


RC 472
1144 ACK, 53
AKK-
Box 1

HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO San Francisco 96257

AVIC-ZR


12 July 1967

SUBJECT: Battle of Slope 30, 19 June 1967



TO: See Distribution

The inclosed narrative description of the "Battle of Slope 30" was compiled as a tribute to the men of the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment who gave their lives through their heroic performance of duty in the early morning Viet Cong attack on the Squadron CP perimeter on 19 June 1967. It is also written as a testimonial of the professionalism and courage of the dead and the survivors to inspire those who follow in their call to arms.

FOR THE COMMANDER


TERRENCE H. WALLACE
Captain, Armor
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special




BATTLE OF SLOPE 30BACKGROUND

On 19 June 1967, the 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment defeated a major Viet Cong force composed of two infantry battalions of the 274th Main Force Regiment, reinforced by heavy weapons elements from the Regiment and the 5th Viet Cong Division. The Viet Cong had attacked elements of the Squadron located near SLOPE 30 Hamlet which is 50 kilometers East of Saigon.

SLOPE 30 Hamlet has long been a symbol of Viet Cong domination in Northern PHOUK TUY Province. It is situated on Highway 2 astride the last East-West line of communication available to the Viet Cong for movement from the FAT DICH secret zone located to the West of Highway 2 to the DAY TAC secret zone located to the East of Highway 2. It is the focal point of Viet Cong activity in the area for it not only provides a rest haven for Viet Cong troops passing through the area, but it is also the supply center for transient Viet Cong troops, and Viet Cong located in nearby base camp areas. The Hamlet, which closely parallels Highway 2 is bordered by a short strip of cultivated fields, and rubber and coffee plantations. Beyond this one to two kilometer strip the primary forests or jungle take over.


Preceding the SLOPE 30 battle, the 3d Squadron had been participating in the US 9th Infantry Division's multi-battalion OPERATION ALBION which was initiated on 9 June 1967. The objective of the operation was the destruction of the enemy forces and installations in the Viet Cong secret zone or base camp area called the FAT DICH. Concurrently, a major engineer effort was directed toward the establishment of jungle-free East-West and North-South line of communications which would facilitate future reentry and exploration of this long-time Viet Cong sanctuary.



The 3d Squadron initially pushed deep into the primary forest from the eastern sector of the area of operation. As the search progressed, the Squadron moved progressively farther to the South until it was operating in the vicinity of SLCHL 30 Hamlet on 18 June 1967. Late on the afternoon of the 18th, the Squadron pulled out of the forest and established troop-sized defensive positions in the relatively open area to the North and East of SLCHL 30 Hamlet. By 2000 hours listening posts, ambush patrols and anti-intrusion devices had been emplaced out from each perimeter and defensive concentrations had been fired. The disposition of the Squadron was as shown in Inclosure 1. From 2000 hours until 0110 on the 19th, the quiet of the night was interrupted only once by suspected enemy movement North of the Team K position at 2200 hours and by the harassing and interdicting fires conducted by Howitzer Battery and the Provisional Mortar Battery.


ATTACK ON TEAM K PERIMETER

Suddenly at 0110 hours on the 19th the Viet Cong unleashed a violent and intense attack upon elements of the Squadron. Team M with the Provisional Mortar Battery, and Team K with the Command Post, Howitzer Battery, and 3/919 Engineer Company were hit simultaneously with mortar fire (Inclosure 2). The fire directed at Team M and Provisional Mortar Battery was apparently delivered to destroy the firing capability of the Mortar Battery and to create a diversion from the main attack. In spite of the fire which lasted for approximately thirty minutes on this position the mortarmen never faltered; instead they started what was to be a fire mission that would last for over one hour. Throughout the fire mission, key personnel remained exposed to call out fire commands and to replace aiming stakes that were blown down by the mortar attack.




The attack on the Team K perimeter was obviously not a diversionary attack for launched simultaneously with the mortar attack was a concentrated attack by two main force battalions of the 274th Viet Cong Regiment reinforced by heavy weapons elements of the Regiment and 5th Viet Cong Division. The attackers were armed with an unusually high density of anti-tank and automatic weapons. They used these weapons to deliver withering fire on first the northern sector of the perimeter followed shortly by successive attacks on the eastern and southern sectors. The latter two attacks were later found to be secondary efforts while the main effort was oriented on destroying the northern sector of the perimeter.

In the initial surge of fire, the northeast sector of the perimeter which included 3d Platoon of the 919th Engineer Company was hit severely. Men who were blown or knocked from their machinegun positions on the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAV) staggered to resume their positions. If they were too severely wounded, they were immediately replaced by volunteers from the inner perimeter. ACAV's that caught on fire were saved by officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men from Team K, the command post and the engineers who moved from vehicle to vehicle using anything available to extinguish the fire. These same men repeatedly entered the burning vehicles to evacuate personnel, equipment and ammunition. While rescue and evacuation measures were being taken, other officers directed ACAV's from the inner perimeter and less critical sectors of the main perimeter to the threatened northern sector. In some cases, ACAV commanders upon seeing a flank vehicle hit moved their ACAV to an exposed position to cover the evacuation of the wounded from the damaged ACAV and to cover the newly exposed sector of the perimeter. Once a replacement ACAV had been thrown into the breach they returned to their original position.



Immediately after the shock of the enemy's initial burst of fire wore off, the defenders returned a devastating volume of automatic weapon and 90mm cannon fire which continued for the next hour and twenty minutes. The returned fire was so well directed and intense that the fire initiative was relinquished by the enemy, never to be regained by him again. Within this same time frame all other teams were brought up on a full alert and were ready to move in five minutes. Within two minutes after the enemy initiated his attack the Provisional Mortar Battery fired illumination in support of the Team K perimeter. This fire quickly sifted to high explosive and illumination with the former being directed to the rubber plantation due East of the perimeter. After the initial volleys, the fire was walked through the coffee plantation and finally through the jungle to the South of the perimeter. At the same time, the Howitzer Battery initiated a counter-mortar fire plan in support of Provisional Mortar Battery. At 0135 hours, a flareship from the US 7th Tactical Air Force arrived on station to provide continuous illumination for the remainder of the night and until first light in the morning. This action enabled the mortars to shift to purely defensive fires.


A short time later, a light fire team from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's Air Cavalry Troop arrived over the battlefield to provide surveillance of enemy routes of reinforcement or withdrawal. By this time it was evident that the enemy's main attack was still being directed from the North. After the location of the ambush patrol in that area was reaffirmed, the light fire team was directed to engage the enemy firing from the rubber tree line just North of the perimeter. This was an extremely hazardous assignment for it called upon the light fire team to make its firing pass from West to East directly into the line of the



trajectory of the mortar rounds falling into the enemy East of the perimeter. The light fire team was so successful that the enemy fire was appreciably decreased after its last firing pass. Upon completion of the firing mission the light fire team jettisoned its rocket pods and voluntarily landed within the Team K perimeter to evacuate the first group of seriously wounded.


When the light fire team departed, an Air Force "Puff the Magic Dragon" arrived on station and interdicted possible enemy positions and routes of withdrawal to the South of the perimeter. As one aircraft expended its ordnance another relieved it and expended its ordnance in support of the Squadron. This firing was followed by 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun support from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 93d Artillery firing from the South from the 1st Australian Task Force Base Camp at NUI DAT. The rounds of these weapons were directed upon enemy routes of withdrawal to the South and East.

During the course of the action, the men manning the three ambush patrols and two listening posts were ordered to remain in position because they were caught in an intense cross-fire. As soon as a lull in the firing began, the listening posts conducted a fighting delay action back to the perimeter. Ambush Patrol Two was not effected by the fire and remained in position to continue to monitor the open flank to the West. Ambush Patrol Three was pinned down and could not move. Without a moments hesitation a six ACOV volunteer force moved out from the Team K perimeter, fought their way to the patrol, and conducted a withdrawal back to the perimeter without suffering any casualties. Prior to the extraction one patrol member had been killed and two had been wounded.



Ambush Patrol One, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and nine enlisted men remained in position throughout the attack. Contact had been maintained with them during the action, but as a result of enemy movement between them and the perimeter they held their ambush position. Not until the Viet Cong started their hasty retreat from the battle area were they detected. When they were, they were hit with such an overwhelming force that they were quickly overrun by a frenzied enemy throwing grenades and firing automatic weapons. As a result of this contact five patrol members were killed and four wounded. Six Viet Cong bodies littered the ambush site. When the Team K commander lost contact with the patrol, he again sent out a volunteer armored relief force that searched until 0310 hours before the survivors were found and extracted. One man remained missing until first light when he was found at a position where he had crawled in an attempt to return to the perimeter. He had been so critically wounded that he blacked out before he could make it to the perimeter.


At 0220 hours the enemy started a hasty retreat from the battlefield. Initially it was estimated that the enemy was moving to the northwest and interdiction fires were directed on routes of withdrawal in the area. Additionally, Team I was committed to pursue in that direction. Subsequently, a captured P1 and a captured Viet Cong operation order for the attack indicated that the main effort would withdraw to the East toward Highway 2 and ultimately toward the MAY TAO secret zone. At this time Team K was ordered to start a detailed search of the battlefield, while Teams L and M initiated pursuit to the East. When Team I uncovered little or no evidence of the enemy activity to the northwest, they too were committed to pursuit to the East. Contact was not regained; however, numerous blood-stained trails were discovered along with a total of eight bodies that had been abandoned along the trails. At the site of the battle,



2 wounded Viet Cong were taken prisoner; at the same time 48 Viet Cong dead were found along with numerous weapons which littered the battlefield.

As a result of the carnage and litter of the battlefield and the obvious disorganization of the fleeing enemy, it was apparent that the confident Viet Cong battalions that had been tailored to destroy an armored force had been dealt a stunning defeat. The US Cavalrymen along the perimeter had persevered and by their disciplined defense and rapid reaction they had been successful in not only blunting and repelling the attack, but also in holding the enemy off at a sufficient range so that the mortars, artillery, Army Aviation and the US Air Force could effectively employ their fires. The ensuing pursuit by the Squadron further destroyed any effort by the elite 274th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment to regroup its fleeing elements into a cohesive tactical whole to conduct an organized withdrawal. Subsequent intelligence reports gathered from agents, the local population, and DUC THANH District indicated that large numbers of Viet Cong dead and wounded had been carried off to the East and that a large number of the wounded had died along the withdrawal route.

As a result of the actions on 19 June 1967, subsequent operations were launched in the SLOLE 30 area by forces of the government of South Vietnam to pacify the area. Thus, the Battle of SLOLE 30 represented another chapter in the Allied struggle to bring former Viet Cong strongholds under effective government control.



RESULT OF THE ACTION

1. US LOSSES

- a. KIA: 7 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav
2 - 3rd Flat, 919 Ingr Co
- b. WIA: 1 - HHT, 3-11 Armd Cav
4 - How, 3-11 Armd Cav
20 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav
9 - 3rd Flat, 919 Ingr Co
- c. ACAV's Damaged: 2 - K Trp, 3-11 Armd Cav
2 - HHT, 3-11 Armd Cav
2 - 3rd Flat, 919 Ingr Co

2. Enemy Losses

- a. KIA (BC) - 56
- b. KIA (Possible) - 150
- c. WIA (BC) - 2
- d. PW - 2
- e. WIA (Possible) - 200
- f. Captured Equipment:
 - (1) 5 RPG-2 Launchers
 - (2) 1 M79 Launcher
 - (3) 4 AK-47 Rifles
 - (4) 2 US BAR's
 - (5) 1 Chicom Type 50 SMG
 - (6) 1 Chicom Type 53 Carbine
 - (7) 2 Chicom Type 56 (SKS) Carbines
 - (8) 2 US M1 Carbines
 - (9) 122 Assorted Grenades
 - (10) 9 M79 rounds
 - (11) 250 rds 12.7mm linked

- (12) 1 Chicom night sight for recoilless rifle
- (13) 5 75mm RA rounds
- (14) 12 RPG-2 rockets
- (15) 6 PRG-2 boosters
- (16) ground mount for 12.7mm AA MG
- (17) 10,000 rds assorted SA ammo
- (18) 250 lbs of assorted individual equipment

2 Incl

- 1 - Operation Overlay
- 2 - Sketch of Situation

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

SUPPLY

The 3d Squadron logistical support for Operation Akron was accomplished by use of CH-47 and Huey 1D aircraft and wheel elements. The Supporting elements for the Squadron were the 551st Maintenance Battalion, the 506th Supply and Service Company which are located in Long Giao (CS464966) and the 3d Ordinance Battalion Ammunition Supply Depot located at Long Binh (YT060105). The Squadron Trains were located at Long Giao. The wheel elements were used to pick-up Class I, II, III and IV supplies from the 506th Supply and Service Company and the 551st Maintenance Battalion and transported to the Squadron Trains area. Class V supplies were transported from Long Binh to Long Giao by organic 5 ton trucks and by trucks from the 709th Transportation Battalion. The 709th Transportation vehicles supported the Squadron mainly by transporting 4.2" mortar, 155mm projectiles, green and white cannister charges and fuses. Aerial resupply was used entirely for transport of Class I, II, III, IV, and V items to the forward elements. The CH-47 and Huey 1D were used for aerial resupply. The CH-47 was the mainstay of the Squadron resupply with the Huey 1D being used primarily for an early morning parts resupply and to airlift one Hot "A" ration supper meal daily.

The resupply requirements were as follows: The rotar wing requirements for the Squadron were planned from the daily status reports sent by each forward unit. During the operation an average of 16 CH-47 sorties and 6 Huey sorties were required daily. The sorties for the CH-47 were increased by approximately 4 per day, when it became necessary to support the Squadron's 155mm SP battery by air. The wheel requirements were estimated to be two organic 5 ton trucks per day and 5 stake and platform trucks every other day.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority ND 927624
 By SP NARA Date 5/8/61

This Squadron shipped the following supplies by CH-47.

	SORTIES	FOL	AM O	C A TIONS	WATER
Hc	14	2860 gal	750lbs	308 cases	5,600 gal
I	42	7400 gal	34,600lbs	282 cases	5,600 gal
K	42	9790 gal	34,250lbs	463 cases	6,400 gal
L	42	9515 gal	49,300lbs	390 cases	6,400 gal
M	42	11,385 gal	25,525lbs	365 cases	5600 gal
How	28	1555 gal	206,500lbs	26 cases	4000 gal
Fort	18	1100 gal	151,000lbs	98 cases	
B17-9Arty	10		33,000lbs		1200 gal
TOTALS	238	44,605 gal	584,925lbs	3073 cases	32,800 gal

MAINTENANCE

Operation Akron continued to point out the value of logistical support by air. As in other operations repair parts were flown to field locations and additionally maintenance contact teams were airlifted with major assemblies to better expedite repairs. This procedure eliminated the necessity for the more vulnerable wheel vehicle logistical resupply which would require the commitment of combat elements for security of road bound convoys.

During Operation Akron the Squadron used two M48A3 engines, three M113 engines, three M48A3 transmissions, five M48A3 final drives and three M113 final drives.

A total of six M48A3 tanks were deadlined for major components and all but two were repaired within 36 hours in the field. The remaining two were evacuated to the 551st Maintenance Battalion located in Long Giao for 3d echelon repairs. Eleven personnel carriers, M113, were deadlined during the operation. Two of these were evacuated to the 551st Maintenance Battalion in Long Giao for 3d echelon repair and the remaining nine were repaired in the field.

PERSONNELFRIENDLY CASUALTIES

US 10 MIA - 52 MIA

ENEMY CASUALTIES

56 VC MIA (BC)

2 VC MIA (Confirmed)


2 VC YBA (EC)

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS


Due to the operation being conducted in the vicinity of the Base Camp, there were only a few minor administrative problems encountered. The religious services were conducted weekly, however, only a portion of the Squadron was able to attend. Since the different troops are always lagged at varying distances, it is impossible to service the entire Squadron in just one or two visits. These units do not close into their respective night areas until late afternoon, thus allowing only a short period of time to hold services prior to setting up night security and the ambush patrols.

Correspondence was received through distribution which by necessity had to go to the field. Often the suspense dates were impossible to meet because of the amount of investigation involved and the fact that the unit concerned was operating all day in the jungle. It is suggested that correspondence of this type be expedited at all levels above the field unit, allowing as much time as possible at Squadron level and below.

With the prospect of future operation at greater distances from Long Giao, the problems of personnel replacement will increase. It is felt that an increased effort will be needed on the part of the Squadron and Regimental staff sections who are concerned with replacement personnel.




New arrivals must be processed, equipped and trained with as little delay as possible. This will allow the commander in the field at least some degree of flexibility in dealing with his mass D.R.O.S. problem.




HGL 1 to Combat After Action Report (Battle of SLOPE 30)

Ref: Map, Vietnam, 1:25,000 Sheet 6430 III N



INOS (Situation Overlay to Combat After Action Report
(Battle of Slope 30)

60/82 60/82
(APPROX PSN)



DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 927624
By [signature] NARA Date 5/8/61

By LD NAPA Date 3/15/00

For most persons included in I, K, L and How they meeting report figures.

Statistical data on
3rd Sgd on date
of Slope 30 battle