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14th MHD  
Historian's Background Files  
Box 14

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THE SHIELD AND THE HAMMER  
The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in War Zone C  
and Western III Corps

Prepared by:

14th Military History Detachment  
1st Cavalry Division (AM)

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

ANNEXES

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Republic of Vietnam  
III CORPS Provinces

- 1: TAY NINH
- 2: BINH LONG
- 3: PHUOC LONG
- 4: LONG KHANH
- 5: BINH TUY
- 6: BIEN HOA
- 7: BINH DUONG
- 8: HUA NGHIA
- 9: GIA DINH
- 10: LONG AN
- 11: PHUOC TUY

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MAP #1

## I. WAR ZONE C

### 1. The Terrain:

A hundred kilometers northwest of Saigon, in an isolated corner of Vietnam bordered on two sides by the Cambodian border, lies a vast jungle known to the enemy as War Zone C. It stretches from the Fishhook south along the Saigon River to LTL 13, and then west, generally paralleling the road. Passing just north of Nui Ba Den, War Zone C continues to the west and southwest to the Cambodian border. (See maps #1 and #2).

There is little prominent terrain in western III Corps except Nui Ba Den, the fabled "Black Virgin Mountain", located on the southern edge of central War Zone C. It spreads over 10 square kilometers and rises 986 meters above the flat to gently rolling jungle floor. (See map #3).

Tay Ninh City, 8 kilometers to the southwest of Nui Ba Den, and the Katum CIDG settlement in north-central War Zone C are the only significant population centers in the area. Occupied hamlets are virtually non-existent.

On the whole, contour intervals are very gradual throughout War Zone C with elevation ranging from 10 to 20 meters in the marshy areas along the western boundary and 50 to 90 meters in the north, central and eastern portions.

The major waterways in the area are the Saigon River and the Prek Klok-Rach Sanh Dol Stream. They flow generally south and east, fed by the numerous small streams winding through the region. Sampans and shallow-draft boats take full advantage of their year-around trafficability.


There are relatively few roads in the area and are all characterized as loose surface, fair or dry weather routes.

Vegetation ranges from rice paddy and grassland - to bamboo thickets - to multi-canopied jungle. The land around Tay Ninh City and the base of Nui

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War Zone C  
in III CORPS



CAMBODIA

• Song Be

II CORPS

• Quan Loi

WAR ZONE C

• Phuoc Vinh

Tay Ninh

• Dau Tieng

Saigon River

• Bien Hoa

• Xuan Loc

• Long Binh

• Cu Chi

IV CORPS

SAIGON

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MAP #2

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Ba Den is open grassland and rice paddy. Beyond that lies the jungle. Two large rubber plantations are located adjacent to eastern War Zone C: the Michelin and the Minh Thanh. The Michelin plantation covers eighty-four square kilometers, while the Minh Thanh covers sixteen.

## 2. The Enemy:

The nature of the terrain in War Zone C makes the region ideally suited as a base area for the enemy; the proximity of the Cambodian sanctuary and the inaccessibility of the area to large conventional ground forces. Over the years the VC and NVA developed the area into a series of base camps and cache sites. Three large, permanent base areas were constructed along the border, giving the enemy a secure area from which he could launch offensive operations. The bases also served as rest areas for units worn out in combat. A fourth base area, #355, was constructed in the vicinity of the junction of the Saigon River and the Rach Sanh Dol Stream. The southwest corner of it is commonly called "The Crescent". This base served as a way station for troops and supplies going south toward Saigon. (See map #4).

Enemy service troops constructed or improved numerous trail systems through the region to serve as lines of communication. (Map #5 shows the general trace of the major infiltration trails). Caches of equipment and rice were located along these trails while most of the weapons and munitions came down the Saigon River corridor. Rice was moved along the X-Cache system, a series of seven rice storage depots which ran from northwest to southeast across War Zone C. The depots were placed approximately 10 to 12 kilometers apart (roughly a night's round trip.) The Saigon Corridor, the X-Cache system and the trail network provided routes for funneling supplies and rice into Base Area 355. From there, the rice and supplies traveled through the Michelin into the Ho Bo Woods-Trapezoid-Iron Triangle region northwest of Saigon.

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CAMBODIA

Key Terrain  
in War Zone C

"Fish-  
hook"

Katum

Thien Ngon

Tonle  
Cham

246

247

Prek Klok-Bach San Doi

Sout Ba Chiem

244

TL 22

TL 4

LTL 13

Saigon River

LTL 13

Vam Co Dong

Ap Phuoc  
Hoa

The  
"Razor-  
backs"

Nui Ba Den

Ap Binh Luong

Michelin  
Rubber Plantation

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Enemy Major Base Areas


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CAMBODIA

352

"Fish-hook"



MAP #4

Prek Klok-Rach San Dol Stream

Soui Ba Chiem

Salgon River

355

The "Razorbacks"

The CRESCENT

Nui Ba Den


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Tay Ninh

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MAP #5

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In order to mount an offensive against the populated areas in III Corps, the enemy would transport the food and ammunition needed to sustain the operation down the infiltration trails into Base Area 355 and the other smaller base camps closer to Saigon. As the offensive got under way, the attacking infantry would move down the trails, picking up their equipment as they marched south. This enabled them to travel very light and very fast.

The Allied Command in III Corps was cognizant of the threat posed by enemy units operating out of War Zone C. Between August 1965 and January 1968, US and ARVN forces conducted four major operations (See annex A) in War Zone C in order to deny the enemy the unrestricted use of his bases and lines of communication in that area. The enemy lost over 8,000 killed in those four operations, in addition to having large base camps and caches destroyed. Although the four operations put considerable pressure on the enemy, there were long periods of time when his presence in War Zone C went unchallenged. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade was supposed to operate in War Zone C as a floating brigade to keep the enemy off balance between major operations in 1967, but developments in I Corps compelled the redeployment of that brigade to I Corps.

The heavy losses suffered by the enemy convinced him that he should not station main force units permanently in War Zone C. Instead, he decided to use the base system as a series of forward operation bases. After April 1967, the NVA were able to develop their border sanctuaries and stock the forward bases with materiel to support the planned General Offensive in Spring of 1968.

## II. TET 1968:

During the period prior to Tet 1968, the NVA completed the planning and building up of supplies for coordinated attacks throughout Vietnam. The offensive in III Corps was to<sup>be</sup> highlighted by the capture of Saigon and the overthrow on the Saigon government. Eleven local force battalions indigenous to the

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Saigon area were to seize key installations inside the city, getting help from the general up-rising that was expected to follow their entry into the capital. Three main force divisions were assigned the mission of isolating the city and preventing Allied reinforcements from entering the city and crushing the local forces before they had consolidated their position. Following this brilliant victory, the war would end victoriously for the communists.

Allied intelligence had determined that an enemy offensive was being planned, but there was no definite information concerning the timing or scope of the expected attacks. It was generally believed that the offensive would begin shortly after the celebration of Tet. Since Tet was a very important holiday to both South and North Vietnamese, it was felt that the enemy would allow its troops a stand-down to celebrate; then launch the attack.

As the intelligence picture clarified, II Field Force determined that the main attack would be made in the Saigon area. Based on this intelligence, Allied units redeployed to block the approach of the main force units and to tighten the ring of defenses around Saigon. On the eve of Tet, over half of the total Allied maneuver units in III Corps were in position in and around the Capital. Reaction forces had been designated, counter-attack plans were drawn up and rehearsed as preparations for the offensive continued. A 36-hour truce was scheduled to allow the Vietnamese soldiers to visit their families during Tet.

Owing to a mix-up in timing, the NVA forces in I and II Corps initiated the offensive a full 24 hours ahead of schedule. Forewarned by this miscue, III Corps went on 100% alert. All leaves were cancelled and the truce lifted.

The enemy began his offensive in III Corps on the night of 30 January with widespread rocket and mortar attacks, followed by ground assaults. The local forces attacked the US Embassy, the Presidential Palace, police stations and

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headquarters complexes. The main force divisions moved out of their assembly areas and into their blocking positions. The 5th VC Division came out of War Zone D and attacked the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex. The 9th VC staged through Base Area 355 and the Iron Triangle and took up its position between Cu Chi and Saigon. The 7th NVA staged through the Saigon River Corridor and moved down QL 13 to the vicinity of Chon Thanh. (Map #6).

Allied reaction to the attacks was swift and violent. The defenders of the installations inside the city held off the local forces and waited for reinforcements. ARVN and US reaction forces were on the road and in the air immediately enroute to the city. The first reinforcements reached Saigon at 0600 on 31 January. On the approaches to the capital, Allied mechanized units barreled through the main blocking forces without stopping and moved into the capital. (One armored cavalry troop drove through two NVA regiments drawn up in attack formation in order to get to its assigned position). The enemy local force units were quickly overwhelmed by the rapidly arriving relief forces.


Having defeated the attacks in the city, the Allies turned to the tedious and bloody task of rooting out and destroying pockets of resistance in bitter house-to-house fighting. The main force units were having their problems too. There was no contingency plan for the defeat of the local force units. Also, no withdrawal plans had been devised. The main force units hesitated and were lost. As late as 18 February, main force units were still milling around out of their safe base areas. Units from the 1st and 25th Infantry, the 101st Airborne Divisions and the 11th ACR engaged the main force elements and inflicted heavy losses on them before they could escape to their sanctuaries. By the end of May, the Allies had inflicted over 10,000 killed on the enemy in the defense of Saigon and follow up operations.

On May 7, the enemy struck again in III Corps. This attack, mounted mainly

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Tet Offensive  
1968



IV CORPS

II CORPS

SAIGON

MAP #6

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to create a psychological impression of "Saigon under siege", was carried out by small teams of infiltrators entering the capital and other key positions. (The largest force was a reinforced platoon which attacked the Bien Hoa air base). By 13 May however, all the infiltrators had been eliminated.

Although neither attack was militarily successful, the psychological and political reaction was considerable. The threat of repeated enemy attacks on the capital city could seriously damage the entire war effort. To block further offensives against Saigon, General Abrams decided to deploy the 1st Cavalry Division from I Corps to III Corps to perform a general outpost line (GOPL) mission along the Cambodian border north and northwest of Saigon. Positioned astride the enemy's infiltration routes, the 1st Cav would detect and interdict movement south. It was believed that the 1st Cav would not be able to completely block the enemy movement, so provisions were made for it to shift its forces laterally and in depth as the NVA tried to move through the screen. This mobile defensive posture would serve to wear down the enemy and to provide information and early warning of his approach to the populated areas. The 1st Cav was ideally suited for this mission by virtue of its complete airmobility, which enabled the division to maintain surveillance and armed reconnaissance over the expanse of terrain extending down through War Zone C.

III. THE 1ST CAV IN III CTZ:


The 1st Cav deployed into III Corps during the period 26 October-20 November 1968 in Operation Liberty Canyon. The division took up a position running from the Cambodian border west of Tay Ninh City to the boundary between III and II Corps. The deployment increased the capability of II Field Force to bring pressure to bear on the enemy in III Corps. The 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions reduced their operational areas and were able to place greater emphasis on pacification; the GOPL posture of the 1st Cav providing early warning and interdiction of enemy offensive thrusts. (Map #7).

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INITIAL DEPLOYMENT in LIBERTY CANYON  
November 1968

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II CORPS

CAMBODIA

• Song Be

"Fish hook"

• 2 X3  
Qun Loi

1 ACD  
++ 1 INF DIV

1 ACD

XX  
25 INF DIV

• Tay Ninh

• Dau Tieng

• Phuoc Vinh

"Angel's Wing"

Bien Hoa

• Cu Chi

• Long Binh

• Xuan Loc

SAIGON

IV CORPS

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MAP #7

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The 1st and 2nd Brigades took up screening positions across the northern frontier of War Zone C, generally along Highway 246. This disposition placed six fire bases astride the Saigon River Corridor and the Mustang Trail. The fire bases served as pivots for airmobile infantry battalions which sought out the enemy's trails and caches. The NVA quickly learned the threat posed by these bases. Units moving supplies were attacked by armed helicopters and ambushed by ground forces. The ground troops were everywhere. (Map #8).

In order to keep open their line of communication, the NVA decided to eliminate one of the fire bases which was blocking the flow of supplies. The 95C Regiment was directed to attack Fire Support Base (FSB) Dot on 14 November with all three of its battalions and eliminate that portion of the 1st Cavalry Division screen.

FSB Dot was defended by the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion, operating under Operational Control (OPCON) of the 1st Cav. The defenders were tipped off to the impending attack when scout helicopters spotted fifty enemy soldiers moving toward Dot.


When the 95C Regiment attacked shortly after midnight on the 14th, the Rangers were ready. The Rangers met the attack with small arms fire, 1st Cav artillery from FSB's Jake and Rita, and Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) from the 2nd Battalion 20th Artillery. When the 95C managed to breach the perimeter at Dot, the intrepid Rangers mounted a determined counterattack and drove the NVA out. The enemy had broken contact and was retreating to the north when the sun came up. Armed helicopters attacked the defeated battalions as they covered the six kilometers between Dot and the border. In all, 287 enemy were killed by the Rangers and 1st Cav elements.

Finding that they could not break through the screen, the NVA decided to go around it. The Saigon Corridor and Mustang Trail traffic was shifted to the

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SCREENING POSITIONS  
NOV-JAN, '68-'69



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MAP #8

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west to avoid the screen. The X-Cache and the Prek Klok routes were expanded and improved to carry the increased load. The flow of materiel had to be kept at a high level in order to prepare the battlefield for the coming Spring Offensive.

#### IV. THE POST-TET or SPRING OFFENSIVE 1969:

The Spring Offensive, also known as the 4th General Offensive, was planned as a re-run of the 1968 Tet Offensive with slight modifications. Four main force divisions were available for the assault. The attack was to be conducted in three phases, lasting a total of thirty four days. In the first phase, NVA units would knock out key bases, seize terrain suitable for continuing the operation and cause the Allies to commit their mobile reserves. The 5th VC Division was to knock out Long Binh and Bien Hoa. The 1st NVA Division was assigned the principal diversionary effort. This division was to march out of War Zone C and take up a position near Highway 1. Their move was intended to draw Allied reserves out of position so the other divisions could move unimpeded to the Capital. The 7th NVA was to repeat its 1968 mission but would not stop at Chon Thanh. Instead, it would go all the way to Saigon. From the Angel's Wing, the 9th VC Division would move down Highway 1 into the capital. (From the Angel's Wing, the 9th VC Division posed a threat to both Tay Ninh and Saigon. Consequently, the objective would not be known to the Allies until after the attack was well under way).

The success of the offensive hinged on the performance of the 1st NVA Division. When the Allies committed their reserves against that unit, the other divisions would move out. Also critical was the flow of supplies needed to sustain the offensive, for without adequate levels of munitions, the attacks could not have been attempted.

The level of enemy supply activity, coupled with information from captured

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documents and prisoners, indicated to the Allies that an offensive on the scale of Tet 1968 was coming up. The 1st Cavalry Division adjusted its disposition of forces in order to contest the enemy movements and to block the expected offensive. The 1st Brigade began moving into the area east of the Angel's Wing on 15 December to interdict the movement of the 9th VC into III Corps. Using airmobile and riverine techniques, the brigade swept through the area in Operation Navajo Warhorse, searching for the enemy's supply caches. The brigade was successful in its search, finding in excess of 150,000 small-arms and 3,400 large-caliber rounds. It was felt that the amount of munitions captured constituted a large percentage of the total amount infiltrated into III Corps by the 9th VC.


The 1st Brigade re-entered War Zone C on 19 January in reaction to increased enemy activity in the area north of Tay Ninh. (A two-company force, Task Force Duke, continued Navajo Warhorse to monitor enemy activity). Based on information concerning the location of enemy trails and troop movements, the 1st Brigade organized a screen across the top of Base Area 355. With this screen, running generally along the line formed by FSB's Dolly-Grant-St Barbara, the brigade could interdict all traffic leading into Base Area 355. (Map #9). The skytroopers combed the terrain for enemy caches and ambushed the trails. Their operations were immediately successful. In the last two weeks in January, the brigade captured 90 tons of rice. Ambush operations were killing as many as forty enemy each night.

The 2nd Brigade continued its interdictory operations south of the Fishhook, uncovering numerous caches. The largest of these was found by the 3rd Vietnamese Marine Battalion on 9 February. It consisted of 250 large-caliber rockets, 90 mortar and RPG rounds, 324 individual and 22 crew served weapons, and 10 tons of miscellaneous explosives and small-arms ammunition. This cache

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Screening Positions  
Feb-Jun '69



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MAP #9

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could easily have outfitted an entire NVA battalion and kept it supplied with ammunition for a sizable attack.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Brigade air-assaulted into War Zone D to head off the 5th VC Division.


The deployment of the 1st and 2nd Brigades in their current positions gave those units more room to maneuver. The increased distance from the border on the western flank gave the air cavalry squadron and the other target acquisition agencies of the division more time to detect the enemy's approach. The extra time permitted the division to destroy the enemy forces with long range fires while the ground troops sought out and destroyed cache sites and units already in position. This two-pronged attack on the NVA logistic system took a heavy toll in enemy resources. Approximately 200 tons of rice alone were captured in February.

As a result of the aggressive air and ground operations by the 1st Cav, the NVA were forced to break up their units into small cells in order to pass through the screen. Heavy materiel losses required diverting manpower resources from offensive operations to the movement of supplies. Preparations for the offensive pushed doggedly forward despite these setbacks. Rear service elements took the brunt of the casualties as they fought to protect their caches and move them south. The main force divisions slowly worked their way forward into their staging areas; the 1st and 7th NVA into the Base Area 355-Fishhook-Michelin area, the 9th VC into the Angel's Wing, and the 5th VC into southwestern War Zone D. (Map #10).

In 1969, the NVA permitted a five-day truce for the celebration of Tet. There had been considerable adverse reaction by the Vietnamese over the violation of that holiday in 1968 and the NVA wished to avoid a recurrence.

The offensive began on 23 February after the conclusion of the truce. The

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Post-Tet Offensive  
1969

CAMBODIA

5 VC

7 NVA

Song Be

II CORPS

• An Loc

1 NVA

• Phuoc Vinh

Tay Ninh

• Dau Tieng

• Xuan Loc

9 VC

• Bien Hoa

• Long Binh

Cu Chi

SAIGON

IV CORPS

MAP #10

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opening of the offensive was characterized by widespread attacks by fire and ground attacks. Approximately 25% of the enemy's troops were engaged in probing the Allied defenses and seizing terrain favorable to the continuation of the offensive. The largest attacks were made against the Long Binh-Bien Hoa complex and Dau Tieng.

In the move south the 33d Regiment, 5th VC Division was hit by ambushes and artillery and was forced to abort its mission and return to War Zone D. The same thing happened to the 174th Regiment, attached to support the 5th VC Division offensive. The other organic regiment, the 275, and the other two supporting regiments, the 274 Infantry and the 74th Artillery pushed on with the Division Headquarters to their objective.

On the 23d of February the 1st Bn., 275th Rgt. and D2/U1, a local force unit, attacked elements of the 3-5 Cav at the Bien Hoa City Railyard. The 274th Regiment at the same time conducted an attack on Bearcat with its 1st Battalion, while the 3rd Battalion followed a mortar and rocket attack with a penetrating ground probe of the 720 MP compound at Long Binh. The 3rd Battalion was the more successful of the three, although it was finally beaten back and lost 194 killed.

The highpoint of the 5th VC Division offensive came on the 26th of February, when the 3rd Battalion 275th Regiment and the 21st Sapper-Recon Battalion attacked the gates and bunker line at Bien Hoa air base. The area was defended by the 3-48 ARVN, the 199 Light Infantry Brigade and the 5th Vietnamese Marines. The attacking force was trapped on an open plain and was quickly reduced by grazing fires and artillery. 214 enemy soldiers were killed and 60 captured.

At Dau Tieng, the 1st Infantry Division repelled a regimental-size attack and launched a counter-attack through the Michelin to finish off the attackers. Although the level of activity was high, the key terrain had not been seized nor

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had the 1st NVA Division begun its diversion.

The 1st NVA Division had not moved because it was still bottled up in War Zone C. Its lines of communication were being interdicted by infantry operating out of FSB Grant. As long as Grant was there, sufficient amounts of supplies could not be brought forward to the division to sustain its attack. In order to free its lines of communication, the division tried to overrun Grant employing the 95C Regiment. Under cover of an intense rocket and mortar attack, the 95C planned to attack the fire base with two battalions in the assault and one in reserve. The attack was scheduled for the early morning hours of 8 March.

On FSB Grant, the officers and men of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry knew something was up. For the past few days, the base had received sporadic 120mm mortar fire. The rounds were fired singly, as though the NVA were registering their tubes. But on the 7th of March all was quiet. It turned out to be the lull before the storm.

The storm broke shortly after midnight on 8 March. A heavy concentration of rockets and mortars slammed into the base. In the opening volley, two 120mm rounds exploded inside the Tactical Operations Center, killing the Battalion Commander, LTC Peter Gorvad, and wounding most of the command group. The Battalion S-3, MAJ Brown was outside the TOC when it was hit. He assumed command and directed the defense of Grant. Almost immediately after the TOC was hit, NVA soldiers were spotted in the wire. The defenders opened up with small arms and automatic weapons, keeping the enemy at arms length. Tube artillery fire began falling around the base and a call went out for Blue Max, the aerial rocket artillery (ARA) battalion.

At 0200, the main attack was launched by the two assault battalions from the southwest along LTL 13. The defenders met the assault with everything but the kitchen sink: artillery, ARA, AC-47 gunships and tac air strikes. On the

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ground, the "Quad-Fifty" (4 barrel, .50-caliber machinegun) poured devastating fire onto the attackers. CPT Bill Capshaw and other members of C Battery, 1st Battalion 77th Artillery, manhandled a 105mm howitzer into a supplementary position opposite the point of attack and raked the NVA ranks with Beehive rounds. It was touch and go for a while. If the enemy hit the base with a fresh body of troops, they might penetrate the perimeter. The time had come for the 95C to commit the reserve battalion. Unfortunately for the NVA, the reserve battalion was in no condition to attack. It had been thrown into confusion when a heavy concentration of artillery slammed into its position. Without the added impetus of the reserve battalion, the attack ground to a halt and was crushed by the withering fires from Grant. At 0400 the crisis had passed and the NVA were withdrawing. Only the dead and the litter parties were left in the area at 0600. The Skytroopers found 157 dead NVA (including the entire 2nd Company of the 2nd Battalion, 95C Regiment) in and near the base.

The 8 March attack did not have the desired results. The 1st NVA was still operating with its supply lines cut. Consequently, the big diversion could not get under way. Another attack was therefore ordered; this time by the 101D Regiment.

In the early morning hours of 11 March, the 101D attacked with two of its battalions. This attack was also made down LTL 13 under cover of a rocket and mortar attack. The Skytroopers met the 101D with the same reception they gave 95C with the same effect. The 101D left behind 62 dead when they withdrew before dawn. Scout helicopters from the 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry and ground troops pursuing the two battered battalions accounted for another 51 enemy killed.

As a result of the two attacks on Grant, the 1st NVA Division was no longer capable of breaking out of War Zone C and accomplishing its mission. Consequently, the general offensive stalled. With no diversion to clear the way, the other divisions were blocked.

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After the Grant attacks, the 1st Brigade relinquished control of its three battalions in War Zone C and shifted its attention to its two battalions continuing operation Navajo Warhorse. TF DUKE had been gradually enlarged to two battalions as there were indications that the 9th VC Division was about to cross into III Corps. The 2nd Brigade assumed responsibility for the interdiction program in War Zone C. The 3rd Brigade in War Zone D continued to hunt for elements of the 5th VC Division.

#### V. OPERATION ATLAS WEDGE

The Allies expected the second phase of the offensive to begin on or about 15 March. In light of the losses inflicted on the NVA and the upsetting of their offensive's timetable, the Allies decided to go over to the offensive to capitalize on the disorganization of the enemy's forces. A quick counterstroke would catch them concentrated in the forward bases and head off further offensive action.

II Field Force initiated Operation Atlas Wedge with a two fold objective: inflict heavy losses on the main force divisions while they were still concentrated and drive them away from the populated areas. The operation employed the 1st and 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Each unit was tasked to attack and destroy enemy elements in their respective areas of operation.

The 11th ACR (-) teamed up with elements of the 1st Cav to sweep through the Michelin Plantation to drive out the elements of the 7th NVA Division. Two squadrons began to drive northward through the rubber trees on 17 March looking for a fight. The enemy was not expecting a fight inside the plantation. In the past, the rubber was a safe place to set up camp because the Allies did not wish to destroy the economically valuable rubber trees. For Atlas Wedge, however, the restrictions on fighting in the rubber were lifted to allow the

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destruction of the enemy before they could escape. Over 100 enemy troops were killed in the first two days of the sweep as the change in Allied policy caught the NVA by surprise. On 19 March, the 11th ACR swept southward back through the rubber.

While the regiment's aerial rifle platoon was conducting a bomb damage assessment of three B-52 strikes northeast of the rubber, it made contact with a large enemy force in bunkers. A Troop, 11th ACR, followed shortly by M Company (Tanks) 11th ACR moved to reinforce the hard pressed ARP. A real melee ensued as the tanks and ACAVs drove over, around and through the NVA positions, delivering killing fire. Enemy resistance was crushed as the cavalrymen killed 75 NVA and captured 48 weapons.

The 11th ACR swept the rubber for two more days, finishing with a sweep of the road to Minh Thanh to cut off any retreating groups of NVA. The four day operation cost the 7th NVA Division 366 men, 88 weapons and six tons of rice.

The 7th NVA was pushed back out of its staging areas and away from its objective. The other Allied units in Atlas Wedge enjoyed similar success. As a result of the Allied offensive, the general offensive was averted. The failure of the 1st NVA to break out of War Zone C was the key to the Allied success. II Field Force was able to hold back its mobile reserves and use them offensively to destroy the enemy's units. The battles at Grant, precipitated by the 1st Cav interdiction program, had cost the enemy his offensive.

#### VI. OPERATIONS MONTANA SCOUT and MONTANA RAIDER:

After Atlas Wedge terminated, the 1st Cavalry Division initiated Operation Montana Scout in order to further exploit the success of Atlas Wedge. The concept of this operation was to employ massed B-52 strikes on enemy troop concentrations and base camps followed by immediate exploitation by ground forces of up to two battalion strength. The objective was the destruction of the enemy

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
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units, bases and lines of communication. Initially two brigades, reinforced by armor from the 11th ACR as needed, were to be employed with the 3rd Brigade ready to enter the operation on order. (The 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions were to conduct similar operations in their respective areas concurrently). Two weeks after Montana Scout started, the 11th ACR was scheduled to make a reconnaissance in force through the Crescent and along the Saigon Corridor to disrupt the NVA base camps and drive enemy units out of their bases and into 25th Division and 1st Cav blocking forces. A key feature of Montana Scout was to be the employment of massed B-52 strikes. Previously, B-52 strikes were made on the basis of one strike per target. In Montana Scout, multiple simultaneous strikes were to be employed where needed. (Maps #11 and #12).

The operation got under way on 29 March with the 1st Brigade air-assaulting into War Zone C. The brigade was deployed in roughly the same area as in February. The 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry air-assaulted into the area northwest of FSB St Barbara to exploit B-52 strikes against the 101D Regiment and to open a fire base to support operations in that area. The first unit to land, A Company, made contact immediately with at least one NVA battalion. B, C, and D Companies were airlifted in to reinforce A Company as the heavy fighting continued. Two more companies were flown into positions along the high speed trails leading out of the area to fix the enemy in position. The battle continued until dark when the NVA withdrew. Fighting continued for three more days, finally tapering off to a point where the infantry could build FSB Jess. No assessment of enemy losses could be made because the enemy carried off his casualties.

Throughout the Montana Scout area of operations lucrative concentrations of troops and base camps were bombed and exploited. The NVA avoided contact whenever possible by leaving small covering forces to engage the exploitation

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MAP # 11 Toy Ninh

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
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B-52 Strikes, April-June '69

April 



May 

June 



 An Loc

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MAP # 12

forces while the main body escaped. The enemy could not afford to have his units heavily engaged under these unfavorable circumstances. The number of troops lost in the bombings and exploitations was not easy to determine. In the areas struck by B-52 strikes, there was a justifiable reluctance on the part of the ground troops to dig through demolished base camps just to raise the body count. The fact that the strikes were hurting the enemy is illustrated by the experiences of the troops operating near Jess, where on numerous occasions the troops found pieces of bodies up in trees and had to don gas masks due to the overpowering stench of death which pervaded the area.

The 11th ACR swept into the Crescent from the southwest on 13 April. In six days, the armor-infantry task forces eliminated 143 NVA from the 18B Regiment, as the tanks and ACAV's crashed through the jungle uncovering caches and destroying base camps. The 3rd Brigade added its weight to the campaign on 20 April, opening three fire bases south of the Fishhook. The 1st and 2nd Brigades opened FSB's Carolyn, Ike and Janie on the 14th, 21st and 22nd respectively. The screen of fire bases was moved deeper into the enemy's base system. A proposed fire base, Pearson, located northwest of Carolyn, was not opened since it would have been too deep. Instead, the screen of fire bases was strung across central War Zone C to concentrate the division effort north of Base Area 355. By this time, the division had eight of its nine organic maneuver battalions exploiting B-52 strikes and seeking out caches in central War Zone C.

On 24 April, the 11th ACR continued Montana Raider south of the Fishhook in conjunction with the 3rd Brigade. Two squadrons, with elements of the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry OPCON, drove south from FSB's Rita and Phyllis in search of the enemy. From Phyllis, TF 2-11 ACR moved cross-country through the jungle as far south as the Saigon River and then back northward to Rita. No significant contact was made. With TF 1-11 ACR moving south from Rita, it was a

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different story. This force swept down Highway 244 past FSB Jamie and through the jungle as far west as the Ba Chiem Stream.

On 27 April, A Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry was deployed to secure two downed aircraft 10 kilometers northwest of Jamie. While moving to that location, the company made contact with a large enemy force in bunkers. The troops pulled back to allow artillery fire and airstrikes to be put into the area. On the next day, C and M Troops of the 11th ACR reinforced A Company but the NVA continued to fight. More artillery and airstrikes, followed that night by a B-52 strike, were put into the contact area. On 29 April, the three companies swept through the bunker complex and found 40 NVA killed. Renewed fighting on the 30th accounted for 48 more enemy and sixteen tons of rice.

In all, this phase of Montana Raider cost the enemy 97 killed, 244 weapons and 42 tons of rice. Numerous base installations of the 82nd Rear Service Group (including an elaborate 3-level underground complex and a huge hospital) were demolished and 13 caches were uncovered. On 7 May the 11th ACR began the last phase of Montana Raider. Reinforced by elements of the 5th Battalion 7th Cavalry, the 11th ACR swept the Minh Than-Chon Than -Michelin area with very little contact. Enemy losses were 21 killed and 9 PW's.

Outside the Montana Raider area of operation, the bombing and exploitation continued. Despite the punishment he was receiving, the enemy resolved to prepare another offensive.

#### VII. THE HO CHI MINH EMULATION CAMPAIGN:

February, March and April had been a very trying period for the NVA. Despite all his efforts, including much sweat and blood, he had not been able to launch a full scale offensive. The 1st Cav interdiction and exploitation programs had thwarted him at every turn. With the collapse of the 1969 Tet Offensive, the NVA Command had to devise some kind of offensive in order to

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recoup their losses, save face and regain the initiative. Due to the restrictions imposed by the 1st Cavalry Division's operations, the enemy had to settle for a smaller scale offensive with a significant but more easily attainable objective.

The provincial capital at Tay Ninh City offered many possibilities as an objective. First, the city was easily accessible to large forces. It was only a short march from the Angel's Wing and Base Area 355. From those two places, a converging attack could be made. Inside the city there were only headquarters and service elements and some RF/PF units. These weaknesses made the city an easy target. Second, the capture of a provincial capital would facilitate the announcement of a provisional revolutionary government. This gimmick would have considerable impact on the Vietnamese people and on American home front morale. Last, the city had thus far been spared the ravages of war. Large scale destruction of the city in house to house fighting could cause the Cao Dai, who harbor considerable resentment toward the Saigon government over the curtailment of the political power of the Cao Dai sect, to abandon the Saigon regime and remain neutral in the war pending the resolution of the conflict. This action would seriously undermine control in Tay Ninh Province because the Cao Dai followers were apt to follow the leaders of the sect rather than the government.

The assault force in the attack would consist of the 9th VC Division attacking from the south and the 1st NVA Division attacking from the north or northeast. The 7th NVA was assigned the mission of holding open the lines of communication along the Saigon Corridor. The campaign was timed so that the preparatory attacks to break the 1st NVA out of War Zone C would take place in early May and the main attack would coincide with Ho Chi Minh's birthday on May 19. Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Emulation Campaign was born.

As Montana Scout continued through April, contact with the enemy slackened

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off. Units in the field encountered rear service units and small covering forces. Since no movement toward the border sanctuaries was detected, it was felt that the enemy was planning to remain in his forward positions and attempt another offensive. Attacks by the 9th VC Division against 25th Infantry Division elements on the southern approaches to Tay Ninh "telegraphed the punch". The 9th VC lost 500 men at Trang Bang and FSB Frontier City in an unsuccessful attempt to open a route into the city. The 1st Cav intensified interdiction operations to check the build up for the expected offensive. Plans were made to close Carolyn in mid May and concentrate the screen along the FSB's Grant and St Barbara line used in March. Since this line had been very successful in shutting off the flow of supplies during the previous offensive, the 1st Cav chose to return to that position to block the May offensive.

In the preparatory phase, the NVA planned to overrun FSB Carolyn in order to relieve the pressure on the X-Cache and Prek Klok traffic. After the base was eliminated, the flow of supplies could be increased to support the offensive. The 95C Regiment was assigned the mission of destroying the base. With its usual thoroughness, the 95C reconnoitered the base and prepared the battlefield for the attack. The Regimental Assistant Chief-of-Staff performed the reconnaissance personally from a tree near the perimeter. The attack plan called for two assault battalions and two support battalions. The three organic battalions of 95C plus the 9th Battalion, 101D Regiment made up the attack force. During the week prior to May 6, the 95C moved southward toward its objective. On the night of 5 May, the regiment was in position, ready to launch the biggest attack to date on a 1st Cav fire base in War Zone C.

On FSB Carolyn, C and E Companies of the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry were expecting an attack. In the jungle north of the fire base, the other companies of the battalion had encountered enemy troops moving southward toward Carolyn. This activity pointed to something big happening very soon.

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Shortly after midnight on 6 May, movement was detected in the wire. Between that incident and 0200, sporadic rocket fire struck the base. At 0200, all hell broke loose. Intense rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle fire slammed into the base. The two assault battalions moved in under the barrage, attacking from the north, south and northwest.

The defenders initiated an operation known in the 1st Cav as "calling in the whole world". From Ike and St Barbara, artillery fire and illumination was on the way immediately. (During the attack, the 105mm battery on Ike expended 700 HE and over 100 illuminating rounds). At Tay Ninh, the Blue Max AH1-G helicopters were cranking up. The infantry and artillery on Carolyn opened up with intense small arms fire and direct fire artillery.

Despite the defensive fires the NVA pierced the perimeter and overran six bunkers. But before the enemy could exploit the breach, the skytroopers counter-attacked.

Overhead, the ARA pilots rolled in, ignoring the heavy .51 caliber anti-aircraft fire, to shower the NVA with rockets and minigun fire. This fire, together with the artillery, prevented the reinforcement of the penetration.

The counterattack drove out the enemy, but not before they blew up an ammunition storage bunker. The high water mark had been reached and the attack began to ebb. At 0600, the 95C broke off the attack and withdrew northward.

At first light, three companies were air assaulted into blocking positions along the 95C line of march. Gunships from the 1st Battalion 9th Cavalry harried groups of enemy soldiers as they tried to escape.

The attack and subsequent pursuit cost the NVA 198 killed and 31 prisoners. The amount of equipment left behind in the wake of the attack further indicates the magnitude of the victory - 48 individual and 23 crew served weapons, including 2 complete mortars and 10 machineguns, 2 radios and over 400 large caliber

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munitions. Among the prisoners was Junior Captain Nguyen Ban Luong, Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the 95C Regiment. Captain Luong was so shocked by the losses inflicted on his regiment that he volunteered to make loudspeaker broadcasts over the regimental base camp to urge the survivors to surrender before it was too late. (Captain Luong had served with the 95C Regiment since before the attack on Dot in 1968 and provided a wealth of information about his regiment and its operations).

The level of enemy activity swung sharply upward as the preparatory phase of the Ho Chi Minh Emulation Campaign progressed. Contacts in the field were frequent as were attacks by fire and ground probes at fixed installations. Ground-to-air firing incidents rose to as many as 32 per day as the NVA tried to protect his movements from observation and attack by 1st Cav helicopters. A high point was achieved between 12 and 14 May. Ground attacks were made on Grant, Jamie and Phyllis. A very strong sapper attack was made at Quan Loi base camp. These actions resulted in 128 enemy killed. At the same time, elements of the 18B Regiment managed to push out of Base Area 355 and ambushed convoys on LTL 26 near Cau Khoi. Except for the units executing the ambushes, the 1st NVA Division was unable to break out of War Zone C. The first week of the Emulation Campaign cost the enemy over 500 men. After the high point, action dwindled to almost zero by 19 May. By that date, the offensive had cost the enemy 600 killed and 144 tons of rice captured. The screen across the top of Base Area 355 had effectively cut the flow of supplies needed for the offensive and doomed it to failure. As the month of May came to a close, the enemy suspended offensive operations in order to rehabilitate and rebuild his decimated units.

VIII. TERMINATION OF MONTANA SCOUT AND THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE:

In June, the 1st Cavalry Division continued Montana Scout. During the

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last days of May, two very lucrative targets were detected in War Zone C. Intelligence indicated that the 95C and 18B Regiments were located in the Crescent and Mustang Trail area, respectively. Plans were made to trap and wipe out these two units.

Up to six infantry companies and one tank company from the 11th ACR were available for the mission. Two companies were inserted into the Crescent on 3 June. As the companies closed in, B-52 strikes were placed on 95C's positions. Between 8 and 10 June, the 2nd Battalion 12th Cavalry, four infantry companies and one tank company were in contact with at least one battalion of 95C. Four B-52 strikes were made simultaneously on the enemy position, followed by an immediate sweep by ground troops. In the three days of fighting, at least 100 NVA were killed in the Crescent.

On 14 June, the 2nd Battalion 12th Cavalry was pulled out of the operation for a well deserved stand-down and was replaced by the 1st Battalion 12th Cavalry. This battalion took up where the 2nd Battalion left off. It drove the remains of the 95C out of the Crescent and demolished the bases within the area. When it was finished, the Crescent was no longer capable of serving as a base area. (After the 1st Battalion 12th Cavalry left the Crescent, the 25th Infantry Division assumed control of that area and Rome-Flowed it). The 95C was so badly hurt that its strength did not reach 1,000 effectives until October.

The 18B Regiment was located north of Base Area 355 between Ike and Jamie. The 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry moved into that area and trapped the 1st and 3rd Battalions of 18B. Between 8 and 23 June, fifteen B-52 strikes and 100 airstrikes were put on top of the two trapped enemy battalions. This firepower and combat with the US Infantry battalions killed approximately 300 NVA. The 2nd Battalion, 18B Regiment had evaded the encirclement and moved north of Ike. In an effort to compel the 2nd Battalion

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5th Cavalry to break off the encirclement, the 2nd Battalion of 18B and the K28 Sapper Battalion decided to launch an attack on FSB Ike.

On 18 June, the K28 Battalion made a sapper attack on Ike to clear the way for a full-scale infantry attack at a later date. Three teams of sappers were in the wire attempting to infiltrate the perimeter to knock out the TOC and the artillery and to clear paths for the infantry. The infiltrators were discovered by an alert bunker guard who took them under fire and sounded the alarm before they could get through the wire. The sappers were engaged with heavy small arms and artillery fire. Thirty seven sappers were killed before the K28 broke off the attack without accomplishing its mission.

The 2nd Battalion, 18B Regiment attacked FSB Ike in force on 20 June. Three infantry combat teams, moving forward under cover of a mortar and rocket barrage, entered the wire where they expected to find the gaps cut by the sappers. But there were no gaps. Caught in the wire, the infantry was decimated. The battalion withdrew before dawn, leaving 90 of its men in the wire.

Two US rifle companies were air assaulted into positions along the battalion's line of retreat. These two companies were not part of the encirclement force, however. In that respect, the attack failed to relieve the pressure on the trapped portion of the regiment.

The 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry completed their encirclement on 23 June. After this operation, the 18B Regiment remained out of action until August.

Montana Scout terminated on 23 June. In July, the low level of enemy activity permitted the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division's forces. The 2nd Brigade was shifted into Phuoc Long Province. The 11th ACR (OPCON) was assigned responsibility for portions of Binh Long Province, while the 1st Brigade remained in War Zone C.

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In August, the NVA launched an offensive. The objective was not Saigon, nor even Tay Ninh. Their offensive capability had been so eroded that they had to settle for An Loc, capital of Binh Long Province. The attack could be made directly out of the Fishhook without requiring the use of forward staging areas. Consequently, the attacking forces would not be exposed to interdiction attacks enroute to the objective. Also, if the attack failed, it was a short distance to run to safety.

On 11 August, the NVA launched their offensive. Supporting the main attack, there was supposed to be a division-size attack in War Zone C and a similar attack in War Zone D. The main attack in Binh Long Province was crushed. In War Zones C and D, barely one battalion in each zone was able to bring off an attack. In less than a week, the offensive was defeated and the NVA were back across the border.

#### IX. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY:

At a cost of 387 killed and 2425 wounded\* the 1st Cavalry Division had stopped cold two full scale enemy offensives and wrested the initiative from a determined enemy. The base system in War Zone C, built up over the years at a considerable expenditure of effort, had been rendered incapable of supporting any type of offensive action. Over 4,000 enemy soldiers had been killed and one million pounds of rice were captured by the division. Behind the screen maintained by the 1st Cavalry Division across the northern tier of III Corps, II Field Force units were able to concentrate on destroying local force units and eliminating the VC infrastructure without fear of attacks by the main force divisions.

Between October 1968 and 30 June 1969, the 1st Cavalry Division had dramatically changed the strategic situation in War Zone C. But how was the 1st Cav able to effect the change?

\*February - June 1969

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Air mobility can take the lion's share of the credit. The 1st Cav was unencumbered by the lack of surface lines of communication through War Zone C. As long as there was reasonable trafficability for foot troops and a patch of hard ground for the artillery to set up, the division was in business. A fire base could be placed anywhere there was room for one helicopter to land. If there was no place to land, the 1st Cav would make one. This capability enabled the division to go where the enemy lived. No area was safe from intrusion, no units safe from attack. Airmobility permitted the relentless search for the enemy to continue despite the abominable wet monsoon weather. No let-up in the operational tempo took place. Consequently, the enemy was allowed no time to recover from his losses in War Zone C. The 1st Cav again showed it could operate for long periods of time over extremely rugged terrain with greater effectiveness and greater combat power than a standard infantry division.

Another key to the success of the 1st Cav was the use of massive firepower. Infantry and air cavalry were used primarily to find and fix the enemy. The destruction of enemy units was left to the "big guns". The 1st Cav made lavish use of all types of artillery and air-delivered ordnance. In support of 1st Cav operations, from February to June, the Air Force flew over 4,000 sorties of Tactical Air (TAC-AIR) support and 150 Combat Skyspot missions in War Zone C. This effort represents roughly 25% of the TAC AIR support expended in III Corps Tactical Zone for all US, ARVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces. Almost 200 B-52 strikes were employed.

The four tube-artillery battalions and the aerial rocket artillery battalion of the division performed yeoman service in providing support for the infantry. Infantry units always stayed within the range of light artillery stationed on battalion FSB's. This artillery was the most readily available means of fire support and the infantrymen depended upon it when in contact with the enemy.

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Artillery was also very effective in interdicting movement through War Zone C by means of planned fires on known enemy locations and frequently used trails.

Special mention must be made of the ARA. This unique unit gave the division the capability to provide devastating firepower throughout the division's area of operations. The fire of the weapons systems mounted on the aircraft can be brought to within 10 meters of friendly units in contact.

"Blue Max" provided support to the troops in the field around the clock, good weather or bad, often in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire.

The effects of this prodigious use of firepower were the destruction of enemy units and bases, the weakening of his morale and a general reduction of his ability to carry on the fight.

The application of tremendous firepower is useless if the bombs and artillery rounds land on empty jungle. This brings up the key role played by intelligence in the 1st Cav's success. The target acquisition agencies of the division were carefully organized and coordinated for maximum effect. No planned offensive or concentration of troops or materiel went un-noticed. The air cavalry squadron, ground and airborne sensor systems and photo reconnaissance gathered information which was integrated to provide the answer to the questions: Where is the enemy and what is he doing?

The search for the enemy was facilitated by the dedication of such people as CPT Milton, the 1st Brigade S-2. CPT Milton would spend hours each day flying over War Zone C in the back of a light observation helicopter, lying on the floor with a pair of binoculars looking for the NVA. He knew the trails and bunker complexes like the back of his hand. When he said the enemy was there, he WAS there.

The last of the keys to the 1st Cav's success was the manner in which the division was employed. The deployment of the 1st Cav into III Corps

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confronted the enemy with a strategic surprise. A division-size force had been injected into the battle area with no warning from 600 miles away. The use of the division in a mobile defensive posture permitted the division to make the most effective and efficient use of its air mobility and firepower.

On the tactical level, the division made very good use of the terrain over which the campaign was fought. Firebases were located to block the avenues of approach to Base Area 355. This situation presented the enemy with multiple difficulties. Troops operating from these firebases could seriously disrupt the flow of materiel. If the enemy continued to move past a particular firebase, he could expect to lose a lot of men and supplies. If he tried to overrun the fire base, he could expect to lose a good portion of his attack force with no assurance that the firebase would be overrun. The enemy could also elect to bypass the firebases. This particular choice presented two more difficulties. First, bypass routes would make the distance that supplies had to be moved considerably longer. The longer distances required more time to build up sufficient stocks of supplies for an offensive and exposed the units moving the supplies to greater danger of being detected by the 1st Cav's reconnaissance forces. Second, the mobility of the 1st Cav would enable it to open new fire bases faster than the enemy could open new routes. The depth of the screen across War Zone C proved to be almost impenetrable. (It took a full scale offensive effort in May to move two battalions through the screen). The enemy had to operate at the end of a long supply line with all the difficulties that arise from that situation. The presence of three fire bases along the X-Cache system, for example, shut off the flow of rice to the south. The same depth across each of the supply routes permitted the 1st Cav to really go over the terrain with a fine tooth comb.

The interdictory effort, combined with offensive operations against the

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enemy's troop units, forced the enemy to try to fight his way through War Zone C instead of barrelling down the trails to Saigon for a quick victory. Each time he had tried, the result was the same: bloody failure.

War Zone C is still the main battleground of III Corps. The NVA rear service groups continue to operate in the area to build up caches, bunker complexes and roads for future offensives. But every day the NVA operate, it becomes more hazardous and costly to them, as the 1st Cav continues its screening and interdictory role in War Zone C.

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## ANNEX A: Allied Operations in and near War Zone C before November 1968

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
El Paso II	2 Jun-13 Jul '66	Took place in Binh Long Province. Resulted in 855 enemy KIA.
Attleboro	14 Sep-24 Nov '66	Took place in War Zone C with 196 LIB, 1st Inf Div, 3d Bde. of 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde taking part. 1106 enemy KIA.
Cedar Falls	8-26 Jan '67	Took place in Iron Triangle, SE of BA 355. 1st Inf Div, 25th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, 11th ACR taking part. 720 enemy KIA.
Junction City	22 Feb-14 May '67	Took place in War Zone C and bordering provinces. Elements of 1st, 4th and 25th Inf Divs, 196 LIB, 173d Abn Bde, 11th ACR. 2728 enemy KIA.
Shenandoah	27 Sep-19 Nov '67	Took place in Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces. 1st Inf Div inflicted 956 KIA.
Saratoga- Yellowstone	8 Dec '67- 11 Mar '68	25th Div operation in Tay Ninh Province and area west of Saigon. Included Tet Offensive. 5116 enemy casualties.
Qayet Thang	11 Mar-7 Apr '68	Took place in Saigon area and 5 surrounding provinces. US 1st, 9th and 25th Inf Divs, ARVN 5th and 25th Divs, ARVN Abn Battalions and Marine Corps Task Forces. 2658 KIA.
Toan Thang I	8 Apr-31 May '68	Took place in Capital Military District and surrounding area. 79 US and ARVN battalions. 7645 enemy KIA.
Toan Thang II	1 Jun '68- 17 Feb '69	Continuation of Toan Thang I.

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By	CP NARA Date 2/1/01

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## ANNEX B: Fire Support Base Construction in War Zone C Area

<u>FSB</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE OPENED</u>
Mustang	XT 366820	Nov 68
Beverly	XT 330900 (Katum)	Nov 68
Ann	XT 085816 (Thein Ngon)	Nov 68
Billy	XT 437843	Nov 68
Jake	XT 620810	Nov 68
Dot	XT 562854	Nov 68
Rita	XT 500809	Nov 68
Joe	XT 629663	Nov 68
Andy	XT 820910 (Quan Loi)	Nov 68
St Barbara	XT 274680	Nov 68
Michael	XT 002763	Dec 68
Ina	XT 605621	Dec 68
Grant	XT 387623	19 Jan 69
Dolly	XT 523588	8 Feb 69
Whit	XT 455624	10 Mar 69
Ike	XT 340714	21 Apr 69
Jess	XT 188717	29 Mar 69
Carolyn	XT 267788	14 Apr 69
Jamie	XT 484719	22 Apr 69
Phyllis	XT 537806	19 Apr 69
Loni	XT 607621	21 May 69
Betty	XT 686745	19 Jun 69

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By	CP NARA Date 6/1/01