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2 The caretaker of civil affairs in the III CTZ area, the Administrative Assistant to former Deputy Government Delegate, has been directed by the Prime Minister's Office to maintain offices and a staff for an inspector general and for the ministries personnel who will be assigned to his operation. The Inspector General and his staff will have no authority other than to perform inspections in the provinces and to report their findings to the office of the Prime Minister. They will work for the Prime Minister and will not be subject to the orders of the Commanding General of III CTZ. This is a change designed to accomplish separation of military and civilian authority.

3 All provinces in III CTZ continued to conduct training for local officials pending the opening of the national training school at Vung Tau. The school is expected to be operational by mid-March.

(d) Engineering/Public Works. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Director of Construction Contract Maintenance Teams, began the repairing and rehabilitation of public works equipment in the provinces. The teams worked in Gia Dinh, Long Khanh, Binh Duong and Phuoc Tuy Provinces as well as in the municipality of Vung Tau. This action decreased the percentage of deadlined equipment in III CTZ from 33 percent to 25 percent.

(e) Logistics. A significant breakthrough was experienced in efforts to acquire trainees to staff provincial maintenance shops. Forty-three Hoi Chanh were selected and placed in various Region III province maintenance shops for training. This has resulted in considerable progress in opening and sustaining operation of the maintenance shops, while at the same time providing returnees an opportunity to learn a skilled trade.

h. Communications. Significant changes and improvements in communications in support of II FFORCEV operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

(1) During the period of 16 October - 15 November, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was assigned to II Field Force Vietnam and moved to Phuoc Vinh. Initial communications support necessitated one teletype circuit and telephone service through the corps area communications system from Headquarters, II FFORCEV to the advance party at Long Binh. During the first week of November, tactical VHF, FM and HF radio systems were established between Headquarters, II FFORCEV and Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division at Phuoc Vinh. This headquarters effected the necessary coordination for lateral telephone circuits among the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division, using a combination of division and corps area VHF and cable systems.

(2) The activation of the Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command (BHTAC) on 1 November resulted in a requirement for additional communications. The US and Vietnamese units which form the command have a relatively austere but effective communications system. Their mission, the defense of the

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Bien Hoa-Long Binh area, requires responsive FM secure and non-secure radio and wire communications. BHTAC has, in addition to its own radio command net and flash base net, sufficient radio equipment available to monitor or enter the II FFORCEV command nets, II FFORCEV Artillery command net, or any subordinate unit command net. Wire communications include dial trunk access to the corps area communications system and sole user circuits to the tactical operations centers of all major combat support units, flash base towers, and local defense command posts in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh area. The ARVN component in BHTAC has generally parallel communications with its units in the area.

(3) During this period the II FFORCEV G-2 and G-3 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) moved from a semi-permanent underground bunker into an adjacent permanent underground structure. The II FFORCEV tactical switchboard (Hurricane TOC) was moved to the old underground bunker and became operational on 7 December. This bunker also houses the II FFORCEV net control stations for the Commanding General's command (FM) secure and non-secure voice radio nets, the radio wire integration station and base defense radio station. Remotes from these radio stations to the tactical operations center provide G-2/G-3 operations personnel ready access into all FM radio nets. Additionally, four active VHF radio-carrier systems have been placed in the underground bunker to provide dispersion for the systems. A new 162-foot radio tower was erected adjacent to the underground bunker. Additional VHF antennas have been installed and oriented toward all OPCON units for contingency purposes. In the event the main tower and VHF complex, located some distance away, is damaged or destroyed, communications can be restored to all units under II FFORCEV operations control within a few hours.

(4) On 15 December, the II FFORCEV Communications Center (Commcenter) was relocated to a new facility. The new building furnishes completely air conditioned, larger accommodations which permit segregation of subsections and therefore contributes to increased efficiency. Electronic equipment maintenance has been reduced as a result of heat reduction and alleviation of the dust problem. New wiring was installed throughout and machines are now arranged for maximum manpower utilization and efficiency. Tempest hazards have been reduced considerably, providing increased security. The new building was built adjacent to the former Commcenter which was refurbished and occupied by Adjutant General Message Center in January. Windows now exist between the Commcenter and Message Center which permit immediate delivery of terminated and originated messages, thus eliminating the frequent hand-carry method previously employed because of the distance between the two functions.

(5) An additional teletype circuit was installed in the II FFORCEV Main Commcenter on 16 December to accommodate backlogs of message traffic destined for the Phu Lam Major Relay (AUTODIN). It is terminated on normal teletype equipment and the distant end is a torn tape relay adjacent to the AUTODIN Automatic Electronic Switching Center (AESC). This temporary

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circuit will be discontinued as soon as the two fixed station AUTODIN Mode V terminals are installed in the II FFORCEV Commcenter. The latter is scheduled to be installed in February 1969. The last shipment of equipment is scheduled to arrive on 1 February and installation will begin as soon as the remaining items of equipment are received. The two terminals will be owned, operated, and maintained by the 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM).

(6) In December the mobile, narrowband Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) terminal was deactivated and replaced by a wideband AUTOSEVOCOM terminal. The new secure voice terminal was installed in the underground II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center for use by operations personnel. A second terminal was later installed in the Commanding General's office. The new wideband systems provide high quality secure voice communications and greater reliability.

(7) A II FFORCEV Prisoner of War Release Team was formed to meet with enemy representatives on 25 December and on 1 January. The nearest military installation to the meeting site was at Tay Ninh West, the location of Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Additional telephone and radio circuits were installed from Headquarters, MACV and Headquarters, II FFORCEV to 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center to provide timely communications support for the II FFORCEV Commanding General and staff located at the 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center during the meetings. Non-secure and secure FM radio contact was maintained between the release team and the 1st Brigade Tactical Operations Center via a command and control ship in the vicinity of the meeting site. Communications established for this purpose worked well.

(8) An active four-channel radio relay system to Detachment B, 56th SIGMA was discontinued when the unit moved to a new location on 17 January. The system provided for teletype and voice circuits to Headquarters, II FFORCEV. This results in additional radio relay and terminal equipment being made available for other uses.

(9) In the latter part of November it was noted that II FFORCEV Regulation 66-1 was outdated in relation to courier services then being provided. A new regulation was published in December reflecting completely accurate information and included for the first time instructions for use of the Armed Forces Courier Service for delivery of top secret and SPECAT material. This valuable service is now being used effectively.

(10) In December a review was made of the crypto material received in Headquarters, II FFORCEV. Action was taken to reduce the amount of keying data and low level (operations, numeral, and authentications) codes issued to this headquarters. This will result in savings in production of material and in manhours spent in destruction of unneeded material, plus elimination of a storage problem. Action was also taken to initiate direct distribution of certain material to the subordinate

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units possessing COMSEC accounts. This new distribution procedure reduces excessive paperwork and time delays by eliminating Headquarters, II FFORCEV as an intermediate redistribution point.

(11) Late in October, MACV changed the locally promulgated address indicator group (AIG) system by assigning unique temporary numbers to all AIG previously controlled exclusively by subordinate commands in RVN. Elimination of unnecessary AIG and a complete update of existing AIG took place within this command and our requirements were submitted through USARV to MACV for application of the new designations. The results were received by this headquarters in the latter part of January and a new II FFORCEV regulation was staffed and is currently pending publication. Temporary AIG lists were previously promulgated as appendices to the II FFORCEV Regulation 105-1. Because of staffing and publishing delays, the old procedure was somewhat inflexible. New AIG lists will be published in the form of an unnumbered directory and the frequent changes will be disseminated by message, providing the maximum in flexibility and expeditious response to authorized originators' needs.

(12) The Command Message Review Board conducted an active program during the past quarter. The major achievements are:

(a) A regulation concerning the disposition of VMAC messages was published, implementing MACV Directive 105-8. The new regulation pinpointed responsibilities previously misinterpreted or neglected and furnished guidance to II FFORCEV operational control units on distribution requirements within their headquarters.

(b) Emphasis was placed on proper message preparation through inclusion of deficiencies found in originating messages filed with the II FFORCEV Main Commcenter in the minutes of the monthly Message Review Board meeting.

(c) A message preparation guide was published on 9 January. The guide condensed information in AR 105-31 into brief, easy to follow instructions and concentrated on the more common, recurring errors found in II FFORCEV staff originated messages. Sufficient copies of the guide were distributed to insure receipt by most potential drafters within the headquarters.

i. Information Officer.

(1) The Information Office continued production of the II FFORCEV monthly magazine, "The Hurricane," at a circulation of 36,000 copies. The November, December and January issues contained a total of 24 feature articles illustrated by color and black and white photographs. Among the subjects of these articles were Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support nation-building activities, community relations projects, psychological operations, pacification, specialized US Army units, Vietnamese units, and Operations of the US Navy in Vietnam.

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(2) The Information Office also produced 32 hometown television interviews, 642 hometown radio tapes, 510 hometown news releases, 63 general news stories and 11 newspaper feature stories.

j. Inspector General. During the reporting period the Inspector General conducted two investigations, inspected nine assigned or attached units, and rendered assistance in 65 cases.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support to Headquarters, II FFORCEV assigned and attached units, and to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) The Staff Judge Advocate also continued to assist the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment by verifying the classification of a number of detainees as to their status as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) Twelve general courts-martial were conducted during the period. Of these, four resulted from offenses committed during disturbances at the Long Binh Post Stockade on 29 August 1968.

(4) The Staff Judge Advocate also disseminated information and gave instruction on changes to the Manual For Courts-Martial which became effective during the period.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: - Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

(1) Military Police Support to Major Units Undergoing Redeployment.

(a) OBSERVATION. When a major unit is scheduled to conduct a redeployment, coordination of Military Police requirements at the receiving end, to include area support, should be accomplished expeditiously, and re-evaluated throughout the operation to determine future needs.

(b) EVALUATION. On 28 October, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) commenced deployment to the III CTZ. Initial coordination was conducted with the Provost Marshals of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions concerning discipline, law and order and convoy support within their tactical areas of interest. It was agreed that military police of the 1st Infantry Division would escort 1st Cavalry Division convoys until the new organization could assume this responsibility. This procedure was implemented and functioned smoothly until 23 November when

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1st Infantry Division resources were no longer adequate to support convoy movements. Shortages of organic transportation precluded the 1st Cavalry Division from providing the required escorts. An immediate request was submitted to the Deputy Commanding General, USARV for area military police assistance in accordance with existing regulations. Assistance was obtained, beginning on 18 December, from the 18th Military Police Brigade. The procedure of employing the military police assets of units in the receiving area proved workable, however, the operation could have been facilitated had the requirements for area military police support been realized earlier, and USARV given more time in which to prepare to support the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(2) Successful Multi-Company Regional Force (RF) Operation.

(a) OBSERVATION. Regional Force units have proved capable of conducting effective multi-company operations against major enemy forces.

(b) EVALUATION. During the morning of 27 November, Tay Ninh Province Headquarters received information from a Hoi Chanh that an enemy battalion was located in a hamlet 15 kilometers south of the city of Tay Ninh. The Regional Force/Popular Force Group at Tay Ninh dispatched three RF companies, the 905th, 547th and 388th, as a blocking force, and scheduled two additional companies as an attacking force. At 0850 hours, while moving into position near the occupied hamlet, the 905th RF Company made contact. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and a 75mm recoilless rifle. The 905th RF Company called for and received ARVN artillery support and a heavy fire team. By 1025 hours, the three blocking force units had made contact. At 1110 hours these companies pulled back to allow airstrikes on the enemy. At 1200 hours the attacking force, composed of the 164th and 688th RF Companies, commenced insertion within one kilometer of the enemy force, and by 1205 hours, the insertions were complete. Airstrikes continued and during the afternoon the friendly forces cordoned off the enemy position. The enemy attempted to break out of the cordon at 2040 hours and again at 0300 hours, but were repelled with the aid of Spooky, a flareship and a light fire team. At 0530 hours the enemy launched a concerted attack on the cordon force employing RPG and mortars, but again was halted. The enemy force then broke up into small groups and exfiltrated the area. Results of this action were nine RF killed, 19 wounded and one missing, 117 enemy killed and seven AK-47 rifles and one RPG-2 rocket launcher captured. The aggressiveness of the RF forces was credited in part to the fact that they had been issued M-16 rifles the week before this action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

(3) US Army and ARVN Participation in Operation Giant Slingshot.

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(a) OBSERVATION. The conduct of river operations by US Navy elements requires close coordination and extensive support on the part of air and ground forces.

(b) EVALUATION.

1 On 6 December, Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam commenced Operation Giant Slingshot along segments of the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay rivers in III and IV CTZ to interdict enemy movements of troops and supplies on the waterways in the vicinity of these rivers. As envisioned initially, the operation was to involve the use of teams of fast river patrol craft, supported by reaction force of approximately 100 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) personnel. US Army and ARVN forces in the area were to provide support as necessary, including on-call artillery fire and air strikes, Spooky, Firefly and light fire teams.

2 A number of conferences were conducted among elements concerned with coordinating Operation Slingshot both prior to and during the operation. Among those participating were representatives of II FFORCEV; III Corps; Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam; the 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions; the 1st Cavalry Division; Capital Military Assistance Command; Tay Ninh, Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, and the 730th Surveillance Airplane Company (Mohawk). Coordination was effected on communications, logistics, and ground, artillery and air support.

3 Communications between US/RVNAF and Naval forces were conducted by means of a Navy liaison team located at Headquarters, 25th ARVN Division. Because of the close relationship between the US and ARVN 25th Divisions, this arrangement functioned satisfactorily, providing an effective reporting channel to higher US headquarters.

4 During the planning for Operation Slingshot it had been anticipated that the presence of the naval elements would deter enemy activity, and that the enemy would attempt to evade the patrol craft. With this in mind, the ready reaction force was maintained as a separate element, on assault support patrol boats some distance away from the patrol boats. As the operation progressed, the enemy launched increasingly determined attacks against the patrol craft, inflicting unacceptable casualties and damage before the reaction forces could be brought in to support them. Reaction forces were then placed on the patrol craft from which they could be employed immediately. Later, the CIDG forces were augmented by combat elements from US and RVNAF commands in whose areas of responsibility the boats were operating.

5 On at least one occasion, the PBR assault craft encountered channels too small to move through. These channels were bypassed by airlifting the boats over them. The boats were stripped to the minimum weight possible and airlifted by CH-54A Flying Crane helicopters. Remaining associated equipment and personnel were transported separately.

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6 Giant Slingshot proved the effectiveness of employing small, highspeed water craft in day and night patrol and search operations to interdict water lines of communications when they are supported by adequately coordinated air and ground support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That units undertaking such operations insure provisions are made for detailed coordination, the establishment of a central point for communications and liaison, and adequate, responsive supporting forces.

(4) Test Burning of Jungle.

(a) OBSERVATION. Headquarters, II FFORCEV has conducted a test to determine the feasibility of burning off large areas of jungle to deny their use to the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION.

1 The test was conducted on 28 January, in War Zone D, 24 kilometers east of Rang Rang. The test area was characterized by a thick growth of trees, many of whose top branches were dead and dry. Green vegetation covered the ground under the tree canopy. The growth in the test area was typical of that found in War Zone D.

2 The tests were conducted by dropping 48 drums containing a mixture of 50 percent JP-4 aircraft fuel and 50 percent diesel oil from CH-47 aircraft. The drops were made from a height of approximately 200 feet at an airspeed of 20 knots. The overwhelming majority, if not all, of the drums burst, either on impact with the ground or heavy tree branches. Three to four minutes later, gunships commenced firing rockets and tracer ammunition into the drop area. Repeated firing over a period of an hour and a half failed to ignite the fuel.

3 The failure of the fuel to ignite may have been caused by one or more of the following factors:

a The ordnance may have missed the drop site. This is unlikely since the area was located positively and firing was conducted both in and around the area where the fuel had been placed. Further, the low altitude and airspeed of the drop aircraft limited dispersion of the drums as they fell.

b The delay between the time of the drops and the commencement of firing into the test area may have permitted the fuel to volatilize and to soak into the ground sufficiently to prevent ignition. That much of the fuel volatilized is confirmed by the fact that fumes could be detected at an altitude of 2,000 feet over the area.

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c. A previous test, in which similar drops were made into an area covered by dry grass and brush, and were followed immediately by the delivery of ordnance, obtained ignition of the fuel. The fire burned satisfactorily until it reached the type of forest in which the latest test was conducted, at which point it burned out.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(5) Enhancement of Operations Involving Contacts with the Vietnamese People.

(a) OBSERVATION. The presence of a GVN official can enhance the effectiveness of direct dealings between US elements and the Vietnamese population.

(b) EVALUATION. The 1st Infantry Division has found that psychological, MEDCAP and other operations are facilitated by the presence of a GVN official. This person, by his presence, indicates official sanction to the American operation, and serves to minimize the American presence in favor of that of the GVN. These two factors have been found to increase the level of cooperation obtained from the Vietnamese people as well as increasing the prestige of the GVN.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the advantages of employing GVN officials in such operations be made known to organizations and units concerned.

c. Training. In-Country Training of Long Range Patrol Companies.

(1) OBSERVATION. The rapid and effective employment of newly arrived long range patrol companies can be facilitated by a period of training and joint operations with an experienced unit.

(2) EVALUATION. In late December 1968, Company D (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry closed into Vietnam to commence operations. The company underwent one week of in-country training with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light). Following this period, an additional four weeks of in-country mission training was given by Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry. The training with Company F included practical exercises in patrolling, helicopter utilization, the use of weapons in patrol operations, artillery forward observer techniques, the utilization of air controllers in the conduct of air strikes, the employment of light fire teams and practical training in voice radiotelephone procedures. Members of Company D also were taken on joint patrols with experienced personnel from Company F. Initially, personnel of Company D were taken on three-day patrols made up of three men from each company, and led by experienced patrol leaders. The second and third patrols consisted of five members from Company D and one experienced member from Company F. All patrols of Company D participated in three such operations during the mission training phase, prior to conducting independent operations beginning on 8 February.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION. None.

Intelligence: Employment of Long Range Patrols.

(1) OBSERVATION. Long range patrols obtain more complete information and better results by moving over a selected route through an objective area of dense vegetation and heavy foliage than by occupying observation or listening posts for long periods of time.

(2) EVALUATION. When long range patrols are employed in static positions, particularly in areas offering limited visibility, there is a good possibility that incomplete and misleading information will be gained. Although moving through an objective area increases the possibility of a patrol being compromised and brought under enemy fire, a thorough reconnaissance of the objective area may be necessary to gain an accurate picture of the enemy situation. Routes should be selected which are most likely to discover enemy activities within the objective area.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That the employment of long range patrols emphasize the need for patrols to move about in objective areas where visibility is limited.

e. Logistics.

(1) The Capabilities of Vietnamese Contractors.

(a) OBSERVATION. Private Vietnamese contractors have the capability and technical skill to construct all but the most sophisticated types of projects.

(b) EVALUATION. The use of Vietnamese contractors to carry out construction projects was emphasized during the reporting period by CORDS. This approach proved highly successful. Construction projects for which bids were open received an average of 30 responses from Vietnamese contractors. With close engineering supervision by CORDS personnel, nearly all projects were accomplished on schedule and the quality of work produced was acceptable. Vietnamese contractors also have the capability of carrying out major road repair projects. However, they have not been given the opportunity as yet, to work on large scale projects such as road repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the scope of projects offered to Vietnamese contractors be broadened to include the building and maintenance of roads in III CTZ.

(2) Effectiveness of the Vietnamese Supply System.

(a) OBSERVATION. The recent issue of M-16 rifles to Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units demonstrated that the Vietnamese supply system can function effectively.

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(b) EVALUATION. During the past quarter M-16 rifles were released to the 3rd Area Logistics Command for issue to RF/PF in III CTZ. Issue orders were prepared and the weapons issued and delivered without undue delay. All echelons of the supply system functioned effectively down to the lowest level. Concurrent with the issue of the rifles, repair parts and ammunition were issued to all units. In some cases, lubricants were not issued in a timely manner primarily due to a failure on the part of the units to request them. Command interest and emphasis at all levels accounted for the efficient functioning of the supply system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That continued emphasis be placed on all aspects of the Vietnamese supply system to insure that it functions properly and effectively.

f. Organization. Reorganization of 9th Infantry Division Riverine Units.

(1) OBSERVATION. Riverine units of the 9th Infantry Division require the capability of conducting both riverine and sustained land-based operations.

(2) EVALUATION.

(a) During the period July - November 1968, the 9th Infantry Division reorganized two brigade headquarters, seven infantry battalions and two artillery battalions to a riverine configuration. This conversion reduced the equipment and personnel which were later required by these units for the conduct of land-based operations. During the initial period of employment of the Riverine concept, excellent results were obtained. However, since that time enemy forces have adapted their tactics to counteract riverine operations to the point that, in recent months, the results obtained from riverine operations have declined to an unacceptable level. As a result, emphasis has been placed recently on profitable land-based operations. Now, of the seven riverine infantry battalions, only two are afloat, and this is due to administrative necessity rather than to operational desirability. Further, the Navy is turning over to the GVN assault craft equivalent to two or three battalions of lift.

(b) Experience has shown that infantry units can conduct both riverine and land operations without significant difficulties. Riverine units, on the other hand, are handicapped in sustained land-based operations because of personnel and equipment shortages. With the increased necessity for land-based operations, these shortages create problems which over a long period of time may seriously impair the operational effectiveness of the division.

(c) The cost of reorganization in men and materiel is minimal when viewed in the light of the increased combat flexibility and ability to conduct sustained land-based operations. A total of 490 men, including

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35 officers, 12 warrant officers and 443 enlisted men would be required and a limited amount of materiel, most of which is already on hand.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That the two brigade headquarters and seven infantry and two artillery battalions presently organized under riverine configurations be reorganized into light infantry and standard artillery units.

g. Other.

(1) Economic Development Manual.

(a) OBSERVATION. Community Development Advisors need a manual which describes development projects for small, rural communities.

(b) EVALUATION. Small, rural communities have a serious need for cash-income producing projects. Advisors in the field, who are third-country nationals, often lack the knowledge to develop projects on their own, but could follow ideas suggested in a manual.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That qualified economists be employed to prepare a manual on rural economic development projects.

(2) Recruitment of Maintenance Shop Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. The GVN has been unable to provide sufficient numbers of personnel to be trained for employment in vehicle and equipment maintenance and repair facilities.

(b) EVALUATION. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the GVN have co-sponsored a nationwide program for the construction and development of a vehicle and equipment maintenance and repair facility in each province. The program included plans for training a Vietnamese work force to staff each shop. To accomplish this phase of the project, USAID negotiated a contract providing for teams of third country national technicians to train the work forces. Region III logistic officers have assisted in recruiting trainees by obtaining teen-age youths, females, category II veterans, Hoi Chanh and others. The recruitment of Hoi Chanh has proved the most successful and appears to offer the best source of trainees.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That provinces encountering difficulties in recruiting province maintenance staff trainees investigate the possibility of recruiting Hoi Chanh as a temporary means of maintaining a staff of mechanics. For long range planning and development of an adequate maintenance capability in the provinces, immediate consideration should be given by the US/GVN to establishing a contract operation utilizing private contractors.

(3) Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

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(a) OBSERVATION. It was apparent during this campaign when a fully coordinated and supported US and GVN effort is made in pacification, dramatic results can be achieved.

(b) EVALUATION. Much of the work in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) was accomplished without utilizing Revolutionary Development Cadre. They were required to finish previously programmed hamlets prior to being employed. Much of the work in the APC was accomplished by the Regional Force and Popular Force utilizing the principles of pacification. They completed tasks similar to those of the cadre. The US/GVN effort brought about a greater advancement in pacification than any other previous program had accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the same close coordination in program planning, development and supervision from the national to the lower levels of government serve as the guiding principles to be continued in the 1969 pacification program.

(4) Reduction in Force of Regional US Aid for International Development Technical Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Reduction in Force of CORDS detailed regional USAID Technicians has resulted in a lack of supervision for on-going programs.

(b) EVALUATION. With the Reduction in Force, technical backstopping is unavoidably being switched to a correspondence chain directly from Saigon to provinces. This creates mass confusion since the regional CORDS headquarters is usually not informed until after the fact. This could lead to embarrassment of the II Field Force Commander and the DEPCORDS if quizzed on activities in the region. There are currently two enlisted technically trained personnel being employed as Regional Agriculture Engineer-Educational Advisor technicians and are doing an outstanding job.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1 That technically qualified military personnel be assigned to regional positions, formerly staffed by USAID, to overcome the budgetary reduction in force of USAID technicians.

2 That the regional CORDS Joint Table of Distribution be revised to include these requirements at the earliest opportunity.

(5) Reduction of the CORDS Public Administration Advisory Staff.

(a) OBSERVATION. The effectiveness of the public administration advisory staff in III CTZ continued to be limited by a shortage of personnel.

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(b) EVALUATION. Only one man is authorized as the public administration advisor to cover 11 provinces and one autonomous city. Because of this, GVN officials and province advisory teams are not receiving the public administration advisory support they require. The success of the 1969 Pacification and Development Program is dependent, to a large measure, on the adequate training of the personnel charged with administering village-level government. The high priority which has been given to training village/hamlet officials is an indication of the recognition which has been afforded to the importance of public administration. The use of civil affairs generalist platoons to augment the advisory program does not appear feasible. Additionally, the personnel of these platoons are not normally trained in public administration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That military personnel with the requisite training be made available to augment CORDS III CTZ to assist in this program.

(6) Combined Civilian Orientation Conference.

(a) OBSERVATION. Formal conferences conducted for Vietnamese civic and political leaders can serve as an effective means of enhancing civil affairs community relations programs.

(b) EVALUATION. On 6 December, Headquarters, II FFORCEV, and Headquarters, III CTZ, held a pilot Combined Civilian Orientation Conference for middle-level government and province officials, educators, and religious and civic leaders of Bien Hoa Province. Guests were given brochures explaining US/GVN programs, attended briefings and viewed demonstrations designed to enhance their support of the efforts of the United States and GVN to achieve peace and democracy in Vietnam. The conference was well received, and spokesmen for those attending urged that similar conferences be held on a periodic basis and be expanded throughout the III CTZ. Present plans envision the conduct of quarterly conferences in Bien Hoa Province. Additionally, commanders of units under the operational control of II FFORCEV are being encouraged to conduct similar programs in their areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That information concerning the Combined Civilian Orientation Conference be made available to organizations concerned with community relations.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.

WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

9 Incl

1. II FFV Order of Battle
2. II FFV Area of Operations

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR - (R1) (W-DHO-TO-A) (U)

3. Statistical Summary USAF C130/C123 Sorties
4. Statistical Summary, Close Air Support
5. Aviation Statistics
6. Statistical Summary D-52 Bombing Missions
7. Enemy Disposition
8. II FFORCEV Troop List
9. Enemy Organization in the III CTZ

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ACofS, G3, II FFORCEV - 5
ACofS, G4, II FFORCEV - 1
ACofS, G5, II FFORCEV - 1
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II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
1	II FFORCEV	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	XY051111	COMUSMACV
2	1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT966489	II FFORCEV
3	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT158513	1st Cav Div (AM)
4	2-12 Cav	TAY NINH	GRANT	XT386623	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
5	1-8 Cav	TAY NINH	WHITE	XT455623	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
6	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT820910	1st Cav Div (AM)
7	2-8 Cav	BINH LONG	RITA	XT499802	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
8	5-7 Cav	BINH LONG	TON LE CHAN	XT625812	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
9	2-5 Cav	BINH LONG	RITA	XT499804	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
10	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT813900	1st Cav Div (AM)
11	2-7 Cav	PHUOC LONG	JILL	XT955908	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
12	1-12 Cav	PHUOC LONG	CAROL	YT058888	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
13	1-5 Cav	BINH LONG	ELEANOR	XT966736	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
14	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962488	1st Cav Div (AM)
15	2-19 Arty (105 T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT158513	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
16	2-20 Arty (ARA)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT970491	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
17	1-7 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
18	1-21 Arty (105 T)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT813900	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
19	1-30 Arty (155 T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT972492	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
20	1-77 Arty (105 T)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT813900	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
21	E Btry, 82d Arty	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT971492	DIV ARTY, 1st Cav Div (AM)
22	11th Avn Gp	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	1st Cav Div (AM)
23	227th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
24	228th Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YS145980	11th Avn Gp
25	229th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT495472	11th Avn Gp
26	11th GS Co	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
27	1-9 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
28	8th Engr	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT954488	1st Cav Div (AM)
29	13th Sig	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT965486	1st Cav Div (AM)
30	Co E, 52d Inf (LRP)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
31	2-2 Inf (MECH)	BINH LONG	SHIRLEY	XT763891	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
32	2-505 Inf	PHUOC LONG	JUNE	YT137788	1st Cav Div (AM)
33					
34					
35	1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT772383	II FFORCEV
36	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT777373	1st Inf Div
37	1-2d Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT779384	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
38	1-26th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT773372	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
39					

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
40	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907073	1st Inf Div
41	2-18th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907076	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
42	2-18th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT903077	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
43	2-16th Inf	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905077	2d Bde, 1st Inf Div
44	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764378	1st Inf Div
45	1-16th Inf (MECH)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT770379	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div
46	1-28th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT783388	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div
47	2-28th Inf	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	3d Bde, 1st Inf Div
48	1-4th Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT907077	1st Inf Div
49	1st Inf Div Arty	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT776375	1st Inf Div
50	1-5th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760366	1st Inf Div Arty
51	1-7th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT909071	1st Inf Div Arty
52	2-33d Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760375	1st Inf Div Arty
53	8-6th Arty (155/8"SP)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT760372	1st Inf Div Arty
54	1st Avn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT831171	1st Inf Div
55	1st Engr	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764379	1st Inf Div
56	121st Sig	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT764380	1st Inf Div
57	Co F, 52d Inf (LRP)	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT761381	1st Inf Div
58					
59					

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
60	9th Inf Div (-)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	II FFORCEV
61	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	9th Inf Div
62	2-47th Inf (MECH)	LONG AN	BINH PHUOC	XS610550	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
63	2-60th Inf	LONG AN	AB TAN THANH	XS656621	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
64	5-60th Inf	LONG AN	RACH KIEN	XS740698	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
65	9th Inf Div Arty (-)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	9th Inf Div
66	1-11th Arty (105 T)	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	9th Inf Div Arty
67	2-4 Arty	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	9th Inf Div Arty
68					
69					
70					
71					
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73					
74					
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76					
77					

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
78					
79					
80					
81					
82					
83					
84					
85					
86					
87					
88					
89	11th ACR (Sep)(-)	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438968	1st Inf Div
90	1-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440970	11th ACR
91	2-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11th ACR
92	3-11th Cav	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS433963	11th ACR
93	919th Engr Co	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS440976	11th ACR
94	Air Cav Trp	LONG KHANH	LONG GIAO	YS438960	11th ACR
95	25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655190	II FROSTV
96	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25th Inf Div
97	3-22d Inf	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT169269	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
98	4-23d Inf (MTCB)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT297487	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
99	4-9th Inf	TAY NINH	HIEU THIEN	XT249310	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
100	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
101	2-14th Inf	HAU NGHIA	DUC HOA	XT602015	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL NO
102	1-9th Inf (MECH)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT593218	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
103	2-12th Inf	HAU NGHIA	PHU DUC	YT517255	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
104	2-27th Inf	HAU NGHIA	DUC LUP	YT476126	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
105	2-34th Armor (-)	TAY NINH	PHU HOA	XT741167	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
106	3-4th Cav	TAY NINH	GO DAU HA	XT414241	25th Inf Div
107	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25th Inf Div
108	2-22d Inf	TAY NINH	KHIEN HANH	XT465378	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
109	1-27th Inf	BINH DUONG	XOM BEN TRANH	XT525412	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
110	25th Inf Div Arty	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
111	1-8th Arty (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div Arty
112	2-77th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT483480	25th Inf Div Arty
113	7-11th Arty (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT168520	25th Inf Div Arty
114	3-13th Arty (155/8 th SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
115	25th Avn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
116	65th Engr	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
117	125th Sig	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
118	Co F, 50th Inf (LRP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div

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119	RTAVF (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	II FFORCEV
120	1st Bde	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT160015	RTAVF
121	1st Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT163002	1st Bde, RTAVF
122	2d Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT165015	1st Bde, RTAVF
123	3d Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT168013	1st Bde, RTAVF
124	RTAVF Arty (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS167997	RTAVF
125	105 Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT165008	RTAVF Arty
126	Engr Bn (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YT157008	RTAVF
127	Sig. Bn (-)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS167999	RTAVF
128	CMAC	GIA DINH	SAIGON	XS841915	II FFORCEV
129	199th Inf Bde (Sep)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	CMAC
130	2-3d Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
131	3-7th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
132	4-12th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
133	5-12th Inf	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
134	D/17th Cav	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
135	2-40th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
136	87th Engr Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT077122	199th Inf Bde
137	3-82d Abn Div	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	CMAC

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
138	1-505 Inf	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
139					
140	1-508 Inf	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
141					
142	2-321 Arty	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865158	3d Bde, 82d Abn
143	HQ 1st ATF (Sep)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	II FFORCEV
144	4th RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443676	HQ 1st ATF
145	3d RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS448658	HQ 1st ATF
146	1st RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS441684	HQ 1st ATF
147	2d SAS Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS436676	HQ 1st ATF
148	A Sqdn/3d Cav Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS429669	HQ 1st ATF
149	12th Fd Regt RAA (105PK)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
150	1st Fd Sqdn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
151	104th Sig Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433668	HQ 1st ATF
152	C Sqdn/1st Armd Regt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS445664	HQ 1st ATF
153	161 (Indep) Recce Flt	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443682	HQ 1st ATF
154					
155	HQ, II FFORCEV Arty	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV
156	5-2d Arty (40mm AWSP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	II FFORCEV Arty
157	D/71st Arty (MG)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
158	I/29th Arty (SLT)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty

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
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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
159	8-25th Arty (TAB), HHB	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT052112	II FFORCEV Arty
160	HQ, 23d Arty Gp	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT887162	II FFORCEV Arty
161	2-13th Arty (105T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT847153	23d Arty Gp
162	3-197th Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT850153	23d Arty Gp
163	6-15th Arty (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT140520	23d Arty Gp
164	1-27th Arty (155 SP)	BINH DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT498468	23d Arty Gp
165	6-27th Arty (8"/ 175SP)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT812903	23d Arty Gp
166	1-16th Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT970494	6-27th Arty
167	2-32d Arty (8"/ 175SP)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT141521	23d Arty Gp
168	HQ, 54th Arty Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT047118	II FFORCEV Arty
169	7-8th Arty (8"/ 175SP)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT024154	54th Arty Gp
170	7-9th Arty (105T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS166991	54th Arty Gp
171	2-35th Arty (155 SP)	LONG KHANH	XUAN LOC	YT474096	54th Arty Gp
172	5-42d Arty (155T)	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS177002	54th Arty Gp
173	Co A, 5th SFGA	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007123	II FFORCEV
174					
175					
176					
177					
178	12th Cbt Avn Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT059118	II FFORCEV
179	11th Cbt Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	12th Cbt Avn Gp

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
180	128th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
181	173d Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780380	11th Cbt Avn Bn
182	213th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
183	205th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
184	145th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT995102	12th Cbt Avn Gp
185	68th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT988129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
186	118th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT990128	145th Cbt Avn Bn
187	190th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT987129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
188	334th Armd Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BINH HOA	XT991129	145th Cbt Avn Bn
189	210th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	12th Cbt Avn Gp
190	120th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT076065	210th Cbt Avn Bn
191	25th Avn Co (Corps)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050105	210th Cbt Avn Bn
192	54th Util Apl Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	210th Cbt Avn Bn
193	73d Surv Apl Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295472	210th Cbt Avn Bn
194	74th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865155	210th Cbt Avn Bn
195	184th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT862160	210th Cbt Avn Bn

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL NO
196	214th Cbt Avn Bn	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	12th Cbt Avn Gp
197	147th Aslt Spt Hel Co	PHUOC TUY	VUNG TAU	YS295471	214th Cbt Avn Bn
198	167th Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn
199	191st Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn
200	222d Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	12th Cbt Avn Gp
201	117th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT068113	222d Cbt Avn Bn
202	135th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
203	195th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
204	240th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEAR CAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
205	273d Aslt Spt Hel Co (Hvy)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
206	269th Cbt Avn Bn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12th Cbt Avn Gp
207	116th Aslt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT657158	269th Cbt Avn Bn
208	187th Aslt Hel Co	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT178521	269th Cbt Avn Bn
209	242d Aslt Spt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662152	269th Cbt Avn Bn
210	3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT908058	12th Cbt Avn Gp
211	335th Aslt Hel Co	DINH TUONG	DONG TAM	XS415429	214th Cbt Avn Bn

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL NO
212					
213					
214	Co-D, 151st Inf (LRP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT083117	II FFORCEV
215					
216	53d Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORCEV

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY USAF C130/C123 SORTIES 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TAC E</u>	<u>ER</u>	<u>CE</u>	<u>PRI 1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Inf Div	0	27	50	148	225
9th Inf Div	0	0	0	2	2
25th Inf Div	0	0	0	232	232
1st Air Cav Div	0	6	180	916	1102
II FFV Arty	7	10	59	458	534
79th Engr Gp	0	0	24	128	152
5th SF GP	0	0	8	201	209
12 AVN GP	0	0	4	36	40
11 ACR	0	0	4	10	14
2d CA	0	0	0	3	3
III Corps	0	0	1	0	1
53d SIG Bn	0	0	0	1	1
303 RR Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	7	43	330	2137	2517

TOTAL SHORT TONS: 21,394

TOTAL PASSENGERS: 23,847

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)
1 November - 31 January 1969

	<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. (C) FAC-Controlled Air Sorties.		
FWAF	10,259	
VNAF	6,479	16,738
2. (C) FAC-Controlled Sorties in Support of RVNAF.		
By FWMAF	2,609	
By VNAF	3,806	6,415
3. (C) FAC-Controlled Sorties in Support of FWMAF.		
FWMAF	10,259	
VNAF	64	10,323
4. (C) Distribution of Sorties (FAC-Controlled) in Support of:		
RVNAF	6,415	
1st Inf	1,191	
1st Cav	2,890	
9th Inf	1,397	
25th Inf	2,566	
CMAC	478	
11th ACR	522	
1st ATF	522	
3d Bde, 82 ABN	14	
RTAVF	232	
Co A, 5th SFG	409	
SIGMA	2	
Co F, 51st Inf	90	
BTAC	10	
5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat, Sky Spot) Missions in Support of:		
RVNAF	141	
1st Inf	50	
1st Cav	155	
9th Inf	19	
25th Inf	120	
CMAC	26	
1st ATF	22	
Co A, 5th SFG	19	
HQ II FFORCEV	50	602
6. (C) Results.		
KBA (BC)		648
KBA (EST)		671
Structures (Destroyed)		2,104
Structures (Damaged)		643
Sampans (Destroyed)		344
Sampans (Damaged)		67

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AVIATION STATISTICS

<u>ROTARY WING</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HOURS	49,697	51,972	52,463	154,132
TROOPS LIFTED	259,425	250,786	276,392	786,603
TONS OF CARGO	32,059	32,999	24,986	90,044

FIXED WING

HOURS	9258	12048	10686	31,992
TROOPS LIFTED	8150	7038	7125	22,313
TONS OF CARGO	345	206	268	819

PERSONNEL

CREWMEMBERS WIA	26	38	43	107
CREWMEMBERS KIA	14	6	5	25
CREWMEMBERS MIA	1	0	0	1
VC KBA	653	634	597	1884

* The above statistics include all 12th Combat Aviation Group assets.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY
B-52 BOMBING MISSIONS (U)
1 November - 31 January 1969

	Bien Hoa	Binh Duong	Binh Long	Binh Tuy	Da Dinh	Hau Nghia	Long An	Long Khanh	Phuoc Long	Phuoc Tuy	Tay Ninh		
1st Cav (AM)			14							31		50	95
1st Inf Div	12	37	4							10		20	83
9th Inf Div													
1st ATF	6								1		1		8
25th Inf Div		26					2					40	68
II FFORCEV	3	1							7	8		2	21
III CORPS							7					11	18
5th SFG												4	4
CMAAC													
RTAFV	1												1
TOTALS	22	64	18				9		8	49	1	127	298


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II FFORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE



ENEMY DISPOSITION
31 JANUARY 69

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II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM GROUP LIST

21 Jan 66

CICOM UNITS

UNIT	DATE	LOCATION
1st Cav Div (A)	26 Oct 66	THUONG
1st Inf Div	15 Mar 66	LAI NIE
9th Inf Div	14 Dec 66	DOH
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	CU CHI
CMAC	4 Jun 68	SAIG
199th Inf Bde (SEP) (LT)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH
1st ATF	Jun 66	HUI DAT
3d Bde, 82d Abn Div	3 Oct 68	PHU LOI
ATANT	22 Jul 68	BEARCAT
23d Arty Gp	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI
54th Arty Gp	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH
6th PSYOP Bn	6 Dec 66	BIEN HOA

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH
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ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HMB, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HHE, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH
2d CA Co	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH
9th Trans Co (CAL)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH
16 PI Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	LONG BINH
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH
44th APU	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
53d Sig Bn (CORPS)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
219th MI Det	20 May 66	LONG BINH
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	LONG BINH
Co D, (LRP), 151st Inf	31 Dec 68	LONG BINH
I Btry, 29th Arty (SLT)	27 Mar 67	LONG BINH
30 CA Det (Chap Tm)	5 Jan 69	BIEN HOA

ATTACHED UNITS

11th ACR	20 Jun 68	LONG GLAO
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AWSP)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
D Btry, 71st Arty (AL)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH

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
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Incl 9

Enemy Organization in the III CTZ
31 January 1969




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
Enemy Organization in the III CTZ
31 January 1969



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HQ II CTZ

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Enemy Organisation in the III CTZ
31 January 1969



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