

18th M.D.
CMD RPT
AAR
May Oct 69
Box 42

25 Nov

File

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCAM-S3

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

THRU: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
ATTN: S3
APO SF 96385

TO: Commanding General
ATTN: Division Historian
25th Infantry Division
APO SF 96225

1. A Co, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor

2. 25 November 1969

3. a) Tay Ninh District - Phu Khuong Province
b) XT 281612

4. 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry

5. CPT Marvin L. Tieman, A Co Commander

6. CPT Howard C. Lewis, S-3 Air, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor

7. 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry - controlling A Co, 2/34 Armor

8. Supporting forces:
a) Light fire teams
b) Air strikes controlled by FAC
c) B Btry 7/11
d) A Btry 2/32
e) B Btry 1/30
f) C Btry 3/13

60-828

REDACTED

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 984334
By	CP
NARA Date 3/10/01	

AVDCAM-S3

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

9. A Company's mission was to secure LZ and PZ for an eagle flight and to support by fire when infantry conducted their reconnaissance on Nui Ba Den.

10. Intelligence:

a) The mountain, Nui Ba Den, has long been known to be an enemy strong point. The enemy has used the mountain as a staging area, resting place, and a communications center.

b) Intelligence had been received that the enemy had once again placed a force on the Northwest side of the mountain.

c) Weather conditions did not hamper operations at all. Clear with light wind.

11. The blocking force's mission was to secure the LZ and PZ for the infantry, provide rear security, and support the ground elements by fire. The 3/22 company's mission was to conduct a ground reconnaissance of the Northwest slope of Nui Ba Den.

12. A Co established their LZ security approximately 0830 hrs. D Co 3/22 Inf started their reconnaissance toward the mountain and A Co moved into a position where they could support them by fire. When the ground troops approached within 50 meters of the base of the mountain they came under mortar and automatic weapons fire. A Co in their position also came under light mortar fire and immediately returned with direct main gun fire into suspected enemy positions. The infantry company was pinned down at their location and requested that the tanks come in and support closely. The 2nd tank platoon tried to maneuver closer but stuck three tanks in soft ground while trying to maneuver closer. The stuck tanks were retrieved and a resupply of ammunition was requested from the 2/34 Armor. The resupply of ammunition with two personnel carriers escorting arrived at A Company's location at 1140 hrs. The ground surveillance track and two ammunition escort tracks were sent into the contact area to evacuate wounded and try to relieve the personnel that were pinned down. The personnel carriers went back into the area three separate times evacuating wounded and providing covering fire for the infantry as they withdrew. When all personnel were clear of the contact area air strikes, gun ships, and artillery engaged the area. The 3/22nd Infantry PZ'd at approximately 1630 hrs. while A Company provided covering fire. A Company

DECLASSIFIED

Authority	NND 984024	
By	CP	NARA Date 3/61 C

AVDCAM-S3

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

was then released from OPCON status and returned to the Rock Crusher for maintenance, refitting, and security.

a) Four 50 cal. barrels became overheated and needed to be replaced during the contact.

- b) No weapons or equipment shortages.
- c) Communications equipment functioned properly.

13. Results.

- a) 17 US WIA, 2 US KIA
- b) 25 enemy eliminated
- c) No US equipment losses
- d) No enemy weapons captured
- e) US ammunition expenditure:
 - 1) 50,000 rounds 50 cal.
 - 2) 20,000 rounds M-73 MG ammo
 - 3) 500 rounds 90MM HE & Cannister
 - 4) 2,000 rounds M-16

14. Lessons Learned:

- a) All areas of suspected enemy locations, especially in free fire zones, should be engaged by artillery prior to ground elements approaching them.
- b) When contact is made and one element is pinned down maximum effort should be made to have supporting elements maneuver against the enemy.
- c) There were no innovations in weapons or equipment.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 984324

By CP NARA Date 3/10/01

AVDCAM-S3

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview

d) Heavy tanks were used in the direct support role while light personnel carriers were used to evacuate wounded and withdraw friendly elements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Roy D. Kimerling
ROY D. KIMERLING
MAJ, Armor
Bn S-3

4

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED	ND 984334
Authority	CP
By	NARA Date 3/6/01