

RG 472
IN Units
2-22 IN
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Box 1

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1. IDENTIFICATION AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Ambush Patrol from Co B 2-22 Inf
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 091830-100500 Feb 69
3. LOCATION: XE453468
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: Hq, 2d Bn (Mech), 22d Infantry
5. TASK ORGANIZATION: a. 1 platoon Co B
6. SUPPORTING FORCES: a. Co B (-)
b. ARVN platoon
c. Arty
7. INTELLIGENCE: Elements of the 1st NVA Division were reported in the area. It was believed that they were moving along the trails in small groups to pick up supplies from near by villages.
8. MISSION: Co B was assigned the mission of leaving a 12 man stay behind ambush in the vicinity of XE453468.
9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1 platoon will leave the perimeter shortly before dusk and conduct a mounted RIF through the area. Using this as a cover, the ambush patrol will hide in the bushes and the remainder of the platoon will return to the NDP shortly after dark, the ambush patrol will move into their designated positions.
10. EXECUTION: At 1830 the 1st Platoon Co B moved out from their NDP with trucks to conduct a RIF in the vicinity of XE453468. Upon arrival at the area, the men dismounted the trucks and began to RIF through the area. Upon completion of the RIF the platoon minus rejoined the company while the men in the ambush remained stationary until just after EEND at which time they moved into their ambush position 500 meters to the north. The ambush was set up at 1940. Just 30 minutes later the patrol began to hear movement to the north, moving south along the trail. Cautioning his men not to spring the

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ambush early, the patrol leader notified the Co CO of the movement so that mortars and arty would be standing by on call. The patrol could now observe the enemy moving towards them but suppressing their fear they bravely held their fire. As what appeared to be 6 enemy entered the kill zone just 10 meters from the patrols position, the patrol leader initiated the ambush. 4 enemy were killed in the initial fire. Almost immediately the ambush patrol began receiving automatic weapons and small arms fire. Artillery and mortar fire were called in as the patrol leader adjusted the fire and moved from position to position encouraging his men and directing their fire. It appears as though the ambush had been sprung on the point element of a much larger unit. For thirty minutes the patrol fought on calling in mortars and artillery almost on top of themselves in an attempt to drive off the enemy. At 2100 hours they had beaten a far larger force back. They were still receiving a limited amount of fire and this precluded them from checking out the kill zone at that time. To prevent the enemy force from encircling the patrol they were given the order to relocate to an alternate position. Making certain not to leave any equipment behind, the patrol crawled out of the contact area and moved to their new location where they once again set up. Throughout the heroic fighting, only one man had been slightly wounded and he refused to be dusted off and requested to remain with the patrol.

11 RESULTS: The success of the patrol in which the valorous men had participated was made possible by the prior planning for the ambush execution. The heroic actions of the patrol led to the defeat of a much larger unit. A sweep of the contact area the following morning found the following:

- a. 3 bodies dressed in NVA uniforms
- b. Signs of other bodies being dragged away

- c. 2 AK-47's
- d. Numerous documents

12. ADMINISTRATION:

- a. Because of the efficient prior planning sufficient supplies were taken with the patrol to make it unnecessary to resupply.
- b. Communication and coordination through the contact were flawless. This was a big factor in the success of the ambush.
- c. Medical treatment, the wounded man was cared for by the medic with the patrol.

13. VALOR AWARDS:

- a. Bronze Star - 1

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