

RB 472  
11th ACR  
53 AARs  
CG-17  
Box 1

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COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT  
OPERATION SANTA FE



11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Downgraded at 3 Year  
Intervals; Declassified  
After 12 Years.  
DOD Dir 5200.10

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WDP NARA D-115 9/5/01

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1. (U) REFERENCES:

a. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment OPOD 25-67 (Operation SANTA FE.),  
30 Oct 67

b. Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L70L, Sheets 6430 I, IV; 6431 II,  
III; 6530 IV; 6531 III; 6534 IV.

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: SANTA FE was a reconnaissance in force operation, combined with road clearing and convoy escort.

3. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: SANTA FE was conducted from 1 Nov 67 through 3 Dec 67.

4. (U) LOCATION: The area of operations was the May Tao Secret Zone and along Highway 1 from Gia Ray east to the II/III Corps Tactical Zones Boundary.

5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Operation SANTA FE was controlled by Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division. The reporting officer for this operation is Colonel Roy W. Farley, Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

6. (C) GENERAL: Operation SANTA FE was undertaken to reestablish friendly control of the area to the east of Blackhorse Base Camp along National Highway 1. Beyond this, it was conceived as an encirclement of the May Tao Secret Zone area in an attempt to trap and destroy numerous Viet Cong units, including the Headquarters of the 5th Viet Cong Division, believed to be operating in this region. During this time, the 2d Squadron continued Operation KITTYHAWK and secured logistical convoys to and from Long Binh. The 3d Squadron was initially engaged in a deception move designed to convince the enemy that the squadron would be involved in EMPORIA VI along Route 20 during early November. Next, a blocking force composed of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons and the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry (ARVN) was swiftly moved into position along National Highway 1 from Xa Suoi Cat east to the II/III Corps Tactical Zones Boundary. The 1st Squadron remained in its blocking position while the 3rd Squadron began to investigate the area between Highway 1 and the May Tao. Subsequently, successful explorations were made of the May Tao Mountain region itself during the latter half of November.

For Task Organization during Operation SANTA FE, see Annex A (OPOD 25-67).

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

## a. Order of Battle:

(1) Strength: Enemy strength at the outset of Operation SANTA FE provided all elements with a combat effective capability. The main force units had not been identified in major contact for over five months and possessed at least an 80 percent personnel strength. Despite the significant loss of a major weapons cache on 15 Nov 67 in the area of the Hat Dich Secret Zone, equipment

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capabilities of the Viet Cong were considered adequate. Due to a long period of inactivity, training of enemy soldiers was also considered adequate.

## (2) Disposition:

(a) The major enemy element employed in the SANTA FE area of operations was the Headquarters of the Viet Cong 5th Division, situated in its long-established May Tao Mountain base complex. Units located with this headquarters probably included these divisional elements: Combined Artillery Group of CT5, the 24A NVA AA Battalion, and the 50th Training Battalion. Additionally, one battalion of the 275th Viet Cong Regiment (probably the 1st Battalion) was deployed with the headquarters in a security role.

(b) The 274th Viet Cong Regiment was located in the Hat Dich Secret Zone. In this posture, this organization presented no immediate threat to Operation SANTA FE. It was believed that one battalion (probably the 1st Battalion) of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment was located east of Interprovincial Route 2.

(c) The 275th Viet Cong Regiment (-) had displaced north into Phuoc Long Province during Sep - Oct 67. Again, no immediate threat was presented to operation SANTA FE from this disposition.

(d) The 84th Rear Service Group was located in its normal base area near Thua Tich (YS6181), providing logistical support to the 274th Viet Cong Regiment through the Slope 30 area and to the 5th Viet Cong Division in the May Tao Mountain region. Security and transportation support for the 84th Rear Service Group were provided by the D445 Local Force Battalion, located in the Thua Tich - Slope 30 areas.

(e) Local force and guerrilla units which could have influenced Operation SANTA FE included the newly formed D440 Local Force Battalion, located vicinity YT5423, the 421st Tanh Linh Company, and the H-1 Company and the H-4 Platoon.

## b. Enemy Reactions:

(1) The Viet Cong evaded contact on all but one occasion during the operation.

(2) Agent reports indicated that the 1st Battalion, 274th Viet Cong Regiment, displaced from the Hat Dich Secret Zone to a position well south of Gia Ray Village (YT6313) just prior to start of Operation SANTA FE. The mission of this unit appears to have been to maintain lines of communication between the 5th Division Headquarters and the 274th Viet Cong Regiment, to act as a diversion for Operation SANTA FE forces, and to furnish additional security for the 5th Division Headquarters. A prisoner of war provided information that confirmed these agents' reports.

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(3) Contacts during Operation SANTA FE were negligible. The enemy made no attacks by direct fire but employed such harassing techniques as mining, planting booby traps, and sniping.

(4) Various support installations were overrun, notably the Convalescent Unit, 274th Viet Cong Regiment, which was apparently located within the Divisional Headquarters support elements.

c. Significant Contacts: The only major action during Operation SANTA FE occurred when M Company, 3rd Squadron engaged an unidentified Viet Cong force of unknown size in the May Tao Mountain region in late Oct 67. TAC Air, artillery, and Light Fire Teams supported the two hour contact. Sweeps of the battlefield area the following day disclosed the bodies of 20 Viet Cong. The cause of death was automatic weapons fire and fragmentation wounds; therefore, these losses were credited to the M Company action.

d. Intelligence Sources:

(1) Aerial Reconnaissance: Infra-red reconnaissance results were not reliable because of differing heat readings in the areas under surveillance. SLAR returns were sparse and provided no discernible pattern of enemy activity.

(2) Agent Reports: These reports were few and proved to be unreliable.

(3) E-63 Personnel Detector: Air reconnaissance with sniffer devices indicated that the Viet Cong were dispersing and evading throughout the area of operations. Significant readings of Viet Cong activity were followed by drops of Riot Control Agent (CS) and air strikes (see CHEMICAL, Para 11. c.).

e. Key Terrain and Weather Features:

(1) Terrain: The terrain was generally suitable for armor operations. The May Tao Mountain presented an obstacle, and operations along its slopes required elements to dismount. Dense vegetation in certain areas restricted movement and required jungle-busting with tanks. The various waterways in the region were generally not a problem.

(2) Weather: Operation SANTA FE was conducted during the transition from the Southeast Monsoon season to the dry season. Early days of the operation were marked by moderate to heavy rains which restricted movement. This quickly subsided into a period of light, occasional showers. Visibility generally varied from 7 to 10 miles, occasionally reduced by shower conditions and spotty morning fog. Winds were light and variable throughout. Temperatures ranged from a late morning high in the low 90's to a low in the 60's between midnight and dawn.

g. Disposition of Major Viet Cong Units:

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Hq 5th VC Div	YS7294
274th VC Regt (-)	YS3188
1/274th VC Regt	YS6398
1/275th VC Regt	YS7294
D440 LF Bn	YT5418
D445 LF Bn	YS5781
421 Tanh Linh Co	YT8622
H-1 Co	YT5822
H-4 Platoon	YS5694

8. (C) MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was to block National Highway 1 from YT525062 to YT789973 to prevent escape of enemy units from the area of operations to the north. The regiment was to secure and establish Fire Support/Patrol Base COUGAR, vicinity YT7300, and to assist passage of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, through this position. Following the 1st Brigade into the area of operations, the May Tao Secret Zone, the regiment was to conduct offensive operations to locate and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and installations. During the third phase, the regiment was to continue blocking Highway 1, to continue offensive operations to the east of the May Tao region, to escort logistical convoys in the area of operations, and to continue clearing and upgrading Highway 1 from Gia Ray to the II/III Corps Boundary.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION: (See Annex B, Op Overlays)

a. Phase I: The regiment was to undertake mutually supporting deception measures in conjunction with elements of the 9th Infantry Division to conceal preparations for Operation SANTA FE and to mislead the enemy into thinking that operation EMPORIA VI would be conducted during this same time frame.

b. Phase II: The regiment was to attack with the 3rd Squadron to secure and establish Fire Support/Patrol Base COUGAR and assist passage of the 1st Brigade 9th Infantry Division, through this position. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons were to block National Highway 1 from YT575062 to YT829973 to prevent escape to or reinforcement from the north.

The 1st and 3rd Squadrons were to conduct operations in the area of operations the May Tao Secret Zone, to locate and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and installations. The 1st Squadron was to provide one troop at Blackhorse Base Camp on 29 Nov OPCON to Regimental Headquarters for CP security and logistical convoy escort between Long Binh and Blackhorse Base Camp, and to assume base camp security at 0900H, 30 Nov.

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c. Phase III: The regiment was to be prepared to continue blocking Highway 1, to continue offensive operations to the east of the May Tao region, to escort logistical convoys in the area of operations, and to continue clearing and upgrading Highway 1 from Gia Ray east to the II/III Corps Boundary.

10. (C) EXECUTION: Operation SANTA FE was a reconnaissance in force mission to locate the Viet Cong units known to be using the May Tao Secret Zone as a headquarters area. This heavily Viet Cong controlled area was suspected of holding the Headquarters of the 5th Viet Cong Division, the 1st Battalion of the 275th Viet Cong Regiment, and the 84th Rear Service Group.

SANTA FE was conducted in three phases. Phase I consisted of mutually supporting deception measures in conjunction with elements of the 9th Infantry Division to conceal preparations for the operation and to mislead the enemy into believing that Operation EMPORIA VI was to be conducted during the same time frame along Interprovincial Route 20. Troops I and L of the 3d Squadron were moved north along Route 20 on November 1-2 and established two fire support/patrol bases in locations YT372258 and YT390260, respectively. Deceptive radio traffic was sent indicating that the entire squadron was in fact moving north and establishing bases for a road clearing operation along Route 20. All indications were that the deception was successful. Several incidents, including the capture of Viet Cong couriers moving openly during daylight hours along National Highway 1, lead to the conclusion that the true objectives of SANTA FE were not known to the Viet Cong.

On 3 Nov 67, Phase II began. The 3rd Squadron established Fire Support/Patrol Base COUGAR in vicinity XS742999 and assisted passage of the 1st Brigade (-), 9th Infantry Division, through this position. Teams K and M of the 3d Squadron and Team D of 1st Squadron, under 3d Squadron control, erected a blocking screen along Highway 1 from YT574064 to YS782978 in order to prevent the escape of the 5th Viet Cong Division to the north or reinforcements to them from the north. On 5 Nov 67, the 1st Squadron moved into a blocking position along Highway 1 from YT613065 to YT732002. That same day, the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN), (comparable in size to a US Cavalry Troop), which had blocked along Highway 1 from YT574064 to YT613065 under 3rd Squadron control, reverted to 1st Squadron control. This freed the 3rd Squadron of blocking responsibility for over half the length of Highway 1 in the area of operations and allowed them to conduct detailed reconnaissance in force missions.

On 6 Nov 67, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of YS725950, a dismounted patrol from L Troop made contact with an estimated ten-man Viet Cong force. Gunships, airstrikes, and artillery were called in on the enemy with unknown results. In subsequent exploitation of the area, a large base camp with signs of fresh occupancy was located, and there was evidence that the unit was equipped with 57mm recoilless rifles and 60mm mortars.

During the period of 7 - 14 Nov 67, the basic posture of the regiment remained constant. The screen along Highway 1 was maintained, and the 3d Squadron conducted a detailed reconnaissance in force mission north and south of this screen. On 11 November, I Troop had contact with two Viet Cong resulting in one KIA and

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the capture of one Mauser rifle with no friendly casualties. On 13 Nov 67, K Troop found two women and two children running a Viet Cong way station. They were evacuated to Blackhorse Command Post where one woman claimed to be an impressed Viet Cong laborer captured over a year before. After questioning, they were released to ARVN officials for resettlement. In addition to these incidents of contact, a significant number of abandoned enemy installations, documents, and supplies were captured or destroyed.

On 15 Nov 67, while conducting a detailed reconnaissance in force mission in the vicinity of YT661004, a patrol from Team M made contact with an estimated 20 man force soon after finding an enemy base camp of major proportions. When the patrol began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire, it immediately began to fire and maneuver. Artillery, Light Fire Teams, and two airstrikes were brought into the area. Team M attempted to close with the enemy, but they escaped to the north with unknown casualties. A large headquarters complex was found in the area and destroyed by 2d platoon, 919th Engineer Company. Team K, operating in the vicinity of XT833004, captured 12 persons, apparently Montagnards, who had been maintaining waystations and conducting harassment for the Viet Cong. One was killed while trying to escape, and the rest were evacuated to the Blackhorse Forward CP for interrogation. They were later turned over to the National Police at Xuan Loc for further disposition.

On 17 Nov 67, after receiving indications of a major Viet Cong concentration to the south, the 3rd Squadron turned its effort toward the May Tao Mountain. On that day, the squadron, less I Troop, moved south approximately 2000 meters by ACAV, dismounted, and moved to the base of the mountain. The purpose of dismounting was to deceive the enemy and to achieve surprise. As they neared the mountain, Team M, the lead unit, captured one Viet Cong dressed in light trousers and blue shirt and armed with a CHICOM AK-47 carbine. The individual was identified as a member of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment. During further questioning, the PW said that he had been captured by the Viet Cong and pressed into service. He stated that there were approximately 200 enemy personnel on the May Tao Mountain, and that the Headquarters and Hospital of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment were there. The PW led an M Team platoon to a cave complex used as a hospital and headquarters. Based on the significant enemy complexes discovered by Team M and the information provided by the PW, a detailed reconnaissance in force mission employing K Troop and M Company was ordered over the area of the May Tao Mountain on 19 Nov 67.

On 18 Nov 67, the 3rd Squadron was joined by the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in coordination and cooperation. They moved to the May Tao Mountain and conducted joint reconnaissance in force operations. On 19 Nov 67, a joint patrol base was established at YS722925. From this position, numerous small contacts were gained by the two units during the period 21 - 23 November. Also, throughout the period, many Viet Cong bunker complexes, supply caches, and documents were located and destroyed or evacuated. The destruction of bunker complexes was accomplished by the 919th Engineers through the use of explosives and Rome Flows.

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Indications were that the majority of the Viet Cong installations and activities were not on the mountaintop but rather around the foothills at lower, more accessible elevations. On 24 Nov 67, the 3rd Squadron and the 2nd Battalion of the 34rd Infantry (ARVN) were extracted from the mountain proper and established patrol bases at the foot of the mountain in vicinities YS700903 and YS751932, respectively. Two enemy installations were found. L Troop located and destroyed a Viet Cong uniform factory containing bags of cloth, partially sewn uniforms, buttons, thread, five sewing machine stands, and parts for Singer and Saki sewing machines. Samples of all material and uniforms were evacuated, and the rest was destroyed. B Troop located several weapons in vicinity YS711910. Of importance were 12 semi-automatic weapons, one BAR, one RPG-2, one claymore mine, 29 rifle grenades, 27 RPG-2 powder charges, and 16 RPG-2 rounds.

On 26 Nov 67, the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) made contact with an estimated Viet Cong squad at YS725934. There were no casualties on either side, and a small base camp with some supplies and clothing was located. The battalion proceeded southeast around the mountainside to establish a patrol base, and at YS735895, they discovered what is believed to have been the Ba Bien District Viet Cong Hospital and the Viet Cong 5th Division Headquarters. Numerous supplies and documents were located which supported this conclusion.

The remainder of the month was spent extending the reconnaissance in force patterns from the base of the mountain and further exploiting previous finds. A Troop, 1st Squadron, which replaced B Troop on 27 Nov 67, moved to vicinity YT745894 to assist the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Infantry (ARVN) in the destruction of the large complex which they had discovered. Within this complex were approximately 300 bunkers, a hospital with medical supplies and equipment, and 50 pounds of documents. Everything of intelligence value was evacuated; the remainder was destroyed.

On 30 Nov 67, the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Infantry (ARVN) was air-extracted by CH-47. On 1 Dec 67, Phase III began when the 3rd Squadron returned to a screening posture along National Highway 1 in preparation for the return to Blackhorse Base Camp. After three uneventful days, on 3 Dec 67, Operation SANTA FE was terminated.

11. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

## a. Artillery:

## (1) Artillery forces firing in support included:

Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment  
 Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment  
 Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment  
 B Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery  
 C Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery  
 C Battery, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery  
 A Battery, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (Supporting during

deception maneuvers on 2 - 3 Nov 67.

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54th Artillery Group (-) (Supported the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division and the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during 3 - 6 Nov 67.

(2) The types of missions fired by the supporting units were:

- (a) Observer adjusted missions
- (b) Harassing and interdicting fires
- (c) Reconnaissance by fire
- (d) Defensive concentrations
- (e) Navigational and marking fires
- (f) Objective preparation fires

(3) The timeliness and effectiveness of the artillery support provided the maneuver group commanders with firepower on call.

b. Engineer:

(1) On 3 Nov 67, the 1st Platoon, 2nd Platoon, and elements of Headquarters platoon, 919th Engineer Company, deployed with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment along National Highway 1.

(2) The following enemy fortifications were destroyed by elements of the 919th Engineer Company:

- (a) 1st Platoon destroyed 150 bunkers.
- (b) 2nd Platoon destroyed 977 bunkers and 46 houses.

(3) The 1st Platoon hauled 430 cubic yards of crushed rock during the course of the operation to repair National Highway 1. The 1st Platoon also set up a practice ambush site involving the use of numerous electrical blasting caps and several small charges of TNT. The ambush site was designed to give platoons from the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, practice in ambush reaction. The site was operated from 23 - 25 Nov 67.

(4) In addition, the 919th Engineers constructed fords, made road repairs, and cleared landing zones.

c. Chemical:

(1) E-63 Personnel Detector Missions: The 33rd Chemical Detachment conducted almost daily personnel detector missions.

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(2) Riot Control Agent (CS) Operations: On 2 Dec 67, thirty 55-gallon drums of CS with M-4 Burstlers were dropped from a CH-47 on a suspected force of the 5th Viet Cong Division. The target was pinpointed with the E-63 Personnel Detector. Following the CS drop, the FAC observed 20 Viet Cong attempting to escape the CS and called in airstrikes. This action resulted in one VC KIA (BC) and 6 VC KIA (FOSS). Intense jungle growth prevented a more accurate body count.

## d. Army Aviation:

(1) General: The aviation elements supported the regiment with 16 OH-23G, 11 UH1D, and 19 UH1C (the figure of 16 OH-23G includes the 2d Squadron, which was involved in operation KITTYHAWK but available for SANTA FE). The OH-23G were flown a total of 732 hours, consumed 12,444 gallons of 115/145 fuel, and transported 841 passengers. The UH1C armed helicopters flew 743 hours, consumed 44,580 gallons of JP-4 fuel, fired 113,000 rounds of 7.62mm, 505 rounds of 2.75 inch, and 730 rounds of 40mm; 2 vehicles and 14 structures were damaged or destroyed with an estimated 61 VC KIA. The UH1D helicopters were flown 667 hours, consumed 40,020 gallons of JP-4 fuel, transported 3,014 passengers, and carried 29.2 tons of cargo (0.94 tons daily).

## (2) Employment:

<u>Flight Type</u>	<u>Number of Sorties</u>		
	<u>OH-23G</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>
Command and Control	554		303
Reconnaissance	56	4	44
Administrative	369		840
Aerial Support & Reaction Force		671	
Troop Lift			215
Cargo Lift			100
Casualty Evacuation			12

Total Sorties - 3,128

## f. Air Force:

(1) General: The TACP supported the regiment throughout the operation. The utilization of the ALO/FAC was much improved over previous operations with better artillery adjustments, radio relay, and plotting of unit positions in the jungle. In addition, normal FAC and visual reconnaissance duties were performed. Improved coordination with ground elements was noted. The benefit of having both squadrons on a frequency within reach of the radio in the O-1 (FAC aircraft) was realized during this operation. This procedure is the key to immediately responsive tactical air support.

## (2) Flight Information:

(a) Total sorties allocated - 81

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- (b) Total sorties flown - 54
- (c) Allocated but not flown - 27
- (d) Average time - 28 minutes
- (e) Missions requested - 52
- (f) Preplanned missions - 41
- (g) Immediate missions - 13

(3) Types of Sorties:	<u>Number</u>	<u>Time</u>
(a) FAC	45	99+45
(b) Visual Recon	138	142+05
(c) Artillery	4	9+30
(d) Escort	5	8+50
Total	<u>192</u>	<u>260+10</u>

## (4) Fighter Flights:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
F-100	<u>100</u>
A-37	22
B-52	4
F4C	4
F-5	4
ALH	2
Total	<u>136</u>

## (5) Ordnance Expended:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Amount</u>
MK 65	6
MK 117	110
MK 82	180
MK 81	30
MK 35	8
MK 65	4
N/P	176
CBU	8
LAU Rockets	8
20mm	36,200 rounds
7.62mm	2,400 rounds
.50 Caliber	1,500 rounds

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## (6) Abnormalities:

MK 117	6 duds
MK 82	5 duds
MK 82	1 negative release
Napalm	2 duds
Napalm	1 premature explosion

## (7) Bomb Damage Assessment:

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Amount</u>
KBA	6 (POSS)
Secondary fire	1
Secondary Explosion	4
Bunkers destroyed	17
Bunkers damaged	6
Structures destroyed	6
Trenches exposed or destroyed	6
Trails destroyed	6
Foxholes opened or destroyed	16

## f. Civil Affairs/PSYWAR:

(1) General: During Operation SANTA FE, continued emphasis was placed on the IMPACT Program. Numerous RF/PF outposts were improved, and MEDCAP operations were conducted during the reporting period, treating 1793 patients. In addition, aerial leaflet and loudspeaker runs were conducted daily in all areas of the operation.

## (2) Operations:

(a) Ground leaflets: 550 sanitation leaflets, 7100 JUSPAO newsletters, and 1000 reward leaflets were passed out during the operation.

(b) Aerial leaflets: A total of 4,364,000 leaflets were dropped during the operation. Subjects consisted of: Chieu Hoi Appeals, Rally Appeals,

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Scare Leaflets, Appeals to the families of Viet Cong, Safe Conduct Passes, 11th Cavalry Rally Appeals, and Post-Airstrike Warnings.

(c) Aerial Loudspeaker: A total of 21.3 hours of aerial loudspeaker missions were conducted on the same subjects as listed in above paragraph, Aerial Leaflets.

(d) Ground Loudspeaker: A total of one hour of ground loudspeaker missions were conducted in support of Operation SANTA FE.

12. (C) RESULTS:

## Friendly Losses:

Personnel: KHA            WHA  
                  0                    3

Equipment: None

## Enemy Losses:

Personnel: KIA            POW            Detainees  
                  33                    1                    16

Fortifications: Bunkers            Hooches            Foxholes            Tunnels  
                                  1779                    195                    207                    5

Equipment: Duds            Mines            SA            SA            RPG-2            RPG-2 rounds            Rockets  
                                  3                    10                    1550            28                    2                    16                    5

Mortars                    Documents            Medical Supplies            Grenades  
                                  1                    281 pounds            46 pounds            54

Foodstuffs: Rice            Peanuts            Salt            Wheat            Soybeans  
(in pounds) 4675                    20                    165                    400                    40

13. (FOUO) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

## a. Logistical Support:

(1) During Operation SANTA FE, all classes of supplies were furnished from supply sources located at Blackhorse Base Camp. Maintenance and medical support were also furnished from Blackhorse. Air sorties and wheel vehicle convoys were utilized to resupply the squadrons with the latter being the principal method of employment. When supplies were moved by convoy, security was provided by organic ACAV forces, which were placed to the front, center, and rear of the convoy. In addition to security, the ACAV also aided in convoy control by use of organic radios.

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(2) Maintenance was performed at the forward area. Vehicles and equipment requiring higher echelon work were evacuated to the 551st Light Maintenance Company at Blackhorse Base Camp.

(3) During the operational period, the following expendable supplies were consumed:

## (a) Class III and IIIA:

1 Diesel:	119,400 gallons
2 Mogas	72,200 gallons
3 Avgas	6,240 gallons

(b) Class V: Rounds

Cal .45	53,000
5.56mm	212,400
7.62mm	419,000
Cal .50	140,800
40mm	6,050
90mm HE	69
90mm Canister	242
90mm WP	7
4.2in HE	6,790
4.2in WP	360
4.2in Illum	400
155mm HE	6,444
155mm WP	88
Grenade, Hand Frag	900
Grenade, Smoke	1,925
Claymore Mine	399
TNT, Block, Demo.	17,850 pounds

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## b. Signal Activities:

(1) General: Communications on Operation SANTA FE were conducted primarily in a field location. Before moving out, coordination was made with the Signal Officer of the 9th Infantry Division and the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division.

(2) Communications to higher headquarters: Prior to the beginning of Operation SANTA FE, the regiment was operational in the CG Command/Intelligence net in both secure and non-secure modes. Land-line communications with higher headquarters were also maintained through dedicated and shared-trunk VHF land-line circuits and a VHF land-line teletype circuit. Secure on-line encryption was utilized on all teletype communications with higher headquarters.

(3) Communications from Regimental Field Locations to Base Camp: FM communications were maintained from the field TOC to the base camp TOC. AM-RATT communications were maintained in the Regimental Command/Intelligence net. Two VHF land-line circuits provided additional communications with the base camp.

(4) Special Equipment and Techniques: There were no new techniques utilized during the operation, and equipment uses were confined to those on hand.

## (5) Radio nets and Teletype Circuits:

## (a) Radio Nets:

1 All regimental FM nets were utilized as well as certain 9th Division nets.

2 AM-RATT contact was reestablished at the field location.

## (b) Telephone Circuits:

1 Internal shared-trunk circuits were established in the Command Post area. In addition, two shared-trunk circuits were established into the Reliable Main switchboard, one to the Long Giao switchboard, one to the S-1 rear, and two to the Reliable TOC switchboard.

2 Dedicated circuits were established between the regimental TOC and the 9th Division TOC. These consisted of G-3/S-3 TOC, G-3/S-3 Air, and an artillery coordination circuit. In addition, a dedicated circuit was established to the 18th ARVN Division for coordination purposes.

(c) Teletypewriter Circuits: A direct tactical teletype circuit was established between the regimental Command Post and the 9th Division.

## c. Personnel and Administration:

(1) Administrative operations continued in a normal manner. A message center was established in the forward area for distribution of reports

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and messages to forward units. Courier service was established twice daily by UH-1D between base camp and the forward area. Casualty and strength reports for units in the field were sent by radio to the Forward Command Post on the Administrative/Logistical Net and forwarded to base camp by telephone. Casualty reports were telephoned to USARV from the base camp.

## (2) Casualties:

KHA 0

WHA 3

MHA 0

NED 0

NBW 7

Injuries 10

## (3) Personnel Services:

(a) Religious: The following services were conducted:

Roman Catholic:

Field Services

Sunday Services - 30 Attendance 680

Weekday Services - 48 Attendance 300

Protestant

Field Services

Sunday Services - 15 Attendance 300

Weekday Services - 18 Attendance 450

Seven chaplains took part in this program, four Protestant and three Catholic.

## (b) Post Exchange:

1 Beer and soda were supplied in bulk quantity to the units in the field.

2 On two occasions, 8 Nov 67 and 23 Nov 67, a mobile unit with many essential items of merchandise went to the field. Total sales for these two days were \$1,519.45.

## (c) Red Cross Clubmobile:

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During the period of Operation SANTA FE, the Red Cross Clubmobile made a total of five visits to the forward support bases. A team of two girls visited the 1st Squadron Forward Support Area on two occasions and the 3rd Squadron FSA on two occasions. During the visits a total of 4 programs were presented with a total of 97 men participating.

(d) Maintenance of morale, discipline, law, and order: The presence of a Red Cross Clubmobile, PX mobile vans, and a plentiful supply of movies contributed to high morale. Strong emphasis was placed on the prompt delivery of mail. The average transit time for airmail was 5 days. There were no serious incidents during Operation SANTA FE.

(e) Handling and disposition of Prisoners of War: One prisoner of War was turned over to the military police in Xuan Loc after questioning. 16 detainees were apprehended and turned over to GVN authorities in Xuan Loc.

(f) Awards and Decorations: The following awards were processed for Operation SANTA FE:

Silver Star	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	1
Bronze Star ("V")	11
Air Medal ("V")	1
Army Commendation Medal ("V")	6

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Although no major contact was made during the month, Operation SANTA FE was definitely a success. National Highway 1, previously almost abandoned, was opened to allow movement of traffic and expansions into the area. The Viet Cong installations, complexes, supplies, and documents were destroyed; captured material provided valuable information. 1779 bunkers were destroyed, including a province headquarters, a division headquarters, and several 84th Rear Service Group installations. Accurate information was obtained on the Viet Cong infrastructure, including province and district committees, communist party membership lists, and youth party membership lists. A full letter box and AKA lists for Ba Bien Province were obtained. Lists of supplies in the Xuan Loc area, Viet Cong installation maps from Bien Hoa, and enemy maps of the Cambodian area were also captured. This information was of significant value to US forces and should be of use in future operations in analyzing the basic infrastructure of Ba Bien Province.

15. (U) LESSONS LEARNED:

Item: Formation of an Admin/Log complex.

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Discussion: The Administrative/Logistical Complex for the 3rd Squadron was comprised of the S-4 track and the Communications Platoon track.

Observation: This arrangement provides a smooth working relationship among the Squadron Executive Officer, the S-4, the Maintenance Officer, and the Communications Officer. This technique enabled the Squadron Executive Officer to stay abreast of administrative reports, communications problems, vehicle deadline status, and other administrative matters.

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