

RG 472

IN Units

2-22 IN

53, AARs

Jan 68 - Dec 69

Box 13

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (MECH), 22D INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268

AVDCTB-G-C

16 January 1968

SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
25th Inf Div
ATTN: G3
APO S.F. 96225

1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Road clearing and convoy escort mission by Co A 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Inf
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 210630 to 211500 Dec 68
3. LOCATION: South, Southeast of Dau Tieng at coord XT515422
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Inf
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Cpt David R. Crocker
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Co A (-) 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Inf
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: 81mm Mortar Plat Co A 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf
8. INTELLIGENCE: Enemy elements of unknown size were known to be mining Route 14 and sniping at convoys on this road.
9. MISSION: Co A (-) was to sweep and clear Route 14 from Dau Tieng to coord XT524408 and outpost the same section of road. On order, A/2-22 escorts convoy from Dau Tieng to Fire Support Base Mahone, XT543375, and returns the convoy to Dau Tieng.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: A. Scheme of Maneuver: Co A (-) departed Dau Tieng 0630 Hours. The Company travelled South along Route 14 in a file of APC's, the Second Plat was followed by the Company Command Group. The Command Group was followed by the First Plat and the Mortar Plat B.) Plan of Fire Support: The 81mm Mortar Plat set up at coord XT500432 to provide supporting fire. Arty and Tactical Air Strikes were not available.

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by [signature] NARA Date 3/21/01

SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report (cont'd)

11. EXECUTION: Company A (-) completed the sweep to XT524408 at approximately 1000 hours. The First Plat, Company Command Group, and Second Plat set up a strong-point vic coord XT509435. At approximately 1020 hrs the squad from Second Plat providing a roving outpost from XT509435 to XT524408, made contact with an estimated enemy squad at coord XT515422. The rest of the Second Plat reinforced this squad at approximately 1030 hours. The 81mm Mortar Plat provided supporting fire on the enemy positions, while the Second Plat reorganized and prepared to assault the enemy positions. At approximately 1100 hrs the 81mm fire was shifted and the Second Plat dismounted and with 3 APC's on line, assaulted the enemy positions. By 1200 hrs the enemy positions had been taken and the adjacent areas secured. The First Plat then escorted the convoy to Mahone and back to Dau Tieng.

12. STATISTICAL SUMMARY:

Friendly Losses: None

Enemy Losses: 4 (KIA)

Enemy Equipment Captured: 3 AK-47, 1 RPG-2, 1 RPG-7, 3 RPG-2 rockets, 3 RPG-7 rockets, and assorted web and small arms ammunition.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Ammunition supply was sufficient during contact. Resupply was effective when Company A (-) returned to Dau Tieng.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT TECHNIQUES: TOE equipment and normal tactics and techniques were employed.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: This contact pointed out the fact that the enemy observes and evaluates US forces continually. The enemy did not try to escape when he had the opportunity early in the contact. US troops have been ordered not to engage the enemy without Arty and Air Support. The enemy seems to know this as he made no attempt to withdraw from his position, even though he was out numbered 3 to 1. It seemed as though he did not expect US forces to leave the road and go into the brush in search of him.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS: Any unit in contact should first try to determine the enemy's strength and location while unit is obtaining Arty and Air clearance. If Arty and Air Support are not needed, do not use them, use fire and movement. Rely on weapons organic to Company and Battalion level units whenever possible. After unit feels out the enemy and it appears to be a large force, then pull back and level the area with fire support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OLA A. MILLS
1LT, INF
ADJUTANT

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