

PG 472
18th MHD
CMD RPTs
AARs
Oct 69 - Dec 69
Box 43

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCAM-S3

3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

THRU: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
ATTN: S3
ARO SF 96385

TO: Commanding General
ATTN: Division Historian
25th Infantry Division
APO SF 96225

1. A Co 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
2. 21 October 1969
3. a) Tay Ninh District-Phu Khuong Province
b) XT 301594
4. 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry
5. CPT Thomas H. Grace, A Co Commander
6. CPT Howard C. Lewis, S-3 Air 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
7. 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry - controlling A Co, 2-34 Armor
160 RF Company
8. Supporting forces:
 - a) Light fire team
 - b) Flare ship w/mini-gun
 - c) A Btry 7/9
 - d) A Btry 2/32
 - e) B Btry 1/30

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f) C Btry 2/19

g) C Btry 3/13

9. A Co's and the 160th RF Co's mission was to establish a blocking position at the base of Nui Ba Den in support of C Co 3/22. C Co 3/22 was airlifted to the top of Nui Ba Den and was conducting a reconnaissance to the base of the mountain.

10. Intelligence:

a) Intelligence had been received that F-33 NVA company had recently moved on the mountain with the mission to capture the installation on top. This was the same company that had previously over-run the installation in May 1968.


b) The security at the installation had detected movement each night for the past seven (7) nights.

c) This combined information indicated that the F-33 company was again going to attempt an attack on the Nui Ba Den installation.

d) Weather conditions during the specific action covered in this report did hamper the action in that just after the initial contact heavy overcast and rain restricted the use of helicopter gun ships and flares. This also reduced the capabilities of night vision devices employed on the blocking positions perimeter.

11. The blocking force's mission was to conduct reconnaissance along the base of the mountain in conjunction with C Co 3/22's move down the mountain. It also was to provide direct fire support to the ground elements as needed.

12. A Co and 160th RF Company were in position by 1255 hours and prepared to carry out their mission. By 1710 hours they had pulled back into a night laager position and all resupply had been completed. The 160th RF Company had employed three (3) listening posts. At 2103 hours personnel on the perimeter observed 10-15 personnel digging in. Initially it was believed that the listening post personnel were those sighted, therefore, the listening posts were called in and movement was still observed.



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The movement was engaged with all organic weapons, artillery, and a light fire team. After the area was engaged the RF company conducted a reconnaissance of the area and received small arms fire from the flanks. The RF company withdrew to the laager position and the area was again engaged with artillery and Spooky. Upon returning to the laager position the RF company reported finding fifteen (15) enemy bodies and brought back two (2) AK-47's, two (2) RPG 7 launchers, two (2) RPG 2 launchers, ammunition for both launchers, and six (6) Chicom hand grenades. Heavy rain and cloud cover forced the helicopters to withdraw and the area was engaged with artillery intermittently through out the night. A sweep of the area at first light revealed five (5) more NVA bodies.

- a) No weapons malfunctioned.
- b) No weapons or equipment shortages.
- c) Communications equipment functioned properly.

13. Results:

- a) No U.S. losses.
- b) Enemy losses - 20 NVA eliminated.
- c) No U.S. equipment losses.
- d) Enemy weapons captured:
 - 1) 2 AK-47 rifles
 - 2) 2 RPG-2 launchers
 - 3) 2 RPG-7 launchers
 - 4) 8 RPG-2 rounds
 - 5) 5 RPG-7 rounds
 - 6) 6 Chicom hand grenades

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e) U.S. ammunition expenditure:

- 1) 4,000 rounds .50 Cal.
- 2) 1,000 rounds M-16 ammunition.
- 3) 30 rounds 90 MM cannister.
- 4) 15 rounds 90 MM HE.

14. Lessons Learned:

- a) Proper utilization of night vision devices in a defensive perimeter was extremely successful. Prior planning and good communications between U.S. and Vietnamese personnel was a deciding factor in the success of this operation.
- b) There were no innovations in weapons or equipment.
- c) No special techniques were used.
- d) Significant results were 20 enemy eliminated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

roy d. kierling
 ROY D. KIERLING
 1st Lt, Armor
 Bn Executive Officer

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Authority NND 984334

By CP NARA Date 3/61/01