

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 17TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
 1st Infantry Division
 APO 96345

AVDB-T (MHD)

29 October 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report: Convoy Ambushes on 12 and 14 August 1969 vic XT766457 and XT766678 (U)

Commanding General
 1st Infantry Division
 APO 96345

1. (U) Type of Operation: Convoy escort and road security operations along Highway 13 north of Lai Khe base camp (XT770380) ("Operation Thunder Run").

2. (U) Date of Operation: 121200 Aug 69 - 221200 Sep 69.

3. (C) Location: AO "Redball." A rectangular area bounded by the 77 EW, 60 EW, 66 NS and 88 NS grid lines, and portions of the Song Be River. This covers an area approximately 10 km east and west of Route 13 from the 1st Infantry Division's old northern boundary (60 EW grid line) to an area 17 km north towards Quan Loi.

4. (C) Control Headquarters: Responsibility for convoy security from Lai Khe to the 77 EW grid line was given to CO, 3d Brigade. CO, 2-2 Inf (Mech), was given the task of securing the road from Fire Support Base (FSB) Thunder III (XT772656) to the 77 grid line.

5. (C) Persons being Interviewed:

LTC NEWELL E. VINSON, CO, 2-2 Inf (Mech)
 CPT CAROL J. HOWARD, CO, C/2-2 Inf (Mech) (Inclosure 6)
 CPT DAVID L. SMITH, CO, A/2-2 Inf (Mech) (Inclosure 7)
 SGT ROBERT C. KEIL, C Co, 720th MP Bn (Inclosure 8)
 CPT LINN B. STARKEY, JR., Asst DTO, 1st Inf Div

6. (C) Task Organization: 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-B Company); B/2-34 Armor (-1 platoon); and A/2-16 Infantry.

7. (C) Supporting Forces: a. B/1-5 Arty (105), C/1-7 Arty (105), and A/3-197th Arty (155).

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- b. Light Fire Teams and Hunter-Killer Teams.
- c. Tactical Air elements directed by the Division Forward Air Controller.

8. (C) Intelligence: a. See Annex A to OPLAN 21-69 (Inclosure 2).

b. Enemy order of battle: See Inclosure 3.

c. Weather and terrain:

(1) Weather: hot and clear without any significant cloud cover on both days.

(2) Terrain: Route 13 is a dirt road wide enough for 2 traffic lanes. Condition of the road reduced the average speed of wheeled convoy vehicles to about 10 mph. The jungle has been cleared out 200-400 meters from each side of the road by Rome Plows. However, the cuts are now overgrown with tall grass. Rough terrain and numerous huge tree stumps prevent rapid movement through these cuts by tracked vehicles. The area beyond the cut is heavy jungle. A destroyed railroad line generally parallels Route 13 on the west (see map, Inclosure 11).

9. (C) Execution:

a. Enemy Operations: General: On 7 Aug 69 the three battalions of the 101D Regiment (K7, 8, & 9) left their sanctuaries inside the Cambodian border and travelled south into the Republic of Vietnam. The Regiment would support the NVA Autumn Offensive schedules to begin 12 Aug 69. Their general mission was to support NVA offensive operations around Quan Loi by interdicting the Lai Khe - Quan Loi supply routes; their specific mission was to conduct a successful convoy ambush on Route 13 between Quan Loi and Lai Khe. As expected, the 101D battalions moved south to their historical base areas (about 4-5,000 meters west of Highway 13 between the 68 and 75 EW grid lines), and chose to conduct their ambushes on familiar terrain. Thus, between 12 - 14 August, that portion of Route 13 between Thunder III and the 77 EW grid line became the focal point of enemy action.

b. Convoy ambush on 12 Aug 69.

(1) Operation "Thunder Run" was put into effect at 121200 Aug 69 and elements of the 2-2 Mech moved from Dau Tieng into A0 Redball, occupying Thunder III and outposting Highway 13 to the 77 EW grid line (Checkpoint 58). Two mechanized infantry companies and one tank company (-) were utilized to secure 11.5 km of road. C Company, 2-2 Inf, and the 3d Platoon of B/2-34 Arm were responsible for the northern section. CPT Carrd J. Howard, CO, C Co, 2-2 Inf had positioned his headquarters and mortar section

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vic XT764738 (the later location of FSB Hartman). The tank platoon was positioned 600m north of this position and the 3d Platoon approximately 400 meters further north near Checkpoint 58. In the same area there was one troop of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment waiting to pick up the north-bound Devil Run Convoy. CPT Howard's 2d and 1st Platoons were positioned 2,000 and 3,000 meters south respectively of his HQ position (see sketch map #1, Incl 10).

(2) At 1530, as the 30 vehicles of the Devil Run convoy were passing north, a culvert south of Checkpoint 58 was blown up by a command detonated mine, trapping five vehicles. Immediately the convoy was taken under fire by an estimated force of three enemy companies from the woodlines on the east and west sides of the road. The main enemy force was on the west; about 300-400 meters northwest of CPT Howard's HQ. While the convoy escort (MP and 1/4 Cav elements), elements of the 11th ACR, the tank platoon, the 3d Platoon, C/2-2 Inf and the HQ APCs of C Co, 2-2 Inf returned fire, CPT Howard's other 2 platoons raced up from the south. Despite the enemy effort to isolate the area by blowing another culvert approximately 1,000 meters south of the ambush site, the 1st and 2d Platoons were able to reach the threatened area in about 15 minutes (approximately 1545 - 1600).

(3) Due to the positioning of the US units, the C/2-2 Inf HQ vehicles at the southern edge of the ambush were initially receiving friendly fire from the 11th ACR Troop in the north. When informed of this, LTC Vinson, 2-2 Inf Battalion Commander, called the 11th ACR who immediately gave him operational control of the involved troop. The lone troop was then moved closer to the ambush site to avoid the necessity of firing due south.

(4) Then with his three HQ APCs in the lead, the 1st Platoon on his left flank, the 2d on his right flank, and the 3 x 81mm mortar APCs in the center, CPT Howard's element made a 250m NW assault on the ambush site. When his force was within about 50 meters of the woodline, it halted and then backed up 50 meters as Tac Air and artillery were brought on the enemy positions (approximately 1600 - 1630). At 1605 hours, Thunder III, whose artillery was supporting the contact, was mortared without any appreciable damage.

(5) An 11th ACR AVLB (bridgelayer) soon moved down from the north and replaced the blown culvert, allowing the rest of the convoy to continue. By 1700, mop up action had been completed and US units established a Remain-Over-Night (RON) position in the vicinity of the ambush. In the next few days the RON became FSB Hartman (XT763738) after bunkers and firing positions had been built by A/2-16 and B/1-5 Arty (105).

(6) There were 2 US KIA and 8 WIA (2 KIA and 2 WIA were from the 11th ACR). A search of the area located 54 enemy dead, 2 PWs, a large number of AK-47s, RPGs, and RPG rounds, a quantity of ammunition and large numbers of documents.

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c. Convoy Ambush on 14 Aug 69.

(1) The events surrounding the ambush on 14 August are more confused, partly due to the variety of units involved and the absence of recordings in the 2-2 Inf Daily Journal because the Battalion Commander was on the ground issuing verbal orders. The following is a rough summary of the events that took place.

(2) On the morning of August 14th, the Devil Run return convoy departed Quan Loi and travelled south on Route 13. The convoy, consisting of 52 vehicles, was divided into two march units of 26 vehicles each. The armored units of the 11th ACR that escorted the two march units apparently moved off the road at Checkpoint 58 (the 77 EW grid line), the boundary between the 1st Cav and the 1st Infantry Division. Although a tank unit may have remained with the first march unit, several sources have underlined the weakness of the internal escorting elements accompanying the second march unit. Only four machine gun jeeps of the 720th MP Battalion provided immediate security; the command and control vehicle was a transportation unit 1/4-ton truck equipped with a radio.

(3) The 2-2 Mech Inf again had the responsibility of outposting Route 13 from Thunder III to Checkpoint 58. However, with C/2-2 involved in a ground reconnaissance operation west of the highway, the strength of the 2-2 Inf was substantially reduced. The outposted security forces under the command of CPT David L. Smith, consisted of A/2-2 Inf, a recon element of the 1-4 Cav, and 1 tank platoon of B/2-34 Arm. Groups of 2 and 3 armed vehicles were outposted along the road, probably at least 1,000 - 2,000 meters apart. At the time of the attack, CPT Smith had taken his headquarters and 1-4 Cav APCs on a sweep of the road up to the northern boundary.

(4) The first march unit of the convoy passed through safely and met the Devil Run (northbound) convoys at Chon Thanh. Then, at approximately 1125, vic XT766678 (1.5 km north of Thunder III) the lead units of the second march unit received a heavy volume of fire from mortars and direct fire from an estimated enemy battalion. The main attacking elements assaulted from the west side of the road, while a smaller element engaged the convoy from the east. Apparently a substantial number of the enemy had moved from the woodline to an area quite close to the road under the cover of the high grass, brush piles and stumps.

(5) Fire was returned by the 2 APCs of the 2d Platoon, A/2-2 Inf and the machine gun jeeps, but the convoy was stopped by the heavy volume of enemy fire. One tanker was hit and exploded but did not catch fire. Its prime mover continued down the road. The next tanker in line was halted by the wreckage of the first and the driver left his vehicle; the following tanker was hit and caught fire. Another tanker was also

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halted with several flat tires. In addition, the communications jeep was hit by small arms fire with the first volley; the driver was killed and the vehicle was a combat loss (see Inclosure 10, Sketch Map 2).

(6) In about 15 minutes these elements were reinforced by 2 V-100 armored cars and one MP jeep from the northbound convoy. At the same time, the platoon leader of 3/A/2-2 Inf reinforced his embattled section with his other two APCs, notified CPT Smith and LTC Vinson, (at Thunder III) and the S2, 2-2 Inf, who was flying over the convoy. As the battalion commander drove out of Thunder III to the ambush site, CPT Smith was assembling his other forces on the northern limit of the ambush. Probably by 1215, US fire superiority was achieved with direct fire weapons while the enemy tried to extract the ambush force.

(7) There was difficulty calling in artillery fire initially. No one on the scene had direct communications with the helicopters overhead (there were no operational VRC-24) and consequently time was lost in determining exactly where the main attacking force was. The difficulty in clearing the helicopters from the west side of the road presented a more serious problem. Because the ambush was so close to Thunder III, the gun-target line of the artillery units was nearly perpendicular to the road precluding the use of air and artillery on the same side of Route 13. The time lost in moving the helicopters to the eastern side was critical. The mortaring that Thunder III received about 1200 hours did not affect the artillery batteries there (Thunder III also reported receiving heavy machine gun fire along with the mortar attack).

(8) Accurate, massive artillery fire finally was brought on the enemy's western position between approximately 1215 and 1300. At the same time helicopter gunships were directed on the enemy west of the road. The supporting fires together with the heavy direct fire from the massing reaction forces kept large numbers of the enemy pinned down in the open field. In the meantime the damaged vehicles were cleared off the road and the remainder of the convoy quickly passed.

(9) At 1300 hours, while the armored tracks of the 2d platoon and the battalion commander continued to secure the western flank of the road, CPT Smith assaulted the enemy's center of mass. The assault elements consisted of CPT Smith's two command APCs, seven APCs of the Reconnaissance Platoon, five 1-4 Cav APCs, and three tanks (a fourth tank with a defective main gun had been sent to drag the burning vehicles off the road). They moved southwest, 1,200 meters to the center of the enemy mass. Due to the extremely rough terrain, and the need to stop and fire about every fifteen minutes, the assault took 45 minutes (see Inclosure 10, Sketch Map 3).

(10) At 1345 the armored force reached what appeared to be the enemy center and formed themselves into a circle. Bitter fighting ensued for the next 15 - 20 minutes resulting in several enemy dead and one Chieu Hoi.

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(11) By 1420, C/2-2 Inf had joined CPT Smith's force. Under the direction of the Battalion Commander, C Company swept 500-600 meters north along the woodline, while A Company made an identical sweep to the south. There was little action and the mechanized companies then swept back to the center. C/2-2 Inf departed the area at about 1600 hours while elements of A Company travelled north to pick up A/2-16 Inf, an infantry company that had been working from the newly constructed Fire Support Base Hartman. A/2-16 Inf was transported back to the ambush site and from 1700-1830 carefully scoured the jungle area west of the woodline in hopes of picking up enemy stragglers and equipment. But by this time the enemy had completely withdrawn from the area.

(12) The enemy left 20 dead, 1 Chieu Hoi, 1 SKS rifle, 4 AK-47 rifles, 8 grenades, 8 RPG rounds, and 3 AK-47 magazines. There was 1 US WIA and 3 US WIA.

10. (C) Evaluation: a. Enemy tactics: The 101D Regiment's tactics were about the same in both ambushes. At least three companies would move up on line (from the west side of Route 13) and, when a signal was given, assault the convoy from the woodline that extends 300-400 meters on either side of the road. Mortar and anti-aircraft (i.e., anti-helicopter) teams would support the attack from the woodline. The EW trails leading to Route 13 and the railway that generally parallels the highway on the west were used as control points. In each case, at least one element (probably a reinforced squad) was positioned on the east side of the road in order to create confusion and obscure the main direction of the attack. Ideally, the ambush would be executed quickly with a high volume of fire. The ambushing forces would then rapidly withdraw and disperse to predesignated assembly areas in the jungle. It also appears possible that a portion of the ambush forces may have been designated as a delaying force to mask the exit of the main body. This has not been proven. In both ambushes the nearest Fire Support Base (Thunder III) received mortar fire in an enemy effort to suppress supporting artillery and cause confusion.

b. Superficially the two ambushes were nearly identical. However, the balance of forces was more favorable to the enemy on the 14th than the 12th. According to PW reports, the K8 Battalion left 100 men behind at their base camp and took only 80 men to the first ambush. This estimate may be conservative since the US units involved felt the enemy force involved to be 120 to 160 men. But PW sources also indicate that at least 200 K9 soldiers were used on the 14th along with an estimated 40 men from the K8. In addition, the US security forces were reduced by the absence of C/2-2 Inf on the 14th and the convoy itself had no armored escort.

c. On the 12th, despite the US force's unfamiliarity with the area, their strong force density enabled them to react rapidly to the enemy ambush. In fact, Company C's command section was parked almost directly opposite the ambush site. On the 14th, our forces were spread out over a larger area and no significant forces had been given the mission of internal convoy security. As a result, critical time was lost in "piling on" and making use of the strong air and

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artillery support available. The late air and artillery strikes prevented the large armored force that had assembled at the ambush site by 1215 from assaulting the enemy. Moreover, most of the armored units were from the Recon Platoon/2-2 Inf and the 1-4 Cav; these elements had no organic infantry. Only when A/2-2 Inf and C/2-2 Inf arrived could an effective infantry assault be undertaken against the enemy hidden in the rough terrain.

11. (U) Lessons Learned: See Inclosure 5.

12. (C) Continued Operations: Between 14 August 1969 and 22 September 1969 the enemy attempted two more ambushes on Highway 13.

a. On 20 Aug 69 a reinforced enemy platoon attempted a third ambush against a Highway 13 convoy vic XT765729. Elements of C/2-2 Inf together with a quick reaction force composed of the Recon platoon/2-2 Inf and B/2-34 Armor (-) rapidly "piled on" the ambush site. Artillery and air support were directed immediately against the enemy force. There were 2 US WIA, 7 enemy KIA and 2 PWs (WIA); 3 AK-47s, 15 AK-47 magazines, 2 RPG launchers and 5 RPG rounds, 1 light machine gun, 2 Chicom hand grenades, 5 sets of web gear, miscellaneous SA ammunition, and 2 documents were captured. The convoy was untouched.

b. On 6 Sep 69, elements of the K9 Battalion launched the 101D Regiment's final ambush against a "Thunder Road" convoy. About 150-200 enemy soldiers participated in the attack; the ambush was positioned vic XT763680, the same location of the K9's previous ambush on 14 Aug 69. At 1055 the Devil Convoy received mortar fire followed by a ground attack at 1100 from the west side of the road. The security element, Troop B/1-4 Cav, returned fire immediately supported by artillery, Hunter Killer Teams, Light Fire Teams, and Tac Air. As the convoy moved safely out of the contact area at 1115, A&C/2-2 Inf moved into the ambush site. Though sporadic contact continued until 1730, it was the initial quick US reaction that trapped the enemy before he could withdraw. US losses were 1 KIA and 7 WIA; enemy losses included 55 KIA, 4 PWs, 3 Chieu Hois, 3 light machine guns, 8 AK-47s and 3 AK-47 magazines, 1000 SA rounds, 11 B40 rounds and 9 B40 rocket boosters, 45 grenades, 4 anti-tank grenades, 18 canteens, 10 sets of web gear, 10 helmets, 10 ponchos, 10 pounds of rice and 4 flashlights.

c. At 221200 Sep 69 AO Redball was terminated, the area was returned to the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2-2 Inf (Mech) returned to the 1st Bde at Dau Tieng. For approximately 41 days the task force based at Thunder III and Hartman had secured the daily convoys to and from Quan Loi and kept a vital supply route open despite the best efforts of at least one full NVA Regiment.

13 Incl

JEFFREY J. CLARKE

1. OPLAN 21-69

CPT, INF

2. Annex A to OPLAN

Commanding

3. Enemy OB

4. Sequence of En Initiated Events

11. Map

5. Lessons Learned

12. Photographs

, Interview w/CPT Howard

13. Aerial Photographs

, Interview w/CPT Smith

6. Interview w/SGT Miel

7. PW Reports

10. Sketch maps

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 Lai Khe (XT7738) RVN
 071030H Aug 1969
 OBS

OPLAN 21-69 (Op Thunder Run) (U)
 Reference: Map, 1:100,000, VN Series L7014

Task Organization:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>3d Bde</u>
1-2 Inf (-)	1-18 Inf	2-16 Inf
C/1-2 (ETF) (o/o)	2-18 Inf	1-4 Cav (-1 Trp)
2-28 Inf (o/o)	1-26 Inf	2-2 Inf (M) (-) (o/o)
1-28 Inf (o/o)	TF Mead. (CRRF)	B/2-34 Arm (-)
Co/2-2 Inf (M)	B/1-16 Inf (M)	
Sct Plat/2-2 Inf (M)	Sct Plat/1-16 Inf (M)	
Plat/B/2-34 Arm		

1. (U) SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces: Current SITREP/Frag Ord; CO, 11 ACR received OPCON 1-16 Inf (M) (-), Trp/1-4 Cav, plus 105 Arty Btry, on order.
- c. Attachments and Detachments:
- d. Assumptions:

2. (C) MISSION

1st Inf Div prepares to assume responsibility for security of Route 13 North to Quan Loi O/O: Continue present missions.

3. (C) CONCEPT

- a. Effective O/O, 1st Bde assumes responsibility for AO Container, 3d Bde assumes responsibility for Rte 13 security and for AO Redball, Priority of fires to 3d Bde.
- b. CO, 1st Bde:
 - (1) Assume responsibility for AO Container O/O.
 - (2) Receive OPCON 1-28 Inf plus 2-28 Inf O/O.
 - (3) Continue to provide security for Romeo Plow Ops in assigned AO.
 - (4) Assume responsibility for Dong Tien Program w/8th ARVN Regt effective O/O.
 - (5) Establish Fwd CP at 8th Regt HQ Ben Cat, off O/O.
 - (6) Be prepared to establish combined coordination center (CCC) at FSPB Mahono w/8th Regt O/O.
 - (7) Continue current ops in assigned AO.
- c. CO, 2d Bde:
 - (1) Continue current ops in assigned AO.
 - (2) Release OPCON Plat/2-34 Arm to CO, 3d Bde, O/O.
- d. CO, 3d Bde:
 - (1) Be prepared, on order, to assume responsibility for Hwy security Q 13 in assigned AO.
 - (2) Pass OPCON 1-28 Inf and 2-28 Inf to CO, 1st Bde, O/O.
 - (3) Release OPCON C/1-2 Inf to CO, 1st Bde, O/O.
 - (4) Be prepared to establish FSPB vic Thunder III and at locale to be coordinated with 11th ACR.
 - (5) Provide such assistance as may be required by CO, 1st Bde, to facilitate passage of Dong Tien Program with 8th ARVN Regt.
 - e. CO, Div Arty: Be prepared to assist CO, 3d Bde in est of FSB as required.
 - f. Coordinating Instructions:
 - (1) Direct liaison w/11th ACR authorized.
 - (2) Units will be prepared to execute the OPLAN on 8 hours notice.
 - (3) This OPLAN effective for planning on receipt, for execution on order.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Annex C (TBP).

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ANNEX A (INTEL) to OPLAN 21-69 (Thunder Run) (U)

1. (C) Situation:

Area of Operational Interest: The operational area is bounded on the North by the 90 EW grid line and on the south by the 6C EW grid line. The area is bounded on the East by NS grid 56 on the West by NS grid 68.

2. (C) Enemy Situation:

a. Composition, Disposition, Strength:

(1) 165 Regiment; 7th NVA Division: The 165 is composed of 3 bns, the K-4, K-5, and K-6. The K-5 is located in the vicinity of XT7492. The K-4 and K-6 Bns are thought to be in the general vicinity of the Fishhook. The 165 Regt has a strength of 1200 men. Each of the battalions has an approximate strength of 250 men.

(2) 141 Regiment; 8th NVA Division: The 141 Regt is composed of 3 bns, the K-1, K-2, and K-3. The entire regiment is believed to be dispersed along the Song Be River with its center of mass in the vicinity of XT9297. The strength of the 141 is held between 1000 and 1100 men. Each battalion has between 225 and 250 men.

(3) 209th Regt; 7th NVA Division: The 209th Regt is composed of three Bns designated K-7, K-8, and K-9. The regiment is currently believed to be located in the vicinity of XT7203 with elements near Bridge 48 on the Cambodian Border, vic XT569949. The current strength of the 209th is 1200, with each battalion at about 250 men.

(4) The K-7 Bn/101 Regt/1st NVA Div: The K-7 Bn is composed of four companies-C6, C7, C8, and C10. The first three being infantry companies and the last being a heavy weapons company. The bn currently is located in the vicinity of XT7873 and threatens Hwy 13. The current strength of the K-7 is held at 225 men.

(5) D368 Bn: The D368 Local Force Bn has been known to operate in the An Loc, Quan Loi area. The unit was possibly contacted on 29 July in an enemy initiated action vicinity XT821797. It is thought that the unit would be used in attacks and shellings of Quan Loi, An Loc and Loc Ninh. The current strength is held at 150 men.

(6) The enemy elements threatening the An Loc-Quan Loi-Highway 13 area have in the past few months, conducted operations in this area with heaviest emphasis placed on ambushes. Since April, the 209th, 165th, 141st, and 101D Regiments all have conducted ambushes in the area. These ambushes have been mostly of battalion size, although several of the smaller attempts may have been company or platoon-sized attempts. In addition to ambushes, the 101D had, before coming into Binh Long Province, conducted ground attacks on allied fire support bases in War Zone C. These actions were characterized by approximately 15 minutes of a heavy attack by fire followed by a battalion-size ground assault. The only other enemy unit of significant size in the area of interest which has definitely been established there is the D368LF Battalion. This unit usually performs small harassing actions, avoiding significant contact unless trapped by Allied Forces.

(7) Tabular Summary of VC/NVA (See Appendix I).

b. Significant Contacts:

(1) 18 June. E/2-11th ACR preempted an ambush on Hwy 13 vic XT769759 contact resulted in 7 NVA and 2 PW's that identified the K-9/101D.

(2) 17 July. L/3-11th ACR repelled an ambush on a convoy at XT765755. The contact resulted in 9 NVA KIA and a PW who identified K-7/101D.

3. (U) Weather.

a. General: During the six month period from May through October, the full force of the SW Monsoon, or the Rainy Season, is experienced in the III CTZ; the transition to the SW Monsoon is usually complete over the III CTZ by the middle of May. Overall, weather conditions deteriorate from the fine conditions found during the NW, or dry season, Monsoon. Showers and thunderstorms become daily weather features along with increasing amounts of cloud cover.

(1) Cloudiness: During the SW Monsoon season cloudiness increases significantly. Reaching maximum coverage during September. A typical rainy season day begins with scattered to broken middle (above 6,000) and high (above 20,000 ft.) level cloudiness during the night and early morning. Scattered low level clouds at 1,500 to 3,000 ft. will begin developing by mid-morning. This cloud layer will frequently become broken during the afternoon. Shower and thunderstorm activity will begin to develop almost daily beginning by mid-afternoon and continuing until late evening. By midnight there will be scattered to broken middle and high clouds as a result of the residual cloudiness for the day's thunderstorm activity. This increase in clouds causes the illumination effect to be increased at night.

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CONFIDENTIALANNEX A (INTEL) to OPLAN 21-69 (Thunder Run) (U) cont'd
(2) **Visibilities:**

- a. Overall, visibility is improved during the rainy season. The fog and haze condition which was prevalent during the dry season decrease sharply.
- b. Visibilities normally will be restricted to 7 to 6 miles on about 6 to 12 days in the N and Central Regions of the III CTZ during any of these months.
- c. During heavy rainfall activity, visibilities will briefly become less than one mile, and occasionally lower to 1/4 mile.

b. Light Data--August 1969

DATE	BMNT	SR	SS	EENT	MR	MS
5	0554	0642	1916	2004	0003	1256
10	0555	0643	1915	2002	0404	1713
15	0556	0643	1912	2000	0010	2039
20	0557	0644	1910	1957	1217	----
25	0557	0644	1907	1954	1725	0413
30	0557	0644	1905	1951	2115	0903

4. **Terrain:**

a. General: The terrain in the area of interest consists primarily of low-land plains with elevations under 100 meters, except in the vicinity of An Loc (XT7588), where the relief may rise to elevations as high as 203 meters. The vegetation varies from primary in the Southwest to large tracts of secondary forest (triple-canopy jungle) in the northern portion of the area. There are large rubber plantations in the vic of An Loc. The Saigon River drains that portion of the area to the West of Highway 13, while the Song Be Brains the Eastern part.

b. **Military Aspects of the Terrain:**

(1) Cover varies from poor in the relatively small clearings throughout the area to fair on the reverse slopes of hills in the Northern portion of the area.

(2) Observation varies from extremely poor in secondary forest and bamboo thickets to fair in clearings and rubber plantations. Good observation and fields of fire exist along major roads where vegetation has been cleared back for stand-off; however, fields of fire are extremely limited in secondary forest and bamboo.

(3) Concealment ranges from poor in clearings and along major roads to good in dense jungle, bamboo and rubber plantations.

(4) Obstacles to movement consist of jungle, secondary thickets, bamboo, and numerous streams, particularly in those areas which form the basins of the Song Be and Song Saigon. In many areas of dense jungle and Bamboo movement is restricted to foot travel along established trails.

(5) Avenues of approach for wheeled and tracked vehicles consist of N-S Hwy 13, E-W Route 245 (Running from the Western Border to An Loc), and Route 14 (Running NE from Loc Ninh to the Eastern Border of the area). Limited vehicular and unlimited foot trails run South from the Cambodian Border along both the Eastern and Western borders of the area of interest. Rubber plantations provide unlimited foot and limited vehicular avenues of approach to any objective within or on the periphery of these plantations.

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APPENDIX 1 (Tabular Summary of VC/NVA Units) to Annex A (Intelligence) to
OPLAN 21-69 (Thunder Run) (U)

UNIT	STRENGTH	WEAPONS	PROBABLE LOCATION
165	1200	AK, LMG, 12.7 AA AMG 120mm mtr 82/60mm mtr, 75RR, 57RR	XT7492
209	1200	AK, LMG, RPG, 12.7AA, MG 12.7AA, MG 82/60mm mtr 57RR	XU 203
141	1100	AK, LMG, RPG, 12.7 AA, MG 12.7 AA, MG 82/60 mm mtr 57RR	XT9297
K-7/101D	225	AK, LMG, RPG 57RR, 82/60mm mtr	XT7873
D368	150	AK, LMG, RPG, 82/60mm mtr 75RR	XT9377

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APENDIX 2 (Tabular Summary of VC/NVA units) to Annex B (Intelligence), OPLAN
21-69 (Ambush Locations)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ENEMY UNIT</u>
28 Apr 69	XT763748	K-8 Bn, 209th Regt
2 May 69	XT767785	Unk
3 May 69	XT765715	K-8 Bn, 209th Regt
6 Jun 69	XT765720	Unk
6 Jun 69	XT766700	K-9 Bn, 101D Regt
18 Jun 69	XT769759	K-9 Bn, 103D Regt
9 Jul 69	XT740930	K-5 Bn, 165 Regt
17 Jul 69	XT765755	K-7 Bn, 101D Regt

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Inclosure 3

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

101D Regiment, 1st NVA Division, consisting of the following units:

1. K7 Battalion: strength unknown but believed to be approximately 220 men with equipment similar to that carried by the K8 and K9 Battalions.

2. K8 Battalion: 3 Inf companies, 1 mortar company, and 1 Bn HQ section. Probable strength is 180 men (about 40 men per company). Probable equipment includes: 3 x 82mm mortars and 70 mortar rounds; 1 heavy machine gun with 5,000 rounds; 9 x B40 or B41 Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher (RPG 2 and 7) with 9 - 12 rounds per weapon; 6 x light machine guns; 4 x K-54 pistols; an unknown number of AK-47s, CKC rifles, light machine guns, and grenade launcher attachments; 1 radio; and 3 x field phones.

3. K9 Battalion: 4 companies plus. Probable strength is 300 men. Probable equipment includes: 3 x 82mm mortars; 16 x B40/41s with 6 rounds per weapon; 16 x light machine guns with 500 rounds per weapon; 16 x grenade launchers; 3 x 60mm mortars with 30 rounds per mortar; 2 x anti-aircraft machine guns with 1,000 rounds per weapon; an unknown number of AK-47s and other small arms; 5 x land line field phones; and 2 x radio telephones (range 50 km).

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Inclosure 4 SEQUENCE OF ENEMY INITIATED EVENTS

7 Aug 69: the 101D Regiment battalions leave their Cambodian sanctuaries by foot and begin travelling south and southeast to their traditional base areas west of Highway 13.

8 Aug 69: At about 1630 hours the K7 Battalion is hit by a B-52 strike while infiltrating south.

9 Aug 69: The main section of the K7 signal platoon was destroyed at 1110 hours vic XT605905 by the Aerial Rifle Platoon, A Troop, 11th ACR.

11 Aug 69: The K8 Battalion arrives at its rest area in the morning. Then at about 1500 it departs for its ambush site, and arrives somewhere between 1900 and 2300.

12 Aug 69: The K9 arrives at its base camp area.

12 Aug 69: At 1500 hours the K8 initiates its ambush on Highway 13 vic XT766745.

13 Aug 69: At about 1800 hours the K9 leaves its base camp and arrives at its ambush site (vic XT766678) at about 2200 hours.

14 Aug 69: At approximately 1100 the K9 deploys its ambush and at 1125 initiates the convoy ambush with mortar fire and ground assault.

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Inclosure 5

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Internal convoy security.

a. Observation: Machine gun jeeps were not effective against the large enemy ambushes.

b. Recommendation: V-100 armored cars, ACAVs, APCs, Dusters, and tanks can be employed profitably as convoy escorts where intelligence indicates that company and battalion-size ambushes are probable.

2. Air and artillery support.

a. Observation: Air and artillery support must be brought to bear immediately on the ambush site.

b. Evaluations: In the two ambushes discussed, this support was coordinated by the ground commander. He determined the main direction of the attack and assigned tasks to supporting artillery and gunships.

c. Recommendations: These functions involve split-second decisions. Thus, the convoy security element should notify the ground commander immediately that an ambush has taken place and its exact location. Artillery, following the convoy with their tubes, should have predesignated targets to fire on. The ground commander should adjust the artillery upon his arrival and direct the available air assets.

3. Ground Forces.

a. Observation: The ability to react swiftly and "pile-on" an ambush site is essential.

b. Evaluation: Due to the enemy's limited objectives and his ability to withdraw quickly, lightning responses by the ground security forces were needed in the ambushes discussed.

c. Recommendations: Commanders responsible for convoy security should consider the following measure to combat enemy ambush attacks:

(1) Insure that convoys have strong internal security when ambushes are probable.

(2) Assist the convoy commander in enforcing prescribed vehicle intervals.

(3) Employ strong, mobile outpost along the route of march.

(4) Organize a centralized ready reaction force (if strength permits), positioned to reach the most likely ambush sites in the shortest possible time.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Inclosure 5 (continued) LESSONS LEARNED

4. Enemy ambushes.

a. Observation: Enemy ambushes along Highway 13 were undetected until they opened fire.

b. Evaluation: No actions were taken to pre-empt the ambush. On the 12th the ambushing force was actually opposite the company command track.

c. Recommendations: Commanders should consider a variety of measures to prevent surprise ambushes such as:

(1) Recon by fire all possible ambush areas before the convoy passes through (by direct fire, mortars, artillery, or gunships).

(2) Conduct night ambush and "bushwhacker" operations in probable ambush sites.

(3) Establish programs to burn or Rome Plow overgrown cut areas on both sides of Route 13.

(4) Conduct continuous air surveillance in areas contiguous to the highway, especially in the morning.

(5) Employ bloodhound aircraft over suspected routes of movement and possible ambush locations.

(6) Use sensor fields to cover approach routes.

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AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWEE: Captain Carrol J. Howard, Commanding Officer, C Company, 2nd Battalion (Mech), 2nd Infantry, 1st Infantry Division.

INTERVIEWER: Captain Jeffrey J. Clark, Commanding Officer, 17th Military History Detachment, 1st Infantry Division.

CLARKE: This interview is being conducted with CPT Carrol J. Howard, CO, C Co, 2-2 Mechanized Infantry Bn, at Fire Support Base Hartman (XT763738) on 18 Aug 1969. Captain Howard, will you describe in your own words, what exactly happened when the K8 Battalion attempted to ambush the "Devil Run" convoy on the afternoon of August 12th, 1969?

HOWARD: My company was outposted along Highway 13 over a several thousand meter front with my headquarters and mortar position set up at approximately 764738. We were set in position, and I finally received word that all of my elements were in position and the convoy began to pass by. At approximately 1530 a command detonated mine blew up a culvert approximately one kilometer north of my headquarters position. My third platoon was positioned near this bridge culvert approximately one kilometer north of my mortar position. My second platoon was positioned at another stream crossing approximately one and one half kilometers south of my mortar position, and my first platoon was positioned approximately 3000 meters south of my mortar position. Also, five to six hundred meters north of my position there was one platoon, the third platoon of Bravo Company, 2/34th Armor, which was attached to me and which was also outposting.

When the command detonated mine was blown we began receiving small arms fire from our west - west of Highway 13. My medic track and mechanic track were facing the woodline and they reported seeing enemy soldiers, 30 to 40 of them, in front of their positions. They took them under fire with their 50 calibers, and my command track pulled up on line with them. I called my first and second platoons to move into my position since they were not taking fire. My third platoon was under fire down at the site of the blown culvert and could not move themselves back up to reinforce me at the time. The second platoon arrived and moved in on my left flank; a few minutes later the first platoon moved in on my right flank at which time we put down heavy fire and began to advance toward the wood-line. We were approximately 250 - 300 meters from the wood-line at this time. As we moved forward, we kept a heavy line of fire going out and we received small arms fire and a few RPGs were fired over our heads. The tank platoon to my north received direct hits from three RPGs and several men were wounded. My third platoon continued to take sporadic sniper fire but nothing serious, just enough to keep them away from my position.

The convoy was stopped at this point to wait for an AVLB (armored bridge layer) to replace the blown culvert. While my second platoon was moving down to my location, they had to cross a bridge that was approximately a kilometer and a half to my south. As they approached it a command detonated mine exploded in front of them, but it did not blow enough of the bridge away to impede their movement and they crossed it without any incidents.

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AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW - HOWARD Continued.

We assaulted until we got within 50 meters of the wood-line and then we held up and had tactical air and gunship strikes and artillery brought in. Artillery had been coming in during the entire contact and my 81 mortars had been firing during the entire contact. I was instructed to withdraw approximately 50 more meters so that additional air strikes could be brought in on the fleeing enemy, which I did, and we consolidated at that point and began a sweep of the area with my leg troops keeping the tracks on line for security to the west. We took an inventory of the bodies that were found and gathered all of the equipment and documents that we could. There were a large number of weapons - AK47x, RPGs - RPG 2s and 7s, and ammunition and a great amount of documents were found. All of these were later counted and turned in to our S2 channels.

As it got later, around 1645 or 1700, we received no more fire, the convoy moved out again, and my third platoon rejoined us. We were instructed to set up a forward operating base at the ambush site, which we did. During that night, we had trip flared all the bodies that were left in hopes that the returning enemy might set them off if they came back to recover the bodies. The next morning more bodies were found and as well as one PW. Also during the contact, in addition to the enemy that were killed, my First Sergeant, First Sergeant Kenyon Hartman, captured two PWs; they surrendered to him when he came upon them in a spider hole, and they were immediately taken back to S2 for interrogation.

CLARKE: Thank you, Captain Howard. At this time, I wonder if you could describe the size of the enemy force, the weapons that he used, and his location as clearly as possible?

HOWARD: Initially the enemy force appeared to be 30 or 40 men that we could see. However, we soon found out that there were many more than that since we were taking fire in our location, the tanks about 500 meters to my north were taking fire, and my third platoon which was approximately another 500 meters to the north was also taking fire. We were fired on with AK47s, SKSs, and RPGs; I would estimate just from the volume of fire that we took that there were from a 100 to 120 enemy in the ambush. But they were not all concentrated in one spot and were all spread out. In front of our position, where I was at, we saw from 30 to 40, and later on with the body count we confirmed a higher number than that.

CLARKE: You have shown to us on your sketch map that most of the enemy was in the wood-line about 400 meters to the west of the road. Was there any enemy units located on the eastern side of the road?

HOWARD: The majority of the force was located on the western side of the road; however, my tanks, the tank platoon, did receive some fire from the eastern side of the road as did my third platoon. In my location we are not really sure if we received any fire from the eastern side of the road, but one of my vehicles that was lined that way said they believed they took some small arms fire from that direction but there was nothing of any great effect from this - it may have just been one or two people that were a small element. Some bodies were found on the eastern side of the road that were killed by the tankers, but most of the enemy dead were on the western side of the road.

AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW - HOWARD Continued.

CLARKE: Can you tell us exactly how long the engagement lasted from the time that the first culvert was blown until the time that the enemy fire began to slacken?

HOWARD: Initially it seemed like several hours, but it started at approximately 1530 and the fight - the main enemy fire - lasted 30 to 45 minutes. After that we had sporadic fire put upon us until about 1700, and 1700 we began to set up our night time position and there was no enemy activity at that time.

CLARKE: You said that your three platoons were positioned - one about 1000 meters north and the others a little farther to the south, and you seemed to be right next to the ambush. Was there any intelligence you received that day regarding an enemy ambush or was this just luck or good fortune that you happened to be right next to the ambush site?

HOWARD: We were told that there was a possibility, as there is every day, of an ambush on the convoy, but there was no intelligence given to me of any particular spot where it was likely to occur. I was given a sector which ran from checkpoint 11 to checkpoint 58 along the route of march to outpost. I selected the position for my headquarters and mortars based upon the fact that it was relatively central to where it could support all of my elements and it was on pretty high ground so that we could observe the rounds fired. Just by good fortune the ground I picked for my mortars happened to be where the main point or close to the main point of the ambush was. Once I called my second and first platoons to reinforce, my second platoon took approximately 5 to 10 minutes and my first platoon approximately 10 to 15 minutes to get there, they made good time up the road in spite of the stopped convoy, and were able to quickly reinforce us.

CLARKE: Captain Howard, is it your opinion that the enemy was established or had established his ambush well before you moved into your position?

HOWARD: Yes. We moved in approximately a half hour to forty-five minutes prior to the ambush being blown and I believe the enemy was already set up in this position. Otherwise he might have picked an area with a less heavy concentration of US troops. I believe he had no choice, he was already set up when we came in and had no place else to go so decided to go ahead and carry out his ambush anyway.

CLARKE: It is my understanding that the convoy was also escorted by elements of the 720th Military Police Detachment and the 1-4 armored cavalry. Could you comment on their effectiveness during the engagement?

HOWARD: The escort units that were moving with the convoy, at least in the area that I was in, were unable to move in and place fire upon the enemy. Due to the fact that, although my unit was spread out, we were close enough to put blocking fires right into the edge of the woodline, they might have moved right into our fire had they moved off the roadline. They remained near the vehicles. In the event that anyone had gotten through our blocking

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AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW - HOWARD Continued.

forces or outposts to the vehicles, I am sure they would have taken care of them on that point. There were a few gaps in the fire and they did put some fire into the woodline, but they weren't able, as far as I could tell, to get into effective range due to the way my troops were disposed at that time.

CLARKE: Captain Howard, I understand that two days later, on August 14th, the southbound "Devil Return" convoy was ambushed on Highway 13 some distance south of the ambush on the 12th. Could you tell in your own words what part your unit, C Company, 2nd of the 2nd, played in beating off that NVA attack?

HOWARD: When the ambush occurred on the 14th, my company along with Bravo Company, 1st of the 28th Infantry Battalion was conducting a ground reconnaissance off the western side of Highway 13 in a suspected enemy base camp area in the 77 east - west grid. They had spotted movement in there and we were in there checking it out. My company was the ready reaction force, or the blocking force, in front of Bravo. About 13:45 we received word that the convoy had been ambushed and that Alpha Company, 2nd of the 2nd and other units in the area had taken the enemy under fire. I received a call from my battalion commander to withdraw out of the woods to the west and come down south to reinforce the blocking force. By the time my company was clear of the wood-line and down the road the majority of the ambush had been routed and when I moved in the only return fire that we took was a lone enemy that we happened to scare up out of the brush. The majority of them, it appeared to me, had already fled out of the area; some of those that were left behind had gotten trapped so that they couldn't move. As we moved through on a sweep - we swept from south to north out of the wood-line along the ambush site back to Fire Support Base Hartman, we did scare up a few. We found two that the artillery had killed, captured two AK47s and accounted for three more enemy killed. But by the time we got there the majority of the ambush had been routed and there wasn't really very much that we contributed to that particular action.

CLARKE: Captain Howard, I have taken from what you have told me that, at the time of the second ambush, your unit was committed on another operation and essentially had no responsibility for the security of the "Devil" return convoy. And at this time this was assumed by the escorting elements and Company A, 2nd of the 2nd Mech battalion which was based out of Thunder III.

HOWARD: That's right. The outposting that day was done by Alpha Company and also by Dreadnaught Bravo, (Bravo Company, 2nd of the 34th Armor) which was reinforced by our 2-2 Reconnaissance Platoon. My mission was not convoy security that day, but once the ambush was sprung my battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Linson felt that they wanted to get all of the people they could into the area in hopes of thwarting the enemy and getting as many of them as we could. But, as I said, by the time we got there the major portion of the engagement had terminated.

AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWEE: Captain David L. Smith, Commanding Officer, Company A, 2d Battalion (Mech), 2d Infantry, 1st Infantry Division.

INTERVIEWER: Captain Jeffrey J. Clarke, Commanding Officer, 17th Military History Detachment, 1st Infantry Division.

CLARKE: This is an interview with Captain David L. Smith, Company Commander, A Company, 2d of the 2d, on 19 August 1969 about 3000 meters north of Thunder III on Route #13. Captain Smith, could you explain for us in your own words the events surrounding the ambush of the "Devil" return convoy on August 14th, 1969.

SMITH: On the 14th of August my company had the responsibility of outposting the road from Thunder III north along Highway 13 to vicinity of the 77 grid line. I had outposted the road during the morning with platoon strongpoint locations generally about 500 meters apart. I took the recon element that I had from the 1-4 Cav and was conducting a sweep all the way up to the northern boundary of the battalion AO. About 1125 I received a call from my second platoon leader and he told me that the convoy was under attack in his general vicinity just north of Thunder III. An enemy force came out of the wood line from the west on line and one of his sections engaged them with 50 caliber machine gun fire. The enemy had withdrawn after the 1st element of the convoy passed the ambush site. When the second element started passing, the enemy again came out on line and started engaging them with mortars and direct fire. The time lapse there was about five minutes or so.

At that time I turned the rest of my elements around and started back to the ambush location. I told the 2d Platoon leader to move down to the vicinity of the ambush which was about 500 meters from his location. He thundered down with his other two tracks, got on line on the west side of the road while I was enroute to the ambush location and engaged the enemy force. About 1215 the battalion commander arrived at the ambush area with my 2d Platoon and began calling for supporting fires. The artillery started firing with a light fire team working the east side of the road.

I moved down with the elements that I had with me to the general vicinity of the ambush and my artillery liaison officer started calling artillery fire into the area of the ambush. He had artillery firing from three batteries while we set up generally north of the ambush site. There were several trucks blocking the road; two of the trucks had received direct hits - one was burning pretty badly. I instructed one of the tanks to go up and knock the burning vehicle off the road so the rest of the vehicles in the convoy could get past the ambush location.

I formed the elements I had with me into a box type formation and at 1300 started moving into the contact area. We returned fire with the tank guns and the 50 caliber machine guns. The assault was about 1200 meters long into a thick bamboo area and lasted about 45 minutes. While plowing all of the way into it, we encountered pretty rough spots where the tanks had to stop and maneuver around. Once we got in about 1345 we found we were right in the middle of an enemy force. I feel it was probably a delaying force for the personnel that were in the ambush. Once we got into that site, we immediately killed 3 NVA soldiers and we had one Chieu Hoi come out.

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AFTER ACTION INTERVIEW - SMITH (Continued)

In the meantime the battalion commander had gotten hold of Charlie Company (2-2 Mech) which was well to the north of us. They pushed down the road and arrived in the ambush area about 1400. They came in on my rear and flanked on the north side of my element. We were instructed then by the battalion commander to make a sweep with Charlie Company moving to the north and my elements moving to the south. As we were moving in, we engaged some enemy personnel that were still in the contact area and along the way counted 13 bodies that we had killed or that the artillery had killed. We policed up quite a few weapons in the ambush area. With my elements, we swept from where we went into contact to about a thousand meters south; Charlie Company went about a thousand meters north but very little contact was made. We found where the ambush position had been and some of the bodies in the area with their equipment. I then called the battalion commander, and since we had swept out of the contact area, asked permission to turn around. I turned around and reswept the area.

When I returned to the area of the original contact, the battalion commander called me and told me to pick up an infantry company on the road just north of us. I took my company from there, went up to the area where the leg company was, picked them up, brought them back down to the contact area with me, came up on line, and dismounted the leg company. Then with my tanks, we conducted a sweep through the contact area to the west into the wood line about 200 meters. We found some other equipment, but no contact in that area. We then formed a blocking position for an element that was performing an assault in the west. They were moving generally in our area, but I don't know what the results of that operation were. After we swept the area with the infantry company we went back into the ambush area, policed up all of our vehicles and personnel, and moved back into Thunder III.

CLARKE: Thank you, Captain Smith. I notice that this is the second ambush that happened in the period of two days where the ambushing unit was quite close to one of the mechanized outposts. Could you describe to me any lessons learned from these operations, especially the one on the 14th?

SMITH: We found from the Chieu Hoi that there were approximately 200 people in the ambush from the K9 battalion. If we had swept into the ambush area a little faster and, I think, used a little less artillery, we might have gotten into the area and had a lot better body count. Now in the morning while moving to the outpost positions, I sweep from wood line to wood line along the road about 400 meters on either flank with a platoon on line on either side of the road ready to react to anything we find along the road. After we have swept, then we outpost the roads. I now am responsible for half of the battalion sector with Charlie Company responsible for the northern half. But we now have a force from Bravo Company, 2d of the 34th Armor and the Reconnaissance Platoon generally set up in the center as the reaction force for both companies.

CLARKE: Thank you, Captain Smith. I notice there was some confusion regarding the precise times that the actions took place. Why don't we go over this right now; we can also draw up a sketch map which I will include in my report.

14 AUGUST 69 CONVOY AMBUSH

INTERVIEWEE: SGT ROBERT C. KEIL, C Company, 720th MP Battalion at Long Binh.

INTERVIEWER: CPT JEFFREY J. CLARKE, Commanding Officer, 17th Military History Detachment, 1st Infantry Division.

CLARKE: This interview is being conducted with Sergeant Robert C. Keil, C Company, 720th MP Battalion (based at Long Binh) on 31 August 1969. SGT Keil, could you describe in your own words, the events that took place on August 14th, the day the "Devil" return convoy was ambushed on Route 13?

KEIL: On the 14th of August the Quan Loi convoy departed south early in the morning. The convoy was broken into two march units, Devil 1 in the lead and Devil 2, second. My jeep, the Devil Trail, was in the rear. The security element consisted of tanks and APCs. The lead escort vehicles were two "big-boys", two ACAVs, and trailing the first march unit they had 6 APCs. The second march unit convoy had 2 APCs in the front and 2 APCs in the rear. We proceeded down south to checkpoint 58 at which time the lead security for the second march unit pulled off the side of the road. They informed Devil 2 that the area on both sides of the road from checkpoint 58 to Thunder III was outposted. Approximately five minutes after the security pulled off, the lead of the second march unit informed me and Devil 1 by radio that they were under attack by RPG fire. I was near checkpoint 58 just passing over the portable bridge. We proceeded on down at which time I noticed smoke was coming up from the front of the convoy. When I got to the scene there was one tanker that had taken a direct hit with an RPG, another tanker was on fire and burning fiercely. Both of these were in the center of the road. On the right side of the tanker that was hit with an RPG, there was another tanker that had attempted to pass him; he was stopped and the driver was nowhere in sight. The second truck was hit by fire. On the right side of that one, in the field, another tanker was attempting to pass these two up, and he was also hit and stopped. It was impossible for the rest of the convoy to pass this location, so we had to come to a complete halt.

Prior to my reaching the front where the trucks were burning, my driver and I came upon the stopped convoy. I got out of my vehicle, told my driver to proceed to the front and check and see if there were any casualties and also attempt to get the drivers back in the trucks and out of the kill zone. This failed. There were no casualties among the truck drivers from the rear of the convoy to about the center where the fire was coming in extremely heavy. There was a jun jeep from the 48th Group off the left side of the road that had taken machine gun fire. The driver was shot twice in the head, the IC of the vehicle was wounded and the gunner was also wounded. He was standing up behind his 60 firing it. There was nothing much we could do except start laying down a base of fire. I had my gunner get and fire his 60. The 60 jammed after the first round and refused to fire, so all we had left were two M79s, three 16s and a 45. We kept up a base of fire and waited for security to come.

There were two ACAVs off the west side putting down a base of fire into the heavy brush 20 to 50 meters off the side of the road. The direction for this would be - the direction of the road from Quan Loi to Thunder III - the left side would be

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14 AUG 69 CONVOY AMBUSH - KIEL (cont)

east and the right side would be west. The APCs came up to where the trucks were burning, putting out a base of fire. We started receiving some mortars and also some RPG rounds again. At the same time there were numerous helicopters flying overhead - there were 4 LOHs and 3 Cobras. One LOH was circling around my position and I was making arm and hand signals to him to show him the direction where I had seen the fire from so he could use his mini-gun on them. It took approximately 45 minutes before these choppers opened fire on the enemy. At that time we had some tanks come up from the Thunder III area (note: these were probably CPT Smith's coming from the north) and put out a base of fire with their 90mm guns and 50 caliber. They kept this up from where the first truck was hit to the rear. Then after we got out of the area, they called in close fire support with some F100s which dropped bombs on the west side of the road. The Cobras laid down a base of fire with their rockets and mini-guns on the east side of the road out along the woodline. They also came in with their mini-guns approximately 100 meters from the road in the open area.

The ambush extended from approximately 500 meters south of checkpoint 11 to almost half-way to Thunder III. From the place where the convoy was ambushed to this area half-way to Thunder III, on the east side of the road, there were 5 or 6 snipers. My Devil 2 was out there taking these people under fire with their M60. Also the new Devil 1 which was coming north, brought us up a new supply of ammunition. They also had two V-100 armored cars with them. They were firing on the east side of the road putting out a base of fire, and taking these snipers under fire.

CLARKE: Sergeant Kiel, could you tell us about what time the convoy was hit and how long it took you to drive up from the rear of the convoy, at what time supporting forces - artillery, helicopters, or the tanks and APCs that you mentioned - came? Can you give us an estimate of the time here?

KIEL: The convoy was hit at approximately 1130. I was the last vehicle in the march unit so it took me approximately five minutes to get to the front where the vehicles were burning. The supporting security units - there were two that were outposted along the side of the road - immediately returned fire. The rest of the security elements took approximately 45 minutes to get back to give us relief.

CLARKE: Were you able to obtain any artillery support?

KIEL: The artillery support was suppressed by the VC as they were mortaring Thunder III after they hit the convoy. Thunder III received approximately 25 rounds of mortar and rocket fire which kept the artillerymen down in their holes so that they couldn't return fire immediately.

CLARKE: How close were the enemy to the road?

KIEL: The enemy soldiers were anywhere from 10 feet from the road all the way back to the woodline which extends back from 200 to 250 meters. They were close enough to throw a satchel charge at myself, and that is a little bit too close.

CLARKE: I take it from what you have said that the MP jeeps were the only escort vehicles with the convoy after it passed Fire Support Base Hartman.

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14 AUG 69 CONVOY AMBUSH - KIEL (cont)

KIEL: That is correct. We departed checkpoint 58 without the security elements. They had pulled off at checkpoint 58 and informed us that the road was outposted. We then proceeded down. We had an MP jeep leading, behind him was a 48th Group gun jeep, then myself, which was the last gun jeep in the march element. There was one other gun jeep from 48th Group - he was behind the bogtails which were directly behind me.

CLARKE: So in your march unit, the second march unit, there were just four gun jeeps, jeeps with M60 machine guns?

KIEL: Yes sir, that is right, there were only four gun jeeps in that march unit.

CLARKE: The first march unit had passed the ambush without being attacked. Did that first march unit have any heavier escorting elements?

KIEL: Yes, the first march unit had two escorting tanks plus some ACAVs in the front. The APCs that were in their rear, I believe, also dropped off at checkpoint 58. I am not real positive about that. The second march unit, which I was in, never had much heavy armored equipment. The reason that all the heavy stuff is always in the first march unit is that the Cav doesn't like to split their fire power, and they claim that one tank in the front in the first march unit and one tank in the second march unit is exposing the heavy armor to RPG fire, whereas if they have two together it is less likely that they will be hit.

CLARKE: Can you estimate at about what time the ambush itself was over, or, in other words, at what time did enough reinforcing elements come up to your position to enable the convoy to move on and to reduce the enemy fire which you were receiving?

KIEL: That is a little hard to answer as it was pretty hot and heavy out there for a while. I looked at my watch for an exact time when it started, and the next time I looked at my watch was down at Thunder III and they had all of the big boys, APCs, Cobras, F-100s, and all of the artillery going into the area - it was approximately 1310 or 1315 hours.

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APO US FORCES 96345TEAM NO: DIV REAR IPW INTERROGATION REPORT

1. (C) REPORT NUMBER: 1-417-69 4. (C) STATUS: PW/NVA
CONTROL NUMBER: D-131-69 5. (C) ADMIN CONT: 1ST INF DIV

2. (C) DATE OF REPORT: 26 AUG 69 DISPOSITION: 50TH EVAC
INTERROGATOR: KUNKEL CONDITION: WOUNDED
INTERPRETER: MINH 6. (C) EDITED BY: LT SOARES

3. (C) REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM 1:50,000 CHECKED BY:
SHEET NAME: BO TUC
SHEET NO: 6-32 11

7. (C) CAPTURE DATA:
DATE/TIME: 130930 AUG 69
PLACE: XT 764 745
CAPTURING UNIT: "C" 2/2

8. (C) CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: CAPTURED DURING SWEEP OF CONTACT AREA.

9. (C) BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:
NAME: NHAM VAN HUNG
RANK/POSITION: SGT/SQD LDR
UNIT: 1ST SQD, 2ND PLT, 6TH CO, 8TH BN, F-12 REGT, 1ST NVA DIV
DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: 1947, KINH DON (V), THACH AN (D), CAO BONG (P), NVN
PLACE OF RESIDENCE: SAME AS PLACE OF BIRTH
OCCUPATION: FARMER
EDUCATION: 4 YEARS
RELIGION: NONE
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE
RELATIVES WORKING FOR VC OR GVN: NONE
CHILDREN: NONE
TYPE OF UNIFORM WORN: LIGHT YELLOW SHIRT WITH BLUE TROUSERS

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**CONFIDENTIAL**

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10. (C) INFORMATION GAINED:

A. PAST ACTIVITIES: SUBJECT WAS DRAFTED INTO THE NVA IN AUG 67 AND WAS SENT TO THAI NGUYEN CITY, THAI NGUYEN (P), NVN, FOR FOUR MONTHS OF BASIC INFANTRY TRAINING. SUBJECT'S BASIC TRAINING UNIT CONSISTED OF 300 PERSONNEL, AND WAS DESIGNATED THE 8TH BASIC TRAINING BN. FROM NOV 67 TO MARCH 68, SUBJECT STAYED AT THAI NGUYEN CITY TRAINING AREA PERFORMING NO SPECIAL DUTIES. IN MARCH 68, SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO INFILTRATION GROUP #668, CONSISTING OF 300 MEN. GROUP 668 BEGAN INFILTRATION BY FOOT FROM THAI NGUYEN (P), TO PHU THO (P), HA DONG (P), THANH HOA (P), QUANG BINH (P) INTO LAOS AND ON TO KONTUM (P), SVN. DURING INFILTRATION, GROUP #668 LOST APPROXIMATELY 125 PERSONNEL DUE TO MALARIA. CASUALTIES WERE LEFT ALONG THE INFILTRATION ROUTE IN CAMBODIA. AFTER ARRIVING IN KONTUM (P) SVN, SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO A WOUNDED TRANSPORTATION PLT, 8TH BN, F-6. THE 8TH BN AND TWO OTHER BN'S OF F-6 WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA (LOC UNK TO SUBJECT). APPROXIMATELY 3 DAYS AFTER BEING ASSIGNED TO THE 8TH BN, SUBJECT WAS USED TO CARRY 6 WOUNDED PERSONNEL TO THE K-4 HOSPITAL LOCATED IN KONTUM (P) (EXACT LOC UNK TO SUBJECT). THIS HOSPITAL CONSISTED OF 100 MEN INCLUDING PATIENTS. IN OCT 68 THE 8TH BN, 7TH BN AND 6TH BN, F-6 RELOCATED TO VIC XT 575 915, ARRIVING AT THIS LOCATION IN DEC 68. SUBJECT STATED THAT WHILE MOVING FROM KONTUM (P) TO VIC XT 575 915 HIS UNIT MOVED VERY SLOW, RESTING OFTEN AND RECEIVING POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AT VIC (XT 575 915), F-6 SET UP A NEW BASE CAMP, EACH BN BEING APPROX TWO HOURS WALKING DISTANCE APART. AT THIS LOCATION, F-6 CHANGED IT'S DESIGNATION TO F-12. UPON ARRIVING AT VIC XT 575 915, SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED, AS AN INFANTRYMAN, TO THE 5TH COMPANY, 8TH BN. IN APRIL 69, SUBJECT'S BN WALKED TO THE BAU CO AREA, TAY NINH (P), (EXACT LOC UNK TO SUBJECT), TO CONDUCT HARRASSMENT ATTACKS ON ENEMY POSITIONS. IN MAY 69, SUBJECT'S BN MOVED BACK TO ITS BASE CAMP. IN JUNE 69, SUBJECT'S BN WALKED TO BINH LONG (P) WITH THE MISSION OF ATTACKING A U.S. CONVOY ON

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HIGHWAY #13. AFTER ATTACKING THE CONVOY, SUBJECT'S BN MOVED BACK TO ITS BASE CAMP. ON 9 AUG 69, AT 1700 HOURS SUBJECT'S BN LEFT IT'S BASE CAMP AND WALKED TO VIC (XT 663 745), ARRIVING AT THIS LOCATION AT 0600 HOURS 11 AUG 69. THE BN ONLY MOVED AT NIGHT. AT 1800 HOURS 11 AUG 69, SUBJECT'S BN MOVED TO WITHIN 500 METERS OF HIGHWAY #13, ARRIVING AT THIS LOCATION AT 2100 HOURS 11 AUG 69. AT THIS LOCATION, SUBJECT'S BN BUILT FIGHTING POSITIONS AND WAITED FOR A U.S. CONVOY TO COME BY. AT 1400 HOURS 12 AUG 69, SUBJECT'S BN AMBUSHED THE CONVOY, SUBJECT BEING WOUNDED AT THIS TIME. WHEN THE 8TH BN WITHDREW ON 13 AUG 69, SUBJECT WAS LEFT BEHIND AND CAPTURED BY U.S. FORCES.

B. MISSION:

1. PW: TO ADVANCE HIS SOD WHEN ATTACKING THE CONVOY.
2. UNIT: AMBUSH U.S. CONVOY ON HIGHWAY #13 AND WITHDRAW BACK TO IT'S BASE CAMP.

C. UNIT:

1. ORGANIZATION: 8TH BN, F-12 REGT, 1ST NVA DIVISION CONSISTS OF 3 INFANTRY COMPANIES AND 1 HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY, A SUPPORT COMPANY AND A HQ'S SECTION.

2. DISPOSITION: 8TH BN, F-12 BASE CAMP IS LOCATED AT VIC XT 575 915.

3. FUTURE PLANS: SUBJECT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE MISSIONS OF HIS UNIT OR ANY OTHER UNIT, BUT HAD HEARD THAT THE ATTACK ON THE CONVOY COULD BE THE START OF A NEW CAMPAIGN.

4. STRENGTH: 8TH BN, F-12 HAS A TOTAL OF 170 EM AND 15 OFFICERS. THE 3 INFANTRY COMPANIES AND THE HEAVY WEAPONS SUPPORT COMPANY EACH HAVING 35 EM AND 3 OFFICERS. THE HQ'S SECTION HAS 30 EM AND 3 OFFICERS.

5. TACTICS:

- A. OFFENSIVE: WHEN ATTACKING, THE 8TH BN'S HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY FIRES MORTAR AND HEAVY MACHINEGUN FIRE INTO THE ENEMY POSITION. THIS IF FOLLOWED BY PLT SIZE ASSAULT'S FROM THE 3 INFANTRY COMPANIES (EACH PLT HAS APPROXIMATELY 17 MEN).

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B. DEFENSIVE: THE 8TH BN SETS UP ITS BASE CAMP ON LINE EACH COMPANY BEING APPROXIMATELY 1 HOURS WALKING DISTANCE APART. EACH COMPANY USES 10 BUNKERS FORMED IN A CIRCLE.

C. WITHDRAWAL: ALL COMPANIES OF THE 8TH BN WITHDRAWS AT SAME TIME.

D. FORMATIONS: THE 8TH BN MOVES IN SINGLE FILE WITH 5 MINUTES WALKING DISTANCE BETWEEN EACH COMPANY.

E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS: NONE.

6. PERSONALITIES: 6TH COMPANY 8TH BN, F-12

HUU: CO/2LT

THANH: XO/2LT

LAM: PO/2LT

PHAT: ASST PO/3LT

8TH BN, F-12:

TOAN: CO

HAI: PO

AI: ASST PO

7. OTHER BASE CAMPS: UNK TO PW.

8. HIDING AREAS & CACHES: UNK TO PW.

9. LOGISTICS: RICE FOR SUBJECT'S COMPANY IS PROCURED FROM AN UNK LOCATION IN CAMBODIA. VEGETABLES ARE PROCURED FROM AN UNK VILLAGE IN CAMBODIA.

10. NORMAL DAILY OPERATIONS: AWAKE AT 0530 HOURS, EAT 0530 TO 0600, UNLESS ON A MISSION SUBJECT'S COMPANY WOULD STAY IN ITS BASE CAMP CLEANING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

11. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

A. LOSSES: DURING OPERATIONS IN APRIL AND MAY 1969, SUBJECTS COMPANY LOST 8 MEN.

B. REPLACEMENTS: THE 6TH COMPANY, 8TH BN RECEIVED 8 NVA REPLACEMENTS IN JUNE 69.

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C. MORALE: SUBJECT STATED THAT MORALE OF HIS UNIT WAS NOT VERY GOOD BECAUSE MOST OF THE MEN DID NOT LIKE TO FIGHT AND WERE HOME SICK.

D. PERCENT OF NVA IN THE UNIT: 100%.

12. EQUIPMENT:

A. WEAPONS: 6TH COMPANY, 8TH BN, F-12 HAS 2 X B40'S WITH 9 ROUNDS EACH, 1 X B41 WITH 9 ROUNDS, 30 X AK'S WITH 500 ROUNDS EACH. THE OTHER 2 INFANTRY COMPANIES OF THE 8TH BN HAVE THE SAME TYPE AND NUMBER OF WEAPONS AS THE 6TH COMPANY. HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY, 8TH BN, F-12 HAS 1 X 82MM MORTAR WITH 150 ROUNDS, 1 X HEAVY MACHINE GUN WITH 5,000 ROUNDS.

B. COMMUNICATIONS: THE 8TH BN HAS 1 X RADIO AND 3 X FIELD PHONES. THE UNIT ALSO UTILIZES RUNNERS.

C. TRANSPORTATION: BY FOOT ONLY.

13. EFFECT OF ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES: SUBJECT HAS NEVER EXPERIENCED AN ARTILLERY OR AIR STRIKE AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR EFFECTS.

14. EFFECT OF ALLIED PSYOPS: SUBJECT HAS HEARD BROADCASTS AND HAS SEEN LEAFLETS BUT DID NOT BELIEVE THEM.

11.(C) INTERROGATORS COMMENTS:

1. PROBABLE VALIDITY: SUBJECT GAVE CONSISTANT ANSWERS AND SEEMED TO BE TELLING THE TRUTH.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER INTERROGATIONS: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION.

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(C) ANNEX A (THE FOLLOWING SICR'S WERE ASKED OF SOURCE AND NEGATIVE
RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED ON ALL QUESTIONS)

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1558
SUBJECT: ENEMY USE OF CIVILIAN LABORERS

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1596
SUBJECT: EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTRICAL WARNING DEVICES

(C) CONTROL NO: D-7CX-22145
SUBJECT: POW INTELLIGENCE

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-A1625
SUBJECT: KILOMETER MARKINGS AND LANDMARK IDENTIFIERS

(C) CONTROL NO: IIFF-SV-030
SUBJECT: MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

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(C) ANNEX A (RESPONSES TO SICR'S)

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1560
SUBJECT: VC AND NVA CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT1. THE SOURCE WAS WEARING KHAKI SHIRT AND PANTS. HE HAD SANDLES
BUT NO HEAD GEAR.2. THE SOURCE WAS ISSUED 1 X FIELD PACK, 2 X SETS OF FATIGUES,
1 X HAMMOCK, 1 X MOSQUITO NET, AND 1 X KHAKI HAT.

3, 4, AND 5. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-A1629
SUBJECT: ENEMY REACTION TO GUNSHIPS

1. THE SOURCE WAS NOT WARNED BEFORE THE ATTACK.

2. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

3. THE SOURCE SAW NO EXHAUST. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE GUNSHIP
WAS ABOUT 100 METERS ABOVE HIS HEAD.

4, 5. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

6. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE GUNSHIPS WERE EFFECTIVE WHEN TROOPS
WERE CAUGHT IN THE OPEN.

THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE FOLLOWING SICR'S:

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1558
SUBJECT: USE OF CIVILIAN LABOR(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-1572
UNGUIDED AA ROCKETS(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-1557
SUBJECT: DARK FIELD UNIFORM*CONFIDENTIAL*

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TEAM NO: 3RD BDE IPW **INTERROGATION REPORT**

1. (C) REPORT NUMBER: 1-415-69 4. (C) STATUS: PW/NVA
 CONTROL NUMBER: 3-65-69 5. (C) ADMIN CONT: 1ST INF DIV

2. (C) DATE OF REPORT: 26 AUG 69 DISPOSITION: III CORPS CAGE
 INTERROGATOR: GOFFRIER 6. (C) EDITED BY: LT SOARES
 INTERPRETER: HIEN CHECKED BY:

3. (C) REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM 1:50,000
 SHEET NAME: AN LOC
 SHEET NUMBER: 6332 III
 INITIAL INTERROGATION REPORT OF 12 AUG 69

7. (C) CAPTURE DATA:
 DATE/TIME: 121530 AUG 69
 PLACE: XT 768 761
 UNIT: "C" 2/2

8. (C) CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: THE SOURCE WAS CAPTURED WHEN HIS UNIT
 FAILED ON AN AMBUSH ATTEMPT AGAINST U.S. FORCES.

9. (C) BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

NAME: NGUYỄN MINH KÍNH
 RANK/POSITION: PFC/SOLDIER
 UNIT: HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, 8TH BATTALION, 2 12TH REGT, 1ST NVA DIV
 DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: 1937, HÀI PHÒNG, NVN
 PLACE OF RESIDENCE: HÀI PHÒNG, NVN
 OCCUPATION: ELECTRICIAN
 EDUCATION: 7 YEARS
 RELIGION: BUDDHIST
 MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED
 RELATIVES WORKING FOR VC OR GVN: NONE
 CHILDREN: TWO
 TYPE OF UNIFORM WORN: KHAKI SHIRT, TROUSERS AND SANDALS

GROUP-4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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10. (C) INFORMATION GAINED:

A. PAST ACTIVITIES: IN JULY 68 THE SOURCE WAS DRAFTED INTO THE NVA FROM HIS HOME IN HAI PHONG PROVINCE, NVN. HE WAS SENT TO THE YEN TU JUNGLE FOR BASIC TRAINING, WHICH LASTED 4 MONTHS. HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 4TH COMPANY, 532ND BATTALION, 42ND REGT, 530TH BASIC TRAINING DIVISION. TWO MONTHS OF HIS TRAINING WERE SPENT IN BASIC INFANTRY TRAINING AND TWO MONTHS WERE SPENT IN THE RURAL AREAS OF HAI DUONG (P), REPAIRING HOUSES AND DIKES WHICH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY HEAVY MONSOON RAINS AND CONSEQUENT FLOODING. THE ENTIRE 532ND BASIC TRAINING BATTALION, CONSISTING OF APPROX 500 MEN, PARTICIPATED IN THIS ACTIVITY. IN NOV 68 THE 532 BN RETURNED TO HAI PHONG (P) AND RESTED UNTIL DEC 68, WHEN THE SOURCE AND HIS ENTIRE BN WERE ASSIGNED TO THE 2079TH INFILTRATION GROUP. THE 2079TH GROUP WAS COMMANDED BY TO AND HAD A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 600 MEN. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW FROM WHAT UNITS THE ADDITIONAL 100 MEN IN THE 2079TH GROUP HAD COME FROM.

THE 2079TH GROUP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES, WITH 150 MEN IN EACH. THE SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 3RD PLATOON, 4TH COMPANY. THE 4TH COMPANY COMMANDER WAS DANG, THE 3RD PLATOON LEADER WAS LO, AND THE 3RD PLATOON SERGEANT WAS THUONG. WHEN THE 2079TH INFILTRATION GROUP DEPARTED HAI PHONG IN DEC 68, EACH MAN WAS ISSUED TWO HAND GRENADES. ONLY OFFICERS PLT LDRS, AND UP WERE ISSUED AK47'S. THE GROUP TRAVELED BY TRAIN FROM HAI PHONG TO VINH CITY, VINH PROVINCE. THE TRIP LASTED TWO DAYS AND THE GROUP ARRIVED ON 5 DEC 68. AT VINH CITY THE 2079TH GROUP BEGAN WALKING, PASSING THROUGH VINH, HA TINH, AND QUANG BINH PROVINCES. THE GROUP ENTERED LAOS AND CONTINUED INTO CAMBODIA. THEY STAYED IN THE JUNGLE AND SAW NO MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM EITHER COUNTRY. THE SOURCE SAID THAT ONCE IN CAMBODIA HE SAW THREE OR FOUR CAMBODIAN WOOD CUTTERS, BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TALK TO THEM. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY CONTACT HE HAD WITH CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FROM EITHER COUNTRY. WHILE IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, THE 2079TH GROUP WOULD PICK UP RICE AND DRIED FISH

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EVERY 6 TO 10 DAYS AT STATIONS IN THE JUNGLE. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO OR THREE NVA PERSONNEL AT EACH STATION THAT DISTRIBUTED THE FOOD. THE RICE WAS STACKED IN 100 KILO BAGS AND COVERED WITH GREEN PLASTIC. THE SOURCE WAS NOT SURE WHEN THE 2079TH INFILTRATION GROUP CROSSED FROM CAMBODIA INTO SVN. HE SAID THAT THEY CROSSED THE VAN CO DONG RIVER ON 4 MAY 69, AND ARRIVED AT THE 280TH REPLACEMENT STATION, 30 MINUTES WALK LATER. THE STRENGTH OF THE 2079TH GROUP WAS APPROXIMATELY 400 MEN UPON ARRIVAL, CASUALTIES WERE TAKEN TO AID STATIONS ALONG THE WAY, SO THE SOURCE HEARD. HOWEVER THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE NEVER SAW ANY OF THESE STATIONS. CASUALTIES WERE DUE TO MALARIA AND FEVER. WHEN THE 2079TH INFILTRATION GROUP ARRIVED AT THE 280TH REPLACEMENT STATION, THERE WERE ONLY TWO PEOPLE THERE. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THEIR FUNCTION. THE 280TH BASE CAMP WAS IN THE JUNGLE AND HAD UNDER GROUND BUNKERS, EACH BUNKER WOULD HOLD 3 MEN. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE WAS RESTRICTED TO HIS BUNKER AREA AND HE DID NOT KNOW HOW BIG THE CAMP WAS. THE 2079TH GROUP REMAINED AT THIS SITE FOR 25 DAYS UNTIL THE 29TH OF MAY 69. THE SOURCE SAID THAT EVERY DAY, ONE OR TWO MEN FROM EACH COMPANY WOULD GO ON A RICE PROCURING MISSION, EACH BRINGING BACK 20 LITERS. THE SOURCE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE ROUTE TAKEN OR WHERE THE RICE WAS PROCURED. SINCE HE HAD NEVER GONE ON A RICE RESUPPLY MISSION.

THE SOURCE SAID THAT ON 29 MAY HE AND ABOUT 50 OTHER MEN FROM THE 4TH COMPANY, 2079TH INF GROUP WERE THEN ESCORTED BY THREE PERSONNEL OF THE 280TH REPLACEMENT STATION TO THE 31ST REPLACEMENT STATION. DESTINATION OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 2079TH GROUP IS UNKNOWN TO SUBJECT. SOURCE SAID THE TRIP TOOK OVER 24 HOURS, AND THAT THEY TRAVELED IN SOUTHERN DIRECTION (LOC UNK). THE 31ST REPLACEMENT STATION WAS ALSO IN THE JUNGLE, AND COULD HOUSE ABOUT 100 MEN. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE SAW 30 UNDER GROUND BUNKERS THAT WOULD ACCOMMODATE THREE MEN EACH. THE SOURCE SAID THAT FIVE DAYS LATER, ON 3 JUNE, THREE MEN FROM

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THE 8TH BN, 212TH REGT, 1ST NVA DIVISION LED THE SUBJECT AND ABOUT 30 OTHER PEOPLE FROM THE 31ST REPLACEMENT STATION TO THE 8TH BN BASE CAMP, LOCATION UNK. DESTINATION OF THE OTHER 20 MEN AT THE 31ST REPLACEMENT STATION IS UNKNOWN TO SUBJECT. THE TRIP WAS IN A SOUTHWEST DIRECTION ON THROUGH THE JUNGLE, AND LASTED ONLY 30 MINUTES. THE SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE TRANSPORTATION PLATOON OF 8TH BN HEADQUARTERS. THE TRANSPORTATION PLT HAD A STRENGTH OF 12 MEN WITH THE MISSION OF PROVIDING RICE FOR 8TH BN HQ'S. THE SOURCE SAID THAT ONCE A WEEK THE 12 MEN WOULD EACH BE ISSUED 2 HAND GRENADES AND LEAVE THE BN HQ AT 0600 HOURS. THE MISSIONS WERE LED BY THE PLT LDR, DAN, THE ONLY MEMBER WHO CARRIED AN AK47. THE WALK TO THE RICE CACHE TOOK ABOUT 8 HOURS AND THE MEN FOLLOWED A TRAIL WEST THROUGH THE JUNGLE. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THERE WAS ALWAYS A MAN AT THE CACHE WHOSE JOB WAS TO KEEP THE RICE COVERED AND DRY. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THERE WERE NO SIGNALS USED, THEY JUST WALKED UP TO THE CACHE. THE RICE WAS STACKED ON THE GROUND IN 100 KILO BAGS AND COVERED WITH PLASTIC. THE STACK WAS ABOUT 10 METERS SQUARE. EACH MAN IN THE TRANSPORTATION PLATOON BROUGHT A 20 LITER BAG WITH HIM, AND THE RICE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THE 100 KILO BAGS TO THE SMALLER BAGS. AS SOON AS THE RICE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE SMALLER BAGS THE PLT STARTED ON THE TRIP BACK. ONCE EVERY TWO WEEKS THE PLT WOULD GO TO GET DRIED FISH, SALT, EGGS, AND SAUCE. THE SAME ROUTE WAS USED FOR THE FOOD AS WAS USED FOR RICE. THE FOOD CACHE WAS ABOUT 1 HOURS WALK PAST THE RICE CACHE. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE THE AMMUNITION CAME FROM SINCE THE TRANSPORTATION PLT DID NOT PROCURE IT.

THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE 8TH BN, 212 REGT, 1ST NVA DIV HAD A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 160 MEN. THE BN WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES AND A HQ SECTION. THE 8TH BN WAS DEPLOYED LIKE A SQUARE, ONE COMPANY AT EACH CORNER WITH BN HQ IN THE CENTER. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE COMPANIES ARE ABOUT 30 MINUTES WALK FROM THE BN HQ. THE HQ SECTION HAD 23 PEOPLE IN IT.

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12 WERE MEMBERS OF THE TRANSPORTATION PLT, 4 WERE STAFF, PLUS MEDICS, TWO MESS PERSONNEL, AND THREE ADMIN PERSONNEL. ON 20 JULY THE SOURCE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THE TRANSPORTATION PLT TO THE PROPAGANDA SECTION, PART OF THE ADMIN GROUP. HIS MISSION WAS TO SPREAD LEAFLETS WHEN EVER THERE WAS ENEMY CONTACT. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW WHERE THE PROPAGANDA WAS PRINTED OR HOW IT ARRIVED AT THE 8TH BN.

ON THE 7TH OF AUG 68 THE 8TH BN, 212TH REGT, 1ST NVA DIV, WITH A STRENGTH OF 80 MEN DEPARTED THEIR BASE CAMP FOR A FOUR DAYS WALK AWAY. THE UNIT TRAVELED SOUTH AND EVERYONE THAT WAS ABLE TO FIGHT WENT ALONG (APPROX 80 MEN). HALF THE BN WAS UNABLE TO GO DUE TO MALARIA AND FEVER. ON THE 10TH OF AUG THE 8TH BN ARRIVED AT AN AREA UNK TO THE SOURCE, AND SET UP A REST AREA. THE BN SPENT THE EVENING OF THE 10TH AND MORNING OF 11 AUG IN THIS AREA. AT ABOUT 1500 HOURS THE 8TH BN MOVED TO THE AMBUSH SITE ON HIGHWAY #13, VIC XT 760 754. THE TRIP WAS IN AN EASTERLY DIRECTION AND TOOK ABOUT 4 HOURS. THE AMBUSH WAS SET UP ON THE WEST SIDE OF HIGHWAY #13, FIVE TO 10 METERS WEST OF THE RAIL ROAD TRACKS. THE SUBJECT SAID THAT THEY DUG THREE MAN BUNKERS AND SLEPT THE REST OF THE EVENING. THE SOURCE WAS TO STAY WITH THE 6TH COMPANY, ALTHOUGH HIS MISSION WAS ONLY TO DISTRIBUTE LEAFLETS. THE PW SAID THAT WHEN THE AMBUSH BEGAN HE WAS TO ADVANCE ACROSS THE RAIL ROAD TRACKS WITH THE REST OF HIS UNIT, WHILE THREE 82MM MORTARS REMAINED SOMEWHERE ^{WEST} OF THE TRACKS AND PROVIDED SUPPORTING FIRE. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH COMPANY HAD THE MORTARS, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 70 ROUNDS FOR THE MORTARS. WHEN THE SOURCE SAW AMERICAN FORCES ADVANCING TOWARD HIM, HE JUMPED IN A HOLE AND WAS EVENTUALLY CAPTURED. THE SOURCE SAID THAT IF THE AMBUSH HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, HE WAS TO HAVE RETREATED BACK ACROSS THE RAIL ROAD TRACKS, REGROUP, AND GO BACK TO THE REST AREA, 4 HOURS WALK AWAY. THE SOURCE WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST IF HE HAD TO GO BACK ON HIS OWN. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE DID NOT

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HAVE A CHANCE TO THROW HIS LEAFLETS.

B. MISSION:

1. PW: THE SOURCE WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AMBUSH AND DISTRIBUTE PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS.

2. UNIT: THE UNIT WAS TO AMBUSH A CONVOY ON HIGHWAY #13.

C. UNIT:

1. ORGANIZATION: THE 8TH BN CONSISTS OF FOUR COMPANIES DESIGNATED 5, 6, 7, AND 8. THERE IS ALSO A BN HQ'S SECTION. EACH COMPANY HAS THREE SQUADS.

2. DISPOSITION: THE BN IS DEPLOYED IN THE FORM OF A SQUARE, WITH EACH COMPANY AT ONE CORNER AND THE BN HQ'S IN THE CENTER. THE WALK FROM THE COMPANIES TO THE BN HQ TAKES ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

3. FUTURE PLANS: THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

4. STRENGTH: THE 8TH BN HAS A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 160 MEN. EACH COMPANY HAS ABOUT 35 MEN AND THE HQ SECTION HAS 23 MEN.

5. TACTICS:

A. OFFENSIVE: THE SOURCE KNEW THAT THE COMPANIES WERE ON LINE FOR THE AMBUSH AND AT A GIVEN SIGNAL, THE COMPANIES WOULD MOVE FORWARD AND ASSAULT. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE SIGNAL. SOURCE KNEW THAT 3 MORTARS WERE TO FIRE AT THE SAME TIME.

B. DEFENSIVE: THE SOURCE WAS TOLD TO GET IN HIS BUNKER IF HIS BASE CAMP WAS ATTACKED.

C. WITHDRAWAL: WHEN THE AMBUSH WAS COMPLETED, THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE WAS TO GROUP WITH THE OTHERS IN HIS UNIT AND WITHDRAW TOGETHER. HE KNEW NOTHING FURTHER.

D. FORMATIONS: WHEN THE SOURCES UNIT MOVED ANYWHERE IT WAS ALWAYS IN ONE LONG COLUMN. EACH MAN WAS 5 TO 7 METERS APART.

E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS: THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

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6. PERSONALITIES: 2079TH INFILTRATION GROUP

TO: COMMANDING OFFICER

DĂNG: COMMANDING OFFICER 4TH COMPANY, 2079TH GROUP

LÔ: 3RD PLT LDR, 4TH CO, 2079TH GROUP

NHỊ: 3RD SQD LDR, 3RD PLT, 4TH CO, 2079TH GROUP

THƯỜNG: 3RD PLT SGT, 4TH CO, 2079TH GROUP

PERSONALITIES FROM THE 8TH BN, 212TH REGT, 1ST NVA DIV

PHẠCH: COMMANDING OFFICER

KHANH: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

TRUNG: POLITICAL OFFICER

DƯ: ASST POLITICAL OFFICER

DÂU: TRANSPORTATION PLT LDR HQ SECTION

PHƯỜNG: TRANSPORTATION PLT SGT, HQ SECTION

7. OTHER BASE CAMPS: THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

8. HIDING PLACES AND CACHES: THE SOURCE KNOWS OF TWO CACHES, ONE OF RICE AND ONE OF FOOD. BOTH ARE LOCATED TO THE WEST OF THE 8TH BN BASE CAMP, THE RICE CACHE BEING ABOUT AN 8 HOUR WALK AND THE FOOD CACHE BEING ABOUT A 9 HOUR WALK. BOTH ARE LOCATED ON THE SAME TRAIL, AND ARE IN THE JUNGLE. SUBJECT KNOWS OF NO OTHER CACHE SITES.

9. LOGISTICS: RICE IS PROCURED FROM THE ABOVE MENTIONED CACHE ONCE EVERY WEEK. DRIED FISH, EGGS, SALT, AND SAUCE ARE PROCURED EVERY TWO WEEKS. THE TRANSPORTATION PLT OF HQ SECTION CONSISTING OF 12 MEN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING THE FOOD, EACH CARRYING ABOUT 20 LITERS APIECE. THE SOURCE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT AMMUNITION RESUPPLY.

10. NORMAL DAILY ACTIVITIES:

0500	GET UP
0600	EAT BREAKFAST
0630-1200	RETURN TO BUNKER AND REST
1200	EAT DINNER
1230-1700	RETURN TO BUNKER AND REST
1700	EAT SUPPER
1730-0500	RETURN TO THE BUNKER AND REST UP FOR THE NEXT DAYS ACTIVITIES

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11. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

A. LOSSES: THIS WAS THE FIRST ACTIVITY AGAINST AN ENEMY THE SOURCES UNIT HAD BEEN IN. HE KNEW OF NO OTHER LOSSES.

B. REPLACEMENTS: THE SOURCE WAS THE LAST REPLACEMENT THE 8TH BN HAD RECEIVED, HE ARRIVED IN THE 3RD OF JUNE.

C. MORALE: THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE MORALE OF HIS UNIT WAS LOW BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. FORCES WERE TOO STRONG AND THAT THEY COULD NOT POSSIBLY SUCCEED IN THE AMBUSH.

D. PER CENT OF NVA IN THE UNIT: 100%

12. EQUIPMENT:

A. WEAPONS: THE 8TH BN HAD 3 X 82MM MORTARS (70 ROUNDS TOTAL) 4 X 82MM (20 ROUNDS TOTAL), 4 X 82MM (20 ROUNDS TOTAL), 4 X K-54 PISTOLS (NUMBER OF ROUNDS UNK), AND THE MAJORITY OF THE SOLDIERS CARRIED AK'S (120 ROUNDS EACH). THE REST OF THE SOLDIERS CARRIED C80'S. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER OF RIFLES.

B. COMMUNICATIONS: EACH COMPANY HAD ONE FIELD PHONE CONNECTED TO BN HQ'S. ALL OTHER COMMUNICATION WAS DONE BY RUNNER.

C. TRANSPORTATION: TRANSPORTATION WAS BY FOOT ONLY.

13. EFFECT OF ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES: THE SOURCE SAID THAT ONCE IN EARLY AUG, ARTILLERY LANDED ABOUT 500 METERS FROM HIS BASE CAMP. THIS WAS THE ONLY EXPERIENCE THE SOURCE HAD WITH ARTILLERY.

14. EFFECT OF PSYOPS: THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD BROADCASTS AND READ LEAFLETS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WERE PROBABLY TRUE AND WAS CONSIDERING THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM, BUT WAS CAPTURED BEFORE HE HAD A CHANCE TO MAKE A DECISION.

D. OTHER UNITS: THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE.

11.(C) INTERROGATOR'S COMMENTS:

1. PROBABLE VALIDITY: ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THE SOURCES STORY WAS NOT CONSISTENT, AND REQUIRED REINTERROGATION. UPON COMPLETION OF THE INTERROGATION, IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE SOURCE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER INTERROGATIONS: IT IS NOT RECOMMENDED THAT THE SOURCE BE FURTHER INTERROGATED. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION
 FIRST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
 APO U.S. FORCES 96345

TE TO 3RD BDE IPW INTERROGATION REPORT

1. REPORT NO: T-418-69 4. (C) STATUS: RALLIED/NVA
 CONT NO: 3-67-69 5. (C) ADMIN CONT: BINH DUONG CHIEU
 2. DATE OF REPORT: 21 AUG 69 HOI CENTER
 INTERROGATOR: LEGAN DISPOSITION: BINH DUONG CHIEU
 INTERPRETER: NIEN CONDITION: GOOD
 3. REFERENCES: MAP, VIETNAM 1:50,000 CHECKED BY:
 SHEET NAME: AN LOC
 SHEET NO: 6332 III
 7. RALLY DATA:
 DATE/TIME: 141525 AUG 69
 PLACE OF RALLY: XT 761 682
 UNIT RALLIED TO: "A" 2/2ND INFANTRY
 8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF RALLY: THE SUBJECT DESERTED HIS UNIT AS IT
 WAS WITHDRAWING FROM AN AMBUSH SITE AND RALLIED LATER TO U.S.
 FORCES SWEEPING THE AREA.
 9. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:
 NAME: PHAM DINH TUNG
 RANK/POSITION: PFC/SOLDIER
 UNIT: C-12 COMPANY, 9TH BATTALION, 1030 REGIMENT, 1ST NVA DIVISION
 DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: 1948, DANG GIANG (V), AN HAI (D), HAI PHONG (P),
 NORTH VIETNAM
 PLACE OF RESIDENCE: SAME AS PLACE OF BIRTH
 OCCUPATION: STUDENT
 EDUCATION: 11 YEARS
 RELIGION: BUDDHIST
 MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE
 RELATIVES WORKING FOR THE GVN OR VC: NONE
 CHILDREN: NONE
 TYPE OF UNIFORM WORN: KHAKI UNIFORM

GROUP-4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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10. (b) INFORMATION GAINED:

4. PAST ACTIVITIES: THE SUBJECT WAS DRAFTED INTO THE NVA IN JUL 67. HE WAS ASSIGNED TO BASIC TRAINING BATTALION 349 LOCATED IN THAY NGUYEN (D) HAI PHONG (P), NVN. WITH THIS BATTALION THE SUBJECT RECEIVED THREE MONTHS OF GENERAL COMBAT TRAINING INCLUDING PRACTICE WITH THE AK-47, RPG, AND THE RPD LIGHT MACHINEGUN. THE BATTALION RESTED FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS AFTER COMPLETING THE TRAINING AND IN DEC 67 BECAME INFILTRATION GROUP 286. COMMANDED BY SENIOR CAPTAIN, BANG WITH A STRENGTH OF OVER SIX HUNDRED MEN, THE GROUP STARTED SOUTH ON 14 DEC 67. TRAVELING ENTIRELY BY FOOT, THEY MOVED THROUGH THE FOLLOWING PROVINCES OF NVNS HAI PHONG, HAI DUONG, HUNG YEN, NAM HA, NINH BINH, THANH HOA, NGHE AN, HA TINH, QUANG BINH AND VINH LINH.

ON OR AROUND 10 FEB 68, THE GROUP CROSSED THE TRUNG SON MOUNTAINS INTO LAOS AND PROCEEDED SOUTH TO CAMBODIA. DURING THIS INFILTRATION TWO HUNDRED MEN BECAME SICK WITH MALARIA AND WERE LEFT AT AID STATIONS AND ELEVEN MEN DESERTED.

ON 7 MAY 68, THE GROUP ARRIVED AT K-9 REPLACEMENT STATION LOCATED IN CAMBODIA APPROXIMATELY ONE DAY'S WALK FROM THE TAY NINH (P)-CAMBODIAN BORDER. TWO DAYS LATER, 9 MAY 68, THE SUBJECT, HIMSELF, BECAME SICK WITH MALARIA AND WAS TAKEN TO K-70 ALSO KNOWN AS K-50 HOSPITAL LOCATED AN HOUR'S WALK FROM K-9. THE SUBJECT NEVER SAW HIS INFILTRATION GROUP AGAIN BUT HEARD THAT IT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE 9TH NVA DIVISION. THE SUBJECT REMAINED IN K-70 HOSPITAL UNTIL LATE FEB 69 AND WAS A PATIENT THE ENTIRE TIME THAT HE WAS IN THE HOSPITAL AND WAS NEVER ASSIGNED ANY DUTIES. THE HOSPITAL CONSISTED OF ABOVE GROUND BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTED BY NVN CADRE. FOOD WAS PURCHASED IN NEARBY CAMBODIAN VILLAGES (NAMES OF THESE VILLAGES WERE UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT).

WHEN THE SUBJECT LEFT THE HOSPITAL IN FEB 69, THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY ONE THOUSAND PATIENTS IN IT, ALL OF THEM NVA THAT HAD BECOME SICK DURING INFILTRATION. THE HOSPITAL HAD A TOTAL OF ABOUT THREE HUNDRED DOCTORS, NURSES, AND CADRE. THE SUBJECT WAS RELEASED FROM THIS HOSPITAL WITH FORTY OTHER PATIENTS. THIS GROUP WAS SENT TO K-50 "COLLECTING AND CLEARING STATION", LOCATED AN HOUR'S WALK FROM THE HOSPITAL. THIS STATION HAD THE FUNCTION OF ASSEMBLING RELEASED HOSPITAL

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AND OTHER HOSPITALS AND ASSIGNING THEM TO UNITS IN SVN. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY SIX HUNDRED SUCH PERSONS AT THE STATION WHEN THE SUBJECT ARRIVED. HE STAYED THERE FOR ONE WEEK, THEN ON OR AROUND 1 MAR 69, THE SUBJECT AND APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED MEN WERE SELECTED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE 1ST NVA DIVISION. THEY WERE TAKEN TO A TRAINING CAMP MAINTAINED BY THE 1ST NVA DIVISION AND DESIGNATED K-31. THE SUBJECT STATED THAT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST NVA DIVISION MUST PROCESS THROUGH THIS CAMP. THE CAMP WAS LOCATED IN CAMBODIA APPROXIMATELY NINE HOUR'S WALK FROM THE 150 STATION AND THE SUBJECT HAS HEARD A CADRE SAY THAT IT IS ONLY A ONE HOUR'S WALK FROM THE TAY NINH (P) - CAMBODIAN BORDER. WHEN THE SUBJECT LEFT THIS CAMP ON 28 MAR 69, IT CONTAINED OVER FIVE HUNDRED MEN STILL IN TRAINING. THE SUBJECT WAS GIVEN ONE MONTH TRAINING HERE WHICH INCLUDED PRACTICE WITH THE B-40, B-42 AND PRACTICE ATTACKS ON OUTPOSTS AND AMBUSHES OF CONVOYS. THERE WERE ALSO POLITICAL LECTURES HELD DURING THIS ONE MONTH OF TRAINING.

ON 2 MAR 69, THE SUBJECT AND FIFTY-TWO MEN WERE ASSIGNED TO THE 8TH BATTALION, 101D REGIMENT AND WERE LED BY THREE COMMO-LIAISON MEN BY THE 9TH BATTALION. THE GROUP WALKED FOUR DAYS BEFORE ARRIVING AT THE 8TH BATTALION BASECAMP ON OR AROUND 2 APR 69 LOCATED IN THE LOC NINH (EXACT LOCATION WAS UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT).

THE 8TH BATTALION SPENT THE PERIOD FROM 2 APR THROUGH 11 MAY 69 TRAINING AND RESTING IN THIS BASECAMP.

ON 1 MAY 69, THE 9TH COMBINED WITH THE 8TH BATTALION PARTICIPATED IN AN ATTACK ON A TARGET KNOWN TO THE SUBJECT ONLY AS THE "BA CHIEM CLOUD". THE SUBJECT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS ATTACK BECAUSE HE WAS STILL WEAK AND COULD NOT DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION.

AFTER THE MISSION, THE 9TH BATTALION MOVED TO THE KATUM AREA AND SET UP A NEW BASECAMP (SEE "DISPOSITION"). THEY RESTED IN THIS CAMP APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS.

IN LATE MAY 69, THE BATTALION MOVED OUT WITH THE MISSION OF AMBUSHING HIGHWAY 13. THE SUBJECT, STILL SICK, WAS LEFT BEHIND AT A BATTALION DESIGNATED K-71, LOCATED AN HOUR'S WALK EAST OF THE BATTALION AREA. THE SUBJECT LATER HEARD FROM HIS FRIENDS THAT

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BATTALION CONDUCTED AN AMBUSH ON OR AROUND 7 JUN 69. THE BATTALION THEN HID IN THE VICINITY OF THE AMBUSH SITE AND CONDUCTED A SECOND AMBUSH LATER IN THE SAME MONTH (DATE UNKNOWN). THE UNIT RETURNED TO THE KATUM BASECAMP ON 28 JUN 69 AND REMAINED THERE THROUGHOUT THE MONTH OF JUL 69 TRAINING AND RESTING.

THE SUBJECT WAS RETURNED TO HIS UNIT ON 17 JUL 69 AT WHICH TIME K-79 HOSPITAL WAS TREATING APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED PATIENTS WITH APPROXIMATELY FIFTY DOCTORS, MEDICS AND CADRE.

ON 7 AUG 69, THE 9TH BATTALION MOVED OUT TO CONDUCT ANOTHER AMBUSH ON HIGHWAY 13. THE BATTALION RECON PLATOON HAD ALREADY SELECTED AN AMBUSH SITE (IN THE VICINITY OF RALLY - XT 761 682) AND ALSO A LOCATION FOR A TEMPORARY BASECAMP APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOUR'S WALK SOUTHWEST OF THE AMBUSH SITE, EXACT LOCATION WAS UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT.

ALL COMPANIES OF THE 9TH BATTALION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT'S COMPANY, C-11, ARRIVED AT THE BASECAMP LOCATION ON 11 AUG 69. THE SUBJECT'S COMPANY HAD BEEN HIT BY A B-52 STRIKE ON APPROXIMATELY 091700 HOURS AUG 69. NO OTHER COMPANIES OF THE BATTALION WERE HIT BY THIS STRIKE. THE SUBJECT'S COMPANY SUFFERED THREE KIA'S AND THREE WIA'S AS A RESULT OF THE STRIKE AND EVERYONE ELSE SCATTERED IN ALL DIRECTIONS. IT TOOK THE COMPANY TWO DAYS TO REASSEMBLE IT'S MEN. C-11 ARRIVED AT THE BASECAMP ON THE NIGHT OF 13 AUG 69. THE CAMP WAS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION. THE BATTALION NOW HAD A STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED MEN.

ON THE NIGHT OF 13 AUG 69, TWO HUNDRED MEN MOVED OUT AND TOOK UP AMBUSH POSITIONS. THE OTHER ONE HUNDRED MEN, MEMBERS OF HEADQUARTERS COMPANY AND MEN WHO HAD BECOME SICK DURING THE MARCH, WERE LEFT AT THE BASECAMP WHERE THEY CONTINUED TO DIG BUNKERS. THE AMBUSH ELEMENT CONSISTED OF FOUR COMPANIES; C-9, C-10, C-11, AND C-12 WITH THE FOLLOWING MISSIONS:

C-9 - "FORWARD BLOCKING ELEMENT" ASSIGNED TO DESTROY THE LEAD VEHICLE, THUS BLOCKING THE FORWARD PROGRESS OF THE CONVOY.

C-10 - "ASSAULT ELEMENT" ASSIGNED TO ATTACK THE MIDDLE OF THE CONVOY.

C-11 - "REAR BLOCKING ELEMENT"

C-12 - "ANTI-AIRCRAFT ELEMENT" ALSO ASSIGNED TO MORTAR THE CONVOY.

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THESE COMPANIES TOOK UP POSITIONS AS FOLLOWS: C-9, C-10, AND C-11 WERE ALIGNED IN THAT ORDER FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AT FIVE HUNDRED METER INTERVALS. EACH COMPANY WAS APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED METERS WEST OF THE ROAD. C-12 WAS SPREAD OUT IN A LONG LINE APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED METERS WEST OF THE OTHER COMPANIES. THE BATTALION COMMAND POST WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES WALK SOUTHWEST OF THE SOUTHERNMOST COMPANY, C-11. THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT COMMUNICATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY LAND LINE FIELD PHONES RUNNING FROM THE BATTALION COMMAND POST TO EACH OF THE COMPANY COMMAND POSTS - HE NEVER SAW THESE PHONES HIMSELF.

ALL UNITS WERE IN AMBUSH POSITIONS BY THE DAWN OF 14 AUG 69. THE SUBJECT SAYS HIS UNIT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVOY SCHEDULES AND WAS SIMPLY WAITING FOR THE FIRST BIG CONVOY THAT CAME ALONG. THEY DID EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT A BIG CONVOY WOULD MOST LIKELY BE MOVING NORTH. A SMALL CONVOY PASSED BY AROUND 0800 HOURS, BUT THEY HELD THEIR FIRE. THEY SPRANG THE AMBUSH WHEN A LARGER CONVOY APPROACHED AROUND 1200 HOURS. THE BATTALION COULD NOT MOVE CLOSER THAN FIVE HUNDRED METERS FROM THE ROAD BECAUSE THERE WAS VERY LITTLE COVER. AFTER THE FIRING OF THE FIRST B-40 AND B-40 ROUNDS, THE THREE FORWARD COMPANIES BEGAN RUNNING TOWARD THE CONVOY TO GET CLOSER TO THEIR TARGETS. THE SUBJECT, WHO HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO RALLY, RAN FORWARD APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED METERS, THEN JUMPED INTO A HOLE AND HID UNTIL HIS UNIT WITHDREW. HE DID NOT SEE WHERE THEY WITHDREW BUT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BEFORE THE ATTACK TO RE-ASSEMBLE AT THE NEW BASECAMP.

B. MISSIONS:

1. PW'S: FOR THIS AMBUSH, THE SUBJECT WAS AN AMMUNITION BEARER IN A THREE-MAN B-40 CELL. HE CARRIED FOUR B-40 ROUNDS AND ONE AK-47.
2. UNIT'S: THE SUBJECT'S COMPANY COMMANDER HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE MISSION OF THIS AMBUSH WAS TO COMPLETELY DESTROY A U.S. CONVOY.

C. UNITS:

1. ORGANIZATION: THE 9TH BATTALION CONSISTS OF THREE INFANTRY COMPANIES - C-9, C-10, AND C-11 - ONE ARTILLERY COMPANY - C-12 - AND ONE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY. THE INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY COMPANIES CONSIST

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OF THE PLATOONS AND EACH PLATOON HAS THREE SQUADS. THE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY CONSISTS OF A RECON PLATOON, A SIGNAL PLATOON AND A TRANSPORT PLATOON.

2. DISPOSITION: THE BASECAMP NEAR THE AMBUSH SITE WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOUR'S WALK SOUTHWEST OF THE AMBUSH SITE. THE SUBJECT COULD NOT DESCRIBE THIS LOCATION MORE PRECISELY.

THE SUBJECT WAS TOLD BY FRIENDS IN HIS UNIT THAT THE KATUM BASECAMP OF THE 9TH BATTALION WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWELVE HOUR'S WALK SOUTHWEST OF THE KATUM OUTPOST. HE WAS TOLD THAT THIS IS A LARGE COMBINED US/ARVN BASECAMP WITH A STRENGTH OF TWO REGIMENTS. THE MEN IN HIS UNIT BELIEVE THAT THE OCCASIONAL ARTILLERY FIRE THEY RECEIVE COMES FROM THIS BASECAMP. THIS IS ALL THE SUBJECT KNOWS ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE 9TH BATTALION BASECAMP. THE CAMP CONSISTS OF FIVE SEPERATE BASECAMPS, FOUR FOR THE FOUR COMBAT COMPANIES, AND ONE FOR THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTER'S COMPANY. THESE BASECAMPS ARE ARRANGED IN A ROUGH CIRCLE WITH FIFTEEN TO FORTY-FIVE MINUTES WALKING DISTANCE BETWEEN ANY TWO OF THEM. THEY ARE ALL BUILT IN HEAVY JUNGLE AND WELL CAMOUFLAGED. THE C-11 BASECAMP CONSISTS OF ABOUT TWENTY BUNKERS WITH THREE MAN CAPACITY. THE BUNKERS ARE LOG FORTIFIED WITH A ROOF THICKNESS OF ONE TO ONE AND A HALF METERS.

3. FUTURE PLANS: THE SUBJECT HEARD THAT THE 9TH BATTALION WOULD DO IN AUGUST WHAT IT HAD DONE IN JUNE - REMAIN IN THE AMBUSH AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND CONDUCT AT LEAST ONE MORE CONVOY AMBUSH. DURING THIS MONTH THEY WOULD HIDE IN THE NEW BASECAMP NEAR THE AMBUSH SITE UNLESS ALLIED ACTIVITY MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE. AFTER THIS MONTH THEY WOULD RETURN TO THE KATUM BASECAMP.

4. STRENGTH: PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE KATUM BASECAMP ON 7 AUG 69, THE 9TH BATTALION HAD A STRENGTH OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED. OF THOSE, FIFTEEN WERE SICK AND WERE ~~LEFT~~ IN K-71 HOSPITAL - NO ONE WAS LEFT AT THE BATTALION BASECAMP. APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED MEN MOVED DOWN TO THE BASECAMP NEAR THE AMBUSH SITE.

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5. TACTICS:

A. OFFENSIVE: THE SUBJECT STATED THAT THE TACTICS USED IN THIS AMBUSH ARE USED IN ALL AMBUSHES CONDUCTED BY HIS BATTALION. A RECON PLATOON IS SET OUT TEN TO FIFTEEN DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE ATTACK DATE WITH THE MISSION OF SELECTING AN AMBUSH SITE, AN INFILTRATION ROUTE, AND OVER NIGHT BIVOUAC AREAS ALONG THE ROUTE - THESE USUALLY CONSIST OF OLD ABANDONED BASECamps. THE BATTALION MOVES OUT AS SOON AS THE RECON PLATOON RETURNS. A TEMPORARY BASECAMP IS ESTABLISHED A FEW HOURS WALK FROM THE AMBUSH SITE AND THE ATTACK IS CONDUCTED AS DESCRIBED IN "PAST ACTIVITIES".

B. DEFENSIVE: UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT

C. WITHDRAWAL: UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT

D. FORMATIONS: WHILE THE 9TH BATTALION IS MARCHING, AN INTERVAL OF THIRTY MINUTES WALKING DISTANCE IS OBSERVED BETWEEN COMPANIES. THE COMPANIES MOVE IN A SINGLE COLUMN WITH FIFTEEN METERS BETWEEN MEN IN OPEN COUNTRY AND ONE TO TWO METERS IN DENSE OONGLE. MEMBERS OF THE BATTALION'S RECON PLATOON, FAMILIAR WITH THE ROUTE, ARE WITH EVERY COMPANY. A THREE MAN RECON TEAM WALKS POINT ONE HUNDRED METERS AHEAD OF THE LEAD COMPANY. THE BATTALION COMMANDER WALKS WITH THE LEAD COMPANY.

E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS: UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT

6. PERSONALITIES: THE SUBJECT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE FOLLOWING PERSONALITIES:

A. H. NGUYEN A

9TH BATTALION COMMANDER

B. K. C.

9TH BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER

C. H. S.

9TH BATTALION CHIEF OF STAFF

D. H. N.

9TH BATTALION POLITICAL OFFICER

E. H. VAN QUYEN

C-91 COMPANY COMMANDER

F. H. VAN MED

C-91 COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

G. H.

C-91 COMPANY POLITICAL OFFICER

H. H. VAN HOA

1ST PLATOON LEADER

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C VAN HAI

1ST ASSISTANT PLATOON LEADER

NGUYEN QUYET TIEN

2ND PLATOON LEADER

GIANG

2ND PLATOON POLITICAL OFFICER

UAN

3RD PLATOON LEADER

DUONG

3RD ASSISTANT PLATOON LEADER

7. OTHER BASECAMPS: THE SUBJECT WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE

8. HIDING AREAS AND CACHES: THE SUBJECT WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE

9. LOGISTICS: IN THE KATUM AREA, FOOD WAS PICKED UP AT A SUPPLY POINT LOCATED ONE HOUR'S WALK WEST OF THE C-11 COMPANY BASECAMP. THIS POINT WAS A LOCATION IN THE JUNGLE TO WHICH A REAR SERVICE UNIT (DESIGNATION UNKNOWN) BROUGHT FOOD SUPPLIES. C-11 COMPANY SENT TEAMS OF FIVE OR SIX MEN TO THIS LOCATION TWICE A WEEK AND THEY USUALLY BROUGHT BACK TWO HUNDRED KILO'S OF FOOD, MOSTLY RICE.

WHEN THE 9TH BATTALION LEFT IT'S BASECAMP ON 7 AUG 69, EACH MAN CARRIED TEN LITRES OF RICE. THIS WAS INTENDED TO LAST FOR FIFTEEN DAYS. AFTER THAT, RICE WAS TO BE OBTAINED BY THE TRANSPORTATION PLATOON FROM CACHES MAINTAINED BY LOCAL FORCE ELEMENTS. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE AS WHERE HIS UNIT PROCURE AMMUNITION.

10. NORMAL DAILY OPERATIONS: IN THEIR KATUM BASECAMP, THE MEN USUALLY GOT UP AT 0600 HOURS, HAD MEALS AT 0630, 1100 AND 1730 HOURS. THEY WENT TO BED AT 1900 HOURS. THEY HAD TRAINING EXERCISES ALMOST EVERY DAY, USUALLY FROM 0700 TO 1000 HOURS AND FROM 1400 TO 1700 HOURS. THE TRAINING CONSISTED OF PRACTICING FOR ATTACKS ON CONVOYS AND OUTPOSTS. THIS TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE BASECAMP.

11. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

A. LOSSES: SINCE EARLY APR 69 WHEN THE SUBJECT JOINED THE 9TH BATTALION, LOSSES HAVE BEEN AS FOLLOWS: TWENTY KIA, FIFTY WIA, TEN CAPTURED, TWO RALLIED, AND THIRTY WERE HOSPITALIZED. MOST OF THESE LOSSES OCCURRED IN MAY AND JUN 69 IN THE ATTACK ON THE BA CHIEM OUTPOST AND AMBOHES ON HIGHWAY 13. THE TWO RALLIERS DESERTED IN LATE APR OR EARLY MAY WHILE THE BATTALION WAS IN THE LOC NINH AREA.

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B. REPLACEMENTS: SINCE THE SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO HIS UNIT, THE 9TH BATTALION HAS RECEIVED REPLACEMENTS FOUR TIMES: IN MID-MAY THE UNIT RECEIVED TWENTY MEN, EARLY JUN 69 THE UNIT RECEIVED FIFTEEN MEN, IN LATE JUN 69 THE UNIT RECEIVED TWENTY-THREE MEN AND ON OR AROUND 8 JUL 69, THE UNIT RECEIVED SEVENTEEN MEN.

C. MORALE: MORALE WAS LOW WHEN A COMBAT MISSION WAS IMMINENT, BUT IT WAS BETTER DURING THE PERIODS WHEN THE UNIT DID NOTHING BUT REST AND TRAIN. IN KATUM BASECAMP, FOOD WAS USUALLY PLENTIFUL AND THERE WERE FEW ARTILLERY OR AIR STRIKES.

D. PERCENT OF NVA IN THE UNIT: THE UNIT CONSISTED OF 100% NVA.

12. EQUIPMENT:

A. WEAPONS: C-11 COMPANY WAS ARMED WITH THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS: ONE X B-41 WITH SIX ROUNDS, THREE X B-40'S WITH SIX ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON, THREE X RBD LIGHT MACHINEGUNS WITH APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON, ONE X 60MM MORTAR WITH THIRTY ROUNDS, AND TWENTY-ONE X AK-47'S WITH TWO HUNDRED-FIFTY ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON.

C-12 ARTILLERY COMPANY WAS ARMED WITH THREE X 82MM MORTARS WITH FIFTY ROUNDS FOR EACH MORTAR, AND TWO HEAVY MACHINEGUNS WITH APPROXIMATELY ONE THOUSAND ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON. THE SUBJECT WAS NOT FURTHER KNOWLEDGEABLE AS TO OTHER WEAPONS IN THIS COMPANY.

THE WEAPONS OF C-9 AND C-10 COMPANIES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF C-11, BUT EXACT FIGURES WERE UNKNOWN TO THE SUBJECT.

B. COMMUNICATIONS: THE SIGNAL PLATOON HAS FIVE X LAND LINE FIELD PHONES (TYPE UNKNOWN) AND TWO WATT RADIO TELEPHONE WITH A RANGE OF FIFTY KILOMETERS.

C. TRANSPORTATION: THE 9TH BATTALION HAS NO SAMPANS OR VEHICLES OF TRANSPORTATION.

13. EFFECT OF ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES: THE KATUM BASECAMP WAS NEVER HIT BY AN AIR STRIKE. ARTILLERY STRIKES, BELIEVED TO BE COMING FROM A BASECAMP NEAR KATUM, HIT NEAR THE BASECAMP ON FOUR OCCASIONS: LATE JUN 69, MID JUL 69, LATE JUL 69, AND 6 AUG 69 AT APPROXIMATELY 1:00 HOUR. THE STRIKE IN MID JUL 69 RESULTED IN THREE WIA, OTHERWISE THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO BUNKERS.

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1b. EFFECT OF ALLIED PSYOPS: THE SUBJECT HAD SEEN THE LEAFLETS AND HEARD THE BROADCASTS BUT AT FIRST DID NOT BELIEVE THEM. AFTER TWO MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT RALLIED IN THE LOC NINH AREA, HE HEARD A HELICOPTER BROADCAST SAYING THEY WERE ALIVE AND PROSPERING AND BEGAN TO BELIEVE THE CHIEU HOI PROPAGANDA.

3. OTHER UNITS: THE 7TH AND 9TH BATTALIONS OF THE 101D REGIMENT HAVE BASECAMPS IN THE KATUM AREA, BUT THE SUBJECT DID NOT KNOW WHERE THESE WERE. HE HEARD THAT THE 8TH BATTALION HAD MOVED OUT A DAY OR TWO BEFORE HIS OWN BATTALION WITH A SIMILAR AMBUSH MISSION ON HIGHWAY 13. IN THE NIGHT OF 13 AUG 69, FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF THE 8TH BATTALION CAME TO THE BASECAMP THAT THE 9TH BATTALION HAD SET UP NEAR THE AMBUSH SITE. THEY HAD BEEN SENT AS REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE NEXT DAY'S AMBUSH. THE SUBJECT HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THE LOCATION OR PLANS OF THE 8TH BATTALION.

4. HE SUBJECT ALSO HEARD THAT THE 7TH BATTALION WAS STILL IN THE KATUM AREA WHEN HIS BATTALION LEFT, BUT THAT IT TOO WOULD MOVE TO HIGHWAY 13 TO MARCH A CONVOY (DATES UNKNOWN).

11. (C) INTERROGATOR'S COMMENTS:

1. PROBABLE VALIDITY: THE SUBJECT IS INTELLIGENT, WELL EDUCATED, AND IS BELIEVED TO BE TELLING THE TRUTH.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER INTERROGATION: DUE TO HIS LIMITED ASPIRATIONS AND EXPERIENCE AND HIS LOW RANK, THE SUBJECT IS NOT VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND FURTHER INTERROGATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED.

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