

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDE-QHS3

3 Feb 70

TO: CO, 3 rd BDE

FROM: CO, 1ST SQDN, 4TH CAV

SUBJECT: COVER AND DECEPTION REPORT FOR 1 NOV 69 TO 31 JAN 70

I Cover and Deception Operations.

The 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry has only conducted one Sqdn size cover and deception operation in this reporting period. On 5 Jan 70 the Sqdn moved from the TAN UYEN area along Hwy 13 to LAI KHE, continued along Hwy 13 to the LAI KHE Rocket Belt, and began intensive ground reconnaissance and ambush operations there. This move (conducted with A Trp (-), Tm B (B/4 and 2/D/1-18 Inf), and C Trp (-) was a feint. The operation that was to actually take place concerned the C-61 Woods area northwest of BEN CAT. This area has been worked by Armor on numerous occasions, with the VC simply moving slightly ahead of the tracks to keep from being observed.

On 7 Jan 70 the Recon Co of the 8th ARVN Regt were air assaulted into blocking positions along the THI TINH RIVER. At the same time A Trp (-) and B Trp (-) moved into the C-61 Woods, splitting it into two operational areas and effectively blocking the avenues of escape.

Lessons Learned


The success of this operation was due to the fact that no Tac Air, artillery or gun ship VR's were conducted over the area prior to entry. Command VR's were kept to a minimum, and the information concerning the operation was distributed on a need to know basis only.

II Cover and Deception Methods

Three of the most successful methods of cover and deception used by the "Quarterhorse" are the moving ambush, the stay-behind technique, and recon by fire.

A. Moving AP

The moving ambush involves splitting the Cavalry Platoon into  $\frac{1}{2}$  Plt size elements. These elements are assigned two, four, or any number of supplementary positions. At intervals during the night these elements conduct tactical moves from one location to another.



Cover and Deception Report for 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70 ( Continued )

Lessons Learned

Each section of the Plt must have a capable individual on command. Intensive day recon of the area is necessary to facilitate accurate navigation at night. Recon by fire is desirable whenever possible. The AP's should move at three hour intervals to provide optimum coverage and keep the enemy off balance. The intervals must be varied slightly to keep from establishing a pattern.

B. Stay-Behind AP

The stay-behind Ambush is a technique that is employed by all Plts in the Sqdn. In this concept, the ambush (dismounted) is dropped from the tracks onto a likely ambush site. The tracks then move on to a mounted ambush or RON position.

Lessons Learned

The tracks should move slowly through the drop area without stopping as the dismounted patrol "scrambles" off. If the terrain necessitates stopping, the time should be kept to a minimum. The dismounted patrol should remain in overwatch for a minimum of one hour before moving to set up.

C. Recon By Fire

Although it is not usually thought of as such, recon by fire can be used as a cover and deception measure. This was used particularly effectively during the C-61 operation of this period. The technique here is to use a high volume of fire during movement to create the impression of a large force in the area. Used properly, a platoon can be made to sound like a troop.

Lessons Learned

The emphasis in this operation should be on 90mm cannister and cal .50 fire.

III SUMMARY

The Armored Cavalry has inherent in its nature much cover and deception. This is due to the fact that it can move from one area to another so rapidly. It can appear to be moving in one way, and then totally reverse itself on a moments notice.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

BROWN  
LTC

OFFICIAL

