents.

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At 1545, the CIDG Co then vicinity XT594563 in the southern portion of the same BDA area saw and engaged 3 NVA. It was supported by one LFT and results netted 1 NVA KIA.

At 1550, TM M located a base camp vicinity XT570540. Its search yielded 3000 lbs rice, 9 Chicom grenades, 7 RPG2 rounds, 7 60mm mortar rounds, 1 12.7 heavy machinegun.

Upon arrival of TM A in the BDA area, the Sqdn CO placed them UPCON to the Air Cav Trp CO as the AO was his as were the ARP's on the ground. The enemy base camp was located in a wooded area and the terrain around it was relatively clear of dense vegetation. As the armored vehicles approached the ARP's, some of the ARP's were able to join in and reinforce TM A. The tanks initially set out to cut a swath around the woods which was accomplished in short order. Throughout, there was sporadic contact characterized by heavy small arms and RPG fire. Once the swath was completed, TM A began sweeping back and forth through the wooded area between the swath (Annex F). On its first pass through the area, it came under intense small arms and RPG fire. The tank platoon leader's vehicle was the first target and RPG splash caught him in the face, blinding him, yet he continued the sweep but because he could not see, his tank fell into a bomb crater, removing it from further action (Annex F). Almost as quickly, three more of his tanks received heavy RPG fire knocking all three out of action. They caught fire and eventually burned becoming combat losses. The one remaining tank plus ACAV's and infantry made one more attack through a portion of the well fortified enemy base camp. By this time control among the elements on the ground had become critical. The one remaining tank no longer had radio communication. Therefore the Sqdn CO, who had replaced

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
the Air Cav Trp CO when he had to refuel, landed to take command. The need was for one final attack against the remaining hard core of the base camp. He positioned the tank in the center, flanked it with ACAV's, and placed the infantry on line to the rear. For control he mounted the back deck of the tank and used arm and hand signals to control the attack (Annex F). The enemy did not flee but continued strong resistance. Halfway through the base camp, the Sqn CO was hit by fragments from an enemy hand grenade, but continued directing the operation. On the return sweep, the attacking force retraced its steps through the base camp past two burning tanks which had already exploded and one which though burning had not yet exploded.

It was very late in the afternoon and much needed to be accomplished before darkness. As all enemy fire had subsided, TM A pulled back to the area it had been using as an LZ and prepared to RON for the night. Dustoff missions continued, the ARP's were extracted, the tank in the bomb crater was recovered, and the NDP was established in a tight and well dug in perimeter. Throughout, the Air Cav Trp had supported and there had been no reported enemy sighted fleeing the contact area.

Minor contacts continued as late as 1900 when the remaining two tanks from H Co saw and engaged 5 NVA. The violent nature of the afternoon's contact made any appraisal of enemy losses impossible that night. As such only two NVA KIA were reported though 72 more would be found the next morning in the enemy bunkers. The US, on the other hand, sustained 2 KHA (1 ARP and 1 L Trp), and 21 WHA (only 2 serious), all of whom were evacuated.

When the Sqn CO had originally joined the forces on the ground, the Regtl CO notified the Sqn S3 that he was in command of the squadron until the Sqn CO was airborne again. The S3 continued with the remaining squadron

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elements to accomplish the original OPLAN which called for an afternoon resupply around 1600, then movement of TM H to join the CIDG Co at DODGE, and finally the joining of TM L and TM M (now with only 1 tank platoon) vicinity OLDS for the night (Annex G).

There had been no battles during the afternoon involving the remainder of the squadron. The limit of each TM's advance is shown (Annex E). As each TM completed sweeping the base camp it was in, it started back to the resupply point about 1600. Each TM resupplied and headed back to the north (Annex G).

TM H was the first to depart and headed to rendezvous vicinity DODGE (Annex G) with the CIDG Co which had been led out of the B-52 BDA area by an Air Cav Trp helicopter. About the time the S3 was placed in command, the Regt CO who had been overflying the action flew south and picked up TM H (Annex G) to help lead them to the CIDG force which was already at DODGE (S3 at that point did not yet have a helicopter).

Shortly after TM H's departure north, TM M completed resupply and started north to bypass the same north/south stream, head south and eventually rendezvous with TM L at OLDS to RON in this ambush/blocking position for the night.

TM L was late in returning to resupply due to the extensive base camp they had found and destroyed. TM L passed TM M just north of the resupply point as it headed in and TM M headed out.

TM H and CIDG Co once together at DODGE organized and placed in position 4 joint AP's plus a joint NDP centrally located (Annex G).

TM M continued its move north. As TM M approached what was to become their night RON position about 1815 (Annex G), they came under sporadic

small arms fire from the west across the streamline. TM M returned fire and for about 30 minutes ripped up the area with its firepower. The NVA ceased fire and withdrew.

Meanwhile, the Regtl CO landed at FSB DOC, talked with the ARP's as they arrived after extraction, and then with the S3 at about 1845 as the Sqdn CO had just been evacuated.


TM L had resupplied and departed the resupply point at 1830 also heading north.

Circumstances dictated a change in mission and by 1900 it was decided to forego OLDS. TM L would join TM M in the area of its just terminated contact and RON in that position (Annex G).

The S3 went airborne and led TM L to TM M's position as darkness fell over the Michelin. A SPOOKY was called in to support and DEFCON's were called in for adjustment to strengthen defense of the RON positions, especially in the TM A area of contact.

By 2045 TM L had rendezvoused with TM M, and all aircraft had to depart the area due to a B-52 strike being placed several km north of the Michelin by the 1st Cav Div.

At 2100, vicinity XT584555, TM H's AP3 spotted and engaged 3-4 VC moving to the west. Small arms and RPG fire was the NVA response wounding one US trooper, but the NVA suffered 1 KIA in the exchange and the loss of 1 AK47. At 2105, TM A suffered 1 WHA within its NDP when fragments from one of the still burning tanks RPG'd earlier that afternoon found a troop during one of its many explosions. A dustoff was called in and by 2200 had successfully extracted both WHA.



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Illumination by SPOOKY resumed by 2145 of the TM M and L NDP. Its brightness as before continued to illuminate TM H's AP4, and the AP was withdrawn back to TM H's NDP as had AP3 after its sweep of the contact area and dustoff. DEFCON adjustment continued and upon its completion, the situation remained uneventful for the remainder of the night.

By early morning of 21 March 1969, the 11th ACR had lost half of its AO and it was decided to move 1-11 ACR into what had been 3-11 ACR's AO and pull 3-11 ACR back to FSB DOC to stand down for a day pending further developments. This exchange was expedited and 1-11 ACR moved into the AO via one of the AVLB's secured by a platoon from A/2-28 Inf. TM L and M had moved south directed by the XO who had moved forward and assumed command from the S3 at about 0830. The column stood aside as 1-11 ACR passed them at the resupply point. TM H and the CIDG Co remained at DODGE where they would eventually link up with 1-11 ACR upon its arrival at DODGE.

TM A was initially placed OPCON to Air Cav Trp on 21 March to sweep the previous day's contact area (Annex G). Still configured with the two remaining tanks from M, the platoon of ACAV's from L, and its own platoon of infantry, TM A began a systematic search and destruction of the base camp. By 0930, the camp had been destroyed and the results yielded 74 KIA, 24 AK47 rifles, 4 AK50 rifles, 20 SKS rifles, and 80 bunkers destroyed. These weapons were recovered, however, there still remained many destroyed bunkers from the previous day's activity which were not dug up due to the extent of damage to them. It is fairly safe to say that these bunkers would also have yielded yet more bodies and weapons.

By 1200, TM's L and M had arrived at FSB DOC, had reorganized, and were

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standing down pulling maintenance. Air Cav Trp had just about completed leading TM A back to FSB DOC and there was no enemy activity noted anywhere within the Regimental AO.


Upon TM A8s arrival at FSB DOC, untasking was completed returning all platoons to their parent Trp/Co headquarters.

3-11 ACR remained in this status until 23 March 1969 when it was alerted to depart the Michelin area and return south to AO BOOTS from whence it had come prior to Atlas Wedge.


3-11 ACR's short participation in Atlas Wedge yielded significant results. 3-11 ACR had in that period, in conjunction with other 11th ACR elements rendered the 320th NVA Regiment combat ineffective as well as inflicting casualties to other 7th NVA Division line and rear service units. Additionally, 3-11 ACR had contributed significantly to the intelligence input that was to form the basis of high level decisions for sometime to follow, not only regarding Atlas Wedge, but in other operational areas as well.

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• RON - A/1/5



ANNEX A
 3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEDGE
 Movement into Michelin - 18 March 1969
 1:50,000




GP 4
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
 AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 87354
 By JW NARA Date 11-15

CONFIDENTIAL




○
RESUPPLY
AREA

○ YSB EX

ANNEX B
3-11 ACR -- ATLAS 12222
Sweeps of Contact Areas and Additional RIFs
Morning and Afternoon - 19 March 1962
1:50,000

OF 2
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By JW NARA Date 11-15



CONFIDENTIAL

60
54



○ RON
M L A CIG

○ ENEMY



B52
BOX

B52 BOX

○ C
RON

M
L
A

ANNEX C
3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEDGE
The Northward Move
1:50,000

Resupply Area

○ H RON
late resupplying

○ FSB DCG


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AFTER 12 YEARS

62
50

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By JW NARA Date 11-15

60
55



ANNEX E
3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEG
Daylight Opns - 25 March 1969
1:50,000

GP 1
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AFTER 12 YEARS

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
North

TMA

ORCON Air Cav Troop

LZ Sqdn CO landed to reorganize and direct second sweep of the hard core of the enemy basecamp

Bomb craters ARF's initially pinned down in



Bomb crater pl't ldr's tank fell in

ANNEX F

3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEDGE

Diagram of BDA contact - 20 March 1969


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57
+
-60



ANNEX G
 3-11 ACR - ATLAS WEDGE
 Night Activities - 20 March 1969
 1:50,000


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GP 4
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
 AFTER 12 YEARS

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 Authority NND 873541
 By JW NARA Date 11-15

ANNEX B OP OVERLAY-- ATLAS WEDGE
TO FRAGO : 106 TO OPORD 4-68
(Campaign TOAN THANG PHASE III) (U)
MAP RELIEF: 1: 50000

HQ 11TH ARMD CAV REGT
LAI KHE (YT 769 382) RVN
221200 H March 1969



NOTE: COPY NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

SHEET 1 OF 1 SHEET

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