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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D SQUADRON, 11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
APO San Francisco, 96374

*Full*  
**CONFIDENTIAL** REGT

AVIC-YR

12 July 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General  
196th Lt Inf Bde  
APO San Francisco, 96374

TO: Commanding General  
Task Force Oregon  
ATTN: Historical Officer  
APO San Francisco, 96374

1. Name and Type of Operation: Operation Lion, Search and Destroy operation.
2. Dates of Operation: 050600 July-090730 July 1967.
3. Location: Binh Son.
4. Command Headquarters: 2d Sqdn 11th ACR CO LTC Benjamin F. Harmon.
5. Task Organization:
  - a. 2d Sqdn 11th ACR (-)
  - b. E Trp 2/11 ACR
  - c. H Co (-) 2/11 ACR
  - d. 1 Plt C Co 4th Bn 31st Inf
  - e. 2 Trp 43rd Scout Dog Plt
6. Supporting Forces:
  - a. Supporting Forces During Operation
    - (1) Army Aviation

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By [Signature]

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- a. 71st Aviation Co
- b. 178th Aviation Co (Combat Support)
- c. 493 Med Co AIRM (Med Evacuation)
- d. 2/11th ACR Aviation Section

(2) Artillery Support

- a. 3/82d Arty
- b. 3/16th Arty
- c. Naval gun fire

(3) TAC Air: 7th US Air Force, AIO 196th Lt Inf Bde

(4) Ordnance Support: Task Force Oregon Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team

b. Performance of Supporting Forces

(1) Army Aviation

a. Missions performed

- (1) Command and Control
- (2) Aerial Reconnaissance
- (3) Medical Evacuation
- (4) Resupply
- (5) Close Support
- (6) Artillery Fire Adjustment
- (7) Liaison

b. Analysis:

Aviation Support was critical for command and control due to restricted ground visibility and for resupply due to limited trafficability.

(2) Artillery Support

a. Missions Performed

- (1) Close support
- (2) Harassing and interdiction fires
- (3) Defense concentrations
- (4) Area preparation

b. Analysis:

Preplanned and immediate fire requests were employed throughout the operation. Reaction to fire requests was prompt except in one instance in which the ROK Marine's delayed clearance for pre-planned fire for 4 hours.

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7. Intelligence:

a. Enemy forces known to operate in area consisted of: (1) 95 Local Force Co, often described as a Sapper Unit, strength 100; (2) Provincial Local Force Co, designated as P-31, located vic LS 627974, strength 80; (3) Provincial Local Force Co, designated as P-14, located LS 701929, strength 116; (4) unidentified unit, located LS 626947, strength 200, uniforms camouflage with red stars and palm-leaf hats; (5) VC 44/3 Bn, located LS 716926, strength 400; (6) VC 9/3 Bn, located LS 701928, unknown strength. The source of enemy information was the 196th Lt Inf Bde S-2.

b. Enemy activity consisted of sniping incidents and direct contact with small VC forces. Two antitank mines located by mine sweeper on first day of operation, destroyed in place. Three male detainees picked up without ID cards were evacuated to the 196th Lt Inf Bde for further interrogation. The detainees were picked up and interrogated at Co/Trp level; they were determined to be of no intelligence value.

FAC located 9 VC armed with undetermined type of Sn weapons. FAC directed ground elements of H Co and E Trp to contact and identified targets for Light Fire Team. The Light Fire Team accounted for 2 KIA (EC); E Trp accounted for 4 KIA (EC); H Co for 2 KIA (EC) and 1 KIA (Prob).

Two PW's were captured and evacuated to the 196th Lt Inf Bde S-2. Five weapons were captured including: 2 Soviet 7.62mm carbines M1944; 1 BAR US Cal 30 M1918A2; 1 US Carbine Cal 30 M1 and 1 US Carbine Cal 30 M2. Approximately 3-4lbs of documents were captured and evacuated to 569th MI Detachment. Results of documents screening revealed much information pertaining to guerrilla activity in immediate AO.

During the operation, 4/250lb bombs were found, they were destroyed in place by EOD.

Contact was made with 20 VC which fired on the friendly unit. VC were engaged with M-16's and M-79's with the result of 3 KIA (EC). One grenade was thrown into friendly positions during the hours of darkness with the result of 1 US WI slightly.


Numerous caves and tunnels destroyed. In one instance, VC suspect observed crawling into one of the caves. The cave was taken under fire with Srd's of 90mm HE with the result of one VC KIA (Prob).

c. Terrain in the AO characterized by moderate rolling hills with rocky slopes, interspersed with cultivated level areas, surrounded by hedgerows that made detection and continuous observation very difficult.

Weather was hot and dry for the operational period with an average daily temperature high of 95° and a low of 78°. No precipitation of any consequence.

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Evaluation of intelligence available at the start of the operation indicated that due to a previous operation in this area with track laying vehicles, and the presence of, at least, one Sapper Company, antitank mines were to be expected, 2 were found.

Security of the operation was successful.

8. Mission:

2d Sqdn 11th Cav (-) continued security of assigned sector of CLDC perimeter and conducted S & D operations along southern boundary of AO Lion.

9. Concept of Operations:

Phase I: 2d Sqdn 11th ACR moved from base areas at 040700 July 1967 into larger site vic LS 705964. Secured larger as LZ for B Co 4/31st Inf. H Co (-), TM E secured LZ vic coordinates LS 726944 050730 July 1967 for airlanding of D Co 4/31st Inf.

Phase II: From 5 July-8 July 1967 Sqdn conducted S & D operations in AO Lion in conjunction with 4/31st Inf.

Phase III: 9 July 1967 Sqdn road marched from AO Lion to base camps, completed 091045 July 1967. Units under control 2/11th ACR.

10. Execution:

a. 4 July 1967

(1) 1355 Trp B found 2 mines in road LS 706974, 1/30-40 lbs, 1/20-30 lbs. Destroyed in place.

(2) Rear CP, LT 562046; Forward CP LS 705977.

b. 5 July 1967.

(1) 0945 Trp E picked up 3 detainees, ages 15-40 yrs at LS 723952. Detainees 1 male and 2 females, evacuated.

c. 6 July 1967


(1) 1145 F.C located 9 VC with weapons fleeing northwest vic LS 682941, all wearing black uniforms.

(2) 1155 Trp E received sniper fire vic LS 683944, returned fire with Cal 50, 2 VC KIA.

(3) 1200 H Co received sniper fire vic LS 682941, 2 rounds canister fire returned. Two VC KIA, weapons destroyed.

(4) 1210 Gunships requested from Bde.

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(5) 1237 Gunships arrived vic LS 688944, took area under fire.

(6) 1240 Trp E received sniper fire from vic LS 687945, 7.62 fire returned, 1 VC KIA, weapon recovered. One US received gunshot wound in leg. Dust Off requested.

(7) 1300 Trp E found 2 VC KIA (Gunships) vic LS 688944, weapons evacuated.

(8) 1303 Dust Off completed.

(9) 1321 H Co found 4 KIA (Airstrike) vic LS 688944.

(10) H Co found 1 VC in village vic LS 688944, 1 leg blown off and burns over 100% of body. Dust Off requested.

(11) 1400 H Co found 1 VC POW vic LS 688944 with documents, both evacuated.

(12) 1905 Trp E sighted 3 VC with weapons 200 meters east Lager site LS 700950, took under fire with 50ounds, M-79, negative results.

d. 7 July 1967

(1) 0950 H Co destroyed 12 bunkers vic LS 664946, bunkers storage type 6' x 8'. Apprehended 1 detainee.

(2) Trp E apprehended 2 detainees, LS 670935, without ID cards, fleeing southwest.

(3) 1415 Trp E found 4/250 lb bombs on a trail vic LS 643 945. EOD requested.

(4) 1527 Trp E encountered 20 VC vic LS 620935, engaged with 7.62 and M-79. 3 VC KIA. Remaining VC ran south, carrying dead with their weapons.


(5) 1544 Sqdn received permission into ROK AO to southwest. Contact lost.

(6) 1814 H Co observed VC enter tunnel vic LS 675957. Taken under fire with 90mm HE. 2 Tunnels destroyed 1 VC KIA (loss).

(7) 2052 H Co sighted 1 VC, 75 meters from perimeter, took under fire with M-79, VC ran vic LS 665954. One US wounded in shoulder from grenade fragment. Dust Off completed.

(8) 2145 Trp E received 15 rounds of small arms fire returned fire with Cal 50 and M-79. Negative results.

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e. 8 July 1967

(1) 0915 EOD blew in place 4/250 lb bombs vic DS 639931. Found by Trp E previous day.

(2) Rear CP, LT 562046; Forward CP, LT 632991.

(3) 2320 Trp E had 1 grenade thrown into perimeter. Negative casualties and no fire returned.

f. 9 July 1967

(1) CP located LT 562046. Sqdn moved from...0 Lion to base camp 0715. Closed by 1300.

(2) 0715 Trp E returned to base camp. Closed by 1300.

(3) 0845 TOC returned to base camp. Closed by 1300.

(4) 0945 II Co returned to base camp. Closed by 1300.

## 11. Results:

Friendly Losses: 0 US KIA

1 US WIA

1 US WIA

Enemy Losses: 15 KIA (C)

12 KIA (Prob)

2 PW

Equipment: US None

ENEMY 2 Anti-tank mines destroyed

4 155 How Shells destroyed

55 Overhead structures destroyed

2 Caves destroyed

2 7.62 (Soviet) Carbines captured


1 DaR US Cal 30 captured

2 Carbines Cal 30 captured

60 Rounds Carbine ammo captured

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|                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
| Equipment:      ENEMY | 6 M.R mag w/amm (90rds) captured             |
|                       | 3 hammocks captured                          |
|                       | 1 poncho captured                            |
|                       | 1 knife and scabbard captured                |
|                       | 1 packet black pajamas captured              |
|                       | $\frac{1}{2}$ 1b first aid supplies captured |
|                       | 1 double reed apparatus (for mines)          |
|                       | captured documents                           |

12. Administrative Matters: None

13. Special Equipment and Techniques:

The Sqdn again, used air support for unit resupply in field.

14. Commander's Analysis: The successful pursuit of the one group of 9 VC was accomplished only by the rapid response of the F.A.C. to the tactical disposition of ground forces and his alertness in assisting the ground forces to close with the enemy.

Contact was maintained through the efforts of the F.A.C and because the ground force commanders' decision to pursue with his own forces rather than call for supporting fires immediately which could have resulted in loss of contact.


During this pursuit flexibility of maneuver was demonstrated as the pursuing unit diverted platoons to suppress snipers resulting in the troops maintaining contact in two positions simultaneously.

Confusion resulted in the second contact (20 VC) when an aerial observer sent reports of enemy activity through artillery channels and could not be brought up on the Squadron Command Net. The observers reports and his subsequent markings with smoke of what he thought to be enemy positions resulted in friendly ground forces being diverted away from the main force and withdrawn from the area to preclude artillery fire from being placed on them.

15. Recommendations:

Whenever F.A.C's are in the immediate area of an operation they continue their current practice of reporting in on the command net to learn the tactical situation. This practice should be followed by all observers rather than having information relayed where a transmission may become confused.

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TS ~~I~~ Harmon  
D. F. HARMON  
LTC, Armor  
Commanding

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