

RG472  
IN UNITS  
2-22 INF  
SI  
Box 1

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1. IDENTIFICATION AND TYPE OF UNIT: Company C 2-22 Inf (M)
2. TIME OF OPERATION: 060800 Mar 69 to 061700 Mar 69
3. LOCATION: XT 460484 to XT 468510
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL: Headquarters 2d Bn (Mech), 22d Infantry
5. TASK ORGANIZATION: a. Co C 2-22 Inf  
b. 1 Eng. Sweep Team  
c. 1 Flame Track
6. SUPPORTING FORCES: a. Light Fire Teams  
b. USAF (TAC Air)  
c. Artillery
7. INTELLIGENCE: An NVA Div was in the area with the mission of ambushing the convoy. Because of the extensive undergrowth and proximity to known havens for enemy forces it was believed that the enemy was in the wooded area north of the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation.
8. MISSION: To conduct a RIF north of the Ben Cui along the west side of the Saigon River checking for signs of the enemy. Limit of advance was the 51 EW grid line.
9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: At 1115, 1st, & 3rd platoon on line were to sweep along west bank of Saigon River with 2nd platoon in reserve moving behind. An FO was attached, 4.2 mortars were on call and A Battery 2/77 was in direct support.
10. EXECUTION: At 1115 on 6 Mar Co C moved out on a RIF of the area along the Saigon River from the Ben Cui to the 51 EW grid line. The formation used was 1st & 3rd plt on line with 2nd following in reserve. (see sketch) The area right next to the river was too wet for tracks. The RIF progressed well through the Ben Cui and across the Romed Plowed area. Once on the north side of the plowed area the forest was extremely dense. The men moved through dismounted with the tracks busting their way through. After proceeding another 1000 meters, the left flank came under extremely heavy RPG, automatic weapons and small arms fire. The enemy having been met, the men reacted to orders b

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and rapidly. Fire was immediately returned as the APC's moved up to lay down a base of fire. It appeared that Co C had come up against a NVA Bn well entrenched in a base camp. (see sketch) Keeping pressure on the enemy, Air strikes and Fire teams were requested. 4.2 Mortar and Arty were immediately called in. Splash from the artillery was flying over the heads of the company however knowing the necessity of closing with the enemy they kept pressing forward. At this time a squad from the third plt was pinned down. The platoon leader took an M-60 machine gun and charged down a trail placing suppressive fire on the enemy to allow his squad to move to a better position. The battle pressed on as the Company pushed into the Bn Base Camp however the enemy did not want to pull back and held in their bunkers. As the Company moved into the first row of enemy bunkers they began flushing the enemy out using grenades. These brave men up against great odds were pressing their way into the core of the Base Camp. One track had become stuck. Not wanting to leave the track behind, another track moved forward through the heavy enemy fire to pull it out. As it approached the stuck track, it was hit with an RPG seriously wounding the driver and 50 cal gunner. Braving a barrage of fire, a man ran out to the track and was able to drive it back as orders were given by Bde to immediately pull the Company back 1000 meters to allow a B-52 strike to go in 2000 meters north of their present location. Because of the absolute necessity of the immediate withdrawal, the stuck track had to be left. Artillery air bursts were fired in immediate area of the track to prevent the enemy from approaching it. After completion of the strike, permission was given to move back into the contact area to retrieve the stuck track. This they did, and the track was able to be driven back. It was now 1700 hours and the order was given to return to base camp. Throughout the fight 51 enemy bodies were counted on the battlefield compared to only one friendly death.

11. RESULTS: Because of this action, the enemy had been dealt a severe blow which could have lead to the failure of the Dau Tieng convoy ambush on 11 Mar 69. Statistics are as follows:

US - KHA - 1  
WHA - 3

Enemy KIA - 51

Due to the B-52 strike far north of the contact area, Co C was prevented from moving through the entire enemy base camp. Airstrikes observed during the contact appeared very successful. Artillery was extremely accurate. Because of the heavy undergrowth it was extremely difficult for the FO on the ground to adjust. A helicopter was immediately requested and received to permit the Bn Arty LNO to overfly the area and call in fires from the air.

12. ADMINISTRATION: Treatment and evacuation of casualties was extremely good. The dustoff pilot, ignoring warnings to clear the area because of the B-52 strike, showed the bravery which was typical of this operation and insisted on setting down to pick up the wounded men. His chopper cleared the area with only two minutes to spare.

13. VALOR AWARDS:

a. Distinguished Service Cross	1
b. Silver Star	4
c. Bronze Star	9