

CONFIDENTIAL

TEAM NO: 3RD BDE IPW

M11/

21 AUG 69

(C) ANNEX A (RESPONSE TO SICR'S)

(C) CONTROL NO: E-3/2
SUBJECT: UNIFORMS

1. A WHEN THE SUBJECT JOINED THE ARMY IN NVN, HE WAS ISSUED A KHAKI UNIFORM.

B. THE UNIFORM THAT HE RECEIVED WAS NEW.

C. HE WAS ISSUED RUBBER TENNIS-TYPE SHOES. BEFORE HIS GROUP BEGAN ITS INFILTRATION TO SVN, THESE SHOES WERE COLLECTED AND HO CHI MINH SANDALS WERE ISSUED.

D. THE SUBJECT WAS ISSUED A PLASTIC HELMET WHEN HE JOINED THE ARMY, BUT THIS WAS TAKEN FROM HIM BEFORE HE BEGAN INFILTRATING TO SVN.

E. IN NVN, UNIFORMS BORE INSIGNIAS INDICATING RANK NOT UNIT, BUT ALL RANK RANK INSIGNIAS WERE REMOVED FROM THE UNIFORMS BEFORE INFILTRATION.

2. THE SUBJECT WAS ISSUED AN AK-47 IN NVN. IT WAS NEW WHEN ISSUED.

(C) CONTROL NO: A-IEB-21932
SUBJECT: EFFECT OF AIR OPERATIONS

1. THE SUBJECT HAS COME UNDER AIR ATTACK TWICE, ONCE WHEN HE WAS WITH K-31 TRAINING CENTER IN MAR 69 AND ONCE WHILE HE WAS MOVING WITH HIS BATTALION ON 9 AUG 69. THE FIRST ATTACK WAS BY HELICOPTER GUNSHIP, THE SECOND BY B-52. K-31 IS LOCATED IN CAMBODIA NEAR THE TAY NINH (P) BORDER. THE SUBJECT WAS UNABLE TO DESCRIBE HIS LOCATION AT THE TIME OF THE B-52 STRIKE.

2. THE ATTACK ON K-31 INVOLVED TWO GUNSHIPS, THE SECOND ATTACK INVOLVED B52.

3. THERE WAS NO WARNING OF THE B-52 STRIKE. THE GUNSHIP ATTACK WAS PRECEDED BY ABOUT FIVE MINUTES BY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE AREA BY A HOUND DOG RECON PLANE. THE NVA IN THE CAMP TOOK COVER WHEN THEY SAW THE RECON PLANE AND WERE WELL CONCEALED WHEN THE GUNSHIP ARRIVED.

4. THE MEN IN THE K-31 CAMP DEFENDED THEMSELVES PASSIVELY BY TAKING COVER EITHER IN THEIR BUNKERS OR IN THE BUSHES.

5. NO MEASURES OF ACTIVE DEFENSE WERE TAKEN.

6. THE SUBJECT DOES NOT KNOW WHICH TYPE OF WEAPON IS MOST EFFECTIVE

7. THE SUBJECT DOES NOT INJURED IN EITHER ATTACK. IN THE GUNSHIP ATTACK A UNKNOWN NUMBER WERE WOUNDED, NONE KILLED. IN THE B-52 STRIKE, THREE WERE KILLED AND THREE WERE WOUNDED.

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Authority 11NO 927623By ss NARA Date 3-2-01

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REF ID: A66000

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THE SOURCE PROVIDED NEGATIVE RESPONSES TO THE REMAINING QUESTIONS IN THIS SICR.

() CONTROL NO: U-UPC-U1553
SUBJECT: DISSIDENCE WITHIN NVN MINORITY GROUPS

1. THERE HAVE BEEN GRIEVANCES BETWEEN MINORITY GROUPS IN NVN AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, BUT THE SUBJECT WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE AS TO THE DETAILS.

2. THE SUBJECT KNOWS OF NO OPEN CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE DRV AND ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. HE STATED THAT THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IS PERMITTED TO EXIST AND HOLD SERVICES, BUT THE RELIGION IS DISCOURAGED BY STATE PROPAGANDA AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN STATE AUTHORIZATION TO BUILD NEW CHURCHES.

3. A THROUGH E. THE SUBJECT HAS NEVER HEARD OF AUTONOMOUS ZONES FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES IN NVN.

4. F. THERE EXISTS A PROGRAM OF THE DRV KNOWN AS "KHAI PHA MIEN TAY" (DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST) AIMED AT ASSIMILATING THE MONTAGNARDS IN THE WESTERN MOUNTAINS OF NVN. UNDER THIS PROGRAM NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SENT TO LIVE WITH THESE MONTAGNARDS, GIVING THEM AGRICULTURAL ADVICE, POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, TEACHING THEM VIETNAMESE AND HELPING TO DEVELOP THE AREA THROUGH CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

5. ETHNIC MINORITIES ARE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR LANGUAGE AND RELIGION THOUGH EFFORTS ARE MADE PEACEFULLY TO ELIMINATE BOTH.

6. MONTAGNARDS AND OTHER MINORITIES DO HAVE A MILITARY OBLIGATION, AND ARE DRAFTED INTO THE NVA. THEY ARE USED MAINLY IN A COMBAT ROLE. MONTAGNARDS DO NOT LIKE BEING DRAFTED BUT THE SUBJECT IS NOT AWARE OF ANY INCIDENTS OF OVER RESISTANCE.

7. WHEN MONTAGNARDS ARE FIRST DRAFTED THEY ARE ASSIGNED TO UNITS MADE UP EXCLUSIVELY OF THEIR OWN RACE, BUT WHEN THESE PEOPLE ARE SENT TO SVN THEY ARE INTEGRATED INTO REGULAR NVA UNITS.

THE SUBJECT WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE AS TO THE REMAINING QUESTIONS COVERED IN THIS SICR.

() CONTROL NO:
SUBJECT: LOCATION OF COSVN

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THE SUBJECT STATED A CADRE IN HIS COMPANY TOLD HIM THAT BOTH COSVN AND THE NEWLY FORMED PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE THEIR HEADQUARTERS LOCATED SOMEWHERE IN THE KATUM AREA. THE CADRE GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS.

(C) CONTROL NO: 11 FFV-SU-031
SUBJECT: MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

THE SUBJECT HAD NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PARTICULAR SICR.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION
FIRST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
APO US FORCES 96345

TEAM NO: 3RD BDE IPW INTERROGATION REPORT

1. (C) REPORT NUMBER: 1-416-69 4. (C) STATUS: PW/NVA
CONTROL NUMBER: 3-66-69 5. (C) ADMIN CONT: 1ST INF DIV
2. (C) DATE OF REPORT: 26 AUG 69 DISPOSITION: III CORP CAGE
INTERROGATOR: SNELLMAN 6. (C) EDITED BY: LT SOARES
INTERPRETER: MAO/HIEN CHECKED BY:
3. (C) REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM 1:50,000
SHEET NAME: AN LOC
SHEET NUMBER: 6332 III
INITIAL INTERROGATION REPORT OF 12 AUG 69

7. (C) CAPTURE DATA:
DATE/TIME: 121530 AUG 69

PLACE: XT 764 751

CAPTURING UNIT: "C" 2/2ND INF

8. (C) CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: THE SOURCE WAS CAPTURED WHEN AN AMBUSH
ON ONE OF OUR CONVOYS ON HIGHWAY #13 FAILED.

9. (C) BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

NAME: PHAM BA HUE

RANK/POSITION: PFC/SOLDIER

UNIT: 3RD SQD, 1ST PLT, 6TH CO, 8TH BN, 12TH REGT (F-12), 1ST
NVA DIVDATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: 1932, CO DONG (H), THANH HAI (V), THANH
LIEM (D), NAM HA (P), NVN

PLACE OF RESIDENCE: SAME AS PLACE OF BIRTH

OCCUPATION: FARMER

EDUCATION: FOUR YEARS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLING

RELIGION: NONE

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED - WIFE'S NAME: VU THI CHAC

RELATIVES WORKING FOR VC OR GVN: NONE

CHILDREN: TWO

TYPE OF UNIFORM WORN: GREEN FATIGUES AND HO CHI MINH SANDALS

GROUP 1
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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10. (C) INFORMATION GAINED:

A. PAST ACTIVITIES: THE SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS DRAFTED INTO THE NVA ON 7 JULY 68 AND ASSIGNED TO THE 4TH COMPANY, 532ND BATTALION, 42ND REGIMENT, 350TH BASIC TRAINING DIVISION. ON LIÊN TỬ MOUNTAIN, IN HẢI PHÒNG PROVINCE, NVN, THE SOURCE RECEIVED BASIC TRAINING CONSISTING OF FIRING AN AK47, OKC, HOW TO CRAWL AND RUN IN A COMBAT AREA, ETC. THIS BASIC TRAINING LASTED FOR A PERIOD OF TWO MONTHS. THE STRENGTH OF THE SOURCE'S BASIC TRAINING BATTALION WAS APPROXIMATED AT 500 MEN.

AT THE TERMINATION OF THE TRAINING AT THE BEGINNING OF SEPT 68, HUE STATED THAT HE WAS GIVEN A SEVEN DAY LEAVE TO VISIT HIS FAMILY IN NAM HA (P). FIVE OF THOSE DAYS WERE SPENT TRAVELING TO AND FROM HIS HOME, THE OTHER TWO DAYS WERE SPENT WITH HIS FAMILY.

WHEN HUE RETURNED TO HIS UNIT, HIS ENTIRE TRAINING BATTALION WAS DEPLOYED APPROXIMATELY FIFTY KILOMETERS WEST OF THE TRAINING AREA IN HAI DUONG (P), NVN WHERE THEY ASSISTED THE CIVILIAN POPULOUS IN CONSTRUCTING A DIKE TO PREVENT HIGHWAY #5 AND NEARBY RESIDENTIAL AREAS FROM BECOMING INUNDATED BY THE THREATENING HEAVY MONSOON RAINS WHICH WERE CAUSING LOCAL STREAMS AND RIVERS TO OVERFLOW THEIR BANKS.

AT THE BEGINNING OF NOV 68, AFTER AIDING THE PEOPLE OF THAT AREA REBUILD THEIR HOMES WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY THE FLOODING CONDITIONS, THE TRAINING BATTALION RETURNED TO THE TRAINING AREA IN HAI PHONG (P) WHERE THE UNIT WAS ALLOWED TO REST UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF DEC 68.

AT THE BEGINNING OF DEC 68, HUE AND HIS BASIC TRAINING BATTALION WERE ASSIGNED TO AN INFILTRATION GROUP DESIGNATED DOAN 2079 WHICH WAS COMMANDED BY A PERSON NAMED TO WHO WAS A SENIOR CAPTAIN. THE POLITICAL OFFICER AND THE ASSISTANT POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE GROUP WERE PERSONS NAMED CHUC AND THACH RESPECTIVELY.

THE INFILTRATION GROUP LEFT IT'S BASIC TRAINING AREA AT THE BEGINNING OF DEC 68 FROM HAI PHONG PROVINCE AND TRAVELED FOR TWO DAYS BY TRAIN AND ARRIVED AT VINH CITY, VINH PROVINCE ON 5 DEC 68. AT THIS

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LOCATION, THE TRAIN STOPPED AND THE GROUP GOT OFF AND BEGAN WALKING. THE GROUP TRAVELED THROUGH VINH, HA TINH AND QUANG BINH PROVINCES, NVN, BEFORE REACHING THE LAOSIAN BORDER. IN LAOS, THE GROUP CONTINUED TRAVELING SOUTH THROUGH THE JUNGLE AREA PROCURING RICE FROM STATIONS IN THE JUNGLE EVERY WEEK. HUE STATED THAT THERE WERE USUALLY FOUR NVA PERSONNEL AT EACH OF THESE STATIONS. THE RICE WAS PILED UP IN 100 KILO BAGS. INITIAL RICE AND DRYED FISH FOR THE INFILTRATION GROUP HAD BEEN PROCURED IN HAI PHONG PROVINCE, NVN BY PERSONNEL OF THE GROUP. EACH PERSON IN THE GROUP WAS RATIONED FIVE LITRES OF RICE WHICH HAD TO LAST THEM UNTIL THEY ARRIVED AT THE FIRST RICE STATION IN LAOS. HUE STATED THAT HE OBSERVED SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS TRADING CLOTHING (TOWELS, HANDKERCHIEFS AND ETC) TO LOCAL VILLAGERS IN LAOS IN EXCHANGE FOR SMALL AMOUNTS OF RICE AND FISH BECAUSE THEY HAD CONSUMED THEIR RATION OF RICE BEFORE REACHING THE FIRST RICE STATION IN LAOS. HUE FURTHER STATED THAT THE LAOSIANS LIVING IN THE RURAL AREAS NEITHER WERE HOSTILE NOR APPEARED TO BE BITTER TOWARDS THE GROUP TRAVELING THROUGH THEIR COUNTRY.

THE INFILTRATION GROUP FINALLY ARRIVED AT THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN EARLY APRIL 69 AND CONTINUED TRAVELING SOUTH THROUGH CAMBODIA NEAR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER. WHILE IN CAMBODIA, HUE STATED HE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY CAMBODIAN SOLDIERS.

IN LATE APRIL 69, THE INFILTRATION GROUP ARRIVED ON THE BANKS OF THE VAM CO DONG RIVER SOMEWHERE NEAR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE/CAMBODIAN BORDER WITH AN APPROXIMATED STRENGTH OF THREE HUNDRED MEN. THE REMAINDER OF THE INFILTRATION GROUP HAD BEEN HOSPITALIZED IN VARIOUS AID STATIONS AND HOSPITALS ALONG THE INFILTRATION ROUTE FOR MALARIA AND OTHER JUNGLE DISEASES.

IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF THIS RIVER, VAM CO, THE INFILTRATION GROUP ARRIVED AT THE BASE CAMP OF DOAN 280 (LOC UNK), WHICH IS A REPLACEMENT STATION FOR SOLDIERS INFILTRATING FROM NVN. HUE STATED THAT

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HE REMAINED AT THIS BASECAMP FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH WHERE HE WAS ALLOWED TO REST. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, PERSONNEL FROM UNKNOWN UNIT OR UNITS CAME TO THE BASECAMP AND RECEIVED REPLACEMENTS FROM THE SOURCE'S INFILTRATION GROUP.

IN LATE MAY 69, HUE STATED THAT FOUR PERSONS FROM A SECOND REPLACEMENT STATION DESIGNATED K-31 ARRIVED AT THE BASECAMP AND STATED THAT THEY HAD COME TO LEAD THE REMAINDER OF THE INFILTRATION GROUP, WHICH NUMBERED MORE THAN 100 MEN AT THAT TIME, TO THE BASECAMP OF THEIR REPLACEMENT STATION WHERE THEY WOULD BE TAKEN TO VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION.

THE REMAINDER OF THE INFILTRATION GROUP WAS LED BY THE FOUR PEOPLE THROUGH THE JUNGLE IN AN UNKNOWN DIRECTION BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 1700 AND 2400 HOURS FOR TWO DAYS BEFORE REACHING THE BASECAMP OF K-31 AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION IN THE JUNGLE. AT THIS LOCATION, THE GROUP RESTED FOR ONE DAY BEFORE THIRTY OF THE MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MEN CONTINUED TO THE BASECAMP OF THE 8TH BN, WHICH TOOK AN ADDITIONAL TWO DAYS TRAVEL. THE GROUP ARRIVED AT THE BASECAMP (LOC UNK) ON 26 MAY 69 AND SEVENTEEN OF THE THIRTY MEN, INCLUDING HUE, WERE IMMEDIATELY ASSIGNED TO THE 6TH COMPANY, 8TH BATTALION. HUE AND THE OTHER SIXTEEN MEN WERE ALLOWED TO REST FOR TWO WEEKS IN THE CAMP DURING WHICH TIME HUE BECAME SICK. HE WAS TAKEN BY AN AIDMAN FROM THE BASECAMP TO A HOSPITAL DESIGNATED K-22 AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. AT THE HOSPITAL, HUE WAS PUT IN AN UNDERGROUND BUNKER WITH TWO OTHER MALARIA PATIENTS OF AN UNKNOWN UNIT AND WAS ADMINISTERED SIX UNKNOWN TYPE OF MALARIA PILLS BY AN AIDMAN AT THE HOSPITAL EACH DAY.

HUE WAS FINALLY RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL ON 29 JULY 69 AND WAS TAKEN BACK TO HIS UNIT BY AN AIDMAN. AFTER ARRIVING BACK AT THE BASE CAMP, HUE WAS STILL FEELING SOMEWHAT WEAK SO HE WAS ALLOWED TO REST.

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ON 7 AUG 69, APPROXIMATELY EIGHTY MEN OF THE BATTALION, INCLUDING HUE, WHO WERE WELL ENOUGH TO WALK AND FIGHT, WERE MOBILIZED. THE UNIT LEFT THE BASECAMP AND TRAVELED EAST FOR FOUR DAYS WITH THE ASSIGNED MISSION OF AMBUSHING A CONVOY TRAVELING ON HIGHWAY #13.

ON 10 AUG 69 AT 2000 HOURS, THE UNIT ARRIVED AT AN UNKNOWN JUNGLE AREA APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOURS WALK WEST OF HIGHWAY #13 WHERE THEY SET UP A TEMPORARY BASECAMP THAT WAS TO BE USED UNTIL THE LATE AFTERNOON OF 11 AUG 69.

ON 11 AUG 69 AT APPROXIMATELY 1800 HOURS, AFTER RESTING FOR NEARLY A DAY, THE UNIT MOVED EAST TO THE AMBUSH SITE. THE CONTACT TOOK PLACE IN THE MID-AFTERNOON OF 12 AUG 69. THE SOURCE WAS CAPTURED AT APPROXIMATELY 1530 HOURS ON 12 AUG 69 WHEN THE AMBUSH FAILED.

B. MISSION:

1. PW: TO PARTICIPATE IN AN AMBUSH AGAINST A CONVOY ON HIGHWAY #13.

2. UNIT: SAME AS PW'S MISSION.

C. UNIT:

1. ORGANIZATION: THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE 8TH BATTALION (K-8) CONSISTED OF FOUR COMPANIES DESIGNATED THE 5TH, 6TH, 7TH AND 8TH COMPANIES. THREE OF THESE COMPANIES (5TH, 6TH, AND 7TH) ARE INFANTRY COMPANIES AND THE 8TH COMPANY IS AN 82MM MORTAR COMPANY. EACH COMPANY CONSISTS OF THREE PLATOONS DESIGNATED THE 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD PLATOONS AND EACH PLATOON CONSISTS OF THREE SQUADS DESIGNATED THE 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD SQDS.

2. DISPOSITION: HUE STATED THAT THE SINGLE BASECAMP FOR THE 8TH BATTALION IS LOCATED SOMEWHERE NEAR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE/CAMBODIAN BORDER. HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE BASECAMP WAS ACTUALLY WITHIN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER OR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.

3. FUTURE PLANS: UNKNOWN TO SOURCE.

4. STRENGTH: HUE STATED THAT THE APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF THE 8TH BATTALION WAS 150 TO 160 MEN OF BUT ONLY APPROXIMATELY 80 MEN TOOK PART IN THE AMBUSH OPERATION, THE REMAINDER OF THE MEN REMAINED IN THE BATTALION BASECAMP BECAUSE THEY WERE SICK AND TOO WEAK TO PARTICIPATE IN

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THE AMBUSH. EACH COMPANY AVERAGED BETWEEN 35 TO 40 MEN PRIOR TO THE AMBUSH OPERATION BUT BECAUSE OF SICKNESS IN THE UNIT, EACH COMPANY AVERAGED 20 MEN DURING THE OPERATION. EACH PLATOON AVERAGED 12 TO 13 MEN AND EACH SQUAD AVERAGED 4 TO 5 MEN.

5. TACTICS:

A. OFFENSIVE: HUE STATED THAT HIS COMPANY WAS DIVIDED INTO FIVE, THREE MAN ASSAULT TEAMS AND THREE, THREE MAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT TEAMS. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE AS TO THE EXACT OFFENSIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE OTHER THREE COMPANIES DURING THE AMBUSH. THE FIVE ASSAULT TEAMS WERE POSITIONED ON LINE WITH 3-5 METERS BETWEEN EACH TEAM. THESE TEAMS WERE SITUATED APPROXIMATELY FIVE METERS WEST FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS IN THE VIC OF (XT 760 754). EACH TEAM HAD DUG ONE FOXHOLE THE NIGHT BEFORE THE AMBUSH. THE THREE ANTI-AIRCRAFT TEAMS WERE SITUATED APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED METERS BEHIND THE ASSAULT TEAMS ON LINE WITH 10 TO 12 METERS BETWEEN EACH TEAM. THE CO OF THE COMPANY GAVE THE VERBAL ORDER FOR THE ASSAULT TEAMS TO MOVE FORWARD AND AMBUSH THE CONVOY WHILE THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT TEAMS REMAINED IN POSITION TO FIRE AT ANY GUNSHIPS THAT MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO THE AREA TO GIVE FIRE SUPPORT TO THE CONVOY.

B. DEFENSIVE: HUE STATED THAT IF ARTILLERY OR AIR STRIKES WERE EMPLOYED IN THE AREA DURING THE AMBUSH HIS UNIT WAS TO RETREAT WEST AND DISPERSE INTO THE JUNGLE AND REASSEMBLE AT THE LAST REST AREA THAT THE UNIT WAS LOCATED THE NIGHT BEFORE. HUE STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT KNOW THE WAY BACK TO THE LAST REST AREA BUT SOME MEN (INCLUDING THE SQUAD LEADER) IN HIS SQUAD DID SO HE STATED HE WOULD FOLLOW THEM.

C. WITHDRAWAL: HUE STATED THAT IF THE AMBUSH ON THE CONVOY HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, THE MEN OF THE UNIT WERE TO REASSEMBLE AT THE ORIGINAL AMBUSH SITE IN THE VICINITY OF XT 760 754 AND AWAIT THE COMPANY COMMANDER'S ORDER TO MOVE WEST TO THE REST SITE THAT THE BATTALION HAD USED THE NIGHT BEFORE (THE REST SITE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOURS WALK WEST OF THE AMBUSH SITE IN THE JUNGLE, EXACT LOCATION COULD NOT BE DETERMINED THROUGH MAP TRACKING). AT THIS LOC

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TO REMAIN UNTIL THE BATTALION COMMANDER DECIDED WHAT THEIR NEXT MOVE WOULD BE.

D. FORMATIONS: HUE STATED THAT WHILE TRAVELING THROUGH THE JUNGLE FROM THE BATTALION BASECAMP TO THE AMBUSH SITE WAS ONLY DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS, THE ENTIRE BATTALION TRAVELED IN A SINGLE FILE FORMATION WITH APPROXIMATELY 2-3 METERS BETWEEN EACH MAN. HUE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE WEAPONS WERE ARRANGED IN THE FORMATION OR ABOUT SECURITY FOR THE UNIT WHILE TRAVELING.

E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS: HUE STATED THAT THIS AMBUSH OPERATION WAS THE FIRST OPERATION THAT HE HAD BEEN ON SINCE HE WAS ASSIGNED TO HIS UNIT ON 26 MAY 69 AND CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS THAT HIS UNIT MAY HAVE BEEN ON PRIOR TO THAT TIME.

6. PERSONALITIES: HUE STATED THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE FOLLOWING PERSONALITIES: 8TH BATTALION

PHACH: CO

KHANH: XO

TRUNG: PO

DU: ASST PO

THAO: 6TH COMPANY POLITICAL OFFICER

(HUE STATED THAT HIS COMPANY COMMANDER WAS A NEW OFFICER IN HIS UNIT THEREFORE HE DID NOT KNOW HIS NAME. HUE FURTHER STATED THAT HIS COMPANY DID NOT HAVE AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER)

VAN: 1ST PLATOON LEADER

THI: 3RD SQUAD LEADER

TAN: SOLDIER IN THE 3RD SQUAD

BA: SOLDIER IN THE 3RD SQUAD

HAI: SOLDIER IN THE 3RD SQUAD

7. OTHER BASECAMPS: UNKNOWN TO SUBJECT.

8. HIDING AREAS AND CACHES: UNKNOWN TO SUBJECT.

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9. LOGISTICS: THE SOURCE STATED THAT FOOD FOR THE BATTALION WAS PROCURED IN CAMBODIA FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS BUT FURTHER INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE PROCUREMENT WAS UNKNOWN TO HIM SINCE HE HAS NOT BEEN ON A RICE MISSION. HE DID STATE THAT HE WAS GIVEN APPROXIMATELY ONE LITRE OF RICE WHICH HAD TO LAST A PERIOD OF FIFTEEN DAYS WHILE TRAVELING FROM THE BATTALION BASECAMP TO THE AMBUSH SITE AND BACK. THE SOURCE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE AS TO WHERE THE BATTALION PROCURED AMMUNITION FOR THEIR WEAPONS.

10. NORMAL DAILY ACTIVITIES: THE FOLLOWING IS A SCHEDULE OF THE UNIT'S NORMAL DAILY ACTIVITIES WHEN THEY ARE RESTING IN THE BASECAMP:

0500-0600	GET UP
0600-0700	EAT BREAKFAST
0700-1100	STAY IN BUNKERS AND REST
1100-1200	EAT LUNCH
1200-1700	STAY IN BUNKERS AND REST
1700-1800	EAT SUPPER
1800-0500	STAY IN BUNKERS AND REST AND SLEEP

11. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

A. LOSSES: SUBJECT STATED THAT THE ONLY LOSSES THAT HE KNOWS OF IS FROM THIS AMBUSH OPERATION.

B. REPLACEMENTS: SUBJECT STATED THAT HE AND THE SIXTEEN MEN THAT WERE ASSIGNED TO THE 6TH COMPANY WERE THE LAST REPLACEMENTS FOR HIS COMPANY SINCE HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT ON 26 MAY 69.

C. MORALE: MORALE OF THE BATTALION WAS LOW BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BE SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN FORCES IN THAT AREA WERE TOO GREAT. ALSO FEAR OF ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES CONTRIBUTE TO THE LOW MORALE WHILE THEY WERE IN THE BASECAMP.

D. PERCENT OF NVA IN THE UNIT: THE UNIT IS 100% NVA.

12. EQUIPMENT:

A. WEAPONS: THE 8TH BATTALION HAD THREE X 82MM MORTARS WITH APPROXIMATELY 70 ROUNDS FOR ALL THREE MORTARS. THESE MORTARS BELONGED TO THE 8TH COMPANY, 8TH BN WHICH WAS THE MORTAR COMPANY. THE 6TH COMPANY, 8TH BN HAD THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS: 2 X 840'S WITH 12 ROUNDS FOR EACH WEAPON, 1 X 841 WITH 12 ROUNDS, TWO X RPD LIGHT MACHINEGUNS WITH

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AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ROUNDS, UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AK47'S AND CKC'S WITH 200 HUNDRED ROUNDS FOR EACH AK47 AND APPROXIMATELY 150 ROUNDS FOR EACH CKC AND 1 X K-54 PISTOL BELONGING TO THE COMPANY COMMANDER.

B. COMMUNICATIONS: RUNNERS ONLY.

C. TRANSPORTATION: SUBJECT STATED THAT THE UNIT WALKED WHERE EVER IT WENT. HE HAS NOT SEEN ANY KIND OF VEHICLES IN THE AREA OF THE BATTALION BASECAMP SINCE HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT.

13. EFFECT OF ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES: SUBJECT STATED THAT AT THE BEGINNING OF AUG 69, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ARTILLERY ROUNDS HIT APPROXIMATELY 400 OR 500 METERS AWAY FROM THE BATTALION BASECAMP. HE STATED THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY TIME THAT HE CAN REMEMBER BEING IN SUCH AN ATTACK. THE ATTACK DID NOT CAUSE ANY DAMAGE TO THE BASECAMP OR PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT.

14. EFFECT OF ALLIED PSYOPS: HUE STATED THAT HE HAS HEARD OUR AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER HEAD BROADCASTING ABOUT THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO CHIEU HOI BECAUSE HE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO GO HOME IF THE WAR EVER ENDS; IF HE WERE TO CHIEU HOI HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED A DESERTER BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WHEN THE WAR ENDED AND HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH HIS FAMILY IN NORTH VIETNAM. HE DID NOT KNOW IF OUR BROADCASTS HAD ANY KIND OF EFFECT ON THE OTHER MEN IN HIS UNIT. HE ALSO ADMITS TO PICKING UP OUR CHIEU HOI LEAFLETS BUT GAVE THE SAME REASON FOR NOT WANTING TO DESERT. HE DID BELIEVE WHAT HE READ.

D. OTHER UNITS: HUE KNEW OF NO OTHER UNITS.

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11.(C) INTERROGATORS COMMENTS:

1. PROBABLE VALIDITY: THE SOURCE WAS INTERROGATED SEVERAL TIMES BY TWO DIFFERENT INTERPRETERS AND HIS ANSWERS WERE CONSISTENT, THEREFORE IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE SOURCE MAY HAVE BEEN TELLING THE TRUTH.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER INTERROGATIONS: SOURCE IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION.

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(C) ANNEX A (RESPONSES TO SIGR'S)

(C) CONTROL NO: U-UPE-A1629
SUBJECT: ENEMY REACTION TO USAF GUNSHIPS

1. NEGATIVE - THE UNIT WAS NOT WARNED BY FORWARD OBSERVERS OF THE PRESENCE OF GUNSHIPS IN THE AREA OF THE BASECAMP.

2. THE GUNSHIP THAT THE SOURCE OBSERVED WHILE MOVING FROM THE BASECAMP TO THE AMBUSH SITE DID NOT HAVE AN EXHAUST FLAME THAT WAS VISIBLE.

3. NEGATIVE - AN EXHAUST FLAME WAS NOT VISIBLE ON THE GUNSHIP. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE GUNSHIP WAS JUST ABOVE THE TREE LINE APPROX ONE HUNDRED METERS FROM THE GROUND.

4. NEGATIVE - THE UNIT WAS NOT TRACKING GUNSHIPS, IT JUST HAPPENED THAT A GUNSHIP CAME INTO THE AREA. THE SOURCE CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE AS HOW GUNSHIPS MIGHT BE TRACKED BY ENEMY UNITS ON THE GROUND.

5. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS THE UNIT MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO FIRE AT A GUNSHIP. HIS UNIT ALWAYS ATTEMPTED TO AVOID BEING DETECTED BY OUR GUNSHIPS.

6. THE GUNSHIP DID NOT DETECT THE UNIT WHILE IT WAS MOVING IN THE JUNGLE TO IT'S FINAL DESTINATION NEAR HIGHWAY #13 THEREFORE THERE WAS NO ATTACK.

(C) CODE NO: E-3/2
SUBJECT: UNIFORMS

1. A. THE SOURCES UNIT HAD MIXED UNIFORMS BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE MEN IN THE UNIT WORE EITHER GREEN FATIGUES AND HO CHI MINH SANDALS OR BROWN KHAKI UNIFORMS WITH HO CHI MINH SANDALS.

B. THE UNIFORM THAT THE SOURCE WAS WEARING WAS ISSUED TO HIM NEW PRIOR TO HIS INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

C. THE SOURCE WAS WEARING HO CHI MINH SANDALS. WHEN THEY WERE ISSUED TO HIM JUST PRIOR TO HIS INFILTRATION, THEY WERE NEW.

D. THE SOURCE STATED THAT HIS UNIT DID NOT WEAR ANY TYPE OF HEADGEAR.

E. NEGATIVE, THE UNIFORM THE SOURCE WAS WEARING DID NOT HAVE

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TEAM NO: 3RD BDE IPW

26 AUG 69

ANY TYPE OF IDENTIFYING INSIGNIA, UNIT PATCHES, RANK AND ETC.

2. THE SOURCE WAS ISSUED AN AK47 PRIOR TO HIS INFILTRATION TO SVN.
THE AK47 ISSUED TO THE SOURCE WAS A USED WEAPON.

(C) THE FOLLOWING SICR'S AND EEI'S WERE ASKED OF THE SOURCE WITH
NEGATIVE RESPONSES:

CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1577
SUBJECT: FARK FIELD UNIFORMS

CONTROL NO: U-UPE-U1558
SUBJECT: ENEMY USE OF CIVILIAN LABORERS

CONTROL NO: D-7CX-22145
SUBJECT: POW INTELLIGENCE

16TH DIVISION EEI AND THE SPECIAL EEI ON THE NEW 3RD BDE AO


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
SKETCH MAP #1 12 AUG AMBUSH



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
SKETCH MAP 2 AN AUG 14 AMBUSH



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SKETCH MAP #3 US RESPONSE



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Drivers Secure Their Vehicles



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


Burning and Damaged Vehicles (note MG Jeep on Left)



After the Action, 1-4 Car Vehicles Secure Highway to the North Side

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FSB Thunder III

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