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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (MECH), 22D INFANTRY
 ANC San Francisco 96268

AVOCATV

17 March 1969

SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report

Commanding Officer
 2d Bde, 22d Inf Div
 ATTN: S3
 APO San Francisco 94120

1. NAME AND TYPE ORGANIZATION: Co B, 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry, joint operation with ARVN forces.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 212200 to 220000 February 1969
3. LOCATION: West of Dau Tieng via XTL/54.53
4. COMMAND & CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Co B, 2d Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry jointly with Bao Don subsector.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Cpt Eugene J. Johnston, Co Bn (Mech) 22d Infantry.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. Co B (-), 2/22 (Mech) Infantry
 - b. 1 platoon 30th ARVN Company
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
 - a. A battery 2/77 Arty
 - b. 2/3th Aviation
8. INTELLIGENCE: Intelligence reports from S-2 2/22 and Bao Don District revealed we were due to receive an enemy ground attack any night. On the 18th of March the night defensive position was probed by an enemy Recon unit. They were discovered and in the ensuing engagement three enemy personnel were killed. From this probe the NLF braced itself for an expected ground attack.
9. MISSION: To stop the infiltration routes of the enemy through the Ben Cui area, and keep route 239, southwest of Dau Tieng, open. Also, to defend the night defensive position.

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SUBJECT: Small Unit After Action Report (cont'd)

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: With the use of listening posts, sentries, radar and supporting fires, repel any attack on the NDP. The First Platoon was in the south & east of the perimeter, the Third Platoon was on the north and west sides. The ARVN force was intermingled with the rest of the company. The Weapons Platoon was in the center of the perimeter. HQ was also located in the center along with an attached radar team.

11. EXECUTION: At approximately 2220 hrs on the 21st of February, a sentry from the first platoon spotted movement through a Starlight Scope approximately 200 meters from the bunker line. Headquarters was notified along with the radar team. The radar team then picked up the movement fixing an distance and azimuth to the target. The forty FO and the Weapons Platoon. Approximately three minutes later mortar fire was placed in the enemy along with fire from the bunker line. A few minutes later A 2/77 began shelling the area from FSB Wood II.

Along with HE, the mortar platoon intermingled illumination rounds until a flare ship arrived on station to provide illumination at 2300 hrs. By this time the enemy was clearly visible because of the excellent illumination, flatness of the terrain, and lack of any dense brush. The artillery was hitting in back of the enemy and the southeast side of the perimeter was placing effective fire on the when he would make the slightest movement. At approximately 2315 a gunship team from Da Nang arrived on station. The team had no trouble spotting the enemy, who was pinned down outside the wire, and placed effective rocket and mini-gun fire on the enemy. At approximately 0300 hrs the enemy broke contact and presumably moved in a southeast direction because of the many blood trails discovered the next morning.

12. STATISTICAL SUMMARY: Enemy Losses: 28 NVA KIA (BC)

Enemy Equipment Captured: Numerous RPG launchers and other weapons and equipment.

Friendly Losses: None

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: None.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Starlight Scopes and radar make an outstanding team. These can be complimented with anti-intrusion devices. Also good communication is essential for fire control. This action was a good example of good commo & coordination.

15. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION: This has to be a perfect example of what good prior planning and coordination can accomplish. The mortar fire was almost instantaneous, the artillery fire was received as soon as the proper clearances were issued, and the gunships working on the company frequency provided close-in support that was just too much for the enemy. The enemy was detected and engaged before he could ever fire a shot and never was able to mount the attack.

FOR THE COMMANDER;

PAUL D. CONLEY
CPT INF
Adjutant

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