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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDAGI

17 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: COL McKee

SUBJECT: Enemy Activity in Cambodian Base Areas

1. Reference: Message your headquarters, subject as above, AVFBB-CO6-0076.
2. Attached as inclosures are responses to the questions posed in paragraphs 2A and 2B, and some of those contained in paragraph 2C, referenced message. Some of the remaining questions are covered in the division's plan for denial operations as contained in OPORD 8-70 (TBP), however, we have no plans for the employment of agents in Cambodia.

- 3 Incl
1. NVA Logistic System
 2. Survey and Radar Information and Planning
 3. Demography

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By LAC-MSRA Date 4/2/01

AVDAGY
SUBJECT: NVA Logistic System

17 June 1970

1. 50th RSG:

The only identification of a 50th RSG storage/depot facility is "The City" also known as Branch 7 Transportation and Storage Element located in the vicinity of XU 5722 (Ref 1ACD INTSUM No 140, Annex G). The exploitation of this facility resulted in depriving the enemy of over 170 tons of munitions; however, this was only 11% of the Group's estimated yearly storage level of 1500 tons.

The majority of the 50th RSG's storage installations have not been discovered and many may have been evacuated prior to our operations. The 50th RSG appears to have relocated outside the Allied operational areas, possibly closer to the Mekong River. Prior to 1 May, the 50th RSG Base Area probably was bounded by the Flatiron on the east to the 40 N-S grid line NW of Katum on the west and Route 7. The contacts with main force elements in the 50th RSG Base Area appear to be toward protecting major remaining caches. Main force activity is often associated with cache security and its intensity may be proportionate to the size of the cache. The commitment of both the 165th and 209th Regiments in countersweep operations in the Fishhook along with the high rate of expenditure of indirect fire munitions indicates major ordnance cache sites close at hand.

2. 70th RSG:

In the 70th RSG area there have been no identifications of major elements of the Group except for the K-30 Hospital complex in the vicinity of XU 8136, and the T8 Cache of the 70th RSG located in the vicinity of XU 7836. The Base Area of the 70th RSG appears to extend from the "66" N-S grid line in the west to about the "85" line in the east. The N-S extremities appear to extend from Highway 131 in the north to about the "25" E-W grid line in the south. Present operations in this Base Area have generated several conclusions: First, the 70th RSG is not a major rear service group in comparison with the other border area rear service groups. Its stockage level is estimated at 200 tons of munitions. Caches found in this area indicate the area probably is not used extensively for the storage of munitions or food supplies. It is obvious that the efforts of the Group have been downgraded as a result of Cav operations against its LOC's - principally the Serpes Jungle Highway. Secondly, Allied operations have only begun to explore the Base Area. The western portion has yet to be exploited since Allied operations have been directed primarily to the northeast. The proximity of the base area to Highway 131 - Route 7 junction is significant in that Route 7 was the major logistical artery from Sihanoukville. The 2-8 Cav cache complex discovery including Picatinny East may have been the first step in uncovering the heart of the 70th's depots (Ref 1ACD INTSUM No 164, Annex G). This one cache was estimated to contain one third of the 70th's total munitions stockage.

3. 86th RSG:

The boundary of the 86th RSG Base Area appears to extend from the "95" N-S grid line north of Bu Dop northeast to the O Rang area. The N-S extremities are the Cambodian-Phuoc Long border in the south to the Prek Chhlom and Highway 14 in the north. To date, somewhere between 30 and 40% of the annual

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stockage level of the Group (1500-2000 tons) is believed to have been captured or destroyed indicating the Cav's operations have made significant inroads into this logistical complex. It appears that the immediate border area has yet to be fully exploited by Allied operations. Since the 86th RSG has not had sufficient time to evacuate its depots, it is maintaining security elements within the Base Area to protect the remaining caches. The increase in enemy activity along the border area substantiates this. The two major items of significance discovered to date on the 86th RSG logistical network are its apparent main depot (Shakey's Hill vic YU 2152), and the transshipment point for supplies moving south (Rock Island East vic XU 0243). Shakey's Hill was of semi-permanent construction and contained supplies that had been emplaced for varying periods of time of up to a year. Rock Island East, on the other hand, was strictly a temporary storage site above ground, palletized stacks of munitions that had been emplaced less than six months. The record size of this transshipment point (329 tons) was undoubtedly due to the effectiveness of the 1st Cav's interdiction operations against the Adams and Jolley Roads and the resulting backup. The remaining cache sites to the northeast were generally temporary in nature and were probably due to attempts to hide relocated caches or to find additional storage facilities for the overflow caused by the backup. Shakey's Hill probably was a main depot of the Group. From the overall size of the 86th RSG's AO and the total presumed stockage prior to the cross-border operations, there are possibly other depots of similar size. The dense forest provides ample hiding areas in which the remainder of the supplies could be dispersed. It seems likely that a small percentage of the 86th RSG's total stockage has been relocated either north beyond the 30 kilometer limit, or temporarily south across the border until the Allies withdraw.

4. Although US Intelligence had accumulated information on the NVA/VC logistical system in Cambodia and South Vietnam, detailed information on the exact daily functioning of the system was unknown. Operation Toan Thang 43 has revealed much additional information and several surprises about the system. The operations in Cambodia will force the NVA to completely reorganize this system. The best way to see these results and forces changes is by viewing the past operations, impact of the Allied operations, and what the future can expect to develop based on current intelligence.

Prior to Operation Toan Thang 43, the system of supply of the NVA utilized ocean shipping, major trucking firms, and rear area and forward area Rear Service Groups. All munitions and weapons had to be shipped into the base areas from Communist block countries. To facilitate this the Communists were allowed free use of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. Munitions and weapons unloaded at this ocean port were then trucked on Highway 7 to the various base areas along the Cambodian border. Generally speaking, the supplies were unloaded at cache sites and depots within 8 kilometers of the South Vietnamese border. These large stocks of supplies were maintained by rear service elements and groups operating solely in Cambodia. "The City" is perhaps the best example of such a major supply point discovered to date by US Forces. From these depot areas supplies were trucked and carried closer to the border to numerous smaller cache sites by rear service groups that operated both in Cambodia and SVN. Many small cache sites of both munitions and food and medical supplies were found right on the border or within 4 kilometers of the border. From here rear service transportation units moved the supplies into South Vietnam by bicycle or mairpack. NVA units in the area also had their own transportation companies

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that would travel to the border cache sites and return with needed supplies. In the latter part of 1969 and 1970, combat maneuver elements also had to send combat troops to procure supplies as increasingly effective Allied operations interdicted in-country cache sites. Food and a large portion of medicine had to be procured locally by the using unit although some food and medical supplies were purchased in Cambodia and transported in-country to units based in areas with little population such as War Zone C. The Allied rice denial program forced the NVA/VC to begin large scale food production in Cambodia which eventually increased alienation in the border areas between Cambodian administrators and NVA/VC forces, and was one of the many pressures that lead up to the coup d'etat against Sihanouk. This then was the basic system that existed prior to the fall of Sihanouk and Operation Toan Thang 43.

Much new intelligence was gained on the enemy system as Allied units thrust into Cambodia. Although the basic system for procurement and transporting of supplies was confirmed, the discovery of a massive medical and evacuation system was a real surprise. Prior to Toan Thang 43, care of wounded and sick enemy personnel was believed shared by the divisional medical battalions and companies and the rear service groups which maintained hospitals in Cambodia. Toan Thang 43 led to the discovery and identification of a divisional size medical effort to treat enemy wounded and sick personnel. Documents captured by the 25th Infantry Division indicated that a 92d Recovery and Replacement Regiment was activated in July of 1969. The regiment was reported to have been completely organized and operational by August of 1969. Two sister regiments have been identified also - the 90th and the 94th RR Regiments. Of the three, the 92d is the best documented. The 92d RR Regiment was organized from personnel and equipment from the 50th RSG and the 90th RSG. The 92d RR Regiment was placed under the direct control of the HQ, SVNLA Military, Political, and Rear Service Staffs. Specialized personnel and equipment from the rear service groups merely remained in place and were reassigned to the new regiment. The regiment was probably organized to alleviate the ever increasing effort of caring for sick and wounded personnel. The rear service groups were allowed to concentrate on their primary missions of moving supplies and equipment to SVN. The new regiment established extensive hospital and medical facilities in the old COSVN Base Area. The regiment also conducted political training for all personnel prior to their being returned to combat units. The picture available to date indicates that a large increase in both medical and wounded casualties must have forced this reorganization. The effort on political training indicates that the Communists are possibly experiencing a morale problem with their wounded. In many instances, the 92d Regiment turned patients loose on their own to rally or be captured by the 11th AGR.

Although the basic system of enemy resupply will not be drastically changed, some major readjustments will be forced by the new situation. If ARVN and Cambodian efforts close Sihanoukville to Communist shipping, a new major supply route will have to be established to get munitions and weapons into the III and IV Corps area if the war in these areas is to continue at all. With the seizure of several major cities along the Mekong River between the COSVN Base Area and Laos, indications are that the enemy may be considering replacing ocean shipping with river shipping for massive munitions movement. Such a plan would only be successful if he also controlled the area around the Mekong River. To date indications are that the enemy is making extensive plans for the occupation of Cambodian territory from the Mekong to the SVN border. From the Mekong he can truck his supplies into the new COSVN Base Area. Recent interest in local production teams and forced labor teams indicates that the NVA intend

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to use human and natural resources of the area for their war effort. Because there is no real assurance that Allied thrusts will not be launched again, the enemy will be forced to locate all major storage facilities further into Cambodia and increase the distance and manpower needed to get supplies to the using units. In addition; the constant Allied threat to these supply bases will possibly cost him combat troops to guard supply depots and routes. The enemy is also expected to disperse supply sites over wider areas and no longer concentrate in depots which will again cost him more manpower and time.

5. Major routes for traffic:

- a. Highway 7
- b. Highway 13
- c. Highway 79
- d. Highway 131
- e. Highway 14
- f. Highway 136
- g. Riner Road
- h. Road from Highway 13 SW to XU 613312, to XU 573250, to XU 565257, to XU 537222, to XU 525156, to XT 528995.

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SUBJECT: Survey and Radar Information and Planning

1. The following fire support bases have been surveyed to 4th order accuracy:

- a. Bu Dop - E-697356.88 N-328905.72 HT 140.86m
- b. FSB Phi Ma - E-670212.90 N-311276.81 HT 165.9m
- c. Bo Duc - E-696538.93 N-324937.29 HT 160.41m
- d. FSB Debbie - E-684222.72 N-313682.25 HT 58.06m
- e. FSB Neal - E-712236.46 N-352459.88 HT 447.0m
- f. FSB West II - E-634605.75 N-293590.76 HT 36.4m
- g. FSB X-ray - E-635872.48 N-301079.90 HT unk
- h. FSB Shakey - E-720859.91 N-351822.00 HT 423.00m

2. Radar positioning will generally be dependent on friendly troop disposition after redeployment from Cambodia. No major changes are envisioned from the present concept of employment of the radar sets AN/PPS-5, AN/TPS-25, and the AN/MPQ-4.

Employment will be as follows:

- a. AN/PPS-5: As a minimum employ one set per fire base in the Div AO. Additionally one set will be employed at each base camp.
- b. AN/TPS-25: Continue to employ the one set available at Camp Gorvad.
- c. AN/MPQ-4: Sets will be allocated on the basis of one per direct support battalion. Positioning will be the responsibility of the DS Battalion Commander. In addition, one set will be employed at each of the following base camps: Camp Gorvad, Quan Loi, and FSB Buttons.

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SUBJECT: Demography

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1. Demography:

a. Civilian Population Centers:

(1) Snoul	XU 552345	estimated population	2000
(2) Villages vicinity rubber plantation	XU 5235	" "	50-500 ea
(3) Villages along Highway (7) & (13)		" "	20-200 ea
(4) Ph Chhang	XU 955425	" "	125
(5) Ph Du Trom Kraom	XU 937533	" "	175
(6) Ph Pu Kroch	YU 295675	" "	120
(7) Ph Pu Chham	YU 339659	" "	200
(8) Unk	YU 333663	" "	70
(9) Ph Pu Plo	YU 332644	" "	50
(10) Ph Pa Rang	YU 368659	" "	100
(11) Ph Pu Blu	YU 338633	" "	45
(12) Unk	YU 264629	" "	75
(13) Unk	YU 275630	" "	80
(14) Unk	YU 254617	" "	100
(15) Refugee village	YU 063435	" "	600-700
(16) Refugee village	YU 115515	" "	615
(17) O'Rang	YU 372639	Residents fled when NVA attacked in early May and have not returned. Estimated population: 300.	

(18) Mondol Kiri YU 380775 Population is presumed similar to that of O'Rang base on similar experiences and subsequent US aerial reconnaissance.

(19) Aerial reconnaissance of the following villages show evidence of possible habitation.

(a) YU 308627	(h) YU 348738	(o) YU 315715	(v) XU 680302
(b) YU 255640	(i) YU 274630	(p) YU 245701	running to
(c) YU 278691	(j) YU 233625	(q) YU 027500	XU 688310
(d) YU 328713	(k) YU 278723	(r) YU 060600	
(e) YU 356709	(l) YU 358735	(s) YU 120520	
(f) YU 288633	(m) YU 146728	(t) YU 612577	
(g) YU 242629	(n) YU 256709	(u) YU 150552	

(20) Aerial reconnaissance indicated that the following villages currently are uninhabited but reoccupation would be possible with minimum of effort.

(a) YU 374618	(f) YU 217623
(b) YU 358637	(g) XU 650460
(c) YU 324622	(h) XU 670460
(d) YU 325610	(i) XU 716307
(e) YU 203613	(j) XU 694318

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(21) The villages at the following locations are indicated on maps but do not exist on the ground:

- (a) YU 094366
- (b) YU 097383
- (c) YU 066397

(22) The following villages are destroyed to the extent indicated and are not inhabited:

- (a) YU 051474 Totally destroyed.
- (b) YU 064444 Half destroyed.
- (c) XU 955427 Partially destroyed.
- (d) XU 851483 Totally destroyed.
- (e) XU 939532 Totally destroyed.

b. Ethnic Composition and Density of Population:

(1) Ethnic Composition:

- (a) Vicinity Snoul and along 7 & 13: semi-nomadic Montagnard (Murir)
- (b) Refugee village at YU 063435: 80% Cambodian
- (c) Vicinity Ph Chhang XU 9542: Montagnard
- (d) Refugee village at YU 015557 and YU 115515: Montagnard
- (e) Vicinity O'Rang: Montagnard from Mong Tribe

(2) Density of Population:

- (a) Vicinity Snoul and along Highway 7 and 13: Approximately 5-20 per sq Km.
- (b) O'Rang west to vic XU 9542 approximately 10-30 per sq Km.

2. Means, Routes, and Peak Hours of Travel by Civilians:

a. In the 11th ACR and 1st Bde area of operation the inhabitants travel on the roads and on the jungle trails during the hours of daylight and are normally in their houses about dark. Since there is no government in the area, population control measures do not impede movement at night.

b. The presence of the Allied Forces in Cambodia probably has upset the normal movement of inhabitants. When US forces are withdrawn the NVA may exercise control of most movement patterns in the area.