

HEADQUARTERS II FFORCEV  
 OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
 1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96266

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Period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A)(U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command.

(1) During the reporting period there were four major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV.

(a) On 28 November, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones became the Staff Judge Advocate, replacing Major Barney L. Brannen, Jr.

(b) On 7 January, Colonel Richard L. West became Engineer, replacing Colonel James A. Vivian.

(c) On 15 January, Colonel John L. Kennedy, Jr. became Commanding Officer of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing Colonel Norman F. Allen.

(d) On 16 January, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Hill, Jr. became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 upon the departure of Colonel H. S. Long, Jr.

(2) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increased during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
30 April 1968	337	27	2983
31 July 1968	339	34	3148
31 October 1968	390	33	2947
31 January 1969	376	36	3105

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety, Discipline and Base Development.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached, and under the operational control of II FFORCEV remains satisfactory.

(2) The experiences of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV, particularly the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in operations near the Cambodian border, reveal that the malaria incidence rate (especially falciparum) invariably increases as VC/NVA contact increases, other factors notwithstanding. Furthermore,

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from operations in Bien Hoa Province south and southwest of Long Thanh City the RTAVF experience an astounding increase in their malaria incidence rate as a result of their personnel having spent a great deal of time inside VC/NVA bunkers found on the operation. These dark moist bunkers are frequently nesting places for mosquitoes which have recently bitten VC and NVA troops coming from Cambodia.

(3) The morale of the command continues at a high level.

(4) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued are listed below.

	<u>Aug 68 - Oct 68</u>	<u>Nov 68 - Jan 69</u>
SILVER STAR	54	43
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS	6	34
SOLDIER'S MEDAL	4	24
BRONZE STAR MEDAL	469	420
AIR MEDAL	315	488
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL	703	536
PURPLE HEART	<u>24</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	1575	1561

(5) January was designated as USARV Safety Month. Notices were published daily in the II FFORCEV Daily Bulletin emphasizing safety. A number of safety posters were distributed. The six major accident categories are listed with comparison figures for the last two reporting periods. The increase is due to the number of accidents incurred by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which came under the operational control of II FFORCEV in November. Figures in parentheses are those of the 1st Cavalry Division.

<u>ACCIDENT</u>	<u>DEAD</u>		<u>INJURED</u>	
	1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69	1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68	1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69	1 Aug 68 to 31 Oct 68
Accidental Dis-charge of Weapons	18(5)	8	81(20)	76

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Aircraft	16(8)	13	25(15)	33
Vehicles	8(1)	7	42(6)	32
Jumps and Falls	0	2	45(22)	25
Burns	0	0	43(11)	28
Ordnance	<u>6(2)</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>38(6)</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	48(16)	37	274(80)	226

(6) The status of discipline within the command improved significantly during the past quarter with a marked decrease in all categories of reported offenses. This decrease is attributed to an extensive educational effort made by this headquarters and the active support rendered by commanders and staff agencies. These actions enhanced the Crime Prevention Program, and developed a general overall awareness of the necessity for improved standards of behavior.

(7) Development of the II FFORCEV base camp continues satisfactorily. The status of significant projects as of 31 January is as follows:

(a) Repair of perimeter defensive positions and bunkers throughout the area was continuous.

(b) A project to air condition the main chapel was started on 18 November. The project is expected to be completed in February 1969.

(c) Construction of a game room addition to the Service Club building was started on 15 January and is programmed for completion in March 1969.

(d) The new building for the Officers Open Mess was opened on 24 December.

(8) On 20 December, the Commanding General, II FFORCEV was tasked by COMUSMACV to meet with an enemy delegation on 25 December to arrange a time, place, and procedures incident to the release of US prisoners held by the enemy. ACOFS, G1, II FFORCEV, was appointed project director and charged with staff responsibility for all preparations for and conduct of the operation. The appointed contact team met with the enemy delegation on 25 December and a second time on 1 January 1969. Three US prisoners were released by the enemy delegation to the US contact team at the second meeting. Ambassador Bunker summed up the operation as follows: "It (the operation) was very well worked out and well concluded and a good way to start the New Year. I am very pleased; I don't see how it could have turned out better." An after action report of this operation is being prepared and will be submitted in accordance with AR 525-15.

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c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TACI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing on selected agent reports was continued by the Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing, described in detail in the preceding ORLL, is to better evaluate the intelligence produced by human sources and to determine the reliability of the sources themselves. This, in turn, enables the agency which employs the sources to decide which agents warrant retention and which should be terminated. The briefing also enables the Collection Division to determine which reports are significant and plausible so that they may be utilized by the various divisions of G2 and considered in the current assessment of the situation. The method by which the evaluation is accomplished is as follows: All reports are indexed and filed by the Collection Division. From the total number received, certain reports are selected as significant. These are then forwarded to the Order of Battle Section where the particular intelligence analyst familiar with its subject comments upon its plausibility. Finally, the reports considered both significant and plausible are briefed. Each briefing covers a 24 hour period. A representative from each of the divisions of the G2 Section attends the briefing.

(b) Collection Division is also responsible for ensuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) are published and levied on the appropriate collectors. In addition, Collection Division coordinates the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and keeps subordinate units informed as to which SICRs are current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry. The Registry indexes all SICR by number and by collector. During the past quarter 13 MACV SICR and 14 II FFORCEV SICR were cancelled, while 18 new MACV and 4 new II FFORCEV SICR were levied.

(3) Counterintelligence/PHOENIX.

(a) During the past quarter steady improvement was noted in the operations of District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) and Province Intelligence Coordinating Centers (PIOCC) in support of the PHOENIX/PHULG HOANG Program. In an effort to improve intelligence collection leading to a substantial upgrading of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) - Guerrilla data base, MACV instituted the Intelligence Collection Program, VC Political Infrastructure and Military Forces (C), nicknamed BIG MACK (U). The reports rendered under this program on VCI, guerrilla and local force order of battle are in computer compatible

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format and should result in more comprehensive data, more readily available to US and Vietnamese agencies charged with the attack on the infrastructure. During this quarter, the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) PHUNG HOANG staff opened a school for DIOCC and PIOCC workers in Bien Hoa. The first class completed the 92-hour course on 18 January. The attendance of all GVN DIOCC workers at this school should do much to raise the level of professionalism in the DIOCC/PIOCC. Indifference to the PHUNG HOANG Program on the part of some province and district chiefs and interagency rivalries within the DIOCC/PIOCC remain problems requiring positive command emphasis. Both US and GVN commanders are aware of these problems and are providing the emphasis.

(b) Volunteer Informat Program. During this past quarter, the Volunteer Informant Program has been stressed and command emphasis placed on the program. The G5 Section and Psychological Operations elements have greatly expanded the publicity for the program. As a result of the added emphasis and the increased publicity, the returns in captured materiel and information obtained have far surpassed any like period since the creation of the program.

(c) The Counterintelligence Section, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment has established a program of road-blocks and traveler searches. This program was instituted as a result of agent reports which indicated that medicines and money were being transported to VC elements with the Bien Hoa area. The success of the program has been evidenced by captured enemy documents which have mentioned the road-blocks as an obstacle to be by-passed.

(4) Ground Reconnaissance. Company F, 51st Infantry (LRP) was employed in ground reconnaissance operations in War Zone D. Not only were the teams used to develop the intelligence situation in the vicinity of Rang Rang (YT2054), but they were also employed in an interdiction role, hampering the activities of the 81st Rear Service Group by developing targets for tactical air strikes and B-52 raids. Later in the period, long range patrolling was conducted in southern War Zone D and northern Viet Cong U-1 Province. In January, training for the recently activated Company D (LRP), 151st Infantry was integrated into continuing operations in the same area, providing for a smooth transition as Company D replaces Company F. The results of 208 operations conducted during the period were 62 contacts, 86 sightings, the capture of seven enemy, 27 enemy killed, six US killed, and 35 US wounded.

(5) G2 Air.

(a) Intensive aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was conducted within III CTZ throughout the reporting period. Full utilization was made of II FFORCEV assets, and requests for 7th Air Force tactical air reconnaissance support (aerial photography and infrared (Red Haze)) were increased. In the Visual Reconnaissance (VR) field, reconnaissance of

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most of the Cambodian-III CTZ border was conducted on a daily basis. The area of the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak was covered on about 90 percent of the days. Portions of the III CTZ coastline were covered on about 75 percent of the days. During the period, a total of 15,383 VR sorties were flown within III CTZ by both Army and Air Force aircraft, resulting in 1,784 significant sightings being reported in the II FFO CLV INTSUM, and an average of 43 of 61 established VR areas being covered daily.

(b) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) electronic reconnaissance was conducted on a nightly basis. The major portion of III CTZ is being covered by the OV-1B Mohawk aircraft, presently consolidated under the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company at Vung Tau Army Airfield. SLAR coverage is directed toward likely avenues of approach into the Saigon area and the Long Binh/Bien Hoa military complex. Additional emphasis was placed on the border areas known as the Parrot's Beak, Angel's Wing, and Fishhook. Flight patterns have been planned to provide intelligence over almost the entire III CTZ as required. There has been little use made of daylight SLAR during the past three months as only a small amount of useful intelligence was being gathered. SLAR-detected moving targets, when identified and determined to be significant have been relayed to artillery warning control centers in the area of operations for further dissemination and tactical response. In many instances artillery units and other tactical units have provided successful response.

(c) Infrared (Red Haze) surveillance was concentrated along the Cambodian border, traditional infiltration routes, and suspected enemy base camps and staging areas to maintain a continuing watch for indications of another general enemy offensive aimed at Saigon and the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex. The areas receiving major emphasis included the Cambodian border in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing, west of Tay Ninh, between the Dog's Face and the Fishhook and northward to the Flat Iron; the Song Be corridor and trail activity in the vicinity of Bu Gia Van; infiltration routes along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong rivers; the area of the Michelin Plantation, the Tunnel area and War Zone D; the Capital Military District, and the coastal approaches to Saigon. A considerable amount of US Air Force Red Haze surveillance support was requested and received, with an average of five targets being flown each night during the past three months. Analysis and interpretation of Red Haze imagery has been used to determine patterns of heat emitters and concentrations of heat-producing equipment.

(d) Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance has demonstrated extensive advances in meeting the requirements of Army, ARVN and Air Force units in III CTZ. Requests for sensor products have increased more than 100 percent in the last three months. In order to expedite the introduction of new technology a comprehensive training program was inaugurated to familiarize users with the newly available multi-sensor systems. This program has resulted in requests for photography that effectively utilize

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the new equipment to provide the best possible coverage of the topography under study. A program of coordination with other staff divisions of the headquarters has provided products that confirm or deny information obtained through other sources. A program of analysis, coordination and response has resulted in the interdiction of enemy activity by field units in receipt of vital intelligence information obtained through Airborne Sensor Systems. A program to improve responsiveness caused both Army and Air Force reconnaissance elements to examine existing procedures. The result of this program was a complete revitalization of the processing and distribution procedures used to request photo products. The changes resulted in a three-fold reduction in time of delivery from time of request. Photo product delivery time has been reduced to eight hours for Priority I missions, 18 to 24 hours for Priority II missions and 18 to 48 hours for Priority III missions. The in-flight assignment of targets has provided units at all levels with unprecedented flexibility and responsiveness. Programmed studies using new high acuity cameras and side oblique photography have aided in monitoring enemy activity on a continuous basis. By providing substantial advancements in techniques, equipment, interpretation and reproduction of sensor products a greater appreciation of the role tactical reconnaissance plays in support of ground operations has been realized.

(e) On 13 December 1968, II Field Force began an evaluation of the OV-1 Mohawk Direct Support Concept directed by USARV. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the feasibility and suitability of providing OV-1 Mohawk aircraft in direct support of the US divisions in the Republic of Vietnam by the Surveillance Airplane Company in each Corps Tactical Zone. This direct support will be compared with the previous organic support to some divisions by their Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) platoons, and general support to other divisions by the surveillance airplane companies.

(6) The Production Division, which was formed during the preceding quarter, continued to develop its operations as the Current Intelligence, Estimate and Indicator Center for II FFORCEV. The division is currently authorized six officers and two enlisted men, and is organized for 24-hour operation. The division provides daily briefings for the Commanding General and staff, publishes the II FFORCEV Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM), prepares a weekly assessment of the current enemy situation, and evaluates information from all sources to produce assessments of the enemy intentions. As the focal point of information evaluation within the G2, II FFORCEV, the division prepares and presents special briefings on the current intelligence estimate, as required.

(7) G2 Targets Division.

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function has continued to be the development and evaluation of B-52 targets. However, the division



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has been increasingly called upon to provide suitable targets for Combat Sky Spots (radar directed tactical air strikes), chemical targets (herbicides and persistent CS), cluster bomb (CBU) targets and artillery intelligence targets. The all-source intelligence data base and enemy activity indications display are also extensively used by the other divisions of G2 and other staff sections.

(b) During this quarter 298 separate B-52 targets were struck in III CTZ. During the month of November these strikes were concentrated in the northern and western Corps Tactical Zone near the Cambodian border, primarily in War Zone C and along the Vam Co Dong River. During December and January the emphasis shifted as enemy units started moving from the Cambodian base areas to in-country base and staging areas and the infiltration corridors leading toward Saigon. The Saigon and Song Be River corridors were hit particularly hard, as were the Trapezoid (KT5943), Boi Loi (KT5933), Ho Bo Woods (KT6039) and the Catcher's Mitt (KT0825).

(c) The 29th Chemical Detachment, assigned to Headquarters II FFOCEV and under the operational control of the G2 Targets Division became one of the principal surveillance tools of the Targets Division, flying approximately 90 hours on airborne personnel detector missions. The detachment also flew an additional 30 hours dispersing herbicides.

#### (8) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description. The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains the supreme political-military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordinated either directly to COSVN or to one of COSVN's 13 province-level subdivisions in III CTZ. (See Inclosure 9). There were no known changes during the quarter in the enemy's military-political boundaries. However, during the quarter information became available which clarified the composition and function of the T7 Military Region. The T7 Military Region, which was formed in about June 1968, was activated by COSVN to provide better control of Sub Region 4, Viet Cong U-1 Province, Viet Cong Ba Bien Province and the Rung Sat Special Zone. These regions have maintained their former internal organization, but are now subordinate to COSVN through T7 Military Region. Another significant change during the quarter was the reorganization of rear service support in Sub Region 1. The sub region had been serviced by elements of the 83d Rear Services Group, but in an effort to overcome problems and strengthen the logistical base in the sub region COSVN directed a reorganization. The sub region is now supported by six logistical areas. The five sub regions surrounding Saigon continue to function as political, economic and military command and control structures directly subordinate to COSVN. (See Inclosure 9). However, the enemy has continued to give higher priority for replacements and supplies to his divisions, and as a result the effectiveness of sub

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regional forces has remained on a low level. The only sub region which has been strengthened during the quarter was Sub Region 1, which now has more than the equivalent of a division under its control. As the quarter ended it appeared that the enemy's divisions were intended to be his main striking force with the sub regional battalions playing an auxiliary role.

(b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

1 The number and effectiveness of enemy units in the II FFORCEV TAOI underwent several significant changes. The number of units rose slightly reflecting the arrival of two new regiments in III CTZ from II CTZ and the formation of new artillery units. The effectiveness of the regiments dropped slightly, but the effectiveness of infantry battalions rose. The most marked rise in effectiveness was in sapper battalions, demonstrating the emphasis that the enemy has placed on the formation and training of sapper units in the previous quarters. The number of artillery battalions continued to rise, reflecting a reorganization of the artillery support in the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division and the formation of new sub regional artillery battalions. The increase of one sapper battalion is the result of the reclassification of a battalion formerly held as an infantry battalion. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the quarter. Units believed to be present, but not confirmed are shown in parentheses. The table includes units in the portion of IV CTZ in which the 9th US Infantry Division has conducted operations.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNITS

	31 OCT 68					31 JAN 69				
	FCE	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL	FCE	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL
INF REGT		4	5(3)	4(3)	13(6)		1	7(4)	7	15(4)
ARTY REGT		2(1)			2(1)		2(1)			2(1)
INF BN	3(1)	7(2)	4(1)	7(2)	21(6)	2(1)	10(1)	11(1)	3(1)	26(4)
ARTY BN		8			8	1	6(2)	1(2)		8(4)
SAPPER BN			2(1)	1(1)	3(2)		3(1)	1(1)		4(2)
RECON BN			2		2		2			2
FCE - Fully Combat Effective					MCE - Marginally Combat Effective					
CE - Combat Effective					NCE - Not Combat Effective					

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2 During the quarter, the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters was reconfirmed. Analysis of captured documents, prisoner and Hoi Chanh statements, plus agent reports coupled with an evaluation of the enemy situation, places COSVN Headquarters within a 15-square-kilometer area in Cambodia north of Tay Ninh Province (XT3696, XT3899 and XT4595). This location offers the enemy a sanctuary based on the Allied policy of restricting air, ground and artillery strikes to Vietnamese territory. In addition the area is well serviced with trails, sparsely populated and well concealed under a dense jungle canopy.

3 Documents captured by the 52d ARVN Ranger Battalion in a contact near the Fishhook (XT5793) identify the 320th North Vietnamese Army Regiment of the 1st North Vietnamese Army Division. This unit was last contacted in an attack against the Duc Lap Sub Sector Headquarters (II CTZ) in August 1968. Since that time the 320th NVA Regiment was believed to be in Cambodia replacing the heavy losses that it suffered in the Duc Lap attack. The regiment is composed of the K4, K5 and K6 Infantry Battalions. Its subordinate units are the 13th Mortar Company, 14th Anti-Aircraft Company, 15th Engineer Company, 16th Signal, 17th Recoilless Rifle (75mm) Company, 18th Medical Company, 19th Reconnaissance Sapper Company, 20th Transportation Company, 21st Infantry Company, 24th Headquarters Company and the 25th Rear Service Company. The strength of the regiment is estimated to be approximately 1,400. Since only the K4 Battalion has been tentatively identified, the Order of Battle Section considers the 320th NVA Regiment as possibly present in III CTZ.

4 The 95C Regiment of the 1st NVA Division, first identified in a 13 November attack on Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Dot (XT560855), and later identified in a number of contacts with the 25th US Division, has been confirmed in II FFORCEV order of battle holdings. The regiment infiltrated from Cambodia, where it had recovered from heavy losses suffered in the attack on the Duc Lap CIDG Camp, in which the 320th Regiment also took part. Like its sister unit, the 320th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, the 95C Regiment is composed of the K4, K5 and K6 Battalions and similar support companies. The present strength of the regiment, which has suffered a number of casualties in III CTZ, is listed as approximately 1,000.

5 There are indications that the 1st North Vietnamese Army Division has relocated from II CTZ. The Order of Battle Section considers the 1st NVA Division's 95C NVA Regiment as confirmed and its 320th NVA Regiment as possibly present in III CTZ, while the remaining 66th NVA Regiment has not been identified. The headquarters of the 1st NVA Division is unlocated, but it is believed that the division has moved into the northwestern III CTZ to fill the vacuum created by the southward movement of the other three divisions in the Corps area.

6 Low level agent reports have led the Order of Battle Section to change the artillery structure of the 7th NVA Division. The 13th AA

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Battalion has been dropped as an artillery unit subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. It is believed that the 7th Division now has a D22 Artillery Battalion and a D14 AA Battalion, like the 5th and 9th VC Divisions. Because the information is limited, these two units are currently held as only possibly present in the II FFORCEV order of battle holdings.

7 During November enough evidence became available to confirm the existence of the 268th Regiment (AKA Cu Chi, AKA Iron Triangle) subordinate to Sub Region 1. The regiment is composed of three battalions, the K1 (AKA 170th), K2, and K3 which operated in the Trang Bang area. Documents subsequently captured have revealed that the regiment is suffering from serious morale problems resulting from B-52 strikes, fatigue, combat failures, and an inadequate food supply. In addition the regiment is understrength, especially the K1 Battalion. This situation has rendered the 268th Regiment less combat effective.

8 Documents have confirmed the subordination of the 88th NVA Regiment to Sub Region 1. There were indications in early December that the 88th Regiment had been dropped by the 5th VC Division when it relocated to War Zone D. Elements of the 88th Regiment were identified in the Ho Bo area (XT6038) at that time and it is believed that the regiment was redeploying from the Boi Loi area into the southeastern part of Sub Region 1.

9 The Quyet Thang Regiment, which was reportedly disbanded in the last quarter, has again reappeared in documents captured in Sub Region 1. Letter box designations identify this regiment and the 1st MF and 2d MF Battalions subordinate to it. The Quyet Thang Regiment will be regarded as only possibly reconstituted until further information confirms its existence.

10 The Song Be Regiment underwent a major reorganization, probably in late October. Captured documents note the reduction of the regiment to one reinforced battalion because of the heavy losses suffered by its 212th Battalion. The Song Be Regiment, redesignated Doan Song Be, is now composed of three infantry companies (C1, C3, and C54), a heavy weapons company (C214), a sapper company (C211), a signal company, and reconnaissance and security elements. Doan Song Be is now carried as a confirmed reinforced battalion with a strength of 280 men. It is believed that the battalion will continue to operate from its base area in Phuoc Long Province, subordinate to Military Region 10.

11 A prisoner captured on 14 October has given some information on the 242d Battalion. This unit infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1968. According to the prisoner, the battalion was composed of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. Based on this information and the identification of the battalion in two contacts, the 242d NVA Battalion has been confirmed as a maneuver battalion subordinate

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to Sub Region 2. Its strength is 250 men and it is believed to be operating in the vicinity of Tra Cu.

12 Information obtained from documents and a prisoner has led to the confirmation of the 242d NVA Battalion as a maneuver battalion subordinate to Sub Region 2. Indications are that the 267B VC Main Force Battalion has been disbanded and it has been dropped from II Field Force order of battle holdings. It is believed that the 267B Battalion may have merged with the 242d Battalion to form the 2642d Battalion, but the evidence of this is tenuous. Strength of the 2642d Battalion is estimated to be 300.

13 Sufficient evidence was obtained from various sources to accept the D1 Battalion as possibly present in III CTZ. This **maneuver** battalion, with an estimated strength of 350, is considered to be subordinate to Tay Ninh Province. Indications are that the D1 Battalion has been working closely with the D14 Battalion and that they would participate in future actions together against targets in Tay Ninh Province. There is not enough information in regard to the D1 Battalion's composition to confirm it as a **maneuver** battalion in the order of battle holdings.

14 There are strong indications that a 3d Artillery Battalion exists in III CTZ, under the joint control of Sub Region 3 and the Combat Control Section. It is believed that the unit is composed of two recoilless rifle companies and one 82mm mortar company and has a strength of 150. This unit will be considered as possibly present in Sub Region 3 until the exact composition is determined.

15 Documents captured in December note the existence of the 9th Artillery Battalion subordinate to Sub Region 1. Indications are that this battalion is probably composed of elements of the C7 and C9 companies of the 3d Battalion, 208th Artillery Regiment. This unit, which has been added to the possibly present list in the order of battle holdings, gives the enemy in Sub Region 1 a 107mm and 122mm rocket capability.

16 Additional information has been obtained on the composition of Military Region T7. Military Region T7 was activated in about June, 1968 by COSVN for better control of Sub Region 4, VC U-1 Province, VC Ba Bien Province and the Rung Sat Special Zone. The sub regions have maintained the same organizational structure and are subordinate to COSVN through Military Region T7. The 274th VC Regiment is confirmed as a subordinate unit of Military Region T7, and it is possible that the 5th VC Division is also under its control. In addition to the forces subordinate to the various sub regions, Military Region T7 has forces that are primarily artillery and sapper types, possibly the 74th Artillery Regiment, the K34 Battalion of the 96th Rocket Regiment and a battalion of the 208th Artillery Battalion, as well as the D67 Engineer Battalion and the D5 Sapper Battalion. These units, combined with infantry, pose a threat to Saigon and Allied installations in its area.

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of operations. Furthermore, Rear Service Groups 81 and 85 are believed to be supporting Military Region T7 operations.

17 Documents captured in early December note the disposition of the 12th Reconnaissance/Sapper Battalion and the location of Sub Region 2 Headquarters in the Ba Thu area (XT2704). The 12th Battalion was moved to the Ba Thu area to train both politically and militarily for an "important mission" that would be assigned to it in the future. A small number of cadre and combatants were left behind to prepare for the offensive. Indications were that Sub Region 2 Headquarters had moved to Ba Thu to avoid Allied operations and harassment.

18 Interrogation of a prisoner has revealed information concerning the Combat Control Section of Sub Region 3. The prisoner noted that the normal military organization of the sub region consisted of five infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company and a sapper company directly subordinate to Sub Region 3 Military Headquarters. However, in May, a Combat Control Section was formed to facilitate the control of the 506th and 508th Battalions. Now all of the units are under the joint control of the Combat Control Section and Sub Region 3 Military Headquarters.

19 Preparations for a possible military effort in Saigon have necessitated the reorganization of forces in Sub Region 6. Documents and a prisoner captured during the quarter have revealed changes in the organization of the sub region. To improve control, the enemy has disbanded the C10 Sapper Battalion, which had an estimated strength of 175 men, in favor of five Special Action Elements designated 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. Indications are that only Special Action Elements 1 and 2 had been assigned personnel as of 30 November. The authorized strength has been reported to be 600 and it is possible that the arrival of personnel to fill the other elements will bring these Sub Region 6 units up to full strength. Pending new information, the strength of these special action elements will be maintained at 175. The C10 Sapper Battalion has been dropped by the Order of Battle Section as a confirmed maneuver battalion.

20 A record book of the 81st Rear Service Group captured on 15 November revealed that B-52 strikes had forced its personnel to live in trenches, resulting in a reduced percentage of personnel available for duty (approximately 69 percent), that there had been a change in unit designators, and that the group had been partially reorganized. Because of the change in designators, previously known units could not be correlated, however, the document revealed the formation of two transportation battalions. The D40A Transportation Battalion is composed of a headquarters, two previously known companies, V14 and V15, and one previously unknown company V16. The D60B Transportation Battalion is composed of a headquarters and three previously known companies, V11, V12, and V13. The total strength of the 81st Rear Service Group was increased to 2,550 by the Order of Battle Section on the basis of this document.

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21 Documents captured by elements of the 1st US Cavalry Division (Airmobile) identify three battalions of the 85th Rear Service Group which were previously unknown - the 532d, the 432d and the 237th Battalions. This information has increased the estimated strength of the 85th Rear Service Group from 425 to a minimum of 1,000. The current area of responsibility of the 85th Rear Service Group is Binh Long Province.

22 The enemy increased significantly his employment of 120mm mortars. The 120mm mortar was identified in a series of attacks on Dau Tieng Base Camp. The 120mm mortar, type 53, has a weight of 606 pounds, a maximum range of 5,700 meters and a minimum range of 500 meters. The mortar fires a high explosive round which is 23.5 inches long and weighs 28 pounds. This mortar is normally found with a divisional artillery battalion, but it is believed that in the attacks on Dau Tieng, the weapon was given to the heavy weapons platoon of the 664 Local Force Company. In addition, a rallier from the 88th NVA Regiment stated that a new 215mm rocket would be used in the next offensive. This projectile was tested in a 25 September shelling of Katum. There are indications that it was also used on a number of other occasions during September. The units which are believed to have employed this weapon were elements of the 69th Artillery Command in conjunction with the 22d Artillery Battalion of the 5th Viet Cong Division before its relocation to War Zone D.

(c) Recapitulation.

1 The VC regions, provinces and special zones in III CTZ controlled 42 Local companies and 17 Local Force platoons. (Note: Local companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or under are considered platoons).

2 The battalions and regimental sized units located within III CTZ are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
69th Artillery Command	COSVN
74th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th Artillery Command
208th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th Artillery Command
56th VC AA Battalion	69th Artillery Command
58th VC Artillery Battalion	69th Artillery Command
95C NVA Regiment	COSVN
274th VC Regiment	COSVN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
275th VC Regiment	5th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	5th VC Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	5th VC Division
141st NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
165th NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
271st VC Regiment	9th VC Division
272d VC Regiment	9th VC Division
273d VC Regiment	9th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	9th VC Division
24th VC AA Battalion	9th VC Division
66th VC MF Base Security Regiment	COSVN
88th NVA Regiment	Sub Region 1
✓ 101st NVA Regiment	Sub Region 1
✓ 268th VC MF Regiment	Sub Region 1
1st VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 1
2d VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 1
8th VC Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 1
6th VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 2
D16 NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
242d NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
267th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 2
2642 NVA Battalion	Sub Region 2
269th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 2
308th VC LF Battalion	Sub Region 2

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
2d Ind VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
265th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
506th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
520th VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
Dong Phu VC MF Battalion	Sub Region 3
Doan 10 VC MF Sapper Battalion	Sub Region 4
Thu Duc VC Infantry Regiment	Sub Region 4
Dong Nai VC Regiment	Sub Region 5
Special Action Element	Sub Region 6
14th VC MF Battalion	Tay Ninh Province
D440 VC LF Battalion	Ba Bien Province
D445 VC LF Battalion	Ba Bien Province
D1 VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 Province
D2 VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 Province
Doan Song Be Battalion	Military Region 10
46th VC MF Reconnaissance Battalion	COSVN
2d VC MF Guard Battalion	Unknown

3 The following units are located in northern IV CTZ in the II  
FFORCLV TAOI:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
Dong Thap I VC Regiment	Military Region 2
Dong Thap II VC Regiment	Military Region 2
295th VC MF Battalion	Military Region 2
502d VC LF Battalion	Kien Phong Province

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
504th VC LF Battalion	Kien Tuong Province
512th VC LF Battalion	An Giang Province
516th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province
518th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province
550th VC LF Battalion	Kien Hoa Province

## 4 Units possibly present in III CTZ are listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
96th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th VC Artillery Command
33d NVA Regiment	5th VC Division
32d NVA Regiment	7th NVA Division
22d NVA Artillery Battalion	7th NVA Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	7th NVA Division
174th NVA Regiment	Possibly COSVN
320th NVA Regiment	Possibly COSVN
21st Ind VC MF Battalion	5th VC Division
Gia Dinh 4 VC Sapper Battalion	Sub Region 1
9th Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 1
12th VC LF Sapper Recon Battalion	Sub Region 2
3d Artillery Battalion	Sub Region 3
D6 Heavy Weapons Battalion	Sub Region 4
67th Engineer Battalion	Possibly COSVN
D1 VC LF Battalion	Tay Ninh Province
D168 Battalion	Phuoc Long Province
D368 Battalion	Binh Long Province

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(d) Summary of Recent Activities.

1 The past quarter has been a period of transition as the enemy attempted to move from a disengaged deployment into an offensive posture. At the beginning of the quarter enemy units were in the traditional base areas in northern and northwestern III CTZ along the Cambodian border. The enemy continued to avoid major contact throughout the period but slowly redeployed to contest Allied operations against infiltration routes, and to move from the border areas into intermediate staging areas. Aggressive Allied operations forced the enemy to delay his movements, break up his forces into small cells to pass through Allied positions, hindered reconnaissance elements from operating, and inflicted heavy logistical losses on the enemy. The loss of vital supplies forced the enemy to divert manpower to the movement of supplies, and caused problems in the support of units that were already in intermediate areas. The Winter-Spring Offensive, which was launched by the enemy in December, was slow in evolving as the enemy's movement towards his objectives in the south central part of the corps tactical zone were hampered and delayed. As the quarter ended the enemy had still not consolidated his units into forward positions, but it seemed clear that the redeployment of major enemy units heralded the advent of a major attack on the scale of the 1968 Tet Offensive.

2 5th VC Division. At the beginning of the period, the 5th VC Division was located in northeastern War Zone C. Indications were that in November the 33d NVA Regiment and the 275th VC Regiment had begun to redeploy to War Zone D, the old area of operations of the 5th VC Division. The 88th Regiment became subordinate to Sub Region 1 and remained in the area of the Michelin Plantation (XT5155), when the division headquarters and the 33d NVA and 275th VC Regiments began their redeployment. The 5th VC Division has avoided major contact throughout the period, but it is believed that the relocation of the division to War Zone D is almost complete, in preparation for the upcoming offensive. During December, small contacts and documents captured in the Song Be Corridor indicated that the 5th Division was slowly moving south in platoon and squad size units. At the end of January a rallier reported that the 174th NVA Regiment had replaced the 88th NVA Regiment. The fact was confirmed by documents captured on 29 January. Including the 174th Regiment, the 5th VC Division has a strength of 5,250.

3 7th NVA Division. This division, with one exception, has remained out of contact in western Binh Long Province. On 27 and 29 November, in a series of company and battalion sized engagements northeast of An Loc, the 141st Regiment lost approximately 150 men. The 32d and 165th Regiments, on the other hand, have avoided major contact throughout the quarter. It is believed that the 7th NVA Division, with an estimated strength of 5,500, remains dispersed in the vicinity of the Fishhook (XT5793).

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4 9th VC Division. At the beginning of the period, the 9th VC Division was avoiding contact in base camps in western and southwestern Tay Ninh Province. Since then all regiments have been identified in contacts with friendly forces. The 271st Regiment lost approximately 100 men in a 27 November engagement southwest of Thien Lon; the 272d Regiment lost approximately the same number of men in a 22 December attack on an ARVN night defensive position north of the Angel's Wing; and the 273d Regiment lost an estimated 50 men in a 28 November contact northwest of Ben Soi. Based on contacts in the last week of January it appears that major elements of the 9th VC Division have redeployed southward from their base areas to staging areas southwest of Tay Ninh in the Angel's Wing and Ba Thu (XT2704). The strength of the division is believed to be approximately 5,500.

5 At present three regiments are believed to be operating independently under COSVN. Two of these regiments are newly arrived units from II CTZ, the 95C and 320th NVA Regiments. These are thought to be part of the 1st NVA Division, which is also believed to have relocated to the III CTZ. However, until the headquarters of the 1st NVA Division is located and the exact composition of the division determined, the 1st NVA Division will not be confirmed and the 95C and 320th Regiments will be considered independent units subordinate to COSVN. The present area of operations of the 95C Regiment is believed to be the Crescent area (XT4160), northwest of the Michelin Plantation, while the 320th NVA Regiment is presently located southwest of An Loc. Their strengths are 1,000 and 1,400 respectively. The 274th VC Regiment has avoided major contact during the quarter but its battalions are believed to be deployed in the area of the Binh Son Plantation and the Hat Dich area (XS3388). The present strength of the Regiment is estimated to be 1,300.

6 At the beginning of the quarter the 88th NVA Regiment was subordinate to the 5th VC Division. However, when this division relocated to its traditional area of operations in War Zone D, the 88th NVA Regiment was left behind. In December it appeared that the 88th Regiment had been resubordinated to Sub Region 1 as part of the effort to bolster the offensive capability of the sub region. The 88th Regiment had been subordinate to Sub Region 1 and operated in the Michelin area prior to rejoining the 5th VC Division during the August 68 offensive. The 2d Battalion of the 88th Regiment was identified in a 7 December contact in the Ho Bo Woods area (XT6083). It was believed, however, that this was the lead element of the regiment as it relocated into southeastern Sub Region 1, and at the end of the quarter the regimental headquarters and the other battalions were still located in the Boi Loi area.

7 The 101st NVA Regiment has been avoiding contact in the Boi Loi-Trapezoid area, where it withdrew to refit and reinforce after having suffered heavy losses in October. A prisoner taken on 23 November placed the 2d Battalion north of Trang Bang. It is believed that the 1st and 3d Battalions are dispersed in the Boi Loi-Trapezoid area. Indications are that the 101st NVA Regiment has replaced its losses and now has a strength of 1,000 men.

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8 The Dong Nai Regiment has remained out of contact for most of the reporting period. Indications are that the regiment has continued to experience food and morale problems. The disposition of the various battalions is believed to be as follows: The K1 Battalion is northeast of Binh My; the K2 Battalion is in the An Son Area; the K3 Battalion is unlocated in the northeast Catcher's Mitt area and the K4 Battalion is east of Lai Khe. The strength of the unit is estimated to be 1,550.

9 Activity in the various sub regions during the quarter was light to moderate, except for Sub Region 1. Activity in Sub Region 1, a traditional bellwether of increased enemy activity, was high until early January but decreased toward the end of the quarter. Sub Region 1, with the addition of the 88th NVA Regiment, now has four regiments, two artillery battalions and a sapper battalion which represents more than a divisional threat. This reinforcement of the sub-region's forces has been reflected in the level of activity in the area.

(9) VC/NVA Battle Losses.

(a) Overall personnel and materiel losses:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>RALLIERS</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>G/S</u>	<u>RICE (TONS)</u>
NOV	4,166	456	367	1,303	273	98.4
DEC	3,670	921	345	1,299	225	100.3
JAN	3,043	428	309	1,303	226	295.8

(b) Losses in caches. One of the major factors which hampered enemy preparation for the Winter-Spring Offensive was the discovery by Allied forces of large quantities of materiel in caches. The enemy's supply system, based on the clandestine movement of materiel and caches in intermediate and forward areas, although a potential weakness, has worked with notable success in the past. During this last quarter, however, increasing Allied expertise in uncovering caches led to the discovering of very significant quantities of enemy weapons, munitions and foodstuffs.

MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ENEMY CACHES

NOV 68 - DEC 68 - JAN 69

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
122mm Rockets	53	87	5	145
107mm Rockets	15	43	48	106

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	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RPG Rounds	1,230	2,582	2,046	5,858
Mortar Rounds	2,322	7,730	5,674	15,726
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	100	758	1,329	2,187
Small Arms Ammunition	218,877	369,196	891,107	1,479,180
Grenades	4,612	5,564	5,292	15,468
Mines and Booby Traps	470	327	408	1,205
Individual Weapons	681	384	317	1,382
Crew Served Weapons	70	53	58	181
Rice (Tons)	98.4	100.3	295.8	494.5

The impact of these losses has been one of the chief factors which has caused the enemy repeatedly to postpone his planned offensive. In addition, these losses have had a sharp effect on enemy morale, since the amount of rice captured is equal to 600,000 daily rations of rice. As a result many enemy units have gone hungry during the past quarter.

(10) VC/NVA Army Tactics.

(a) In this quarter the enemy's efforts were primarily directed at the positioning of men and supplies in support of a major offensive. The enemy demonstrated a continuing dependence on his system of caches in intermediate and forward areas. In addition, the enemy once again displayed his ability to postpone his offensive operations in response to repeated allied spoiling operations.

(b) There was continuing emphasis during the quarter on the formation and training of sapper units, with special attention given to the infiltration of sapper elements into Saigon.

(c) The enemy continued to make extensive use of attacks by fire, and increased his use of 120mm mortars during the quarter. His primary means for attacks by fire continued to be 60mm and 82mm mortars, with rockets playing an important but secondary role.

(d) There were increasing signs during the quarter of the political motivation of the enemy's military actions. Attacks against civilian targets increased as did terrorist attacks, and the enemy undertook a program of equipping all his soldiers with standardized uniforms in order to blur the distinction between the NVA and VC forces.

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(11) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

(a) Capabilities.

1 Attack.

a The enemy is capable of conducting another offensive aimed primarily at Saigon/Tan Son Nhut and/or Long Binh/Bien Hoa employing elements of the 7th NVA Division, the 5th VC Division, 9th VC Division, and Sub-Regional forces.

b The enemy is capable of attacking Tay Ninh, Loc Ninh, Quan Loi and An Loc utilizing elements of the 7th NVA Division and the 1st NVA Division, supported by provincial forces.

c The 74th NVA Artillery Regiment, the 208th NVA Artillery Regiment and the 96th NVA Artillery Regiment are capable of attacking civilian and military targets throughout III CTZ, independently or in support of ground attacks.

d The enemy is capable of conducting limited ground attacks and attacks by fire against friendly units, outposts and installations within the corps zone.

e The enemy is capable of temporarily interdicting and staging ambushes along friendly lines of communication.

2 Defend.

a The enemy is capable of defending base areas in northern Binh Long Province and Phuoc Long Province with elements of the 7th NVA Division, and provincial forces.

b The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone C and Tay Ninh Province with elements of the 1st NVA Division and 9th VC Division, forces subordinate to COSVN, and provincial forces.

c The enemy is capable of defending base areas in the Michelin, Trapezoid, Ho Bo and Boi Loi areas with elements of the 1st NVA Division and the forces of Sub Region 1.

d The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone D with elements of the 5th VC Division and Rear Service Group personnel.

3 Reinforce.

a The enemy is capable of reinforcing an attack on Saigon with battalions from the northern provinces of IV CTZ and from the 1st NVA Division.

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b The enemy is capable of reinforcing with infiltration groups of unknown size.

c The enemy is capable of reinforcing with units up to regimental size from II CTZ.

4 Withdraw. The enemy is capable of avoiding contact and withdrawing to relatively secure areas within III CTZ or base areas in Cambodia.

## 5 Other.

a The enemy is capable of replacing losses and increasing strength through upgrading guerrilla forces, recruiting and impressing civilians, and receiving replacements from North Vietnam.

b The enemy is capable of conducting resupply at the required rate when not interdicted by Allied operations.

## (b) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses.

1 The enemy's continuing losses have caused a shortage of personnel familiar with the terrain, a deterioration of leadership, a drop in the level of experience and training of individual soldiers, and an overall lowering of morale.

2 The replacement of VC cadre and soldiers with NVA personnel has led to conflicts, possibly some loss of popular support and has decreased the enemy's capability to evade Allied operations.

3 Successful Allied operations against VC Infrastructure have resulted in a reduced capability to support enemy forces.

4 The enemy's medical facilities are inadequate and he is short of medical supplies.

5 The enemy's supply system, based on extended lines of communication and caches in the forward areas, is vulnerable to Allied operations.

6 The enemy's continued planning for operations directed against Saigon could cause him to become vulnerable to concentrations of Allied forces, firepower and mobility in the Capital Military District.

7 The enemy is vulnerable to being misled by his own propaganda concerning the state of morale of Allied forces and the civilian population.

8 The enemy's continued use of known base areas while avoiding contact with friendly forces, renders him susceptible to B-52 strikes.



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(c) Relative Probability of Adoption at the End of the Quarter.

1 The enemy will probably increase offensive activity throughout the II FFORCEV TACI with concentrated effort either to threaten or attack toward the Capital Military District, the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, Tay Ninh City, and the Trang Bang/Cu Chi area.

2 The enemy is likely to reposition Sub-Regional Forces around the Capital Military District in attack configuration.

3 The 5th VC Division, the 7th NVA Division and the 9th VC Division will probably be redeployed into positions to support or conduct attacks toward Saigon, while the 1st NVA Division prepares combat positions in the vicinity of Tay Ninh City.

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period, II FFORCEV continued Phase II of Campaign Toan Thang, conducting operations throughout the III CTZ to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict infiltration routes. Intelligence received during the quarter indicated the enemy had planned to conduct a Winter-Spring Offensive against populated areas and critical installations during December. However, rapid planning and reaction on the part of friendly forces caused the planned offensive either to be delayed or cancelled. The enemy continued to attempt to prepare for his offensive and to avoid decisive battle. His most frequent tactic was to conduct harassing attacks by fire and light ground probes against friendly units and installations. The capability of II FFORCEV to bring pressure upon the enemy was increased with the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from I CTZ to III CTZ in November. Its employment in the northern tier of the CTZ reduced the operational areas of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, enabling both to increase their emphasis on supporting pacification within their respective areas. The 1st Cavalry Division initiated operations in the vicinity of the Fishhook, Serge's Road, and Adam's Road, along the Cambodian border. The division deployed a brigade (-) to the Parrot's Beak/Angel's Wing area to conduct interdiction operations, while the remainder of the division continued operations along the northern tier. Operations in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak areas were conducted in coordination with Naval Riverine Forces (Giant Slingshot), operating along the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. Preparations were made and work initiated on the upgrading and restoration of ground lines of communication from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai, Bunard and Song Be. Operations consisted of combined efforts on the part of US and ARVN forces to clear the area along the road and replace bridges and culverts to restore military and civilian traffic. The 9th Infantry Division continued offensive operations in the III CTZ with one brigade, and in the IV CTZ with two brigades. The Division conducted operations

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Quyet Chien and Kudzu in the IV CTZ under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. On 1 December, the division, less the 3d Brigade, was placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. The 3d Brigade continued operating under II AFMCEV control in the southwest portion of III CTZ. The Capital Military Assistance Command continued operations in and around the Capital Military District with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light) and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne under its operational control. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, less one squadron, remained under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st Australian Task Force continued operations in the southern portion of III CTZ, in December and January carrying out offensive operations in the Hat Dich area. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force conducted offensive and security operations in the region surrounding its base camp at Bearcat. At the close of the reporting period, II FFORCEV combat operations and quick reaction to intelligence continued to limit the ability of the enemy to wage large-scale offensive actions.

(b) Results of Operations in the III CTZ.

1 Significant results of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, during November, December and January were: 786 US/FWMAF killed (753 US, 21 Australians, 10 Thais, two New Zealanders), 4,297 wounded (4,141 US, 77 Australians, 71 Thais, and eight New Zealanders), 12 US missing, 6,272 enemy killed, 296 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses include 2,036 small arms, 437 crew served weapons, 1,296,513 rounds of small arms ammunition, 18,689 high explosive rounds, 150 122mm rockets, 1,520 mines, and 431.86 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

2 Cumulative results of Campaign Toan Thang, Phase II, include 1,746 US/FWMAF killed (1,676 US, 40 Australians, 27 Thais, and three New Zealanders), 27 US missing, 15,846 enemy killed, 956 enemy captured. In addition, enemy losses include 4,593 small arms, 1,056 crew served weapons, 1,974,688 rounds of small arms ammunition, 31,088 high explosive rounds, 256 122mm rockets, 4,076 mines and 1,199.67 tons of rice captured or destroyed.

(2) Summary of Combat Operations.

(a) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). As the reporting period opened the division was deploying to the northern portion of the III CTZ, an operation which had commenced on 27 October. Combat elements of the 3d Brigade, upon closing in the new area, were placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, while combat elements of the 1st Brigade were placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The division headquarters deployed to Phuoc Vinh

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and operational control of 3d Brigade was passed from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 7 November 1968. On 9 November the division assumed operational control of the 1st Brigade from the 25th Infantry Division. Combat elements of the 2d Brigade closed and became operational under division control on 12 November, with the last combat essential equipment of the division closing in III CTZ on 15 November. From the outset of operations in III CTZ the division conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to block enemy infiltration and movement of supplies along Adam's Road, Serge's Jungle Highway and south from the Fishhook. Throughout the period, the 1st Cavalry Division actively engaged large enemy elements, inflicting heavy casualties. The division's first major action in the III CTZ occurred on 13 November when the enemy launched a determined two-battalion attack against FSB Dot, seven kilometers northwest of Tong Le Chon. The base was occupied by elements of 5-7 Cavalry and the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), in direct support of the division. The attack began at 2351 hours when the base was hit by heavy mortar fire. US and ARVN artillery, tactical air, Spooky and flareships supported the friendly units. At 0125 hours the perimeter was breached at two points, but was restored by 0240 hours, when the intensity of the attack decreased. At 0255 hours the attack resumed in full force with intensive ground and mortar fire. Supporting aircraft received heavy anti-aircraft fire from 50-caliber machineguns until 0515 hours. At first light, Scouts of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, with 1-9 Cavalry, supported the action. At 0725 the enemy force began to withdraw. Ten minutes later the Rangers began a sweep of the area, receiving small arms fire. Airstrikes were called in, and at 0815 hours the base again commenced receiving mortar and rocket fire which continued throughout the day. Results of the action were nine ARVN killed, 41 wounded and one missing; 287 enemy killed, including 77 by air elements, 114 by artillery and 96 by ground fire (credited to the ARVN Rangers), and three 60mm mortars, 12 RPG launchers, 53 AK-47 rifles, ~~seven light machineguns, and two ChiCom carbines captured.~~ At 0630 hours 16 November, B/E/1-7 Cavalry, occupying a night defense position seven kilometers northeast of Thien Ngon, received a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. The friendly units returned fire with organic weapons as aerial rocket artillery and airstrikes supported. Contact was lost at 0800, and at 0825 hours a sweep was initiated. The units immediately began to receive fire from snipers hidden in trees. At 1315 hours the enemy attacked with small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire, and fighting continued until contact was again lost at 1530 hours. Results of the day's action were 11 US wounded, 37 enemy killed, and 11 AK-47 rifles, two machineguns and nine RPG rounds captured. On 25 November, elements of 1-7 Cavalry engaged in two sizeable contacts. The first commenced at 0620 hours five kilometers west of Thien Ngon, when the company engaged elements of the 273d VC Regiment. The fighting, which continued for four hours, resulted in 52 enemy killed and seven captured, and five US killed and 13 wounded. In addition, 12 RPG launchers, 45 RPG rounds, 20 AK-47 rifles, 19 mortar rounds and five

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machineguns were captured. At 1705 hours approximately one kilometer to the southwest, A/1-7 Cavalry received fire from an enemy force. In the resulting action, 12 US were wounded and 40 enemy were killed. On 27 November, seven kilometers north of Loc Ninh, B/2-12 Cavalry, and C/1-11 Armored Cavalry, engaged an estimated enemy company, killing 57 enemy and capturing five crew served weapons, four RPG launchers, and 13 individual weapons. Friendly losses were 20 wounded. At 0900 hours 28 November six kilometers north-northeast of Loc Ninh, C/2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment (ARVN), under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, engaged an enemy force of undetermined size, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. Airborne rocket and ground based artillery supported until contact was lost at 1046 hours. At 1313 hours, contact was reestablished about one kilometer to the northwest when C/2-2 Infantry and 2-9 Infantry began receiving fire. Artillery, air strikes, and aerial rocket artillery resumed support until contact was again lost at 1630 hours. Results of the action were 70 enemy killed, and two RPG launchers, 25 small arms, one 12.7mm machinegun and two 60mm mortars captured; friendly losses were 14 wounded. At 1110 hours 29 November, six kilometers north of Loc Ninh, C/2-2 Cavalry engaged an estimated enemy battalion in bunkers. The enemy was supported by RPG and mortars while the friendly force called in artillery, light fire teams and air strikes. The action continued until 1530 hours when the enemy withdrew to the west and contact was lost. Results were seven US killed and 16 wounded, 78 enemy killed, and 10 individual weapons, one crew served weapon and four RPG launchers captured. On 3 December, 17 kilometers northeast of Hon Quan, A/2-7 Cavalry conducted a combat assault into a landing zone which appeared to be free of enemy activity. Suddenly, the company came under heavy attack from RPG, 82mm mortars, 50-caliber machineguns, automatic weapons, small arms, and command-detonated claymore mines. Airstrikes, airborne rocket artillery and ground artillery support enabled the company to repulse a number of ground attacks by the estimated battalion-sized force. A/2-7 Cavalry air assaulted into the landing zone to reinforce Company D. The contact broke after more than five hours of fierce fighting. Known enemy losses were one killed and one RPG launcher and five RPG rounds captured, while friendly losses were 24 killed, one missing and 52 wounded. Beginning at 0245 hours 4 December, A C/D/2-8 Cavalry night defensive position 17 kilometers east of Katum came under attack from 75 to 100 rounds of 82mm mortar and heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The two companies returned fire with organic weapons, supported by aerial rocket artillery, in fighting that continued until nightfall, and killed 40 and captured one enemy while losing three killed and 19 wounded. Twenty small arms, two RPG-2 launchers, and one light machinegun also were captured. That same day a sizeable cache was located in a bunker 14 kilometers northwest of Song Be by B/1-12 Cavalry. It contained 600 mortar rounds and 100 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. On 7 December, during a reconnaissance in force mission nine kilometers northeast of

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Dong Xoai, A/2-5 Cavalry uncovered a cache containing 50 bicycles, 8,000 pounds of rice, 876 B-40 rockets, 100 B-41 rockets, 256 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle and 60,920 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 9 December, six kilometers southwest of Hoi Quan, A/5-7 Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy company. C/1-11 Armored Cavalry provided fire support in the five-hour battle. The enemy left behind 93 killed, and one captured, two RPG-2 and one B-40 rocket launchers, 12 individual weapons, 53 B-40 rockets and 34 60mm mortar rounds. Friendly casualties were 14 killed and 17 wounded. Operating 10 kilometers north of Trang Sup on 14 December, A/1-9 Cavalry engaged 30 enemy, killing 20 of them. In mid-December the division's operations were extended into Hau Nghia Province, with particular emphasis on infiltration and supply routes in the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak. At 1300 hours 18 December, the 1-9 Air Cavalry, while conducting operations in northern Phuoc Long Province, sighted an estimated 15 enemy in an open area near Bu Gia Map (YU3437). The enemy attempted to evade the aircraft, but were engaged. During this contact, air cavalry elements observed an estimated enemy battalion, and attacked with organic weapons and air strikes, killing 41 enemy without incurring casualties. The same day, 25 kilometers southeast of Bunard (XT474823), C/1-9 Cavalry located 15 enemy killed as the result of a previous air strike. On 23 December, C/1-8 Cavalry located a large weapons cache five kilometers northwest of Hiep Hoa. It contained 80 82mm mortar rounds, 138 B-40 rounds, 37 bangalore torpedoes, 155 60mm mortar rounds, 29 claymore mines and 195 grenades. On 24 December, the company found another large cache in the same area containing 270 grenades, 101 rounds of 60mm and 48 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, and 86 B-40 rounds. On 26 December, 12 kilometers northwest of Ap Phu Loc, C/1-9 Cavalry engaged approximately 60 enemy, killing 41 without friendly losses. On 27 December, 10 kilometers northwest of An Loc, B/2-2 (Mechanized), under the division's operational control, made contact with an estimated enemy company. The fighting lasted three hours and resulted in 52 enemy killed and two captured. In addition, five RPG launchers and 25 rocket grenades, three rifles and 15 grenades were captured. Friendly losses were two killed and 27 wounded. On 28 December, B/1-9 Cavalry, while conducting an aerial reconnaissance in the Phuoc Binh area, received heavy automatic fire. In the resulting contact 59 enemy were killed. While searching the area, additional small groups of enemy were sighted and an additional 12 enemy were killed. There were no friendly losses. On 31 December B/2-12 Cavalry located a large ammunition cache 10 kilometers north of Hiep Hoa. It contained 84 B-40 rockets, 45 122mm rockets, 162 rounds of 82mm and 571 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, and 90,150 rounds small arms ammunition. On 10 January, the division accounted for 53 enemy killed in scattered action. At 1252 hours 11 January, A/1-11 Cavalry engaged an enemy force of unknown size nine kilometers south of Phuoc Vinh, killing 31 and capturing one enemy, while losing three killed and 20 wounded. The division accounted for an additional 30 enemy killed in scattered actions. The following day, the division killed 50 enemy and captured

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one prisoner, 22 small arms, 10 crew served weapons and 41 high explosive rounds. On 19 January, 20 kilometers east-southeast of Phuoc Vinh, the 2-505 Infantry (Airborne), under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, located 30 enemy killed from air strikes. In other operations that day division forces killed another 14 enemy and captured three prisoners, 13 small arms, six crew served weapons, five tons of rice, 325 high explosive rounds, 30 122mm and six 107mm rockets, and 134,728 rounds of small arms ammunition. On 21 January, the 5-7 Cavalry conducted operations in the area eight kilometers southwest of the Fishhook (XT5483). Between 1110 and 1624 hours, contacts with scattered enemy forces resulted in six enemy killed and the capture of four AK-47 rifles and one 60mm mortar. In the same area the unit also located caches containing 331 82mm mortar rounds, 312 60mm mortar rounds, 44 107mm rockets, 40 RPG-2 rounds, 15 RPG-7 rounds, 75 recoilless rifle rounds, 246 grenades, 147,020 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1.1 tons of TNT, .33 tons of C4 explosives, 24 mines and 11,760 time fuzes. On 31 January, elements of the 1-9 Air Cavalry operating 23 kilometers southeast of Phuoc Vinh, engaged an enemy force, killing 34, without suffering friendly losses. Also on that date the division killed an additional 14 enemy, and captured or destroyed 51.2 tons of rice, 63,150 rounds of small arms ammunition, 762 high explosive rounds, and 178 grenades.

(b) 1st Infantry Division. Operations during the quarter were characterized by two distinct battle areas and types of combat. Major enemy units were fought and defeated in areas remote from major population centers, while areas near population centers were the scenes of numerous guerrilla and local force platoon-sized contacts. Combined operations with the 5th ARVN Division, Regional and Popular Forces and the National Police proved valuable in enhancing the detection of the enemy, locating caches and acquiring intelligence. Combined operations generally proved more successful than operations using US or ARVN forces alone. The assignment of Kit Carson Scouts to battalions and National Police Field Forces to brigades has improved the intelligence acquisition and rapid reaction capability of units in the field. /As the reporting period opened on 1 November, beginning at 0333 hours, FSPB Rita (XT500805) received heavy RPG, small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire from an estimated 800 enemy. The attack ended at 0700 hours and resulted in 12 US killed, 54 wounded, 27 enemy killed, and 42 RPG rounds, 17 grenades, and 57 satchel charges captured. /At 1135 hours 11 November, B/1-11 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of enemy seven kilometers west-southwest of An Loc. The contact, supported by artillery and airstrikes and reinforced by B/1-4 Cavalry, continued until 1540 hours. Results were one US killed, 38 enemy killed and six RPG launchers, 11 RPG rounds and one AK-47 rifle captured. /On 13 November, in a sharp 20-minute contact eight kilometers west of Tong Le Chon, Aero Scouts of the 1st Infantry Division engaged 40-50 enemy, killing 38 without taking casualties. /On 16 November, while searching a base camp 16 kilometers east of Chon Thanh, A/2-28 Infantry located 900 82mm mortar rounds, 160 claymore mines, 200

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bangalore torpedoes, 960 grenades and 750 one-quarter pound blocks of TNT. At 0300 hours 1 December, FSPB Junction City (WT620328), occupied by elements of 2-28 Infantry, was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. The action lasted for two hours and resulted in one US killed and 36 wounded, 44 enemy killed, two prisoners and 21 small arms and 11 crew served weapons captured. The division was credited that day with killing a total of 79 enemy. During the remainder of the reporting period, division contacts were generally light and scattered. As the period closed the division continued operations designed to locate and destroy enemy forces and to interdict his movements and logistical operations toward the Capital Military District and the Long Bien/Binh Hoa military complex.

(c) The 25th Infantry Division. As the period opened, 25th Infantry Division forces were deployed with the 1st Brigade to the east of Kui Ba Den, northeast of Tay Ninh; the 2d Brigade, west and south of Cu Chi, and the 3d Brigade to the west and south of Dau Tieng. Throughout the period the division aggressively sought out enemy forces operating in its areas and conducted operations to interdict enemy movements of personnel and supplies toward critical installations and population centers. Despite enemy attempts to avoid decisive combat during the period, the division developed a number of major contacts and located several sizeable caches of enemy materiel. At 1335 hours 13 November seven kilometers southwest of An Loc, A/2-12 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size, receiving small arms and RPG fire. The battalion returned fire with organic weapons and called in artillery and airstrikes. Contact was lost at 1805 hours. Results were 31 enemy killed and one captured, and two US killed and five wounded. On 22 November seven kilometers southeast of Dau Tieng, elements of the 1-27 Infantry located a cache containing 31 RPG rounds, 6,600 small arms rounds, 31 individual weapons, and 14 rifle grenades. On 20 November, the 3d Brigade commenced a new operation, Casino Sabre, as part of Campaign Tean Thang in the Trapezoid area. This operations resulted in 171 enemy killed and six captured. Among the items captured included one ChiCom radio, one commercial receiver-transmitter, 6.2 tons of rice, 650 pounds of salt, 110,000 piasters, 19,080 rounds of small arms ammunition, 43 RPG rounds and 76 weapons. On 28 November, A/2-27 Infantry, conducting operations 12 kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha received a heavy ground attack. The company, supported by artillery and light fire teams, killed 36 enemy and captured one prisoner and 15 weapons, while suffering light casualties. On 24 November, a light fire team from the 173d Assault Helicopter Company received automatic weapons fire from an enemy position adjacent to the Cambodian border west of Thien Ngan (WT975625). The team returned fire, killing 54 enemy. On 27 November, near the Renegade Woods (XT230290) C/D/3-22 Infantry reinforced five Regional Force companies, killing 25 enemy. Friendly losses were one killed and 14 wounded. At 0130 hours 11 kilometers southwest of Go Dau Ha, an A/2-27 Infantry night defensive position received a ground attack, supported by 60mm mortars, from an enemy force of unknown size. The company returned fire with organic

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weapons and called in artillery, light fire teams and flareship support, killing 36 enemy and capturing one, while losing three US killed and six wounded. In addition, the unit captured nine R.G. launchers, 11 small arms, three light machineguns, and 22 RPG-7 rounds. Eight kilometers southwest of Trang Bang a Firefly team supporting Regional Force elements engaged an enemy force killing at least 30 enemy. On 6 December two kilometers southeast of Trung Lap, B/1-5 Infantry found a cache containing 140 RPG rounds, 127 mortar rounds, 13 anti-tank mines, 150 pounds of plastic explosives, 492 82mm mortar fuzes, and 64 ChiCom grenades and 8,500 small arms rounds. On 15 December in the Hobo Woods (XT555203), elements of 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized) and 2-14 Infantry, made contact with a large enemy force. Thirty enemy were killed in the resulting action. There were no friendly losses. At 1105 hours 17 December, a 25th Infantry Division convoy moving between Cu Chi and Dau Tieng was attacked at the western edge of the Ben Cui Plantation by an estimated enemy battalion employing small arms, RPG and automatic weapons. The ensuing contact, which was supported by elements of 2-22 Infantry, B/3-4 Cavalry and C/1-27 Infantry, resulted in five US killed and 11 wounded, 73 enemy killed and 66 high explosive rounds, 81 grenades, eight small arms, one rocket launcher and five gas masks captured. One US truck was destroyed and five damaged in the action. On 20 December, B/1-5 Infantry (Mechanized), elements of the 4-49 ARVN Regiment and one Regional Force/Popular Force company from Trung Lap conducted a combined sweep near Ao May Dang (XT660180), and engaged a force estimated at two enemy companies. A/3-4 Cavalry and B/D/2-12 Infantry reinforced the contact, which resulted in 30 enemy killed and four RPG rocket launchers and 15 AK-47 rifles either captured or destroyed. On 22 December, at 0010 hours FSPB Pole City (XT249309), manned by elements of the 4-9 Infantry, received a heavy attack by a force estimated at two battalions. The initial ground attack was preceded by a preparation which included fire from 51-caliber machineguns and 82mm mortars. Elements of 4-9 Infantry returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars, supported by air strikes, AC47 (Spooky), artillery, and light fire teams. Contact was lost at 0630 hours. A sweep of the battlefield revealed 108 enemy killed. In addition, 34 rifles, nine light machineguns, two RPG-7 launchers, two ChiCom radios, and three pistols were captured. US losses were 17 killed and 34 wounded. On 13 January, elements of 1-5 Infantry (Mechanized), conducting security and reconnaissance in force operations on the west edge of Michelin Plantation, uncovered caches containing 15.7 tons of rice. On 14 January, elements of the 3d Brigade engaged in two sizeable contacts. At 0850 hours seven kilometers southeast of Tay Ninh, 2-22 Infantry (Mechanized)(-) contacted an enemy force of undetermined size, killing 23 enemy while losing one US killed and two wounded. Contact was lost for a short period but regained at 1045 hours. Results of this engagement were 99 enemy killed and four US killed and five wounded. Air strikes in support of the brigade killed another 36 enemy. On 17 January, the 3-4 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the area 10 kilometers south of Michelin Plantation. At 0905 hours,

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the unit contacted an enemy force of undetermined size, killing 46. One US was killed and 17 were wounded in the action. During the remainder of the period, the division's contacts were light and sporadic.

(d) The 9th Infantry Division.

1 During the reporting period the 9th Infantry Division conducted operations in Long An Province of the III CTZ under the operational control of II FFORCEV and in the IV CTZ under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Division elements operating in III CTZ participated in Campaign Toan Thang, while the remainder of the division conducted Operations Quyet Chien and Kudzu. On 1 December, the division, less the 3d Brigade and supporting elements, was released from the operational control of Commanding General, II FFORCEV, and placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV Corps. Operations conducted in the IV CTZ after 30 November are discussed in the Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division.

2 Campaign Toan Thang. The 1st Brigade continued Toan Thang in Long An Province with four battalions, 2-39 Infantry, 3-39 Infantry, 2-60 Infantry and 2-47 Infantry, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry conducted operations in support of the brigade. From 31 October to 3 November, elements of the 3-39th Infantry, gunships and scout ships of A/3-17 Cavalry, and elements of 2-4 Artillery conducted Night Hunter operations near Can Giuoc. Reacting to radar sightings and engaging targets under illumination, maneuver elements of the 3-39 Infantry and 3-17 Air Cavalry accounted for 47 enemy killed and 11 sampans destroyed. On 13 November, the 3d Brigade replaced the 1st Brigade in 9th Division participation in Campaign Toan Thang, employing the 2-47 Infantry (Mechanized), 2-60 Infantry and 5-60 Infantry. Sporadic contact continued throughout the remainder of November with the following results: 226 enemy killed and 37 captured. Contacts on 6 and 7 December by elements of the 3d Brigade with small groups of enemy resulted in 59 enemy killed at a cost of one US killed. On 13 December, the Viet Cong launched a three-hour attack by fire against the base camp of the 2-60 Infantry at Tan Tru (XS669631). Results of the ensuing battle were 33 enemy killed and two US killed and 45 wounded. On 24 December, while conducting operations six kilometers southwest of Can Giuoc, A/2-60 Infantry found the graves of 32 enemy killed by artillery. On 4 January, A/3-17 Air Cavalry, operating in the area 15 kilometers northwest of Tan An, captured 391 high explosive rounds, 43,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 12 booby traps and 12 mines. In scattered actions on 26 January, the brigade killed 52 enemy, received one rallier and captured one prisoner, 12 small arms, six crew served weapons, seven high explosive rounds and 16 grenades. Friendly casualties were seven US wounded. On 28 January, 5-60 Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the area 21 kilometers northwest of Tan An and captured 424 rounds of high explosive ammunition, 37,000 small arms rounds and 38 grenades. Contacts continued light during the remainder of the reporting period.

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3 Operation Quyet Chien. The 2d and 3d Brigades continued operation Quyet Chien in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces of the IV CTZ. Task organizations consisted of the 2d Brigade, with the 2-47 Infantry and 3-60 Infantry, and the 3d Brigade, with 4-39 Infantry, 5-60 Infantry, and the 6-31 Infantry. On 13 November the 1st Brigade replaced the 2d Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province. During the night of 14 November, near Phuoc Tay, 27 enemy were killed while moving by sampans along canals in the area. On 23 November, A/C/D/6-31 Infantry, supported by A/3-17 Air Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy company west of Gai Lay (XS120490). Airstrikes and supporting artillery were directed into the area. Results of the operation were 51 enemy killed and 10 prisoners, six small arms and one crew served weapon captured. Thirty motorized sampans and 70 structures were destroyed. On 30 November, A/3-17 Air Cavalry, supporting 2-39 Infantry in an airmobile operation, made contact with an estimated enemy company north of Gai Be (XS190450). The action resulted in 86 enemy killed, seven prisoners and 33 weapons captured. Cumulative results of Operation Quyet Chien as of 30 November were 94 US killed, 721 US wounded, 10 US missing, 1,571 enemy killed and 19 captured, 18 ralliers, 1,005 detainees, and 304 small arms, 101 crew served weapons, 18.32 tons of rice, 115,126 small arms rounds, 801 high explosive rounds, 3,632 grenades, and 165 mines captured or destroyed.

4 Operation Kudzu. At the beginning of the reporting period the 4-47 Infantry was conducting Operation Kudzu with the mission of securing the 9th Infantry Division base camp at Dong Tam. No major contacts were developed during November. Cumulative results of Operation Kudzu as of 30 November were two US killed and 15 wounded, 11 enemy killed, three detainees apprehended and one grenade captured.

(e) Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC). During the reporting period, CMAC continued offensive operations in Gia Dinh Province and adjacent areas to counter the enemy ground and rocket attacks against Saigon. Operations focused on denying the enemy the resources and staging areas needed to conduct offensive operations by locating enemy caches and interdicting routes of infiltration. Contacts during the period were sporadic, and limited to actions against small groups of enemy. Probing and the use of mine detectors proved successful in locating cache sites. Booby traps continued to be encountered, however the use of armored suits reduced the number of casualties incurred from these devices. CMAC began the reporting period with a task organization consisting of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light), 2-3 Infantry, 3-7 Infantry, 4-12 Infantry and the 5-12 Infantry; the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne, with the 1-505 Infantry (Airborne), 2-505 Infantry (Airborne) and the 1-508 Infantry (Airborne); the 3-17th Air Cavalry (less Headquarters Troop), and B, 7-1 Air Cavalry. On 9 November, the 4-12 Infantry was released by CMAC to become direct support to the 1st Australian Task Force, and on 19 December the unit went under the operational control of Binh Hoa Tactical Area Command. The 3-17 Air Cavalry, less two hunter-killer teams of A/3-17th Air Cavalry, was released on 6 December. On 1 November in the vicinity Ap Tay village,

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11 kilometers west of Saigon, C/1-505 Infantry found two caches containing one 60mm mortar, 37 122mm rockets, 10 B-40 rockets and four B-41 rockets. In response to an intelligence report on 10 November, D/1-505 found a cache two kilometers northwest of Tan Thoi Nhut. It contained 384 pounds of TNT, 96 pounds of C-3, 60 pounds of an unknown type of explosive, 2,250 rounds of AK rifle ammunition, five B-40 rockets and one B-41 rocket. On 2 December, with the assistance of a prisoner, B/2-3 Infantry located a cache two kilometers southwest of Tan Buu, and D/2-3 Infantry located a cache in the vicinity of Tan Nhut. The caches contained 131 B40 rocket charges, five AK-47 rifles, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. On 5 December, two kilometers east of Vinh Loc, B/1-505 Infantry found a cache containing 15 107mm rockets. On 15 December, a Navy patrol boat found two 122mm rockets and one rocket motor adjacent to the Vam Co Dong River, six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc. A search of the area the following day by A/3-7 Infantry resulted in finding 11 AK-47 rifles, 34 AK-47 magazines and a 55-gallon drum of gasoline. On 19 December five kilometers northeast of Hoc Mon, A/2-505 Infantry found a cache consisting of 64 B-40 rockets, 48 B-41 rockets, 59 82mm mortar rounds, 10 60mm mortar rounds and 150 B-51 charges. On 21 December, a combined cordon and search operation in the vicinity of Tan Buu with three companies of 2-3 Infantry and the 648th Regional Force Company resulted in finding 13 AK-47 rifles, 41 B-41 rockets, 42 B-41 charges, 11 120mm mortar rounds, six 82mm mortar rounds, seven mines, 32 ChiCom grenades, and a bipod for an 82mm mortar. On 23 December, six caches were found by elements of the 199th Infantry Brigade. Three were located five kilometers northwest of Ben Luc and three in the vicinity of Tan Buu village. They contained a total of 29 B41 rockets, 174 B40 rockets, 252 60mm mortar rounds, four AK-47 rifles, 12 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 221 B40 boosters, 35 pounds of TNT, and 165 gallons of diesel fuel. The following day, A/2-3 Infantry found three additional cache sites near Tan Buu. They contained 234 ChiCom grenades, 44 B40 rounds with charges, 116 rifle grenades, 6,000 rounds of AK rifle ammunition, three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, one 55-gallon drum of gasoline, 150 blasting caps and 50 pounds of TNT. C/2-3 Infantry continued to search in the vicinity of Tan Buu village on 26 December, locating three cache sites containing six 122mm rockets, two 122mm rocket motors, 100 pounds of TNT, 3,000 rounds of AK rifle ammunition and 24 82mm mortar charges. On 27 December four kilometers southwest of Tan Buu along the Rach Tri Canal, D/3-7 Infantry found a cache of 42 82mm mortar rounds with 300 charges. On 30 December, A/D/3-3 Infantry, searching north of Tan Buu, found three caches which held 43 B41 rockets, eight B40 rockets, 54 82mm mortar rounds with charges and fuzes, five 105mm rounds, and 450 rounds of 30-caliber ammunition. On 20 January, 5-12 Infantry, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations in the Pineapple six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc, located a cache containing a total of 85 small arms and five rockets. On 28 January, the 4-12 Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and patrol operations in the area eight kilometers northeast of Ben Luc. The unit located a cache containing 18 tons of rice. At the close of the reporting period, CMAC continued day and night operations to locate and destroy the enemy, interdict his movements and capture his stocks of materiel.

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(f) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF). During the reporting period there were no changes in the RTAVF organization. Missions consisted of security operations near Bearcat, Long Thanh, Binh Son, and along Highway 15, and reconnaissance in force operations throughout its assigned tactical area of responsibility. RTAVF contacts during the period were generally light and scattered, with no major actions reported. On 15 November, nine kilometers southeast of Binh Son, a mortar attack resulted in two Thais killed and 13 wounded. On 28 November, five kilometers north-east of Binh Son, a mortar attack resulted in nine Thais wounded. On 14 December, three kilometers north of Binh Son, elements of the 2d Battalion engaged an enemy force. The contact resulted in five enemy killed and three weapons captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 22 December a mortar attack on Fire Support Patrol Base Tak resulted in 10 Thais wounded.

(g) 1st Australian Task Force. The task force continued participation in Campaign Toan Thang throughout the period, with operations designed to destroy enemy elements, base areas and supply caches in Thuoc Tuy Province. On 9 November, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was placed under the operational control of the task force and began operations in the southwestern portion of Base Area 300. Contacts were light in this area, but numerous caches were located. The most significant items located were 130 small arms, 13 crew served weapons and 2,465 grenades. On 20 November, the 3d RAR returned to Australia and was replaced by the 9th RAR. In early December the task force, reinforced by the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry and K/L/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and two battalions of the 2d ARVN Airborne Regiment, began extensive operations in the Hat Dich area. Light scattered contacts in this area resulted in 123 enemy killed. Friendly casualties were light. On 3 December, the 1st ATF commenced Operation Goodwood in the Hat Dich area with the mission of locating and destroying the 274th VC Regiment. During the remainder of the period, the force killed 220 enemy, most of them as the result of Operation Goodwood, while suffering light casualties. In addition, the force captured 28 crew served and 160 individual weapons, and 10.2 tons of rice.

(h) Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (Provisional)(BHTAC). On 1 November 1968 the command was organized with an authorized strength of 12 officers and 27 enlisted men. The mission of BHTAC is to coordinate US and RVNAF forces in the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex against ground, rocket and mortar attack; to coordinate operations of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force which affect the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex; to exercise control over United States and Free World Military Assistance force fire support within the BHTAC area of operations and to operate the Bien Hoa Artillery Warning Control Center. On 5 November the BHTAC Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) and the Artillery Warning Control Center (AWCC) became fully operational. The FSCE has the responsibility of coordinating all artillery fires in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex; coordinating the efforts of the Flash Base Center and the 10 flash base towers around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex that assist in the detection of mortar and rocket firing sites. The Artillery Warning Control Center

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is responsible for broadcasting all artillery data to aircraft entering the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. // On 11 November, BHTAC, working with the Long Binh/Bien Hoa Special Zone, became fully operational and began planning and coordinating in an effort to improve the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. At 2225 hours, 5 December, the BHTAC billeting area (AT15145) received an estimated 25 to 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, which resulted in one US killed and two US wounded. The command assumed control of the following units on the dates indicated: 4-12 Infantry and L/3-11 Cavalry, 18 December, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry and A/D/1-508 Infantry (Airborne), 21 December. These elements were used on 22, 24 and 25 December when BHTAC conducted operation Holly '68, a security mission for Long Binh Post. On 23 December an ambush patrol of A/1-508 Infantry engaged two sampans moving west on a river eight kilometers south of Long Binh Post (vicinity of XS040970). A Firefly team was deployed to the area to assist. The two sampans were located by the Firefly team and were captured by the ground element. The Firefly then proceeded to sweep the area, resulting in 19 enemy killed and three sampans, five RPG launchers with three rounds, one mortar, three AK-47 rifles with ammunition, rucksacks with rice, 80 grenades, eating utensils, one claymore with wire, and three entrenching tools captured or destroyed. On 25 December, C/1-11 Cavalry replaced L/3-11 Cavalry, and A/3-17 Air Cavalry was released to its parent unit. On 28 December Task Force Walter was established and conducted operations with D/4-12 Infantry and 4th Company, 51st Ranger Battalion (ARVN) until 30 December. On 7 January, 2-3 Infantry was placed under the operational control of BHTAC, and A/D/1-508 Infantry were replaced by B/C/1-508 Infantry. The following day B/C/1-508 Infantry were returned to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. On 11 January, C/1-11 Cavalry was returned to its parent unit, and on 25 January the 2-3 Infantry was released to the 25th Infantry Division. During the remainder of the reporting period no forces were under the operational control of BHTAC.

### (3) Air Operations.

(a) B-52 Operations. B-52 operations are discussed in Paragraph 1c (7) (a). Inclosure 6 indicates the number and distribution of Arc Light strikes in III CTZ.

### (b) Army Aviation Operations.

#### 1 Resources.

a The following non-divisional resources were under the control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period:

#### Rotary Wing:

#### \*14 Assault Helicopter Companies

##### 1 Armed Helicopter Company

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\*4 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Med)

1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy)

1 Aviation Company (CORPS)

\*1 Air Cavalry Squadron

Fixed Wing:

2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies

1 Utility Airplane Company

1 Surveillance Airplane Company

\*1 Air Cavalry Troop, 4 Assault Helicopter Companies and 1 Assault Support Helicopter Company were placed OICCN to IV Corps on 1 December 1968.

b At the close of the reporting period, there were 453 helicopters and 124 airplanes assigned. These do not include 214th Combat Aviation Battalion aircraft under the operational control of IV Corps. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G2 in surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by G3 in air cavalry, combat assault, airmobile, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continued to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

c Allocation. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units by Commanding General, II FFORCEV or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and Allied organizations under the operational control of II FFORCEV and III Corps.

2 Employment. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy valid requirements. The policy of allowing each AHC to stand down two days each month has improved availability and quality of maintenance. In addition, the operational limitation of six hours of flying time a day for each committed aircraft has resulted in a more efficient utilization of aviation support to II FFORCEV and III Corps by requiring more thorough planning of tactical operations. The use of preparatory fires and smoke on landing zones prior to insertion has reduced the loss of personnel and aircraft to enemy fire.

3 Helibucket. The 12th Combat Aviation Group is presently evaluating the use of helibuckets to assist in fire control in contested areas. A CH 47 employing two (2) 375 gallon water buckets is being employed on a standby status.

4 Statistical summaries of close air support and Army aviation support are at Inclosures 4 and 5, respectively.

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(4) The following changes occurred in force structure:

(a) Gains.

1 The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) closed in III CTZ between 26 October and 12 November. The maneuver elements of the division became operational as follows:

<u>a</u>	2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry	30 Oct
<u>b</u>	2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry	31 Oct
<u>c</u>	2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry	1 Nov
<u>d</u>	1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry	5 Nov
<u>e</u>	1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry	6 Nov
<u>f</u>	1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry	7 Nov
<u>g</u>	5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry	11 Nov
<u>h</u>	1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry	12 Nov
<u>i</u>	2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry	13 Nov
<u>j</u>	1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry	5 Nov

2 The Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry advance party arrived in Vietnam 21 December 1968. The main body closed on 30 December 1968.

(b) Losses.

1 The 9th Infantry Division (less the 3d Brigade) was released from the operational control of II Field Force Vietnam on 1 December and placed under the operational control of Senior Advisor, IV CTZ.

2 Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry was inactivated on 26 December 1968 by USARPAC General Order 888, 23 December 1968. On 27 December, the unit was organized as the II FFORCEV Long Range Patrol Company (Provisional) by II FFORCEV General Order 59, dated 10 January 1969. The company will be deactivated on 15 February. (See paragraph 1d (7).)

(5) Training.

(a) Four ARVN battalions completed Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training during the period 1 November - 31 January. Two additional battalions were in training at the end of January. The training is progressing on schedule and is being well received by the ARVN battalions.

(b) The 1st Infantry Division has reinitiated a refresher training program for engineer units of the 5th ARVN Division.

(c) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division, the 25th Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Division, and the 9th Infantry Division and the 7th ARVN Division during the reporting period. This program involves

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the exchange of RNTT between US and ARVN divisions. The type of training conducted by the RNTT depends on the needs of the particular units involved.

(6) Test of Fuze and Burster, Bomb System, XM 925. At the request of this headquarters the Fuze and Burster, Bomb System, XM 925, for the CS-filled 55-gallon drum, was tested for reliability by the 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). This system, which provides only an impact burst, is designed to detonate CS containers for dispersion of persistent CS in target areas. The first drop was conducted from a height of 2,100 feet. Of the 30 drums involved, 50 percent failed to detonate. A second drop was made from an altitude of 3,000 feet to insure that the fuzes would have more than sufficient time to arm. A 15-percent dud rate was experienced. A third test drop conducted under identical conditions, but in conjunction with a rigid pre-check of fuze assembly and arming procedures, resulted in three duds out of 30 drums released. In addition, a fourth drum experienced a low grade burst, indicating that it had broken apart without the burster having been activated. A fifth drum failed to burst because the lanyard parted at the snap fastener at the time of ejection from the aircraft. The results of these tests indicate in its present state the system does not meet this command's requirements. A dud rate of 15 percent is unacceptable, from the standpoint of both the efficient use of munitions and aircraft, and the potential for enemy reclamation of the material. Action was being taken by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam to request that the fuzing system be retested in the United States.

(7) Operations of Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry. From 1 to 4 November, Company F conducted operations southwest of Cu Chi. Its missions included monitoring waterways and harassing and interdicting enemy supply operations in the vicinity of the Song Vam Co Dong. From 5 to 12 November the company underwent a stand-down to prepare for its Annual General Inspection. From 13 November until 23 December, the unit conducted intelligence-gathering patrol operations in the Rang Rang area northeast of Bien Hoa, under the operational control of II FFORCEV. After 24 December the company operated south of Rang Rang and prepared to conduct operational training of Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry, which arrived in country in late December. During the remainder of the period the company conducted training for Company D, including practical exercises in patrolling, helicopter utilization, the use of weapons in patrol operations, artillery forward observer techniques, the utilization of air controllers in the conduct of air strikes and the employment of light fire teams. Initially, personnel of Company D were taken on three-day patrols made up of three men from each company and led by an experienced patrol leader. Subsequent patrols were conducted by Company D personnel with an experienced team leader-observer monitoring. On 26 December, Company F was deactivated and continued operations and training on 27 December as the II FFORCEV Long Range Patrol Company, preparatory to its inactivation on 15 February 1969.

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e. Logistical Operations

(1) Programs and Projects.

(a) Preparations continued during the period for the receipt and support of the second increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force at Bearcat. The upgrading of facilities was accomplished and the issue of TOE and TA equipment continues with support provided by US Army Support Command, Saigon.

(b) Preparations were also made for the receipt and support of Company D (LRP), 151st Infantry at II FFORCEV. The G4 Section, II FFORCEV, coordinated extensive logistical and engineering support with the Engineer Section and the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) which sponsored the unit upon its arrival in Vietnam in December.

(c) During the period the fortification of critical bridges in III CTZ was intensified. Plans for standardized protective and lighting systems were developed.

(d) Province and District Advisor Support. Coordinated action to upgrade the maintenance support rendered to US advisors at province and district level was taken by Headquarters II FFORCEV, Saigon Support Command, and the III Corps advisory staff. Weekly schedules for maintenance support were developed and implemented. US Divisions in III CTZ were instructed to establish liaison with, and provide necessary support to advisors located in their tactical areas of interest.

(e) Logistics Readiness Program.

1 The quarterly meeting for Logistic Readiness Officers of II FFORCEV assigned and attached units was held 15 January. Topics discussed were closed loop support items, material readiness expediter procedures, organizational maintenance and supply inspections, the II FFORCEV Vehicular Maintenance and Utilization Team, a new weekly command deadline reporting procedure, and the 1st Logistical Command's "Project Dog," which is designed to remove unserviceable equipment from the supply system.

2 During the reporting period 16 organizational maintenance and supply inspections were conducted of II FFORCEV assigned and attached units. Thirteen units received a satisfactory rating and three were rated unsatisfactory. This was a significant improvement over the last reporting period during which 11 units were rated satisfactory and 11 unsatisfactory.

3 The program of visits to each assigned and attached unit by the II FFORCEV Logistics Readiness Officer has been implemented and is progressing satisfactorily.

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## (2) Aircraft Maintenance.

(a) Receipt and issue of helicopters. During the period 40 AH-IG (Cobra) and 75 OH-6 (Cayuse) helicopters were received and were issued as follows:

1 AH-IG (Cobra):

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
7	12th Avn Gp
15	1st Cav Div
6	9th Inf Div
6	25th Inf Div
6	1st Inf Div

2 OH-6 (Cayuse):

17	1st Cav Div
13	1st Inf Div
13	25th Inf Div
6	3d Bde, 82d Abn Div
13	9th Inf Div
4	23d Arty Gp
9	11th ACR

(b) Dropping of external loads from helicopters continues to be a problem among II FFORCEV units; however, improvement was noted during the last month of the quarter due to command emphasis. Sling failure has been, and continues to be, the primary cause of dropped loads. Slings are not always being maintained, stored, or inspected as required by TM 55-450-11. Aerial Delivery Equipment Assistance and Inspection teams have been instructed on methods to correct this problem.

(c) The operational readiness rate for CH-54 (Flying Crane) helicopters has been below the criteria established by Department of Army. Contributing factors have been a critical shortage of tail rotor blades and main rotor heads both in the Republic of Vietnam and the continental United States.

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(3) Ammunition.

(a) Ammunition items in short supply are managed through the use of available supply rates (ASR) to insure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all units within II FFORCEV. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items, specifically 81mm, 4.2-inch, 105mm, 155mm and 8-inch high explosive ammunition are also controlled by means of ASR.

(b) During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the number of items under ASR control for the allocation period was:

Nov 68 - 16

Dec 68 - 12

Jan 69 - 17

These totals show the number of items was consistent with the number managed by ASR during the previous quarter.

(4) Transportation.

(a) An airlift conference was sponsored by II FFORCEV on 20 November. The purpose of the conference was to orient II FFORCEV airlift customers, airlift traffic managers, logistical managers and airlift operators on various facets of the system and to discuss problem areas. Problem areas taken under study included the method of reporting missions completed, the importance of complying with cargo show times, advance planning meetings for large scale airlift operations, late changes to missions already scheduled, establishment of priorities for shipment, 463L palletizing of ammunition, and documentation of emergency shipment.

(b) USAF C130/C123 sorties flown in support of II FFORCEV units are summarized in Incl #3.

(5) Engineer Support.

(a) General. Engineer support was provided throughout the III CTZ in the form of airfield maintenance and rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of artillery fire support bases, improving lines of communications, jungle clearing, and support of tactical operations.

(b) Combat support. Engineer activities were characterized by a wide variety of combat support during the quarter.

1 Elements of the 20th Engineer Brigade provided support to the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam by removing a canal obstruction in the Tra Cu Canal at XS 442951.

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2 Support of these operations involved divisional and non-divisional engineer elements. Knife rests and flame mines were constructed and emplaced on suspected infiltration routes being used by the Viet Cong in the area between the Parrot's Beak and the Angel's Wing.

3 Combat engineer support of the 24th Infantry Division was provided by the 20th Engineer Brigade on Highway LTL 15 north of Tay Ninh. The support required the opening of approximately 10 kilometers of Route LTL 13, from QL 22 to the Rach Ben Da River. The road opening permitted the extraction of elements of the 25th Infantry Division operating along the Cambodian border.

4 Jungle clearing continued to be an important component of engineer combat support during the quarter. A total of 38,850 acres was cleared in support of tactical operations to deprive the enemy of traditional strongholds. Major clearing operations were conducted in the Catcher's Mitt, Dau Tieng area, the Citadel, the Lai Khe-Ben Cat area, and along Route LTL 1A north of Phuoc Vinh.

5 Organic divisional and supporting non-divisional engineers provided continuous tactical support to maneuver elements in the form of mine sweeping, constructing pioneer roads, operating water supply points, erecting tactical bridging, and clearing barriers, obstacles and fields of fire.

a Tactical support was provided at special forces camps by constructing and rehabilitating berms, constructing defensive bunkers and installing mines. Camps which received support during the past three months were Katum, Thien Ngon, Tong Le Chon, and Rang Rang.

b Organic engineer elements cleared minefields at Bien Hoa Air Force Base, Phuoc Vinh Camp, and Fire Support Base St. Barbara.

c The quarter showed a significant improvement in the fortifications at many of the critical bridges within III CTZ. The engineer effort consisted of constructing pier protection, lighting systems, mine booms, watch towers, and approach roads.

d Operation Liberty Canyon, the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from I CTZ to III CTZ, required a large amount of engineer effort and resources, including immediate repair of airfields to facilitate the initial move. Revetments were constructed at Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Song Be, Lai Khe, Tay Ninh, Bearcat, Phu Loi, Cu Chi, and Dau Tieng. Additional support at those locations consisted of constructing bunkers, fuel facilities, watch towers, perimeter wire obstacles and prefabricating brigade and battalion-sized tactical operation centers. Support of this operation was terminated 30 December 1968.

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e Continuous effort was expended during the quarter by engineer units on the maintenance and upkeep of lines of communication. During the quarter 50.2 kilometers of roads were paved to MACV standards.

f On the night of 6 November 1968, three spans of the Phu Cuong highway bridge were destroyed by enemy action. The contingency plan for this bridge was implemented immediately, and a 708-foot M4T6 floating bridge was emplaced within 24 hours by the 65th Engineer Battalion supported by elements of the 79th and 159th Engineer Groups. The fallen bridge was reconstructed and opened to traffic on 25 January 1969.

g The continuous airfield maintenance and improvement program included work at Lai Khe, Cu Chi, Katum, Phuoc Vinh, Long Thanh, Dong Xoai, Bunard, Song Be, Tong Le Chon, Quan Loi, and Thien Ngon.

h Engineer support of artillery units included work at Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) St. Barbara (XT 2768), FSPB Concord (YT 0112), and similar bases located at Ben Luc, Can Giuoc, Thien Ngon, Saigon, Bearcat, Tan An, and Xuan Loc. Support included constructing and upgrading gun pads, perimeter berms, defensive personnel positions and access roads.

(c) Miscellaneous Engineer Support.

1 Signal facilities at Nui Chua Chan and Nui Ba Den were rehabilitated by non-divisional engineers. Additional non-divisional engineer support was provided to signal units at Lai Khe.

2 Elements of the 29th Engineer Brigade conducted well drilling operations at Bao Trai, Long Binh Post, and FSPB St. Barbara.

3 Revolutionary Development: During the quarter, in support of the Long An Pilot Pacification Program, construction of six schools with a total of 16 classrooms, one teacher's house, two village offices, and one warehouse were completed. The 159th Engineer Group removed its elements from Long An Province during this period; the last two-room schools to be built during the CY 68 program were transferred to the 34th Engineer Group for construction.

(6) Status of Primary Land Lines of Communication as of 31 January 1969.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following terms concerning the condition of land lines of communication are defined:

1 Condition I. The route is capable of carrying up to class 50 loads (all division loads).

2 Condition II. Up to class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport, e.g., 5,000 gallon fuel tanker).

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3 Condition III. Up to class 16 loads (armored personnel carriers and 2 1/2 ton trucks).

4 Condition IV. Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is only open to light reconnaissance vehicles.

5 Condition V. Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL-1.

1 Cambodian border (XT284244) to Go Dau Ha (XT383250), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Go Dau Ha (XT383250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), condition I.

3 Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XS793942), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

4 Saigon (XS793942) to road junction 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

5 Road junction 316 (YT072130) to Xuan Loc (YT456080), all bridges unlimited capacity, condition I.

(c) Route QL-4.

1 Road junction QL-1 (XS845914) to Ben Luc (XS618758), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Ben Luc (XS618758) to IV CTZ boundary (XS599600), lowest bridge capacity class 30, condition III.

(d) Route QL-13.

1 Road junction QL-1 (XS879971) to Phu Cuong (XT810148), capacity class 30, condition III.

2 Phu Cuong (XT810148) to An Loc (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

3 An Loc (XT755885) to Cambodian border (XU683233), lowest bridge capacity class 6, condition IV.

(e) Route QL-14. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to II CTZ boundary (YU588175), bridge out at YT166820 and YU303011, condition V.

(f) Route QL-15.

1 Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

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2 Baria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity class 12, condition IV.

(g) Route QL-20. Road junction QL-1 (YT343101) to II CTZ boundary (YT763572), lowest bridge capacity class 20, condition III.

(h) Route QL-22. Go Dau Ha (XT384251) to Tay Ninh (XT199500), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(i) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YT002114) to junction LTL 1A (XT287373), lowest bridge capacity class 40, condition II.

(j) Route LTL 1A.

1 Dong Xoai (YT079759) to Phuoc Vinh (XT970490), no bridges, condition I.

2 Phuoc Vinh (XT975491) to road junction QL-13 (XT812140), ford at XT862262, condition IV.

(k) Route LTL 2. Road junction QL-1 (YT437045) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 24, condition III.

(l) Route LTL 5A.

1 Saigon (XS816890) to Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775), lowest bridge capacity class 50, condition I.

2 Ong Thin Bridge (XS815775) to Can Giuoc (XS830731), no bridges, condition I.

3 Can Giuoc (XS830731) to Cau Noi Ferry (XS786568), lowest bridge capacity class 16, condition IV.

(m) Route LTL 23.

1 Baria (YS830607) to YS628653, lowest bridge capacity class 35, condition II.

2 YS628653 to Ham Tan (ZS023821), 13 bridges out, condition V.

(n) Route TL 9A. Road junction QL-1 (XS739003) to Duc Hoa (XS598966), lowest bridge capacity class 45, condition II.

(o) Route LTL 26 and Route 239. Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Dau Tieng (XT490460), lowest bridge capacity class 60, condition I.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

(1) Psychological Operations.

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(a) The II FFORCEV psychological operations program directed against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel, as well as civilians under the influence of the Viet Cong, continued during the reporting quarter. A total of 499 million leaflets were disseminated by Army and Air Force aircraft. More than 1,680 psychological warfare sorties were flown and 2,329 aerial loudspeaker hours were broadcast in support of tactical operations.

(b) A total of 1,021 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN during the reporting period.

(2) Civil Affairs and Civic Action.

(a) Community relations continued to constitute an important part of the Civic Action program. Headquarters, II FFORCEV conducted a number of community relations programs during the period, including coordinating the establishment of Community Relations Committees and Friendship Councils. These organizations are being formed by installation coordinators whose facilities are located near major population centers. In addition, commanders of separate units which have a strength of at least 600 men and are located in populated areas have been encouraged to form these committees and councils.

(b) As an adjunct to existing programs, on 6 December II FFORCEV and III CTZ conducted a pilot Combined Civilian Orientation Conference in Bien Hoa Province. Among those attending were middle-level Government officials, province officials, educators, and religious and civic leaders of Bien Hoa Province. Guests received brochures explaining US/GVN programs, attended briefings and viewed demonstrations designed to enhance the peoples' appreciation and support of the efforts of the United States and GVN to achieve peace and democracy in Vietnam. The conference was well received, and spokesmen for those attending urged that similar conferences be held on a periodic basis and be expanded throughout the III CTZ. Present plans envision the conduct of quarterly conferences in Bien Hoa Province. Additionally, commanders of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV are being encouraged to conduct similar programs in their areas.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Refugee Program.

(a) Resettlement Planning. During the reporting period detailed plans were developed for the completion of resettlement activities at each refugee site in III CTZ, including the scheduling of all construction work and the distribution of food, tin and cement. In addition to providing a means to assess the resettlement problem on a corps-wide basis, these plans have proved a valuable management tool in that they provide a forecast of commodity and money requirements on a monthly, province-by-province basis.



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(b) Emergency Prestockage. Plans providing for the prestockage of certain commodities necessary for emergency refugee relief in province warehouses were developed during this quarter. Amounts of commodities to be stocked at province level were determined on the basis of average refugee generation during selected base months. Supplies which are prestocked are sufficient to sustain 18,000 refugees for 30 days. It is felt that the prestockage concept will enhance the provinces' capability to respond to emergency relief requirements. Significant reduction in the use of air transportation will be realized by supplying commodities on a routine rather than a priority basis.

(2) Territorial Security.

(a) Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) activity increased during the reporting period as compared to the previous period. In contrast, enemy activity directed against RF/PF units decreased with the exception of shellings of friendly installations in December. Continued participation in joint operations with US/FWMAF forces has enhanced the fighting capabilities of the RF/PF and assisted the US/FWMAF forces in the accomplishment of their missions.

(b) The increased effectiveness of the RF/PF can be further attributed to the equipment modernization program, the Mobile Advisory Team Program and an increased interest on the part of Vietnamese leaders in the care and well-being of the individual soldier.

(3) Revolutionary Development. The Revolutionary Development program continued to accelerate during the reporting period. Of the 281 hamlets targeted for pacification in 1968, 277 have been certified as completed and four have been abandoned. No significant disruption occurred during the reporting period, as compared with VC TET and May offensives and the major attacks in August and September, which had earlier disrupted the program. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was implemented in November and carried to its completion in January. The impetus provided by this campaign plus the intensification of efforts in the regular RD program brought outstanding results in the extension of government control. By the end of December the VC had lost control of 150 hamlets in the III CTZ. While the final results have not been fully reported, it is apparent that in addition to the 281 APC-targeted hamlets and the 277 Regular RD program hamlets more than 100 additional hamlets were brought under government control. As a result of this remarkable success, III CTZ is in excellent posture to begin the 1969 Pacification and Development program. With the exception of Long An and Hau Nghia, all provinces are able to target for pacification all of the contested and VC hamlets in their areas. This reporting period brought about a full recovery in pacification from the disruptions encountered earlier in the year and provided an expansion of GVN control well beyond that enjoyed at the end of 1967.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A)(U)

(a) During the period 1 November through 31 January, 1,021 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN, an increase of 209 over the previous three months. In November, 367 Hoi Chanh were received. This was the largest number to rally since October 1967. In December, a total of 345 rallied, and in January, 309.

(b) The Third Party Inducement Program, a new means of encouraging ralliers, went into operation on 7 November. The program provides for awards to be paid to any Vietnamese citizen, civilian or military, who induces a VC/NVA to rally. The program, which was authorized by the Chieu Hoi Ministry by Directive 691, dated 31 October, was directly credited with producing 518 Hoi Chanh during the reporting period. As a result of this effort, a total of 86 VC Montagnards from one village were induced to rally over a three-day period.

(5) New Life Development.

(a) Economic Development.

1 Harvest of the first crop of high yield 1R-8/5 rice planted in 1968 has been completed. Production averaged 4.07 metric tons per hectare on 4,888 hectares planted. Approximately 2,000 hectares were planted in the second crop. The goal for 1969 is 45,310 hectares.

2 The Broiler Production Program was augmented by the receipt and distribution of 150,000 day-old chicks.

3 The vaccine center distributed 650,000 doses of assorted vaccines.

4 Significant programs during the reporting period were the construction of hamlet classrooms, training of teachers, development of vocational/technical high schools, construction of schoolmasters' quarters, and workshops for teachers in adult education, and the development of prototype school libraries.

(b) Community Development. Priorities for Community Development projects have been established for military civic action and self-help activities, with first priority on cash income-producing projects. Primary emphasis was given to economic development projects as opposed to projects which merely provide services. However, because many resources are not suitable for economic development, projects for general social improvement, which contribute to the American image, continued to be accomplished.

(c) Public Administration.

1 Regional GVN administration continues to be hampered by the continued delay in the appointment of a new chief of the regional inspectorate. Reportedly he will not be appointed until the Chief Executive signs a bill abolishing the office of Government Delegate. This bill has been passed by the Lower House.