


Lt Farington tried to assess the situation. He had a good vantage-point from the road, and could see that the enemy had come around both sides of the salient formed by bunkers 15 and 16 (1 and 2 on the sketch) and some of them had reached the road. Bunker 15 was taking RPG fire from all directions. The RPG screen (chain-link fence) to the front of the bunker effectively stopped the rockets coming from that direction, but, of course, the rear of the bunker was not similarly protected. Even so, the bunker was sufficiently solid and it stood up under the attack. The three troops inside it, however, were shaken up and they decided that they better make a run for bunker 16 where six of them could make a better stand.

"The area between the bunkers was pretty clear," remembers Truman, "and they made it OK. They told us that there were gooks behind us, but we couldn't see them because of the berm behind our bunker. We put a few frags out and the firing seemed to stop for awhile."

"We could see the gooks running all around bunker 15. Couldn't figure out what they were doing - just jumping up on top of it and running around. We had to get out of our bunker to bring fire on them, and we stayed on top of it in the fighting position for the rest of the time. We could see a lot better from up there."


Farington noticed that the people in the artillery battery back from the road were having a hard time bringing fire into the area around the road where the enemy was with their M-16's. "Everybody that wasn't firing the guns had come to our side of the parapets and was trying to shoot the gooks that had gotten through, but bunker 17 was in their way and it kept taking hits from our own people." Farington decided to have the people in that bunker evacuate it and reinforce bunker 18, and when this was done, he notified the artillery people that they could now fire in that area at will. Bunker 16 was still manned, of course, but the berm protected it from the fire from the artillery parapets.

On the other side of the perimeter, in the meantime, fighting had also



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
LZ INDIY (JUN 101), EASTERN SECTOR

broken out at bunker 61 in the green sector which was being manned by B Company, 1-7th Cav. Quite coincidentally, earlier on the 11th the engineers had improved the wire in front of this bunker. It had been discovered that erosion had eaten out a four-foot ditch under the wire, through which the enemy could have come almost up to the bunker without obstruction and without being seen. No doubt the enemy in his reconnaissance had selected this for a prime route of entry into the LZ. Imagine his surprise when he found that the gap had been sealed.

This may be an explanation of why at this location alone the enemy used bangalore torpedoes to breach the wire; and when he blew them, of course, it gave early warning to the defenders in that area. The NVA, however still managed to penetrate the perimeter by wounding two of the men in bunker 61, and sharp fighting resulted in the area as the enemy apparently tried to widen his penetration.

Fast thinking and a good deal of initiative, however, on the part of 1Lt Barry G. Hitner of the 919th Engineers denied further progress to the enemy. LTC Perry, Deputy Commander of the Third Brigade says, "Lt Hitner probably saved the day for us."

Hitner was in charge of "RF All Glory" located at the eastern end of the LZ. He had been alerted at 0110 hours that a sapper attack was under way, but then he lost communications with the base defense commander, under whose instructions only was he to deploy his force. He heard the fighting at bunker 61, and decided on his own initiative that it was time to move. He sent two of his CEV's (Combat Engineer Vehicles - a fearsom machine with a bulldozer blade, two M-60 machine-guns and a 165mm gun which fires medicine-ball sized plastic explosive rounds) to bunker 61, and when he heard from them that the enemy was inside the wire, he deployed the rest of his force to the area, again on his




own initiative. "All Glory" did not take long to plug the gap and the situation was stabilized. Four or five enemy troops, however, had reached the inside of the perimeter and were to be heard from later.

In the meantime, back at the Blue sector, the sector reaction force, under a 1Lt Hendrickson, Executive Officer of A Company, 1-8th Cav, was moving to the assistance of Farington's troops on the line. As this group was moving out, a voice from the rear was heard to say, "Man, I'm too SHORT to be doing this, I only got 20 days!" Hendrickson turned around and retorted, "Shut up and get the **** back in line, I've only got seven."

At the road junction behind bunker 19 this group married up with two Sheridan tanks and three "A" Cavs from A Troop 1-11th ACR, which had been brought in support by Major John O Blake, the Executive Officer of the 1-8th. Farington briefed them, and Blake decided to sweep the area with tank-infantry tactics straight out of Fort Benning. He deployed the 15 men from the sector reaction force out to the left of the tanks, in the deep grass behind the road, and this joint force began its slow, tedious sweep. Major Blake, riding the lead tank, told the troops to proceed slowly and carefully as there were quite a few enemy troops in the deep grass. How true this was he found out when the lead tank reached point 6 on the sketch, just in front of bunker 17. A lone NVA soldier jumped up from the right side of the road, not ten feet from the tank, and cut loose with an RPG. Fortunately his aim was not quite up to his fortitude and the round whooshed over the top of the tank. Seconds crawled by like hours as the crew reacted and hit the man full in the chest with a bee-hive round from its main gun. All they could find the next day was about two-thirds of a head and a left arm.

The joint force rolled on, and when it reached point 5, just behind bunker 16, Lt Farington ordered the troops to evacuate it and join the reaction force



so that the tanks would have unobstructed fields of fire to the right. Moving in file along the road, the tanks and APC's put out a fearsome volume of firepower into the wire on their right. Thus the enemy that might still have been in the perimeter were trapped between the artillery, the wire and the tanks. It was a tough combination to beat, and some 31 enemy soldiers were killed in this sector alone for the loss of one American killed and one wounded.

As the tanks and infantry swept by the bunkers, Lt Farington put men back into the ones that had been vacated so that, when the first sweep was complete, the line was secure.

While this was going on, at 0238, bunkers 67 and 68 received direct hits from RPG's in the initial burst of the enemy's third and final assault, and they had to be abandoned. Sgt Douglas Chappell, B/1-7, was in the adjoining bunker, number 69, and he remembers, "The two bunkers on my left took direct hits from RPG's and the NVA were standing on top of them, firing at out bunker. About 25 of them started coming at us. They seemed to be working their way down the line to the CP bunker which was to the right of us (bunker 73). I started throwing frags (fragmentation grenades) as fast as I could and laying down a base of fire with my 16. I guess I threw about 60 frags. For a while I didn't think we could hold them off, but I was determined they weren't going to take my bunker."


Lt Hitner, with his reaction force "All Glory" was still in the vicinity of bunker 61, but when he heard the firing further down the line, he again responded to the call. He left one CEV at bunker 62 and moved the rest down the road toward bunker 68. "There were RPG rounds going all over the place," he recalls, "and people scurrying back and forth across the road. We couldn't tell if they were gooks or friendlies."

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As the lead track approached bunker 67 it was hit with two RPG's and three of the crew were wounded. Hitner deployed his force, and put fire into the gap where bunkers 67 and 68 were, adding considerably to the enemy's problems in the area. Apparently, "All Glory" forced some of the NVA that had made it to the road to evade in the other direction, as SP/4 Albert Joines who was in bunker 71, tells this story:

"I was putting out fire from my bunker when I heard this voice behind me. In perfect English this guy said, 'Hey Buddy! What bunker ya on?' It sounded just like a GI to me, so I said, '71'. I turned back around to defend my position when a B-40 hit the top of my bunker. I didn't know what the hell was going on. Then I saw this guy and his buddy drawing a bead on the bunker again. I cranked the 60 around and started throwing out lead. They lit out for the tall grass about 50 yards behind me and hid; we fought em for about half an hour. They kept harassing us by runnin' back and forth in the grass and firing at us. We finally got em when an illumme caught them trying to cut the lima-lima line to the CP bunker."

It was also some of the attackers at this location that managed to get into the French village on the other side of the road. The barbed wire that surrounds the village had been blown up in several places by artillery of some kind. It has been suggested that the village was one of the enemy's objectives, and that he blew the gaps in the wire with Bangalore torpedoes. The engineers who repaired the wire, however, say that the gaps were not the sort that Bangalores make, but seem to have been made by a high explosive round of some sort, possibly a plastic round from one of the CEV's. It is far more likely that the enemy troops that had made it inside the outer perimeter wire to the road found themselves trapped between "All Glory" on the right and SP/4 Joines and his bunker-mates on the left,




and simply took the path of least resistance.

It seemed like everyone was running out of ammunition at this time, and the base defense net was flooded with urgent requests for resupply. Major Blake, still fighting over by bunker 16, sent his jeep driver back to the CP tent to get some and take it over to bunker 68. He did not intend for the young man to go alone, but that is what he did. He drove all the way over to the other side of the perimeter with a APC-load of ammunition, dropped it off as close to bunker 68 as he could get, and drove back to the Blue sector as calmly as if he were taking a Sunday drive through the park.

1LT Douglas A Cohn, B/1-9, who was in his company's rear area, went over to the TOC to see if there was anything that needed doing. He was told that the troops in the green sector were running low on ammunition. He commandeered a jeep, filled it with the needed supplies, and drove down to the green sector where he linked up with the "All Glory" people.

Sgt Chappell, still in bunker 69, had the same supply problem but found a different solution. "I ran down to the next bunker and grabbed all the ammo I could, but I still had a hard time. It took me a long time to get the ammo back because an NVA sniper on top of one of the bunkers kept firing his AK at me. Every time I moved he opened up on me. Somehow I managed to get back with the ammo."

At 0330 hours a platoon from A Company 5-7th Cav, Brigade QRF, arrived in the vicinity of the fighting around bunker 68, and the situation very quickly stabilized. The infantry re-manned the bunkers while "All Glory", with the help of Lt Cohn and his jeep, started evacuating some of the 16 wounded, 13 of them from the bunkers and three from Lt Hitner's lead track. Through quick reaction and no small amount of heroic fighting the gaps had been plugged, and the enemy




denied a significant penetration.

However, at least one small group of enemy sappers did get all the way through, as medic SP/5 Allan Sedam can attest. He was sleeping in his hootch only 100 meters from the Third Brigade TOC when, at about 0400 hours he was awakened by incoming. Sedam recalls: "We ran out of the hootch towards our bunker and there they were!" Three enemy sappers were crouched in a ditch not 20 yards from their bunker. "We opened up with our '16's. Then they threw Chicoms (grenades) and fired several RPG's at us." One RPG narrowly missed them, knocking a five-foot hole in the wooden hootch behind them. Sedam and his small force of several medics soon silenced all three attackers.

Unfortunately the incoming that had awakened Sedam and his hootch-mates took its toll. A Cobra gunship, coming in for fuel after flying in support of the troops at Sidewinder, was hit by one of the 107mm rockets on the runway. The aircraft was totally demolished and one of its crew - the aircraft commander - killed. A UH-1 Huey supply chopper was also hit in the barrage while sitting on the 1-8 log pad, but no one was hurt in that incident.

As the early hours of the morning wore on, the clerks, cooks, and short-timers of the 1-8th were still taking fire from the tall grass behind the road in the Blue Sector. Major Blake and Lt Farington decided that they should sweep through the area a second time with their impromptu combined-arms team. This time they started at bunker 13, using RF Charlie which had arrived in support to man some of the bunkers, and they worked their way along the road toward bunker 18. There they were to meet RF Bravo, which had also been sent to the area to help. A few more enemy were killed in this sweep, and the sniping subsided.


It was beginning to get light when the tanks reached bunker 18. Lt Farington linked up with 2Lt Robert E. Walters (B-31st Engineers), the RFB Commander and placed the troops from this force in bunkers 11-14.



The attack on Quan Loi had not been a successful one for the enemy. It was later discovered that he had deployed three companies of the 4th Battalion, J-16 Sapper Regiment against the LZ - the 34th, 35th, and 37th Companies - and these were backed up with elements of the enemy 272nd Regiment. Normally on a sapper attack of that size, the enemy would hope to kill many more Americans and do considerably more damage than he managed to accomplish on this attack. Five defenders did lose their lives, but the enemy was unable to place his satchel charges on anything of value, and he actually failed to make even a significant penetration. The Third Brigade's concept of a mobile defense was most effective, reaction forces arriving at each location in time to catch the enemy in his confusion after he had broken through the last strand of wire.


It was difficult, however, to tell just what the enemy's objectives were. One prisoner, Sgt Phung Van Kia, probably came the closest to spelling it out for us when he belligerently said that his mission was to "breach the wire and kill every American in the area." Yet Sapper Tran Son, 3d Group, 34th Company, who was captured in the vicinity of bunker 60, claims that his mission was to destroy a certain concrete building (possibly the 11th ACR's Officers Mess) after the first five men in the group had cut the wire. The remaining 19 members of his group were to destroy the village, but the element leader made a mistake and cut the wire in the wrong place. The most likely possibility, however, is that the sappers were just to make holes in the wire and blow the critical bunkers so that a main infantry unit could get through and destroy as much of the LZ's military capability, including personnel, as possible.

It is even less clear why they hit over by bunker 16. A large brick building to the left of bunker 13 seems to have been a target of some kind from the number of RPG's that hit it, but nothing was in it. This building was used to billet troops from the 11th ACR when they were at Quan Loi for maintenance stand-down, but on this particular night it was empty. The enemy could have been




aiming for the artillery battery behind the green line at this point, but the sappers that did get through the wire gave no indication that this was their target.


Whatever the enemy goal, he did not achieve it, unless it was to have 55 of his best-trained sappers killed, and four of them captured. His main attack of the campaign was blunted rather harshly, with the assistance of the brave troops of the second platoon, A Company, 1-4th Mech (which will be covered in part III), and the fighting spirit of the Skytroopers of the First Cav was more than a match for the enemy's best. As one Cav Trooper was heard to comment upon searching a particularly dead enemy soldier, "Man, for this Charlie the twelfth of August was the twelfth of never!"



PART III: CONTACT OF A TROOP, 1-4 ARMORED CAV, SOUTHEAST OF QUAN LOI

From 7 through 11 August, A Troop, 1-4 Cav was working OPCON to 1-16 Mech around fire support base Eagle I (XT 697927) and Eagle II (XT 748931). The troop was headquartered at Eagle II. On the morning of 11 August the unit was operating around Quan Loi (LZ Andy). A Troop's initial mission was to set up a blocking screen to cover the south and southeast approaches to LZ Andy. At 1700 hours, the three platoons of A Troop were located in the following positions: The 1st platoon was situated on Road 245 about 3 kilometers southwest of Quan Loi, (XT 809883). The second platoon was guarding the eastern approach to Quan Loi planted astride Road 303 at XT 833894. The third platoon, which harbored the command post was entrenched in the rubber at XT823884, along a dirt road three kilometers south of Andy (See illustration A). At 1800 hours on 11 August, the S-3 from 1-8 called Captain William J. Newell, the troop Commander of A/1-4, to tell him that heavy enemy troop movement was reported in the area roughly 1000 meters east of where the 2nd platoon was set up. Captain Newell then got in touch with Platoon Sergeant Lawrence D. Noland Jr, acting 2nd platoon leader, and instructed him to move his platoon east along road 303 until reaching the fork it makes with road 345. Sergeant Noland got his men together, they mounted their platoon's six tracks and two tanks, and rumbled east to the designated fork. The 2nd platoon moved into the area at 1915 hours. Sergeant Noland then set up his vehicles in a 360-degree defense configuration, with each tank covering the avenues of approach that the fork afforded, and the personnel carriers (PC) interspersed between them. The acting platoon leader then situated his three starlight scopes so that they surveyed in the general direction of north, east, and south into the rubber (See Illustration B). By 1945 hours, the 2nd platoon had completed its assigned defense mission for the night, setting up an ambush. The tank and PC commanders received their usual night briefing (light and noise





SITE OF 2A/1-4 CAV CONTACT


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discipline, etc), and Sergeant Noland instructed the vehicle commanders to call in situation reports every 15 minutes. He, in turn, was to call in his platoon's situation report to Captain Newell, who was with the 3d platoon, every 30 minutes.

Nothing of any consequence happened for the next two hours. But at 2200 hours the starlight scope facing north spotted two enemy moving along the northern edge of the fork (See Diagram B). Sergeant Noland papped a hand flare, and platoon elements fired on the movement with unknown enemy losses. There was no return fire.

Between 2400 hours and 0100 hours on 12 August, the starlight scopes detected enemy movement in three directions - north of the upper fork, south of the lower fork, and in between the forks (See Diagram B). Sergeant Noland then had his platoon put out small arms fire in the three directions to try to discover what was out there. At this time, all tank fire was held back. Most of the firing was coming from the .50 caliber and M-60 machineguns on the PC's. The enemy answered with return fire, to include a couple of rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire. Sergeant Noland now ordered his tanks to traverse slowly and fire their canister rounds sparingly. The enemy fire began to increase in intensity, but the second platoon had yet to receive any casualties. Then at 0130 hours, the gunner on PC 29 took sniper fire from a tree to his front, receiving a leg flesh wound. Then the second man on the vehicle, the driver, took a round through the nose by the same sniper (See Diagram B). The gunner and driver were put on stretchers and attended to by the medic. The driver was medevaced in the early morning light hours.

The enemy volume of fire continued to accelerate, with a noticeable increase in RPG's fired down the rubber rows. They were landing erratically everywhere, many times flying overhead, from one side of the fork to the other, impacting in the rubber. Sergeant Noland tried to reach Captain Newell but was unable to get



through so he turned his full attention to his unit. At 0200 hours, PC 21 received an RPG round near its gas tank; the PC's bucket seat and M-60 machinegun were instantly blown away. Three men were wounded as a result of this action - the vehicle commander was hit in the head by RPG fragments, the driver received chest shrapnel, and the gunner received a serious wound in his left arm. All three were put on stretchers and given first aid by the busy medic. PC 21 was no longer putting out fire. Once again Sergeant Noland tried to reach the Troop Commander on his command radio, but once again it was to no avail.

At 0215 hours, Sergeant Noland radioed his forward observer (FO) to request illumination ships. The 2nd platoon had a limited supply of hand flares to light the area. The FO, on the headquarters track, tried repeatedly to get illumination and artillery support, but was unsuccessful. At 0230 hours he was hit, receiving a head wound, and was layed out on a stretcher. At this time, an enemy machinegun, located directly in front of PC 22 in the rubber (See diagram B) opened fire. It was knocked out within 10 to 15 minutes.

The enemy continued to put out extremely heavy RPG fire and moderately heavy small arms fire. Some enemy began to crawl out of the rubber onto roads 303 and 345 and getting within 5 feet of the vehicles before being stopped by small arms fire and hand grenades. The situation was becoming increasingly critical. Again Sergeant Noland tried to reach his CO over his command radio net. He was on two pushes, to his platoon and CO. Noland did not discover until first light that the antenna to the CO's push had been shot off. Up until that time he was extremely puzzled as to why Captain Newell failed to acknowledge the 2nd platoon call sign. Fortunately at 0245 hours, an unidentified helicopter passed overhead and made radio contact with Sergeant Noland. The pilot, after a quick briefing, got through to Captain Newell, who finally became aware of the 2nd platoon's fire fight, about two hours after it had begun. Captain Newell decided quickly to move the 3d

platoon to reinforce the 2nd platoon. At the same time, he instructed the 1st platoon to move north along Road 245 to where it junctioned with Road 303 and establish a blocking position at that point. Captain Newell directed the 3d platoon northwest along the dirt road in the rubber in which he had established the troop's command post. Once the platoon reached Road 303, the vehicles swung east and rumbled the approximate 3 kilometers to where the 2nd platoon was embroiled with the enemy (See Diagram A).

While the 3d platoon was enroute, the sniper that had been harassing PC 29 was finally eliminated. Shortly thereafter, an RPG round hit the front of PC 29. The track driver was wounded in the neck and the PC commander was knocked unconscious for about 30 minutes by the concussion. The vehicle's .50 caliber machinegun was also rendered inoperative, but was functioning again after 45 minutes of frenzied repairs. By the time Captain Newell reached the contact area, 5 of Sergeant Noland's men were in need of Medevac while 6 others had wounds of a less serious nature.

When Captain Newell was within 100 meters of the 2nd platoon, he ordered his tracks to start reconning the flanks of Road 303 with M-60 and .50 caliber machinegun fire. As it later turned out there were no enemy to the west of the 2nd platoon along Road 303 because the rubber was cut back 20 meters on each side of the road. The enemy was concentrated directly north, east, and south of the 2nd platoon along the forks of the road where the rubber came up to the edge of both split-offs.

When Captain Newell arrived with the 3d platoon he deployed three PC's each on the northern and southern sides of Road 303 facing the rubber and moved his two tanks to protect the approaches from the two forks (See Diagram C). By this time both tanks of the 2nd platoon were down to 9 and 7 cannister rounds each from a basic load of 50; 6 of the platoon's eight .50 caliber machineguns were


inoperative due either to expended ammunition or enemy fire, and the troops were very low on rounds. Sergeant Noland estimated that his platoon was, at best, a half-hour from being overrun.

Around 0330 hours, the 3d platoon tank guarding the northern fork approach (Road 345) was hit on the side of the turret with an RPG round and rolled forward 30 to 40 meters (See Diagram C). The tank commander, gunner, and driver were all wounded. Somehow the commander got out of his cupola, dragging the gunner with him and returned to the 2nd platoon perimeter. The tank driver was still inside and could not be returned for because of the heavy volume of enemy fire.

After Captain Newell arrived, Sergeant Nolan informed him that he had been unable to secure any tube artillery, ARA, or illumination support. The CO told him to keep trying. Captain Newell then decided to commit the 1st platoon into the area to further reinforce the contact. The 1st platoon left its holding position and rumbled $3\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers east along Road 303. Fifty meters from the contact area, the lead tank of the 1st platoon took a direct hit from an RPG round, blew up and killed the driver. The remainder of the crew miraculously got out and hopped on the first 1st platoon track that came by. Once the 1st platoon reached the contact area, Captain Newell deployed its tracks in the same fashion as he had those of the 3d platoon and sent the remaining tank to guard the northern fork approach (See Diagram C).


Then, at 0400 hours, a good three hours after the first heavy contact, illumination arrived. Cobra gunships from Blue Max arrived on station and ringed an area 50 meters out from the friendly force with a shower of steel. Captain Newell said, "Those Cobras did a truly outstanding job." After Blue Max worked out, enemy pressure lifted enough for dust-off to take place. With the illumination, Sergeant Noland's five seriously wounded men, including the FO, were evacuated at 0430 hours. At the same time, two troops rushed to extract the wounded

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


DIAGRAM(A)

DIAGRAM(B)



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


driver from the 3d platoon tank that had been hit around 0330 hours. He was subsequently evacuated but died shortly thereafter.

After the Cobra gunships expended their lethal firepower, the enemy volume of firepower abruptly decreased in intensity from heavy to sporadic. By 0500 hours, all contact had ceased. The reasons for the delay in artillery and illumination support was a combination of ubiquitous enemy contact in the early morning hours of 12 August and the relatively low priority of A Troop, 1-4.

A first light sweep of the contact area revealed 23 NVA KIA, numerous blood trails, 14 AK-47 rifles, 3 RPD launchers, 25 RPG rounds with boosters, 51 hand grenades, 1 bolt-action rifle, and 1 RPD machinegun. A Troop, 1-4 Cav also discovered 9 bunkers on both sides of the upper fork (Road 345) freshly dug. These bunkers, splattered with blood, were 20 meters back from the road and 40 meters from the 2nd platoon perimeter. A sweep of the contact area a day later, 13 August, by elements of the 1-8th Cav produced 15 more bodies for a total of 38 NVA KIA. Both Captain Newell and Sergeant Noland estimated the enemy force at between 100 and 150 men. Captain Newell speculated as to the identity of the enemy unit, either D368 or the 141st of the 7th NVA Division, while the unit was actually hit by an entire battalion from the 272nd, as was learned from a PW on 18 August.

Total friendly losses were 2 US KIA and 12 wounded, 6 of which required Medevac. After Captain Newell arrived at the fire fight, the 2nd platoon took no further casualties. Two more PC's of the platoon were hit by RPG rounds, but RPG screens on the front of the PC's saved them from serious damage. Sergeant Nolan wrote down that his platoon alone had fired 14,000 rounds .50 caliber, 2 cases of M-16 rounds, detonated 2 cases of claymores and used up 12 cases of M-79 HE.



PART IV: CONTACT OF 1-16 (MECHANIZED) TASK FORCE

On the afternoon of 7 August, at 1342 hours, the 1-16 Mech was alerted to clear fire support base Jim. At this time, the Battalion (-) was OPCON to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and composed of A and C Companies, which were to be the only two organic line companies it was to employ for the next ten days. The Battalion (-) also included Headquarters and Headquarters Company; there was no reconnaissance platoon or tanks. By 1530 hours the column tail of the 1-16 was out of Jim. The Battalion closed into fire support base Aspen (XT 749801) at 0315 hours on 8 August. At 0800 hours the same day, the 1-16 left Aspen for fire support base Eagle I (XT 696927), arriving there at 1330 hours. The Battalion (-) left Eagle I after one hour, and moved to establish and secure fire support base Eagle II (XT 747930). The 1-16 also provided security for the movement of 4-9 ARVN headquarters and a self-propelled 155mm battery (6 tubes) from Eagle I to Eagle II. Later in the afternoon of 8 August, A Troop, 1-4 Cav became OPCON to 1-16. On 8, 9, and 10 August, 1-16 operated from Eagle II with a task force consisting of its own A and C Companies, A/1-4, a 155mm self-propelled battery, and with 4-9 ARVN Headquarters co-located at the fire support base in Dong Tien fashion.


The 1-16th first received word of NVA presence in the Fishhook on 8 August. The battalion also knew that the 271st and 272nd NVA Regiments were planning a push to An Loc and Quan Loi in the very near future. On 10 August, A/1-4 was released from OPCON of 1-16. That same day, one platoon from C Company, 1-16, together with one company from 4-9 ARVN, killed 23 NVA in the vicinity of XT 637972. At 1340 hours on 11 August, the 1-16 was ordered to move to and secure a fire support base at XT 727968, which was to become Allons II.

In the evening of 11 August, C Company, 1-16 was at Allons II as a ready reaction force with D Company, 5-7 Cav OPCON. A Company, 1-16 was 7 kilometers


southeast at fire support base Thunder IV (XT 762896) for security. Shortly after midnight, on 12 August, the 9th ARVN Command Post at Chanh Tanh was hit with B-40 rocket and small arms fire. A short time later, enemy infiltration began to apply strong pressure on ARVN elements at Chanh Tanh. A Company, at Thunder IV, was alerted to begin preparations for moving to Chanh Tanh to reinforce.

At 0141 hours, fire base Aspen came under enemy attack; the 1-16 was alerted for possible deployment to Aspen. By 0200 hours, 1-16 had been alerted for Chan Tanh, Aspen, An Loc, and Thunder IV. Five minutes later, suspecting an imminent enemy attack, C Company at Allons II dismounted all personnel from its tracks, except for the commanders and gunners for the .50 caliber machineguns, to man the perimeter. However, between 0230 hours and 0345 hours, things quieted down and all elements of 1-16 returned to their normal alert status.

At 0605 hours, A Company, 1-16 was alerted to leave Thunder IV and execute a counter-attack plan. At 0609 hours, the Company pulled out of the fire support base and moved north to XT 739924, just south of Eagle II. At 0609 hours, 1-16 received work from the 11th ACR to move one company (C) to recon within a 4 square kilometer grid box (2 kilometers on a side) centered on XT 6891. Initial emphasis was to be given to the northwest corner of the box. The 1-16 was also instructed to move a rifle company (D/5-7th Cav) to screen, facing east, a 4 kilometer square grid box centered on XT 6889. A Company, now positioned below Eagle II, was instructed to check out a 4 kilometer grid box centered on XT 7288. All three companies of 1-16 task force now had specific instructions and began moving to carry them out. A Company waited at its position south of Eagle II until C Company, with D/5-7 Cav OPCON, moved south from Allons II and married up (See Diagram A). The 1-16 task force, with C Company first in the order of movement, began moving in a southwest direction.



At 0705 hours on 12 August, lead elements of C Company received heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire from the vicinity of XT 706903 (See Diagram A). The first track in the column was hit by an RPG round and knocked out of action. A few seconds later, the driver was felled by a 57mm recoilless rifle. The task force deployed on line and prepared to sweep the ambush site down the rubber rows against an enemy estimated to be the size of a reinforced company. A Company was on the left and C Company on the right, with the Cav troops from D/5-7 dismounting on line in front of the tracks and interspersed among them. The battalion commander's track was wedged between A and C Companies, and two tracks were staggered behind the right and left extremes on the line protecting the flanks (See Diagram B). Troops from A and C Companies jumped off their tracks and darted for cover. From prone positions they opened up with their organics laying down bases of fire. This fire supplemented the tracks' .50 caliber and M-60 machinegun fire which was spraying the area. There was much crawling back and forth between firing positions and tracks for ammunition resupply. The general direction of fires was north-south, with the task force located north. The enemy fire output steadily increased. Around 0745 hours, tube artillery, gunships and aerial rocket artillery were called in to support. About this time, the battalion commander's track and those of the A and C company commanders were all knocked out by RPG's. All three commanders mounted other tracks. The enemy tried to move northwest to cut off C Company's right flank. However, due to aggressive fighting by the 1-16 task force, the enemy was forced eastward. The strategy was to force the enemy 1400 meters eastward out of the rubber and into a clearing where artillery and cobra gunships from the 1st Air Cavalry Division's 2d/20th ARA Battalion (Blue Max) could place more accurate fire on him (See Diagram B). As the day progressed, contact was continuous. By 1200 hours, three more tracks from the 1-16 task force had been rendered inoperative, two due to RPG rounds and




one as a result of 60mm mortar fire; no injuries resulted. However, shortly after noon, AK-47 fire from a sniper killed one US soldier. At 1400 hours, the command and control helicopter of the battalion's S-3 was shot down by .50 caliber fire at an altitude of 600 feet. One gunner and the co-pilot were wounded; they were extracted 15 minutes later by 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) aircraft. By 1500 hours, the S-3 was in another aircraft and back over the contact area. At 1600 hours, on command from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment commander, contact was broken. All friendly units returned to their original fire support bases to resume their ready reaction force responsibilities.

Throughout the contact hours, D Company, 5-7 Cav was quite instrumental in enabling A and C Companies of 1-16 (Mech) to force the NVA to move east and prevent them from turning either friendly flank. To quote Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth G. Cassels, the battalion commander, "I have never witnessed more aggressive fighting by a unit over here in Vietnam than D/5-7; it did a hell of a job."

C Company, 1-11 Armored Cavalry Regiment did not arrive in the contact area until 1500 hours, at the tail end of the fire fight. It was not able to make a significant contribution to the total effort.

The results of the contact showed 29 NVA KIA by actual body count and numerous blood trails. Enemy equipment seized during the day's action included 35 Chicom grenades, 2 AK-47 rifles, 2 M-16 rifles, 4 RPG-2 launchers, 1 RPG-7 launcher with 1 B-40 round, 1x57R round, and 10xD-40 boosters. Friendly casualties showed 2 US KIA, 27 US WIA, and 5 PC's destroyed.





12 AUG 69.

TF-16:



AN LOC.

DIAGRAM(A)



12 AUG 69
TF-16
AN LOC
ALLONS II
EAGLE II
THUNDER II
AN LOC


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
APPENDIX V: E Troop, 2-11th ACR Counter-Attack

E Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th ACR secured and reinforced LZ Sidewinder during the early morning hours of 12 August 1969. At approximately 0700 hours on the same day, E Troop received an order to move from LZ Sidewinder and conduct reconnaissance in force operations of an area approximately 4 kilometers to their northwest. This operation was part of the overall counter-attack plan which was initiated by allied forces against the enemy.


To accomplish this mission, E Troop was ordered to proceed up "Route T" to an area designated "R-4". If contact was not made with the enemy, the Troop was then to proceed to an area designated "R-5" and conduct further reconnaissance of this area. At this time, E Troop consisted of 3 Mechanized Platoons and a Headquarters element, which was composed of 16, M113A1, ACAV Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's). H Company, 2-11th ACR which was composed of 2 tank platoons and one ACAV platoon was to follow E Troop via "Route Z" and recon an area designated "R-6".




On order, E Troop began moving to "R-4" and made no contact with the enemy while en route and during the reconnaissance of the area. Consequently, the Troop regrouped and moved to "R-5" and again made no contact during this reconnaissance operation. The Troop then split into platoon size elements and began conducting reconnaissance of the surrounding area. In the meantime, the Troop Commander's APC developed mechanical difficulty resulting in E Troop minus the 3d platoon, moving and regrouping at the village of Lang Nam. The 3d platoon continued to recon the area and in so doing split into smaller elements. Again the platoon made no contact with the enemy so it regrouped at a road junction approximately 1 kilometer east of Lang Nam. At this location, the platoon received small arms fire but contact broke immediately with no friendly casualties. The platoon then proceeded to Lang Nam where it rejoined the Troop.




While E Troop was accomplishing its mission, H Company began moving to "R-6" at 0800 on 12 August 1969 via "Route Z". While proceeding to their destination, the company had to fight its way in and out of Minh Duc making a passage through the lines of the 15th ARVN Cavalry which had a troop size unit in sporadic engagement within the town. H Company's area reconnaissance mission in "R-6" was completed without incident. However, in proceeding to and from this area, and in reinforcement of E Troop, they sustained 10 casualties; 2 KIA, 8 WIA, and lost two tanks to RPG fire.




After regrouping at the village, the commander directed the troop to return to the area in which the 3d platoon made contact. When the Troop arrived at the road junction, they found no enemy elements. E Troop then proceeded along the road in a southerly direction into a rubber plantation. It must be kept in mind that as the Troop moved towards the plantation, it was moving on




"Route Z" which H Company had passed over earlier that day. When the Troop reached the rubber plantation, the road upon which they were traveling ("Route Z") then turned to the southeast. As soon as the Troop entered the plantation,




the 3d platoon which was the lead element, spotted several individuals running. The platoon immediately engaged these individuals with their organic weapons and made a turning movement to the right allowing the platoon to move directly south through the plantation. The 2d platoon immediately deployed to provide security for the left flank and the entire Troop then went on line. Contact with the enemy was quickly broken. However, following a two to four minute lull, at 1210 hours on the 12 August 1969, E Troop began receiving heavy RPG and machinegun fire from all directions. Specialist 5th Class James E. Foote who was an APC driver for the 1st platoon of E Troop said, "I've never seen anything like it! We were getting fire from all directions! PC's (meaning armored personnel carriers) were getting hit all over the place. It was quiet and then all at once all hell broke loose!" The majority of the fire was coming from a bunker complex that was located within the rubber plantation which was off the road.



This complex was 200 meters long (from east to west) and 75 meters in width (from north to south). The bunker complex turned out to be a base area for a battalion of the 271st Regiment of the 9th VC Division.



NOTE: Initially, 3d platoon (on the right) detected movement. Moving forward the platoon made a turning movement to the right, heading directly south. The 1st platoon was directed to move up on the left. After a 2 to 4 minute lull following minor small arms fire, the assaulting elements came under heavy fire from numerous RPG teams, and possible heavy machinegun fire. Elements from the 2d platoon moved up to protect the left flank. At this time the assault was halted, E Troop having sustained 43 total casualties and 7 ACAV's hit by RPG fire. (Small squares represent ACAV's with E Troop bumper numbers shown within).




The terrain consisted of red clay, new rubber trees which were 14 feet in height and had foliage. There were also numerous terraces which provided the enemy cover and concealment. The visibility at the time was good and E Troop began closing on line from north to south. E Troop fired its weapons without restriction to all flanks and to the front of their location. As the troop continued south, they approached the bunker complex and fighting became quite fierce.

E Troop continued to close with and destroy the enemy until the Troop Commander had lost two platoon leaders and could not continue forward. The Squadron CO, who was on the scene by this time, directed the Troop to redeploy so artillery and Tac Air could be directed onto the objective. At this time, five APC's were burning in the area of contact. The remaining vehicles moved back to Lang Nam in order to Medevac their casualties. The S-3 then directed air strikes into the area along with artillery and ARA.

H Company was later directed to move into the area of contact to recover the dead. At 1425 hours on 12 August 1969, H Company entered the area and received RPG fire sustaining two casualties who eventually died from their wounds. Fire was returned and H Company was instructed to withdraw to allow an air strike to be employed. They were further instructed to move fire support base Aspen and secure it. The reason being, the weather was closing, air support was not available, and neither were Command and Control aircraft.


2Lt Hudkins was the platoon leader of the 2d platoon of E Troop. His vehicle was one of the first APC's to be hit by RPG fire. The unit medic checked the wounded officer and pronounced him dead due to the large amount of blood coming from his chest and groin. There were no signs of life and the medic moved on to assist other wounded personnel. At approximately 1700 hours on 15 August 1969, an Air Cavalry Troop was flying in the contact area of the



12 August encounter. Several kilometers due south from the battle site, at the edge of the plantation, an APC was observed and troops were inserted into the area to investigate. When the ground elements arrived at the location of the APC, they found 2Lt Hudkins inside the APC and still alive after three days.

The Lieutenant vaguely remembered the artillery concentrations and the insuring air strikes. Apparently, he crawled back inside his APC (E-22) and attempted to bandage his wounds. It is believed that the Lieutenant remained at that location the entire night and on 13 August drove his APC to the location where he was located on 15 August.

Between 1300 hours on 12 August and 0300 hours on 13 August, 4 air strikes were placed into the area of contact along with artillery. During this period a total of 8x750 pounds high explosive (HE) bombs, 22x500 pound HE bombs, 14 Napalm bombs, 386 rounds of 105 howitzer, and 46 rounds of 8" Howitzer were placed within 1,000 meters of the contact area enveloping E Troop. Furthermore, 8 cobras from the 2d Bn (ARA), 20t. Artillery expended all their ammunition into this area during the same time period. The initial contact with E Troop resulted in 31 NVA being killed, while the Troop had 4 Americans killed, 32 wounded, and 1 missing in action. The artillery concentrations that followed the ground battle resulted in 12 NVA being killed while ARA accounted for 15 additional NVA being killed which brought the total to 58 NVA soldiers who died. The air strikes resulted in 75 NVA bunker complex being destroyed.



RESULTS OF TROOP E ENGAGEMENT OF 12 AUGUST 1969

1. PERSONNEL:

- a. Enemy: 31 KIA; 12 Killed by Artillery; 15 Killed by Helicopter
- b. Friendly: 38 WIA; 4 KIA; 1 MIA


2. EQUIPMENT:

- a. Enemy Losses: 8 RPG-7; 7 RPG-2; 12 AK-47 rifles, 32 Rounds B-40; and 15 Hand Grenades
- b. The following is a list of weapons and equipment by type recovered by US Forces from E Troop engagement on 12 August 1969.

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Type</u> | <u>Disposition</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Four (4) ea | M113A1 ACAV's | Combat Loss |
| Three (3) ea | M113A1 ACAV's | Moderate Damage |
| Twenty One (21) ea | CVC Helmets | Combat Loss |
| Two (2) ea | Radios RT-125/VRC | Combat Loss |
| Two (2) ea | Radios R-442/VRC | Combat Loss |
| One (1) ea | Radio RT-246/VRC | Moderate Damage |
| One (1) ea | Radio R-442/VRC | Moderate Damage |
| Fourteen (14) ea | M-60 Machinegun | Combat Loss |
| Twenty Six (26) ea | M-16 Rifles | Combat Loss |
| Five (5) ea | Cal. 45 Pistols | Combat Loss |
| Five (5) ea | M-79 Grenade Launchers | Combat Loss |
| Five (5) ea | Cal. .50 Machineguns | Combat Loss |

- c. The following is a list of weapons and equipment not recovered and presumed in the hands of the enemy from the engagement of 12 August 1969.

| <u>Number</u> | <u>Type</u> | <u>Disposition</u> |
|-----------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Two (2) ea | M-60 Machineguns | Hand of enemy |
| Sixteen (16) ea | M-16 Rifles | Hand of enemy |
| Two (2) ea | M-79 Grenade Launchers | Hand of enemy |
| One (1) ea | Cal .50 Machinegun | Hand of enemy |



APPENDIX I

INTERROGATION REPORTS, HOI CHANH NGUYEN VAN AN.

A. Initial Interrogation Report.

1. Nguyen Van An, Private, Sapper, 1st Squad, 2d Platoon, 2d Company, unknown battalion, 272d Regiment, 9th VC Division. rallied at XT 721858 on 29 July at approximately 1800 hours to the 214th Regional Force Company. Source had no weapons or documents in his possession at time of capture, but he did have a compass.

2. Under questioning, An gave the following information about his unit and other units of which he had knowledge:

Source said the 2d Company had approximately 80 men. Source had no knowledge of any units of the 9th VC Division.

Source stated that the 9th VC Division had 3 regiments; the 1st, 2d and 3d. Source said each regiment had 3 battalions. The 2d Regiment consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 6th battalions. The following companies are attached directly to the 2d Regiment: H-16 (82mm Mortar Company); H-17 (DK 75 Company); H-18 (122mm Rocket Company); H-19 (Engineer Company) and the 2d Company Sapper Reconnaissance.

Source stated that he and approximately 80 other men comprising the 2d Company were receiving sapper training, and he had heard some of the other men speak of much fighting in the future (hearsay).

3. Background:

Source said he and 18 others joined 2d Company on July 7th 1969. He had been forced to join the VC on 3 June 1969 at My Hank village when 5 VC and approximately 18 other new recruits came to My Hank. From there they were taken to Long An Province, Tan Tru District, Tan Phouc village where they picked up some ammunition. Source and approximately 14 othersmen carried 5 B-40 rounds each. They carried this ammunition to Tay Ninh Province, Tra Cau village. This part of the trip took approximately 15 days. They then took the ammunition from Tra Cau village across the border into Cambodia. Source arrived in his Cambodian base camp on 7 July 1969, and that day he started his training as a sapper.

4. Interrogator's Comment: Source was very cooperative and he answered questions without hesitation. Source volunteered all knowledge which he felt would be helpful. Source twice stated that he was willing to guide allied troops into the area.

5. Present Disposition of Captive: Source is presently located at the MACV Compound, An Loc District, Binh Long Province, SVN.

6. OB Comment: Source seems to be making a memorized recital of AKA's and organization of his knowledge is unusually broad for a private, forced laborer, who has been with the 9th VC Division for only 59 days. The source correctly states the AKA's for the 272d Regiment, the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of the 272d Regiment, and the H-19 Engineer Company and the H-21 Sapper Recon Company. He has confused his identification of the regimental AKA's for the 271st and 273d, however, and H-16's and H-17's designations were reversed by the source. H-16 is the 75mm RR Company and H-17 is the 82mm mortar company. Regimental size forces do not normally have a 122mm rocket capability. The 9th VC Division has historically been charged with opening the east-west route to Saigon from the vicinity of the Angel's Wing east. The 88th Regiment was mentioned in Source's spot report as continuing to operate in Tay Ninh Province west of Tay Ninh city and north. Sources knowledge of other

units in the fishhook could be partially correct. The 1st and the 7th NVA Divisions headquarters elements could be in the area. Elements of the 5th VC Division may have moved north during the last two weeks. In the past it has operated along the Saigon River below the Fishhook.

B. Supplementary Interrogation Report.


1. Background: Source now admitted, two days after the above, that he was a platoon leader in the H-21 Sapper Recon Company, 272d Regiment, 9th VC Division. He stated that by 20 June 69 elements of the 271st and 272d Regiments had returned to the Fishhook area while the 88th Regiment remained in the Tay Ninh area. The 9th VC Division re-located into the area between the O Slai Strang stream and O Loved Stream.

2. Mission: After the withdrawal into the Cambodian sanctuaries all four divisions (1st, 5th, 7th, and 9th) dispatched their subordinate Recon companies to reconnoiter targets in SVN. After one month of reconnaissance the companies were recalled to discuss the situation. On 20 July, the Recon platoons belonging to the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions of the 272d Regiment, along with their respective Battalion Commanders, were dispatched to the An Loc area to scout the situation there. They were to choose possible avenues of approach. The 6th Battalion will have the mission of providing a blocking force between village 8 (XT701857) and Binh Ninh (XT721862). The Sapper Company of the 272d will attack Binh Ninh. The 271st Regiment will set up a blocking force between Village 6 (XT688875) and Village 8. The Binh Long Local Force Battalion (D368) will operate with the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 272d Regiment. However, if D368 for some reason is unable to participate, then the Sapper Battalion (K59) from the 9th VC Division will replace them. An also believed that the four main force divisions would have the following targets: 9th VC Division - An Loc; 7th NVA Division - Quan Loi, Loc Ninh, Bo Duc; 1st NVA Division - Tay Ninh, and interdiction of QL 13 south of An Loc; 5th VC Division - Tay Ninh.

By 20 July, elements of the 7th NVA Division had re-located within a four kilometer radius of XU500050. At this time, the 1st and 5th NVA Divisions were also pulling back into Cambodia, along the border north of Tay Ninh. Also the K71 Hospital was located in Cambodia within a 3 kilometer radius of XU4904. There were numerous caches within a five to six kilometers radius of this area including one million liters of rice. An stated that motor vehicles are driven freely throughout this area.

3. Additional Information: Source stated he joined the VC five years ago when he was 14. Since then he had participated in battles with the 9th Division against Dond Xoai, Loc Ninh, An Loc, Bo Duc and Tay Ninh.


4. OB Comment: OB has no evidence of such a relocation of the four main force divisions. OB carries the 9th Division along and arc southwest of Tay Ninh City along the Cambodian border, however, OB cannot rule out the possibility of such a move. (ed. italics).



APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE BUILD-UP 25 July - 10 August 1969

1. 25 July: (XT 720737) 14 km S of An Loc, B/1-8 found documents left behind in a bunker complex by enemy they had driven out.
ID: 101D, C-18 Anti-aircraft Company.
2. 27 July: (XU 723030) On road between An Loc and Loc Ninh, F/2-11 killed 1 NVA. ID: C-2 Sapper Recon Co, 209th Regiment.
3. 28 July: (XT 717757), 3km SSW of An Loc, C/5-7 killed 2 NVA
ID: 271st, 272nd Regiments.
4. *29 July: (XT 719858), 3km W of An Loc, Nguyen Van An rallied to 214th RFC. Sent to An Loc Chieu Hoi Center, 31 July.
ID: 9th VC Division.
5. 31 July: (XT 359178) Vicinity Angel's Wing, Hoi Chanh Nguyen Van Do, XA Co 28 Hamlet Guerrillas rallied. Said 9th Div passed through Xa Co Hamlet (76°0) between 1-5 July.
6. 01 Aug: (XU 592073), 16km E of Loc Ninh, D/1-7 killed 5 NVA, captured 2. One PW said 7th NVA Division to attack Quan Loi.
7. *31 July: An Loc Chieu Hoi Center, US Interrogators discovered Hoi Chanh An (item 4 above) who said 9th VC Division was in the Fishhook.
8. 02 Aug: (XT 863877) Hoi Chanh Nguyen Van Sen who rallied to 399th RF at An Loc said two companies of the 9th VC Div were reconnoitering the area in mid-July and stayed two weeks. D368 LF followed them through.
9. 03 Aug: (XU 717044) Hoi Chanh wounded on 27 July (item 2) said the 209th Regiment would attack Soc 10 between 5 and 7 August.
10. *03 Aug: An Loc. Hoi Chanh An revealed he was from H-21 Sapper Recon Company, 272nd Regiment and he drew out basic plans for attacks on Binh Long Province by elements of the 9th, 7th, and 1st Divisions, 5-15 August. (See Appendix I)
11. 04 Aug: (XU 595105) ACT 11th ACR killed 4 NVA N of Fishhook, no ID.
12. 05-06 Aug: (XU 577188-58 172) N of Fishhook, ACT Killed 21 NVA.
13. 04 Aug: (WS 340189) Vicinity of Angel's Wing, Hoi Chanh Le Thanh Hien, Plt Ldr C-100 Sapper Co, H95 Recon Bn, 9th VC Division, rallied to 127th RFC. 9th Division at XT 970700.
14. 08 Aug: An Loc, Hoi Chanh Pham Van Do, member 8th Bn, 209th Regiment said that unit would cross Cambodian border at XT 5795, move east to cross Canle River to attack An Loc.
15. 09 Aug: (XU 638018) Vic. Fishhook, B/1-9 killed 23 NVA. ID: Foss 272nd



APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE BUILD-UP (CONTINUED)

16. 09 Aug: (XT 605905) 0905 Hours, vic Fishhook, ACT killed 33 NVA and captures 6. ID: 271 and 101D.

17. 09 Aug: XT 5990 grid square, vic Fishhook, 1115 hours BDA of B-52 strike spotted individuals sitting in stunned state. ARP's captured 6, killed 2, 4 NVA KBM, 2 NVA KBA. ID: 271 and 101D.

18. 10 Aug: (XT 622972) Fishhook, BDA spotted 40-50 individuals sitting in a lightly vegetated area. Psyops bird, ARP's, B/1-9 Blues, plt from 1-16 Mech, and Go from 4-9 ARVN's inserted. 31 NVA KIA, 4 PW, 4 HC. ID: 272nd Regiment.

Throughout the development of the intelligence picture, technological means made a significant contribution in helping to clarify the enemy's dispositions and intentions.

TOTALS: 5 US WIA, 129 NVA KIA, 16 PW's

APPENDIX III

CHRONOLOGY 12 August 1969, FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY LOSSES:

0045: Chon Thanh hit by an estimated enemy company and incoming mortars. F/2-11 ACR moved to SW end of airstrip for security. ID: 101D. 9 NVA KIA, 7 ARVN KIA, 22 ARVN WIA.

0105: LZ ANDY receives incoming followed by sapper attacks at three different locations (See Part II, Appendix 2) ID: 34, 35, 37th Co's, J-16 Armor Officer (Sapper), 272nd. 7 US KIA, 23 WIA, 55 NVA KIA, 7 PW.

0115: 2d Plt, A/1-4 hit by very heavy ground attack in screening position.

0120: An Loc receives heavy B-40 fire.

0135: Sidewinder receives incoming 60mm mortar rounds.

0141: Aspen receives four rounds, unknown variety, incoming.

0141: Phu Mieng (XT 7991) hit by 60 mm mortar incoming.

0150: An Loc and villages NW receives unknown number of mortar rounds.

0210: Loc Ninh, FSB Jon and MACV compound receive incoming and small ground probe. D/1-11 at N end of airstrip hit by RPG's. 12 NVA KIA.

0227: Aspen hit by heavy ground probe, Spooky arrives 0258. Situation quiet b- 0315. ID: 209th. 1 US KIA, 19 US WIA, 32 NVA KIA, 2 PW.

0228: D/1-11 ACR still taking RPG's, 2 vehicles burning, one US trapped in cupola. ID: 209th. 1 US KIA, 1 KCS KIA, 8 US WIA, 19 NVA KIA.

0241: Sidewinder under heavy attack. 0305 NVA in wire, 0315 11 ACR to send E/2-11 to reinforce. 0316 NVA inside NE side of perimeter, ARA, Spooky expend. 0330 E Trp moves out. 0400, 1st Plt, E Trp reaches perimeter; 0420 rest of E Trp closes. 0413 one Co 2-9 ARVN leading up to move to Sidewinder from Chon Tank. 0641 PW says NVA Battalion to hit 2-11. ID K2 Bn, 271st 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA, 44 ARVN KIA, 78 NVA KIA, 3 NVA PW, 4 HOI CHANHS.

0315: A/1-4 reinforces the 2d Plt. 2 US KIA, 14 WIA, 38 NVA KIA (ID: 272).

0341: Loc Ninh; 1-11 sends C Trp with 1 Co 34 Rangers to reinforce D Company.


0345: Hon Quan, vic An Loc, receives 4x107mm rocket at west gate.

0413: An Loc hit by 5x82mm mortar rounds from west.

0645: Blue Max engages enemy force evading vic XT 7908. 8 NVA KBH.

0745: A/1-16 marries up with C/1-16 and engages USEF while executing counter-attack plan; D/5-7 reinforces. 2 US KIA, 26 WIA, 29 NVA KIA.

0810: B/1-9 engages evading enemy force off Andy; 6 NVA KBH, 10 HOI CHANHS.

CONTINUED OVERLEAF

APPENDIX III

CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)

0820: A/1-5, B/1-5, and A/2-5 Cav combat assault into LZ "zulu" begins to block enemy egress as airmobile part of counter-attack plan.

0825: C/1-9 at XT 862890 receives ground fire, engages. 2 NVA KBH.

0840: B/1-9 Cav choppers engage enemy force evading vic XU 625175: 9 NVA KBH.

1005: A/1-11, 4-34 Rangers, 7km N of Loc Ninh engage USDF: 7 NVA KIA.

1140: CP/1-11 receives 20x82mm mortar rounds, no casualties or damage.

1210: E/2-11 while executing counter-attack plan engages Bn-size enemy force. 4 US KIA, 1 MIA*, 36 WIA, 31 NVA KIA, 12 NVA KBA, 13 NVA KBH.


1330: H/2-11 moves to reinforce E Trp, contacts USDF S of their position. 1 US KIA, 12 WIA, 29 NVA KIA. ID: 271.

1425: F/2-11 escorting convoy along QL 13 engages large enemy force. ID: 101D 2 US KIA, 50 NVA KIA.

1610: A/5-7 on sweep around Andy received one Hoi Chanh, apparently burned by fougasse.

| | | | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| TOTALS: | 20 US KIA 1 US MIA* 145 US WIA | 52 ARVN KIA 59 ARVN WIA | 460 NVA KIA 15 NVA PW |
|---------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|

*MIA from E/2-11: Letter was found supposedly from him inside I/3-11 night perimeter a month later. Letter seemed authentic and stated that MIA is in NLF hospital receiving medical attention.



THE BATTLE OF BINH LONG PROVINCE

APPENDIX IV: B-52 STRIKES

1. 041825 August
XT 495895-498905-465913-463903

- 042310 August
XU 936155-936165-966165-966155


2. 051110 August
XT 509903-481911-48921-512913

3. 062315 August
XT 509903-481911-483921-512913
062100 August
XT 448912-456917-472893-464888

4. 071625 August
XT 571959-581964-556985-565990
072110 August
XU 803245-811252-832232-825224
070915 August
XT 609878-619879-621859-611858

5. 081630 August
XT 588910-597917-614894-607888
081125 August
XT 603932-602921-633928-632919
080635 August
XT 639529-643935-658909-651904
080920 August
XT 645939-674943-676934-647929
082120 August
XU 577062-586064-525033-595036
081840 August
XU 609120-612111-583102-580112
081430 August
XU 653113-663113-663083-653083

6. 091635 August
XU 764231-773235-788210-779205
090130 August
XU 786225-794230-913207-805201
091845 August
XU 574205-583210-597185-589180
092215 August
XT 539912-566900-563891-535903
090645 August
XU 600025-608032-616000-625008
090430 August
XT 590910-590900-620900-620910
091425 August
XU 555003-585003-585031-555013



APPENDIX V

ARTILLERY SUPPORT SUMMARY

Two artillery battalions were paramount in the action of the 3d Brigade, First Cav and the 11th ACR during the period 12 August - 20 August. The units were the 1st Bn, 21st Arty (105mm) a First Cav artillery unit in direct support of the third brigade, and the 6th Bn, 27th Arty (8-inch/175mm) a II Field Force unit which controlled the fires of the separate batteries of the 11th ACR and also provided General Support artillery to US and ARVN forces.

The artillery forces participated intimately in preparation of plans for the defense and counter-attack. Fire plans were developed to support ground force maneuver plans. Targets were selected and planned in close cooperation with the S-2 and S-3 personnel of the 11th ACR and the Third Brigade. Heavy emphasis was given to the routes into and away from objectives and assembly areas indicated in disclosed enemy attack plans.

The 1-21 Arty had in effect a splendid defensive fire plan for the protection of Quan Loi Base Camp. When the enemy initiated the action early in the morning of 12 August the planning was complete; there was little for the gunners to do but pull the lanyard.

In the course of the action on 12 August the artillery in support of the 11th ACR fired 2,816 rounds. Artillery fires in support of the third brigade of the First Cav totaled 2,303 rounds (including 686 rounds of 4.2-inch mortar illumination) the major portion of which was fired in and around Andy.

Artillery Supporting the Third Brigade:

1st Bn, 21st Arty (105) DS
C Btry, 1/30 Arty (155) GS-R 1/21 Arty
3 sections twin 40mm AA Cannon, 4/60 Art (AW) GS-R 1/21 Arty
1 Quad .50 Cal

Artillery Supporting the 11th ACR:

1 How Btry (155SP) DS 1/11 ACR
2 How Btry (155SP) DS 1/16 Mech
C Btry, 2/33 Arty (105) DS 2/11 ACR

Supporting Artillery:

6th Bn, 27th Arty (8"/175) GS IIFFV
A Btry, 6/27 Arty GS-R 1ACD Div Arty
B Btry, 6/27 Arty GS IIFFV
C Btry, 6/27 Arty GS IIFFV
C Btry, 2/13 Arty (105) GS-R 1ACD Div Arty
F/16 Arty (155) GS-R 1ACD Div Arty

Disposition of Artillery: (12 August 1969)

1st Bn, 21st Arty
HQ&SVC Btry - LZ Andy
A Btry - LZ Ellen
B Btry - LZ Vivian
C Btry - LZ Wescott

1st Plt, C/1-30 Arty - LZ Wescott
2nd Plt, C/1-30 Arty - LZ Buttons
6th Bn, 27th Arty

A Btry - LZ Andy
B Btry - LZ Buttons
C Btry - Camp Gorvad

APPENDIX V

ARTILLERY SUPPORT SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

F Btry, 16th Arty (155) - LZ Andy
C/2-13 Arty (105) - LZ Shirley
C/2-33 Arty (105) - FSB Aspen
1 HOW Btry 11 ACR (155SP) - FSM Jon
2 HOW Btry 11 ACR (155SP) - FSB Eagle II

//CPT DAVID D WILEY
FSCOORD, DIV TAC CP

2. Historical Input, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

During the period 0110 - 0600 hours, 12 August 1969 there were attacks throughout the length of Binh Long Province on US and ARVN installations and a few of the population centers. 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery coordinated the fires of nine artillery units rendering artillery support throughout the Province.

The unique operations of the Battalion TOC, consisting of seven radio stations for direct communications with the firing batteries, two radio stations for base defense and First Cav Division Artillery Operations, and one radio set for the Quan Loi Artillery Warning Control Center, from 12 August to 15 August directed and coordinated the following fires in support of both ARVN and US troops:

| | |
|------------------------------|--------------|
| C/2-13 (105) - Thunder IV | 1,768 rounds |
| C/2-33 (105) - Aspen | 2,968 |
| B/1-21 (105) - FSB Eagle | 1,909 |
| HOW/1-11 (155SP) - FSB Jon | 1,202 |
| HOW/2-11 (155SP) - Allons II | 1,308 |
| A/6-27 (8-inch) - Quan Loi | 446 |
| A/6-27 (175) - Quan Loi | 335 |
| F/16 (155) - Quan Loi | 1,341 |


The effect of the 6th Bn, 27th Artillery team effort resulted in having approximately 12,000 rounds of all types of artillery being placed on the enemy in the defense of American and ARVN forces throughout Binh Long Province during the period 12-15 August.

//LT HARRY S MCGEHEE, S-1, 6/27 Arty

3. Historical Input, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, Defense of LZ Andy.

Events for the period 120001 to 122400 August 1969 LZ Andy:

At 0045 hours on the evening of 11 to 12 August the fire direction center, 1-21 Arty in coordination with the Base Defense Center initiated a counter-mortar - counter-rocket (CMCR) plan against suspected enemy rocket locations. As the batteries, C/1-30 Arty and C/1-21 Arty, were approximately half-way into the program a report was received from the 6-27 Arty area that they were receiving incoming RPG and mortar fire and that there seemed to be a ground probe in their sector of the green line. Immediately after this report the alarm was sounded and all available batteries were brought into the base defense CMCR plan. The time was 0110 hours. The Aerial Observer from the 1-21st Arty had met his bird dog on the strip at 0100 hours for the nightly mortar patrol. At 0109 hours the O-1 Bird Dog was lifting off the end of the strip when the AO spotted incoming and flashes of mortar locations. He immediately relayed this information to the FDC over the Base Defense Frequency and directed the lone Cobra from C/2-20 ARA on mortar patrol in on the positions he had located. The Cobra was immediately joined by his wingman and the Fire Direction Officer (FDO) also bounced another sector of Blue Max at that time. The FDO relayed the attack information to Div Arty and



APPENDIX V

ARTILLERY SUPPORT SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

requested that Shadow and Spooky birds be bounced. By this time the Battalion Commander and S-3 had arrived in the FDC to directly supervise the conduct of the artillery battle.

The Artillery Base Defense Officer then began receiving requests from the green line for illumination, defensive target and adjust fire missions on enemy in the wire in the vicinity of the French House area and bunker 61. Battery B, 1-21 Arty was firing in two roles at LZ Vivian at 0115 hours; it played an important part of base defense of LZ Andy, and it was also defending its own LZ with direct fire at a small harassing ground probe. 0120 hours: The FDC at this time was busy reacting to calls for fire. A/1-4 Cav had earlier in the evening reported heavy movement in every direction around their position. The FDC had directed C/1-30 to lay one tube on the A/1-4 location should it become necessary to support their position. At 0315 it became necessary. A/1-4 Cav was in extremely heavy contact and ARA and tube artillery were called in to provide fires. C/1-30 provided a total of 102 illumination rounds while ARA engaged close in targets and C/2-13 Arty and F/16 Arty fired on targets farther out from the position. Again at 0345 hours and at 0402 hours the intensity of the attack resumed, however, the superior fire-power brought to bear on the enemy in that area forced him to break contact.

C/1-21 Arty resumed CMCR fire and continued until 0220 hours. At 0301 hours B/3-197 Arty at LZ Buttons, fired on suspected enemy movement in that area.

C/2-13 Arty, who had been primarily firing defensive targets close into Quan Loi during the entire attack, fired missions on enemy evacuating wounded and killed from the 6/27 area. The time was approximately 0230 hours. By the end of the attack 2-13 Arty would have tallied over 200 defensive targets in defense of LZ Andy in addition to the fires they supported A/1-4 Cav and 11th ACR units with.

At 0430 hours, C/1-21 Arty delivered fires on a sensor target that had been activated. This was the first sign that the NVA were on the move away from the LZ. At 0435 hours, Dragoon 61 (A/1-4 Cav) once again came into contact and received 5 WP and 12 HE rounds - observed - in support of this action. By 0440 hours it was obvious that the enemy was withdrawing from the battlefield.

The FDC of the 1-21 Arty immediately initiated blocking fires behind the retreating NVA. Trail junctions and stream-crossing sites were also picked off the battle map as likely areas for withdrawal and fires were placed on these. The defensive target program was intensified and observers on the towers walked the rounds up and down the green line. This intense fire program was kept up until after the enemy broke contact with all pursuing friendly units.

By 0600 hours, on the morning of 12 August, the battle action had subsided and all fire units were awaiting the contact that would result from early morning reconnaissance sightings of withdrawing enemy units.

The 1-21 Arty FDC had controlled successfully the major resources of fire-power available to the Third Brigade during the attack. These included Shadow, Spooky, Blue Max (ARA), and also batteries C/1-21, C/1-30, C/2-13, F/16, A/6-27, and B/3-197 Arty. G Trp, 11 ACR, 4.2 mortar platoon was also under the OPCON of the 1-21 Arty FDC and provided 686 rounds of illumination during the night. The assets of the 1-21 also included the aerial observer in the O-1 Aircraft who quickly brought fires to bear on the enemy's mortars and the AN/MPQ-4A radar section who called in grid locations for CMCR fires at the outset of the attack. The batteries primarily used in the CMCR capacity were C/1-21 Arty, F/16 Arty, A/6-27 Arty, and G/2-11 ACR.

APPENDIX V

ARTILLERY SUPPORT SUMMARY (CONTINUED)

4.2 mortar platoon in the illumination role. ARA, who had lost a ship and pilot to either a 107mm rocket or a stray RPG round, was employed in a variety of mission to include Medevac cover and had flown 74 sorties during the night and had expended 758 rockets, 22,650 minigun and 1,400 40mm cannon rounds.

At 0830 hours, C/1-21 Arty and C/2-20 ARA sprang into action with a Ground Air Program for the insertion of the airmobile blocking force as a part of the counter-attack plan. A total of 4 WP and 97 HE was fired and one section of Blue Max expended. It became quite obvious at this time that the NVA was attempting to leave the field throughout the area. C/1-21 Arty engaged various known enemy locations and enemy in the open up until approximately 1300 hours. Other batteries were similarly occupied.

At 1725 hours an agent report was received locating very close to Quan Loi a hastily organized hospital/aid station area which was tending enemy wounded from the battle. F/16 engaged immediately with 36 rounds HE. During the entire day many sightings of NVA had been made and the majority of these noted that movement was away from Quan Loi in all directions. Selected blocking fires were fired throughout the early evening hours. From 1800 to 2200 hours all batteries were engaged in attacking sniffer and sensor targets which indicated heavy movement throughout the AO.

At 2145 hours Tower #5 reported observing movement and mortar flashes, C/2-13 Arty and B/3-197 Arty had intermittently engaged with TOT's (Time On Target) two ground-to-air targets from 1626 hours to 1925 hours.

All batteries continued firing on suspected locations, and a vigorous defensive target and planned fire program was executed during the late evening through 2400 hours and on into the early morning hours.

Total for C/1-21 Arty and C/1-30 Arty - 1234 rounds.

//S-2, 1 Bn, 21st Arty
CPT JOSE MURATTI

