

RG 472  
2D Units  
53, AARs  
Jan 68-Dec 69  
Box 13

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (MECH), 22D INFANTRY  
APO San Francisco 96268

AVDCTV

28 February 1969

SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report

Commanding Officer  
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div  
ATTN: S3  
APO San Francisco 96268

1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: A Co 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 140900 to 141800 Jan 69.
3. LOCATION: West of Ben Cui Village on Rt. 239 vic XT429449.
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Co A 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Cpt. David R. Crocker, Commanding Officer  
Co A 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Control Headquarters: Battalion Headquarters,  
2d Bn (M) 22d Inf. Units Participating: Co A 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf, CRIP  
Plt, HHC 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: A Battery, 2d Bn 32d Arty  
B Battery, 2d Bn 77th Arty  
Tactical Air Strikes  
Huey Cobra teams from D Company 229th Air Cav
8. INTELLIGENCE: An NVA force of regimental size was known to be trying  
to disrupt resupply routes between Dau Tieng and Cu Chi.
9. MISSION: Co A was to conduct local RIFs along Rt. 239 between Ben Cui  
Village and check point 36. Co A was to be prepared to react to the Dau  
Tieng to Cu Chi resupply convoy.

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SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report (cont'd)

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Co A 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf was securing the road about five hundred meters east of the ambush site. The third platoon was on the north side of the road and the first on the south side. The second platoon was securing a Rome plow which was cutting a new logger site about two kilometers away. The first and third platoons were to go on line and sweep through the enemy positions on the south side of the ambush site. The second platoon was to return the Rome plow to the previous night's logger position and then proceed to the vicinity of the ambush to act as the company ready reserve.

11. EXECUTION: The first and third platoons began a sweep along the southern side of the ambush site. At this time they came under heavy automatic weapons and RPG fire from their front and heavy sniper fire from their right flank (north of the road). Rather than remain in the cross fire the company commander ordered the first platoon to sweep the north side of the road to eliminate the sniper while the third platoon engaged the enemy on the south side of the road with 50 cal. and M-60 machine guns.

The first platoon encountered a heavily fortified bunker complex on the north side of the road. As the advance was slowed almost to a halt, the company commander committed the second platoon to reinforce the first platoon and clear the north side of the road. Even with two platoons the advance was pinned down by small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire.

At this time the company commander elected to pull back the entire company and bring in artillery, airstrikes and gunships. After approximately 45 minutes of this, the company again attempted to sweep the north side of the road. Again they were unsuccessful and pulled back for further artillery and airstrikes.

During the entire time the company was concentrating on the north side of the road, artillery and gunships were preping the south side of the road.

Due to the fact that it was already twilight the company was ordered back to its night logger position. There was no time to make a detailed search of the ambush site until the next day.

12. RESULTS: Friendly Losses: 1 US RHA, 4 US WHA  
Enemy Losses: 13 VC KIA (BC), 114 VC KIA (possible)

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Resupply of ammunition was accomplished late in the afternoon by the battalion support platoon at the ambush site.

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14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: This action showed the need for a rapid fire machine gun such as the mini-gun. At least one APC per rifle platoon should be equipped with a mini-gun. With such weapons the effectiveness of enemy snipers and entrenched troops would be greatly reduced.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Road security is a very important responsibility. It is essential that resupply reaches the troops in the field. When the enemy can stop our resupply as he did on the 14th, conditions in the field could become very dangerous. To alleviate this danger, more troops with greater firepower capabilities are needed to escort the resupply convoys and secure the resupply routes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PAUL D. CONLEY  
CPT            INF  
Adjutant

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