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11th ACR

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D SQUADRON, 11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco, 96374

AVIC-YR

30 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
196th Lt Inf Bde
APO San Francisco, 96374

TO: Commanding General
Task Force Oregon
ATTN: Historical Officer
APO San Francisco, 96374

1. Name and Type of Operations: Operation Rhino. Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates of Operation: 190730 June-231530 June 1967.
3. Location: Quan Tan Ky.
4. Command Headquarters: 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR, C. C. LTC Benjamin F. Harmon.
5. Task Organization:
 - a. 2d Sqdn 11th ACR (-)
 - b. E Trp 2/11 ACR
 - c. F Trp 2/11 (-)
 - d. H Co (-)
 - e. How Btry
 - f. Assault Plt 1/14th Inf
 - g. Recon Plt 1/14th Inf

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6. Supporting Forces:

a. Supporting forces during operation.

- (1) Army Aviation
 - a. 71st Aviation
 - b. 178th Aviation Co (Combat Support)
 - c. 498 Med Co, 2 IR MB (Med Evacuation)
 - d. 2/11th AAC Aviation Section
- (2) Artillery Support
 - a. How Dtry 2/11th AAC
 - b. 3/16th Arty (General Support Reinforcing)
- (3) Tac Air: 7th US Air Force, 410 196th Lt Inf Ade.
- (4) Engineer Support: 2 Demolitions teams from 175th Engr. Co. 2 Engr. Mine Sweeper Teams 175th Engr. Co.

b. Performance of Supporting Forces.

(1) Army Aviation

- (a) Missions performed
 - (1) Command and Control
 - (2) Aerial reconnaissance
 - (3) Medical evacuation
 - (4) Resupply
 - (5) Close support
 - (6) Artillery fire adjustment
 - (7) Liaison

(b) Analysis:

Air Aviation Support was critical for command and control and for resupply due to restricted terrain trafficability.

(2) Artillery Support


- (a) Missions performed
 - (1) Close support
 - (2) Harassing and interdiction fires
 - (3) Defense concentrations
 - (4) Area preparation

(b) Analysis:

Planned fires were continuous throughout the operation and were used to support each phase. An unnecessary delay was experienced on one occasion when political clearance was sought prior to

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firing a contact mission. This delay, encompassing a 30 minute period, though not disastrous, hampered an immediate reaction to enemy fire.

7. Intelligence:

a. Enemy forces known to operate in the area consisted of one NVA Sniper company with a strength of 65 men located vicinity DT 275124, and one Local Force company, the 53d, with a strength of 100 men and located vicinity DT 255125. The source for all these units was the 196th Inf Bde S2 section.

b. Enemy activity consisted primarily of mining incidents; eight (8) were encountered. Four resulted in casualties and damage while four were discovered and destroyed in place. There were four enemy initiated incidents of sniper and small arms fire being directed at friendly troops followed by a rapid withdrawal of enemy personnel. One grenade was thrown into friendly positions during hours of darkness. Eighteen (18) detainees were evacuated to the 196th Inf Bde MI Det for further interrogation, and at the time of this report, disposition is unknown.

c. Terrain in the operational area was characterized by gently rolling hills and open terrain in the Eastern portion with hills of moderate height averaging 80-100 meters above sea level and in the Southwestern portion large hills with a height averaging 250-300 meters above sea level. The large hills in the Southwestern portion of the area are generally uncultivated with enough foliage and undergrowth to restrict speed of movement.

(1) Cover was generally good except in valleys and stream beds.

(2) Concealment was good for both vehicles and dismounted personnel except in the Eastern portion where large open areas were encountered.


(3) Numerous streams in the area were of a size to be considered effective obstacles to movement of vehicles and troops and required use of fords. The large hill masses to the Southeast channelized movement of vehicles into the valleys and along streams.

(4) Observation in operational area ranged from good in the Eastern portion to poor in the Southwest with thick foliage on the hills and in the valleys.

(5) Avenues of approach follow existing trails along the valleys and stream beds.

d. Weather was hot and dry for the operational period with an average daily temperature high of 100 and a low of 97. No precipitation occurred.

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8. Evaluation of intelligence available at the start of the operation indicated that, due to numerous large mines and explosives detonated and located in the area, the 70th NV. Supper Co of the 409th Bn is active in mining in areas along trails and dominating terrain to counter armor operations. If Local Force units or guerrilla units were in the area they chose not to engage. The security of the operations was successful.

8. Mission: 2d Sqdn 11th ACR (-) conduct Search and Destroy Operations in A0 Rhino 19-23 June 1967.

9. Concept of Operation: This operation was conducted in three phases:

Phase I: 2d Sqdn 11th ACR moved from base areas at 190730 June 1967 to conduct Search and Destroy operations in A0 Rhino. HQ Trp (-), H Co, TOC to C.C India coordinates AT 329175. Tn F and Tn E moved to larger position at AT 305138. How Btry at coordinates AT 395145, general support; of squadron.

Phase II: Beginning 19 June 1967 Tms E and F conduct search and destroy operations in A0 Rhino covered with supporting direct fire by H Co displacing forward from C.C India.

Phase III: 23 June 1967 Sqdn road marched from A0 Rhino to base camps, complete 231530 June 1967. Units under control 2/11th ACR: see Task organization.

10. Execution:

a. 19 June 1967.

(1) F Trp (-) returned to Sqdn control from 1/14th Inf; moved to A0 Rhino 0730. Begin S & D operations.

(2) E Trp, Co H, HQ Trp (-), Forward CP moved 0815 to A0 Rhino. Begin S & D operations.

(3) 0910 Co H tank hit 250 lb bomb rigged as mine (pressure detonated) at AT 312153, tank was a combat loss.


(4) 0930 F Trp encountered 4 detainees at AT 331170; evacuated to 196th Lt Inf Bde

(5) 1240 F Trp sighted 21 enemy personnel crossing area at AT 291490. Artillery called, negative results.

(6) 1600 F Trp encountered 5 detainees at AT 306138, evacuated to 196th Lt Inf Bde.

(7) 1620 E Trp encountered 9 detainees at AT 305138, evacuated to 196th Lt Inf Bde.

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(C) TOS, Co II, and (-), at DT 329175, Trp E and F at DT 315134.

b. 20 June 1967.

(1) 0300 F Trp requested Dust Off for one (1) AL and two (2) L.L.'s from an enemy grenade thrown into outpost at DT 306139, fire returned with negative results.

(2) 1030 E Trp burned 5 huts which had been vacant for some time at DT 329116.

(3) 1315 F Trp found a bear trap at DT 321125 with a cow leg in jaws.

(4) 1715 E Trp received sniper fire at DT 274115. Fire returned with negative results.

(5) 1720 E Trp received 1 round of fire from 5 enemy personnel on trail leading southeast at DT 274116. Fire was returned with negative results.

(6) Sqn (-) located as on 19 June 1967.

c. 21 June 1967.

(1) 1310 F Trp located 2 10 lb anti-tank mines, one on top of the other at DT 295114. Mines blown in place. 5x7 ft. crater.

(2) 1440 F Trp received 5 rounds sniper fire at DT 286102. Sqn. 50 fire returned with negative results.

(3) 1630 F Trp discovered a Marine helicopter (H-34) tail boom and rotor assembly at least one year old at DT 284107. Parts were scattered in area, numbers legible 148062. No equipment discovered on wreckage.

(4) 1620 F Trp encountered 2 155 How mines at DT 211820. Destroyed in place.

(5) 2005 F Trp received sniper fire at DT 312138. Fire was returned with negative results.

(6) Sqn (-) located as on 20 June 1967.


d. 22 June 1967.

(1) 0802 Co II tank heavily damaged by mine (pressure detonated) at DT 331169, two personnel slightly wounded.

(2) 1120 E Trp M.V combat loss by mine (pressure detonated) at DT 31 34; 013 (1) KIA, ten (10) WIA.

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(3) Sqn (-) located as on 21 June 1967.

e. 23 June 1967.

(1) 0901 F Trp M.C.V destroyed by mine at DT 324162. Seven (7) WIA.

(2) 1400 E Trp returned to Base Camp DT 575029. Closed 1530.

(3) 1400 F Trp returned to Base Camp DT 401150, closed 1500. Returned to control of 1/14th Inf.

(4) 1400 Co II returned to Base Camp DT 576029. Closed 1530. 2d Plt OPCON 1/14th Inf.

(5) 1400 TOC returned to Base Camp at DT 562046. Closed 1530.

(6) 1530 How Btry returned to OPCON 3/18th Arty. Located DT 443087.

11. Results:

Friendly Losses: 2 US KIA

21 US WIA

Enemy Losses: None counted

Equipment: US 2 M.C.V combat loss

1 tank damaged

1 tank combat loss

ENEMY 6-anti-tank mines destroyed

2-155 How Shell destroyed

1-8" Round destroyed

1-250 lb bomb destroyed


3-foxholes destroyed

1-bear trap captured

2-pair black pajamas destroyed

2-VC gas masks captured

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*CONFIDENTIAL*12. Administrative Matters: None.13. Special Equipment and Techniques:

During Operation Rhino, the 2/11 S-4 provide logistical support to the squadron. All resupply of Troop E and Troop F was accomplished from a Forward Supply Point (FSP) by air using CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters. Company H was resupplied by a combination of truck convoy and air.

a. Air requests— Air requests were programmed 24 hours in advance based on past experience and known logistical requirements of each unit. Air requests were prepared by the S-4 and submitted thru the S-3 to the 196th Lt Inf Bde for scheduling with the 176th Assault Support Helicopter Company (CH-47 Chinook) and the 71st Assault Helicopter Company (UH-1D).

b. Forward Supply Point— Supplies, including rations, water, ammunition, and POC were moved by truck to the forward support point (BT 97145) on 18 June and stockpiled. Resupply of the FSP was accomplished on a daily basis using consumption figures obtained from the troops.

(1) Rations— Troop's and attachments received a modified "A" ration breakfast, "C" ration dinner and an "A" ration supper. Troop's E and F prepared the rations and shipped them to the forward elements by air. The hot "A" ration breakfast was prepared by a cook using one burner and limited portable utensils. This procedure has so far provided maximum "A" rations to the Sqdns combat elements.


Company H, with the TOC attached, received an A/C/A ration. However, Company H took their mess personnel to the field with them. The problem of preserving ice during shipment has confronted the unit for quite some time. It was found that by freezing water in fuse boxes, holding it in ice chests and flying it to the forward elements immediately, greatly reduces the loss of ice and provides the unit with cold drinks.

(2) Water— Organic water trailers rigged for air movement were utilized for movement of water to forward elements. S-4 has developed a technique called "Quick Fill" which allows sending two loads of water to a unit in 1 day. Basically the helicopter takes the 1st load out and the unit empties the trailer as rapidly as possible while other loads are being brought in. The helicopter extracts the empty trailer and returns it to the FSP where a water tanker is waiting to refill it. The helicopter either waits or continues to ferry supplies. Refilling takes approximately 6 minutes from the time of delivery to the FSP to the time of return of the trailer to the unit.

(3) Ammo— Ammo was delivered by air using cargo nets and M-22 bugs.

(4) Fuel— Fuel was delivered by air using 500 gallon collapsible bladders and 50 gpm pumps.

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c. Utilization of aircraft--During Operation Rhino, aircraft were utilized as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u># AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>TONS MOVED</u>
19 June 1967	CH-47	1	3	9.1
19 June 1967	UH-1D	1	3	1.1
20 June 1967	CH-47	2	7	20.1
20 June 1967	UH-1D	1	4	1.6
21 June 1967	CH-47	1	9	26.4
21 June 1967	UH-1D	1	5	2.5
22 June 1967	CH-47	1	9	26.4
22 June 1967	UH-1D	1	5	2.5
23 June 1967	CH-47	1	2	5.0
<u>TOTALS</u>				
CH-47 Sorties	30	CH-47 Tons	81.0	
UH-1D Sorties	17	UH-1D Tons	17.7	
Total Sorties	47	Total Tons	98.7	

Peak ton/days 21 and 22 June 1967—56.4 tons.


14. Commander's analysis: During aerial resupply operations when armed helicopters are employed in an escort role for the resupply helicopters, every precaution must be taken to preclude the armed helicopters from firing into positions occupied by friendly troops. Clearance to fire into the area must come from the senior tactical headquarters at the landing zone. Coordination can be effected only if the escort helicopters report in to the Ground Commander's command radio frequency and monitor it while in the area. The Ground Commander must be notified if armed helicopters are to escort the resupply helicopters when the request has not been initiated through his headquarters.

The terrain encountered in the area of operations restricted vehicular movement to a single avenue. Repeated use of the same route compromises any surprise that may be gained by speed of movement and increases the hazard of encountering mines.

Mines also encountered were along ridge lines that had previously been used as firing positions.

Mine sweepers in three instances failed to reveal the presence of the anti-tank mines and the mine detonated only after several vehicles had passed over it.

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15. Recommendations: When armed helicopters enter the area of operations they should report in on the command frequency of the Senior Tactical Headquarters to receive the situation and instructions. Every precaution should be made in the planning and execution of an operation to avoid, if at all possible the repeated use of a single avenue.

R. F. Hansen
R. F. HANSEN
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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