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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY A 2D BATTALION (MECH) 22D INFANTRY

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AVDCTB-G-CCA

7 October 1968

SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
2d Bn (Mech) 22d Inf
ATTN: S 3
AFC SF 96268

1. Name or Identity and/or Type of Operation: Search and Destroy
by Co "A" 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry, Co C 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry and
Scout Platoon 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry.

2. Date of Operation: 191300H to 191930H

3. Location: North, northwest of Go Dau Ha at XT383285

4. Control of Command Headquarters: 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry

5. Reporting Officers:

a. Company Commander: CPT Harvey R. Holter

b. Battalion Commander: LTC James A. Damon

6. Task Organization:

a. Co A 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry

b. Co C 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry

c. Scout Platoon, 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry

d. Heavy Weapons Platoon, 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery

b. Light Fire Team

c. Heavy weapons platoon

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8. Intelligence:

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a. Reports from local Regional Popular Forces outpost and Joint Forces Headquarters indicated a large NVA force of possible regimental size operating in 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry Area of operations. The enemy forces were believed to be located in a staging area conducting limited offensive and psychological operations. When contact was made at approximately 1400 hours the force was estimated to be a reinforced heavy weapons company.

b. The terrain consisted of flat rice patties with hedgerows and built up areas. The area was criss-crossed with hedgerows, berm lines and bushes which offered the enemy good concealment and cover. The weather was overcast with scattered showers making air strikes unfeasible. Overall intelligence reports were extremely accurate as to the general location of the NVA forces.

9. Mission: Co "A" conducts a search and destroy operations with an axis of advance primarily to the Northeast of XT3828.

10. Concept of Operation:

a. Scheme of maneuver: Co "A" departs at 1300 hours to conduct a dismounted sweep. Northeast from grid XT3828 with support on the west flank from organic Armored Personnel Carriers and Scout Platoon in mobile blocking force. Co C departed at 1300 hours to set a mobile reaction and blocking force to the east flank. The line of departure time is 1300 hours.

b. Plan of fire support: Sweep forces are supported by organic 81 mm Mortars, artillery and light fire teams on call.

11. Execution: At approximately 1300 hours Alpha Company began to sweep northeast while the Armored Personnel Carriers of Co "A" and the Scout Platoon began to move up on the left flank. On the right Charlie Company sent a small element out to a built up area to check a possible fording site for the carriers. At approximately 1400 hours the element from Charlie Company made contact and was pinned down. Co "A" began sweeping to the southeast to help and also came under intense small arms fire when about 200 meters from the left flank of Co C. The Company Commander called the elements with the Armored Personnel Carriers and told them to move to his location. The Carriers had begun to move south on a whiteball when they made contact and one track was knocked out. They withdrew, moved around the area of contact area and moved up on line with the company about 1600 hours. Artillery and light fire teams were called in but some of the forward

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elements could not be pinpointed. The fire support was almost useless. At approximately 0900 hours Co "A" broke contact and returned to the battalion laager where they were resupplied and dusted off the WHA and KHA. Through out the firefight, contact was maintained at a distance of 100 meters and communications was good through out. Co "A" lost 2 men KHA and 8 Men WHA all were dusted off prior to darkness. The main maneuver tactic's employed was fire and movement. It was later estimated that the enemy suffered 15 killed.

12. Results: Co "A" lost two men KHA and 8 WHA. Material losses suffered included on Armored Personnel Carrier and various personal gear mainly flak jackets. NVA forces were known to have suffered at least 15 killed and several automatic weapons sites were knocked out by light fire teams.

13. Administrative Matters: Supply of ammunition was sufficient during the contact. Resupply was effected immediately after contact and arrived at the laager site prior to darkness. Dustoff's were called in for the wounded and killed and rear elements in Cu Chi met the dustoff upon arrival. All personal gear was collected, inventoried, tagged and stored in Co A supply.

14. Special equipment and Techniques: Supporting fires were not as effective as they could have been if the forward elements could have been spotted. The armored carriers helped to swing the momentum of the attack.

15. Commanders analysis: The contact pointed up the fact that offensive actions should be conducted in a formation conducive to defensive postures when contact is made. Supporting fires cannot be effectively used if elements are not on line and accounted for at all times. All personnel should be checked for identification Cards and tags. Personal gear of WHA and KHA should be tagged and sent to the rear detachment soonest.

16. Recommendations: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Vernon E. Surge
 VERNON E. SURGE
 1LT, Infantry
 Executive Officer

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