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AUTHORITY: NND 947573

DATE: 4/16/01

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS, 2D SQUADRON
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

19 May 1968

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT (5 Dec 1967 - 6 Apr 1968)

TO: Commanding Officer
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
ATTNs Regiment Historian
APO San Francisco 96257

1. (U) References

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>OPORDER</u>	<u>Maps, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series 17014, Sheets</u>
a. QUICKSILVER	21-67	6330I, II 6331I, II, III, IV 6430IV
b. FARGO	22-67	6232I, II 6332I, II, III 6333II
c. CASEY	1-68 2-68	6231I, IV 6332II, III
d. ADAIRSVILLE	3-68 4-68 5-68	6330I 6331II
e. VALLEY FORGE	6-68	6330I 6331II 6431II 6430IV
f. HARRISBURG	7-68	6330I 6331II 6430IV 6431II
g. ALCORN COVE	8-68	6231I, II 6331III, IV

2. (C) TYPE OF OPERATIONS:

Operation QUICKSILVER was conducted to secure Highways TL78, TL2A, and LTI1A.
(Ref: Annex A - Ops Overlay).

All other operations were primarily reconnaissance in force operations but included security of Base Support Bases and key military installations.

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3. (C) DATES OF OPERATIONS:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TIME PERIOD</u>
QUICKSILVER	05 Dec - 21 Dec 1967
FARGO	22 Dec 1967 - 21 Jan 1968
CASEY	21 Jan - 31 Jan 1968
ADAIRSVILLE	31 Jan - 08 Mar 1968
VALLEY FORGE	08 Mar - 16 Mar 1968
HARRISBURG	16 Mar - 21 Mar 1968
ALCORN COVE	21 Mar - 06 Apr 1968

4. (U) LOCATIONS: See Annex A - Opns Overlay.

5. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS of 2d Sqdn, 11th ACR:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>HEADQUARTERS</u>
QUICKSILVER	11th ACR
FARGO	11th ACR
CASEY	
21 Jan - 22 Jan	11th ACR
22 Jan - 24 Jan	2d Bde, 101st Abn Div
24 Jan - 31 Jan	11th ACR
ADAIRSVILLE	
31 Jan - 02 Feb	11th ACR
02 Feb - 18 Feb	101st Abn Div
18 Feb - 05 Mar	3d Bde, 101st Abn Div
05 Mar - 08 Mar	199th Lt Inf Bde
VALLEY FORGE	199th Lt Inf Bde
HARRISBURG	199th Lt Inf Bde
ALCORN COVE	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div

6. (C) GENERALS:

a. LTC Garland R. McSpadden commanded 2d Sqdn during the entire period.

b. Task Organizations:

(1) QUICKSILVER

2d Sqdn
 A Co, 2/18 Inf
 3d Plt, 919th Engr Co

(2) FARGO

2d Sqdn
 3d Plt, 919th Engr Co
 Water Point 27th Engr Bn
 QM Bath Sec, 506th S&S Co

(3) CASEY

2d Sqdn (-S Troop)
 A Co, 1/500 Abn Br.
 A Co, 2/500 Abn Br.
 3d Plt, 919th Engr Co
 Water Point 27th Engr Bn

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- (4) ADAIRSVILLE
2d Sqdn (w/ 2nd G Troops)
Inf Co, 101st Abn (Units were rotated)
3d Flt, 919th Engr Co
- (5) VALLEY FORGE
2d Sqdn (w/ E Trp)
B Co, 3/187 Abn Bn
3d Flt, 919th Engr Co
- (6) HARRISBURG
2d Sqdn (w/ F Trp)
- (7) ALCORN COVE
2d Sqdn (w/ F Trp)
B Co, 1/26 Inf Bn
3d Flt, 919th Engr Co

c. Fire Support:

(1) Artillery: Artillery support was normally provided by the Squadron Howitzer Battery, reinforced by, in support of, or under the control of the various central headquarters under which the 2d Squadron operated.

(2) Air Support: 11th ACR supplied light fire teams to the 2d Sqdn even when the Squadron was under the operational control of other command headquarters. Additional fire teams as well as (BAF) support were provided by the various command headquarters.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. QUICKSILVER 5 Dec - 21 Dec 1967

(1) Prior Intelligence:

(a) Because of extensive friendly activity in the area during the preceding year, contact with main force units was not expected to occur immediately. Enemy units located near the AO included elements of the 9th VC Div, Dong Nai Regt and the 7th NVA Division, however, it was considered unlikely that the enemy would commit these forces even when he realized the magnitude of the operation. Harrassing fire, mortar fire, mining and sniper fire by local force units and elements of the Dong Nai Regt were considered to be the most likely enemy actions.

(b) Sources: 11th ACR INTSUMS and daily RTT messages.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) The terrain in the AO was primarily rolling hills with rice paddies, moderately wooded areas, thick underbrush and tall grass. Highways within the AO were generally good, dirt roads. The weather was generally hot and clear during the day and cool and clear during the night.

(b) No enemy units were identified during the operation. The enemy made extensive use of mines of all types. On several occasions elements of the Squadron received sniper fire from villages and sighted movement at night. Searches in the AO revealed several tunnels and bunkers, medical, food and ammunition caches, plus materials to manufacture mines. Intelligence collection was difficult as there were no established networks and the population was very uncooperative and apparently well indoctrinated. Incidents were attributed to well trained local force VC, and not large units.

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b. FARGO 22 Dec 1967 - 21 Jan 1968

(1) Prior Intelligence:

(a) Suspected enemy locations within the AO were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>
9th VC Div HQ	XU 820246
271 Regt	XU 910330
272 Regt	XU 890306
273 Regt	XU 940348
7th NVA Div HQ	XT 680915
141 NVA Regt	XT 730735
165 NVA Regt	XT 713680
101 NVA Regt	Unknown
COSVN HQ	XT 468738
Local Units	Throughout TACR

(b) Sources: 11th AGR INTSUMS.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) The terrain was generally suitable for armor operations, with major restrictions being occasional steep gullies and dense jungle. Weather was dry, skies generally clear, days warm and nights cool with early morning ground fog in low areas, which occasionally limited visibility.

(b) Enemy reaction to the operation was very light, although small contacts were almost a daily occurrence. These consisted of small arms, RPG and automatic weapons fire. On 6 Jan 68, H Company made contact with an estimated enemy company, which POW interrogation revealed to be three companies of the 2d Bn, 88th NVA Regt vic XT6298. Contact was broken just prior to dark. This was the only significant contact during the operation. RIF operations conducted throughout the operation resulted in several bunker complexes and base camps being uncovered, the bunker complexes ranging in size from a few bunkers to platoon size and larger.

c. CASEY 21 Jan - 31 Jan 1968

(1) Prior Intelligence:

(a) Suspected enemy locations, strengths and capabilities derived from OB listings and daily Intelligence reports indicated the following units were in or adjacent to AO ATTALA.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMPOSITION</u>
165 NVA Regt	vic XT7068	Two Bn(1100 men Est), 3 Arty pieces of unknown caliber, one mortar Co, one AA Co, and one RR Co.
88th NVA Regt (=)	South of the AO	One or two Bns (1000 men ea), one mortar Co, and one AA Co.
C45 Chon Thanh Plt:	vic XT6968	Strength of thirty (30) men.
C55 An Loc Plts	vic XT8397	Strength of forty (40) men.
C64 Dau Tieng Co	vic XT5256	Strength of eighty (80) men.

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(b) The following units were considered capable of reinforcing the above units and could possibly be involved in the area of operations:

UNIT	LOCATION	COMPOSITION
141 NVA Regt	vic XT4482	Strength 1700 men, Hwy MGs, 81mm mortars, and 75mm RR Co.
271 VC Regt	vic XT5690	Strength 1200 men supported by 82mm mortars and one 12.7mm MG Co.
272 VC Regt	vic The Fish Hook	Strength 1200 men, supported by 82mm and 75mm mortar and RR Cos.
273 VC Regt	east of the AO	Strength approximately 1300 men.
101 NVA Regt	vic XT5151	Strength 1700 men, 82mm mortars, 75mm RR, and Heavy AA MGs.

(c) There were indications of significant activity in the AO by a sizeable force, with the possibility of an attack against Lai Khe or Dau Tieng. The 165th NVA Regt (-) appeared to be securing the area and acting as a reserve force. Regimental size attacks were considered possible.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) The terrain in AO Attala was primarily hilly land with a dense triple canopy of jungle that slowed the movement of both vehicles and foot soldiers. Because of the width of the streams and marshy banks, the water ways were major obstacles and vehicular movement required the use of bridging equipment. The highways within the area (QL13, W-S; LTL13, E-W; and 245, SW-NW) were, with the exception of QL13, unimproved dirt roads which were cratered extensively, but were used daily by heavy logging trucks. QL13 is an all weather hard surface highway. The weather was generally clear and dry.

(b) No enemy units were identified during the operation and the only significant intelligence matter was the knowledge of the enemy's extensive use of mines. A total of eleven were found, ranging from five pounds to a 175mm projectile. Enemy contact during the operation was very light. When fire was returned, the enemy broke contact immediately. Further investigation produced negative results. Several small groups of bunkers were found in addition to one complex containing fifteen bunkers and a CP and kitchen area.

d. ADAIRSVILLE 31 Jan - 08 Mar 1968

(1) Prior Intelligence:

Due to the immediate movement of the squadron from the operation Casey area, no intelligence was available at the beginning of the operation. However, an assessment of intelligence data gathered on the second day of the operation by direct liaison and electric communications was more than sufficient to evaluate the developing situation. Enemy forces believed located within the AO of the Squadron were as follows: 273rd, 274th, and 275th VC Regiments.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) Bien Hoa complex terrain omitted.

(b) An analysis of significant operations reveals two major engagements. On 3 Feb 68, while conducting RIF vic Xa Tan Phu (XT960173), the Squadron made contact with unknown size enemy forces. The situation was developed by TM E and TM Whitehead (D-4/506 Abn Inf). TM H was committed at 1530 hours, and two airstrikes were called in. Action resulted in 47 VC KIA and one POW who was evacuated to 101st Airborne for interrogation.

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The second major contact occurred on 28 Feb 68 vic Binh Phuoc (XT962173), when TM F made contact with an unknown size VC force. TM F was reinforced by the 57th and 58th ARVN Bns and one plt of H Company. TM F developed the situation. Enemy losses were 23 VC KIA.

The squadron conducted many road movements in small unit forces within the AO to provide security in the Bien Hoa area. As the operation progressed very little enemy contact was established, and intelligence reports indicating attacks were usually not accurate.

e. VALLEY FORGE 08 Mar - 16 Mar 68

(1) Prior Intelligence:

(a) Suspected enemy units deployed within AO Wheelock included elements of the 5th VC Division that were suspected to be regrouping after suffering heavy losses during the TET offensive. The 275th VC Regt was considered to be located north and south of the Dong Nai River, with possibly one battalion located in AO Wheelock. The 274th VC Regt was expected to be operating with three battalions throughout the AO, interdicting Highway 1, conducting training, transporting and guarding supplies.

(b) Suspected locations were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQ, 274th VC Regt	vic XT272144
1st Bn	vic XT2802
2d Bn	vic XT2802
3d Bn	vic YT2608

(c) Possible enemy reinforcement units were located as follows:

275th VC Regt, 2d and 3d Bn	North-south of Dong Nai River
88th Regt	North-south of Dong Nai River
84A Artillery Bn	vic YT 175235
V-1 LF Bn	vic YT 210225

(d) It was believed that the enemy was attempting to keep steady pressure against Allied Forces to maintain momentum while refitting and regrouping for a renewed offensive. Most of the TET offensive losses were considered to be replaced with untrained and inexperienced formations, with a resulting decrease in the enemy's combat effectiveness.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) The Squadron AO had few distinguishing terrain features. Hwy 1 served as the northern boundary with a railroad approximately one kilometer south of the Highway running east-west across the entire AO. Rugged terrain with heavy woods and thick underbrush characterized the AO, except for the NE portion which was relatively flat, open, and crossed by numerous roads and trails. Approaches were good, with Hwy 1 on the north and Hwy 25 running southwest from the AO's eastern boundary. Access to the central section of the AO was somewhat restricted by the lack of useable trails, heavy underbrush and bamboo, and numerous large trees. The requirement for tactical bridging of the numerous streams prevented, in several instances, the rapid movement of vehicles.

(b) Humidity as well as winds increased during the operation, and the weather was cool and dry with no rain. Visibility was generally good, but was limited by heavy woods and early morning ground fog.

(c) Intelligence gathered during 9-12 March indicated that the VC were to be expected to launch ground attacks on allied installations within the AO. Further

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intelligence revealed that the VC forces were moving towards Hwy 1 from the north (outside of the AO) and south (within the AO). The Squadron continued RIF within the AO and on 12 Mar 68 TM G made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in twelve VC KIA. On the night of 12-13 Mar 68, TM F came under heavy mortar, ground and RPG attack in its NDP at YT305097 on Hwy 1. Organic weapons were fired and a LFT supported the defense. Contact was broken after two hours. VC body count was eight and one POW captured. Through interrogation, the POW identified his unit as the 274th Regt, 5th VC Division.

The intelligence available during the days preceding the attack allowed the Squadron to react to the threat of attack. The contact made by TM G just southeast of the TM F NDP was credited in greatly decreasing the size of the enemy force employed in the night attack against TM F. The fact that the civilian population evacuated their village near the TM F NDP allowed timely reinforcement of the NDP and indicated the enemy's objective.

f. HARRISBURG 16 Mar - 21 Mar 68

(1) Prior Intelligence:

(a) Enemy units believed to be operating in the Squadron AO included:

Dong Nai Regt	vic YT 0723	Strength approx 100 men
Unknown Bn	vic YT 0723	Strength approx 600 men
84A Rct Arty Regt	vic YT 0523	Three Bns of 18 launchers each, suspected of being engaged in rocket attacks on the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex.

(b) Enemy units operating outside of the AO but believed capable of reinforcing within 24 hours were as follows:

3d Bn, 274th VC Regt	vic YT 1919	Approx 500 men
88th NVA Regt (-)	Southern War Zone D	Unknown strength
275th VC Regt	North of Tan Uyen	Strength of approx 1000 men

(c) Intelligence information from II FFV, 9th Inf Div, III Corps INTSUMS, reports, Perintreps, and CB Intelligence Summaries. Most information except that received by RATT Delivery was several days old.

(2) Situation as found:

(a) The Squadron AO consisted of areas north and south of the Dong Nai River. The area south of the river was generally rolling terrain becoming more rugged to the east. The western portion was dominated by the Bien Hoa AF/ 101st Abn Complex. The area north of the river consisted of flat lowlands along the river for one and one-half to two kilometers, rising to rugged hills in the north. The Dong Nai River effectively cut the AO in two. Tactical bridging was necessary to cross several feeder streams on the north bank. Fields of fire were generally good to excellent south of the river. North of the river they varied from good near the river to poor in the wooded hills. Cover and concealment was poor in the south and good in the north. There were well used enemy avenues of approach into both sectors of the AO.

(b) Temperatures varied sharply, with hot humid days and damp cool nights. Winds increased throughout the operation, increasing the probability of forest/brush fires. Early morning ground fog limited visibility.

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(c) No unit identifications were made, nor was any significant intelligence uncovered during the operation. The only enemy incidents involved two mines with unknown enemy losses.

g. ALCORN COVE 21 Mar - 06 Apr 1968

(1) Prior Intelligence:

Enemy forces which were expected in the AO included the command and control elements for the TET offensive and at least one battalion committed to its defense, believed to be from the 101st NVA Regt or the 165th NVA Regt. Elements of the 271st, 272d and 273d VC Regiments were expected to be within the AO recuperating from the TET offensive, but these units were not considered to be combat effective. They were, however, expected to be well emplaced. It was also believed that the 88th NVA Regt was using the AO as base for their deployment in the Saigon area.

(b) The 7th NVA Division, consisting of the major portions of the 165th and 141st NVA Regiments, was believed to be located on the outskirts of the AO and its units were believed to be fresh, combat effective, and capable of being employed in reinforcing or counterattacking roles.

(c) Sources:

(2) Situation as found:

(a) Terrain of the AO was generally flat, with maximum elevation from 25-30 meters. Streams were small except for the Song Saigon and Song Tri Tinh which flanked the AO and presented major obstacles to movement. Tactical bridging was necessary in the western area of the AO. The forested areas, which covered 60% of the AO, afforded excellent cover and concealment for the enemy, however, they decreased observation and created restrictions in the movement of vehicles. The rice areas provided good fields of fire and observation and created only minor restrictions of movement. Defoliated areas bounded by XT664394, XT550393, XT547357, and XT682347 rated from good to fair for aerial observation. Road conditions were generally good.

(b) Days were hot and humid, nights cool and damp, and precipitation increased slightly. Early morning ground fog limited visibility.

(c) During the operation, the 88th NVA Regt was identified by POW interrogation. Significant intelligence was derived through the quantity and size of base camps found. It was apparent that the AO was used as a staging area or rest area. There were forty-two separate mine incidents, ranging in size from anti-personnel mines to ten to fifteen pound anti-tank mines. There were six separate small enemy contacts involving enemy fire from small arms and automatic weapons fire to 57mm RR fire. Contact lasted from five to twenty minutes before contact was broken. In all contacts, fire was returned immediately with organic weapons and in two cases with artillery and Ta_o Air. The majority of the bunker complexes found consisted of eight to twelve bunkers, except for two complexes of more than thirty bunkers including several kitchens.

8. (C) MISSIONS (Annex A - Opns Overlay)

a. QUICKSILVER - Move commencing 060000 Dec 67 to AO ZINC. Secure AO ZINC in sector and establish FSB BOW (XT815350) and FSB RED LEG III (XT885370) effective 071000 Dec 67. Provide convoy escort and RRF in sector.

b. FARGO - Move on order 21 Dec 67 to occupy an attack position vicinity An Loc (XT7495). Attack on order 22 Dec 67 through 1st Sqdn to position 13 in sector, establish FSB DICK, provide escort for artillery and engineer convoy on or about 23 Dec 67. Conduct RIF operations in assigned AO.

c. CASEY - Squadron moves to attack NVA units in AO ATTALA.

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d. ADAIRSVILLE - Squadron moves to secure III Corps POW Compound via YTO39127, III Corps Compound, Honour Smith Compound, provide RRF for Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, conduct land clearing operations in eastern sector of AO, conduct RIF and counter-rocket operations in AO.

e. VALLEY FORGE - Move to AO Wheelock, establish position via Hwy QLI, secure LZs for 4/12 Inf, conduct RIF in conjunction with 4/12 Inf to destroy enemy elements in AO.

f. HARRISBURG - Move to AO Harrisburg and occupy AO north of Dong Nai River, secure FSB Concord (YTO38178), secure 4/12 FSB during destruction of MSE Bev, secure 4/12 Inf PZ, escort 2/35 Arty to FSB Lewis (YTO43246), be prepared for boat crossing of Dong Nai River or road movement through Tan Uyen on 17 March, move to vic YT695313, establish FSB Sierra and be prepared to conduct RIF operations in AO.

g. ALGORN COVE - Squadron becomes OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div effective 220600 March 1968, and moves to vic XT667327 to establish base of operations; be prepared to RIF in AO.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. QUICKSILVER

(1) Phase I: 2/11 ACR conducted tactical road march from Blackhorse Bag Camp to AO ZINC commencing 060600 Dec 67 (See Appendix 1, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: 2/11 ACR secured Route Zinc in sector by establishing troop size positions, and FSB BOW (XT815350) and FSB RED LEG III (XT885370), for convoy movement of 101st Abn Div and conducted cordon and search and RIF operations in AO with troop-size teams (See Appendix 1, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

b. FARGO

(1) Phase I: 2/11 ACR conducted tactical movement from Route Zinc via Hwy 13 to occupy attack position (XT7495) and establish FSB FOX NLT 211835 Dec 67 (See Appendix 2, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: 2/11 ACR attacked on order through 1st Squadron 22 Dec 67 along Hwy 13 to secure Hwy 13 in sector and to establish FSB DICK and HARRY. Squadron attacked with columns of Teams, TM G, TM H, Command CP, HQ Trp, TM E(A) and TM F (See Appendix 2, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

(3) Phase III: 2d Sqdn conducted search and destroy operations, 290700 Dec 67 along Axis Club, Spade, and Diamond with TM F on left, Co H center, TM E on the right. TM G (-) secured mortar base at Pan Heart (See Appendix 2, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

(4) Phase IV: 2d Sqdn re-secured control of AO Battle effective 011200 Jan 68, and conducted multi-troop RIF operations in AO Plymouth II (See Appendix 2, Annex A).

(5) Phase V: 2d Sqdn moved 060730 Jan 68 along routes Iron, Lead and

Sulphur to positions Faith, Hope and Charity to establish a three troop screen along the western boundary of AO Plymouth II and conducted RIF operations on order.

c. CASEY

(1) Phase I: Sqdn moved 21 Jan 68 in one serial of five march units to AO Attala to establish blocking positions, sweep and secure Routes Black and 239 (See Appendix 3, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: Squadron became OPCON to 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div 221100 Jan 68, and attacked in double troop axis to seize objectives in AO Attala (See Appendix 3 Annex A, Ops Overlay).

(3) Phase III: Squadron returned to 11th ACR control 240805 Jan 68 and continued troop size RIF operations in AO Attala (See Appendix 3, Annex A - Ops Overlay).

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d. ADAIRSVILLE

(1) Phase I: Squadron left all non-combat essential items at Lai Khe Post to facilitate the tactical road march to the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex in response to the TET offensive. Movement commenced at 301400 Jan 68 and was conducted in two march serials, with Trs F and G in the first serial, and the Sqdn(-) in the second. Squadron secured III Corps POW compound and was prepared to react anywhere in the Long Binh complex (See Appendix 4, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: Squadron became OPCON 101st Abn Div 020900 Feb 68 and conducted multi-troop RIF operations southwest and north of Bien Hoa airfield and continued to secure Honour Smith compound, III Corps HQ compound, and III Corps POW compound with forces strong enough to hold position until RRF arrives. QM5 was kept open by motorized patrols. On 7 Feb 68, Squadron assumed responsibility for securing land clearing operations in the eastern sector of the AO. Squadron was to execute counter-rocket plan and maintain one team in the rocket belt (See Appendix 4, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

(3) Phase III: Squadron became OPCON 199th Lt Inf Bde 051200 Mar 68, and conducted RIF operations from blocking positions with three teams in eastern sector of AO Uniontown to defeat enemy threat to Bien Hoa complex from the east. Squadron also provided one team RRF for key installations in Bien Hoa area and secured FSB Concord with one team (See Appendix 4, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

e. VALLEY FORGE

Squadron moved 080800 March 68 by troop size units to establish positions south of Hwy QL1 in AO wheelock. On order the Squadron conducted RIF operations with three teams with one team as RRF to destroy enemy in AO, and secure LZs in conjunction with 4/12th Inf, 199th Lt Inf Bde (See Appendix 5, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

f. HARRISBURG

(1) Phase I: Squadron remained OPCON to 199th Lt Inf Bde and 161600 March 68 moved by troop size march units to AO Harrisburg to secure FSB Concord and establish positions in AO (See Appendix 6 to Annex A-Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: Squadron was to destroy enemy in sector by multiple troop sweeps (See Appendix 6, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

g. ALCORN COVE

(1) Phase I: 2d Squadron became OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div 220600 March and moved to vic XT667327 by troop size march units and established a base of operations from which it conducted RIF operations in AO (See Appendix 7, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

(2) Phase II: 2d Squadron conducted team size RIF missions in AO in conjunction with 1/26 Inf (See Appendix, Annex A-Ops Overlay).

10. (C) EXECUTION.

a. OPERATION QUICKSILVER

(1) On 6 Dec 67, the 2d Squadron departed Blackhorse, moved by tactical road march to AO Zinc and secured its sector of Route Zinc from XT760325 to XT917429. It had the mission of securing and outposting this portion of the route to support movement of logistical and personnel convoys of the 101st Abn Div from Ben Cat to Phuoc Vinh. An additional mission was RIF in AO. Route Zinc was swept daily by mine-sweep teams protected by dismounted troops and followed by ACAVs.

(2) Significant contacts: Throughout Operation Quicksilver, contact with enemy forces was light, and these incidents which occurred were primarily sniper fire and small arms and automatic weapons fire. All contacts resulted in negative friendly and unknown VC casualties. Contacts were as follows:

(a) 061500 Dec 67, How Btry APC vic XT826322 was hit by one RPG-2 round. Fire returned with organic weapons and LFT. Resulted in one US WHA and unknown enemy casualties.

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(b) 062150 Dec 67 Trp G LP vic XT842355 fired on two or three VC. VC dispersed to the west. Negative friendly or VC casualties.

(c) 102315 Dec 67 Trp F vic XT842355 observed three or four people moving west to east. Engaged with claymores with negative results.

(d) 111405 Dec 67 H Co vic XT801345 received AW fire from village. Fire was returned with unknown results.

(e) 112026 Dec 67 H Co AP vic XT801345 fired on squad size VC force. Checked area at first light and found one grenade and two blood trails leading northwest.

(f) 120230 Dec 67 Trp G patrol vic XT792337 received four rounds semi-automatic fire. Fire returned with negative results.

(g) 130138 Dec 67 Trp E vic XT870336 received four rounds sniper fire. Fire returned with negative results.

(h) 142020 Dec 67 H Co night patrol vic XT812359 fired on two or three individuals with claymores, AW, and 90mm. Check of area at first light revealed one blood trail.

(i) 162105 Dec 67 Hq Trp AP vic XT814844 fired on three persons with semi-automatic fire and claymores with negative results.

(j) 172009 Dec 67 H Co AP vic XT802349 received two rounds sniper fire. Fire returned with negative results.

(3) Mine Incidents: Route Zinc and adjacent trails were heavily mined. The majority of the mines were pressure detonated with the exception of one command detonated mine. During the period of 6-15 Dec 67, there were six separate mine incidents in the Squadron's AO resulting in one US KIA, twelve US WHA, three ACAVs and one tank damaged and one tank combat loss. During the period of 16 Dec - 21 Dec 67 there were no mine incidents in the AO, due primarily to exhaustive mine sweep methods, frequency of sweep and use of road runner night patrols. Mine sweeps uncovered seven emplaced mines ranging from locally made pottery mines to twenty pound shaped charges. Other operations resulted in the finding of three duds ranging from M-79 to 175mm, two firing devices, and three caches of mine materials.

(4) On 21 Dec 1967, 2d Squadron terminated operation Quicksilver and moved from AO Zinc to occupy attack positions vic An Loc (XT7495).

b. FARGO

(1) Operation Fargo was initiated on 21 Dec 67 when the 2d Squadron departed the Ben Cat-Pnuoc Vinh area to the Fargo Area of Operations (See Annex A, Ops Overlay). The Squadron attacked through the First Squadron to secure Hwy 13, FSB DICK and FSB HARRY, secure the FSA and Regimental CP locations vic Loc Minh (XU732078), conduct RIF in AO Battle. Significant actions during this phase were as follows:

(a) 222215 Dec 67 Hq 2d Sqdn received twelve rounds of 82mm mortar vic XU732078. Resulted in two US WHA and one ARVN Interpreter WHA.

(b) 231020 Dec 67 E Trp found 1000 meters of trench, camouflaged with dirt and brush vic XU720073, two spider holes with small bags of gunpowder vic XU718073.

(c) 261102 Dec 67 F Trp found grave uncovered by plows at earlier date vic XU725005. Estimated remains of seven Vietnamese, also found were 50 caliber shells, 90mm casings, one dud ChiCom grenade, 60mm mortar rounds, Ho Chi Minh sandals and black pajamas.

(2) During the period of 27-30 Dec 67, Squadron continued to secure FSB and Regimental CP with one team, secure FSB Dick with one team, escorted logistical convoys with one team and conducted RIF operations in AO. There were no significant actions or contacts during this period, nor were there any mine incidents.

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(3) From 1-4 Jan 68, the squadron conducted RIF and search and destroy operations in AO Plymouth (See Annex A, Opns Overlay). During this period there was no significant enemy contact. On 5 Jan the squadron conducted maintenance in preparation for future operations.

(4) On 060727 Jan 68, the squadron (-) moved to establish a screen along the western boundary of AO Plymouth II from XT588895 to XT583993. Significant contacts were as follows:

(a) 060815 Jan 68, H Co reported contact with the estimated squad size force at XT625982. H Co received S/A fire from southeast and returned fire with organic weapons and artillery. Continued to move to develop the situation. H Co received two RPG-7 rounds, one hit a tank resulting in one US KIA and two US WHA and negative confirmed VC losses. Contact ended at 0823.

(b) 060950 H Co received one RPG-7 round which missed, vic XT613984. Fire returned with coaxial machinegun and cannister rounds resulting in two VC KIA and one POW captured with AK-47. Initial interrogation of POW revealed he was a member of the 88th Regt, 5th Div, and that three companies of NVA were in the area to establish a base camp.

(c) 061123 Jan 68 H Co received S/A fire resulting in two US WHA, vic XT609978. Heavy contact followed and at 1225 H Co reported fifteen VC KIA(BC). At 1250 H Co reported having one US KIA, one US WHA. Artillery, gunships, and airstrikes were called into the area and at 1605 E Trp and H Co swept the area with negative contact and found thirty-three VC KIA(BC).

(d) 070945 E Trp found twenty-five bunkers vic XT585967, all were destroyed.

(e) From 7 Jan 68 to 10 Jan 68, the squadron continued its mission in AO Plymouth II. Contact was light and sporadic throughout the period and ranged from sniper and small arms fire to RPG fire with one US WHA and four VC KIA(BC). There were thirteen such incidents. Several bunkers and base camps were located ranging in size from one bunker to twenty-five with varying amounts of foodstuffs, ammunition and documents.

(5) On 11 Jan 68 the squadron continued its mission in AO Plymouth II. Incidents and actions were as follows:

(a) 110800 FAC spotted six antiaircraft positions vic 584934. Positions were circular and laid out in a diamond form. Artillery fired on them.

(b) 210835 H Co tank hit a mine vic XT573957 resulting in moderate damage to tank but no casualties.

(c) 111105 G Trp found company size base camp of fifty bunkers vic XT645967, bunkers were destroyed.

(d) 111131 H Co received sniper fire vic XT570953 and returned fire resulting in one NVA KIA(BC) and one AK-47 captured. Negative US casualties.

(6) During the period of 12-16 Jan 68 the squadron conducted maintenance in preparation for future operations and provided two troops as RRF for 1st and 3d Squadrons. The squadron was located vic XT684998 and there were no enemy incidents.

(7) The squadron from 17-18 Jan 68 conducted RIF and search and destroy operations in AO Utah (See Annex A, Opns Overlay). Significant incidents were as follows:

(a) 171120 G Trp found and destroyed a battalion size base camp vic XU628036 with kitchen. One bunker resulted in two secondary explosions of undetermined size.

(b) 171145 H Co found small base camp vic XT608998 about two hours old with cooking utensils and clothing. Occupants fled south.

(c) 171320 H Co lead tank hit by a 57 or 75mm RR round vic XU608003. Round did not penetrate but resulted in one US KIA. Fire was returned with cannister and auto weapons resulting in two VC KIA(BC) and several RPG rounds and launcher captured.

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(d) On 18 Jan 68 several bunkers and base camps were found ranging in size from one bunker to forty-five bunkers 88n feet long, four foot wide, and three feet deep with kitchens. Contact was light and consisted of sniper fire resulting in two VC KIA (Poss) and one US WHA.

(8) On 19 and 20 Jan the squadron performed maintenance for future operations, and on 21 Jan 68, Operation Fargo ended.

c. CASEY

(1) On 21 Jan 1968, 2d Squadron became OPCON to 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div and on 22 Jan 68, the squadron attacked to destroy NVA units in AO Attala (See Annex A, Opns Overlay). Contact was very light and no significant actions resulted. One base camp of thirty bunkers was found with 24" overhead cover via XT700646.

(2) On 24 Jan 68, the squadron was released from OPCON to 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div, and conducted route recon of Hwy 239 and secured engineer work parties (See Annex A, Opns Overlay). There was no significant contact, but mines at the following locations:

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
251030 Jan	1 mine (French type)	XT720612	E Trp
251130 Jan	8 mace-type booby traps	XT719613	E Trp
251645 Jan	1 grenade, butterfly bombs	XT708603	F Co
271005 Jan	Old mine, destroyed	XT660578	G Trp
271420 Jan	6 AT mines, 75mm projectiles electrically wired to go off together	XT659578	G Trp

(3) From 28-31 Jan squadron swept and secured MSR along Route 239 from junction Hwy 13 to squadron area. Only contact occurred on 302000 Jan when G Trp patrol received probe via XT655576. Patrol opened fire resulting in one US PWA and one WHA by friendly fire. Several mines were found during the sweep, ranging in size from a fifteen pound shaped charge to a forty pound anti-tank mine. On 28 Jan 68 G Trp located a base camp of fifteen well constructed bunkers with overhead cover and kitchen area via XT612536.

(4) On 311219 Jan 68, the squadron received a new mission to move to the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area.

d. ADAIRSVILLE

(1) On 31 Jan 68, the 2d Squadron moved from the Operation Casey AO to the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex in response to the VC TET offensive, to conduct RIF and security missions in the AO (See Annex A, Opns Overlay). On 020900 Feb 68 the squadron became OPCON to 101st Abn Div. Searches resulted in finding several VC and NVA bodies and various equipment. There was one significant action which began on 3 Feb 68, when the squadron made contact with an unknown size enemy force via Y1003118. Situation was developed by TM E and TM Whitehead and at 1530 TM H was committed. Teams were withdrawn and two airstrikes were called in. At 1932, 2/506th Abn Bn was committed to assist in searching and clearing the villages. On 4 Feb the search was completed resulting in twenty-eight VC KIA (BC) and one POW. Numerous weapons and other items were captured. Squadron losses, including TM Whitehead, were two KHA, twelve WHA.

(2) During the period of 6 Feb - 5 Mar 68, the Squadron conducted RIF, security RRF, land clearing, and counter-rocket operations in the AO. Significant incidents during this period were as follows:

(a) 180115 Feb, Plt E Trp received approximately four rocket rounds and small arms fire inside perimeter via Y104178. Negative casualties.

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- (b) 180116 Feb, G Trp sighted twelve to fifteen rockets being launched on an azimuth of 125 degrees, 1000-1500 meters from their location.
- (c) 201145 Feb, H Co found rocket site vic YT093167 with evidence of two launch sites, aiming stakes indicated azimuth of 240 and 250 degrees.
- (d) 240930 AVLB from LIT hit a mine vic YT985243 just off the road resulting in moderate damage and one US MIA dusted off. At 1055 man from F Trp stepped on a mine ten meters from previous incident resulting in one US KHA and one US MIA.
- (e) 241500, children in village vic XT100140 gave H Co one frag grenade and one 81mm mortar round.

(f) 201620, Feb 68, F Trp, working with ARVN 57th and 58th Bn made contact with an unknown size force vic XT958158. Situation was developed through the night. 290855 F Trp and ARVN swept the area and resulted in finding (F Trp) two VC/NVA POW and twenty-three VC/NVA KIA(BC).

(3) On 5 March 68, Squadron released from OPCON 101st Abn Div, became OPCON 199th Lt Inf Bde and continued operations in AO (See Annex A, Ops Overlay). There were no significant contacts during this period, however several mines and two base camps (one platoon size, one battalion size) were found. Operation Adairsville ended 8 March 1968.

e. VALLEY FORGE

(1) On 8 Mar 68 Squadron moved to AO Wheelock and on 9 Mar 68 began RIF in AO, in conjunction with 4/12 Inf Bn (See Annex A, Ops Overlay). Throughout the operation Trp NDPs and LPs reported movement, observed enemy personnel moving and fired on them. There were six such incidents. Several VC bodies were found as well as several mines. Significant incidents were as follows:

(a) 091455 Mar, H Co found five aiming stakes vic XT203091 with no definite azimuth.

(b) 091650 B-3/187 found four aiming stakes vic 271079 set on an azimuth of 270° pointing to squadron perimeter.

(c) 091745 Mar 68, G Trp ACAV hit a mine vic XT303084 with heavy damage to ACAV and no casualties.

(d) 101604 Mar 68, F Trp located twenty-five bunkers in a circle vic YT292044. Bunkers were destroyed.

(e) 121230 March 68, G Trp made contact vic YT310055. Three bunkers were spotted. Tanks fired canister at VC squad in open resulting in twelve VC KIA(BC).

(f) 121310 Mar 68, G Trp tank hit by RPG vic YT310055. Crew evacuated and tank was burning (Tank was later recovered).

(g) 121810 Mar 68, B-3/187 shot two VC out of trees vic YT321068 resulting in two VC KIA (BC).

(h) 122400 Mar 68, F Trp NDP came under heavy mortar fire and ground attack vic YT305097. Approximately seventy-five 82mm and twenty-five 60mm rounds received. Ground attack consisted of small arms, AW, and RPG fire from estimated VC company. Enemy was well equipped with very well maintained equipment. A sweep of the area the next morning resulted in eight VC KIA(BC), one POW plus the capture of several weapons and ammunition. US casualties were one KHA and twelve MIA.

(2) On 16 March 1968, Operation Valley Forge ended.

f. HARRISBURG

(1) On 17 March the squadron moved on Operation Harrisburg to conduct RIF and security operations in AO (See Annex A, Ops Overlay). There was no enemy contact during the operation and one mine incident on 210950 Mar. Trp K ACAV hit a mine vic XT999256 resulting in ACAV combat loss, three US MIA, and negative enemy casualties. (Trp K was moving with the Squadron at the time)

(2) On 21 March 1968 Operation Harrisburg ended, the squadron was released from OPCON to 199th Lt Inf Bde at 0950 hours.

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g. ALCORN COVE

(1) On 21 March 68, Squadron moved to Operation Alcorn Cove area, and on 22 March 68, closed in AO Blackhorse and became OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div (See Annex A, Ops Overlay), and began RIF in AO. Significant incidents are as follows:

(a) 221330 Mar 68, E Trp, while moving to NDP picked up two POWs desiring to surrender via XT669305.

(b) 221445 Mar 68 E Trp received AW fire, observed four VC via XT668323, and returned fire with organic weapons with negative results. At 1515 E Trp reported finding a VC base camp, resulting in two POWs, four VC KIA (BC) and three VC KIA (Poss). US casualties were one US WHA. Action was accomplished at close range with US elements dismounted systematically clearing bunkers while overwatched by ACAVs.

(c) 221200 Mar 68 F Trp while moving to NDP was fired on by undetermined size VC force with RPGs. Engaged enemy with organic weapons resulting in five VC KIA (BC) and one US WHA when two ACAVs were hit by RPG.

(d) 230845 Mar 68 G Trp received RPG or BR fire via XT658337 resulting in two US WHA and moderate damage to ACAV.

(e) 231130 Mar 68 G Trp lead had contact with unknown size force via XT654341. Fire returned with organic weapons, Tac Air and LFTs. Results were two US WHA, two VC KIA (BC) and two POW (WIA).

(f) 231245 Mar 68 H Co found fifty bunkers in a complex via XT643329 and destroyed thirty of them.

(g) 231254 Mar 68, B-1/26, OPCON to Squadron, had contact with an unknown size VC force via XT643330, resulting in two US WHA, one ACAV moderate damage (RPG), three VC KIA (BC), one VC POW (WIA) and two AK-50s captured.

(h) 241126 Mar 68 G Trp found large tunnel complex via XT621329, with ten to twelve holes, seven to ten feet deep connected by tunnels. Area had not been recently used and was destroyed.

(i) 250845 Mar 68 G Trp received AT and SA fire resulting in three US WHA and one ACAV moderately damaged. Area taken under fire with organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.

(j) 261214 Mar 68, G Trp, supported by one plt H Co received RPG fire from bunker complex via XT613345. No US casualties or damage. Fire returned with AW, cannister and HE resulting in two VC KIA (BC) and two VC KIA (Poss).

(k) 270200 Mar 68 I Trp received five rounds 122mm rocket via XT677344. Resulted in one US KHA, three US WHA.

(l) 271030 Mar, H Co found four bunkers ten by twenty by seven feet via XT620350 which had been used in the past 24 hours.

(m) 271205 Mar, H Co found eight bunkers via XT612150 which appeared to be a rest camp or layover point. Bunkers had been used in last 24 hours. At 1255 found five bunkers five feet by five feet by five feet which contained a kitchen via XT613348.

(n) 281300 Mar 68, B-1/26 found four large bunkers (one with two rooms) via XT574363, also found some equipment.

(o) 281355 Mar 68 G Trp found two bunkers via XT587376 with corrugated metal top camouflaged, with two tunnels leading into a heavily reinforced room seven feet by twelve feet by twelve feet built on two levels.

(p) 281500 Mar 68, B-1/26 found at XT587376, one bunker, one pound of documents, thirty five inch by eight inch photos of VC training scenes, equipment and targets for marksmanship training. Also found a twenty foot deep well which was checked by "tunnel rat", who fell into the well because of a broken rope or slipping, a second individual was lowered to recover the first and he passed out and was lifted out. Another, with protective mask, was lowered, and he also passed out and was lifted out.

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"Tunnel rats" with special breathing apparatus were called in and recovered the body of the first man. All three men were evacuated.

(q) 290845 Mar 68, G Trp found and destroyed a heavy bunker complex vic XT633333.

(r) 300945 Mar 68 H Co located base camp vic XT622358 containing approx seventy-five bunkers built above ground, plus 190 cu ft of rice and several hundred yards of commo wire.

(s) 301042 Mar 68, B-1/26 found vic XT621353, one large bunker, one mess hall, eight firing positions, and three PRG-40 radios.

(t) 301220 Mar 68 from XT612355 to 615360, H Co found over 100 bunkers, freshly cooked food and hot coals, 7500 lbs of rice and several portable transistor radios.

(u) 301930 Mar 68, NDP 2/11 ACR at XT620328 was mortared by twenty rounds of 60mm from 6,000 mils 1000-1400 meters. Rounds impacted outside the perimeter with no US casualties.

(v) 310920 Mar 68, E Trp found base camp vic XT625330 with eight large bunkers, two mess halls, and one body in a grave.

(w) 310945 Mar 68, F Trp, OPCON 1/26, found letter from NVA soldier to sister identifying his unit as C-64-B5 vic XT580467.

(x) 311050 Mar 68, H Co found eight bunkers vic XT639364.

(y) 311605 Mar 68, G Trp found four bunkers and one tunnel built in the last two days.

(z) 011215 Apr 68, E Trp received three rounds RPG or RR fire vic XT640350, returned fire and called in artillery. Negative US and unknown VC casualties.

(aa) 011220 Apr 68, at XT649326, E Trp received one RPG which penetrated ACAV engine compartment from 50-75 meters. Fire was returned with negative results. ACAV was still operational and continued mission.

(bb) 011305 Apr 68, at XT637341, B-1/26 engaged one VC in tree with small arms fire. Saw boy fall but only found a blood trail. One US WHA.

(cc) 011525 Apr vic XT655343, E Trp found ten bunkers linked by commo wire.

(dd) 011721 Apr vic XT653336, E Trp found thirty graves with markers that indicated dates of death as in Jan and Feb 68. One marker in a tree read 21 March.

(ee) 021435 Apr vic XT595357, H Co found ten bunkers with fighting trenches around each bunker. Hot soup and coffee was found with fresh food and cooking utensils.

(ff) 021805 Apr vic XT624328, Squadron C&C ship received fire as he took off from NDP. Ship was not hit. LFT saturated area with unknown results.

(gg) 041430 Apr vic XT575370, E Trp found three graves four to five days old. Graves were not dug up.

(2) Mine incidents during the operation were numerous and a total of forty-three mines were found by sweep or other methods and ranged in type from claymore to anti-tank and included US Artillery rounds, homemade, Ch&Cem manufacture and shaped charges. Some mines were found on trails, but most were located off the trails. In some instances the VC posted warnings in Vietnamese. Mine incidents involving US vehicles were as follows:

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>RESULT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
231500 Mar	XT646330	unk	Tank had one road wheel, track blown off.	H Co
231557 Mar	XT646330	unk	ACAV had 3 road wheels destroyed, 1 track blown off, 1 US WHA.	E Trp
250815 Mar	XT652350	small-	Negative damage, 1 US WHA	H Co
261100 Mar	XT713316	unk	5 ton C/L, no casualties	How Btry

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261255	Mar	XT615345	Arty	Tank, no damage/casualties	H Co
261305	Mar	XT615345	TNT	Tank, no damage/casualties	H Co
261338	Mar	XT591340	AP	ACAV, no damage/casualties	E Trp
261342	Mar	XT651332	unk	VER, moderate damage, 1 US WHA	HHT
281250	Mar	XT575337	unk	ACAV, C/L, 5 US WHA	E Trp
311700	Mar	XT641325	12# TNT	Tank, no damage/casualties	H Co
031745	Apr	XT593342	AP	Tank, no damage/casualties	H Co
040820	Apr	XT658318	unk	ACAV, moderate damage, 4 US WHA	G Trp
041220	Apr	XT643322	10#	Tank, light damage, no casualties	G Trp
070830	Apr	XT641326	AP	ACAV, no damage/casualties	G Trp

(3) During the operation movement was detected or individuals were spotted outside the perimeter at night. There were thirteen separate incidents of this type and in most cases small arms and M-79 fire was utilized with one possible VC KIA.

(4) On 6 April 1968, the Squadron (-) was released from OPCON of 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div and marched to Blackhorse Base Camp to perform maintenance in preparation for future operations.

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11. (C) RESULTS

	QUICK-SILVER	FARGO	CASEY	ADAIRSVILLE	VALLEY FORGE	HARRISBURG	ALCORN COVE	TOTALS
Friendly Losses								
KIA	3	5	0	4	1	0	1	14
IBL	28	25	2	27	19	0	41	142
Damaged								
ACAV	3	1	1	0	1	0	7	13
Tank	1	3	1	0	0	0	5	10
AVIB	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
VTB	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Destroyed								
ACAV	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	5
Tank	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Truck	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Enemy Losses								
VC KIA (BC)	0	59	0	51	22	0	13	145
VC POW	0	1	0	2	1	0	4	8
VC KIA (P)	0	2	0	0	0	0	6	8
Detainees	7	1	0	8	0	0	0	16
Hot Chunks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bunkers	260	160	15	0	29	0	324	318
Bunkholes	0	147	0	0	0	0	12	159
Base Camps	0	5	0	2	2	0	5	14
Duds	6	5	10	3	5	3	4	36
Mines	6	0	122	4	2	0	13	67
AK-47	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	9
LA MG	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
RR	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
RPG-2 Launch	3	0	0	0	3	0	3	9
RPG-7	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	7
RPG-2 Rds	0	3	0	4	16	0	18	41
RPG-7 Rds	0	8	0	22	3	0	3	36
Grenades	3	8	1	14	0	0	0	26
Master Rdn	0	6	0	4	0	0	12	22
Documents	0	0	0	0	14	0	13	13
Med Supp	2	1	0	4	0	0	10	17
Clothing	175	51	0	2	0	0	10	238
Rice	250	1505	0	217	0	0	950	11,852
Salt	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	30
Tobacco	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Money	\$VN 193,800	0	0	0	0	0	0	\$VN 193,800

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12. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Administrations: During the period of 5 Dec 67 - 6 Apr 68, no significant administrative matters were encountered. It was noted, however, that delays often occurred in the forwarding of Casualty Roster Reports (DA Form 1156) to the Squadron S-1 (Rear). This problem as well as that of transporting other correspondence and personal between forward and rear areas would be best alleviated by establishing a daily air-courier service.

b. Medical Services

(1) The Aid Station with the Squadron Surgeon operated continuously from 6 Dec 67 through 6 Apr 68 away from Blackhorse Base Camp. At all times, a rear detachment consisting primarily of new arrivals or individuals preparing to leave Vietnam and the Medical Service Corps Officer rotated between the Base Camp, the Forward Supply Point, and the Forward Aid Station locations. With each line troop, a minimum of five medics and preferably six medics were on duty at all times.

(2) In the line troops, several new ideas were adopted as standard procedure. It was found undesirable to maintain six medics in a line troop. This enabled three medics to usually be on the medical track so that one man could dismount to treat casualties and the track would still have a driver and track commander. Additionally, when a troop medic was wounded or left the troop for some other reason, another man was readily available who was familiar with the troop and its field operations. A second idea previously used but now adopted as standard procedure was the carrying of a minimum of sixty battle dressings in each platoon dispersed on at least two separate tracks. Also, each platoon carries a minimum of three litters, each litter on a different track. All serious casualties received emergency treatment by the line troop medic and were dusted-off by helicopter from the site of injury.

(3) There were no significant changes in the operation of the Forward Aid Station. It consisted of the M577A1 Medical Command Post with refrigeration, a one and one-half ton cargo trailer, and a front line ambulance (FLA) or the medical command jeep. The FLA or jeep greatly facilitated the Surgeon's movement throughout the Squadron. Refrigeration enabled tetanus toxoid to be stored so that individuals with minor wounds did not have to be evacuated from the field for treatment. Furthermore, the bimonthly immunization program was able to be sustained during the long field operation. By keeping the cargo trailer with the M577A1, it was possible to maintain an emergency treatment facility during movement, an adequate medical supply could be stored, and the pack up and tear down of the Forward Aid Station was facilitated.

(4) Maintenance of a substantial medical supply was deemed necessary at all times. Sources of medical supply were uncertain and undependable during most of the operation. Since the H-23 helicopters were not stationed at Blackhorse Base Camp, supplies could not be sent directly from the Rear Aid Station to the Forward Aid Station as had been done previously. Two types of supply were used. One was through the 37th Medical Company and the other was from medical facilities located near the area of operation. The latter was most commonly used. During most of the operation, the 37th Medical Company did not accompany the Regiment. Therefore, any supply from it had to be drawn at Blackhorse Base Camp and forwarded through Squadron channels. At one time the 37th Medical Company was in operation at Blackhorse Forward, but did not have enough supplies to support the Squadrons. When queried about supply, they stated that they had been unable to obtain any priority for medical supply by air from Blackhorse Base Camp, land convoys from Blackhorse Base Camp to Blackhorse Forward were unpredictable and took several days, and that substantial supply had already been lost in transit or spoiled on the air strip at Blackhorse Base Camp. In view of this experience, a medic was included in convoys going to the vicinity of a Medical Clearing Company or Surgical Hospital. These facilities were always cooperative in supplying the unit's needs.

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Additionally, two medics with a vehicle were usually located in the Squadron Trains Area. They could obtain medical facilities in the area and send it forward.

(5) Although the previously mentioned problems existed, they were overcome without serious difficulty. The Forward Aid Station was able to accomplish its mission at all times.

c. Communications:

(1) Part of the difficulties encountered by the 2d Squadron during the time period indicated were due in part to prior activities. The Squadron engagement as part of Task Force Oregon forced its support to come from units to the north. Upon the Squadron's return to Blackhorse and Regimental control, it had to start anew in the way of demand data, new repair procedures, etc. All requisitions with Task Force Oregon support units were cancelled, and all items were rerequisitioned with the 506th S&S Co and the 551st LMF.

(2) Between the initiation of operations in early December and the VC TET Offensive, the Squadron was dependent upon 551 LMF for backup communications repair. This support was very slow with extensive down-time for all equipment turned in for repair. Very few batteries, and no repair parts, were received during this period, through 506 S&S or 551 LMF. Resupply of much needed GVO helmets and antenna sections was non-existent, due in part to the reasons given in the initial paragraph.

(3) From the end of January 1968 to 20 March 1968, the Squadron operated from the vicinity of Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Communications maintenance support now came from 185 MB and 5th LEM. Equipment in for repair was returned in as little as one day. The Squadron was able to procure badly needed repair parts, batteries, antenna sections, and other items from units in the area.

(4) On 24 March the Squadron moved to the Ben Cat-Lai Khe area for operations and reverted to the 551 LMF for DS support. Only a contact team was sent with the squadron, thus further complicating the support picture. The contact team could only evacuate all items turned in to 185 MB in Long Binh. During the time spent in the Ben Cat area, no equipment was returned through 551 LMF.

(5) From November on, except for the items procured through units in Long Binh, the Squadron has received no repair parts, batteries, etc., through normal supply channels. However, visits directly to the 506th yard in Saigon show that the needed items are in-country.

(6) Communications during the period were generally good with only slight delays encountered in operation of the newly-received AN/GRC-106 radios. FM communications between elements of the 2d Squadron was no problem. FM communications with higher headquarters was consistently excellent.

d. Supplies

(1) During operations Quicksilver and Fargo, all supplies were transported overland. During 21 Jan-6 Apr 68, the squadron utilized ground and air transport, a total of 247 air sorties were flown for the squadron, delivering 862.8 tons of cargo.

(2) During the period of 6 Dec 1967 to 6 Apr 1968 the squadron used the following amount of ammunition

TYPE	AMOUNT	TYPE	AMOUNT
5.56	190,280	7.72, 4&1	1,019,500
.45 Cal	8,000	.50 Cal	258,100
40MM M406	15,000	90mm Smk	36
90mm Cannister	644	90mm HE-T	237
4.2 HE	2,654	4.2 ILL	26
4.2 WP	655	155 HE	12,176
155 ILL	377	155 Smk WP	360
155 Smk, Yellow	88	Claymore Mine M18	1,080
Frag Grenades	5,400	LAW	150
Thickener	320Lbs	Coal	3,000 Charges

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- C O N F I D E N T I A L -

13. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques,
River Crossing Operations

During Operation Harrisburg, Second Squadron conducted a deliberate crossing of the Dong Nai River in the vicinity of YFO45187. The operation was conducted utilizing two LCM craft to transport 156 assorted vehicles and trucks across the river. A squad of infantry from C-1/506 Inf and a squad from 3d Plt 919th Engr were helilifted to the far shore to secure and prepare a site. The variation in water level due to the tide and the height and slope of the banks of the river precluded the preparation of more than one crossing site. Organization at the crossing site was good and the operation would have gone smoothly except that one of the LCMs was inoperative for most of the crossing. Despite the lack of craft, the operation was completed in less than fifty hours. This operation showed that with six LCMs and two or three crossing sites a squadron size unit could cross a major river in twenty-four hours with a minimum of non-organic support and prior preparation. Non-organic support for an operation of this type, in addition to the LCMs, can be limited to one D-7 tower.

14. (C) Commander's Analysis.

a. Timeliness and Effectiveness of Operations:

(1) With the exception of Operations Casey and Harrisburg, all operations were both timely and effective. The enemy in the areas of operations were either defeated or forced out of the area. All installations secured by 2d Squadron were held without interruption of the installation's activities. No convoy secured by the 2d Squadron was threatened.

(2) Operation Casey - Operation Casey was both untimely and ineffective. It was poorly timed because the enemy reported in the AO had successfully departed for Saigon and the TET Offensive, hence, units were committed for several days to an unprofitable area. Since the mission of the operation was to destroy VC units in the area and, in fact, contact with large units was never made, it must be concluded that the operation was ineffective.

(3) Operation Harrisburg - This operation was timely since it was designed to interdict rocket units operating in the Bien Hoa area. However, the operation was ineffective due to its premature termination. The day after F and G Troops crossed the Dong Nai and got into position to conduct operations they were ordered out of the area. Thus they had no opportunity to conduct any detailed search of the area.

b. Psywar Activities:

During this entire period, despite extensive use of psywar teams and leaflet drops, only two men Chieu Hoi'd. Both of these men had already deserted the VC and used loudspeaker direction to located friendly units. The Psywar teams included, in addition to the Regimental team, teams from ARVN III Corps, 1st Inf Div, 101st Abn Div, and 199th L& Inf Bde. All teams used generally the same approach, pamphlet drops, loudspeaker appeals, etc. Two Chieu Hoi's is a poor result for the time and effort expended. The following recommendations for a more effective Psywar Program are submitted:

(1) Whenever a unit is in heavy contact surrender leaflets should be dropped right after the Tac Air and LFT strikes or as soon as the enemy appears to be trying to break contact. These leaflets could be delivered by helicopter, a vehicle immediately available to Regiment's Psywar Team. The LFT team could quite easily carry and drop a bundle.

(2) Whenever possible the leaflet drop should be followed by a loudspeaker appeal. If possible, a POW taken earlier in the battle should be employed. In order to facilitate such an operation a loudspeaker system should be rigged so it can be quickly mounted on a helicopter.

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15. (C) LESSONS LEARNED.

a. Items Deceptiveness of aerial reconnaissance in the jungle.

Discussions Although the aerial observer is of high value to the ground forces in jungle operations he has certain limitations with regard to assisting ground movement. Even when flying at treetop level it was found that the aerial observer could not correctly gauge the height or density of trees and grass. Even more important is the inability to correctly judge soil trafficability from the air. On several occasions, ground commanders have been directed by the aerial observer to apparently excellent movement areas only to discover the ground was too soft to support vehicles.

Observations The aerial observer can be of great navigational assistance to the ground commander in the jungle, however, only ground reconnaissance can determine the trafficability of the terrain and the density of the foliage.

b. Items Relocation of Gunner's Control Box on M48A3 Tank.

Discussions When moving through the thick foliage of the type located in the vicinity of Loc Minh, the normal engagement distance was less than ten meters. At this range it was impossible to focus the gunner's sight, hence the main gun and coax machine gun were fired by the tank commander. In this situation it was found that the gunner was of more value on the back of the tank. Since the loader usually stands in the loader's hatch, no one was down in the battle compartment to turn on the firing switches. This created a problem since safety requires the switches to be off when not in use. In a contact situation the tank commander requires a method of selecting the desired weapon. This problem was solved by moving the gunner's selector box to the tank commander's position.

Recommendations It is recommended that squadron commanders be given the authority to authorize the repositioning of the gunner's selector box on the M48A3 tank at the tank commander's position.

c. Items Tide data for inland rivers.

Discussions Twice during the month of March the Squadron has conducted river crossing operations in inland rivers in the II Field Forces area. In both operations the rivers had tidal changes of three to four feet that affected the conduct of the crossing. The nearest tidal information was for the Saigon River at Saigon. Although both rivers flowed into the Saigon River, the Saigon tidal chart bore no correlation to the tides at the crossing sites.

Recommendations A study of the river tides in the II Field Forces area be made and disseminated to Squadron/Battalion level.

d. Items Problem of forcing CS gas into VC tunnels.

Discussions When checking VC tunnel complexes with CS gas it is often difficult to get gas to flow through the tunnel. One solution is to throw one CS grenade in the tunnel and follow it with a fragmentation grenade which lands between the tunnel entrance and the CS grenade. The ensuing explosion will cause the gas to be blown through the tunnel complex.

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Observations: The use of a CS grenade and fragmentation grenade in this combination has provided an effective means of gassing VC tunnels.

e. Items Aerial delivery and extraction of vehicles.

Discussions: During Operation Alcorn Cove, three combat damaged M113A1s were evacuated from forward locations to Lai Khe by OH-54 aircraft. Rigging required five 5" clevis's, four 13,500 lb test slings 12 feet long. Four clevis's were attached to the lifting eyes at each corner of the vehicle. A sling was connected to each of these clevis's, then to the fifth clevis, which was hooked onto the flying crane hook. The first vehicle evacuated had the following components removed: engine, transmission, control differential, armament kit, and basic load of ammunition. Weight of the vehicle during evacuation was reported by the aircraft commander as 13,000 lbs. The other two vehicles had only the engine and basic load of ammunition removed; the armament kit was tied down inside the vehicle. Weight of the vehicle during evacuation was reported by the aircraft commander as slightly over 15,000 lbs. The present airlift restriction on aircraft in Vietnam is a maximum load of 20,000 lbs. Based on our experience, it should be possible to airlift an M113A1, with all components installed, and only the basic load removed, whether to extract an inoperative vehicle from or to deliver an operative vehicle to forward locations.

On 31 March, an attempt was made to deliver an M52A2 five-ton truck (with winch) from Lai Khe to the forward area. The truck data plate listed the weight of the vehicle (including OVM and the spare tire) as 19,830 lbs. The OH-54 made two attempts to lift the vehicle. Each time, it was able to lift the truck about fifteen feet, but was unable to gain altitude. The mission was aborted. The aircraft commander reported that the vehicle weighed 21,500 lbs.

Recommendations: That this information be disseminated to all units in the Regiment that might conduct aerial transportation of vehicles.

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
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APPENDIX I ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY)
OPERATION QUICKSILVER

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
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TABLE APPENDIX 2 - ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY) OPOD 22-67
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
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

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
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
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TAB B - APPENDIX 2 - ANNEKA (OPNS OVERLAY)
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


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


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
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
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APPENDIX 3 - ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY)
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TAB A- APPENDIX 4- ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY)

ADAIRSVILLE


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TAB B - APPENDIX 4 - ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY)

ADAIRSVILLE

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
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
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APPENDIX 5 ANNEX A (DPNS
OVERLAY) VALLEY FORGE
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Sheets: 6330, 6331, 6430, 6431



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APPENDIX 6-ANNEX A (OPNS OVERLAY)


HARRISBURG

Ref: sp Map SE ASIA

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
APPENDIX 7- ANNEX A (OPNS
OVERLAY) ALCORN COVE

REF: SP MAP SE ASIA

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