

RG 472
25ID, DISCOM
S3, ORLL
Dec 65-Apr 70

Box 1

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96225

AVDCSP-C

31 January 1969

AVDC
SUBJECT: Operational Report: Lessons Learned for the Period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969.

File
WJ

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCMH
APO 96225

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Headquarters Headquarters Company 25th Infantry Division Support Command.

(1) Throughout this reporting period the 25th Infantry Division's Support Command headquarters elements and subordinate units have participated in operations Toan Thang, phase II by supporting operations primarily from Cu Chi, Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng. On 15 October 1967 the Support Command was given the mission of providing the internal security and control for the daily logistical convoy. It accomplished this mission by utilizing an attached reconnaissance platoon with additional equipment and vehicles from the 4th Battalion 9th Infantry. On the 25th November this headquarters was relieved of this responsibility and the mission was given to the Provost Marshal. The security platoon with all its vehicles and equipment was transferred at this time.

(2) On 27 November 1968 Colonel James Atwell was assigned as the commander of the Support Command. The new commander placed command emphasis on reducing the amount of salvage which had accumulated in each of the division's base camps, retrograding of the large amount of excess conex containers, reducing the tonnage of the division's ASP, and the overall upgrading of the living conditions in all areas of the Support Command. The results of these activities will be noted in the appropriate area of this report. It was learned by visits of the commander to the supported units that many of the logistical problems that units encountered was due mainly to the lack of communication or action by the supported unit to the supporting units. The policy of frequent visits to the supported units by the supporting battalion commanders has and will eliminate many of the units logistical problems.

(3) On 25 November 1968 the new G Series TOE was implemented and authorized a major as the S-5 of this headquarters, prior to this the job was performed by a captain assigned against the Medical Battalion TOE.

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It was learned that the S-5 was needed in this headquarters and very useful in coordinating all civic actions and psychological operations activities within the unit area of operation. During this reported period the efforts and results of the S-5 were outstanding.

b. Band 25th Infantry Support Command

(1) The 25th Infantry Division Band participated in the following public performances:

(a) Routine commitments (excluding Project Christmas Carol performances during the period 18 - 25 December 1968):

Change of Command ceremonies (Div units)	9
Awards ceremonies (Div units)	6
Miscellaneous ceremonies (Div)	30
Serenades, arrivals and departures of troops	52
One hour concerts (Service Club, Hospital, Snack Bar, Unit area)	21
Performances and ceremonies (Non-Div units)	3
Solo Bugler (Memorial Services)	1
Performances by small instrumental groups	5

(b) The object of Project Christmas Carol was to present live programs of Christmas music for the maximum number of personnel during the period 18 through 25 December 1968. In addition to Christmas music concerts by the full band, five ensembles of four to seven musicians each were formed in order to play in areas too small to accommodate the full band, or to give simultaneous performances. One ensemble also performed classical chamber music for the Division Chapel Choir in a choral program which was presented in 17 fire support bases on the 24th and 25th of December. Other holiday activities supported were concerts in unit mess halls or clubs, Christmas parties for Vietnamese children, chapel services, special serenades for Division Headquarters, service club Christmas party, roving carol serenades, etc. The following is a breakdown by performing medium of Project Christmas Carol presentations:

Full Band performances	21 performances
Ensemble with chorus	26 performances
Instrumental ensemble	14 performances

(2) During this reported period the band was requested to perform outside of the Division TAOI on four different occasions. The band was also requested in conjunction with civic action projects this past quarter. Now the band visits a fire support base twice a week to provide early morning music.

HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND
 QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VIETNAM

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 BY: WAD/ NARA Date: 3/30/15

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c. Division Ammunition Office

(1) The 25th Division Ammunition office continued to provide ammunition support to the divisional and attached units operating within the division area of responsibility. During this period the division ASP provided Class V support to elements of the 1st Cav Division and 199th Light Infantry Brigade while conducting operations in the division area. The tonnage of the ASP was reduced from 1500 tons to 696 tons. The number of line items carried in the ASP was reduced from 210 items to 69 items. The present concept in utilizing Thru-Put where ever possible to fire support bases has greatly assisted in reducing the line items and the tonnage on hand in the ASP.

(2) Status at the end of quarter: Tons on hand 696

(3) Issues during quarter:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total Tons</u>	<u>Tons/Day</u>
November	1170	27
December	788	14
January	696	34

(4) Average for quarter (Tons/Day): 25

d. Division Transportation Office

(1) The Division Transportation Section has coordinated the requirements for U.S. Air Force airlift for unit movement and resupply in support of operations. Special airlift data concerning USAF support is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CARGO (Tons)</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
November	1,437	24,767	N/A
December	1,155	26,945	N/A
January	829	23,062	N/A
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,421</u>	<u>74,774</u>	

(2) The Division Transportation Section continues to operate hold baggage sections at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng for the convenience of personnel located within the Division TAOI. These baggage sections are capable of receiving baggage of rotating personnel, processing and delivering baggage to Hqs Area Command Baggage Section, Tan Son Nhut. The baggage sections also process baggage of newly arrived personnel. Data concerning the Division baggage sections is as follows:

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PERSONNEL PROVIDED SERVICE</u>	<u>PIECES</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
November	755	1,085	89,570
December	779	1,122	85,304
January	659	995	88,610
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,193</u>	<u>3,202</u>	<u>263,484</u>

(3) The Division Transportation Section continues to coordinate and schedule the operation of resupply convoys within the Division TAOI. During the past quarter 599 convoys have been operated in support of the base camps located at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, and Dau Tieng with a total volume of 22,051 vehicles. The operation of resupply convoys includes establishing schedules, receiving vehicular requirements and coordination of security forces and traffic control. All convoys operating on the Division MSR, either tactical unit moves or unit resupply, are granted movement clearance by the Transportation Officer. Highway continues to be the primary mode of transportation for the resupply of the division base camps. Following is a breakdown of regular resupply convoys operated in the division area:

a. Cu Chi - Tan Son Nhut

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>	<u>VEHICLES 1ST LOG COMD</u>	<u>25TH DIV & ATTACHED UNITS</u>
November	26		344
December	0		
January	0		
<u>Total</u>	<u>26</u>		<u>344</u>

b. Cu Chi - Long Binh

November	40		489
December	44		552
January	55		681
<u>Total</u>	<u>139</u>		<u>1,722</u>

c. Long Binh - Cu Chi - Tay Ninh

November	60	3,481	858
December	57	3,159	961
January	62	3,872	1,119
<u>Total</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>10,512</u>	<u>2,938</u>

d. Long Binh - Cu Chi - Dau Tieng

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>	<u>LST LOG COMD</u>	<u>25TH DIV & ATTACHED UNITS</u>
November	60	1,109	858
December	57	1,206	961
<u>January</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>1,108</u>	<u>1,119</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>3,423</u>	<u>2,938</u>

e. Cu Chi - Duc Hoa

November	24	202
December	26	208
<u>January</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>208</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>618</u>

(4) On 19 December 1968, an alternate MSR was opened to expedite highway movements between Cu Chi and its two forward support base camps. Connecting Trang Bang with Bao Don, the new road provides a route which shortens the distance between the three base camps. The addition of an alternate MSR reduced the possibilities of ambushes by utilizing different routes if required.

(5) In December 1968, the Division Transportation Office was required to retrograde approximately 1,000 conex containers to Newport RVN, on a scheduled monthly basis from January through June 1969. The Division Transportation Office arranged for the collection and retrograde of conex containers required. The task was completed on 31 January 1969, returning 1,000 conexes to the transportation system. The fact that so many had to be moved in so short a time proved that some Army assets were not being utilized to the maximum. This action allowed delivery of a vital supply item to the transportation system and ridding the division of excess equipment requiring preventive and corrective maintenance. The lesson learned shows that closer scrutiny must be placed on asset utilization to prevent waste, misuse and to promote maximum effectiveness of resources.

e. 25th Administration Company

(1) During the past month and a half this unit has seen a considerable improvement in Administration Company's overall position. Physically, a new sump for the Mess Hall has been built, four new prefabricated billets are being constructed, a new sump for shower area has been approved, bunker capacity has been increased by about 50%, a weapons room and addition to supply room has been constructed.

f. 725th Maintenance Battalion

(1) During this period the unit continued to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts support to the division in all of its operations.

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(2) As a result of the Phase II Standardization Program, the Battalion was reorganized in accordance with USARPAC General Order Number 775, dated 22 November 1968. This action organized the Battalion under MTOE 29-15G. The reorganization provided for increased personnel which were vitally needed. Comparative strengths before and after this reorganization are:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
MTOE 29-15E	29	14	648	691
MTOE 29-15G	31	17	806	854

(a) Operations: The following jobs were completed by this battalion during reporting period:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Wheel Vehicles	314	302	305	921
Tracked Vehicles	190	179	177	546
Small Arms	781	1047	917	2745
Artillery	69	76	111	256
Engineer	24	32	34	90
Signal	2067	2290	2275	6632
Office Machines	140	107	178	425
Aircraft	241	233	265	739
Other	259	289	315	863
<u>Totals</u>	<u>4085</u>	<u>4555</u>	<u>4577</u>	<u>13,217</u>

(b) Logistics:

(1) General

(a) At the Battalion's request, the 1st Logistical Command's Instructor and Inspection (INI) Team visited during the first week of December 1968. The results of the inspection verified that much improvement has been made in the technical operation of the Battalion since last August. The Inspection report is now being used as the basis for further improvements. All deficiencies will be corrected by 1 February 1969.

(b) An all-time low backlog figure of 449 jobs was reached during the period. This represents about a 3 day workload.

(2) Supply

(a) During the period, repair parts have gradually become more plentiful.

(b) A complete review of all the Battalion ASL's was completed. This resulted in 4755 line items being deleted from the stockage lists due either to lack of demands and/or invalid federal stock numbers. Prices and units of issue were posted to all stock records. This has resulted in the Battalion's ASL being reduced from approximately 16,000 line items (including aircraft) to 12,000 line items.

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(c) Performance data during this period also continued to improve. Zero balances are holding at about a 30% level; demand accommodation continues at about 36%. Requisition volume continues at about 15,000 per month. The number of Red Ball requisitions continues at 12-14% of the total volume handled.

(d) A complete location survey was performed in all of the forward support companies. 731 fringe items were located and shipped out. Location accuracy was increased from an average of 57.7% to above 90%. Each of these 3 ASL's was reduced by about 40%.

(e) A complete inventory of the stocks in the forward support companies was also completed. Inventory accuracy improvement from 64% to above 90%.

(f) All requested objectives were recomputed along with the net assets for each ASL line item. Excessive requisitions were cancelled, proper quantities were reordered and any excesses were shipped.

(g) Changes in procedures governing turn-in serviceable stocks to the depot have severely hampered disposing of excesses. Under these procedures, nothing may be returned without obtaining disposition instructions from the USAICCV. This has taken about 14 days or more with disposition being directed to any of the in-country support commands, Okinawa, USADJ, and CONUS. These procedures not only slow down the return of stocks but place a burden on the unit to pack, crate, and ship for which they are not equipped.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) Commel: The arrival of 8 additional AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets, making a total of 14, has increased the requirement for test equipment. The overall support of the AN/PPS-5 Radar Set is inadequate due to lack of trained personnel, repair parts and test equipment. Organizational technicians and the limited OJT given and the lack of repair parts allow these personnel to make very minor adjustments and only clean the equipment. Maintenance at the direct support level is also hampered by a lack of diagnostic test equipment and repair parts. This results in evacuation of the equipment to higher levels and subsequent delays in returning it to an operational status.

(b) The lack of A-9 modules continues to be the primary parts problem with the RT-505, FM radios.

(c) The AN/PPS-3, Miniaturized Starlight Scopes arrived in the Division in December 1968. Additional batteries, BA-1533, FSM 6135-056-7612, have not been received to support the scope.

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(d) Wheel Vehicles: Generally each family of vehicles is being deadlined for the following critical parts: $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton-Engines, Transmissions and Transfers; $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton-Engines and Front axles; $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton-Multi-fuel Engines, Throwout Berings, CV Boots, and Clutch Carriers; and 5 Ton-Boots and Hydrovac. Little supply response from the logistical support bases is being experienced in obtaining these parts.

(e) Track Vehicles: Although the number of engines used to support the M113 family of vehicles has gone down considerable since the previous quarter, usage of M18A3 engines has increased. The primary cause is the dry weather and increased operations. M113A1 APC's on hand now have the new shock mounted fuel tanks which are holding up very well. M88 engines continue to be critical.

(f) Artillery: Due to the number of rounds being fired and the increasing age of the M109 Howitzer fleet the deadline rate has increased considerably since the last reporting period. Fourth year models (4 ea) are still on hand and have never been replaced. One battalion of M-101A1 Howitzers has been completely changed to the M-102. The current quarter should see the completion of the exchange with the 2nd Battalion.

(g) Small Arms: The M2 50 Cal MG continues to be a problem due to lack of training on the part of gun crews in setting head space and timing. Many weapons were retrograded to depot repair facilities because of loose receiver rivets. Caused by improper setting of headspace and timing by the crew.

(h) Engineer: The backlog of deadlined generators remain high due to the unavailability of certain repair parts. Resupply of many engineer construction and heavy lift equipment repair parts remain at a very slow rate. The processing of DA Form 5-23 has accelerated considerably thereby reducing the time lost in obtaining disposition instructions for engineer equipment. Critical parts that are needed for repair of engineer equipment are listed below:

<u>NOUN</u>	<u>END ITEM</u>	<u>FSN</u>
Voltage Regulator	3KW Generator	2920-299-0637
Control Panel	"	6115-924-9778
Engine	Loader Scoop 175 AM-23	2815-996-1003
Control Panel	1.5KW Generator	6115-905-5631
Stator	3KW Generator	6115-997-9769
Rotor	"	6115-685-0692
Regulator	"	2920-299-0637
Gen Assy	3KW Generator	6115-658-0491
Cyl Assy	Fork Lift CC1117	5330-966-2290
Pump Assy	Fork Lift MHE199	2815-930-5694

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g. 25th Medical Battalion

(1) Throughout the report period the Battalion continued relatively routine medical support of the Division. HQ & A Company staffed the Arthur E. Lewis Dispensary at Cu Chi Base Camp. This facility continued to operate 60 beds. Company B continued to support Dau Tieng Base Camp with a 40 bed capacity. Company D continued to support Tay Ninh Base Camp with 50 beds. Statistics for the quarter's operation are included.

(2) In early November the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, moved to Tay Ninh Base Camp with an area of operations north of Tay Ninh in War Zone C. The 1st Bde, 1st Air Cav Div brought with them their supporting medical company, Company A, 15th Med Bn, set up a clearing station at Tay Ninh Base Camp, thereby eliminating the need for 25th Medical Battalion to provide medical support as it had to the 3rd Bde, 101st Airborne Division, earlier. The 25th Medical Battalion did provide initial logistical support to assist company A, 15th Med bn, in setting up operations. They continued to provide support in the way of hand receipting cots and one 3/4 ton ambulance which was used for patient transfer by A Company, 15th Med Bn, to 45th Surgical Hospital, and emergency backup for medical supplies. In mid-December a section of the Clearing Platoon of Company A, 15th Med Bn, moved to Cu Chi. Once again the 25th Medical Battalion acted as host and assisted Company A in setting up operations which consisted of a small clearing station. Again a 3/4 ton ambulance was hand receipted in order to provide patient transfer capability from the clearing station to 12th Evac Hospital. Company A, 15th Med Bn, brought two (2) medical evacuation helicopters to Cu Chi. The 25th Med assisted Company A, 15th Med Bn, by operating ust-off Control for them. This was done by placing an additional AN/VRC 46 radio in the Dustoff Control Center and monitoring the 1st Air Cav Medevac request net. Company A medevac helicopters and the 159th Medical Detachment, supporting the 25th Infantry Division, provided mutual support to each other on making field pick-ups.

(3) The 25th Medical Battalion continued to provide medical aidmen to the Ambush Patrol under the direction of the Lightning Combat Leadership Course.

(4) Work continued on the Division Medical Supply bunker, which is designed to hold 50 persons or 20 litter patients.

(5) In mid-November combat damage resulted in a shortage of helicopters in the 159th Medical Detachment. Because of this, the 57th Medical Detachment was requested to provide area medical evacuation coverage to the Dau Tieng area on a temporary basis. This support is continuing at the present time.

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(6) The 25th Medical Battalion continued to operate Dustoff Control Centers at the 3 division base camps, Cu Chi, Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh. Cu Chi Dustoff Control continued to receive interference. In an effort to eliminate this, the Dustoff frequency was declared a discrete frequency for III CTZ on 18 Dec 68. Interference is still occurring and investigation as to the cause continues.

(7) A request for revetments around the wards and dispensary at Cu Chi was submitted as an operational necessity on 24 Nov 68. A message from the CO 20th Engr Bde, received on 1 Dec 68, indicated that the request was approved and will be funded through O&MA.

(8) On 25 November 1968 the battalion went under the G-Series TO&E. The overall effect was beneficial to the battalion, however, a request for a change will be submitted to cover those area where the TO&E is felt to be deficient.

(9) In mid-Dec the 25th Medical Battalion Optometry Clinic was opened. This is a two lane clinic and provides the Battalion with the capability of eye examinations and spectavle fabrication.

(10) On 27 December 1968, Company C set up an aid station for the Bob Hope Show.

(11) In early December 1968, a change in policy of handling KIA's was directed by the Commanding General. This policy was changed as a morale factor. The KIA and WIA were both brought to the dispensary prior to the change. It was felt that the KIA would be depressing to the WIA's. Instead of all KIA's being brought directly to the dispensary to be declared officially dead by the Medical Corps Officer, in Cu Chi Base Camp they are taken directly to the Graves Registration Collecting Point. This necessitates sending a physician to the Graves Registration Collecting Point to declare the individual officially dead.

(12) During this period this unit supported Division units with medical service and supplies. In addition non-division units were supported with medical supplies.

(a) Medical Totals:

- (1) Patients seen - 16,740
 - (a) Decease - 13,481
 - (b) Non-battle-injuries - 1,743
- (2) Lab test - 9,029
- (3) Immunizations - 6,340

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(4) Prescriptions filled - 13,953

(5) X-Ray -- 9,111

(b) Supply and Services:

(1) Line items issued - 10,518

(2) MEDCAP Line items issued - 1,201

(3) Maintenance work orders received - 23

(a) Work orders completed - 14

(b) Work orders awaiting parts - 9

(4) Eyeglasses ordered (pairs) - 2,017

(5) Bulk pharmacy items issued - 31

h. 25th S & T Battalion

(1) Operations

(a) Class I Supply

(1) Status

	<u>A Rations</u>	<u>C Rations</u>
(a) Stockage objective (days):	3	10
	3	10.6

(2) Fresh fruits and vegetables received from Class I Issue Point, Saigon (pounds):

Nov	-	405,718
Dec	-	459,219
Jan	-	362,067
Total		1,227,004

(3) Ice Cream

(a) Cycle or issue: four times per week.

(b) Average gallons per week imported: 2600

(c) Average gallons per week produced at Cu Chi: 0

(d) Average gallons per week produced at Dau Tieng: 100

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(4) Ice Issue

- (a) Average pounds of ice issued daily: 100,000
Note: All ice is potable.

(b) Class II & IV

- (1) Deletions to ASL during quarter: 153

- (2) Total lines on ASL: 3580

(c) Class III

Consumption rates (gals)

		Daily	Quarterly
(1) JP4	CC	36,700	3,376,000
	DT	10,500	968,000
(2) AVGAS	CC	1,300	116,000
	DT	400	35,100
(3) IDGAS	CC	10,200	915,000
	DT	3,000	283,000
(4) DIESEL	CC	25,500	2,351,000
	DT	5,900	548,000

(d) Services

(1) Graves Registration

- (a) Deceased US personnel processed: 195

- (b) Deceased Vietnamese personnel processed: 85

(2) Laundry

Contract (bunkles): 16,491

(3) QM Bath Section

- (a) Total showers (field): 138,894

- (b) Daily Average (field): 1,455

- (c) Total Showers (Base Camp): Neg

- (d) Daily Average (Base Camp): Neg

(4) Water Delivered:

- (a) Total gallons: 4,482,651

- (b) Average per day: 48,724

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(5) Total Hogas and Diesel Delivered on Cu Chi:

(a) Total Gallons: 40,398

(b) Average per day: 139

(6) Duc Hoa Expended:

(a) Ammunition Expended:

(1) 7.62MM: 807,000

(2) 40MM: 3,250

(3) 2.75 in. Rockets: 9,000

(4) 50 Caliber: 8,671

(a) Transportation

(1) Miles Driven:

(a) Total Mileage: 137,242

(b) Average per day: 1,491

(2) Tonnage Hauled:

(a) Total Tonnage: 12,509.5

(b) Average per day: 1,359.7

(f) The shifting maneuver battalions and the number of fire support bases being supported from Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh increased logistical requirements at these locations. Sufficient personnel were on station however, to absorb the increase. Since maneuver battalions have insufficient organic transport capability to provide their own logistical support, a light truck squad was deployed to Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh. These squads were placed under the operational control of the OIC, Fwd Area Support Team. Squads are rotated from Cu Chi at two to three week intervals.

(g) Significant Activity

As of 31 December 1968, the Cu Chi Salvage Collection Point was cleared of all retrograde equipment. During the month of December alone the following number of loads were shipped to Long Binh CC&S;

24 Ten Ton Trucks
239 Stake and Platform Trailers
33 Low-bed Trailers
5 Tank Transporters

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The amount of salvage that was retrograded from Tay Ninh during the quarter was as follows:

November - 550 tons
 December - 757 tons
 January - 638 tons

Dau Tieng breakdown of salvage during the quarter is as follows:

November - 56 S&P loads
 December - 84 S&P loads
 January - 82 S&P loads

Commercial trucks and trailers as well as military equipment were used in the task. As of 1 January 1969, a new system was established to preclude creating a large backlog salvage retrograde. See Section 2 for analysis and recommendation.

(h) Rifle Exchange: The Division completed its conversion to the new chrome chambered model rifle M16A1 during this quarter. Number of chrome chambered weapons issued to unit during this quarter:

November - 579
 December - 1646
 January - 3843

Number of non-chrome chambered weapons turned into 1st Log Comd during the quarter:

November - 758
 December - 2059
 January - 4100

In so doing it became the first combat division in Vietnam to be completely equipped with the new model rifle.

(i) The helicopter external lift training program moved forward with vigor during this period. In addition to the on-site inspections conducted by the Battalion XO and the Battalion parachute rigger, a class was presented in conjunction with the Aviation Battalion and each presentation was a success. The class covered capabilities of lift aircraft and all aspects of air safety. It also covered inspection, maintenance and storage of air delivery equipment. Pathfinder techniques rounded out the lecture phase and the students then rigged and hooked out equipment. One chinook was attached to provide realistic training.

Air delivery sorties during the period 8 Oct-8 Jan totaled 4675 missions. During this same period only 6 malfunctions were experienced.

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This is the lowest malfunction rate the division has recorded. The low rate of malfunctions is decidedly a result of consistent inspection and training.

(j) Search and Recovery missions were the most significant actions which occurred in the GR field. The development of S&R recovery packages, consisting of all materials required for any type of recovery, were mounted on rucksacks allowing for full mobility under any condition. These kits were used on 5 S&R missions. The mortuary at Tan Son Nhut noted that not only does the 25th Division perform the most professional S&R missions of all divisions but that the last mission was the best they had ever seen in not only recovery but in the preparation of associated drawings and paperwork.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MD974177
By LV22 NARA Date 3/20/10

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendation.

a. Personnel

(1) Ammunition Qualified Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION. The division ammunition officer has been required to run a division ASP, the enlisted personnel assigned to assist are not TOE nor school trained as ammunition specialist. They are assigned against the TOE of other units of the Support Command. It is a requirement for the DAO to train the individuals in that the ASP will be able to function. The time spent in this function by the DAO takes away from the time which should be spent in the normal functions of the DAO.

(b) EVALUATION. The division's ASP was reduced in tonnage thus anticipating reducing the number of personnel assigned to the ASP. The present concept of running a division ASP without the qualified personnel required the DAO to spend time training and supervising the ASP operation thus taking away the time which could be spent in normal DAO functions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The operation of the division ASP be turned over to a Logistical Command unit: therefore releasing the present personnel to their units to work in there assigned MOS.

b. Operations

(1) Delays in C-7A (Aircraft) in the Division TAOR

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, the only indication that the DTO had of a delay was after an abnormally long absence from this, station, action was initiated to determine cause of delay.

(b) EVALUATION. Closer communication with senior TALO, Hq II FV concerning delay in ETA of mission-essential aircraft has resulted in more efficient coordination of schedules from 25th Division TALO.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. Assistance is necessary in the form of prompt notification in the event that either the primary C-7A (Mission 422) or additional aircraft that might be making for the division are delayed at other stations. Since a system of prompt notification has been utilized, letter service is being rendered to the users of airlift service in the 25th Division TAOR.

(2) Capability in minimizing damage and loss

(a) OBSERVATION. The Dau Tieng convoy was subject to an enemy ambush on 17 December 1968, the second march unit commander was killed when he left his covered position to use his jeep radio to warn the trail element that an ambush was in progress.

On this convoy ambush only the second march unit was hit.

(b) EVALUATION. In this ambush the first march unit continued to its destination unscratched. The constant stress on keeping all vehicles moving during an ambush must be credited with preventing needless casualties. When severe casualties arise, it is generally because the road is blocked and the vehicles are stuck in the open, subject to hostile fire. Had provision been made for communication within the march unit prior to the ambush the march unit commander would not have to expose himself in order to notify other elements in the convoy of the ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. It is now the policy to place vehicles transporting explosives in the rear of the convoy to assure that if the cargo is hit the rest of the convoy is more apt to avoid both the explosion and the risk involved in being blocked. In addition, it is now the policy to cover the beds of loaded vehicles with canvas. This is done to deny the enemy the opportunity of knowing what cargo is being hauled thus depriving him of the ability to determine which target would bring him the greatest advantage. It is also recommended that a radio be carried with the control vehicles at the rear of each march unit.

(3) Salvage Collection Operation

(a) OBSERVATION. The S&T Battalion has the responsibility for operating the salvage collection point which processes and ships over 1,000 tons a month. No provision has been made in the TOE 1-76 for the necessary equipment to operate this point.

(b) EVALUATION. While small equipment can be loaded using either a fork lift or a wrecker, no organic capability presents little problems since they load their own equipment on the trailers provided. For units not possessing heavy lift capability, coordination must be made with units having lift capability to load these items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Provisions be made for organic heavy lift capability in the S&T Battalion TOE.

c. Training

None

d. Logistics

None

(1) Aviation:

(a) OBSERVATION. Support of the LOH Tail Rotor Assembly is inadequate due to shortage of items in supply system and test equipment for repair of items on hand.

(b) EVALUATION. During the testing of LOH Aircraft, prior to putting the aircraft into field, very few difficulties were experienced with the tail rotor assembly. At present, the most serious problem with the LOH Aircraft is high frequency vibrations. A majority of the high frequency problems can be eliminated by use of a Dynamic Balance Kit; however, only three (3) such kits exist in-country the only other alternative to solving the vibration problem is replacement of the tail rotor assembly, tail rotor assemblies are in extremely short supply. A properly balanced tail rotor is a must as a starting point if vibration is not in the tail rotor and it is located elsewhere in the powertrain. New, out-of-the box rotors from the factory have arrived at DSU in out-of-balance condition, or visual defects (bent, or curved blades) This causes the units to go EDP again for another assembly, with the aircraft remaining non-operational for excessive periods of time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Expedite test equipment. Increase availability of tail rotor assemblies in the supply system. A closer inspection be given items before shipment from manufacture to detect and prevent unserviceable new items from getting into supply channels.

(2) XM 517 Articulated Cargo Vehicles

(a) OBSERVATION. The lack of logistical planning for the introduction XM 571 into the theater has severely limited the effectiveness of this equipment.

(b) EVALUATION. After learning that the XM 571 vehicles were to be introduced in the division, attempts were made to obtain the necessary information for maintenance planning. No logistical officer was appointed to coordinate this introduction, information received was limited. Limited maintenance training for DSU mechanics was eventually provided, but was delayed until after the equipment was on hand in the using unit. Shipment of support items were received at various intervals and consisted of mixed BILL, tools and ASL. No stock record support was available to assist in setting up the ASL.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. More detail support planning to be conducted prior to introducing of a new item.

3. Indigenous Rations.

(a) OBSERVATION. The injection into the system of indigenous rations has not been thoroughly staffed or planned.

(b) EVALUATION. No planning factors have been provided to the field; no basis of issue established; no acceptability test are being performed prior to issue; and generally no written guidance provided by 1st Log Cmd on use of these rations. As a result, there are not enough of these rations available for use and no written guidance for the efficient use of those that are available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Sufficient stocks and guidance should be developed by 1st Log Cmd and necessary management factors, data and information provided to the field.

(4) MILSTRIP

(a) OBSERVATION. The MILSTRIP as presently modified by the 35VN system and supporting allied regulation provides the means for requesting major and/or command control items of equipment. Basically, this system calls for the submission of an AE requisition bearing the appropriate authorization and necessary information (exception data, authority, etc) which is then "Manually processed" as apposed to computer processed. This exception data is then edited by checking its accuracy against the cited TO&E, CTA, TDA, MTOE or MDA and density and information maintained by the particular echelon at which the edit is being accomplished.

(b) EVALUATION. The weakness of this system is that of any of the echelons of processing error in punching the new card or transcribing the exception data, of fail to have current copies of the authorization cited, then the requisition is erroneously cancelled back to the Division when this occurs, the requisition must be resubmitted and the process begun all over again, with the document faring the same hazards of processing and editing as before.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The editing and processing of each requisitions should be simplified and criterin for rejection/cancellation developed that will preclude cancellation for mechanical, administrative or statistical error. The tendency to summarily cancel rather than attempting to clarify and if need be, correct the information in questions, must be revised and more emphasis placed on making each requisition a good working one at each echelon of activity.

(5) Obtaining Station-Type Property

(a) OBSERVATION. This Division is expericecing extreme difficulties replacing or obtaining initial issue of station-type property.

(b) EVUALATION. The primary cause is lack of authorization. A TDA was submitted for these items but is not yet approved. In the mean time, such items as 10,000 BTU refrigerator units are becoming unserviceable with no replacements or repair parts. Six inch single stage pumps for helicopter refuel points are in the same category.

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By MMD NARA Date 3/30/01

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Critical items that station property should be acted on either with a TDA or special authorization to draw these critical items.

(6) STRIP Team

(a) OBSERVATION. During the period this division was visited by a STRIP Team from USARV. The mission of the team was to inventory class II & IV items and to compare the quantities with the established RO's to determine if these quantities were excess to a 150 day level.

(b) EVALUATION. The team if necessary could not check float documents or make recounts. As a result, a great deal of reworking had to be done to clarify exact quantities to be retrograded. The ship to addresses for this retrograded also caused some problems in that excess supplies were all not shipped back to Long Binh. Some were scheduled for Japan and Okinawa. This placed an additional burden on the DSU that they are not staffed to handle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that future excess teams confine themselves to a smaller area so that accurate counts and float documents can be considered prior to declaring an item as excess. Also, it is questionable as to the value of retrograding excess stocks that do show a history of active issue unless the excess are excessively high.

(7) Commercial Contractors

(a) OBSERVATION. During the subject quarter it has become necessary to refuse up to an average of 40 percent of the fuel delivered by commercial contractors due to poor quality of the product.

(b) EVALUATION. Factors contributing to the poor quality are rusted and poorly maintained tankers; use of tankers converted from one product another without proper flushing and cleaning and a general lack of quality surveillance on the part of the contractor.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Action must be taken by 1st Log Cmd to insure the quality of the product delivered by commercial contractors, as well as insuring prompt and timely delivery.

f. Organization

(1) Substitute Items of Class I

(a) OBSERVATION. The manning document at depot does not provide for a Food Service Warrant Officer to make recommendation on what to provide as a substitute where the main item is not available.

(b) EVALUATION. As a consequence, dried beef is being provided as a meat substitute in prodigious quantities, much too often. During one ten day period so much dried beef was received that it required that it be served in the same form for at least one meal every day.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Some food service expertise should be sought and made available to depot when substitutions are necessary.

9. Others

None

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Commanding

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