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CMD RPTS
AAKS
Oct-Dec 69

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION (MECH) 22D INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96365

Box 43 AVDCTV

22 Sep 69

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report

**TO: Headquarters
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: Division Historian
APO San Francisco 96225**

1. NAMES OF UNITS AND TYPES OF OPERATIONS:

- (1) Headquarters, 2d Bn 22d Inf (M).
- (2) Company C, 2d Bn 22d Inf (M).
- (3) Headquarters, 7th ARVN Airborne Division.
- (4) 73rd ARVN Airborne Company.

TYPE OF OPERATION:

- (1) The operation was a combined operation with one US company and one ARVN Airborne company conducting independent but mutually supporting reconnaissance in force operations in the Boi Loi Woods. Each company was under the control of its parent headquarters; however, the two battalion commanders had agreed that, in the event of contact by either company, coordination control of the other company would be exercised by one of the battalion commanders. Command of the specific unit would remain with the national (US or VN) battalion commander.
- (2) A similar operation consisting of one US company and one ARVN Airborne company, was being conducted in the upper Boi Loi north of Highway 19 with the same command, control and coordination being pre-arranged.

2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION:

070600H to 072130H September 1969.

3. LOCATION OF OPERATION:

- a. Central Boi Loi Woods
- b. RVN Map Series 1:50,000 sheet 6251, I & II. Action occurred in vicinity of coordinates 500349.
- c. RVN Map Series 1:25,000 (Pictomap) supplement to 6251, II N, coordinates vicinity 500349.

4. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION HEADQUARTERS

- a. 2d Bn (M) 22d Inf
- b. 7th Bn, ARVN Airborne

5. TASK ORGANIZATION

- a. Initial Contact: Company C, 2a Bn (M) 22d Inf.
- b. At approximately 1400 hours, 73rd ARVN Co. joined C Co. 2/22 (M) Inf.

6. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery

- (1) 105 MM Battery, FSB Wood
- (2) 105 MM Battery, FSB Pershing
- (3) 8" Howitzer Battery, FSB Hampton
- (4) 8" Howitzer Battery, Dau Tieng
- (5) 152 MM Battery, Dau Tieng

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- (6) 7th USAF (Issue Fac)
- (7) 1st Bde, 25th Div LOH (3)
- (8) Divarty, 25th Div LOH (1)
- (9) C&C ADC 25th Div (UHLD)
- (10) C&C 1st Bde, 25th Div (UHLD)
- (11) 3/4 Cav gunships (CENTAR)
- (12) 25th AVN gunships (Diamondhead)
- (13) 25th AVN flame bath (UHLD)
- (14) 25th AVN CS (UHLD)
- (15) Aeromedical Evacuation, Dau Tieng

7. MISSION: Clear the Boi Loi Woods of suspected NVA and VC elements.

8. INTELLIGENCE: Continuous indications of enemy activity in Boi Loi Woods to include trails, bunker complexes, cache sites and other signs of activity in the area. Additionally, in August and early September, the 2/22 had encountered heavy contact in the Boi Loi Woods with NVA and SR1 VC elements.


9. MISSION OF THE MANEUVER UNIT:

- a. C Co. (See attached overlay I)
 - (1) Drop off 73rd ARVN Airborne Co at LD.
 - (2) LD 0830 conduct dismounted RIF; leave APCs vic LD area to move on order of Commanding Officer.
 - (3) After completion of mission pick up 73rd ARVN Company RP Red and move to combined NL.
- b. 73rd ARVN Airborne Co; See attached overlay.
 - (1) LD 0830 conduct dismounted RIF.
 - (2) After completion of operation, be picked up by C Co at RP Red and move to combined NL.

10. EXECUTION:


At 0820, C Co. having dropped off the 73rd ARVN Airborne Company at their LD, arrived at their LD, vicinity XT504346. The following actions took place:

- (1) Dismounted infantrymen test fired M16 and M60 weapons into the woods on the direction of the advance.
- (2) APCs, on line, test fired .50 Cal MG on the direction of advance.
- (3) The APCs formed a daylight lager position in the Rome Plow area. The operation was planned as a dismount operation for the following reasons.
 - a. The enemy has become accustomeda to the infantry moving with the APCs. The noise of movement thus alerted him and alloweda him to either withdraw or to prepare an ambush. Dismounted movements with the APCs remaining in the Rome Plow area was planned in order to assist in achieving surprise.
 - b. The battalion commander had determined that dismounted tactics and the application of disciplined squad and platoon fires required improvement. Such training and reaction away from the blanket of fire provided by the .50 Cal MG was determined to be the most feasible means of developing the required skills. The APCs were located in a position where they could be quickly moved up to support in the event of a large contact.
- (4) C Co 81 MM Mortars were placed vicinity of XT503334 in order to support the operation.
- c. At 0830, C Co. crossed the LD. Almost immediately, an old sandal print trail was found with direction of movement to NE.



d. At 0905, a trail no older than 24 hours moving SE of at least three persons were found.

e. At 0917, C Co. reported contact vic 508349. Heavy automatic weapons fire, AK fire and possible 51 Cal MG fire was reported. Immediate fire was placed upon the enemy and Cpt. Goldsmith, the Company Commander, called forward 6 APCs at 0920. His evaluation of the terrain, which is heavily bomb-cratered, resulted in a determination that 6 was the minimum which could be maneuvered. The first platoon was on the left, the third platoon was on the right and the second platoon provided flank and rear security, plus reserve. As the distance moved by the dismounts had only been approximately 100 meters, the APCs were quickly moved into the formation. The formation used was as follows:



f. The Battalion Commander, LTC Williams, and the Artillery LNO, P I Williams, immediately went airborne to the contact area in a LOH.

g. At 0925, the company commander estimated that he was in contact with an estimated enemy squad-platoon size element and was moving into the area, maintaining contact and pressure upon the enemy who were in bunkers. At this time, AK fire and at least two RPG rounds were reported as incoming.

h. The arty LNO placed 105 MM artillery fires to the east and north of the contact areas blocking fires. A light fire team was requested and reported on station at 0943. The C.C. LOH which had been flying low over the dismounted men and APCs attempting to mark enemy bunker positions was replaced by the light fire team.

i. At 0944, C Co reported negative enemy fire. Artillery from FSB Pershing was placed to the east to add to the blocking fires. Fires were shifted away from the immediate contact area and at 0952, the light fire team (Diamondhead 52) engaged the bunker area forward of the moving dismounts and APCs with mini-gun fire.

j. At 1009 hours, C Co reported receiving additional automatic weapon and RPG fire. Fire was returned with all organic weapons and LWT fires.

k. The battalion CO requested that the ARVN Airborne CO order the 73rd Co to move from their location to the Rome Ploy to be a better position to support C Co if required. The ARVN CO concurred and he ordered his company, then located at 494366, to commence foot movement to the SW.

l. At 1013, the Issue FAC who had reported on station to the Bn CO, reported that the weather would not allow fighter employment at that time, but that he would advise if situation improved.

m. At 1017, C Co received sniper fire from the left flank and maneuvered to bring fire on that area. This sniper fire continued until approximately 1035.

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n. At 1045, the 74th ARVN Co, working in the northern ~~Boi~~ Boi, reported contact. The 2/22 Bn CO ordered that A Co, working with the 74th ARVN Co, support their contact as coordinated by the ARVN Airborne Bn CO. He also requested that the 1st Bde XO, in the vicinity of the C Co contact in a C&C helicopter, provide helicopter C&C support to the Airborne CO. This request was granted.

o. At 1057, C Co requested a routine dustoff for 2 EM. Dustoff was completed at 1131 by Dustoff 71.

p. At 1114, LFT (Diamondhead 36) spotted enemy moving 50 meters in front of C Co. Placed mini-gun fire on enemy as C Co continued to maneuver in the area.

q. At 1125, the weather situation started improving. The Bn CO requested that a flame bath be provided. Previous requests had been deferred due to weather.

r. At 1135, C Co reported that they were in the initial bunker complex and that the bunker had been booby-trapped with a CHI-COM grenade, which they had destroyed.

s. At 1205, Flame bath reported on station (Little Bear 706), the location for drop, approximately 70 meters in front of the advancing troops, was marked by LFT and Bn CO. It is noted that the flame was dropped from tree-top level as opposed to the usual 1000-1500 feet altitude, thus allowing pin-point accuracy in close proximity to the troops. The flame was inserted at 1215.

t. At 1222, CS ship reported on station with two sticks of CS, (Little Bear 275), this was placed to the north of the contact and prevailing winds blew it across the enemy withdrawal route. One stick did not ignite; therefore, the artillery ~~140~~ placed arty on the area, igniting the CS.

u. At 1234, the second flame bath ship (LB 706) reported on station and, at 1250, was again inserted approximately 50 meters in front of the advancing troops using low level techniques.

v. At 1235, C Co reported a sniper being engaged with .50 Cal fire and at 1242, reported AK and RPG fire. Maneuver continued.

w. At 1247, C Co reported one APC hit by RPG fire. The track required evacuation. Both the driver and the gunner were wounded. The Bn CO directed C Co to withdraw to the SW to allow heavy artillery to be placed into the contact.

x. At 1303, the 7/11 Arty Bn CO, flying low level on BOA, reported eleven enemy bodies in the enemy position.

y. At 1306, C Co requested a priority dustoff for 5 EM, the result of the RPG hit, on the APC. Dustoff (71) complete at 1330.

z. At 1317, LB 706 reported with the ~~second~~ ^{third} flame bath which was inserted at 1326 to support the withdrawal,

aa. Heavy Artillery was placed in the area of contact by arty.

bb. At 1400, C Co reported receiving mortar and RPG fire. The ARVN Airborne Co joined C Co in their new position to rear of contact area.

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Weather indicated that an air strike might be possible and one was requested.

cc. At 1434, the 7/11 Arty Bn CO reported 5 additional enemy dead dressed in NVG uniform.

dd. At 1436, Issue Fac reported on station.

ee. At 1442, 7/11 Arty Bn CO reported 9 additional NVA bodies.


ff. At 1446, C Co, while moving back in area with ARVN Airborne, reported receiving RPG and small arms fire. One APC was hit and the ammunition exploded. The Bn CO directed, at 1503, that company C withdraw approximately 400 meters to allow air strike. Bn Arty LNO placed 8" round on burning APC to assist in quick burn off of ammo. Track exploded.

gg. At 1548, C Co requested dustoff for 5 EM. Dustoff completed at 1642.

hh. At 1556, the withdrawal, having been completed, Issue 12 FAC directed an air strike into the area of contact. Strike complete at 1630.

ii. At 1655, C Co, while again moving into area of contact, reported movement to the left flank and then reported that a POW had been captured.

jj. At 1659, POW reported that an enemy force, estimated at a reinforced company was trying to slip a platoon around the left flank of C Co. POW evaded at 1726. C Co shifted direction of movement to react to information. They and their counterparts moved into the area and maneuvered forward. The formation used was as follows:



kk. Artillery was called by the Bn Arty LNO moving it forward of the maneuvering troops. Adjustment was made at small intervals into the friendly location until dead shrapnel started to fall just forward of their position and then was moved in 50 meter intervals forward with the movement. Negative contact was made, and the operation terminated at 1815.

11. Results:

a. US losses
15 US WIA



b. Enemy losses
(1) 26 NVA KIA (Body count)
(2) 1 NVA POW

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12. Artillery Fired: 2, 361 rounds
13. Analysis: The three day Cease Fire, effective 8 September 1969, precluded followup operations.



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OVERLAY 1

SITUATION AT 0917A. SEE PARA 10 D, NARRATIVE
ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND AK FIRE RECEIVED

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



OVERLAY 2

SITUATION AT APPROXIMATELY 0925. SEE PARA 10g, NARRATIVE. ENEMY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND RPG FIRE REPORTED. FIRE CEASED AT 0944 LFT ON STATION AT 0943. MOVEMENT CONTINUED FORWARD UNTIL 1009. ARTY FIRES PLACED IN ARCS PARA 10h-i, NARRATIVE

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



OVERLAY 3

AT 1017, SNIPER FIRE RECEIVED FROM LEFT FLANK. 73rd AIRBORNE COMMENCED MOVEMENT TO SUPPORT. DUSTOFF CALLED AT 1057. L1 REPORTED MOVEMENT AT 1114. MOVEMENT FORWARD CONTINUED AT 1135, 1ST BUNKER AREA REACHED, FLAME BATH PLACED 1215 AND 1250. CS EMPLACED AT 1222. AT 1235 AK AND RPG FIRE REPORTED. PARA 10 m - W, NARRATIVE. COMPANY WITHDREW TO APPROX LINE XRAY TO ALLOW HEAVY ARTILLERY TO BE PLACED IN CONTACT AREA

34+



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OVERLAY 4

COMPANY AGAIN MOVED IN AREA, AT 1408, REPORTED
MORTAR AND RPG FIRE. AT 1448, APC (●) WAS HIT BY F
COMPANY ORDERED TO FALL BACK TO LINE YANKEE TO
ALLOW AIR STRIKE. AIR STRIKE COMPLETE AT 1630.
PARA10X-1h, NARRATIVE.

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OVERLAY 5

AT 1655, A POW REPORTED ENEMY FORCE LEFT FLANK. C CO AND 73rd CO COMMENCED MOI INTO AREA BUT NO COMBAT DEVELOPED. TERMINATED AT 1815. NARRATIVE PARA 1099 -

34+

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