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RG 472
11th ACR, 53
AARs
Box 1

COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION VALDOSTA
1 - 6 September 1967

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 977624</i>
By <i>LD</i> NARA Date <i>5/8/01</i>

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1. REFERENCES:

- a. OPORD 17-67 (Operation VALDOSTA)
- b. Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6430 I, II, III, IV, 6431 I, II, III.

2. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation VALDOSTA was a road security operation of routes to polling places in Long Khanh Province and a limited search and destroy operation, conducted in the Blackhorse TAOR/TAOI.

3. DATES OF OPERATION: Operation VALDOSTA was conducted from 1 to 6 September 1967.

4. LOCATION: Operation VALDOSTA was conducted in the Blackhorse Tactical Area of Responsibility and Tactical Area of Interest, in the Long Khanh Province.

5. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Operation VALDOSTA was conducted under the operational control of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

6. GENERAL: Operation VALDOSTA was an operation designed to provide security for the Vietnamese National Elections, providing route security for voters, and to search out and destroy enemy concentrations in the Blackhorse TAOR/TAOI. The object of the operation was to minimize any affect the above operations would have on the election in this area.

a. Organizational Structure (under regimental control)

(1) 1st Squadron, 1/919th Engineer Company, Team, 541st Military Intelligence Detachment.

(2) 3rd Squadron, 3/919th Engineer Company, Team, 541st Military Intelligence Detachment.

(3) Regimental Headquarters, Air Cavalry Troop, 919th Engineer Company (-), 37th Medical Company, 409th Radio Research Detachment, 541st Military Intelligence Detachment (-).

b. 54th Artillery Group provided reinforcing fires on call.

c. Army Engineer Support was provided by the 919th Engineer Company, and A Company, 86th Engineers.

d. Army Aviation:

(1) General: The Aviation element supported the Regiment with 13 OH-23's; 12 UH-1D's; and 19 UH-1C's. 4 OH-23's remained with the 2nd Squadron. The OH-23's were flown a total of 87 hours, consumed 1,479 gallons of 114/145 fuel, and transported 99 passengers (average of 16 daily). The

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armed helicopters flew 191 hours, consumed 11,460 gallons of JP-4 fuel; fired 53,300 rounds of 7.62mm, 356 rounds of 2.75 inch, and 1395 rounds of 40mm. Three structures were damaged and an estimated 22 Viet Cong killed. The UH-1D helicopters were flown 87 hours, consumed 1,220 gallons JP-4 fuel, transported 606 passengers (37 average daily), and 13 tons of cargo (2.2 tons a day).

(2) Employment (number of sorties):

	Command and Control	Reconnaissance	Aerial Support and Reaction Forces
OH-23	170		
UH-1D		4	260
UH-1C	99	4	
	Troop Lift	Cargo Lift	Casualty Evacuation
UH-1D	52	40	0

Total Sorties - 632

(3) Techniques: The Air Cavalry Troop, with assistance from the Regimental Aviation Section, accomplished two tactical troop lifts for the 2nd Battalion, 47th Mechanized Infantry. The first lift moved two platoon size forces into critical areas for search and destroy operations. The landing zones were covered with Artillery and armed helicopter fire prior to landing of the troops. The second lift involved the movement of a company size element from its area of operation to a fire support base at the completion of the operation.

(4) Maintenance:

	On Hand	Available
OH-23	13	53%
UH-1C	19	85%
UH-1D	12	64%

(5) Analysis of timeliness and effectiveness indicated both were considered highly satisfactory.

e. Chemical: Chemical support was provided by the 33rd Chemical Detachment.

f. Air Force: Combat Air Support was provided by the 7th Tactical Air Force during Operation VALDOSTA.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Anticipated enemy situation:

(1) In Northern Long Khanh Province, the 275th Viet Cong Regiment

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(minus the 1st Battalion) presents the greatest threat to Highway 20, the La Nga Bridge and Dinh Quan Village. In Eastern Long Khanh Province the 1st Battalion of the 275th Viet Cong Regiment, and possibly the 1st Battalion, 274th Viet Cong Regiment are believed to extend the area of influence along Highway 1 East of Highway 2 to Gia Ray Village. In Southern Long Khanh Province and Northern Phouc Tuy Province, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment, the D445 Local Force Battalion, and possibly the 1st Battalion, 274th Viet Cong Regiment are within easy striking distance of the Blackhorse Base Camp, The Australian Base Camp at Nai Dat, Highways 1, 2, and 15.

(2) Order of Battle:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
274th VC Regt.	1400	
1st Bn	400	Unloc, possibly East of Bao Binh Hamlets and South of Highway 1.
2nd Bn	350	Southern Hat Dich
3rd Bn	350	Northern Hat Dich
275th VC Regt (-)	800	North Western Long Khanh Province
1st Bn	400	Unloc, possibly May Tro Base Area
D445 Local Force Bn	350	
1st Company	90	Unlocated
2nd Company	80	Dispersed from Hat Dich to East of Highway 2.
3rd Company	90	Unloc
4th Company	70	Unlocated, probably South of Song Dong Nai in Long Khanh Province.
D800 Dong Nai Bn	450	Unlocated, probably South of Song Dong Nai in Long Khanh Province.

(3) Tactics: The enemy was primarily interested in a psychological victory prior to the 3 September elections for propaganda purposes. This could be achieved through mortar attacks on the Blackhorse Base Camp and/or the Australian Base Camp possibly in conjunction with a ground attack on the Xa Bong outpost or Gia Ray Village. In Northern Long Khanh Province the enemy could mortar and/or attack Dinh Quan Village. These actions would represent the capabilities of Viet Cong action prior to the election. More certainly, the Viet Cong will attempt to interdict Highways within the area of operations, utilizing sniping and harrassing fires against voters at the polls or en route to hinder

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the turnout for the elections and thereby dampen the psychological advantage this election created for the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

b. Actual Enemy Situation: No major contacts with the enemy occurred during Operation VALDOSTA. The enemy was apparently frustrated in his attempts to mount any sort of large scale attacks. This is believed to be especially true of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment, which was hit by a B-52 Bomb Strike and a sweep operation. As a result of this action the regiment was kept off balance for several days prior to the election. The frequency of mining, sabotage, and terrorist activities, as expected, increased appreciably beginning three days prior to the election and continued through election day.

8. (C) MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) continues Operation KITTYHAWK, secures Blackhorse Base Camp and escorts logistical convoys between Long Binh and Blackhorse Base Camp. During 2-4 September 1967, conducts Operation VALDOSTA by conducting search and destroy operations in TAOR/AO ORANGE and maintains reaction forces along Highways 1, 2 and 20.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) conducts this operation 2-4 September 1967. 1st Squadron continues security of GIA RAY Rock Quarry, establishes FS/PB (ANNE) vicinity YT3726, conducts search and destroy operations in AO ORANGE and BLUE and maintains reaction force at Blackhorse Base Camp and position D, Bau Chanh, vicinity YT558116. 3rd Squadron continues Operation KITTYHAWK, escorts logistical convoys between Long Binh and Long Giao, secures Blackhorse Base Camp, conducts search and destroy operations in AO WHITE and maintains reaction forces at positions A, B and Blackhorse Base Camp.

b. Fires:

(1) Artillery forces employed during Operation VALDOSTA were:

- (a) HOW Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
- (b) HOW Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
- (c) B Battery, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (54th Artillery

Group).

(2) Types of missions fired during the operation:

- (a) Observer adjusted missions
- (b) Harrassing and Interdicting fires
- (c) Navigational and marking fires

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(d) Reconnaissance by fire.

(3) Operation VALDOSTA was highly successful in decreasing the number of minings and incidents against civilians during the election period of 1-6 September 1967. The Artillery supported the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment maneuver elements as well as providing fires on call to ARVN troops and RF/PF outposts.

(4) No new fire support equipment or techniques were employed during Operation VALDOSTA.

c. Air Support: The Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) picked up Operation VALDOSTA with a minimum of additional sorties. The TACP operated from the Base Camp providing cover for Operation KITTYHAWK as well as VALDOSTA. Visual Reconnaissance during the operation was very successful in detecting road blocks and blown bridges. Although other sorties were flown during this period, only those in support of VALDOSTA are shown in this report.

(1) Total O-1 sorties - 17 (38:10 hours)

(a) Forward Air Control - 7 (22:50 hours)

(b) Visual Reconnaissance - 10 (15:20 hours)

(2) Fighter/Bomber support:

(a) Total strike aircraft missions - 6

(b) Total strike aircraft sorties - 10

(c) Immediate missions - 1 (4 sorties)

(d) Preplanned missions - 5 (6 sorties)

(3) Size and composition of forces:

(a) Immediate missions by flight:

3 A-37 6 Mk 117 / 6 LAU-3 / 19 LAU 59

2 F-100 4 Mk 82 / 4750# Nap

2 F-4C 6 Mk 82 / 4 750# Nap / 1600 rounds 20mm

2 F-100 4 Mk 82 / 4 750# Nap

(b) Preplanned missions - by flight:

3 A-37 12 Mk 82 / 1800 rounds 7.62mm

3 A-37 12 Mk 82


3 A-37 12 Mk 82

3 F-100 4 Mk 117 / 4 750# Nap

3 A-37 6 Mk 81 / 4 Mk 82

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(4) Employment and results: All missions were flown against regimental assigned targets, except the immediate, which were requested by the 3rd Squadron.

(a) Recap of ordnance delivered:

Mk 117 750# bomb - 10
 Mk 82 500# bomb - 54
 Mk 81 250# bomb - 6
 BLU-27 750# Nap - 16
 LAU-3 2.75" Rocket - 6
 LAU-59 2.75" Rocket - 19
 20mm 1600 rounds
 7.62mm 1800 rounds

(b) Bomb Damage Assessment¹:

Bunkers or foxholes destroyed - 6
 Trench uncovered (meters) - 65
 Secondary fires - 6
 KBA confirmed - 4

10. EXECUTION:

a. 1st Squadron initiated Operation VALDOSTA on 020001H, September 1967. Troop A and Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, moved to and secured FSPB ANNE (YT3725) (See Annex A, Operational Overlay). Troop B secured FSPB TAMMY (vicinity YT5411), Troop C continued to secure GIA RAY Rock Quarry, while Company D moved to and secured FSPB ECHO (YT4305). Positions were maintained on 3 September, and on 4 September, Troop A continued to secure FSPB ANNE, Troop B took over security of GIA RAY Rock Quarry, while Troop C became OPCON to 3rd Squadron, conducting search and destroy operations in AO PANTHER. Company D secured FSPB SARAH (YT438303).

These Positions were maintained until 6 September 1967, When Troop A, while continuing to secure FSPB ANNE (YT3725), also secured work parties along route

¹ The bomb damage assessment could have been better had ground forces moved through the area immediately after the strikes, though this was not possible in all cases.

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20. Troop B continued to secure Gia Ray Rock Quarry. Company B continued to secure FSPB SARAH (YT4330) and continued to secure engineer work parties along route 20. Work was 50% completed at YT431312, work 75% completed at YT478312. Company D provided rapid reaction forces along National Highway 1, escorting Company A, 86th Engineer gravel convoys from Long Binh to FSPB ANNE and FSPB SARAH and returning convoys to Long Binh. At 0955 hours, 3 small road blocks (vicinity YT538357) were removed by the reaction force.

b. 3rd Squadron. During the period Operation VALDOSTA was conducted (1-6 September) the 3rd Squadron also conducted Base Camp Security, Convoy Escort, Operation KITTYHAWK and initiated Operation EMPORIA IV.

Of particular interest during the operation was the successful security and assistance provided in the area surrounding the village of CAM MY (YS4692). As early as two months prior to the date of the elections, the village chief had requested the requested the squadron's assistance and provided detailed information concerning polling places, routes to be used by people entering the village to vote from outlying hamlets, current and expected Viet Cong activity to include areas in which he and the Rural Forces Company Commander felt the Viet Cong could possibly interdict or harrass the voters. Through detailed coordination the squadron was able to position ambush patrols in locations most likely to be used by the Viet Cong at night. As a result of this preparation there were no Viet Cong initiated incidents or acts to harrass or intimidate the people during the election period. This, coupled with the long term friendship, assistance and good relations the squadron has maintained with the village and its surrounding hamlets is felt to have significantly contributed to the very high (nearly 100%) turn out of eligible voters. This percentage was the highest registered by any village in the Province.

Early in the operation several Viet Cong hasty road blocks and propaganda displays were located and removed. These were positioned along National Highway 1 in the Hung Nghia (YT3009) area and along Highway 2 in the Thoi Gaio area (YT4402). They were removed without incident, with the exception of one pressure release booby trap which exploded and injured a senior NCO when he removed a small log which was part of a road block.

A culvert in the vicinity of Hung Nghia (YT18094) was destroyed by the Viet Cong in an effort to disrupt traffic along National Highway 1 during the

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
election period. The squadron provided security for a Vietnamese civil work party and later for engineer road parties repairing the damage. Some difficulty arose in controlling civilian traffic which at one time was backed up for several kilometers in both directions. Initial requests for National Police assistance failed to produce results. The assistance of National Police circumvented most of the traffic problems which arose.

On 3 September elements of Troop K on a search and destroy mission four kilometers south of the village of Hung Ngia (YT3009) made contact with a group of Viet Cong who ran from a dwelling located in a cultivated field. Two were killed and although the remainder of the group fled into the jungle they left behind a large cache of food, equipment, medical supplies and an extremely significant set of finance and supply records. The records included full tax collections records on Viet Cong taxes along National Highway 1, lists of Viet Cong sympathizers in the area and other information of significant value. The major caches and living quarters were located in an open cultivated area and would have been indistinguished from innocent civilian structures had the Viet Cong not panicked and run with their weapons when the platoon approached. The following day Troop K returned to the same general area to search the edge of the jungle for additional installations. At a location approximately 200 meters from the previous days encounter the troop was engaged by a force estimated to be in excess of forty men. It is significant to note that apparently the Viet Cong were in the process of constructing a new base camp area near the supply and finance installation. Several additional stores of food and bunkers were located on this and the following days.

During the encounter one ACAV was hit by an RPG-2 rocket, killing one man and wounding another. The Troop Commander maneuvered his troop into position to cover the entire woodline with automatic weapons and canister fire. Helicopter Light Fire Teams placed fire on areas from which the Viet Cong fire was coming and five air strikes by Air Force F-100 fighters hit the jungle concealing the Viet Cong positions. Troop C (which became OPCON on 040001H September) was committed to support Troop K. Results of the encounter were 8 Viet Cong KIA (BC) and 5 KIA (POSS). No estimate was possible of further Viet Cong casualties. The following morning the 4th Battalion, 99th Infantry air landed vicinity YT3103 to cut off the Viet Cong force. Troop K established a block t

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north. Troop C continued the search of the area of contact and by afternoon the 1st Battalion, 43rd ARVN Regiment was committed to establish blocking positions vicinity YT2606. The search operation located three additional base camp areas but was unsuccessful in regaining contact with the Viet Cong force which had apparently slipped away the night before.

In this action the requirement for immediate commitment of sufficient forces to augment the force in contact was again pointed out. Given a few hours under the cover of darkness the Viet Cong will invariably move away from the area of contact and make good his escape. Committing forces the following day seldom produces significant results.

Captured grain was distributed to the village vicinity YT2610 in order to assist the villagers and to publicize the victory over the local Viet Cong. The villages have on previous occasions provided good intelligence information to the squadron. It is hoped that the successful operations on VALDOSTA will increase the flow of information.

Significant also in the conduct of this operation was the intelligence previously collected which indicated that the Hung Ngia, Thoi Giao and Slove 30 areas were active with localized Viet Cong activity and should have been targets for increased collection efforts and operations during the period. Additional emphasis should be placed on developing intelligence about suspect areas. Quick reaction by forces to exploit the intelligence obtained is of the utmost importance.

4th Battalion, 39th Infantry (-). The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry became OPCON to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on 050655H September, upon assault of LZ23.

On 5 September, 1967, the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry commenced airmobile assault from PZ to LZ 23 vicinity YT308028 at 0655H. Company A was airlifted from PZ North, vicinity YS109897 to LZ23. Company C was airlifted from PZ, vicinity YS110830 (FSPB RED) to LZ 23. Recon Platoon was airlifted from PZ North to LZ 23, upon landing at the LZ became attached to Company C. Headquarters and Headquarters Company (-) was airlifted from PZ North to LZ vicinity YT282103, where they remained until completion of the operation. At 1305H Company A reported finding a Viet Cong base camp YT288037. The complex consisted of 16 bunkers (3' wide by 4' long with overhead cover), 10 huts (with straw and

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dued camouflage), it was about two to four days old. Artillery was called and a sweep of the area proved that they destroyed 50% of the area. At 1315H, Company A found two well used trails moving East to West and South east to Northwest, the latter having footprints (YT298040) on the trail. A search of the area was made with negative results. The elements moved into objective Dodge and rendezvoused with Company A (vicinity YT284062) and Company C (vicinity YT291060; each company had a tight perimeter and four LZ's. The Artillery fired harassment and interdiction (H&I) on the Viet Cong base camp and the trails which were found by 39th Infantry units earlier.

On 6 September 1967, at 0730H, companies A and C began to move from their Remain Over Night (RON) positions. At 0750H Company C found 12 bunkers in a linear fashion from East to West (YT305062). All were destroyed. At 0800H Company A found what appeared to be a layover station (vicinity YT284069) with 8 freshly dug graves. The graves were open and nothing was in them. At 0920H Company A hit a Viet Cong boobytrap vicinity YT285065 resulting in 1 KHA and 2 WHA's. Interrogation of WHA revealed they were walking on a well used trail running north, they were just about to cross a small stream when the explosion went off. Dust off was completed at 1020H. The KHA was evacuated by a medevac at 1200H vicinity YT296066. At 1215H Company A found a Viet Cong base camp (vicinity YT290062). Complex consisted of 18 bunkers with overhead cover, 5 huts, 9 trenches (2' deep) leading from bunker to bunker, two fireplaces, a trail going through the middle of the camp and a stream at the South end of the camp. At 1200H the Battalion (-) was airlifted to LZ North, and was released from OPCON to 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

11. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

(1) Personnel:

<u>WHA</u>	<u>KHA</u>
5	3

(2) Equipmental: One OH-23 was slightly damaged during the operation.

b. Enemy Losses:

Personnel: The regiment reported 10 Viet Cong KIA (BC), 5 Viet Cong KIA (POSS). Equipmental losses included: 1 bolt action rifle, 50 pounds

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of grain, 50 pounds of peanuts, 1500 pounds of corn, 2 canteens, 2 web belts with suspenders attached, 200 pounds rice, 2 pounds medical supplies, and a 50 pound shaped charge were captured. 27 Bunkers and 13 huts were destroyed.

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

(1) Resupply:

(a) Method of Operation. During Operation VALCOSTA, the units of the regiment received logistical support from the supply facilities of the Blackhorse Base Camp and Long Binh. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company which are located at the Blackhorse Base Camp provided Class I, II, III and IV resupply and direct maintenance support. The 3rd Ordnance Battalion at Long Binh provided Class V resupply. The majority of the resupply during the operation was performed by wheel vehicle convoy. These resupply convoys were supplemented by CH-47 air sorties. The unit trains remained in the base camp.

(b) Consumption data:


- 1 Class I: 765 Cases
- 2 Class III: 14,500 gallons
- 3 Class V: 172,935 pounds

(2) Maintenance: The 551st Light Maintenance Company provided direct maintenance support. Maintenance contact teams were available to the squadrons and were employed on an "on call" basis. During the operation the following vehicles were deadlined:

- (a) Tank, M48A3 - 3 each
- (b) ACAV, M113 & M113A1 - 5 each
- (c) VTR, M88 - 3 each
- (d) Flame thrower, M132A1 - 4 each
- (e) Mortar Carrier, M106 - 2 each
- (f) Recovery Vehicle, M578 - 2 each

(3) Transportation: The majority of the transportation utilized for transporting supplies during this period were wheel vehicle convoys. A total of 12 Chinook CH-47 air resupply sorties were used in addition to the ground convoys. There were no transportation problems encountered during the entire operation.

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(4) **Services:** The normal services available to the units of the regiment at the base camp, i.e., laundry and water point, were available for use by the units at the field location. This was possible due to proximity of the field locations to the base camp.

(5) **Friendly Losses:** No weapons or vehicles were reported as a combat loss during this operation.

(6) **Special Equipment and Techniques:** Operation VALDOSTA was conducted in conjunction with Operation KITTYHAWK which is an everyday requirement and therefor required no special techniques or equipment to be employed to adequately support the units involved.

b. **Signal Activities:**

(1) Administrative plans for communications were limited prior to Operation VALDOSTA as the necessary radio contact and sole user telephone circuits were already operational. No special procedures or actions were required for the operation, as communications facilities in use were quite adequate to support the regiment and ARVN forces.

(2) Normal communications to the 9th Infantry Division were maintained, for additional communications.

(3) As the regiment was not located in the field, no requirements existed for additional communications.

(4) No special equipment or techniques were used.

(5) The normal telephone and teletypewriter circuits were maintained. The Radiotelephone nets, as outlined in the current 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment SOI were maintained. No special circuits or nets were established.

(6) No lessons learned were encountered in the communications field during Operation VALDOSTA.

c. **Personnel Services.**

(1) During this period, normal personnel services were performed for the Blackhorse Troopers. Five chaplains conducted a total of 26 religious services at unit chapels, the hospital, and in the field. Post special services ran 6-7 movies each evening, with a total daily audience of 800 men. On 6 September, special services also sponsored a USO show, featuring Nilda Terrace, for about 300 men.

(2) The post exchange took in receipts totalling \$68,349. The

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heaviest volume sales consisted of beverages and food. Electronics equipment accounted for the high dollar sales. On 1 September the Red Cross girls regular visit to Xuan Loc was cancelled due to the election. Instead, they carried out their daily clubmobile schedule - visiting units, serving kool-aid, etc.

(3) There were no prisoners of war captured during the period in question. However, one civilian defendent, who had been apprehended with a cross-bow on 26 August was detained by the MP's from that date until 9 September.

(4) A total of 8 men have been recom ended for Bronze Stars for action performed during the reporting period. Three of the 8 were posthumous.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES:

a. No chemical activity was conducted during this period.

b. Civic Action/Psyops Activities:

(1) No leaflets were dropped.

(2) Voting Statistics:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Xuan Loc	28,874	81%
Kiem Tan	15,880	88%
Dien Quan	7,089	96%
Total	51,847	84.6%

(3) Total hours of Aerial loudspeaker time: 2 hours, 10 minutes.

(4) It is difficult to accurately estimate the impact the aerial loudspeaker missions had in relation to the percentage who voted, however, note that the percentages are lower in Xuan Loc, the most secure area.

14. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: From the viewpoint of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operation VALDOSTA, phase I, was a highly successful and well coordinated operation. Working closely with the ARVN forces located in the Long Khanh Province, the 11th Armored Cavalry operated more than a dozen different security positions, as well as assuming fire support and artillery control for the operation. Significant were the combined operations of coordination and co-operation with the 18th Division (ARVN) in the TAOI.

During this period of operation, the 11th Cavalry operated fire support bases, rapid reaction forces, conducted road security, and operated several platoon sized convoy escorts and security forces inside the TAOR/TAOI.

These operational efforts contributed greatly to denying the Viet Cong the opportunity to harass and interdict the National and Interprovincial highways.

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in the Long Khanh Province. During the National Elections, held on 3 September and 22 October, 1967, there was a record turnout of voters, to wit, 84% on the 3 September election, and 78% on the 22 October election. As a whole, for the reasons listed above, and from the intelligence gathered during this operation, VALDOSTA must go down as an unqualified success in the records of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

15. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:a. Item: Followup operations.

Discussion: Returning to an area a second time after an hour, a day, or several weeks may be very productive since the Viet Cong in several cases have reentered the area shortly after US troops departed. Artillery fires and a stay behind patrol are alternative tactics.

Observation: Conduct reentry operations whenever possible in Viet Cong suspected areas, where minimum or negative contact has taken place.

b. Item: Action upon encountering mines.

Discussion: When mines are encountered always sweep the entire area for additional mines. Experience has shown that in most cases, where there is one mine, others will be positioned near by.

Observation: Never allow personnel to group together in the immediate vicinity where there has been a mine detonation, nor assume any area to be safe without prior checking.

c. Item: Actions taken in case of booby traps.


Discussion: The majority of Viet Cong road blocks encountered are of hasty construction, usually small hand carried brush and trees placed across the road. While the majority of these are not mined or booby trapped, injury has been caused by the mining of these obstacles.

Observation: All road blocks must be treated as though mined and/or booby trapped and cleared with grappling hooks or explosives used to clear them. Under no circumstances should they be cleared by hand.

d. Item: Captured Viet Cong Grains.

Discussion: Rice and other food grains captured from Viet Cong depots were taken into the largest nearby friendly village and distributed under the direction of the village chief. This was particularly successful during the operation when grain was delivered to the village vicinity YT2610. This vi

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has previously provided substantial intelligence information to members of the squadron and the reaction to the squadron's success was excellent.

Observation: Providing captured rice and other food stuffs to the villages that have proven friendly and provided assistance is an effective means for maintaining good relations and exploiting success.

e. Item: Location of established contact.

Discussion: Rapid reaction in providing sufficient forces to exploit or contain an established Viet Cong contact is essential. A few hours delay, particularly overnight will almost always insure that the Viet Cong are successful in their attempts to withdraw from the point of contact and make good their escape.

Observation: All attempts should be made to quickly and effectively introduce additional forces into an area of established contact to prevent the Viet Cong from withdrawing or escaping.

f. Item: Follow up and utilization of intelligence.

Discussion: In many instances intelligence indicators have not been aggressively pursued to follow up leads or determine their validity. In other cases the intelligence was available but not acted upon. Additionally intelligence that is collected over a long period of time must be correlated to form proper conclusions.

Observations: Intelligence must be aggressively pursued, correlated over a period of time, and acted upon.


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
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Annex B to Operation VALDOSTA

Operation VALDOSTA II was executed with the same mission and purpose as VALDOSTA I, but with the following changes:

a. One Troop of the 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, provided the base camp reaction force, with 1st and 3rd Squadrons on Operations in the TAOI.


b. Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, provided fire support for the 1st and 3rd Squadrons while they were engaged on Operation VALDOSTA II.

OPERATION VALDOSTA II

1. REFERENCES: OPORD 17-67, OPORD 23-67.
2. NAME AND TYPE OR OPERATION: Operation VALDOSTA VALDOSTA II, conducted as a search and destroy and route security in the Long Khanh Province during the Vietnamese National Election of 22 October 1967.
3. DATES OF OPERATION: VALDOSTA II was conducted from 21 - 23 October 1967.
4. LOCATION: Long Khanh Province.
5. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
6. through 8. Reference VALDOSTA.
9. (C) MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continues Operation KITTYHAWK, secures Blackhorse Base Camp, controls logistical convoys between Blackhorse and Long Binh, provides security forces for Gia Ray Rock Quarry and conducts Operation VALDOSTA by positioning reaction forces and conducting search and destroy operations in Blackhorse TAOR/TAOI.
10. (C) EXECUTION:
 - a. 1st Squadron: Initiated Operation VALDOSTA II on 210001H October 1967. Troop A moved at 0850H into AO SNAPPER (See inclosure 1, Operations Overlay), closed vicinity YT326009 at 1116H and conducted search and destroy operations in the Area of Operations. Troop B moved at 0845H, closed vicinity YS-449909 at 0939H, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO BASS. Troop C moved at 0908H, closed YT432041 at 1114H. Company D moved at 0900H, closed vicinity YS390996 at 1040H and conducted search and destroy operations in AO SNAPPER. At 1520H, Troop B found 1 bunker and 12 foxholes vicinity YS463858, RON positions were Troop A at YT326009, Troop B at YS449909, Troop C at YT432041, Company D at YS390996, while the command post remained at Blackhorse Howitzer

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Battery, DS 3rd Squadron, vicinity YT398161. On 22 September, the 1st Squadron continued Operation VALDOSTA II without significant contact. Two platoons of Troop G moved to AO PIKE at 0553H, conducting search and destroy operations in AO PIKE. The squadron maintained their RON positions.

At 231600H October 1967, Operation VALDOSTA II was terminated by the 1st Squadron, with negative contact.

b. 2nd Squadron. Howitzer Battery moved from Long Binh to Blackhorse, closed with the base camp at 1016H. Troop G provided a rapid reaction force from the base camp, while HOW battery supported 1st Squadron from Blackhorse Base Camp. On 22 October, the 2nd Squadron (-) continued to conduct maintenance and training in preparation for future operations. Troop G continued to provide rapid reaction force, while HOW Battery continued to provide fire support from the base camp.

c. 3rd Squadron. Moved out on operation VALDOSTA 20 October, with one troop and HOW Battery moving to set up a fire support and patrol base, RUBY. On 21 October, positions were maintained, with I Troop conducting search and destroy operations in AO SHARK. Troop K departed Blackhorse at 0757H, and closed vicinity YT337062 at 1128H, and conducted search and destroy operations in AO OYSTER. At 1650H, vicinity YT335134, Company captured 1100 pounds rice. At 1600H, vicinity YT358287, Troop I found a VC base camp of approximately 200 bunkers, and commenced destruction of base camp, also capturing 1 pound medicine. On 22 October, Troop I received a burst of small arms fire with negative casualties, and no VC killed. The day before, Troop I found 5 graves, vicinity YT358287, 2 of which contained newly dead VC. On 23 October, 3rd Squadron terminated Operation, with negative further results.

11. Through 13: Reference Operation VALDOSTA I.


14. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Operation VALDOSTA II was effective. Voting percentages for the three main polling places were high, with an overall average of 77.7%. VALDOSTA II was more effective than VALDOSTA I due to experience gained during the latter. In addition, the return of the 2nd Squadron and the new perimeter security plan enabled the 11th Cavalry to deploy two entire squadrons in VALDOSTA II. This had not been possible on VALDOSTA I due to the base camp security requirement. The additional troops that were deployed enabled the polling routes to be thoroughly secured and allowed for more effective reaction forces.

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