

A History of Marine ATC in Vietnam 1962-1975

--

By and for members of the
Marine Air Traffic Control Association
(MATCA)



MATCU-67 Tower at Chu Lai – 1965

Photo Courtesy of Joe Medico

Data Collected and Edited
By Bob Marshall

Version 3.5.1

Copy _____ of _____ Copies

A History of Marine ATC in Vietnam 1962-1975

--

**By and for members of the
Marine Air Traffic Control Association
(MATCA)**

Data Collected and Edited
By Bob Marshall

Version 3.5.1

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Table of Contents

(Version 3.5)

SECTION	PAGE
1 - Forward	5
2 - Researched History	7
3 - Personnel Listings (Partial)	99
4 - Bibliography	131
5 - Glossary	139
6 - Appendix A {Monographs}	153
7 - Appendix B {MATCA Hotline Articles}	355
8 - Appendix C {Stories}	391
9 - Appendix D {Significant Documents}	423
10 - Appendix E {OPNAV Reports}	649
11 - Appendix F {Logbooks}	669
12 - Appendix G {Errata Data}	717
13 - Appendix H {Photographs}	731
14 - Appendix I {Later Additions}	793

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Foreword

I started collecting information for this history in October of 2003. I had some time on my hands and wanted a project to keep myself involved. I don't know that I have succeeded in producing a useful history, but I have sure learned a lot along the way.

The focus of this history should be on the individual monographs, stories, and previously published MATCA Hotline articles. These three areas represent what the Marines, whose activities forty some odd years ago made this history, remember about their tour(s) in Vietnam. I am afraid I waited too long to start collecting information, for some of the major participants can no longer speak for themselves.

The Researched History section is a time-line derived from information contained in official documents and other published sources. Information that is pertinent to ATC is in normal typeface. *Information that is pertinent to the War in Vietnam is italicized.* (Information that points the reader to specific monographs, stories, articles, or documents is in parenthesis normal typeface.) *(Any personal comments I included are italicized and in parenthesis.)*

An incomplete roster of personnel that served with that MATCU follows the Researched history.

The remaining sections are self-explanatory.

As I review this document I see its many flaws, all of which are mine, but not by intent. I hope the reader will consider the overall concept before judging the document too harshly.

I do wish to thank all of those that have contributed their time, memories, documents, pictures and good will. I hope that you will find some satisfaction that your contributions produced a consolidated history of Marine ATC in Vietnam.

Lufkin, Texas
September 15, 2006

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

RESEARCHED HISTORY INDEX

Year	Page
1962	10
1963	11
1964	12
1965	13
1966	14
1967	15
1968	16
1969	17
1970	18
1971	19
1972	20
1973	21
1974	22
1975	23

Researched History

RESEARCHED HISTORY INDEX

Year	Page
1962	9
1963	11
1964	12
1965	13
1966	19
1967	27
1968	40
1969	63
1970	78
1971	85
1972	87
1973	91
1974	94
1975	96

Date	1962	Reference
January		
17 Jan	<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff order Admiral Harry D. Felt, USN the Commander in Chief Pacific (CinCPAC) to prepare for increased operations in South Vietnam.</i>	19 (pg 57)
February		
08 Feb	<i>U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) created. General Paul D. Harkins, USA assigned as ComUSMACV.</i>	19 (pg 46)
March		
16 Mar	<i>Following a series of high-level discussions, CinCPAC orders Admiral John H. Sides as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPACFLT) to deploy a Marine helicopter squadron to South Vietnam. Direct liaison between MGen John P. Condon, USMC CG 1stMAW and ComUSMACV was authorized.</i>	19 (pg 59)
30 Mar	<i>CG 1stMAW creates SHUFLY under the command of Col John F. Carey. Operational control of SHUFLY would be with ComUSMACV, while administrative control would remain with 1stMAW. HMM-362 under the command of LtCol Archie J. Clapp, and a sub-unit of MABS-16 under the command of LtCol William W. Eldridge were assigned to SHUFLY. MATCU-67 under the command of Captain Jac D. Watson was attached to MABS-16.</i>	19 (pg 60-61)
April		
9 Apr	<i>MATCU-67 begins deployment from Okinawa to Soc Trang South Vietnam.</i>	19 (pg 61)
15 Apr	<i>When HMM-362 arrives at Soc Trang the control tower, TACAN, and GCA unit of MATCU-67 are fully operational.</i>	2 (4-62)
May		
10 May	<i>CinCPAC orders 1stMAW to prepare to activate Joint Task Force 116 and then assigns LtGen John L. Richardson, USA to command the JTF and to position his forces in a manner so that they could respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.</i>	19 (pg 88)
18 May	<i>A Marine A-4 squadron (VMA-332) under the command of LtCol Harvey M. Patton deploys to Udorn, Thailand. Also deployed is LtCol Fred A. Steele's HMM-261, and detachments from MACS-2 and MACS-4, as well as MABS-12 make up the remaining elements of the Provisional Marine Air Group under the command of Col. Ross S. Mickey.</i>	19 (pg 89)
19 May	<i>BGen Ormand B. Simpson, USMC creates 3rdMEB at Udorn from the ProvMAG and BLT 3/9.</i> <i>MATCU-66 deploys MSQ-4 with associated generators, technicians, and radar approach controllers to MATCU-67 at Soc Trang.</i>	19 (pg 90) 2 (4-62)

Date	1962	Reference
May		
19 May	MATCU-66 under the command of Captain Merrill S. Newbill deploys from NAS Atsugi, Japan to Udorn, Thailand.	2 (5-62)
20 May	MATCU-66 has TACAN and GCA operational at Udorn, Thailand.	2 (5-62)
27 May	MATCU-66 has Portable Control Tower operational at Udorn, Thailand.	2 (5-62)
July	(See 1 st monograph by Bob Marshall).	
28 Jul	MATCU-66 ceases operations at Udorn and returns to NAS Atsugi.	2 (7-62)
September		
15 Sep	MATCU-67 ceases operations at Soc Trang and returns to MCAF Futenma, Okinawa. SHUFLY moves operations to Da Nang, South Vietnam.	2 (9-62)
	(See monographs by Hank Flood, and Matt Brill).	
November		
	All Navy and Marine aircraft redesignated to standard Air Force identification.	23 (11-62)

Date	1963	Reference
	<i>Throughout 1963 SHUFLY operates at Da Nang, South Vietnam with one or more Marine Medium Helicopter (HMM) squadrons and a detachment of O-1s from VMO-2.</i>	23 (1963)
	MATCU-60 provided ATC service to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan	
	MATCU-66 supported MAG-11 from NAS Atsugi, Japan	
	MATCU-67 provided ATC service to MCAF Futenma, Okinawa	
August		
22 Aug	<i>Henry Cabot Lodge replaces Frederick Nolting as U. S. Ambassador to the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 286)
November		
1 Nov	<i>South Vietnamese military overthrow Government of South Vietnam</i>	25 (pg 304)
2 Nov	<i>South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem executed by Major Duong Nuu Nghia. Duong Van Minh becomes new President of South Vietnam</i>	25 (pg 310)
22 Nov	<i>The U.S. President, John F. Kennedy, was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, Texas. Lyndon B. Johnson takes oath of office as new President of the United States.</i>	25 (pg 311)

Date	1964	Reference
	MATCU-60 continues to support MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.	
	MATCU-66 continues to support MAG-11 at NAS Atsugi, Japan.	
	MATCU-67 continues to support MCAF Futenma, Okinawa.	
March		
	MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan records 70,000 th GCA.	2 (03-64)
June		
	<i>Henry Cabot Lodge resigns as U. S. Ambassador to the Republic of South Vietnam and is replaced by General Maxwell Taylor, USA (Ret.).</i>	25 (pg 345)
	<i>General William C. Westmoreland, USA assumes command of USMACV.</i>	25 (pg 345)
August		
7 Aug	<i>The U. S. Congress passes the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" giving President Johnson extraordinary power to act in Southeast Asia.</i>	25 (pg 681)
November		
3 Nov	<i>Lyndon B. Johnson defeats Barry Goldwater in the U. S. Presidential Election.</i>	25 (pg 681)
December		
	<i>Operation SHUFLY is renamed Marine Unit Vietnam (MUV) at Da Nang, South Vietnam.</i>	24 (1964)

Date	1965	Reference
March	<i>Marine Unit Vietnam redesignated MAG-16 (FWD).</i>	24 (1965)
	<i>Absent MAG-16 at MCAF Futenma, Okinawa MATCU-67 moves headquarters to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.</i>	24 (1965)
8 Mar	<i>9th MEB consisting of BLT 3/9 and BLT 1/3 makes an administrative landing near DaNang and is assigned to defend the airbase at DaNang.</i>	20 (pg 30)
30 Mar	<i>Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara approves the building of a Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) at Chu Lai, South Vietnam.</i>	
	<i>CG 1stMAW, MGen Paul J. Fontana, assigns Maj Frank P. Costello to be Wing Project Officer for Chu Lai.</i>	20 (pg 30)
April		
3 Apr	<i>Maj Costello, BGen Marion Carl, and 1stMAW Engineering Officer LtCol Charles L. Goode conduct reconnaissance of Chu Lai site. It was determined that 1,400,000 square feet of aluminum matting would be required for an airfield with an 8000 x 102 runway, a 7916 x 36 parallel taxiway, and four 300 x 36 cross taxiways. This was every plank the Marine Corps had in the Far East.</i>	20 (pg 30)
11 Apr	<i>MATCU-67 was tasked to support MABS-12 in support of deployment to Chu Lai.</i>	9 (4-65)
	<i>(See monograph by Jim Janke.)</i>	
27 Apr	<i>MATCU-67 under the command of Captain Donald Quagliotti embarks its heavy equipment aboard the USS Windham County LST-1170 and sets sail from Iwakuni, Japan.</i>	9 (4-65)
	<i>(See the roster of MATCU personnel assigned to LST-1170 in the Significant Documents appendix.)</i>	
28 Apr	<i>3rd MEB consisting of RLT 3, BLT 2/3, BLT 3/4, and MAG-13 under the command of BGen Marion Carl activated.</i>	20 (pg 31)
	<i>CG 1stMAW, MGen Paul J. Fontana, overrules BGen Marion Carl's intention to assign his MAG-13 to Chu Lai.</i>	20 (pg 31)
	<i>At Atsugi, Japan, MAG-11 reports assigning VM CJ-1 and VMFA-531 to MAG-16 at Da Nang, South Vietnam.</i>	24 (1965)
May		
7 May	<i>3rd MEB (less MAG-13) under BGen Marion Carl makes an administrative landing at Chu Lai, South Vietnam.</i>	20 (pg 35)
3 May	<i>NMCB-10 begins construction of SATS field at Chu Lai.</i>	20 (pg 39)

Date	1965	Reference
May		
8 May	3 officers and 19 enlisted men from MATCU-66 report to CO, MABS-12 at Iwakuni and are reassigned to MATCU-67. They depart for DaNang by air.	9 (05-65)
10 May	Captain Donald Quagliotti, OIC MATCU-67, departs for Saigon. Captain W. B. "Bill" Harvill assumes duties as OIC, MATCU-67.	9 (05-65)
11 May	MATCU-67 personnel begin to unload heavy equipment at Chu Lai beach.	9 (05-65)
15 May	MATCU-67 installs GRC-99 Mobile Expeditionary Control Tower to provide air traffic control service for transient and logistic helicopter operations.	9 (05-65)
16 May	<i>NMCB-10 lays first piece of aluminum runway matting at Chu Lai.</i>	20 (pg 41)
28 May	MATCU-67 was directed to install and establish air traffic control facilities at Chu Lai and to be prepared to provide Air Traffic Control Service on 1 June 1965. During the period 11 May to 28 May MATCU-67 personnel were largely used as security personnel.	9 (05-65)
29 May	MATCU-67 positions ATC equipment and erects control tower at Chu Lai.	9 (05-65)
30 May	At Chu Lai, MATCU-67 reported TSA-13 Control Tower, TSQ-18 Radar Approach Control shelter, and TRN-14 TACAN operational.	9 (05-65)
31 May	<i>NMCB-10 reports having completed 4000 feet of runway and 1000 feet of taxiway.</i>	20 (pg 41)
June		
1 Jun	<i>At 0810 Col John D. Noble, CO MAG-12, makes first arrested landing in an A-4C at the Chu Lai SATS field.</i>	20 (pg 41)
5 Jun	<i>MGen Lewis W. Walt assumes command of III MAF from MGen William R. Collins.</i>	20 (pg 42))
8 Jun	<i>MGen Keith B. McCutcheon assumes command of 1stMAW from MGen Paul J. Fontana.</i>	20 (pg 42)
18 Jun	Captain John F. Keane assumes duty as OIC, MATCU-67.	9 (06-65)
	(See monographs by Jack Keane, Jim Janke, Joe Medico, and Jerry Kelly about early period at Chu Lai.)	
	(See the MABS-12 "Lessons Learned" report about early MATCU-67 operations in Significant Documents appendix.)	
22 Jun	SSgt Van C. Lafoon, MATCU-67, receives Navy Commendation Medal from LtGen Victor H. Krulak, CG FMFPAC.	9 (06-65)

Date

1965

Reference

June

(See SSgt Van C. LaFoon's Navy Commendation Medal citation in Significant Documents Appendix.)

Letter of Agreement between the Directorate of Civil Aviation of Vietnam and the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on Establishment of Air Traffic Control, Airspace, Approach Control and Aerodrome Functions and Responsibilities Incident to the Commissioning and Operation of the Chu Lai Air Base is signed by General William C. Westmoreland and Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky. This letter is backdated to apply from 27 May 1965.

2 (06-65)

(See this letter and other associated documents in the Significant Documents appendix.)

MATCU-67 conducts flight checks on surveillance and precision radars and on the TACAN. Radars are unrestricted, but TACAN is not reliable. TACAN is restricted to radar-monitored approaches during actual IFR operations.

9 (07-65)

26 Jun

MATCU-67 requests radomes for the TPN-8 radars to protect them from hot humid climatic conditions that cause severe corrosion in the waveguides and tilt servo actuators.

9 (07-65)

30 Jun

MABS-12 reports MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 4,946 control tower operations and 11 GCA during its first month of operation at Chu Lai.

9 (07-65)

July

1stMAW reports MATCU-60 controllers at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan are standing port and starboard watches resulting in an 84-hour workweek. MATCU-60 records 5717 operations for the month; of which 3414 were instrument operations including 692 GCA.

2 (07-65)

1st MAW reports MCAF Futenma, Okinawa critically under strength with only 3 tower controllers available to operate the facility on a 24-hour basis.

2 (07-65)

1 Jul

Mortar attack at DaNang airbase destroys 5 U.S. aircraft.

32 (pg 24)

3 Jul

Henry Cabot Lodge replaces Maxwell Taylor as U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.

25 (pg 682)

14 Jul

MAG-11 reports completing its deployment to Da Nang, South Vietnam.

20 (pg 149)

20 Jul

WO M. D. Broden, OIC MATCU-66, reports to the CO of MAG-13 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan with 1 officer and 15 enlisted personnel. This move closed the Marine side "East Camp" at NAS Atsugi, Japan.

10 (07-65)

28 Jul

MAG-36 prepares to deploy from MCAF Santa Anna and MATCU-68 prepares to deploy from MCAS EI Toro following President Johnson's approval of a JCS request for additional support.

20 (pg 149)

(See monographs by Patrick Prout and Ed LeBaron.)

Date	1965	Reference
August		
16 Aug	<i>MABS-16 begins construction of support facilities at an airfield on the Tonkin Gulf coast. Initially identified as Da Nang east, the airfield would eventually become the Marble Mountain Air Facility (MMAF).</i>	6 (08-65)
18 Aug	<i>Operation STARLITE begins on the Van Tuong Peninsula 15 miles South of Chu Lai. The ground element was the 7th Marines, and they were supported by MAG-16 and MAG-12. The purpose of the assault was to stop a force of 1,500 VC from attacking the Chu Lai base.</i>	24 (1965)
22 Aug	<i>Seabees arrive at MMAF to assist in construction.</i>	6 (08-65)
25 Aug	<i>First MAG-16 helicopter squadron (HMM-261) begins operation from MMAF.</i>	6 (08-65)
31 Aug	<i>MAG-36 deploys from USS Princeton LPH-5 with a command and construction element proceeding to Ky Ha 2 miles north of Chu Lai, and its helicopter squadrons flying to MMAF. Some MATCU-68 equipment and personnel were also on board. MATCU-68 was under the command of Captain R. C. Coulter during the deployment. Once organized at Ky Ha they moved overland to MMAF.</i>	7 (08-65)
<i>(See monographs by C. E. Cosner, Ed LeBaron, and Patrick Prout.)</i>		
September		
	<i>During the month of September the final elements of MAG-16 move to MMAF. It is the first time in four years that the group has gathered all its squadrons on a single field.</i>	6 (09-65)
	<i>R. C Coulter, OIC MATCU-68 reports to the CO MAG-16 for duty with 8 officers and 58 enlisted men.</i>	6 (09-65)
4 Sep	<i>Seabees begin laying aluminum matting on Mat #1 at Ky Ha.</i>	7 (09-65)
12 Sep	<i>MAG-36 begins operations at Ky Ha from the completed MAT #1.</i>	7 (09-65)
15 Sep	<i>MAG-36 commits two aircraft on a daily basis to provide SAR for Chu Lai.</i>	7 (09-65)
25 Sep	<i>Between July and September the southern 4,000 feet of the Chu Lai runway 14/32 deteriorated noticeably due to foundation erosion caused by heavy rain. The Seabees closed the southern 4,000 feet of the runway for repair.</i>	2 (09-65)
<i>(See monographs by J. J. Dargan and Bob Stepp)</i>		
30 Sep	<i>MAG-12 reports MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 9,037 aircraft operations for September of which 767 were GCA.</i>	3 (09-65)
October		
	<i>1stMAW publishes liberty regulations for the DaNang area.</i>	2 (09-65)
<i>(See Wing Order 1050 in Significant Documents appendix)</i>		

Date	1965	Reference
October	MATCU-66 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan is now under the command of its new OIC, Captain V. J. Fulladosa. MAG-13 reports that the TSA-13 and GRC-99 assigned are now operational. 5 controllers are TAD to MATCU-60, also at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and have been transferred to MATCU-60 permanently. MATCU-66 now reports having 5 officers and 27 enlisted men available for duty.	4 (10-65)
8 Oct	Seabees begin construction of Mat #2 for MAG-36 at Ky Ha. MAG-36 reports a PRC-41 radio set being installed in the Ky Ha Field Tower as an interim means of communication until a GRC-99 is received. A Westmont Terminal Navigation Beacon is also reported to be in use at Ky Ha to provide guidance at night and during inclement weather. Two VMO-6 UH-1Es report inadvertent IMC, jettison rocket pods, and climb to VMC at 8'000 where they receive vectors to Chu Lai from MACS-7. They land at Chu Lai with 5 minutes fuel remaining. (See monographs by Jack Keane, J. J. Dargan, and Bob Stepp.) <i>(Throughout this history I have found little evidence that MAG-36 has any integral ATC support until it moves to Hue Phu Bai in October 1967. No mention of any MATCU-67 personnel being assigned to Ky Ha is made in any of the MAG-36, MABS-36, MAG-12, or MABS-12 chronologies. J. J. Dargan remembers Sgt Posner working at Ky Ha.)</i>	7 (10-65) 7 (10-65) 7 (10-65) 7 (10-65)
28 Oct	VC attack Chu Lai for first time. Sapper teams destroy 2 aircraft, seriously damage 3 aircraft, and cause minor damage to 3 aircraft. Crash Crew and Group Guard receive Letters of Commendation. (See monographs by Jack Keane, J. J. Dargan, and Joe Medico.) VC sapper teams also attack at Marble Mountain. MAG-16 reports 3 KIA, and 24 WIA. 19 helicopters, including 13 of VMO-2s UH-1Es, were destroyed and 11 badly damaged in the attack. (See monographs by Patrick Prout and Ed LeBaron; also see annotated photographs of MMAF contributed by Ed LeBaron.)	3 (10-65) 6 (10-65) 32 (pg 37)
31 Oct	MAG-12 reports MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 6,483 air operations of which 421 are GCA.	3 (10-65)
November	9 Nov MAG-12 reported the full 8,000 feet of the SATS runway again useable. The Seabees are required to perform nightly maintenance work to keep north half minimally useable. Rehabilitation is delayed until a sufficient supply of JATO is available.	3 (11-65)
30 Nov	MAG-12 reports MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 6,554 air operations of which 421 are GCA.	3 (11-65)

Date	1965	Reference
December		
9 Dec	<i>Martha Ray's USO show performs at DaNang.</i>	2 (12-65)
11 Dec	<i>Hugh O'Brian's USO show performs at DaNang.</i>	2 (12-65)
17 Dec	<i>Eddie Fisher's USO show performs at DaNang.</i>	2 (12-65)
28 Dec	<i>Bob Hope's USO show performs at Chu Lai and DaNang.</i>	2 (12-65)
	<i>MAG-36 reported two VMO-6 UH-1Es assigned to fly air cover for "Operation BIG CHEER" (the Bob Hope Show) at both Chu Lai and DaNang.</i>	7 (12-65)
31 Dec	<i>MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 6,848 air operations of which 469 are GCA</i>	3 (12-65)
	<i>At year-end U. S. troop strength in South Vietnam is nearly 200,000.</i>	25 (pg 682)
	<i>(At year-end MATCU-67 is established at Chu Lai supporting MAG-12. MAG-36 is at Ky Ha and operates a control tower. MATCU-68 is at Marble Mountain Air Facility (still referred to as DaNang East) supporting MAG-16. MATCU-66 remains at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan with MAG-13. In Japan MATCU-60 continues to support MCAS Iwakuni.)</i>	
Addendum for 1965	<i>On 24 August 1965 a KC-130 from VMGR-152 crashed on take-off at Kai Tak airport in Hong Kong. LCpl Ronald L. Runkle, a technician with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai, was returning from R&R and was a passenger on the flight. He did not survive.</i>	32 (pg 30)

Date	1966	Reference
January	MATCU-68 now reports from the renamed Marble Mountain Air Facility (MMAF).	6 (01-66)
5 Jan	At Chu Lai an HMM-364 aircraft, supporting MAG-12 on SAR duty, collides with a runway approach light while making a practice night GCA. The aircraft sustains a broken strut but is able to land on a portable trailer in Ky Ha without further incident.	7(01-66)
16 Jan	At Chu Lai the Seabees begin rehabilitation of the northern 4,000 feet of the SATS runway.	3 (01-66)
27 Jan	MATCU-66 under its OIC, Captain V. J. Fulladosa moves from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan to MCAF Futenma, Okinawa. They continue to report to MAG-13, but are tasked with the ATC support of MCAF Futenma, Okinawa.	2 (01-66)
31 Jan	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 8,542 air operations of which 424 are GCA.	3 (01-66)
February	MAG-16 records no tower operations for MATCU-68 at MMAF in this or any previous month, but does now report a VFR GCA capability with 36 approaches being made. The control tower is in operation 24 hours per day.	6 (01-66)
16 Feb	At Chu Lai short field operations are secured when the Seabees provide 6,500 feet of usable runway.	3 (02-66)
23 Feb	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai reported its CPN-4 GCA Unit was successfully flight checked and is now FAA certified for ASR approaches. <i>(The CPN-4 was transferred from MATCU-65 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona to relieve dependence on the frequently unavailable UPS-1. This CPN-4 had seen prior service with MATCU-65 at MCAAS Mojave, California, MATCU-66 at NAS Atsugi, Japan, and MATCU-66 at the K-3 Airfield, Korea.)</i>	3 (02-66)
28 Feb	At Chu Lai all 8,000 feet of the SATS runway is now available.	3 (02-66)
March	MAG-12 reported that MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 8,853 air operations of which 688 were GCA.	3 (02-66)
	MAG-16 reported that MATCU-68 at MMAF again failed to record tower operations, but does record 158 GCA.	6 (02-66)
7 Mar	1stMAW Communications-Electronics Officer (CEO) is identified as LtCol J. A. Blakely.	2 (03-66)
	1stMaw CEO identifies need for FM and VHF radios for MATCUs in South Vietnam. 6 VHF radios are needed for each TSQ-18, 3 VHF Radios are needed for each TSA-11, 1 VHF radio is needed for each GRC-99, and 2 FM radios are needed for each TSA tower.	2 (03-66)

Date	1966	Reference
March		
15 Mar	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai reported 2 nd TPN-8 radar dome installed.	3 (03-66)
20 Mar	MAG-12 reported The Chu Lai Marine Corps Airfield Operations Directive No. 1 covering the control of helicopters in the Chu Lai Control Zone effective.	3 (03-66)
27 Mar	MAG-16 relocates MATCU-68 from MMAF to Hue Phu Bai. (A TSA-11 control tower was left at MMAF.) (See monograph by Patrick Prout.)	6 (03-66)
30 Mar	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reports a visit by MGen McCutcheon, CG 1stMAW.	6 (03-66)
31 Mar	1stMAW CEO identifies a need for 3 UHF radios for the use of MATCU-68 at Phu Bai. Radios are for fixed installation using 110v AC @ 60 Hz.	2 (03-66)
	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 9,176 air operations, of which 688 are GCA.	3 (03-66)
	MAG-16 reported MATCU-68 at Phu Bai fails to report tower totals at MMAF and Phu Bai, but reports a GCA count of 147 through 20 Mar.	6 (03-66)
April		
6 Apr	1stMAW CEO reported the control tower at Phu Bai jointly manned by Vietnamese civilians and MATCU-68 controllers. (See the 1stMAW CEOs messages relating problem areas a Phu Bai in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (04-66)
11 Apr	1stMAW CEO scheduled inspection of MATCU-67 and MATCU-68 by the Wing Inspector.	2 (04-66)
16 Apr	<u>1stMAW CEO publishes staff study on the feasibility of assigning MATCUs within any MAW to an ATC section under the control of a MACG.</u> (See the 1stMAW CEO staff study in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (04-66)
	1stMAW reported MATCU-66 at MCAF Futenma, Okinawa is to now report to MWSG-17.	2 (04-66)
19 Apr	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that the Flight Check Division of the 1964 th Air Force Communications Group had determined the unit to be fully operational.	6 (04-66)
27 Apr	1stMAW reported both MATCU-60 and MATCU-66 detached from MWSG-17 to report to MAG-13. Major W. C. Service III is OIC of MATCU-60 and Captain V. J. Fulladosa is OIC of MATCU-66.	2 (04-66)

Date	1966	Reference
April 30 Apr	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 8,788 air operations of which 559 are GCA.	3 (04-66)
	MAG-16 reported MATCU-68 again fails to report tower totals at both Phu Bai and MMAF, but reports 101 VFR GCAs and 49 IFR GCAs at Phu Bai.	6 (04-66)
May 12 May	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that Captain K. V. Berchiolli assumed duty as OIC from Captain B. C. Coulter. MATCU-68 reported 7 officers and 82 enlisted men available for duty.	6 (05-66)
15 May	<i>MGen L. B. Robertshaw assumes duty as CG, 1stMAW from MGen K. B. McCutcheon.</i>	2 (05-66)
	1stMAW CEO requested that MATCU-66 ship a GRC-99 to MAG-36 for use at Ky Ha and a TSA-13 to MATCU-68 for use at Phu Bai. The GRC-99 is to be returned upon completion of a locally fabricated tower by MAG-36.	2 (05-66)
17 May	1stMAW CEO reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai passed inspection with an overall grade of excellent. He comments that the unit is well organized and has a good training program for new controllers. He also notes that a new TSA-13 has been received, and that communications within the TSQ-18 are marginal. (See the inspection report in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (05-66)
30 May	<i>Dong Ha Air Facility opened. It is supported by MAG-16 detachments.</i>	24 (05-66)
31 May	MAG-12 fails to report air operations statistics for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. MAG-16 reports MATCU-68 had 13,413 air operations at MMAF, and 8,515 air operations at Phu Bai of which 310 were GCA.	3 (05-66) 6 (05-66)
June	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reports that WO G. R. Sobyra of MATCU-67 appointed to present rank.	10 (06-66)
	MATCU-67 reported receiving two new TPN-8 radars, and that the 1964 th Communications Group had flight checked a 3.1 degree glide path for runway 14 and a 3.04 degree glide path on runway 32.	10 (06-66)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported promoting GySgt Vopelak, GySgt Smith, GySgt Mischock, GySgt Carman, GySgt Collins, GySgt Bess, SSgt Mays, Sgt Craven, and Sgt Gordon to their present rank.	18 (06-66)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported repair parts shortages for the repair of APA-125s, ARC-94s, and ARC-52s. It is still awaiting crystals for the operation of VHF radios in its TSA-13.	18 (06-66)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported splitting equipment and personnel between Phu Bai and MMAF. A TSA-11 and GRC-99 are reported at MMAF.	18 (06-66)

Date	1966	Reference
June		
15 Jun	MATCU-68 equipment at Phu Bai was flight checked by 1964 th Communications Group and found fully operational. The TACAN at MMAF was also checked and found satisfactory.	18 (06-66)
19 Jun	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported Captain John D. Parker assuming duties as OIC of MATCU-67 from Captain John F. Keane.	9 (06-66)
	<i>John Wayne visits 1stMAW units.</i>	2 (06-66)
30 Jun	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 7975 air operations of which 624 are GCA.	9 (06-66)
	MAG-16 reported MATCU-68 at Phu Bai had 11,904 air operations of which 147 are GCA. It also reports 13,400 air operations at MMAF.	18 (06-66)
	MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 13,719 air operations.	13 (06-66)
July		
	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported James J. Dargan commissioned as Second Lieutenant at MATCU-67.	9 (07-66)
	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported Base Operations Officer, OIC-MATCU-67, NCOIC Base Operations, and an Approach Control NCO attending a 1stMAW/FAA conference at Hue Phu Bai to resolve problems in flight planning and air traffic control.	9 (07-66)
6 Jul	MABS-12 reported Captain John C. Bever assuming duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Captain John D. Parker.	9 (07-66)
10 Jul	1stMAW CEO reported that operations dictate immediate need to install ATC capability at Dong Ha for an indefinite period. He states intention to ship MATCU-68's GRC-99 from MMAF to Dong Ha. A GRC-99 shipped from MATCU-65 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona will be re-directed from MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to MATCU-68 at MMAF.	2 (07-66)
15 Jul	<i>Operation HASTINGS begins in Quang Tri Province supported by the MAG-16 detachment at Dong Ha.</i>	24 (1966)
23 Jul	VC mortars fired at MMAF. 31 rounds fired. No reported damage.	6 (07-66)
29 Jul	1stMAW CEO denies MAG-36 at Ky Ha request for TACAN and GCA. Decision is based on CG FMFPAC not providing required radar technicians. A URN-5 LF RBN is soon to be installed, and the GRC-99 has been placed on top of a 3 high stack of 55 gal dirt filled oil drums.	2 (07-66)
	(See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
30 Jul	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 8,555 air operations, but fails to report GCA operations. MAG-16 fails to report any operations by MATCU-68 at Phu Bai and MMAF. MAG-36 fails to report any operations at Ky Ha.	3 (07-66)

Date	1966	Reference
August	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported MATCU-67 having 8 officers and 63 enlisted men available for duty.	9 (08-66)
	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported MATCU-67 OIC, Capt. John C. Bever, attending meeting in Saigon to discuss ATC coordination between Saigon Center and Chu Lai Approach Control.	9 (08-66)
	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported the Seabees preparing to begin construction of crosswind runway (3/21).	9 (08-66)
1 Aug	<i>1st Battalion, 2nd Korean Marine Brigade arrives and sets up camp 3 miles south of Chu Lai.</i>	24 (1966)
5 Aug	1stMAW CEO states that during operation HASTINGS elements of MATCU-68 augmented by USAF teams provided support for 24-hour VFR operations at Dong Ha airfield. The continued use of Dong Ha airfield will require operations below VFR weather minimums. He implies a sense of urgency due to the oncoming monsoon season.	2 (08-66)
6 Aug	1stMAW CEO tasks 9 th Engineering Battalion to prepare site for URN-5 at Ky Ha, and tasks MATCU-67 with its installation. He offers assistance as necessary, and states that the 9thEB committed to higher priority tasks.	2 (08-66)
26 Aug	1stMAW CEO reported that GRC-99 for MMAF that was shipped from MATCU-65 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona was received in unserviceable condition and requests it be replaced by a TRC-131.	2 (08-66)
31 Aug	MAG-12 reported 10,151 air operations at Chu Lai, but fails to report GCA totals. MAG-16 fails to report operations at Phu Bai, MMAF, and Dong Ha. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reports 13,719 operations.	3 (08-66) 13 (08-66)
September	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported that Captain T. Meyer of MATCU-67 was promoted to his present rank.	9 (09-66)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that Capt Bevins, Capt Jacobsen, SSgt Ambuske, SSgt Branstetter, SSgt Godfrey, Sgt Eslick, Sgt Hulbert, Sgt Mais, Sgt Olaharski, Sgt Rains, Cpl Gmmersheimer, Cpl Beals, Cpl McKay, Cpl Martin, Cpl Cain, Cpl Bresett, Cpl Baltins, Cpl Hautamaki, Cpl Kolke, Cpl Neal, Cpl Gilmour, Cpl Bishop, and LCpl Meola were promoted to their present rank.	18 (09-66)
	MATCU-68 reported receiving the VHF crystals for its TSA-13, but the domes for the TPN-8s remain on order. Its UPS-1C is functioning satisfactorily, but its two TACANs are on loan to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai.	18 (09-66)
8 Sep	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported an explosion in an ammo dump caused by a "friendly" 155mm projectile.	9 (09-66)
21 Sep	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported a mortar attack. 25 to 30 rounds were fired resulting in light damage to 8 aircraft, and 15 MAG-12 Marines WIA.	3 (09-66)

Date	1966	Reference
September		
24 Sep	1stMAW CEO tasked MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to ship 1 TRN-14 TACAN (Ch 62) to Khe Sanh. He also tasks MAG-16 to provide necessary personnel and test equipment to install, operate, and maintain a TACAN at Khe Sanh. MAG-16 is to be prepared to expand Khe Sanh installation to include ASR.	2 (09-66)
25 Sep	1stMAW CEO directed MATCU-67 to ship 2 inoperative TRN-14 TACANs to 1stMAW CEO for repair.	2 (09-66)
27 Sep	1stMAW CEO reported on status of 5 TRN-14 TACANs available to 1stMAW. 1 is at Chu Lai providing marginal service, 2 are at 1stMAW CEO undergoing repair, and 2 are waiting shipment to 1stMAW CEO for repair.	2 (09-66)
29 Sep	1stMAW CEO indicates that the 7 th Air Force has directed its 1 st Mobile Communication Group at Clark AFB in the Philippines to install a TACAN at Khe Sanh, and to be prepared to install a portable control tower.	2 (09-66)
29 Sep	1stMAW CEO reported that 7 th AF URN-3 TACAN and crew at Khe Sanh. The Khe Sanh Camp commander released MATCU-68 personnel to return to Phu Bai.	2 (09-66)
(See these documents in the Significant Documents Appendix.)		
30 Sep	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 13,059 air operations, but fails to report GCA totals. MAG-16 reports MATCU-68 had 12,455 air operations at Phu Bai of which 300 were GCA. MAG-16 reports MATCU-68 also had 14,860 air operations at MMAF, and 15,717 air operations at Dong Ha. MABS-36 had 13,440 air operations at Ky Ha.	3 (09-66) 6 (09-66) 13 (09-66)
October		
1stMAW reported that LtCol R. V. Anderson has replaced LtCol J. A. Blakely as CEO.		
2 (10-66)		
MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported GySgt Feilen, SSgt Haney, SSgt Bennet, and Cpl Evans promoted to their present rank.		
18 (10-68)		
1 Oct	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai established a control tower at Khe Sanh for VFR and Special VFR control of aircraft during daylight hours.	18 (10-68)
MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported that Major F. T. Sullivan assumed duties as OIC MATCU-67 from Captain John. C. Bever.		
9 (10-66)		
5 Oct	MAG-13 reported the Chu Lai West Field officially open. Col D. D. Petty Jr., CO MAG-13, made first landing in TF-9J. VMFA-323, an F-4B squadron, transferred from MAG-11 at DaNang to MAG-13 at Chu Lai.	4 (10-66)
MAG-13 published operations order for Chu Lai.		
4 (10-66)		
(See ATC relevant pages of this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)		

Date	1966	Reference
October		
12 Oct	1stMAW CEO reported on status of MATCU equipment in 1stMAW. Concrete pad poured at Chu Lai West for FPN-36 that was shipped from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. TSA-11 is enroute to Chu Lai. TSA-13 has been relocated to elevated platform. 1stMAW G-4 has located steel tower and cab at Kadena, Okinawa and plans to rehabilitate, equip, and install as near-permanent control tower at Chu Lai. Design drawings for turntable for Chu Lai CPN-4 turned over to construction. The URN-5 installation at Ky Ha is complete.	2 (10-66)
	1stMAW CEO issued order to MATCU-67 to take custody of GRC-99 and URN-5 at Ky Ha, but to leave the equipment in place. Upon receipt of new TSQ-18A (with Surveillance Extension), it is to ship its old TSQ-18 to MATCU-65 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona.	2 (10-66)
17 Oct	<i>At Chu Lai an A-4 from VMA-214 struck and killed two MAG-13 marines while on take-off roll. It was a very dark night and the pilot was not aware of the accident. The bodies were discovered about 30 minutes later.</i>	3 (10-66)
30 Oct	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 11,419 air operations, but fails to record GCA totals. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reports 12,893 air operations of which 322 are GCA. MATCU-68 also reports 12,928 air operations at MMAF, 16,035 air operations at Dong Ha, and 3,660 air operations at Khe Sanh. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 10,406 ops.	3 (10-66) 18 (10-66) 13 (10-66)
November		
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported receiving 2 FPN-36s, and 1 TRC-131.	18 (11-66)
1 Nov	MATCU-68 assigned 1stLt Mark D. Parish as its OIC of the ATC Detachment at Khe Sanh.	18 (11-66)
20 Nov	MATCU-68 assigned Capt Lance V. Bevins as its OIC of the ATC Detachment at MMAF.	18 (11-66)
29 Nov	MATCU-68 moved PAR radar to Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. In two days both facilities were in operation and awaiting flight checks.	18 (11-66)
30 Nov	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 11,496 air operations, but fails to report GCA totals. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reports 11,456 air operations of which 504 were GCA. MATCU-68 also reports 15,398 air operations at Dong Ha, 12,541 air operations at MMAF, and 3,223 air operations at Khe Sanh. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 8,925 air operations.	3 (11-66) 18 (11-66) 13 (11-36)
December		
	1stMAW CEO requested CG, III MAF assign channel for TRN-14 TACAN to be positioned at An Hoa.	2 (12-66)
	MABS-12 at Chu Lai reported that 1stLt J. M. Mutter of MATCU-67 was promoted to his present rank.	9 (12-66)
1 Dec	MAG-16 reported that Captain Robert O. Meyer, OIC MATCU-62, reported for duty with 4 officers and 34 enlisted men. MATCU-62 was assigned to Dong Ha.	6 (12-66)

Date	1966	Reference
December	(See monographs by Bill Behan, Leo Culp, Ron Dodge, and Don Faram about the early days of MATCU-62 and its long, involved deployment from MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii.)	
2 Dec	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded SSgt Don Faram makes first GCA approach at Dong Ha with FOLLOW 1 a Marine S-2.	30 (2-12-66)
4 Dec	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded FPN-36 (Quad) radar flight checked with runway 25 glide path angle of 3.02 degrees. A 13.5-mile limitation was placed on the FPN-36's surveillance radar.	30 (4-12-66)
18 Dec	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded TPN-8 flight check unsatisfactory.	30 (18-12-66)
31 Dec	MAG-12 reported MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 12,303 air operations, but fails to record GCA totals. MAG-16 reports MATCU-68 at Phu Bai had 13,156 air operations of which 637 were GCA. MAG-16 also reports MATCU-68 at Khe Sanh had 3528 air operations of which 161 were GCA, and MAG-16 reports MATCU-68 had 12,675 air operations for MMAF. MAG-16 has no report for Dong Ha from either MATCU-68 or MATCU-62. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 8,735 air operations.	3 (12-66) 6 (12-66) 13 (12-66)
	<i>At year-end there are nearly 400,000 U. S. troops in South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 683)
	<i>(At year-end MATCU-67 remains at Chu Lai in support of MAGs 12 and 13. The runway complex at Chu Lai has increased with the addition of 14/32 West and the crosswind runway 3/21. It has also been tasked to support MAG-36 at Ky Ha. MMAF remains under the control of MATCU-68 at Phu Bai and does not have GCA. MATCU-68 also has the responsibility for the tower and GCA at Khe Sanh. MATCU-62 has taken control of Dong Ha from MATCU-68. Both MATCU-62 and MATCU-68 are in support of MAG-16. An Hoa is about to become a further drain on ATC resources.)</i>	
Addendum for 1966	(See the stories by Ed "MOFAK" Cathcart and L. C. Pritchett.)	
	(See the monographs by Merrell Branstetter, Jim Mutter, Dick Traver, and Stuart white.)	
	On 19 September 1966 an Air Force F-4 made an intentional crash landing on the short Dong Ha runway. The pilot had intentionally exceeded bingo fuel while on a RESCAP just north of the DMZ.	
	(See the story and photographs by George Bryant who was tasked with scavenging useable parts from the damaged aircraft.)	
	Joe Medico reports that during October Luther Rice was promoted to Warrant Officer, Jim Newton was promoted to Master Sergeant, and Joe was promoted to Gunnery Sergeant.	
	Davy Crocker and Bob Stepp report that they were promoted to Gunnery Sergeant.	

Date
January

1967

Reference

	1stMAW CEO asks each MATCU in country to forward 35mm slides of its operations to the FMFPAC CEO for a pictorial spread to be used to brief CMC and CG, FMFPAC.	2 (01-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported receiving at TRC-131 portable control tower.	15 (01-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported Cpl. Grohnke promoted to present rank.	18 (01-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 2ndLt G. P. Stirling assigned duties as OIC of the MMAF detachment.	18 (01-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged cycling through TACAN channels 46 and 94 before finding channel 109 partially useful.	30 (04-01-67)
1 Jan	MAG-16 reported that Capt John C. Bever assumed duty at OIC MATCU-68 at Phu Bai from Capt Kent V. Berchiolli.	6 (01-67)
4 Jan	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged use of its CPN-4. It was used as an assist only because the FPN-36 and TPN-8 were out of service.	30 (09-01-67)
9 Jan	1stMAW CEO tasked MATCU-67 at Chu Lai with providing 2 FPN-36s and 2 TSN-1s. He additionally asks for 5 FPN-36 qualified Marines; 1-6720, 2-6715, and 2-5951. They are to be assigned to the Air Force 1972 nd Communications Squadron at DaNang.	2 (01-67)
13 Jan	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged that its CPN-4 precision radar had been flight checked.	30 (13-01-67)
15 Jan	1stMAW CEO issues orders for the following Marines from MATCU-67: 1stLt L. E. Schneider, GySgt H. A. Reda, SSgt J. A. Daniel, Sgt D. L. Greek, and Sgt C. T. Tanners be issued TAD Orders to DaNang. 2ndLt G. P. Stirling and GySgt D. H. Feilen from MATCU-68 and Sgt L. Harvey from MATCU-62 were also included. It was noted that the Marines would be required to pay for their meals at the Air Force mess hall. The Marines were to serve at the 1972 nd Comm Squadron from the 15 th for seven days.	2 (01-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged being notified of possible attack during the night. Sgt Goode and Cpl Brown also report hearing an unknown station speaking in Vietnamese on a monitored frequency.	30 (15-01-67)
17 Jan	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged satisfactory flight check of its TPN-8. There are no restrictions on either surveillance or precision functions and the device is approved for IFR operations.	30 (17-01-67)
22 Jan	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged making emergency approach in marginal weather with Covey 75 and Covey 51. The engine of Covey 75 quit at a point 2 miles west, but the aircraft landed OK.	30 (22-01-67)
	(See selected pages from the Dong Ha GCA logbook in the Contributed Logbooks appendix.)	

Date	1967	Reference
January		
31 Jan	MAG-12 reported 6,944 air operations from Chu Lai's East Field and 66 air operations from Chu Lai's crosswind runway (3/21). MAG-13 fails to report operations at Chu Lai. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reports 13,448 air operations of which 1,003 were GCA. MATCU-68 at Khe Sanh reports 2,773 air operations of which 124 were GCA. MATCU-68 at MMAF reports 13,949. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reports 10,298 air operations of which 364 are GCA. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 8,647 air operations.	3 (01-67) 4 (01-67) 18 (01-67) 15 (01-67) 13 (01-67)
February		
	1stMAW ASO reported two GCA related aircraft accidents. Date and location is not included in the report.	2 (02-67)
	(See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
	MAG-16 reported MATCU-62 at Dong Ha has 5 officers and 41 enlisted men available for duty. MATCU-68 at MMAF is reported to have 9 officers and 68 enlisted men available.	6 (02-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported transferring 1 officer and 3 enlisted men to MATCU-62, and the promotion of Sgt Cole to his present rank.	18 (02-67)
	MABS-13 at Chu Lai states that it does not have an ATC function, but that it maintains a close liaison with MATCU-67.	10 (02-67)
3 Feb	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged that a Capt Powell has notified them of a possible alert, and requests that current weather sequences be available in case aircraft must be launched.	30 (03-02-67)
15 Feb	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha accepts responsibility for Khe Sanh from MATCU-68. 2ndLt R. L. Dodge is assigned as MATCU-62 Khe Sanh OIC and replaces MATCU-68's 1stLt Mark D. Parish. 1 officer and 7 enlisted men now staff Khe Sanh.	15 (02-67)
	MAG-16 assigns responsibility for An Hoa to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai. An Hoa Tower will operate on 247.0 MHz and 30.7 MHz.	6 (02-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai assigns Capt John W. McGee to replace 2ndLt G. P. Stirling as OIC at MMAF.	18 (02-67)
19 Feb	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha receives mobilizers for its TSQ-18 GCA unit.	15 (02-67)
21 Feb	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged a weather sequence of W0X0F.	30 (21-02-67)
	<i>(I don't know how many times W0X0F was on some ATC test, but this is the first time I remember ever seeing it actually reported.)</i>	
28 Feb	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged interference by unknown source on its surveillance radars.	30 (28-02-67)
	MAG-12 reported 3,872 air operations at Chu Lai's East Field. MAG-13 makes no report of air operations at Chu Lai. No Mention is made by any command of GCA totals by MATCU-67 at Chu Lai.	3 (02-67) 4 (02-67)

Date	1967	Reference
February		
28 Feb	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 13,479 air operations of which 897 were GCA. MATCU-68 also reports 13,789 air operations at MMAF, and 1,314 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-68 reported 1,160 air operations at Khe Sanh of which 87 were GCA, MATCU-62 also reported for Khe Sanh 1,550 air operations of which 40 were GCA. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported 8,760 air operations of which 457 were GCA. MABS-36 at Ky Ha reported 9,598 air operations.	18 (02-67) 15 (02-67) 13 (02-67)
March		
	MAG-13 publishes Pay and Allowance charts for 1967.	4 (03-67)
	(See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported that 7 miles of tactical barbed wire were laid. It also erected 3 towers, and constructed 32 new bunkers to improve the Chu Lai airfield ground defense posture.	10 (03-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported and 1 MSgt and 5 GySgts reported for duty. Capt Skov and Sgts Costlow, Martin, Hutchason, McKay, Boos, Beals, Bresett, Dedominicus, Cain, Sherwood, Servick, Hautamaki, Nold, Marshall, Gilmour, Leonard, Bailey, Russell, and Hersberger were promoted to their present rank.	18 (03-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported using approximately 50,000 sand bags to protect all electronics equipment. They also report promoting 3 Corporals to Sergeant. Their on-board strength has now increased to 7 officers and 52 enlisted, with 2 officers and 7 enlisted men serving at Khe Sanh. New arrivals include 1 1stLt, 1 MSgt, 1 SSgt, 3Cpls and, 1 LCpl.	15 (03-67)
1 Mar	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha assigns 1stLt William Flahive to duty as the Assistant OIC at Khe Sanh.	15 (03-67)
3 Mar	MAG-16 reported the loss of 1 CH-46 and heavy damage to 1 CH-46 and 2 UH-1 helicopters at an early morning mortar attack at Khe Sanh.	6 (03-67)
5 Mar	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported GRC-99 SERNO 6 damaged beyond economical repair in a mortar attack at Khe Sanh. 2ndLt R. L. Dodge is reported WIA in this attack.	15 (03-67)
6 Mar	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported 20 82mm mortar rounds fired at the airfield. No casualties were reported.	10 (03-67)
14 Mar	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha logged DaNang airfield closed due to enemy attack at 0230.	30 (14-03-67)
20 Mar	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha assigns 1stLt M. D. Parish as OIC of Khe Sanh, replacing the wounded 2ndLt R. L. Dodge.	15 (03-67)
22 Mar	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai assigns MSgt William L. Brunson to replace WO William B. Whitten as Maintenance Officer when WO Whitten rotates to CONUS.	18 (03-67)

Date	1967	Reference
March		
28 Mar	MAG-16 reported the loss of a VMO-2 UH-1 at Dong Ha. The helicopter was on an evening visual recon flight around the base perimeter when it was hit by heavy caliber automatic weapons fire. It crashed and burned killing all 4 crewmembers.	6 (03-67)
31 Mar	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reports 4,901 air operations at Chu Lai's East Field. MAG-13 makes no report, and no MATCU-67 GCA totals are recorded. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 17,384 air operations of which 982 were GCA. MATCU-68 also reported 17,400 air operations at MMAF, and 2,687 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported 19,102 air operations of which 696 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 reported 4,530 air operations of which 80 were GCA. MABS-36 recorded 10,542 air operations at Ky Ha.	3 (03-67) 4 (03-67) 18 (03-67) 15 (03-67) 13 (03-67)
April		
	1stMAW CEO requested a replacement Technical Representative (TECH REP) from Gilfillan for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. An additional TECH REP is requested for MATCU-62 at Dong Ha because the TECH REP with MATCU-68 at Phu Bai is unable to cover both locations.	2 (04-67)
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported that a provisional airbase structure was being proposed to consolidate all base operational facilities and capabilities to handle an anticipated increase in air operations.	4 (04-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai received a certificate of commendation from MGen L. B. Robertshaw, CG, 1stMAW, for support of combat operations between September 1965 and February 1967.	18 (04-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai received a letter of appreciation from the 311 th Air Commando Squadron for activities in March 1967.	18 (04-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that SSgt Brake and Sgt Branum received certificates of commendation for their work with the citizens of the village of Lang Vei after the village was bombed by unknown aircraft.	18 (04-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that 1stLt Reed and 1stLt Flood were promoted to their present ranks.	18 (04-67)
1 Apr	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that 1stLt William Flahive assumed duties as OIC Khe Sanh from 1stLt Mark Parish. 1 officer and 10 enlisted men now staff Khe Sanh, while 4 officers and 49 enlisted men staff Dong Ha.	15 (04-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that 1stLt Henry D. Flood replaced MSgt William L. Brunson as Maintenance Officer.	18 (04-67)
12 Apr	1stMAW CEO announced a MATCU Maintenance Instruction team would arrive in country on 24 April. He also states intentions to install semi-permanent control towers at Chu Lai and Ky Ha to allow the TSA-11s, TSA-13s, and GRC-99s presently in use to be used elsewhere.	2 (04-67)

Date	1967	Reference
April		
12 Apr	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha records receipt of GRC-99 SERNO 9.	15 (04-67)
24 Apr	<i>1st Battle of Khe Sanh, also known as "The Hill Fights" begins.</i>	27 (pg 124)
	1stMAW CEO announced a schedule for the MATCU Maintenance Instruction team. MATCU-67 at Chu Lai on 25 Apr. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai on 30 Apr, and MATCU-62 on 4 May.	2 (04-67)
25 Apr	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded receipt of a URD-12 and an FPN-36 from MATCU-68 at Phu Bai.	15 (04-67)
26 Apr	1stMAW CEO identified ATC equipment assets available for the support of An Hoa and Khe Sanh.	2 (04-67)
	(See this letter in the Significant Documents Appendix.)	
28 Apr	MATCU-62 logged Dong Ha under attack at 0230 and states that the GCA site is evacuated.	30 (27-04-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong had reported GySgt George E. Payne as WIA during a rocket and mortar attack.	15 (04-67)
30 Apr	MABS-13 recorded 11,724 air operations at Chu Lai. Neither MAG-12 nor MAG-13 recorded GCA totals. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 20,124 air operations of which 658 were GCA. MATCU-68 also recorded 21,144 air operations at MMAF, and 2,177 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 12,470 air operations of which 525 were GCA. MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh recorded 4,740 air operations of which 52 were GCA. MABS-36 at Ky Ha recorded 12,016 air operations.	3 (04-67) 4 (04-67) 18 (04-67) 15 (04-67) 13 (04-67)
May		
	1stMAW CEO reported all three in country MATCUs received grades of satisfactory with discrepancies during the inspection in April and the first part of May.	2 (05-67)
	(See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai records than NMCB-8 had surveyed the new control tower site and the 30 th NCR had been tasked with its construction.	4 (05-67)
	MAG-16 at MMAF recorded replacing all of the Groups CH-37s with new CH-53s, and mourns the passing of an era.	6 (05-67)
1 May	<i>Ellsworth Bunker replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as the U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 683)
	MAG-12 at Chu Lai recorded that Maj Victor D. Steele assumed duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Maj F. T. Sullivan	3 (05-67)

Date	1967	Reference
May		
5 May	MAG-13 recorded that Col Dan H. Johnson assumed duty as Commanding Officer Marine Corps Air Station Chu Lai.	4 (05-67)
18 May	MAG-16 reported 2 UH-1s damaged in a mortar and rocket attack at Dong Ha. MAG-16 records that SSgt Robert T. Egan and Sgt Arthur D. Faram of MATCU-62 were wounded during the attack.	6 (05-67)
21 May	MAG-16 reported a mortar attack on Dong Ha that inflicted numerous casualties. It reports that 1stLt Leo V. Culp of MATCU-62 was wounded during the attack. (See monographs by Bill Behan, Leo Culp, Ron Dodge, and Don Faram about their tour with MATCU-62. Don Faram also provided photographs of Dong Ha during this period.)	6 (06-67)
31 May	MABS-13 recorded 24,566 air operations at both the East and West Fields at Chu Lai. No record of GCA by MATCU-67 was made. MAG-16 at Phu Bai recorded 21,057 air operations of which 167 were GCA. At MMAF MAG-16 recorded 15,595 air operations, and 2,680 air operations at An Hoa. MAG-16 at Dong Ha recorded 22,019 air operations of which 123 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MAG-16 recorded 12,905 air operations of which 90 were GCA. MABS-36 at Ky Ha recorded 11,976 air operations.	4 (05-67) 6 (05-67) 13 (05-67)
June		
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai received Letter of Achievement from MGen L. B. Robertshaw, CG, 1stMAW, for support of combat operations between 1 May 1967 and 1 June 1967.	18 (06-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded that the number of officers available for duty will drop to 3 with the departure of Capt Bever in July. It also recorded the promotion to their present rank of SSgt James P. Davenport and Sgt William H. Shuman. A difficulty in attaining spare generator parts was recorded as an on-going problem. The maintenance section was praised for keeping the radios and radars operational.	18 (06-67)
	MAG-12 at Chu Lai recorded MATCU-67 as having 11 officers and 91 enlisted men available for duty. These totals included WO Bobby W. Morgan, who was assigned to duty as Maintenance Officer of MATCU-67.	3 (06-67)
1 Jun	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded that Capt J. W. McGee assumed duty as OIC from Capt R. O. Meyer. Since March 1967 Capt. McGee had been OIC of MATCU-68 detachment at MMAF.	15 (06-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha assigned 2ndLt A. Warnack to assume duties as OIC of the Khe Sanh detachment from 1stLt W. Flahive. 1 officer and 11 enlisted men now staff Khe Sanh, while 5 officers and 49 enlisted men staff Dong Ha.	15 (06-67)
2 Jun	1stMAW recorded that MGen N. J Anderson assumed command of 1stMAW from MGen L. B. Robertshaw.	2 (06-67)

Date	1967	Reference
8 Jun	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded E. Jernican, an ITT Gilfillan TECH REP, joined for duty.	15 (06-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded receiving a TRN-14 from MATCU-68.	15 (06-67)
19 Jun	MAG-12 recorded that Maj Dennis R. Bowen assumed duties at OIC MATCU-67 at Chu Lai from Major Victor D. Steele.	3 (06-67)
22 Jun	MABS-16 at Phu Bai transferred operational responsibilities for An Hoa to MAG-36 at Ky Ha.	12 (06-67)
	<i>(Though it is not directly discussed, I believe that MATCU-68 at Phu Bai continued to provide controllers for An Hoa.)</i>	
30 Jun	MABS-13 at Chu Lai recorded 21,396 air operations at MCAS Chu Lai. No mention is made of MATCU-67 GCA totals. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 21,101 air operations of which 154 were GCA. MATCU-68 also recorded 15,276 air operations at MMAF, and 3,971 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 14,396 air operations of which 229 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 recorded 13,085 air operations of which 63 were GCA. MABS-36 recorded 9,690 air operations.	10 (06-67) 18 (06-67) 15 (06-67) 13 (06-67)
July	<i>(No command chronology was recorded for either MATCU-62 at Dong Ha or MATCU-68 at Phu Bai during July, August or September of 1967. May of 1967 is also missing. No command chronology for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai exists until September of 1968.)</i>	
3 Jul	MAG-16 at MMAF rebuilt and repositioned bunkers and fighting holes due to the future installation of observation towers. No enemy contact was reported at MMAF or Phu Bai, but Khe Sanh was attacked 4 times and Dong Ha 10 times.	6 (07-67)
5 Jul	MAG-16 recorded that Dong Ha came under mortar and artillery attack. 6 helicopters were damaged and 13 Marines injured.	6 (07-67)
	MAG-16 recorded that Captain W. D. Skov assumed duties as OIC of MATCU-68 at Phu Bai from Captain J. C. Bever.	6 (07-67)
6 Jul	MAG-16 recorded that Dong Ha underwent artillery attacks at 0330, 1750, and 1830. No damage to MAG-16 assets was reported.	6 (07-67)
7 Jul	MAG-16 recorded 5 separate artillery attacks at Dong Ha. No damage to MAG-16 assets was reported. Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) were observed.	6 (07-67)
8 Jul	MAG-16 recorded 2 separate artillery attacks at Dong Ha. 13 helicopters were damaged as well as a radar antenna and fuel bags. One Marine was wounded.	6 (07-67)
10 Jul	MAG-16 recorded a single artillery attack at Dong Ha that damaged 3 helicopters and wounded 2 Marines.	6 (07-67)

Date	1967	Reference
July		
15 Jul	MAG-16 recorded providing medevac for personnel injured in a 0025 rocket attack at DaNang.	6 (07-67)
18 Jul	1stMAW CEO does not concur with the proposed use of MATCU-67 personnel to staff Air Base Operations at Chu Lai because the proposed table of organization exceeds that of the MATCU and the proposal contradicts his plan to form MATCUs into an ATC Squadron. (See this letter in the Significant Documents Appendix.)	2 (07-67)
25 Jul	MAG-16 recorded that 1stLt R. W. D'Ambrosio assumed duties as OIC MATCU-62 at Dong Ha from Capt J. W. McGee.	6 (07-67)
27 Jul	MAG-16 recorded 4 artillery attacks at Dong Ha. 2 helicopters received minor damage, but no Marines were reported injured.	6 (07-67)
28 Jul	MAG-16 recorded 2 artillery attacks at Dong Ha. No damage or injuries were reported.	6 (07-67)
31 Jul	MABS-13 recorded 27,209 air operations at MCAS Chu Lai. Totals of MATCU-67 GCA were not reported. MAG-16 reported 22,665 air operations at Phu Bai of which 155 were GCA. MMAF recorded 18,273 air operations. At Dong Ha MAG-16 recorded 16,929 air operations of which 153 were GCA. Khe Sanh recorded 9,541 air operations of which 138 were GCA. MABS-36 recorded 8,854 air operations at Ky Ha and 4,652 at An Hoa.	10 (07-67) 6 (07-67) 13 (07-67)
August		
	MAG-16 recorded rebuilding its command post and other bunkers at MMAF and installing perimeter lighting. At Phu Bai MAG-16 extended the perimeter 300 meters and built new bunkers and fighting holes. MAG-16 recorded constantly improving defense positions at Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. There were 4 attacks on Dong Ha, 2 attacks on Phu Bai, and 1 attack on MMAF recorded by MAG-16.	6 (08-67)
	MABS-13 recorded 3 accidents on the Chu Lai West Field that resulted in 1 death and 2 aircraft destroyed. It also records that 4 bombs were accidentally dropped while aircraft were landing or launching. No injuries or damage was reported.	10 (08-67)
	MABS-16 at MMAF recorded repairing the eastern taxiways in preparation for the winter monsoons.	12 (08-67)
	1stMAW recorded LtCol K. M. Worley replacing LtCol R. V. Anderson as CEO.	2 (08-67)
3 Aug	MAG-16 recorded that 1stLt C. H. Bodmer assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 at Phu Bai from Capt W. D. Skov.	6 (06-67)
5 Aug	MAG-16 recorded the explosion of an ammunition supply point (ASP) at Phu Bai.	6 (08-67)

Date	1967	Reference
August		
8 Aug	<p>MAG-12 recorded the death of the ITT Gilfillian TECH REP Eugene Jernigan attached to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. It records that Mr. Jernigan was working in the CPN-4 power trailer when the trailer was struck by a C-1A. The C-1A was the Carrier On-Board Delivery (COD) aircraft of the USS Hornet and it crashed on take-off from Chu Lai's West runway. Mr. Jernigan was immediately medevaced to DaNang, but did not survive.</p>	3 (08-67)
	<p><i>(The USS Hornet reported the loss of a C-1A, BUNO 146016, on this date, but reported it lost at sea following a launch accident. All 5 crewmen were reported as survivors.)</i></p>	32 (pg 113)
24 Aug	<p>1stMAW CEO recorded a letter from the OIC of MATCU-62 agreeing in principle to upgrade the control tower at Khe Sanh, but stating that there are no TSA-13 towers available in the 1stMAW for reassignment to MATCU-62.</p>	2 (08-67)
	<p><i>(See this letter in the Significant Documents appendix.)</i></p>	
28 Aug	<p>MAG-16 recorded a rocket attack at MMAF. 3 helicopters were destroyed and 15 were damaged. 6 Marines were killed and 80 injured. The runway was holed, as well as the parking ramps. 2 enlisted billets were destroyed and the mess hall was damaged.</p>	6 (08-67)
	<p>MAG-16 recorded 3 attacks at Dong Ha with the VC/NVA using both rockets and artillery. 2 helicopters were destroyed and 12 were damaged. 1 C-130 was damaged. The runway had 6 holes and the control tower and GCA generators were damaged. The mess hall and 2 billets were damaged or destroyed, and 7 fuel bladders were destroyed. 1 Marine was killed and 20 were wounded.</p>	6 (08-67)
30 Aug	<p>MAG-16 recorded a mortar attack at Phu Bai. 14 helicopters were damaged and 14 Marines were wounded. The runway and parking ramps were holed.</p>	6 (08-67)
31 Aug	<p>MAG-12 at Chu Lai records 31,501 air operations at MCAS Chu Lai of which 2,479 were MATCU-67 GCA.</p>	3 (08-67)
	<p><i>(This is the first accurate report for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai since June of 1966. The report includes cumulative totals, since May of 1965, of 336,049 air operations at Chu Lai of which 23,880 were GCA.)</i></p>	3 (08-67)
	<p>MAG-16 recorded 29,380 air operations at Phu Bai of which 445 are GCA by MATCU-68. At MMAF MAG-16 recorded 22,274 air operations. At Dong Ha MAG-16 recorded 13,974 air operations of which 163 were GCA by MATCU-62. MAG-16 recorded 9,481 air operations at Khe Sanh of which 248 were GCA by MATCU-62.</p>	6 (08-67)
	<p>MABS-36 recorded 10,771 air operations and 3 aircraft crashes at Ky Ha. At An Hoa MABS-36 recorded 4,544 air operations with no aircraft crashes.</p>	13 (08-67)

Date September	1967	Reference
	<i>Gen William Westmoreland Commander USMACV begins to fortify Khe Sanh.</i>	25 (pg 683)
	1stMAW recorded that Dong Ha airfield withstood enemy artillery attacks on 13 days during the month.	2 (09-67)
	MAG-16 recorded that 84 aircraft revetments were constructed at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, Phu Bai, and MMAF. These revetments were made from 7,000 55 gal barrels.	6 (09-67)
2 Sep	MAG-16 recorded 4 artillery attacks on Dong Ha. 3 helicopters received minor damage and 6 Marines were wounded.	6 (09-67)
3 Sep	MABS-13 recorded the closure of the West runway at Chu Lai for the installation of centerline lighting. The stated intent is to use the crosswind runway for normal operations for MAG-13 and rely on the East SATS runway and the West parallel taxiway as necessary.	10 (09-67)
	MAG-16 recorded an artillery attack at Dong Ha in which 150 152mm rounds were fired. An adjacent ASP was hit causing spontaneous secondary explosions. The combination resulted in the destruction of 32 billets, and 44 billets heavily damaged. 16 aircraft received significant damage and 50 Marines were wounded.	6 (09-67)
4 Sep	MAG-16 recorded that what remained of Dong Ha was again attacked at 0734. No injuries were reported.	6 (09-67)
6 Sep	MAG-16 recorded that Dong Ha survived 2 artillery attacks without reporting any further injuries.	6 (09-67)
19 Sep	MAG-12 at Chu Lai recorded that Maj Carl F. Bergstrom Jr. assumed duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Maj Dennis R. Bowen.	3 (09-67)
21 Sep	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported that the West runway was re-opened.	10 (09-67)
23 Sep	MAG-16 recorded 5 separate artillery attacks at Dong Ha. 1 helicopter received minor damage.	6 (09-67)
26 Sep	MAG-16 recorded 2 artillery attacks at Dong Ha, one at 2005 and the other at 2025. No damage was reported.	6 (09-67)
29 Sep	One last artillery attack at Dong Ha during September was recorded by MAG-16 at 0645. 1 helicopter received minor damages.	6 (09-67)
30 Sep	MAG-12 at Chu Lai recorded 26,159 air operations of which 821 were MATCU-67 GCA. Included in this total were 2,069 MAG-13 F-4 ops on the crosswind runway, and 226 F-4 ops on the SATS runway. MAG-16 recorded 23,825 air operations at Phu Bai of which 513 were MATCU-68 GCA. At MMAF MAG-16 recorded 18,135 air operations. At Dong Ha MAG-16 recorded 13,224 air operations of which 166 were MATCU-62 GCA. At Khe Sanh MAG-16 recorded 7,393 air operations of which 204 were MATCU-62 GCA. At Ky Ha MABS-36 recorded 10,101 air operations and 3 aircraft crashes, and at An Hoa MAG-36 recorded 9,252 air operations with no crashes.	3 (09-67) 6 (09-67) 13 (09-67)

Date
October

1967

Reference

	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded the receipt of a TSA-13 to replace damaged equipment, and two TPN-8s to replace the damaged CPN-4. It also notes that the percentage of ERPAL's spare parts for all equipment had dropped due to large amount of parts used and a lack of funds to re-order needed parts. MATCU-62 now has 7 officers and 69 enlisted men available for duty at both Dong Ha and Khe Sanh.	15 (10-67)
	MATCU-62 again reported that 1stLt William Flahive had been assigned duty as OIC at Khe Sanh.	15 (10-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai has 7 officers at 70 enlisted men available for duty at MMAF and Phu Bai. It also recorded a continuing lack of funds to order needed parts.	18 (10-67)
16 Oct	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha and Khe Sanh are transferred to MAG-36, which has moved to Phu Bai. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai and again at An Hoa is also assigned to MAG-36. MAG-16 now operates MMAF without direct ATC support.	15 (10-67)
19 Oct	At Phu Bai MATCU-68 recorded that Capt William C. Joiner assumed duties as OIC from 1stLt Charles H. Bodmer.	18 (10-67)
20 Oct	MATCU-70A under the command of Captain Patrick M. Prout arrives at Phu Bai. The unit has been ordered TAD to South Vietnam by CG, FMFPAC from MACS-2 at MCAF Kaneohe, Hawaii.	2 (10-67)
21 Oct	1stMAW records the completion of a 3,500-foot runway at Quang Tri.	2 (10-67)
23 Oct	1stMAW records the official opening of the new airfield at Quang Tri.	2 (10-67)
24 Oct	1stMAW recorded that MATCU-70A is air lifted to Quang Tri from Phu Bai. MATCU-70A is also assigned for duty to MAG-36.	2 (10-67)
29 Oct	MAG-16 recorded a single artillery attack at Dong Ha that badly injures one Marine.	6 (10-67)
31 Oct	1stMAW CEO requested an MRN-21 TACAN from FMFPAC for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to use on Channel 50.	2 (10-67)
	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded 30,719 air operations of which 1296 were MATCU-67 GCA.	3 (10-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 21,561 air operations of which 618 were GCA. AT MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 17,971 air operations.	18 (10-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 15,881 air operations of which 184 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 recorded 7,252 of which 272 were GCA.	15 (10-67)
	MABS-36 recorded 10,774 air operations at Ky Ha before transferring to Phu Bai.	13 (10-67)
	<i>(No report on An Hoa is made by any reporting agency.)</i>	

Date	1967	Reference
November	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported a minimum construction list for Quang Tri was prepared for 1stMAW and III MAF approval. MAG-36 reported the tower and MATCU facilities operational and that by month end there was sufficient living space for flight crews.	7 (11-67)
	1stMAW reported that an unknown A-6 experienced a malfunction of a multiple ejector rack and inadvertently dropped a 500-pound "Snake Eye" bomb on the Phu Bai parking mat. A VMO-6 UH-1 received substantial damage, but no one was injured.	2 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the following equipment in use: TSA-13 (Pri), GRC-99 (Sec); CPN-4 (Pri) TSQ-18 (Sec); 3 TRN-14 TACANs.	15 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh reported the following equipment in use: GRC-99: TPN-8 (Pri), FPN-36 (Sec).	15 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the following equipment deadlined awaiting parts: at Khe Sanh a TPN-8 and FPN-36: At Dong Ha a TRN-14 and an APA-125 radar indicator.	15 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha noted that the TACAN at Khe Sanh was maintained by the Air Force as well as the radio beacon.	15 (11-67)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported having 8 officers and 64 enlisted men available for duty, but noted that a shortage of both technicians and controllers had forced a two-crew schedule.	18 (11-67)
	(See monographs from Patrick M. Prout and Ed LeBaron about Quang Tri, and from Lonnie Darr about Khe Sanh. Lonnie Darr also contributed photographs from Khe Sanh. Daniel Chase contributed photographs from Dong Ha of this period.)	
6 Nov	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported combining the Base Operations sections of both MAG-13 and MAG-12 into a single combined operation at West Field. The old control tower was remodeled into a weather observation site.	4 (11-67)
15 Nov	1stMAW CEO published MATCU Personnel Status Report.	2 (11-67)
16 Nov	1stMAW CEO published MATCU Equipment report.	2 (11-67)
22 Nov	1 st MAW CEO requested MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to ship 2 URN-5 radio beacons to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai.	2 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported a satisfactory flight check on TPN-8 SERNO B-51, but then noted that the equipment was deadlined on the 29 th awaiting parts.	15 (11-67)
29 Nov	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded a satisfactory flight check on TPN-8 SERNO B-99.	15 (11-67)
30 Nov	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded 31,647 air operations of which 1,264 were MATCU-67 GCA.	3 (11-67)

Date	1967	Reference
November		
30 Nov	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 13,883 air operations of which 553 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 16,040 air operations.	18 (11-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 9,752 air operations of which 161 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 reported 5,577 air operations of which 231 were GCA.	15 (11-67)
	MABS-36 at Phu Bai reported 3,509 air operations at Quang Tri.	13 (11-67)
	<i>(No agency reported for An Hoa.)</i>	
December		
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported that Bob Hope visited with his Christmas Show.	4 (12-67)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the CPN-4 awaiting disposition instructions, and all TRN-14s are deadlined.	15 (12-67)
21 Dec	Capt Robert J. Puskar assumed duties as OIC MATCU-62 at Dong Ha from Capt Richard W. D'Ambrosio.	15 (12-67)
31 Dec	1stMAW CEO requested frequency and identifier for LF RBN at Phu Bai.	2 (12-67)
	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai reported 30,209 air operations of which 2,213 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 10,908 air operations of which 789 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 reported 17,536 air operations. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 10,887 air operations of which 266 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 reported 6,789 air operations of which 149 were GCA. Only 170 operations at both Dong Ha and Khe Sanh were VFR. MABS-16 reported 1,330 air operations at An Hoa. MABS-36 recorded 15,947 air operations at Quang Tri. MACS-2 reported MATCU-70A at Quang Tri had conducted 404 GCA approaches of which 102 were IFR. This was a cumulative total since 20 October.	3 (12-67) 18 (12-67) 15 (12-67) 12 (12-67) 13 (12-67) 33 (12-67)
	<i>At year-end almost 500,000 U. S. troops serve in South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 683)
	<i>(As 1967 ends MATCU-67 remains fully involved with the support of MAG-12, and MAG-13 at MCAS Chu Lai. Ky Ha has been turned over to the U. S. Army. Operational control over MATCU-68 at Phu Bai, MATCU-62 at Dong Ha and Khe Sanh, and MATCU-70A at Quang Tri rests with MAG-36. MAG-16 continues to operate from MMAF and An Hoa without official ATC support, but remnants of MATCU-68 are making things work. All MATCUs appear to be under funded for spare parts, and are making do as best they can with what equipment they have still working. Tet and the siege at Khe Sanh loom in the wings, waiting eagerly to take center stage.)</i>	

Date	1968	Reference
January	MAG-13 reported installing a new rotating beacon on top of the H&MS-13 hangar. It identifies MCAS Chu Lai as a military land airport with its alternating green and split white beams.	4 (01-68)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that every SNCO controller except one would rotate to CONUS before the end of May. It also reported that it was in the processes of installing GCA radar at MMAF, but that the lack of controllers and technicians would cause problems in trying to maintain and operate the equipment.	18 (01-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported reconstruction of the runway as in progress, and the completion of a pad for the GCA unit. It confirmed that MATCU-68 had installed a GCA unit, but that landlines to DaNang needed to be installed, and the unit needed to be flight checked. MABS-16 also noted that they had no personnel to operate the GCA unit.	12 (01-68)
	1stMAW comments that during January DaNang was attacked on two occasions. It also noted that Chu Lai, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai were also subject to rocket and mortar attacks.	2 (01-68)
6 Jan	1stMAW CEO requests guidance from NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ on the repair of TRN-14s SERNO 10, 11 and 13. Failures caused by deterioration of major components due to extreme environmental conditions.	2 (01-68)
7 Jan	1stMAW CEO requested another TACAN channel for Chu Lai TACAN, and identifies a program implemented in SE Asia that restricts shore stations to high band TACAN channels. Channel 99 has been assigned to replace the Chu Lai TACAN previous channel of 50. Channel 99 is not compatible with the antenna configuration of the TRN-21 TACAN in use so another channel is requested.	2 (01-68)
11 Jan	1stMAW CEO notified OIC MATCU-70A at Quang Tri that the LF RBN is assigned a frequency of 327 KHz and an ID of QKR. He asks to be notified when LF RBN is certified reliable.	2 (01-68)
14 Jan	1stMAW CEO issued a list of MATCU equipment, and identified the CPN-4 as the primary GCA radar at Chu Lai.	2 (01-68)
17 Jan	1stMAW CEO requested a modification of the Ground Electronics Equipment Allowance that replaces the GRC-99 with the TRC-131.	2 (01-68)
	(See these documents in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
21 Jan	The siege at Khe Sanh begins with an artillery barrage that ignites secondary explosions from an ASP that scatters un-exploded rounds, and floods MATCU area with CS gas.	26 (pg 74)
	<i>At Khe Sanh a Marine A-4 is struck by ground fire while on a bomb-run. The pilot, Capt. Bobby Downing, is forced to eject and his parachute lands just within the perimeter. The entire sequence is filmed by a newsman and is a highlight on American TV.</i>	32 (pg 134)

Date	1968	Reference
January		
23 Jan	At MCAS Chu Lai MAG-12 reported that Major Samuel M. Horton has assumed duties as OIC MATCU-67 from Major Carl F. Bergstrom Jr.	2 (01-68)
24 Jan	1stMAW recorded that approximately 115 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire hit Quang Tri. No damage was mentioned.	2 (01-68)
27 Jan	1stMAW recorded Quang Tri hit by 70 122mm rockets.	2 (01-68)
29 Jan	MAG-36 recorded 50 mortar bombs striking the Quang Tri Airfield.	7 (01-68)
30 Jan	1stMAW reported 51 82mm mortar rounds fired at MMAF that resulted in no injuries or damage to MAG-16.	2 (01-68)
31 Jan	<i>The Vietnamese Lunar New Year called TET begins. The NVA and VC begin coordinated assaults throughout South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 684)
	<u>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the death of Captain William Flahive the Officer in Charge of its Khe Sanh Detachment.</u>	18 (01-68)
	MAG-36 recorded that between the 21 st and 31 st that damage to the Khe Sanh airbase included the runway, TACAN, and control tower.	7 (01-68)
	MAG-36 recorded that Phu Bai is hit by a combined mortar and rocket attack.	7 (01-68)
	MAG-36 reported that Quang Tri is again hit by mortar fire damaging the runway and MAG-36 aircraft.	7 (01-68)
	MAG-12 recorded that 48 122mm rockets struck MCAS Chu Lai. The attack caused severe damage to the MAG-12 hangar and other support facilities. 18 MAG-12 aircraft were damaged, 4 that required extensive repair. A C-117 was damaged beyond repair. Only one person was wounded badly enough to be medevaced.	3 (01-68)
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported seven of its officers as casualties due to the 0400 rocket attack. 3 were reported as KIA, and 4 WIA. A single rocket hit their bunker.	4 (01-68)
	In addition to Captain Flahive MATCU-62 reported 1 Marine was MIA, and 3 WIA. No indication was made if these additional casualties were at Dong Ha or Khe Sanh.	18 (01-68)
	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded 36,933 air operations, of which 1,715 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 21,630 air operations, of which 740 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 reported 21,980 air operations. MAG-16 reported 1,818 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU 62 at Dong Ha reported 13,909 air operations, of which 185 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 reported 7,824 air operations, of which 149 were GCA. At Quang Tri MABS-36 reported 15,947 air operations and 1 aircraft accident. No mention is made about MATCU-70A GCA totals.	3 (01-68) 18 (01-68) 6 (01-68) 15 (01-68) 13 (01-68)

Date	1968	Reference
February	<i>(January was a bad month. In February it gets worse. The siege at Khe Sanh continues, and members of the MATCU-62 detachment there have taken refuge in their above ground bunker called "the white elephant". The situation at the other Marine airfields is not as intense as Khe Sanh, but none escape unscathed.)</i>	
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha assigned Captain Richard D'Ambrosio to duty as OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh.	15 (02-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that it is also performing as the Air Field Operations Department at both Dong Ha and Khe Sanh.	15 (02-68)
	Awaiting transportation from Dong Ha are MATCU-62's CPN-4, a FPN-36, and a TSA-11. They were previously damaged and disposition instructions have been received.	15 (02-68)
1 Feb	1stMAW CEO asks MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to ship a TPN-8 to MATCU-62 at Dong Ha. MATCU-62 is to ship a damaged TPN-8 and FPN-36 to MATCU-67 for disposition evaluation.	2 (02-68)
5 Feb	1stMAW reported 2 buildings at Chu Lai destroyed when 16 rockets hit the airfield.	2 (02-68)
6 Feb	1stMAW again reported slight damage and light casualties at Chu Lai when 6 rockets hit the MCAS.	2 (02-68)
7 Feb	MAG-36 at Phu Bai has reported moderate mortar and rocket fire daily since the 1 st . No MAG-36 aircraft are reported damaged.	7 (02-68)
8 Feb	1stMAW CEO reported Khe Sanh GCA out of service after a TPN-8 was hit.	2 (02-68)
9 Feb	1stMAW CEO reported that a repaired TPN-8 transmitter for Khe Sanh was available at Dong Ha, but weather precluded shipment.	2 (02-68)
10 Feb	A Marine KC-130F, BUNO 149813, piloted by CWO Henry Wildfang was hit by ground fire while on approach to Khe Sanh. With one engine on fire and their load of fuel bladders ignited the aircraft landed and was consumed by flame when the fuel bladders exploded. The pilot and co-pilot, who exited through the cockpit windows, were the only survivors.	32 (pg 134)
	<i>(The burning KC-130F has made an appearance in most every film documentary of the Khe Sanh siege. In some of the shots, backlit by the flames is a single member of MATCU-62. He is helmeted, wears a flak jacket and stands, on duty, in the TRC-131.)</i>	
	Reports from the 1stMAW CEO indicate the TPN-8 from MATCU-67 at Chu Lai has arrived at Khe Sanh along with two technicians. Necessary cables were missing. The TPN-8 transmitter repaired at Dong Ha also arrived, but failed.	2 (02-68)
11 Feb	1stMAW CEO reported that the surveillance portion of a TPN-8 at Khe Sanh was working, but the PAR cursor was still bad.	2 (02-68)

Date
February

1968

Reference

Date	Description	Reference
12 Feb	1stMAW reported an attempt to intercept two unidentified aircraft north of Dong Ha.	2 (02-68)
	1stMAW CEO recorded Khe Sanh GCA operating on low power and not flight checked. Pilots accepting guidance reported accurate approaches.	2 (02-68)
13 Feb	1stMAW CEO reported Khe Sanh GCA officially up following successful flight check.	2 (02-68)
14 Feb	1stMAW reported MCAS Chu Lai struck by 12 rockets. One Marine was reported WIA.	2 (02-68)
19 Feb	1stMAW CEO recorded Khe Sanh GCA had taken a direct hit on its GRC-99. The TPN-8 cabling system was destroyed, and the unit is not functional. The TRC-131 also there received some shrapnel damage, but its components still work.	2 (02-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha intentionally placed its TPN-8s in a down status so as to scavenge needed parts for Khe Sanh.	2 (02-68)
20 Feb	1stMAW CEO notified MATCU-70A at Quang Tri to operate its LF RBN of 327 KHz with an ID of "XB". MATCU-62 at Dong Ha is to operate its LF RBN on 267 KHz with an ID of "IE".	2 (02-68)
21 Feb	1stMAW CEO recorded that MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh was back in operation. Bad weather had delayed delivery of replacement parts and technicians.	2 (02-68)
22 Feb	Khe Sanh reported 270 enemy rounds hit between 1200 and 1700.	26 (pg 262)
23 Feb	Khe Sanh reported 1,407 enemy rounds hit during the day.	26 (pg 271)
24 Feb	1stMAW reported implementation of its Operation Plan 3-68. This plan integrated helicopter resupply to the Khe Sanh Combat Base with coordinated attacks from 1stMAW A-4s and 26 th Marines supporting fire. The plan was also known as "The Super Gaggles".	2 (02-68)
	1stMAW reported An Hoa hit by mortar attack with limited damage.	2 (02-68))
25 Feb	Khe Sanh recorded 1,200 enemy rounds hit during the day.	26 (pg 295)
	1stMAW reported MMAF hit by rocket attack that damaged 6 UH-1s.	2 (02-68)
	<i>American and South Vietnamese forces recapture the city of Hue after 25 days of house to house fighting.</i>	25 (pg 684)
27 Feb	1stMAW reported that two NVAF AN-2 type aircraft were headed to Khe Sanh. USAF F-100s attempted an unsuccessful intercept.	2 (02-68)
29 Feb	1stMAW reported that since the inception of Op Plan 3-68 on the 24 th no helicopters or strong point resupply missions in and around Khe Sanh had been lost to enemy fire.	2 (02-68)

Date	1968	Reference
February	<p><u>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha in its February Command Chronology recorded 10 of its Marines as WIA. In the February OPNAV 3721 report by MATCU-62 these Marines are identified further. The following named Marines were WIA and returned to duty: SSgt W. P. Greek, SSgt J. S. Harvey, Sgt J. W. Albin, Sgt R. J. Dale, and Sgt W. H Linnemeier. The following Marines were WIA and required hospitalization in Japan: 1stLt A. R. Shaw, SSgt P. J. Bywater, SSgt W. J. Zukowski, and Sgt A. W. Covey Jr. Sgt D. H. McClure and Sgt R. H. Waters were medevaced after being wounded, but at the time of the report MATCU-62 had no information on their condition.</u></p>	15 (02-68)
	<p>In the same OPNAV report MATCU-62 lists 9 major pieces of equipment either damaged or destroyed during the month. Following the list is the verbatim statement "Outside of that, we're all OK!"</p>	28 (02-68)
	<p>(See this OPNAV report in the OPNAV Reports appendix.)</p>	
29 Feb	<p>MAG-12 reported 33,366 air operations at MCAS Chu Lai, of which 1,552 were GCA by MATCU-67. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 23,494 air operations of which 798 were GCA. MATCU-68 also reported that 22,265 air operations were recorded at MMAF. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 1,150 air operations at An Hoa. MABS-36 recorded 15,948 air operations at Quang Tri, without mentioning MATCU-70A GCA. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 13,037 air operations, of which 530 were GCA. At Khe Sanh, in spite of the siege, MATCU-62 recorded 4,936 air operations, of which 431 were GCA.</p>	3 (02-68) 18 (02-68) 12 (02-68) 13 (02-68) 15 (02-68)
	<p>(See the monographs that mention this period by Richard D'Ambrosio, Lonnie Darr, Roger Irons, and Rick Rasmussen. See also the MATCA Hotline articles by Lacey Causey and Lonnie Darr. See the photographs submitted by Daniel Chase and Lonnie Darr.)</p>	
March	<p>In responding to four previous rocket attacks on MCAS Chu Lai MAG-13 requests that Chu Lai tower notify the MCAS ODO whenever it sights rocket trails lifting off at night.</p>	4 (03-68)
	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai noted that incoming rounds at Khe Sanh decreased significantly during the month, and that Quang Tri was attacked twice with only slight damage resulting.</p>	7 (03-68)
	<p>(No command chronology was recorded for MATCU-62 for either March or April of 1968.)</p>	
	<p>MATCU-68 at Phu Bai again reported a shortage of personnel necessitated a port and starboard crew schedule.</p>	18 (03-68)
	<p>MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported being host to ten World Airways Boeing 707s, and indicates that additional World Airways aircraft will use the Chu Lai facilities.</p>	10 (03-68)
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported that all that was needed for its GCA to become operational is enough controllers and technicians to operate the unit 24 x 7, and to connect "RAPCON" lines to Da Nang AB.</p>	12 (03-68)

Date	1968	Reference
March	MABS-16 defined the control tower section at An Hoa as two tower controllers and one radio technician.	12 (03-68)
1 Mar	<i>A mortar round hit an Air Force C-123 taking off at Khe Sanh at lift off. The pilot put the aircraft back on the runway, but it veered off, crashed, and started to burn. All aboard the aircraft escaped, but six were injured.</i>	32 (pg 139)
	Khe Sanh tower reported that after the C-123 crashed additional incoming was directed at the crash site that resulted in 15 additional WIA that included 4 Marines from 1stMAW.	31 (01-03-68)
	1stMAW CEO requested that CG FMFPAC configure a MRN-21 TACAN for channel 74 and ship to MCAS Chu Lai.	2 (03-68)
2 Mar	<i>At Phu Bai an Air Force C-130 crashed in a night landing accident. The crew escaped without injury, but 6 passengers were killed.</i>	32 (pg 139)
	1stMAW CEO issues MATCU Personnel Status Report noting serious deficiencies in 67xx and 13xx fields.	2 (03-68)
	1stMAW CEO requests CG FMFPAC replace the TSQ-18 at Phu Bai with a TSQ-18A that has a surveillance extension. The request is based on the 100% increase in the volume of aircraft receiving approach control service at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai.	2 (03-68)
	1stMAW CEO requested additional landline circuits for the Northern I Corps airfields. This addresses long-standing failures, and problems coordinating air traffic data.	2 (03-68)
	1stMAW CEO cancelled CG FMFPAC plans to construct permanent control towers at Ky Ha and Phu Bai. Marine assets no longer support Ky Ha, and Phu Bai has the existing civil tower.	2 (03-68)
3 Mar	Khe Sanh tower recorded that after a conference on suppressive fires for transport aircraft "Whale Hellfire" procedures were set in place.	31 (03-03-68)
	MABS-16 reported An Hoa under heavy mortar attack. No Marine casualties were reported	12 (03-68)
5 Mar	Khe Sanh tower recorded large mortar attack at 1515 that resulted in 5 WIA, of which 3 required medical evacuations. A note appended to the log requests that MATCU-62 must be beefed up number wise to provide replacements.	31 (05-03-68)
6 Mar	<i>At Khe Sanh an Air Force C-123 was hit by ground fire while on approach. The pilot elected to go-around on the first approach because a VNAF light aircraft was obstructing the runway. While in the pattern the C-123 was again hit by ground fire. With one engine out the pilot reported his intentions to return to DaNang. The aircraft crashed 1 mile southeast of Khe Sanh killing all on board. The passenger list included 44 Marines and 1 civilian photographer.</i>	32 (pg 140)

Date	1968	Reference
March		
6 Mar	1stMAW CEO requested that MATCU-67 transfer temporary custody of a TRN-14 TACAN to MACS-4. Spare parts and test equipment are to accompany a courier who will assist in installation.	2 (03-68)
7 Mar	<i>At Khe Sanh a taxiing Air Force C-123 was hit by mortar fire. Once it stopped taxiing and was evacuated it was again hit by mortar fire and destroyed.</i>	32 (pg 140)
	1stMAW CEO requested TACAN channel assignment for the MCAS-4 TACAN. The TACAN is to be installed on Monkey Mountain to provide navigation assistance for low flying aircraft.	2 (03-68)
	1stMAW CEO identified MATCU-67 at MCAS Chu Lai as a depot repair site and requests an increase in the manning level of technicians.	2 (03-68)
	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum identifying specific deficiencies in the manning levels of MATCUs.	2 (03-68)
11 Mar	1stMAW CEO issued agenda items for a training conference. In this document he identifies a need for better training of 6713s and 2851s. He states that average in country training time for approach controllers is 9 months, and that the workload of qualified approach controllers at Chu Lai and Phu Bai may exceed the limits of safety.	2 (03-68)
	See the above documents in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
13 Mar	1stMAW CEO ordered 1 radar technician, MOS 5951, from both MATCU-70A at Quang Tri and MATCU-62 at Dong Ha to duty at Khe Sanh. Two MATCU-62 PU-344 generators are also ordered shipped from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh.	2 (03-68)
14 Mar	Khe Sanh tower logged Khe Sanh GCA out of service all day and noted the non-availability of a radar technician. Khe San GCA does not return to service until 2000 on the 15 th .	31 (14-03-68)
16 Mar	<i>General Creighton Abrams assumes duty as Commander, USMACV replacing General William Westmoreland who has been appointed Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army.</i>	25 (pg 684)
17 Mar	Khe Sanh tower reported receiving sniper fire at 0900.	31 (17-03-68)
19 Mar	Khe Sanh tower logged the sniper as still active and reported the shower dinged.	31 (17-03-68)
20 Mar	Captain Richard D'Ambrosio, OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh, is medevaced.	
23 Mar	1stMAW CEO identified frequencies in use at Phu Bai and Quang Tri.	2 (03-68)
25 Mar	Khe Sanh tower reported an 82mm recoilless rifle round had made a direct hit on a PU-344 generator.	31 (25-03-68)

Date	1968	Reference
March		
26 Mar	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported moderate rocket and mortar fire resulting in limited damage to aircraft and 14 Marines WIA.	7 (03-68)
27 Mar	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum on the problems associated with the replacement of MATCU-70A at Quang Tri. MATCU-66 is unable to deploy from MCAF Futenma because of commitments to support the MCAF. In the same manner MATCU-60 cannot deploy from MCAS Iwakuni, plus MATCU-60 is dedicated to pending developments in Korea. MCAF Futenma is requested to advance the completion date of a self-sufficient ATC Department, and a new MATCU complete with personnel and equipment is to be formed in CONUS. (See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (03-68)
28 Mar	1stLt Daniel Chase assumes duty as OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh.	31 (28-03-68)
31 Mar	<i>U. S. President, Lyndon B. Johnson, announces that he will not seek re-election.</i>	25 (pg 684)
	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded 40,084 air operations, of which 1,615 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 31,261 air operations, of which 1,006 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 23,974 air operations. MABS-16 recorded 1,723 air operations at An Hoa. MABS-36 recorded 15,531 air operations at Dong Ha and 36,371 air operations at Quang Tri. MABS-36 did not record GCA by either MATCU-62 at Dong Ha or MATCU-70A at Quang Tri. MATCU-62s Khe Sanh tower recorded 1,682 air operations, but did not record GCA.	2 (03-68) 18 (03-68) 12 (03-68) 13 (03-68) 31 (03-68)
April		
	<i>[MATCU-62 at Dong Ha did not report a command chronology for the April 1968 time period.]</i>	
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai continued to have a personnel shortage and remained on a two-crew schedule. 1 un-named member of the unit was reported as a casualty. They recorded 8 officers and 61 men available for duty.	18 (04-68)
2 Apr	Khe Sanh tower logged a continuing problem with snipers.	31 (02-04-68)
4 Apr	1stMAW CEO replied to a request from the 7 th Air Force and agreed to replace the AF NAVIDS at Phu Bai and Dong Ha with Marine assets, but declined to replace the NAVIDS at Khe Sanh because the equipment was unavailable.	2 (04-68)
6 Apr	Khe Sanh tower logged the arrival of ARVN units, and with the end of the siege an increase in the tempo of operations.	31 (06-04-68)
8 Apr	<i>Delta Co, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, U.S. Army recorded as first U. S. force to open Highway 9 to Khe Sanh.</i>	26 (pg 401)
9 Apr	Khe Sanh tower recorded 642 daily air operations, a significant increase, in spite of a rocket attack that set an ASP on fire.	31 (09-04-68)

Date	1968	Reference
April		
10 Apr	1stMAW CEO ordered the following personnel transferred from MATCU-62 to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai: Capt G. H. Brandt Jr., MSgt D. H. Badger, Sgt L. L. Darr, Sgt J. T. Edwards, and Sgt W. W. Woodruff.	2 (04-68)
13 Apr	<i>An AF C-130 landing at Khe Sanh lost an engine on final. No hostile fire was involved. On landing the aircraft left the runway striking stacked cargo and equipment and was damaged beyond repair. The crew survived and there were no passengers.</i>	32 (pg 145)
14 Apr	Khe Sanh tower reported that 1stLt D. D. Chase and Sgt R. E. Powell as WIA.	31 (14-04-68)
15 Apr	1stMAW CEO reported TRC-131 at Khe Sanh damaged by enemy action but was repairable. He then requested MATCU-68 at Phu Bai to ship replacement TRC-131 to Khe Sanh.	2 (04-68)
	Khe Sanh tower logged 1stLt D. D. Chase medevaced. 1stLt K. R. Hand assumed duties as OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh.	31 (15-04-68)
	MATCU-66A under the command of Capt H. Lacey Causey reported to MAG-36 at Quang Tri with 3 officers and 36 enlisted men available for duty.	16 (04-68)
16 Apr	MAG-36 transfers MATCU-66A and MATCU-70A at Quang Tri to the control of the newly formed ProvMAG-39.	7 (04-68)
	1stMAW CEO asks CG FMFPAC for permission to retain MATCU-70A personnel and equipment at Quang Tri.	2 (04-68)
	Khe Sanh tower reported that 1stLt D. D. Chase had been returned to duty as OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh.	31 (16-04-68)
	Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-39 formed at Quang Tri.	14 (04-68)
17 Apr	1stMAW reported 26 rockets fired at Quang Tri airfield.	2 (04-68)
18 Apr	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum on plans to upgrade communications in the permanent towers at MCAS Chu Lai and at Phu Bai and MMAF.	2 (04-68)
	1stMAW again reports Quang Tri airfield under rocket attack.	2 (04-68)
19 Apr	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri reported that detachments from MCAS El Toro and MCAS Yuma had augmented their on-board strength.	16 (04-68)
20 Apr	MATCU-66A assumed operational control of Quang Tri airfield from MATCU-70A.	16 (04-68)
	1stMAW reported that before the end of the month MATCU-70A had returned to MACS-2 at MCAS Kaneohe. How much equipment and personnel had been left behind was not discussed.	2 (04-68)

Date	1968	Reference
April		
30 Apr	MAG-12 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded 40,446 air operations, of which 1,348 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 25,096 air operations, of which 911 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 23,110 air operations. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 2,077 air operations at An Hoa. No report on operations at Dong Ha or Quang Tri was made by MATCU-62, MAG-36, or MAG-39. Khe Sanh tower logged a busy 9,063 air operations, but MATCU-62 GCA at Khe Sanh is not reported.	3 (04-68) 18 (04-68) 12 (04-68) 31 (04-68)
May		
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri reported Sgt M. M. Edwards medevaced, leaving the unit with only 1 MOS 5951 technician. Their lack of spare parts continues to plague them. They have constructed two new bunkers and a recreation tent. An SOP is in a rough state and all instrument approaches have been reviewed.	16 (05-68)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai continues to report a two-crew requirement due to a shortage of personnel.	18 (05-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa was on 100% alert through most of the month. When on 100% alert the MABS-16 detachment provided 8 Marines for the reaction platoon. In addition, each night 3 Marines manned a perimeter bunker from 1800 until 0600. MABS-16 identified the control tower section at An Hoa as Sgt J. M. Johnson a 2851 radio tech, and the two controllers as Cpl S. E. Alexander and Cpl L. L. Sullivan.	12 (05-68)
2 May	Khe Sanh tower reported barbed wire across the runway causing one aircraft to wait while the wire was cleared. This was the first day barbed wire was noted across the runway, but it would continue to be a problem for the rest of the month.	31 (02-05-68)
	1stMAW CEO scheduled the arrival of new TSQ-18A systems to MATCU-67, MATCU-66A, and MATCU-62.	2 (05-68)
4 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming.	31 (04-05-68)
5 May	<i>(This date denotes the beginning of the "mini TET" period.)</i>	
	Khe Sanh tower recorded incoming in early morning.	31 (05-05-68)
	MAG-13 reported MCAS Chu Lai being hit by 36 rockets.	4 (05-68)
	MAG-16 reported 41 82mm mortar rounds struck MMAF.	6 (05-68)
	MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported an enemy rocket attack that destroyed 1 CH-46, and damaged 4 other CH-46s, and 1 UH-1. Three Marines were WIA and the CH-46 availability severely affected.	8 (05-68)
6 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded incoming in the early evening and the GCA unit out of service for two hours in the morning.	31 (06-05-68)
7 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded numerous rockets striking the airfield.	31 (07-05-68)

Date	1968	Reference
May		
8 May	<p>MATCU-67 at MCAS Chu Lai recorded that at 1735 a direct hit from hostile rocket fire destroyed all three shelters of the TSQ-18A. Of the Marines on duty in the shelters at the time Cpl J. E. Lott was KIA, SSgt J. M. Call was WIA and medevaced to USNH Yokosuka, Japan, Cpl R. A. Smart was WIA and medevaced to Cam Rahn Bay, SSgt J. F. Rush and Sgt J. W. Peterik were WIA, but able to return to duty.</p>	29
	<p>In order to continue to provide necessary services technicians mated two TSN-1 shelters to the CPN-4 operations van. The removal of a workbench allowed a spare APA-125 indicator to be jury-rigged to provide an approach control capability.</p>	29
	<p>(See the MATCU-67 OPNAV 3721 Report for May 1968 in the OPNAV Reports appendix, and read the monographs and Hotline articles by Boyd Murdock, John Rush, Martin Hendrix, Chris Reed, and John Call.)</p>	
	<p>MAG-12 at Chu Lai also reported the 1735 rocket attack. It listed only one additional Marine WIA that was not a member of MATCU-67.</p>	3 (05-68)
9 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower logged an incoming artillery attack, and that the GCA unit was out of service for a few hours.</p>	31 (09-05-68)
10 May	<p>1stMAW CEO attempted to schedule replacement equipment for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai from MMAF and CG FMFPAC.</p>	2 (05-68)
11 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower logged an incoming artillery attack that lasted all day.</p>	31 (11-05-68)
	<p>MAG-13 recorded another rocket attack at Chu Lai.</p>	4 (05-68)
	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai recorded the airburst of two "friendly" artillery rounds that damaged one building.</p>	7 (05-68)
12 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming.</p>	31 (05-68)
	<p>MAG-16 at MMAF recorded 20 122mm rockets struck the airfield.</p>	6 (05-68)
	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that CatKiller 42, an Army O-1 landed on Runway 25 without its right main landing gear. The pilot and observer escaped injury.</p>	15 (05-68)
13 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower recorded incoming artillery attack.</p>	31 (13-05-68)
14 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower recorded incoming artillery attack.</p>	31 (14-05-68)
	<p>MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported a rocket attack that resulted in 2 Marines KIA, and 15 WIA.</p>	4 (05-68)
15 May	<p>Khe Sanh tower logged an all day rocket and artillery attack. The GCA unit was out of service in the morning. The ITT Gilfillian TECH REP Mr. Terry flew in and out.</p>	31 (15-05-68)
	<p>MAG-39 reported the crash of an AF C-130 on Runway17 at Quang Tri. The aircraft lost a wing and burst into flames.</p>	14 (05-68)

Date	1968	Reference
May		
15 May	<u>MATCU-66A reported the loss of a TPN-8 and a TRC-131 when the AF C-130 skidded through their GCA site. No injuries to MATCU-66A personnel were reported.</u>	16 (05-68)
16 May	Khe Sanh tower logged sporadic incoming and a successful flight check of a GCA TPN-8.	31 (16-05-68)
17 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming artillery. 1stMAW CEO requested replacement of damaged MATCU-66A equipment from CG FMFPAC. (See the monographs by Lacey Causey and Gary Lewis about this period at Quang Tri.)	31 (17-05-68) 2 (05-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the crash of Swift 52, a CH-46 that overturned in the fuel pits.	15 (05-68)
18 May	Khe Sanh tower logged only 5 rounds of incoming artillery fire.	31 (18-05-68)
19 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming, and noted a warning of full-scale attack. Fighting holes were manned all night.	31 (19-05-68)
20 May	Khe Sanh tower logged noontime artillery attack. MAG-16 at MMAF recorded 31 82mm mortar rounds struck airfield.	31 (20-05-68) 6 (05-68)
21 May	Khe Sanh tower reported 1stLt R. W. Norton assumed duty as OIC MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh from 1stLt D. D. Chase. No incoming was recorded.	31 (21-05-68)
22 May	MAG-16 at MMAF recorded 20 82mm mortar rounds struck airfield. MABS-16 reported the windows of the MMAF control tower blown out during attack.	6 (05-68) 12 (05-68)
23 May	Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming in the morning. MAG-13 at Chu Lai recorded a rocket attack that destroyed the MAG-13 PX, and damaged 9 aircraft.	31 (23-05-68) 4 (05-68)
24 May	Khe Sanh tower logged another day of sporadic incoming. 1stMAW CEO scheduled the replacement and overhaul of MATCU NAVAIDS.	31 (24-05-68) 2 (05-68)
26 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai recorded another rocket attack on the airfield. MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported 52 82mm mortar rounds hitting the airfield. A direct hit on the SATS hangar resulted in 3 Marines KIA and 31 WIA. 1stMAW reported a rocket attack at Quang Tri.	4 (05-68) 7 (05-68) 2 (05-68)

Date	1968	Reference
May		
27 May	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported Sgt T. E. Hood WIA while controlling traffic in the tower during an artillery attack. He was medevaced.	15 (05-68)
28 May	Khe Sanh tower reported incoming all day. Crash crew put out a fire in stacked ammo at the west turnaround.	31 (28-05-68)
31 May	During the month of May MABS-16 at MMAF reported the runway matting at An Hoa breaking apart and being welded back together to sustain operations. Also noted was a problem with the ARC-27 radios in the control tower constantly being out of service due to heat, and dust fouling the blower motors.	12 (05-68)
	MAG-12 recorded 44,920 air operations at Chu Lai, of which 763 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 32,360 air operations, of which 293 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 28,557 air operations at MMAF, and 3,184 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 23,299 air operations, of which 68 were GCA. At Khe Sanh MATCU-62 recorded 5,999 air operations, of which 7 were GCA. MAG-39 at Quang Tri recorded 26,177 air operations, of which 132 were MATCU-66A GCA.	3 (05-68) 18 (05-68) 12 (05-68) 15 (05-68) 8 (05-68)
June		
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported that MATCU-67 averaged 1,508 daily air operations during the month of June. MAG-13 also notes that total operations by MATCU-67 since June of 1965 were 825,079.	4 (06-68)
	During the month of June MAG-36 at Phu Bai, during the hours of darkness, maintained an airborne "Mortar Watch" over the Phu Bai Airfield. No enemy attacks on Phu Bai were recorded in June.	7 (06-68)
	MAG-39 at Quang Tri recorded the tempo of operations in the Khe Sanh area continued with many NVA contacts. Preparation for the evacuation of the Khe Sanh combat base was made and everything that could be used by the enemy was flown to LZ Stud.	8 (06-68)
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri reported continued 60 Hz generator problems, and that a concrete pad for its new TSQ-18A was poured.	16 (06-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported taking a step back in its plans for a GCA site. Loaning critical parts for the FPN-36 to Chu Lai has placed the project on hold until the parts are returned. No landlines have yet been laid to DaNang, and no personnel are available to man the site.	12 (06-68)
1 Jun	Khe Sanh tower logged incoming in the morning.	31 (01-06-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that Capt P. D. Haynes assumed the duty as OIC MATCU-62 from Capt R. J. Puskar.	15 (06-68)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai under the operational control of MAG-36 reported assigning 1stLt Jerry W. Ford to duty as OIC of a detachment at MMAF, which is under the operational control of MAG-16. 1stLt Daniel B. Dorn is the Assistant OIC at MMAF.	18 (06-68)

Date	1968	Reference
June		
2 Jun	Khe Sanh tower recorded sporadic incoming in the morning.	31 (02-06-68)
4 Jun	MAG-39 reported rocket attack on LZ Stud that destroyed AVGAS tanks and pumps.	8 (06-68)
7 Jun	MAG-39 reported rocket attack that hit an ASP at LZ Stud.	8 (06-68)
9 Jun	Khe Sanh tower recorded no incoming, but reported that an A-4 Sky Hawk landed at 1225 and departed at 1845.	31 (07-06-68)
	MATCU-62 reported Cpl D. L. Taylor promoted to present rank.	15 (06-68)
12 Jun	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported staffing LZ Stud with 5 Marines, 1 TRC-131 control tower, and 1 generator.	15 (06-68)
13 Jun	Khe Sanh tower logged incoming in the morning and that 1stLt Hand and GySgt Dimon had arrived from Dong Ha to help with radio repair.	31 (13-06-68)
14 Jun	Khe Sanh recorded enough incoming that AF C-130s were discouraged from a landing attempt.	31 (14-06-68)
	1stMAW CEO reported to CG FMFPAC that the TRC-131 damaged, but repairable, at Khe Sanh was further damaged in shipment to Dong Ha. It is now damaged beyond the repair capability of MATCU-62.	2 (06-68)
15 Jun	Khe Sanh tower recorded incoming in the morning.	31 (15-06-68)
	MATCU-66A recorded its OIC at monthly MATCU meeting at 1stMAW.	15 (06-68)
16 Jun	1stMAW CEO lists equipment that was salvaged from the MATCU-67 TSQ-18A that was destroyed in May.	2 (06-68)
	MAG-39 reported that helicopters were spotted on radar resupplying NVA artillery positions along the DMZ.	8 (06-68)
18 Jun	Khe Sanh tower notified to prepare to be re-deployed.	31 (18-06-68)
19 Jun	Khe Sanh tower logged incoming in the afternoon, and that the mount out had commenced	31 (19-06-68)
20 Jun	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported an ASP and fuel dump ignited by enemy ordnance causing the evacuation of MATCU living quarters from 1600 to 2400. No casualties. Medium to heavy concussion damage was dealt to MATCU living quarters. A large amount of unexploded ordnance was scattered about the landing, living, and work areas. Damage assessment and EOD efforts were hindered by darkness. Dong Ha Air Base was closed to fixed wing traffic until daylight.	15 (06-68)
21 Jun	Khe Sanh tower logged Khe Sanh GCA was removed from service.	31 (21-06-68)
	MAG-39 at Quang Tri recorded a rocket attack that failed to damage equipment or personnel.	8 (06-68)

Date	1968	Reference
June		
22 Jun	<p>Khe Sanh tower logged the end of the MATCU-62 Detachment at Khe Sanh.</p> <p><i>Khe Sanh had been under the control of Marine ATC assets since it was first staffed on 1 October 1966.</i></p>	31 (22-06-68)
	<p>1stMAW reported that MGen C. J. Quilter assumed command of 1stMAW from MGen N. J. Anderson.</p>	2 (06-68)
23 Jun	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded that all personnel from its Khe Sanh Detachment had returned to Dong Ha, and that the equipment from Khe Sanh had been staged at LZ Stud to await further transfer.</p>	15 (06-68)
26 Jun	<p>1stMAW CEO requested a VHF (FM) frequency for ATC use at LZ Stud.</p>	2 (06-68)
27 Jun	<p>1stMAW CEO reported to NAVELECSYSCOM on the arrival of the TSQ-18A at Quang Tri.</p>	2 (06-68)
	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded that at a MAG-39 awards ceremony Sgt J. P. Eshleman, Sgt J. G. Kalb, and Cpl L. C. Gaffney were awarded Purple Heart medals. A Bronze Star medal was awarded to Sgt G. J. Larson.</p>	15 (06-68)
	<p>H&MS-39 recorded SSgt T. E. Hood WIA in the control tower at Dong Ha during an artillery attack.</p>	14 (06-68)
	<p><i>(There has to be more to this story. As a Sgt, T. E. Hood was also reported WIA in the Dong Ha control tower on May 27th.)</i></p>	
30 Jun	<p>MAG-12 reported that there were 42,057 air operations at Chu Lai, of which 856 were GCA by MATCU-67. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 30,844 air operations, of which 454 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 26,458 air operations. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 3,402 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 recorded 19,872 air operations at Dong Ha, 4,070 air operations at Khe Sanh, and 3,992 air operations at LZ Stud. MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded 23,000 air operations. Neither MATCU-62 at Dong Ha nor MATCU-66A at Quang Tri reported GCA totals.</p>	<p>3 (06-68)</p> <p>18 (06-68)</p> <p>12 (06-68)</p> <p>15 (06-68)</p> <p>16 (06-68)</p>
July		
	<p>MAG-36 reported that its airborne "Mortar Watch" continued through the month, and that no attacks were recorded at Phu Bai.</p>	7 (07-68)
	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that its operations at LZ Stud were hampered by the failure of aircraft to contact the control tower.</p>	15 (07-68)
	<p>MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded a continued generator problem. It also has a critical need for GCA runs to qualify newly joined personnel. A new letter of agreement with the Air Force RAPCON was presented for comments.</p>	16 (07-68)
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported the completion of ATC letters of agreement between the AB at DaNang and MMAF.</p>	12 (07-68)

Date	1968	Reference
July	MABS-16 at MMAF reported installation of new windsocks and a tetrahedron at MMAF. They also reported the return of the FPN-36 indicators previously loaned to Chu Lai.	12 (07-68)
	At An Hoa MABS-16 reported three and a half days of continuous enemy fire that closed the airfield except for emergencies. Cpl S. E Alexander and LCpl D. A. Ethington were the tower controllers and Cpl R. A. Scott was the radio technician during this month.	12 (07-68)
2 Jul	1stMAW CEO coordinated the replacement of the GRC-99 at An Hoa with a TRC-131 from MATCU-67 at Chu Lai.	2 (07-68)
3 Jul	MAG-16 at MMAF reported a 122mm rocket attack that damaged the runway.	6 (07-68)
4 Jul	1stMAW CEO denied request by MATCU-66 for the return of a TRC-131 on loan to MATCU-62. The TRC-131 was installed and operational at LZ Stud and no other TRC-131 was available from 1stMAW assets.	2 (07-68)
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri reported the new TSQ-18A operational.	16 (07-68)
8 Jul	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum discussing equipment deficiencies at both MMAF and Quang Tri. MMAF needs FPN-36 indicators so that the new GCA site is operational before the monsoon season, and MATCU-66A at Quang Tri needs 60 Hz generators.	2 (07-68)
9 Jul	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported that Maj John R. Behm assumed duties as OIC MATCU-67 from Maj Samuel M. Horton.	3 (07-68)
10 Jul	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded the loss of a TPN-8 during a windstorm. The radar dome was blown into the surveillance antenna which then collapsed the elevation antenna.	16 (07-68)
13 Jul	1stMAW CEO coordinated delivery of new TSQ-18A for MATCU-62 at Dong Ha.	2 (07-68)
15 Jul	1stMAW CEO requested III MAF assign frequency for LF RBN at LZ Stud, and to anticipate a future request for a TACAN channel.	2 (07-68)
16 Jul	1stMAW CEO requests CG FMFPAC to immediately ship a TRN-16 LF RBN to MATCU-62 at Dong Ha for use at LZ Stud.	2 (07-68)
17 Jul	1stMAW CEO issues list of TRC-131 control towers assigned to 1stMAW.	2 (07-68)
19 Jul	1stMAW CEO identifies problems with TRN-16 antennas and requests assistance from NAVELECSYSCOM.	2 (07-68)
21 Jul	1stMAW CEO transfers SSgt A. C. Weaver from MATCU-62 at Dong Ha to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai.	2 (07-68)

Date	1968	Reference
July		
23 Jul	MAG-16 at MMAF recorded 53 82mm mortar rounds fired at airfield.	6 (07-68)
26 Jul	1stMAW CEO requests delay in returning replaced Dong Ha TSQ-18 to NAVELCSYSCOM based on an anticipated need at MATCU-62's Detachment at LZ Stud.	2 (07-68)
30 Jul	1stMAW CEO requests III MAF reassign frequencies for LF RBNs at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Stud. Frequencies assigned interfere with communications systems in use at the bases. Frequencies in the range 400-450 KHz are requested.	2 (07-68)
31 Jul	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 40,404 air operations, of which 1,178 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 37,560 air operations, of which 566 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 26,432 air operations. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 3,906 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 21,704 air operations, but did not record GCA. At LZ Stud MATCU-62 recorded 17,496 air operations. MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded 24,053 air operations, but also did not report GCA.	3 (07-68) 18 (07-68) 12 (07-68) 15 (07-68) 16 (07-68)
August	<i>(The Marine FOB at LZ Stud is renamed LZ Vandegrift. No reason was recorded for dropping the identifiers MCAS and MCAF from the names of some airfields, but that has happened in official correspondence.)</i>	
	MAG-12 reported 4 rocket and mortar attacks at Chu Lai during the month. 4 Marines were WIA.	3 (08-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded having 7 officers and 75 enlisted men available for duty. 7 enlisted Marines are assigned to LZ Vandegrift. MATCU-62 reports dissatisfaction with motor transport assets and support at Dong Ha.	15 (08-68)
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded having 2 officers and 24 enlisted men available for duty. It also reported replacing a TSA-11 with a TSA-13 control tower.	16 (08-68)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded having 10 officers and 74 enlisted men available for duty. They are also staffing the new GCA unit at MMAF, but do not record the number of Marines involved. 1stLt Gerald S. Pahl has replaced 1stLt Daniel B. Dorn as the Assistant OIC at MMAF.	18 (08-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had been attacked 9 times during the month by mortars and small arms. Sgt R. J. Burger and LCpl J. D. Grugan are the tower controllers and LCpl R. P. Vickery is the radio technician in the An Hoa tower.	12 (08-68)
	1stMAW recorded LtCol R. S. Hartman assuming duty as CEO from LtCol K. M. Worley.	2 (08-68)
1 Aug	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum that delineated communications equipment shortages at Phu Bai.	2 (08-68)

Date	1968	Reference
August		
1 Aug	1stMAW CEO reported to NAVAIRSYSCOM that a PU-344 generator, a TSQ-18 mobilizer, and a GRC-99 mobile watchtower were not evacuated from Khe Sanh.	2 (08-68)
12 Aug	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded an inspection tour by the 1stMAW CEO.	15 (08-68)
14 Aug	1stMAW CEO tasked MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to ship a TSN-1 operations shelter to MMAF. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai is to ship a TSN-1 to MATCU-67.	2 (08-68)
15 Aug	1stMAW CEO defines plan to replace 7 th AF NAVAIDS with 1stMAW assets.	2 (08-68)
20 Aug	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded a visit by the MAG-39 small unit inspection team.	15 (08-68)
21 Aug	MAG-16 reported that MGen Fontana and MGen Quilter visited MMAF for a briefing and tour.	6 (08-68)
23 Aug	1stMAW reported minor damage at Chu Lai following rocket attack. The attacks on the 23 rd signal the beginning of the anticipated third NVAVC major assault of the year.	2 (08-68)
	MAG-16 recorded that 17 82mm mortar rounds struck MMAF.	6 (08-68)
	MAG-36 reported 9 122mm rockets struck Phu Bai resulting in minor damage and 3 Marines WIA.	7 (08-68)
	MAG-39 reported 7 or 8 122mm rockets struck Quang Tri resulting in major damage to one aircraft, and minor damage to several aircraft.	8 (08-68)
24 Aug	<i>The National Convention of the Democratic Party took place in Chicago, Illinois, and unruly demonstrators interrupted the convention. The subsequent efforts by the Chicago Police Department to restore order were widely televised.</i>	21 (pg 726)
25 Aug	MATCU-66A now reports 4 officers and 44 enlisted men.	16 (08-68)
26 Aug	MAG-39 reported Dong Ha struck by artillery fire from the DMZ causing minor damage and a small number of casualties.	8 (08-68)
	MAG-16 reported that MMAF was struck by 19 82mm mortar rounds.	6 (08-68)
31 Aug	MAG-12 recorded 34,578 air operations at Chu Lai, of which 1,361 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 30,843 air operations, of which 329 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 28,570 air operations, of which 126 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 7,452 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 15,914 air operations, but again failed to record GCA totals. At LZ Vandegriff MATCU-62 recorded 13,315 air operations. MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded 20,805 air operations, of which 276 were GCA.	3 (08-68) 18 (08-68) 12 (08-68) 15 (08-68) 16 (08-68)

Date	1968	Reference
September	MAG-12 recorded two rocket and mortar attacks at Chu Lai that only caused light damage to defensive positions	3 (09-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported receiving two new TRN-14 TACANs. It also noted that 12 of its 74 Marines were tasked with extraneous duties that made them non-effective to the mission of the MATCU. The MATCU has found no relief from its continuing motor transport problems.	15 (09-68)
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded that two machinegun bunkers and a command bunker had been constructed facing Route 1, and NMCB-11 had completed 6 SEA hootches.	16 (09-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF recorded the Marble Mountain GCA had been flight checked with satisfactory results, and that a MMAF operations manual had been submitted for approval. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 4 separate mortar attacks.	12 (09-68)
4 Sep	MAG-39 reported Typhoon Bess started to effect weather in northern I Corps.	8 (09-68)
6 Sep	MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported sniper fire on the perimeter.	8 (09-68)
7 Sep	MAG-39 reported Typhoon Bess no longer effecting northern I Corps weather. Sniper fire was again reported on the Quang Tri perimeter.	8 (09-68)
18 Sep	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the arrival of the FMFPAC MATCU Contact team.	15 (09-68)
20 Sep	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that operational hours of Vandegrift Tower were extended to 24 hours per day. It also reported that Sgt R. G. Rasmussen had received a Purple Heart Medal at a MAG-39 awards ceremony.	15 (09-68)
	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded the arrival of the FMFPAC MATCU Contact Team.	16 (09-68)
22 Sep	MAG-16 at MMAF reported a rocket and mortar attack that damaged the runway and parking areas at MMAF.	6 (09-68)
	MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported sniper fire on the base perimeter.	8 (09-69)
30 Sep	MAG-12 reported 25,488 air operations at Chu Lai of which 1,591 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 28,191 air operations, of which 705 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 27,186 air operations, of which 203 were GCA. MABS-16 at An Hoa recorded 6,048 air operations. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 10,773 air operations, but failed to total GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 7,648 air operations. MATCU-66A at Quang Tri recorded 20,181 air operations, of which 353 were GCA.	3 (09-68) 18 (09-68) 12 (09-68) 15 (09-68) 16 (09-68)

Date October	1968	Reference
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 1stLt Daniel D. Chase, an ATC officer, had been assigned duty as ROIC of its air base detachment at An Hoa. Sgts L. M. Madson and Sgt R. J. Burger were reported as tower controllers. The tower is missing an aldis lamp and wind indicator, but both have been ordered.	12 (10-68)
1 Oct	1stMAW CEO creates MATCU HF Net on 15016.5 MHz and assigns MATCU-62 as BOSTON BEAN, MATCU-66 as ANTI FREEZE, MATCU-67 as CHOWHOUND, and MATCU-68 as SAGAMORE.	2 (10-68)
5 Oct	1stMAW reported enemy mortar attack at MMAF.	2 (10-68)
6 Oct	1stMAW CEO lists TRC-131 assets that are to be modified with URC-46 radio sets.	2 (10-68)
	1stMAW CEO identifies need for TACAN at An Hoa.	2 (10-68)
7 Oct	1stMAW CEO transferred SSgt C. G. Ivey from MATCU-66 at Quang Tri to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai.	2 (10-68)
	<i>1stMAW reported that two VMFA-323 F-4s were credited with destroying 10 ELEPHANTS and wounding 5 others which were part of an enemy supply convoy.</i>	2 (10-68)
	<i>(I realize that the above entry has nothing to do with ATC, but you have to admit, it's got a place in any history of the war in Vietnam.)</i>	
10 Oct	MATCU-66A at Quang Tri becomes MATCU-62A under the command of Maj H. L. Causey. 1stLt M. Z. Smith becomes OIC MATCU-66 at MCAF Futenma, Okinawa. Maj H. L. Causey assumes duty as OIC MATCU-62 at Dong Ha from Capt P. D. Haynes. At Dong Ha and LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 reported 5 officers and 69 enlisted men available for duty. At Quang Tri MATCU-62A reported 5 officers and 46 enlisted men. MATCU-66 reported 2 officers and 20 enlisted men.	15 (10-68) 16 (10-68)
	<i>(See the monographs by Lacey Causey, Gary Lewis, and Mike Smith and the MATCU-66 Command Chronology in the Significant Documents appendix about this change.)</i>	
12 Oct	1stMAW CEO attempted to establish slot for a 6720 Major ATC officer within the 1stMAW G-3 section.	2 (10-68)
22 Oct	1stMAW CEO directed MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to install an FPN-36 GCA unit at An Hoa.	2 (10-68)
27 Oct	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported Capt Billy K. Gabriel assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 from Capt William C. Joiner.	7 (10-68)
31 Oct	MAG-12 recorded 21,519 air operations and 1,703 GCA at Chu Lai. MATCU-68 recorded 24,426 air operations and 107 GCA at Phu Bai, and 28,389 air operations and 107 GCA at MMAF. At An Hoa MABS-16 recorded 7,107 air operations. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 recorded 12,024 air operations, and 7,648 air operations at LZ Vandegrift. MATCU-62A at Quang Tri had 20,254 ops and 504 GCA.	3 (10-68) 18 (10-68) 12 (10-68) 15 (10-68)

Date	1968	Reference
November	MAG-13 reported Chu Lai under rocket or mortar attack on two separate days. No Damage was recorded. A rocket warning system was installed in the MAG-13 officer living area.	4 (11-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported adjustments to the TACAN Runway 25 approach and implementation of a 4-degree glide path for the Runway 25 PAR approach. 90% of the units personnel armed with M-14s have been re-armed with M-16s. The landline between Dong Ha and Quang Tri Approach (an AF RAPCON) is frequently out of service.	15 (11-68)
	MATCU-62A at Quang Tri reported Major H.L. Causey, Captain S. D. Davis, and Captain E. P. Basher promoted to their present rank. The following personnel are reported on duty at LZ Vandegrift: Capt E. P. Basher, Cpl A. N. Carlson, Cpl R. G. Giesin, and Cpl J. N. Spierings.	15 (11-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had seven separate enemy attacks. The following MATCU-67 personnel are now assigned at An Hoa: Sgt J. P. Redden, Sgt M. Holbrook, Sgt Carl Garden, Sgt L. M. Madson, Sgt R. J. Burger, and Cpl M. D. Joyce.	12 (11-68)
1 Nov	<i>Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States halted all bombing of North Vietnam.</i>	2 (11-68)
	1stMAW CEO reported the Marine TRN-14 TACAN at Phu Bai had failed a flight check delaying transfer of Air Force TACAN.	2 (11-68)
	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum that detailed the process to be used in placing the MATCU-62 TRC-131 at LZ Vandegrift on a raised platform.	2 (11-68)
	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported that 3 122mm rockets hit on a taxiway between the runway and base operations causing minor damage.	7 (11-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported Capt R. W. Norton assigned duty as Assistant OIC.	15 (11-68)
4 Nov	1stMAW CEO scheduled a Radiation Hazard Survey of all MATCU sites.	2 (11-68)
	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported that Capt William E. McCollum assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 from Capt Billy K. Gabriel.	7 (11-68)
5 Nov	<i>Richard M. Nixon defeated Hubert H. Humphrey in the U. S. Presidential Election.</i>	25 (pg 684)
8 Nov	1stMAW CEO directs that a 3051 Corporal be assigned to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai to replace a SNCO technician drawing P-3 proficiency pay who is currently assigned to the billet.	2 (11-68)
15 Nov	1stMAW CEO directed each MATCU to report each month on the number of hours that Approach Control is out of service (Chu Lai only), and the hours that GCA, the Tower, and TACAN are out of service.	2 (11-68)

Date	1968	Reference
November		
20 Nov	1stMAW CEO reported that TACAN Channel 121 is active at An Hoa. MAG-16 reported 17 82mm mortar rounds struck MMAF	2 (11-68) 6 (11-68)
25 Nov	1stMAW reported MMAF struck by 8 122mm rockets causing major damage to 1 OV-10, and minor damage to 1 OV-10, 2 CH-53s, and 2 UH-1s.	2 (11-68)
30 Nov	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 24,677 air operations, of which 1,351 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 31,434 air operations, of which 638 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 28,112 air operations, of which 433 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa has 8,006 air operations. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported 10,094 air operations, with no GCA total. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 12,486 air operations. MATCU-62A at Quang Tri recorded 17,247 of which 222 were GCA.	3 (11-68) 18 (11-68) 15 (11-68) 12 (11-68)
December		
	MAG-13 reported three rocket or mortar attacks at Chu Lai.	4 (12-68)
	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that high angle trajectory firing, especially at night, had restricted the number of practice GCAs the unit could make. Serious delays in receipt of ERPAL parts used in maintenance continue.	15 (12-68)
	<u>MATCU-62A at Quang Tri reported taking its UPS-1 radar out of service pending further investigation as to the exact nature of the radiation hazard. This was done following a survey by a Field Technical Authority Representative to check on radiation emanating from the organic radar systems.</u>	15 (12-68)
	MATCU-62A at Quang Tri reported that MSgt T. F. X. Carroll was promoted to his present rank, and that Cpl B. R. Cleverdon and Cpl R. F. Peterson had been assigned to LZ Vandegrift.	15 (12-68)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that the Air Force TACAN had been hit by a C-130, and that they were attempting to bring their TACAN on line.	18 (12-68)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that the An Hoa GCA FPN-36 had been flight checked. In addition a 12 Marine detachment from MATCU-67 at Chu Lai was assigned to duty at An Hoa. 1stLt J. E. Koffenberger (OIC) and GySgt L. E. Waggoner (NCOIC) led this detachment. The following Marines were also assigned: Sgts J.P. Redden, M. Holbrook, L. M. Madson, R. J. Burger, C. C. Gordon, and J. G. Krantz; Cpls M. G. Shirk, J. P. McKay, R. S. McRae, and E. Papis.	12 (12-68)
1 Dec	MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that Capt S. D. Davis assumed duty as Assistant OIC from Capt R. W. Norton.	15 (12-68)
14 Dec	1stMAW CEO requests that MATCU-67 at Chu Lai have access to administrative MAG-16 SAR helicopter flights to and from MMAF to deliver personnel and equipment to An Hoa.	2 (12-68)

Date	1968	Reference
December		
21 Dec	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported 8 Marines KIA and 5 Marines WIA following a rocket attack.	4 (12-68)
30 Dec	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported completion of an Emergency Heli-Port next to their dispensary.	4 (12-68)
31 Dec	1stMAW CEO notified CG FMFPAC that Mr. James Terry the ITT Gilfillian TECH REP assigned to MATCU-62 at Dong Ha would routinely return to CONUS in March 1969 at the end of his contract. A replacement TECH REP was requested to be on site prior to Mr. Terry's departure.	2 (12-68)
	MAG-12 recorded 28,210 air operations at Chu Lai, of which 1,309 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 30,015 air operations, of which 509 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 26,931 air operations, of which 317 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 14,296 air operations at An Hoa. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 12,207 air operations, but again failed to total GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 13,110 air operations. MATCU-62 A at Quang Tri recorded 17,751 air operations, of which 246 were GCA.	3 (12-68) 18 (12-68) 12 (12-68) 15 (12-68)
	<i>At year- end there are 540,000 U. S. Servicemen in South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 684)
	<i>(As 1968 closes MATCU-67 continues to support MAG-12 and MAG-13 at Chu Lai, and has just added support of MAG-16 at An Hoa to its busy schedule. At Chu Lai MATCU-67 has totaled 866,527 air operations since 1 June 1965. MATCU-68 supports MAG-36 at Phu Bai and MAG-16 at MMAF. The Air Force has taken over the approach control services provided by MATCU-68 in previous years. MATCU-62 supports MAG-39 at Dong Ha and LZ Vandegrift. MATCU-62A also supports MAG-39 at Quang Tri. Though the two MATCUs in MAG-39 are defined differently, and both file separate command chronologies, Major H. Lacey Causey is recorded as the OIC of both MATCUs.)</i>	

Date	1969	Reference
January	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha relocated the LF RBn to avoid interference from a new metal hangar being built. Enlisted men with the unit are reported to be extending their in-country tours at an increasing rate. GySgt D. T. Burk and GySgt T. W. Rasa were promoted to their present rank. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported the following Marines assigned duty at LZ Vandegrift: 1stLt W. M. Sanders, SSgt T. R. Hudson, Cpl J. P. Franka, Cpl R. E. Holland, Cpl D. H. Miller, LCpl J. M. Barry, LCpl P. D. Keefe, and LCpl A. J. Nazario.</p>	15 (01-69)
	<p>MATCU-62A at Quang Tri reported a period of inclement weather in which controller performance was generally excellent and coordination between GCA and the AF RAPCON improved. A new ADF approach using the LF RBn was submitted for approval, and the TACAN was relocated to a new pad to eliminate flooding problems. MATCU-62A at Quang Tri also assigned the following Marines to LZ Vandegrift: SSgt J. McClurg, CPL A. J. Amato, and Cpl J. G. Wong.</p>	15 (01-69)
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported that the MATCU-67 Detachment "A" at An Hoa had constructed a new pad for the tower on the north side of the runway near the GCA pad. An approach corridor for C-130s and C-123s has been established at coordinated with the FSCC. GySgt W. B. Murdock has replaced GySgt L. E. Waggoner as NCOIC, and SSgt R. F. Job is the GCA technician. During the month An Hoa airfield survived 3 82mm mortar attacks.</p>	12 (01-69)
2 Jan	<p>MAG-16 at MMAF reported 4 122mm rockets hit the airfield and damaged the runway.</p>	6 (01-69)
6 Jan	<p>MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that 1stLt Gerald A. Byrne assumed duty as OIC of the detachment at MMAF from 1stLt Jerry W. Ford.</p>	18 (01-69)
20 Jan	<p><i>Richard M. Nixon takes oath of office as 37th President of the United States.</i></p>	25 (pg 684)
25 Jan	<p><i>Peace talks with the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Viet Cong in attendance begin in Paris.</i></p>	25 (pg 684)
31 Jan	<p>MAG-12 reported 31,700 air operations at Chu Lai, of these 1,759 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 24,936 air operations, of which 1,006 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 reported 26,138 air operations, of which 404 were GCA. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 10,069 air operations, but made no mention of GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 19,958 air operations. MATCU-62 A at Quang Tri recorded 16,820 air operations, of which 487 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported An Hoa had 12,778 air operations, of which 48 were MATCU-67A GCA.</p>	<p>3 (01-69) 18 (01-69) 15 (01-69) 12 (01-69)</p>
February	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported that James D. Terry, the ITT Gilfillian TECH REP had departed, and that his replacement had been assigned to MATCU-62 A at Quang Tri. MATCU-62 also reported CWO W. J. Komsi, SSgt W. D. Orthman, and LCpl J. I. McMahon assigned to LZ Vandegrift. SSgt E. R. Tokarz was promoted to his present rank.</p>	15 (02-69)

Date	1969	Reference
February	<p>MATCU-62A at Quang Tri reported the arrival of Mr. Dwayne Schmidt an ITT Gilfillian TECH REP. In addition to duties at Quang Tri MATCU-62A accepted responsibility for the operation and maintenance of a LF RBn at FSB Cunningham. The following Marines were assigned to LZ Vandegrift by MATCU-62A: Sgt M. W. Brackett Cpl. P. Delorenzi, Cpl W. A. Jordan, and Cpl J. L. Wong.</p>	15 (02-69)
	<p>(See the monographs by TFX Carroll, H. Lacey Causey, Don Eskam, Jack Koms, Jim Janke, Gary Lewis, and the 2nd monograph by Bob Marshall about this period in the ICTZ. Also see the MATCA Hotline article by Jack Koms.)</p>	
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had been attacked 10 times during the month using 82mm mortars, 122mm rockets, B-40 RPGs, grenades, and small arms fire. The runway at An Hoa remains under repair by the SeaBees, but the taxiway and parking area revetment construction projects are complete. During the attacks the MATCU-67A detachment lost both TACANs to enemy fire. A UHF RBn (283.4 MHz, ID-AHA) and an LF RBn (515 KHz, ID-AW) were installed but have not been flight checked. A replacement TACAN has been received from MATCU-68, but was not installed by month end. 1stLt J. E. Koffenberger continued to lead MATCU-67A at An Hoa, but GySgt D. H. Fielen has replaced GySgt W. B. Murdock the other eleven members of the detachment are GySgt R. F. Job, Sgt L.L. Darr, Sgt J. E. Forester, Sgt J. G. Krantz, Sgt W. V. Egan, Cpl J. P. McKay, Cpl W. L. Mengel, Cpl M. G. Shirk, Cpl E. Papis, Cpl R. S. McCrae, and LCpl D. A. Etherington.</p>	12 (02-69)
	<p>(See the monograph by Daniel Chase and the MATCA Hotline article by Lonnie Darr about this period at An Hoa. Also see the pictures contributed by Daniel Chase.)</p>	
7 Feb	<p>MAG-13 reported Chu Lai attacked by 122mm rockets that with no damage to the MAG-13 area.</p>	4 (02-69)
23 Feb	<p>MAG-13 reported Chu Lai subject to the largest rocket and mortar attack yet at the airfield. A combined total of 66 122mm rockets and 82mm mortar bombs hit the base.</p>	4 (02-69)
	<p>MAG-16 reported MMAF hit by 18 mortar rounds that produced no casualties but damaged 2 UH-34s, 2 CH-46s, and 2 CH-53s.</p>	6 (02-69)
	<p>MAG-16 at MMAF reported that at An Hoa an enemy mortar attack had hit a Grade 3 ASP, and a bulk fuel storage destroying 10,000 gallons of AVGAS and 30,000 gallons of JP-4. Two TACAN units were destroyed, the runway was rendered unserviceable, and 5 Marines were WIA.</p>	6 (02-69)
24 Feb	<p>1stMAW CEO notifies CG FMFPAC of the TACAN damage at An Hoa.</p>	2 (02-69)
25 Feb	<p>MATCU-62 at Dong Ha reported replacing its TSA-13 tower with the new TSA-28.</p>	15 (02-69)
	<p>(See monograph by Joe Medico about his work on the TSA-28.)</p>	

Date	1969	Reference
February		
26 Feb	MAG-13 reported Chu Lai again struck by rockets or mortars. No damage was recorded.	4 (02-69)
27 Feb	1stMAW CEO in discussing the VHF problems at Chu Lai tower acknowledges the difficulty in maintaining parts and technicians for the old radios in use, and recommends that Continental Air Service equip its aircraft with UHF radios.	2 (02-69)
28 Feb	III MAF directs that call signs be rotated monthly between tactical units. Under this plan MAG-11 would be SAGAMORE and MATCU-67 would be SCARFACE, MATCU-68 SPICEBERRY, and MATCU-62 WALNUT HILL.	2 (02-69)
	(The 1stMAW responded on 15 March 1969 to this document. The response is in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
	MAG-12 recorded that Chu Lai had 22,764 air operations, of which 1,487 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 26,813 air operations, of which 1,312 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 25,015 air operations, of which 371 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 11,770 air operations, of which 8 were MATCU-67A GCA. MATCU-62 at Dong Ha recorded 10,002 air operations, of which 332 were GCA. AT LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 18,547 air operations. MATCU-62A at Quang Tri recorded 16,094 air operations, of which 732 were GCA.	3 (02-69) 18 (02-69) 12 (02-69) 15 (02-69)
March		
	Effective in March MATCU-62A at Quang Tri became MATCU-62 and reported to MAG-39 via H&MS-39 for Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. Captain Sam Davis remained the senior officer at Dong Ha and continued to report to the OIC of the MATCU at Quang Tri. MATCU-62 reported a continued decline in personnel strength and reports that no help appears to be in sight. They have 13 officers and 105 enlisted men available for duty at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift, but controllers have been placed on port and starboard duty that requires in excess of 90 hours per week on position. MATCU-62 reported that the rotating detachment at LZ Vandegrift consisted of the following Marines: CWO W. J. Komsi, SSgt J. N. Beaubieu, SSgt J. S. Harvey, SSgt E. R. Tokarz, Cpl P. Delorenzi, Cpl R. S. Howland, Cpl R. J. Meldon, Cpl J. P. Stevens, and LCpl M. J. Sorg. The following Marines were promoted to their present rank: SSgt J. C. Mills, Sgt M. J. Carter, Sgt T. L. Owens, and Cpl D. G. Woods. MATCU-62 recorded that Air Medals were awarded to the following Marines: SSgt J. E. McClurg, Sgt M. J. Carter, Sgt T. E. Meadows, Sgt T. W. Mintz, and Cpl G. M. Wilkenson.	15 (03-69)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that the two FPN-36s were flight checked and the controllers given excellent ratings. At An Hoa the base was under light rocket and mortar attack throughout the month. The TACAN remained out of service all month due to lack of parts and test equipment.	12 (03-69)
1 Mar	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported Maj V. R. Hughes assumed duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Maj J. R. Behm.	3 (03-69)

Date	1969	Reference
March		
7 Mar	MAG-16 reported substantial damage at MMAF following an attack in which the airfield was hit by 5 122mm rockets.	6 (03-69)
8 Mar	MAG-16 reported 2 CH-46s and 1 UH-34 damaged in rocket attack at MMAF.	6 (03-69)
15 Mar	1stMAW CEO requested the construction of Chu Lai tower be held in abeyance pending review of Southeast Asia military construction.	2 (03-69)
	1stMAW CEO published a preliminary systems plan for Marine Corps ATC towers.	2 (03-69)
	CG 1stMAW described monthly call sign rotation plan set forth by CG, IIMAF as impractical.	2 (03-69)
16 Mar	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported that Maj B. W. Braswell Jr. assumed duty as OIC from Maj H. L. Causey.	15 (03-69)
19 Mar	MAG-16 reported An Hoa hit by rocket attack that damaged a CH-46. One Marine pilot was reported WIA.	6 (03-69)
	1stMAW CEO scheduled a monthly MATCU meeting for all OICs to discuss manning levels, FMFPAC inspection, test equipment requirements, and excess equipment.	2 (03-69)
20 Mar	MAG-16 recorded two separate attacks at MMAF. In one 3 82mm mortar bombs caused no damage, in the other, 8 122mm rockets caused light damage.	6 (03-69)
21 Mar	1stMAW CEO published manning levels and on-hand strength of in-country MATCUs.	2 (03-69)
23 Mar	1stMAW CEO transferred Capt E. P. Basher from MATCU-62 at Dong Ha to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai.	2 (03-69)
27 Mar	MAG-16 reported that MMAF had been struck by 6 122mm rockets that caused no damage.	6 (03-69)
29 Mar	1stMAW CEO published results of technical inspection of MATCU-68. (See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (02-69)
31 Mar	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 27,033 air operations, of which 1,458 were MATCU-67 GCA. MAG-36 at Phu Bai recorded 30,350 air operations of which 1,449 were MATCU-68 GCA. At MMAF MABS-16 recorded 25,542 air operations, of which 322 were MATCU-68 GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 6,473 air operations, of which 11 were GCA by MATCU-67A. MATCU-62 reported 21,419 air operations, at Quang Tri, of which 821 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 recorded 10,075 air operations, of which 406 were GCA. MATCU-62 recorded 20,863 air operations at LZ Vandegrift.	3 (03-69)
		7 (03-69)
		12 (03-69)
		15 (03-69)

Date	1969	Reference
April	<p>MAG-13 reported no enemy attacks at Chu Lai during the month.</p> <p>MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported 10 officers and 90 enlisted men available for duty at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. The MATCU stated, "Personnel strength continues to decline and is at a critical stage. Further personnel losses without replacements will force curtailment of air traffic control services." MATCU-62 assigned the following personnel to LZ Vandegrift: SSgt Harvey, SSgt Wheeler, SSgt Tokarz, Cpl Delorenzi, Cpl Roda, Cpl Barry, and LCpl Aznaran. The following MATCU-62 personnel were promoted to their present rank: Sgt Best, Sgt Bradford, Sgt Howland, Sgt Scott, Sgt Vasser, Cpl Barry, and Cpl Keefe.</p>	<p>4 (04-69)</p> <p>15 (04-69)</p>
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported that technicians were installing permanent radio equipment in the control tower. ATC services were provided from a TRC-131 during the equipment change.</p>	12 (04-69)
	<p>MABS-16 at MMAF reported that at An Hoa concertina wire hung with high-voltage signs had been placed around the TACAN to keep away unauthorized personnel.</p>	12 (04-69)
2 Apr	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported an Air Vietnam DC-6 crashed on landing. 2 passengers suffered minor injuries.</p>	7 (04-69)
	<p>1stMAW CEO requests authorization for MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to transfer the equipment shelters associated with the TSA-11 and TSA-13 control towers to a rehab facility. The radio equipment was removed from the shelters and installed in the semi-permanent tower, and now the shelters are deteriorating.</p>	2 (04-69)
3 Apr	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported a HMM-362 UH-34 crashed one half mile northeast of the airfield after two unsuccessful GCA attempts. There were no crew injuries.</p>	7 (04-69)
	<p>1stMAW CEO recommends that the UPS-1 radars not in use at Dong Ha, Quang Tri and Phu Bai be transferred to MATCU-66 on Okinawa for storage until needed.</p>	2 (04-69)
8 Apr	<p>1stMAW CEO recommends that GCA service be removed from An Hoa and Dong Ha. He anticipates that ATC services at Phu Bai will be transferred to the USA or USAF. He intends to remove MATCU-67A from An Hoa and move MATCU-68 to MMAF where it will also take on the tower responsibilities at An Hoa. MATCU-62 is expected to provide GCA only at Quang Tri, while continuing to operate control towers at Dong Ha and LZ Vandegrift. These moves are all in an attempt to operate within current manning levels.</p>	2 (04-69)
9 April	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported the crash of a CH-53 from HMH-462 at LZ Vandegrift. The helicopter was attempting an external lift from the LSA. The fire destroyed the aircraft and the LSA. Four crewmen and 3 ground personnel were injured at the time of the accident. Later, there were additional injuries and one fatality amongst ground personnel as ammunition stored at the LSA continued to explode.</p>	7 (04-69)

Date	1969	Reference
April		
10 Apr	MAG-16 at MMAF reported the arrival of the AH-1 "Huey Cobra".	6 (04-69)
18 Apr	MAG-16 at MMAF reported the first combat mission flown by AH-1s.	6 (04-69)
20 Apr	MAG-16 reported MMAF hit by 5 122mm rockets. 2 rockets hit the Sgts Club resulting in 2 Marines KIA, 32 Marines WIA and requiring medical evacuation, and 14 Marines WIA, but returned to duty.	6 (04-69)
23 Apr	MAG-16 at MMAF reported a rocket and mortar attack at An Hoa that damaged an AH-1 and wounded 5 Marines.	6 (04-69)
27 Apr	1stMAW reported its headquarters compound at DaNang seriously damaged by a fire at a nearby ASP.	2 (04-69)
30 Apr	MAG-16 at MMAF reported a Seaboard World DC-8 jetliner landed at MMAF.	6 (04-69)
	(See the monograph by Skip Redpath and the story by Frank Gullede, et. al. about this incident.)	
	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 33,671 air operations, of which 937 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 31,466 air operations, of which 913 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 reported 25,911 air operations, of which 322 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 6,074 air operations, of which only 1 was a MATCU-67A GCA. MATCU-62 at Quang Tri recorded 23,450 air operations, of which 411 were GCA. At Dong ha MATCU-62 recorded 14,355 air operations, of which 200 were GCA. AT LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 28,390 air operations.	3 (04-69) 18 (04-69) 12 (04-69) 15 (04-69)
May		
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri had 11 officers and 80 enlisted men to operate Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. The MATCU reported a continued decline in on-board strength, and the anticipated loss of 4 of their 8 diesel mechanics in June. In preparing to assume approach control responsibilities the UPS-1B at Dong Ha has been relocated to Quang Tri, and the TSQ-18 Surveillance Shelter, and Landing Control Central (LCC) have been secured at Dong Ha. MATCU-62 recorded the following personnel assigned to LZ Vandegrift: SSgt Wheeler, SSgt McConnell, SSgt Harvey, Sgt Williams, Cpl Roda, LCpl Aznaran, and LCpl Gidney. SSgt D. W. Watson was promoted to his present rank.	15 (05-69)
	MABS-16 at MMAF that at An Hoa MATCU-67A GCA was out of service most of the month, and is scheduled to be returned to Chu Lai for repair. Anticipated return date for the FPN-36 is 1 September 1969. During May An Hoa was attacked 5 times using 122mm and 140mm rockets, and 60mm and 82mm mortars. There were no casualties reported by MABS-16 personnel, and no facilities damaged.	12 (05-69)
7 May	1stMAW CEO issued a report on the MATCU Maintenance Meeting. Capt Van Orden represented MATCU-67, Capt Gabriel represented MATCU-68, and 1stLt Bowman represented MATCU-62.	2 (05-69)

Date	1969	Reference
May		
12 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported three separate rocket attacks using a total of 14 122mm rockets. No serious damage or Marine injuries were reported.	4 (05-69)
17 May	MAG-13 again reported Chu Lai hit by 5 122mm rockets without causing any damage or Marine casualties.	4 (05-69)
18 May	MAG-16 at MMAF reported a mortar attack that damaged an Army UH-1.	6 (05-69)
19 May	1stMAW CEO continues discussion on resolving shortage of 6711 and 6713 MOS controllers. In addition to transferring control of Phu Bai, he now adds the control transfer of Quang Tri. Current requirements are for 174 controllers in country; by constricting Marine ATC to just MMAF and Chu Lai he needs only 101. This is well within the approved manning level of 108. (See this and other related documents in the Significant Documents appendix.)	2 (05-69)
20 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported that 6 122mm rockets struck the airfield causing no damage or casualties.	4 (05-69)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported that 1stLt J. A. Capistran assumed duty at OIC MATCU-68 at MMAF from 1stLt G. A. Byrne.	18 (05-69)
22 May	1stMAW CEO reported continuing problems with the MATCU-68 TACAN at Phu Bai.	2 (05-69)
24 May	MAG-13 reported the 6 th and final attack on Chu Lai. This time an unknown number of mortar bombs fell on the airfield, but again caused no damage or injuries.	4 (05-69)
28 May	1stMAW CEO issues memorandum on realignment of ATC responsibilities. No further mention is made of the intended transfer of ATC responsibilities at Quang Tri. Dong Ha operates a TSA-28, FPN-36, and TACAN; LZ Vandegrift operates a TRC-131 and LF RBN, Quang Tri operates a full TSQ-18A, TACAN, and TSA-13 providing approach control, GCA, and Tower services; all under MATCU-62. MATCU-68 operates a TSQ-18A at MMAF, and a FPN-36 at An Hoa to provide GCA. MATCU-68 operates the permanent tower at MMAF and a TRC-131 at An Hoa. The two FPN-36s currently at MMAF are reassigned; 1 to An Hoa, and 1 to Dong Ha. MATCU-67 at Chu Lai is relatively unscathed, and they no longer support An Hoa.	2 (05-69)
31 May	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 41,584 air operations, of which 753 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 reported 33,391 air operations, of which 412 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 reported 29,195 air operations, of which 487 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported An Hoa had 8,351 air operations. MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported 25,023 air operations, of which 244 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 reported 15,496 air operations, of which 68 were GCA. MATCU-62 reported LZ Vandegrift had 21,109 air operations.	3 (05-69) 18 (05-69) 12 (05-69) 15 (05-69)

Date	1969	Reference
June	<p>MATCU-62 at Quang Tri continued to plan for approach control service and has begun qualifying controllers at the position. GySgt E. R. Nelson is the first controller reported as approach control qualified. At Dong Ha the MATCU-62 billeting area was reported under reconstruction by NMCBU-301, but "since reconstruction began the billeting area has been condemned, and presently there are no new hootches being constructed or old ones repaired." The following Marines were reported promoted to Sergeant: R. A. Barbeau, W. I. Beagle, T. G. Dunn III, J. P. Franka, T. C. Gafney, W. T. Gray, D. W. Miller, R. F. Peterson, J. D. Williams, and R. D. Womak. MATCU-62 promoted Cpl J. R. Johnson and Cpl A. J. Nazario to their present rank. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 assigned: SSgt J. H. Beaulieu, SSgt L. N. McMasters, Cpl J. M. Barry, Cpl R. A. Roda, Cpl E. L. Stough, LCpl M. T. Gidney, and LCpl W. A. Overstreet. MATCU-62 reported 11 officers and 76 enlisted men available for duty at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. The shortage of diesel mechanics of MOS 1342 is noted.</p>	15 (06-69)
	(See monographs by TFX Carroll, Don Eskam, Jim Janke, and Gary Lewis about this period in the history of MATCU-62.)	
7 Jun	MAG-16 at MMAF reported being hit by 18 82mm mortar bombs. 3 CH-46s were damaged and 5 Marines wounded.	6 (06-69)
	At An Hoa MABS-16 reported a mortar and rocket attack that damaged the runway and TAFDS.	12 (06-69)
8 Jun	MAG-13 reported Chu Lai hit by 5 122mm rockets. The one KIA reported was a female nurse at the 312 th Evacuation Hospital.	4 (06-69)
11 Jun	<p><u>MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported a rocket attack that damaged the MATCU working and living area. Sgt M. W. Bracket and Sgt J. F. Wright were reported WIA and required medical evacuation. A PU-239 generator was destroyed. The TRN-14 TACAN and TRN-16 LF RBn were damaged by shrapnel and concussion, but have been returned to service. Several maintenance shelters received minor damage from shrapnel and concussion.</u></p>	15 (06-69)
12 Jun	MAG-16 at MMAF reported that 12 82mm rounds hit the airfield, but caused no damage,	6 (06-69)
13 Jun	1stMAW CEO issues memorandum in which he tries to anticipate the monsoon season by swapping GCA equipment at MMAF with that at Dong Ha.	2 (06-69)
14 Jun	1stMAW CEO requested assistance from NAVELECSYSCOM in locating proper site for TACAN at Quang Tri, and inspection of all Marine NAVAIDS in country.	2 (06-69)
	MAG-13 reported 8 122mm rockets struck the airfield. No damage or injuries were reported.	4 (06-69)
20 Jun	MAG-13 reported Chu Lai again hit by 3 122mm rockets that did no damage and caused no injuries.	4 (06-69)

Date	1969	Reference
June		
21 Jun	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported a rocket attack that hit an Americal Division dispensary. 7 soldiers were reported KIA, and 14 soldiers were WIA.	4 (06-69)
24 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported the opening of the crosswind runway at the south end of the airfield.	12 (06-69)
29 Jun	1stMAW CEO scheduled full itinerary for TECH Team from NAVELECSYSCOM.	2 (06-69)
30 Jun	MAG-12 failed to publish air operations data for Chu Lai. MATCU-68 recorded 30,882 air operations at Phu Bai, of which 363 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 26,556 air operations, of which 527 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 7,309 air operations, and GCA no longer in service. MATCU-62 at Quang Tri recorded 21,164 air operations, of which 187 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 recorded 16,492 air operations, of which 3 were GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 26,891 air operations.	18 (06-69)
July		
	MAG-12 reported that MATCU-67 at Chu Lai had 7 officers and 53 enlisted men available for duty. MAG-12 also reported that their ski boat was out of service all month for lack of spark plugs.	3 (07-69)
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported having 10 officers and 62 enlisted men available to operate Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. GySgt C. P. Newcomb was designated Acting GCA Watch Officer. The TRC-131 at LZ Vandegrift was replaced by a new TRC-131. MATCU-62 assigned SSgt J. N. Beaulieu, Sgt E. R. Forsythe, Sgt G. L. Hushagen, Cpl J. R. Johnson, Cpl E. L. Stough, and LCpl J. W. Dewitt to operate LZ Vandegrift.	15 (07-69)
	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported having 8 officers and 49 enlisted men available for duty at Phu Bai, and MMAF.	18 (07-69)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that at An Hoa 1 Marine was KIA and 1 Marine WIA after two separate 140mm rocket attacks.	12 (07-69)
7 Jul	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported that the TRN-Technical assistance team had established a reliable TACAN site.	15 (07-69)
8 Jul	1stMAW reported 4 122mm rockets struck Quang Tri resulting in major damage to one MAG-39 aircraft and minor damage to two others. There were no casualties reported.	2 (07-69)
10 Jul	MAG-16 reports Typhoon Tess affecting weather systems in ICTZ.	6 (07-69)
11 Jul	1stMAW reported that MGen W. G. Thrash had assumed command from MGen C. J. Quilter.	2 (07-69)
16 Jul	MAG-16 at MMAF reported 19 mortar bombs had hit the airfield. 3 HMM-165 CH-46s sustained fragment damage.	6 (07-69)

Date	1969	Reference
July		
31 Jul	1stMAW reported 4 rocket attacks on MAG-36 at Phu Bai during July. No Damage or casualties were reported.	2 (07-69)
	1stMAW reported 3 mortar bombs hit the MAG-39 perimeter at Quang Tri without causing any damage or casualties.	2 (07-69)
	<i>During July Operation Keystone Eagle began. This operation was a retrograde movement of the 3rd Marine Division and its supporting units to Okinawa. The first unit withdrawn was 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.</i>	27 (pg 277)
	MAG-12 reported that Chu Lai had 33,400 air operations, of which 904 were GCA. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported 26,395 air operations, of which 389 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 26,562 air operations of which 462 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 7,068 air operations. MATCU-62 Quang Tri reported 18,300 air operations, of which 355 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 reported 16,023 air operations, of which 8 were GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 20,452 air operations.	3 (07-69) 18 (07-69) 12 (07-69) 15 (07-69)
	(See monographs by Steve Hulland, Chet Newcomb, and Danny Walczak about this period in northern ICTZ.)	
August		
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri now has 9 officers and 57 enlisted men available for duty at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. GySgt C. P. Newcomb, SSgt D. C. Baczkowski, and SSgt G. S. Simmons were certified as Radar Approach Controllers at Quang Tri. The GCA unit and TACAN at Dong Ha are reported as being decommissioned. The MATCU-62 detachment at LZ Vandegrift now consists of SSgt J. N. Beaulieu, Sgt W. T. Gray, Sgt E. R. Forsythe, Sgt W. I. Beegle, Cpl W. A. Rodda, Cpl L. W. Wingard, and Cpl J. W. Dewitt. MATCU-62 reported the following personnel promoted to Corporal: R. V. L. Brigance, J. A. Brown, J. W. Dewitt, H. R. Gausman, M. T. Gidney, R. D. Moerloos, and W. A. Overstreet.	15 (08-69)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa was attacked by mortars and rockets on 5 separate occasions. Damage to the runway was quickly repaired, and no casualties were reported. The TACAN is back on the air, but has not been flight checked. An FPN-36 GCA unit has been returned to An Hoa but is not operational.	12 (08-69)
6 Aug	1stMAW CEO reported the departure of a MATCU detachment of 4 officers and 19 enlisted men to CG FMFPAC. No equipment was moved outside of South Vietnam.	2 (08-69)
	<i>(No specific MATCU recorded the loss, so I believe that this was just a group of MATCU Marines at the normal end of their tour.)</i>	
11 Aug	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported the airfield being hit by 15 mortar bombs and 7 RPGs.	7 (08-69)

Date	1969	Reference
August		
12 Aug	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported that 4 122mm rockets hit the airfield.	7 (08-69)
13 Aug	MABS-16 at MMAF reported installing a windsock on the crosswind runway.	12 (08-69)
15 Aug	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported that MATCU-67 had completed a letter of agreement with U. S. Army airfields at Quang Ngai and Duc Pho. Chu Lai Approach will provide radar control services to aircraft from these bases when they operate in airspace under the jurisdiction of Chu Lai Approach.	3 (08-69)
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported that Capt A. E. Romsos assumed duty as OIC from Maj B. W. Braswell Jr.	15 (08-69)
16 Aug	1stMAW CEO notified CG FMFPAC about the ATC equipment that will be excess when control of Phu Bai is turned over to 7 th Air Force.	2 (08-69)
17 Aug	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported that 3 122mm rockets struck the airfield.	7 (08-69)
18 Aug	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 290.3 MHz was established as the Ground Control frequency.	12 (08-69)
19 Aug	MABS-16 at MMAF reported being hit by 6 122mm rockets. Damage to the runway was quickly repaired. 3 Marines and 1 Navy corpsman were reported KIA.	12 (08-69)
	1stMAW reported that LtCol T. Klaus assumed duty as CEO from LtCol R. S. Hartman.	2 (08-69)
20 Aug	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported 4 122mm rockets hit the airfield without causing any damage.	7 (08-69)
25 Aug	MATCU-68 at Phu Bai reported turning over GCA responsibilities to the 7 th Air Force. Col Noah New [CO MAG-36] flew the last Marine GCA, which was controlled by LCpl P. L. Cullum.	18 (08-69)
26 Aug	MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported two separate rocket attacks at LZ Vandegrift. During the first attack 5 Marines were reported WIA and required emergency medevac. Two HMM-262 aircraft came under RPG fire while conducting the medevacs.	8 (08-69)
27 Aug	MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported 7 122mm rockets hit the airfield without causing any damage.	7 (08-69)
31 Aug	MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported that 31 122mm rockets hit the airfield destroying 15 buildings and damaging 7. 3 Marines were reported KIA, 25 Marines were WIA and required emergency medevac, and 4 Marines were WIA, but returned to duty.	8 (08-69)
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri accepted approach control responsibilities from the 7 th Air Force.	15 (08-69)

Date	1969	Reference
August		
31 Aug	<p><i>Operation Keystone Eagle continued during August with the redeployment of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines to Okinawa. This left just the 3rd and 4th Marines and part of the 12th Marines available to the 3rd Marine Division at Dong Ha.</i></p>	27 (pg 277)
	<p>MAG-12 at Chu Lai again failed to record air operations statistics. MATCU-68 at Phu Bai recorded 24,442 air operations, of which 357 were GCA. At MMAF MATCU-68 recorded 30,401 air operations, of which 500 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa had 5,484 air operations. MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported 21,360 air operations, of which 395 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 recorded 24,230 air operations, of which only 1 was GCA. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 14,700 air operations.</p>	3 (08-69) 18 (08-69) 12 (08-69) 15 (08-69)
September		
1 Sep	<p>MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported that Maj C. A. Reynolds had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Maj V. R. Hughes.</p>	3 (09-69)
	<p>MAG-36 at Phu Bai reported that MATCU-68 had been transferred to the operational and administrative control of MAG-16 at MMAF.</p>	7 (09-69)
	<p><i>[MATCU-68 had operated at Phu Bai since 27 March 1966.]</i></p>	
2 Sep	<p>MAG-39 at Quang Tri reported that Typhoon Dora had caused considerable damage to living and working areas.</p>	8 (09-69)
3 Sep	<p><i>The death of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, North Vietnam was reported.</i></p>	25 (pg 684)
6 Sep	<p>MAG-16 at MMAF reported that a mortar attack had damaged the eastern parking ramp, 2 CH-46s, and 1 CH-53.</p>	6 (09-69)
7 Sep	<p>1stMAW CEO issued memorandum describing his intentions for disposing of non-standard ATC equipment. In this memorandum he describes continuing problems with the Chu Lai TACAN. The TRN-21 arrived in poor condition, and the TRN-14 is an expeditionary TACAN not well suited for long term usage. 1stMAW must also re-think its personnel strategy based on the usage of FPN-36s at MMAF. With the TSQ-18A complex and TPN-8s now there with MATCU-68 the maintenance personnel re-distributed to MATCU-62 and MATCU-67 will have to be transferred back to MATCU-68 to cover the additional needs. At least one FPN-36 is requested to remain at Chu Lai because the TPN-8s in use require almost an hour to realign during a runway change, and are almost impossible to align at night or heavy rain since the technician must be able to see the parallel touchdown reflector.</p>	2 (09-69)
23 Sep	<p>MAG-39 received a warning order to prepare for redeployment.</p>	8 (09-69)
30 Sep	<p>MAG-12 at Chu Lai recorded 25,855 air ops, and 1,093 GCA. MAG-39 reported 21,797 air ops and 702 GCA at Quang Tri, 19,870 air ops at Dong Ha, and 10,571 air ops at LZ Vandegrift. MABS-16 recorded 19,469 air ops at Phu Bai, 29,956 air ops and 702 GCA at MMAF, and 4,112 air ops at An Hoa, of which 10 were GCA.</p>	3 (09-69) 8 (09-69) 12 (09-69)

Date October	1969	Reference
	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri reported having 7 officers and 35 enlisted men available for duty at Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and LZ Vandegrift. During the month two TRN-14s were transferred on temporary loan to the U. S. Army. 1 TRC-131, 1 TPN-8, 1 TSQ-18 GCA Shelter, 2 PU-648 and 1 PU-590 generators were transferred to MATCU-68 at LZ Baldy on temporary loan. A surveillance radar (UPS-1C) was transferred to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai, also on temporary loan.	15 (10-69)
4 Oct	MATCU-62 ceased operation of LZ Vandegrift. <i>[MATCU-62 had operated LZ Vandegrift since June 1968.]</i>	15 (10-69)
10 Oct	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that An Hoa airfield had received 25 inches of rain since the first of the month. The rain flooded normal supply routes, and all re-supply was airlifted.	12 (10-69)
15 Oct	MATCU-62 ceased operations at Dong Ha. <i>[Marine ATC had operated at Dong Ha since September 1966.]</i>	15 (10-69)
17 Oct	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported that Captain L. E. Harry had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-67 from Major C. A. Reynolds.	3 (10-69)
21 Oct	1stMAW CEO issued a memorandum discussing operational difficulties with the TRN-14 TACAN.	2 (10-69)
	MAG-16 at MMAF reported eight CH-46s damaged in a rocket attack.	6 (10-69)
23 Oct	MABS-16 at MMAF completed an operational agreement with the 7 th Marines for the operation of LZ Baldy.	12 (10-69)
24 Oct	MATCU-62 ceased operations at Quang Tri. <i>[Marine ATC had operated Quang Tri since September 1967.]</i>	15 (10-69)
26 Oct	MAG-39 at Quang Tri transferred administrative and operational control of MATCU-62 to MAG-13 at Chu Lai.	8 (10-69)
29 Oct	1stMAW CEO denies request from 7 th Air Force for Marines to continue to operate TRN-14 TACAN at Quang Tri. The 7 th AF found that it could not fulfill its commitment.	2 (10-69)
	MAG-13 reported Chu Lai hit by 4 122mm rockets. Though 1 rocket hit the MAG-13 bomb dump no secondary explosions occurred.	4 (10-69)
31 Oct	<i>Operation Keystone Eagle continued with the transfer of the 3rd Marine Regiment from the 3rd Marine Division to Camp Pendleton. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was re-deployed to Okinawa.</i>	27 (pg 280-282)
	MAG-12 reported 24,015 air operations at Chu Lai, of which 1,179 were MATCU-67 GCA. MAG-16 reported 7,324 air operations at Phu Bai. At MMAF MAG-16 reported 26,311 air operations, of which 552 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 recorded 5,742 air ops, (10 GCA), and at LZ Baldy 6,858 air operations were reported.	3 (10-69) 6 (10-69)

Date	1969	Reference
October		
31 Oct	MATCU-62 at Quang Tri recorded 10,974 air operations, of which 436 were GCA. At Dong Ha MATCU-62 recorded 4,613 air operations. At LZ Vandegrift MATCU-62 recorded 1,561 air operations.	15 (10-69)
	The Provisional Marine Aircraft Group – 39 at Quang Tri is deactivated.	24 (1969)
	<i>[MAG-39 had supported the 3rd Marine Division in northern ICTZ since April 1968.]</i>	
November		
	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai submitted a complete Command Chronology for the first time. They report 6 officers and 59 enlisted men available for duty. The Assistant OIC is 1stLt Lloyd E. Stanton. 1stLt James E. Koffenberger is the Tower Officer. The Radar Officer is CWO Donald N. Barber. The Training Officer is CWO George E. Meshke, and the Electronics Officer is CWO Robert R. Gerber. MATCU-67 reports totals from both an East Tower and a West Tower. Since arriving at Chu Lai in May 1965 MATCU-67 reported 1,378,496 air operations, of which 62,115 were GCA. During November a new method of counting helicopter operations was placed in effect. "The new policy conforms to the new helicopter course rules outlined in the Air Operations Manual (Air Base Order P3710.7C)."	17 (11-69)
1 Nov	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that Maj. Rudolf M. Nebel had assumed duties as OIC MATCU-68 from Capt. William E. McCollum. Capt Earl P. Basher was listed as the Assistant OIC. Capt Gordon P. Stirling was listed as the Operations Officer, and the Maintenance Officer was Capt James M. Holk.	12 (11-69)
4 Nov	MAG-16 at MMAF reported 19 82mm mortar bombs struck the airfield causing light damage.	6 (11-69)
7 Nov	MAG-36 at Phu Bai was redeployed to Okinawa.	24 (1969)
14 Nov	1stMAW CEO published the findings on the annual inspection of MATCU-68 by NAVELECSYSCOM.	2 (11-69)
30 Nov	<i>Operation Keystone Eagle came to an end. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th Marines had left South Vietnam for Okinawa. This ended the history of the 3rd Marine Division in Vietnam.</i>	27 (pg 283)
	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai reported 24,308 air operations, of which 1,240 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 26,235 air operations, of which 412 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 3,378 air operations, of which only 1 was a MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 12,385 air operations.	17 (11-69) 12 (11-69)
December		
	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai reported being augmented by 2 officers and 8 enlisted men from MATCU-62. MATCU-62 is now at Chu Lai attached to MAG-13. Two MATCU-62 officers listed by name are 1stLt Barrett J. Fenney and 1stLt Gary Weather, both were GCA Officers.	17 (12-69)

Date	1969	Reference
December	MABS-16 at MMAF listed 1stLt Thomas N. Tuthill, 1stLt Phillip A. Grzanish, and 1stLt J. R. Bowman as GCA Officers, and 1stLt Richard C. Jonely as the Tower Officer.	12 (12-69)
5 Dec	1stMAW CEO issued explanation on the failure of the An Hoa TACAN to pass a flight check.	2 (12-69)
7 Dec	MAG-16 at MMAF reported 18 82mm mortar bombs struck the airfield causing moderate damage.	6 (12-69)
9 Dec	MABS-16 at MMAF reported moving a Crash Crew detachment to LZ Baldy.	12 (12-69)
11 Dec	1stMAW CEO discussed coordination problems between the TAOC and Chu Lai Approach.	2 (12-69)
17 Dec	MABS-16 at MMAF reported the loss of 60,000 gallons of JP-4 at LZ Baldy in a fire at the TAFDS.	12 (12-69)
18 Dec	1stMAW CEO described the need for continued Contract Electronic Technical Services for the in-country MATCUs.	2 (12-69)
31 Dec	MATCU-67 at Chu Lai reported 26,506 air operations, of which 1,318 were GCA. Since May of 1965 MATCU-67 has had 1,405,002 air operations, of which 63,433 were GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 25,327 air operations, of which 744 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 4,628 air operations, of which 46 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 10,633 air operations.	17 (12-69) 12 (12-69)
	During December MABS-16 reported several sniper attacks in the MATCU-68 area at An Hoa, but there were no casualties.	12 (12-69)
	<i>At Year-end there are less than 500,000 U. S. Servicemen in South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 684)
	<i>(As 1969 closes MATCU-67 remains at Chu Lai in support of MAG-12 and MAG-13. MATCU-67 is itself supported by personnel from the redeployed MATCU-62. MATCU-68 has moved its flag from Phu Bai to Marble Mountain in support of MAG-16. MATCU-68 remains involved in the support of the An Hoa detachments and at LZ Baldy. MATCU-60 continues to support MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and MATCU-66 is in support of MCAF Futenma, Okinawa)</i>	

Date	1970	Reference
January	1stMAW ASO discusses the loss of an H&MS-13 C-117 with all crewmembers while on a check flight of the Chu Lai TACAN in IMC. In the same report the 1stMAW ASO discusses problems with radar identification.	2 (01-70)
	(See both reports in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported MATCU-62 attached with 4 officers and 47 enlisted men available for duty. MATCU-67 has 5 officers and 59 enlisted men available for duty.	3 (01-70)
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai also reported MATCU-62 attached with 4 officers and 52 enlisted men available for duty. MATCU-67 is also reported as attached to MAG-13 with 6 officers and 84 enlisted men available for duty.	4 (01-70)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported 1stLt Malcom S. Smith as a GCA Officer with MATCU-68. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported continued sniper fire into the MATCU-68 area, but no casualties were reported. At LZ Baldy the GCA unit is operational and awaiting flight check.	12 (01-70)
1 Jan	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported receiving warning order to prepare for redeployment.	3 (01-70)
5 Jan	MAG-16 at MMAF reported 6 122mm rockets struck the airfield causing light damage.	6 (01-70)
14 Jan	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported their sector of the perimeter probed by a small VC unit. There were no casualties.	4 (01-70)
15 Jan	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported their perimeter guards fired on a small VC unit. There were no Marine casualties.	4 (01-70)
	MAG-12 reported transferring MATCU-67 to MAG-13.	3 (01-70)
18 Jan	MAG-12 reported the transfer of MATCU-62 from MAG-13.	3 (01-70)
25 Jan	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported two POL tanks destroyed when 8 122mm rockets hit the airfield. There were no American casualties.	4 (01-70)
31 Jan	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported air operations from both the East and West towers was 27,951, of which 1,080 were MATCU-67 GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 27,567 air operations, of which 576 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 5,188 air operations, of which 13 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 10,235 air operations, of which 3 were MATCU-68 GCA.	10 (01-70) 12 (01-70)
February		
	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported VC units probing their perimeter on four separate occasions.	4 (01-70)
1 Feb	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 5 122mm rockets had hit An Hoa. No damage or casualties were reported.	12 (01-70)

Date	1970	Reference
February		
2 Feb	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 18 82mm mortar bombs had hit An Hoa with no casualties or damage.	12 (02-70)
12 Feb	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported ceasing combat operations.	3 (02-70)
19 Feb	MAG-12 at Chu Lai reported that 36 enlisted men from MATCU-62 had embarked on LST-1151 and sailed for Iwakuni, Japan.	3 (02-70)
20 Feb	1stMAW reported the movement of MATCU-62 from Chu Lai to Iwakuni, Japan.	2 (02-70)
27 Feb	MAG-12 reported the arrival of LST-1151 with men and equipment from MATCU-62 had docked at Iwakuni.	3 (02-70)
28 Feb	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported 22,692 air operations, of which 732 were MATCU-67 GCA. MATCU-68 at MMAF reported 33,986 air operations, of which 607 were GCA. At An Hoa MATCU-68 reported 7,542 air operations, of which 46 were GCA. At LZ Baldy MATCU-68 reported 7,549 air operations, of which 9 were GCA.	10 (02-70) 18 (02-70)
	MATCU-68 reported Capt David G. Cassell as Assistant OIC, and MSgt John C. O'Hey as NCOIC. Capt Gordon P. Stirling is assigned as OIC of the An Hoa Detachment, and Capt Earl P. Basher is the OIC of the detachment at LZ Baldy. MATCU-68 reported 9 officers and 66 enlisted men available for duty.	18 (02-70)
	(See the monographs by Ron Brigance, Roger McIntosh, Chet Newcomb, and G. P. Stirling about this period in the war. Also see the story and MATCA Hotline article by Ron Brigance.)	
March		
16 Mar	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that Capt D. G. Cassell had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 at An Hoa from Capt G. P. Stirling.	12 (03-70)
20 Mar	1stMAW CEO discussed problems in delivery of TPN-8 radar systems to replace FPN-36 radar systems.	2 (03-70)
25 Mar	MABS-16 at MMAF reported a mid-air collision between two HML-367 AH-1s in the pattern. All 4 crewmembers were killed, but there were no ground casualties from the wreckage falling near air freight.	12 (03-70)
31 Mar	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported a combined total, from both East and West towers, of 29,245 air operations, of which 348 were MATCU-67 GCA. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 29,366 air operations, of which 737 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 5,163 air operations, of which 19 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 7,298 air operations, of which 14 were MATCU-68 GCA.	10 (03-70) 12 (03-70)
	(See the story by Ray Norton about this period at MMAF and LZ Baldy.)	

Date	1970	Reference
April	MABS-16 at MMAF recorded the addition of 1stLt Robert L. Barry and 1stLt Frank J. Conti to the MATCU-68 staff as GCA Officers. At An Hoa a TRN-29 TACAN is reported in use.	12 (04-70)
27 Apr	MABS-16 at MMAF reported the termination of TACAN service at LZ Baldy.	12 (04-70)
28 Apr	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that GCA service was discontinued at LZ Baldy.	12 (04-70)
30 Apr	1stMAW reported Chu Lai airfield hit by 3 122mm rockets. No damage or injuries were reported.	2 (04-70)
May	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported a combined air operations total from both East and West towers as 27,759. No total of MATCU-67 GCA was made. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 32,841 air operations, of which 534 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 4,910 air operations, of which 19 were MATCU-68 GCA. MABS-16 reported 6,363 air operations for LZ baldy, of which 5 were MATCU-68 GCA.	10 (04-70) 12 (04-70)
1 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 1stLt Malcom S. Smith had been assigned to duty as OIC of the MATCU-68 detachment at LZ Baldy.	12 (05-70)
4 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that all GCA equipment at LZ baldy had been returned to MMAF.	12 (05-70)
4 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported 12 122mm rockets hit the airfield causing U. S. casualties and starting a POL fire.	4 (05-70)
5 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported 10 122mm rockets hit the airfield. 1 Marine was KIA, and 24 Marines were WIA, including two from MATCU-67. (See monograph by Jim Strasser.)	4 (05-70)
8 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported An Hoa airfield hit by 5 122mm and 140mm rockets. No damage or casualties were reported.	12 (05-70)
13 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported 5 122mm rockets hit the airfield in two separate attacks that caused no damage or casualties.	4 (05-70)
16 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported the LF RBn at LZ baldy operational.	12 (05-70)
16 May	1stMAW CEO reported that 7th AF had not released the Marine TACAN at Quang Tri until February 1970.	2 (05-70)
19 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported 3 140mm rockets hit the An Hoa Airfield without causing damage or casualties.	12 (05-70)
21 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported the MATCU-68 TPN-8A at An Hoa had passed a periodic flight check.	12 (05-70)
21 May	MAG-13 at Chu Lai reported that 8 122mm rockets had hit the airfield without causing damage or injury.	4 (05-70)

Date	1970	Reference
May		
26 May	MABS-16 at MMAF reported two mortar bombs hit the An Hoa airfield without causing damage or casualties.	12 (05-70)
31 May	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported a combined total of 27,759 air operations at both East and West towers. MATCU-67 GCA totals were not reported. MABS-16 at MMAF reported 35,032 air operations, of which 666 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 6,835 air operations, of which 6 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 6,106 air operations.	10 (05-70) 12 (05-70)
June		
4 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported 8 82mm mortar bombs struck the Army side of the airfield. Shrapnel damaged 9 Army aircraft.	12 (06-70)
6 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported an Air Force C-119 lost an engine and jettisoned 15 parachute flares overhead the airfield. The falling flares damaged two crash trucks and injured 4 Marines.	12 (06-70)
9 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported BULLY 19, an Air Force OV-10, under control by MATCU-68 GCA struck a dirt pile on the runway threshold.	12 (06-70)
	(See the MATCA Hotline Letter by Ron Brigance regarding this incident.)	
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported NMCB-7 had completed all work on the runway at LZ Baldy.	12 (06-70)
	1stMAW CEO coordinated the temporary loan of a UPS-1C from MATCU-66 at Futenma, Okinawa to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. Loan required because NAVELECSYSCOM had no replacement available.	2 (06-70)
10 Jun	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported 2 rockets hit near the northeast end of the flight line. No report of damage or injury was made.	10 (06-70)
15 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 1stLt Robert L. Barry had been assigned to duty as the OIC of the MATCU-68 detachment at An Hoa.	12 (06-70)
18 Jun	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that the runway at An Hoa had been closed to fixed wing aircraft due to surface deterioration.	12 (06-70)
19 Jun	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported 2 rockets struck the airfield near the U. S. Army's 14 th Aviation Company. No report of damage or injury was made.	10 (06-70)
20 Jun	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported that 1 rocket struck the airfield near MATCU-67. No report of damage or injury was made.	10 (06-70)
30 Jun	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported 25,547 air operations. MATCU-67 GCA totals were not recorded. At MMAF MABS-16 reported 33,629 air operations, of which 761 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 7,192 air operations, of which 7 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MATCU-68 recorded 7,213 air operations.	10 (06-70) 12 (06-70)

Date	1970	Reference
July		
2 Jul	1stMAW reported that MGen A. J. Armstrong had assumed command from MGen W. G. Thrash.	2 (07-70)
12 Jul	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that C. R. Armstrong of MATCU-68 had been assigned duty as control tower officer at MMAF.	12 (07-70)
25 Jul	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that Maj D. R. Bowen had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 from Maj R. N. Nebel.	12 (07-70)
	(See the monographs by Denny Bowen, John Campaigne, J.J. Carr, and Dick Szuba concerning this period of the war.)	
31 Jul	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported a combined total of 29,555 air operations by both East and West towers. Again, MATCU-67 GCA totals were not noted. At MMAF MABS-16 reported 31,825 air operations, of which 573 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa 9,716 air operations were recorded by MABS-16, of which 4 were MATCU-68 GCA. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 reported 8,435 air operations.	10 (07-70) 12 (07-70)
August		
1 Aug	MABS-16 at MMAF issued a NOTAM withdrawing the GCA, TACAN, and LF RBn at An Hoa from service.	12 (08-70)
3 Aug	1stMAW CEO requested III MAF approval for the installation of the TACAN and LF RBn removed from An Hoa at MMAF.	2 (08-70)
7 Aug	1stMAW reported the LtCol S. J. Czubai assumed duty as CEO from LtCol T. Klaus.	2 (08-70)
22 Aug	1stMAW issued warning order to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai to be prepared to turn over to the U. S. Army's 327 Aviation Detachment selected tower assets.	2 (08-70)
31 Aug	MABS-13 reported that there were 28,500 air operations at Chu Lai. MATCU-67 GCA totals were not noted. MABS-16 at MMAF recorded 30,128 air operations, of which 644 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported 9,122 air operations and at LZ Baldy 7,642 air operations were recorded by MABS-16.	10 (08-70) 12 (08-70)
September		
13 Sep	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that TACAN Channel 121, ID-MBN, was installed by MATCU-68.	12 (09-70)
15 Sep	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported MATCU-67 ceased operation simultaneously with the closing of the air base. Since arriving at Chu Lai in May 1965 MATCU-67 had conducted 1,455,432 tower operations, 69,146 GCA operations, and 177,963 approach control operations.	10 (09-70)
27 Sep	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that Capt T. N. Cox had joined the MATCU-68 staff as a GCA Officer.	12 (09-70)

Date	1970	Reference
September		
27 Sep	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that MATCU-68 had installed a LF RBn on frequency 525 KHz, with an ID of MBN at MMAF.	12 (09-70)
30 Sep	MABS-13 reported transferring administrative and operational control of MATCU-67 to the 3rdMAW at MCAS El Toro, California. In closing this chapter in the history of MATCU-67. Maj M. J. Fibich Jr, the CO of MABS-13, notes that during its assignment to Chu Lai MATCU-67 "supported operations comparable to most Marine Corps Air Stations in the Continental limits of the United States, while utilizing equipment and manning levels designed for SATS operations."	10 (09-70)
	MABS-13 at Chu Lai reported that prior to 15 September there were 13,637 air operations at Chu Lai. No monthly GCA totals were noted. At MMAF MABS-16 recorded 27,880 air operations, of which 776 were MATCU-68 GCA. At An Hoa MABS-16 reported only 736 air operations, while at LZ Baldy 10,876 air operations were reported by MABS-16.	10 (09-70) 12 (09-70)
October		
6 Oct	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 1stMAW had completed its annual inspection of MATCU-68.	12 (10-70)
9 Oct	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that MATCU-68 had secured the TRN-29 TACAN at Chu Lai and arranged for its return to MATCU-67.	12 (10-70)
13 Oct	1stMAW reported Typhoon Joan effecting weather patterns in ICTZ.	2 (10-70)
15 Oct	The airfield at An Hoa is closed.	24 (1970)
20 Oct	MABS-16 reported MATCU-68 returning TRC-131 SERNO A-17 to NAVELECSYSCOM.	12 (10-70)
25 Oct	1stMAW reported Tropical Storm Kate effecting weather in ICTZ.	2 (10-70)
26 Oct	MABS-16 reported 1stLt J. L. Webb attached to the MATCU-68 staff as an ATC Officer.	12 (10-70)
30 Oct	1stMAW reported that 10 CH-53s from MAG-16 flew 179 sorties and transported 3,840 civilian passengers during mandatory rescue missions in badly flooded areas.	2 (10-70)
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported 21,889 air operations, of which 829 were MATCU-68 GCA. In addition to GCA MATCU-68 provided 287 radar monitors assisting MAG-16 helicopters in finding pick-up points in their rescue missions. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 recorded 10,100 air operations.	12 (10-70)
November		
	MABS-16 at MMAF reported installing a LF RBn at LZ Ross	12 (11-70)
30 Nov	MABS-16 at MMAF reported 23,873 air operations, of which 662 were MATCU-68 GCA. MATCU-68 provided an additional 278 radar monitors in furtherance of MAG-16 missions. At LZ Baldy MABS-16 recorded 13,064 air operations.	12 (11-70)

Date	1970	Reference
December		
31 Dec	<p><i>U. S. Troop strength in South Vietnam is 280,000.</i></p> <p><i>(At year end the only active MATCU in country is MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain. MATCU-68 also has active tower detachments at LZ Baldy and LZ Ross. At MCAS Iwakuni, Japan ATC is supported by MATCU-60, and MATCU-66 supports MAG-36 at MCAF Futenma, Okinawa. MATCU-62 is assigned to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, but in a maintenance only status. MATCU-67 has been re-assigned to the 3rdMAW at MCAS El Toro, California.</i></p> <p><i>In the coming year there is very little recorded in the command chronologies of either MABS-16 or MAG-16 concerning MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain. Even the 1stMAW CEO has ceased to include ATC related comments in the 1stMAW chronology.)</i></p>	25 (pg 685)

Date	1971	Reference
January		
1 Jan	Capt. J. A. Capistran has assumed duty as OIC MATCU-62 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan	2 (01-71)
11 Jan	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that Maj B. I. Collins assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 from Maj D. R. Bowen. Maj Bowen was re-assigned as CO, H&MS-16 at MMAF.	12 (01-71)
February		
15 Feb	LZ Ross transferred to the control of the South Vietnamese Army.	27 (pg 308)
March		
April	<i>By the end of March Operation Keystone Robin Charlie had accounted for the redeployment of the 5th Marine Regiment to Camp Pendleton, California. This left only the 1st Marine Regiment available to the 1stMarDiv.</i>	27 (pg 308)
14 Apr	MABS-16 at MMAF reported that 1stLt R. A. Anderson and 1stLt P. M. Giglio have joined the MATCU-68 staff as GCA Watch Officers, and 1stLt W. J. O'Sullivan has joined MATCU-68 as the Control Tower Officer.	12 (04-71)
14 Apr	III MAF at Danang is dissolved, and reformed as the 9 th Marine Amphibious Brigade under the command of MGen A. J. Armstrong. MGen Armstrong had passed command of the 1stMAW to BGen R. F. Conley who redeployed the 1stMAW to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.	2 (04-71)
14 Apr	During April duties as the OIC MATCU-62 at Iwakuni, Japan rotated through 1stLt G. G. Weaver and 1stLT B. G. Feeney, before settling on Capt T. N. Cox.	2 (04-71)
May		
7 May	All units of the 9 th MAB cease combat operations.	27 (pg 311)
19 May	<i>2nd Battalion, 1st Marines leave South Vietnam for Camp Pendleton, California. This was the last Marine infantry battalion in South Vietnam.</i>	27 (pg 311)
June		
15 Jun	1stMAW at Iwakuni, Japan reported that MATCU-68 had been transferred from MAG-16 at MMAF, to MAG-36 at MCAF Futenma, Japan.	2 (06-71)
22 Jun	1stMAW at Iwakuni, Japan reported that the USS Dubuque off loaded MATCU-68 equipment at White Beach, Okinawa.	2 (06-71)
27 Jun	CWO-2 L. R. Coxe assumed duty as OIC MATCU-68 from Major B. I. Collins.	2 (1972)
27 Jun	<i>The 9th MAB is formally deactivated. "With all Marine ground combat, aviation, and support units redeployed, the only Marines remaining in South Vietnam were the approximately 550 officers and men serving as embassy guards, on the MACV staff, or as advisors to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps.</i>	27 (pg 311)

Date	1971	Reference
August		
1 Aug	1stMAW at Iwakuni, Japan reported that Capt. D. L. Hendrix had assumed duties as OIC MATCU-60 from 1stLt C. R. Hickey.	2 (08-71)
	1stMAW published results of readiness inspections of MATCU-60, MATCU-62, MATCU-66, and MATCU-68.	2 (08-71)
	(See these reports in the Significant Document appendix.)	
September	<i>(Leon Coxe reports MATCU-68 establishing a GCA unit at the 9th Marines Headquarters at Camp Schwab called SCHWAB RADAR for use in helicopter operations in the Northern Training Area.)</i>	
December	<i>(Leon Coxe reports transferring all MATCU-68 "end items" to MCAS Quantico where Roger McIntosh reports MATCU-68 re-commissioned with Al Davis as OIC and Bill Van Orden as NCOIC.)</i>	
	<i>(This ends the distinguished history of MATCU-68 in South East Asia and the Western Pacific. The unit had served with honor since 1965.)</i>	
	At year- end there are 140,000 U. S. Servicemen in South Vietnam.	25 (pg 685)
	<i>(As 1971 comes to an end MATCU-60 remains in support of MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, but is attached to MAG-15. MATCU-62 is also at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and is attached to MAG-12. MATCU-66 is in support of MCAF Futenma, Okinawa, but is attached to MAG-36.)</i>	

Date	1972	Reference
January	The year opens with MajGen R. G. Owens Commanding the 1stMAW with Col J. A. Blakeley assigned as Wing CEO. The 1stMAW Command Directory lists Captain D. L. Hendrix as OIC MATCU-60, and Captain A. E. Peters as OIC MATCU-62.	2 (1972)
February	3 Feb 1stMAW reports MATCU-60 (-) (Rein) deployed aboard USS Washenaw County (LST-1166) for training exercise ICARUS.	2 (1972)
	(See the Joint Public Affairs Office release in Significant Documents.)	
	<i>(This entry is made because I did not know that MATCU-60 in its entire history ever did anything but provide Marines and equipment to support MCAS Iwakuni.)</i>	
March	30 Mar NVA main force units attack across the DMZ into South Vietnam.	27 (pg 314)
April	2 Apr Capt John W. Ripley, USMC attached as an advisor to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, successfully stops NVA tank assault by destroying the bridge over the Song Bo Dieu in Dong Ha City.	27 (pg 318-320)
6 Apr	MAG-15 reported deploying from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan to Da Nang, South Vietnam.	5 (04-72)
25 Apr	MajGen L. E. Brown assumed duty as CG 1stMAW from MajGen R. G. Owens.	2 (1972)
27 Apr	Dong Ha falls to the NVA after defending South Vietnamese tanks are repositioned and panic affects remaining defenders.	27 (pg 322)
29 Apr	NVA assault on Quang Tri City begins.	27 (pg 322)
May	The 1stMAW Command Directory reports 1stLt J. F. Rush as OIC of MATCU-66 on Okinawa. (See monograph and HOTLINE article by John Rush.)	2 (1972)
2 May	South Vietnamese defenders abandon Quang Tri City.	27 (pg 324)
8 May	Operation LINEBACKER I, the mining of Haiphong harbor is initiated.	25 (pg 685)
17 May	MAG-12 reported deploying from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan to Bien Hoa, South Vietnam.	3 (05-72)
25 May	1stMAW reports LtCol J. H. Bird assumed duties as Wing CEO from Col J. A. Blakely.	2 (1972)
27 May	At MCAS Iwakuni, Japan MABS-15 reports transferring MATCU-60, under the command of Capt D. L. Hendrix, to MABS-12 (Rear). In turn MATCU-62, under the command of Capt R. D. Anderson, is transferred from MABS-12 (Rear) to MABS-15.	11 (05-72)

Date	1972	Reference
May		
28 May	MABS-15 reported that an advanced party from MATCU-62 and other airfield support elements deploy to Nam Phong, Thailand. MAG-15 listed CWO Thomas Lish as a member of this advanced party.	11 (05-72) 05 (05-72)
30 May	1stMAW reported MATCU-62 deployed to Nam Phong AB, Thailand.	2 (1972)
June		
	MABS-15 reported MATCU-62 operational at Nam Phong, Thailand. The OIC is Captain R. D. Anderson and there are 5 officers and 52 enlisted men available for duty. (See monographs by Tom Lish, Jack Mefford, and Richard Hawes, and story by Jack Hales.)	11 (06-72)
2 Jun	Wing CEO submitted request to CG FMFPAC for assistance in expediting shipment of TRN-29A TACAN to MATCU-62.	2 (1972)
	Wing CEO coordinated efforts of MATCU-60 and MATCU-66 in responding to urgent requirement by MATCU-62 for TRN-14 TACAN.	2 (1972)
	Wing CEO submitted request to COMUSMACTHAI for frequency clearance for low frequency homing beacon at Nam Phong to support airfield operations.	2 (1972)
3 Jun	Wing CEO reported MATCU-66 received TRN-14 from MATCU-60 at 0730Z. MATCU-66 replaced inoperable components, performed an operations check, and shipped TRN-14 to MATCU-62 at 1130Z.	2 (1972)
20 Jun	MAG-15 moves to Nam Phong, Thailand from Danang, South Vietnam.	5 (06-72)
	Wing CEO reports coordinating the transfer of three (3) Radar Technicians MOS 5944 from MASS-2 to meet an urgent requirement by MATCU-62.	2 (1972)
22 Jun	Wing CEO provided rationale to CG FMFPAC for the retention of VHF (AM) capability in the MATCU inventory and advised that being limited to 118.0 MHz to 136.0 MHz would not create any problems.	2 (1972)
28 Jun	<i>South Vietnamese forces attack to retake Quang Tri City. A Marine helicopter squadron airlifts friendly forces from ships in a U S Navy Amphibious Ready Group in the Tokin Gulf.</i>	27 (pg 325)
29 Jun	1stMAW reports that Col H. L. Fogarty has assumed duty as Wing CEO from LtCol J. H. Bird Jr.	2 (1972)
30 Jun	MABS-15 at Nam Phong, Thailand reported that there were 5,108 air operations, of which 232 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (06-72)
	<i>(At some point Nam Phong has started to be called "The Rose garden", leading to a popular recruiting campaign.)</i>	
July		
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that MATCU-62 had 7 officers and 58 enlisted men available for duty	11 (07-72)

Date	1972	Reference
July	The 1stMAW Command Directory now lists 1stLt N. S. Davis as OIC MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.	2 (1972)
11 Jul	(The 1stMAW reports that in the Gulf of Tonkin HMM-165 lost one CH-53 to an SA-7 missile during operation LAM SON 72. Two crewmembers, SSgt J. W. Hendrix and Cpl K. L. Crody, were killed in action. The remainder of the crew were wounded but rescued. An estimated 48 South Vietnamese troops were killed in the crash and subsequent fire.)	2 (1972)
31 Jul	In their second month of operation MABS-15 reported 4,463 air operations, of which 342 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (07-72)
August	MABS-15 reported the failure of the MATCU-62 TRN-29 TACAN, and that a TRN-6 TACAN had been borrowed from the USAF. Flight check of the TRN-6 is still pending. MATCU-62 has permission to change channels on their TRN-29 from 103 to 61, and is awaiting arrival of the necessary parts. A UHF RBn has been installed and flight checked.	11 (08-72)
2 Aug	(1stMAW reports an F-4J from VMFA-232 crashed after fuel exhaustion three (3) miles south of Nam Phong. The crew successfully ejected and was recovered within five (5) minutes.)	2 (1972)
18 Aug	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that 1stLt E. H. Sullivan had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-62 from Capt R. D. Anderson.	11 (08-72)
31 Aug	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that there were 4,667 air operations, of which 296 were MATCU-62 GCA	11 (08-72)
September	The 1stMAW Command Directory now lists Captain R. D. Anderson as OIC of MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan:	2 (1972)
4 Sep	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that Capt H. D. Hollis had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-62 from 1stLt E. H. Sullivan.	11 (09-72)
	MABS-15 reported installing an M-21 arresting gear at the midpoint of runway 01/19 at Nam Phong.	11 (09-72)
	1stMAW reports that the UPS-1 at Nam Phong, Thailand was certified by the FAA for use in ground controlled instrument landing approaches.	2 (1972)
16 Sep	<i>South Vietnamese forces report Quang Tri City back under the control of the Republic of South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 685)
30 Sep	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported 3,649 air operations, of which 354 are MATCU-62 GCA. The control tower and GCA unit are on a 24-hour per day 7-day a week schedule.	11 (09-72)

Date	1972	Reference
October	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that MATCU-62 "received a new AN/TRN-29A, which after siting was flight checked and certified as a terminal Navaid. The subsequent publishing of a TACAN approach, allows MATCU-62 to provide full IFR services to MAG-15 Aircraft. The proceeding certification gives MATCU-62 the distinction of being the only fully operational Marine Air Traffic Control Unit in the 1 st Marine Aircraft Wing."	11 (10-72)
31 Oct	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported 4,013 air operations, of which 543 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (10-72)
November		
7 Nov	<i>Richard M. Nixon defeated George McGovern in the U. S. Presidential Election.</i>	25 (pg 685)
30 Nov	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported 5,887 air operations, of which 579 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (11-72)
December		
18 Dec	<i>President Nixon authorizes LINEBACKER II, the bombing of North Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 686)
	(1stMAW reports that an Air Force B-52, damaged on a mission over North Vietnam, crashed 12 miles SE of Nam Phong. All seven crewmen successfully ejected and were rescued by the CH-46 helicopters of the H&MS-36 detachment at Nam Phong.)	2 (1972)
20 Dec	(1 st MAW reports a battle damaged Air Force B-52 diverted to Nam Phong while returning from a mission over North Vietnam. The field was closed from 0100-0400H before the large bomber could be moved clear of the runway.)	2 (1972)
23 Dec	MAG-15 reports that USO entertainer Bob Hope performed at Nam Phong.	5 (12-72)
31 Dec	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported 4,419 air operations, of which 388 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (12-72)
	<i>(As 1972 comes to a close MATCU-62 continues to support MAG-15 at Nam Phong, Thailand. On the Japanese mainland MATCU-60 is attached to MAG-12, but is in support of MCAS Iwakuni. On Okinawa MATCU-66 is attached to MAG-36, but is in support of MCAF Futenma.)</i>	

Date	1973	Reference
January		
5 Jan	1stMAW reports that a VMFA-115 F-4 sustained extensive battle damage from 23MM AAA. In spite of the substantial damage to fuel cells, flaps, and port engine the aircraft returned safely to Nam Phong with no personnel injuries.	2 (1973)
12 Jan	MAG-12 (Rear) at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan reported that 1stLt M. S. Davis had assumed duty at OIC MATCU-60 from Capt M. D. Anderson.	3 (01-73)
19 Jan	1stMAW reports the operation name for the repatriation processing procedures for US personnel POW/MIA has been changed from EGRESS RECAP to HOMECOMING.	2 (1973)
27 Jan	MAG-12 reported ceasing combat operations at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam.	3 (01-73)
	<i>Peace accords signed in Paris, France.</i>	25 (pg 686)
February		
1 Feb	MAG-12 reported its return to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan	3 (02-73)
2 Feb	1stMAW reports the Officers and SNCO clubs opened in Nam Phong RTAB, Thailand	2 (1973)
12 Feb	<i>Operation HOMECOMING, the release of U. S. POWs from captivity in Hanoi begins.</i>	25 (pg 686)
17 Feb	MAG-15 at Nam Phong reported 1 Marine killed, 5 Marines seriously injured, and 15 Marines with minor injuries following the collision between a liberty bus and an Esso oil truck.	5 (02-73)
March		
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that MATCU-62 had received a satisfactory grade on its recent annual inspection by NAVELECSYSCOM.	11 (03-73)
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that TAD personnel from MATCU-66 on Okinawa and helped resolve personnel problems within MATCU-62.	11 (03-73)
18 Mar	MAG-12 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan reported that Capt Art Warnak had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-60 from 1stLt M. S. Davis.	3 (03-73)
April		
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported publishing "Air Operations Order for RTAFB Nam Phong."	11 (04-73)
	(See this document in the Significant Documents appendix.)	
1 Apr	<i>Last known U. S. POW released at Hanoi.</i>	25 (pg 686)
17 Apr	1stMAW reports that MajGen F. C. Lang assumed duties as Commanding General 1 st Marine Aircraft Wing from MajGen L. E. Brown.	2 (1973)

Date	1973	Reference
June		
24 Jun	<i>In Saigon Graham Martin replaces Ellsworth Bunker as U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.</i>	25 (pg 686)
	1stMAW Reports that LtCol R. J. Lee assumed duties as Wing CEO from Col H. L. Fogarty.	2 (1973)
30 Jun	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that since 1 January there had been 39,886 air operations, of which 3,771 were MATCU-62 GCA.	11 (06-73)
July		
1 Jul	1stMAW reports that LtCol R. V. Cisewski assumed duties as Wing CEO from LtCol R. J. Lee.	2 (1973)
23 Jul	1stMAW reports that LtCol R. J. Lee relieved LtCol R. V. Cisewski as Wing CEO.	2 (1973)
August		
1 Aug	MABS-15 at Nam Phong reported that Capt C. L. Lott had assumed duty as OIC MATCU-62 from Capt H. H. Hollis.	11 (08-73)
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong now reports 1stLt J. T. Cantwell as Assistant OIC of MATCU-62.	11 (08-73)
15 Aug	1stMAW reports that all combat operations against enemy forces within the Republic of Cambodia were terminated. 1stMAW notes that MAG-15 was last Marine Aviation unit engaged in combat in South East Asia.	2 (1973)
27 Aug	1stMAW reports that Task Force Delta received a warning order to retrograde out of Nam Phong RTAFB.	2 (1973)
30 Aug	1stMAW reports that Task Force Delta executed the orders received on the 27 th .	2 (1973)
	1stMAW reports that 8 A-6A's of VMA (AW) – 533 flew from Nam Phong RTAFB to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan marking the end of a 14-month deployment in Thailand.	2 (1973)
31 Aug	1stMAW reports that VMFA-115's F-4Bs departed Nam Phong RTAFB for MAF Naha, Okinawa.	2 (1973)
September		
1 Sep	1stMAW reports that the F-4Bs of VMFA-232 left Nam Phong RTAFB for NAS Cubi Point, Philippines. This squadron was the last tactical Marine aircraft squadron to participate in combat operations in South East Asia.	2 (1973)
	MABS-15 at Nam Phong RTAFB, Thailand reported beginning to move back to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan.	11 (09-73)

Date	1973	Reference
September		
14 Sep	MAG-15 at Nam Phong, Thailand reported the start of a MAC airlift of its assets to MCAS Iwakuni.	5 (09-73)
21 Sep	1stMAW reports last units of MABS-15 departed Nam Phong after completing US-Thai base turnover.	2 (1973)
23 Sep	MAG-15 reported the last contract surface ship, the SS Green Forest, left Sattahip, Thailand for Iwakuni, Japan.	5 (09-73)
October		
1 Oct	MAG-15 reported the SS Green Forest commenced unloading at Iwakuni, Japan.	11 (10-73)
10 Oct	<i>Vice President Spiro Agnew resigns and is replaced by Gerald Ford.</i>	25 (pg 686)
<p><i>(With the end of U S Combat Operations in South East Asia temporarily at an end 1973 closes with MATCU-62 back with MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. MCAS Futenma, Okinawa continues to be supported by MAG-36's MATCU-66.)</i></p>		

Date	1974	Reference
January	<i>In Saigon President Nguyen Van Thieu declares that the war in South Vietnam has begun again.</i>	25 (pg 686)
15 Jan	MAG-36 identifies Capt W. M. Darnell as OIC MATCU-66. ProvMAG-10 begins to deploy to Pohang, Korea in preparation for Exercise FLYAWAY. MATCU-66 is an element of ProvMAG-10 and is tasked with the operation of a control tower with UHF and FM frequencies at PoHang. It is also tasked to provide additional personnel to support the USAF control tower at Taegu.	7 (1974)
February	MCAS Futenma closes runway for resurfacing.	7 (1974)
1 Feb	Exercise FLYAWAY begins in Pohang, Korea.	2 (1974)
7 Feb	Exercise FLYAWAY completes.	2 (1974)
27 Feb	1stMAW reports that all units assigned to ProvMAG-10 have returned to their parent commands and air stations.	2 (1974)
March		
1 Mar	MCAS Futenma runway reopens after resurfacing.	7 (1974)
April		
4 Apr	Naval Electronics Inspection of MATCU-60, MATCU-62, and MATCU-66 is reported by 1stMAW.	2 (1974)
6 Apr	1stMAW identifies Operation EAGLE PULL as a contingency for the evacuation of personnel from Phnom Phenh and begins assigning units to the 31 st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) on board the USS New Orleans LPH-11 and USS Okinawa LPH-3.	2 (1974)
9 Apr	1stMAW reports MajGen V. A. Armstrong assumed duties as CG 1stMAW from MajGen F. C. Lang.	2 (1974)
May		
9 May	<i>The U. S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee opens impeachment hearing on President Richard M. Nixon.</i>	25 (pg 686)
Jul	<i>Saigon reports that the communist buildup of men and equipment in South Vietnam continues.</i>	25 (pg 687)
12 Jul	1stMAW reports that LtCol D. D. Hall assumed duties as Wing CEO from LtCol R. J. Lee Jr.	2 (1974)
18 Jul	1stMAW reports that LtCol F. M. Manrod assumed duties as Wing CEO from LtCol D. D. Hall.	2 (1974)
30 Jul	<i>The U. S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee votes to impeach President Richard M. Nixon on three (3) counts.</i>	25 (pg 687)

1974

Date
August

Reference

1stMAW CEO identifies critical shortage of Marines in MOS 5952 Air Traffic Control Navigation Aids.

2 (1974)

(See this document in the Significant Documents Section.)

9 Aug

President Richard M. Nixon resigns and is replaced by Gerald R. Ford.

25 (pg 687)

September

8 Sept

President Gerald R. Ford issued pardon to Richard M. Nixon for all federal crimes that he committed or he may have committed.

25 (pg 687)

(As 1974 ends the United States attempts to recover from its political turmoil and South Vietnam braces for what is to come. Both MATCU-60 and MATCU-62 continue to support MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and MATCU-66 continues to support MAG-36 and MCAS Futenma, Okinawa.)

Date	1975	Reference
January	MAG-36 identifies Captain S. D. Haley as OIC of MATCU-66.	11 (1975)
6 Jan	<i>Communists capture Phuc Long Province North of Saigon.</i>	25 (pg 687)
18 Jan	1stMAW reports that MajGen N. W. Gourley has assumed duties as Commanding General from MajGen V. A. Armstrong.	2 (1975)
February		
24 Feb	MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan is inspected by representatives from the Naval Electronics System Command.	2 (1975)
March		
11 Mar	<i>Communists capture Ban Me Thout.</i>	25 (pg 687)
12 Mar	MAG-36 reported that MATCU-66 has embarked to participate in MARFLEX 1-75.	11 (1975)
15 Mar	<i>South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in a meeting with his commanders at Cam Rahn Bay orders that the Northern provinces of South Vietnam are to be abandoned.</i>	25 (pg 687)
25 Mar	<i>In spite of a reversal of orders that Hue be held at all costs the city falls to the Communists.</i>	25 (pg 687)
27 Mar	MAG-36 reported that MAFLEX 1-75 is cancelled in the late planning stage due to operational commitments.	11 (1975)
30 Mar	<i>Da Nang falls to the Communists.</i>	25 (pg 687)
	<i>(The film crew that accompanied the World Airways Boeing 727 in the last flight into Da Nang recorded scenes of panic and the complete breakdown of order. The aircraft's armed crew had to fight off excess passengers. As the aircraft started its takeoff roll it was chased down the runway by all manner of vehicles from trucks to motor scooters. As the aircraft became airborne unfortunate souls were observed to fall from the wheel wells and the rear stairway. The aircraft flew at low altitude with its wheels down and locked to Saigon, should anyone have retained a grip on the landing gear. This film and accompanying commentary was shown widely on US television.)</i>	
	MAG-36 reported embarking detachments to assist in Operations EAGLE PULL and FREQUENT WIND.	11 (1975)
	<i>(See the Monograph from Robert Young about the experiences of the MATCU-66 detachment on the USS Oriskany CVA-34.)</i>	
April		
7 Apr	<i>Le DucTho arrived in Loc Ninh to direct the Communist offensive against Saigon.</i>	25 (pg 687)
	<i>This is the same Le DucTho that negotiated the 1973 Peace Treaty in Paris with Henry Kissinger and shared the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize.</i>	
12 Apr	MAG-36 reported executing Operation EAGLE PULL to evacuate US citizens from Phnom Phenh, Cambodia.	11 (1975)

Date	1975	Reference
April		
17 Apr	<i>Phnom Penh, Cambodia falls to the Communists.</i>	25 (pg 687)
21 Apr	<i>Xuan Loc, the last defense line before Saigon, falls to the Communists.</i>	25 (pg 687)
23 Apr	<i>US President Gerald Ford, speaking in New Orleans, calls the war "finished".</i>	25 (pg 687)
28 Apr	<i>South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu leaves Saigon for Taiwan. The Vice President, Tran Van Hong, transfers authority as chief of state to General Duong Van Minh.</i>	25 (pg 687)
29 Apr	1stMAW reported executing Operation FREQUENT WIND.	2 (1975)
	<i>Ambassador Graham Martin leaves Saigon.</i>	25 (pg 687)
30 Apr	<i>Saigon falls to the Communists.</i>	25 (pg 687)
June		
4 Jun	1stMAW reported that Major T. D. Love assumed duties as Wing CEO from LtCol F. M. Manrod.	2 (1975)
22 Jun	1stMAW reported that the last MAG-36 units return to MCAS Futenma ending participation in Operation FREQUENT WIND.	2 (1975)
30 Jun	MAG-36 reported that MATCU-66 had 8 officers and 55 enlisted men available for duty.	11 (1975)
August		
17 Aug	1stMAW reported that LtCol F. J. Reisinger assumed duties as Wing CEO from Major T. D. Love.	2 (1975)
	<i>(As 1975 ends MATCU-60 and MATCU-62 are at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan and MATCU-66 supports MCAS Futenma, Okinawa. These MATCUs remain in place until the name MATCU disappears into history with the creation of Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron Detachments.)</i>	

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Personnel Listings (Partial)

PERSONNEL ROSTER INDEX

Unit	Page
MATCU-62	101
MATCU-66	110
MATCU-67	114
MATCU-68	122
MATCU-70	130

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Dong Ha	Dick Acosta	SSgt	T	67	Bill Behan
Nam Phong	Tom Adams	SSgt	C	72-73	Jack Mefford
Dong Ha	J. W. Albin (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Jerry Albin (WIA)	Sgt	T	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	A. J. Amato	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
LZ Vandegrift	A. J. Amato	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	J. A. Anderson	1stLt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Iwakuni	R. D. Anderson	Capt	A	72	MABS-15 CC 6-72
Nam Phong	R. D. Anderson	Capt	A	72-73	Tom Lish
Dong Ha	W. B. Andes	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	W. B. Andes	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Nam Phong	Ray Anti	CWO	T	72-73	Jack Mefford
Dong Ha	Robert G. Arthur	SSgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	M. E. Asmus	GySgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	R. N. Aznaran	PFC	C	68-69	Don Eskam
LZ Vandegrift	R. N. Aznaran	LCpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Quang Tri	D. C. Baczkowski	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	D. H. Badger	MSgt	A	67-68	Dick Wooton
Dong Ha	T. G. Balderree	1stLt	C	67	MATCU-62 CC 12067
Quang Tri	R. A. "Rex" Barbeau	Sgt	C	68-69	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	G. H. Baribeault	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	J. M. Barry	LCpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	J. M. "Mike" Barry	Cpl	C	68	Richard D'Ambrosio
LZ Vandegrift	J. M. Barry	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	Earl P. Basher	Capt	A	68-69	Don Eskam
LZ Vandegrift	Earl P. Basher	Capt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Nam Phong	Del Bassett		A	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	R. G. "Bob" Bathe	MSgt	A	69	Chet Newcomb
Dong Ha	Jerry Bauer	SSgt	T	69	Jerry Bauer
Quang Tri	Jerry Bauer	SSgt	T	69	Jerry Bauer
Chu Lai	Jerry Bauer	SSgt	T	69	Jerry Bauer
Quang Tri	J. H. Beaulieu	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
LZ Vandegrift	J. N. Beaulieu	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	W. I. Beegle	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
LZ Vandegrift	W. I. Beegle	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Quang Tri	E. R. Befern	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	Bill Behan	SSgt	C	67	Bill Behan
Quang Tri	D. P. Bergeim	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Khe Sanh	Chris Bernard	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	Steve E. Best	Sgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
Quang Tri	? Betts	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Nam Phong	Doug Blower		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	J. C. Booker	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	J. C. Booker	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	A. S. "Al" Boone	Cpl	T	68-69	Jim Macaulay
Quang Tri	J. R. Bowman	1stLt	T	69	Chet Newcomb
Quang Tri	M. W. Brackett (WIA)	Sgt	D	68-69	Gary Lewis
LZ Vandegrift	M.W. Brackett	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	K. R. Bradford	Cpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Khe Sanh	? Brake	SSgt		67	MATCU-62 CC 4-67
Dong Ha	G. H. Brandt Jr.	1stLt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	George H. Brandt Jr.	1stLt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Khe Sanh	? Branum	Sgt		67	MATCU-67 CC 4-67
Quang Tri	B. W. "Bo" Braswell	Maj	A	69	H.L. Causey
Dong Ha	R. Breitmos	LCpl	S	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	J. R. Brenan	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	K. T. Brenard	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	R. V. L. Brigance	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	C. L. Brown	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	C. L. Brown	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	J. A. Brown	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Dong Ha	G. S. Bryan	SSgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	D. T. Burk	GySgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	D. C. Burke	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
LZ Vandegrift	Dennis C. Burke	Cpl	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
LZ Vandegrift	D. C. Burke	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	P. J. Bywater (WIA)	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	Charlie Cannon	SSgt	C	67	Bill Behan
Khe Sanh	Charlie Cannon	SSgt	C	67-68	Bill Behan
Nam Phong	J. T. Cantwell	1stLt	C	73	MABS-15 CC 12-73
Quang Tri	Joe Capistran	Capt	T	69	Chet Newcomb
Iwakuni	J. A. Capistran	Capt	A	70	MAG-13 CC 6-70
Quang Tri	H. L. Cardwell	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Dong Ha	A. N. Carlson	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	A. N. Carlson	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
LZ Vandegrift	A. N. Carlson	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	TFX Carroll	GySgt	A	68	TFX Carroll
Quang Tri	TFX Carroll	MSgt	C	69	TFX Carroll
Dong Ha	M. J. Carter	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	M. J. Carter (AM)	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	W. P. Carter	PFC	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	M. A. Carter	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Quang Tri	Hubert L. "Lacy" Causey	Maj	A	68-69	H.L. Causey
Dong Ha	? Cawley	Cpl	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Quang Tri	V. M. L. Chandler	GySgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	L. H. Charles	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	Daniel Chase	1stLt	C	68	Daniel Chase
Khe Sanh	Daniel Chase (WIA) (BS)	1stLt	A	68	Daniel Chase
Dong Ha	W. P. Cinquemani	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	B. R. Cleverdon	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	R. W. Cochran	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Quang Tri	R. W. Cochran	SSgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
Nam Phong	Corny Cornielius		C	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	D. L. Cottrill	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Dong Ha	H. "Toney" Couteau Jr.	GySgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	H. Couteau Jr.	GySgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	A. W. Covey Jr. (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Bill Covey	Cpl	C	67-68	Lonnie Darr
Iwakuni	T. N. Cox	Capt	A	70	MAG-13 CC 6-70

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Dong Ha	Leo V. Culp (WIA)	2ndLt	C	66-67	Leo Culp
Dong Ha	Hyson Currey	SSgt	D	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	R. J. Dale (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Bob Dale (WIA)	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Dong Ha	Richard D'Ambrosio	Capt	A	67-68	Richard D'Ambrosio
Khe Sanh	Richard D'Ambrosio (WIA)	Capt	A	68	Richard D'Ambrosio
Quang Tri	R. E. Darling	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-69
Dong Ha	Lonnie Darr	Sgt	T	67-68	Lonnie Darr
Khe Sanh	Lonnie Darr	Sgt	T	67-68	Lonnie Darr
Dong Ha	William H. Davis	GySgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	S. D. "Sam" Davis	Capt	A	68-69	Don Eskam
Quang Tri	D. N. Davis	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	L. K. Day	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Quang Tri	P. Delorenzi	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
LZ Vandegrift	P. Delorenzi	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	J. A. DeMichael	LCpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Dong Ha	E. B. Denger	MSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
LZ Vandegrift	J. W. Dewitt	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Quang Tri	D. P. Dial	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	R. F. Dimon	GySgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	Ray Dinnan	MGySgt	A	67	Bill Behan
Dong Ha	G. G. Dixon	Cpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	Ronald L. Dodge	1stLt	C	66-67	Leo Culp
Khe Sanh	Ronald L. Dodge (WIA)	1stLt	A	67	Ron Dodge
Quang Tri	J. C. Downey	Msgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Quang Tri	J. G. Downie	MSgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	G. H. Dugan	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	T. G. Dunn III	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	J. T. Edwards	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	D. S. Ekum	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	J. A. Elizalde	LCpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	R. A. Elwell (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	J. P. Eshelman (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Nam Phong	Joe Eshelman		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	J. P. Eshleman (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	Donald T. Eskam	SSgt	C	68-69	Don Eskam
Khe Sanh	Joe Eskam		T	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	Don Eskam	SSgt	C	69	Don Eskam
Chu Lai	Don Eskam	SSgt	C	69	Don Eskam
Dong Ha	J. L. Esther	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	Charley Farr	GySgt	C	68	Gary Lewis
Dong Ha	Arthur "Don" Farram (WIA)	SSgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	Ron "Hook" Fay	GySgt	C	67-68	TFX Carroll
Quang Tri	B. J. Feeney	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Iwakuni	B. J. Feeney	1stLt	A	70	MAG-13 CC 6-70
Dong Ha	A. M. Feldes	SSgt	D	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Chu Lai	Barrett J. Fenney	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-67 CC 12-69
Quang Tri	B. F. Ferguson	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	William Flahive	1stLt	C	67	Leo Culp
Khe Sanh	William Flahive (KIA)	Capt	C	67-68	MATCU-62 CC 11-67

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Nam Phong	Hank Flood	CWO4	T	72-73	Hank Flood
LZ Vandegrift	E. R. Forsythe	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	W. G. Frame	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	W. G. Frame	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Walt Frame	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Dong Ha	J. P. Franca	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	T. A. Froelich	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	T. A. Froelich	LCpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Khe Sanh	Dan Fulwider (KIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	Lonnie Darr
Dong Ha	L. C. Gaffney	Cpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	L. C. Gaffney (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
LZ Vandegrift	Larry C. Gaffney	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	D. C. Gahan	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	G. E. Gardner	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Dong Ha	L. E. Garrett	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	L. E. Garrett	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	H. R. Gausman	Cpl	C	68-69	Don Eskam
Quang Tri	H. R. Gausman	LCpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	J. J. Gentry	PFC	S	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	E. T. Gidney	LCpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	M. T. Gidney	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
LZ Vandegrift	E. T. Gidney	LCpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	R. G. Giesen	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
LZ Vandegrift	R. G. Giesin	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	? Goode	Sgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	I. S. Graham	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	I. S. Graham	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	W. T. Gray	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
LZ Vandegrift	W. T. Gray	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Quang Tri	Eldon Grebey	MGySgt	A	68-69	H.L. Causey
Dong Ha	W. B. Greek (WIA)	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	M. T. Green	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	R. E. Grimmet	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	R. E. Grimmett	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	? Halburnt	SSgt	T	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	Kenneth R. Hand	1stLt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Khe Sanh	Kenneth R. Hand	1stLt	A	68	Daniel Chase
Dong Ha	J. S. Harvey (WIA)	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	J. S. Harvey	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Ron Harvey	SSgt	T	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	J. S. "Jim" Harvey	SSgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
LZ Vandegrift	J. S. Harvey	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	R. L. Haskell	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Khe Sanh	John Havlik	Maj	A		Khe Sanh Vet Assoc.
Dong Ha	Preston D. Haynes	Capt	A	67-68	Dan Dorn
Dong Ha	D. P. Hearty	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Nam Phong	Chuck Henderson	GySgt	C	72-73	Jack Mefford
Dong Ha	M. L. Hill	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	B. E. Hines	LCpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Nam Phong	H. D. Hollis	Capt	A	72	Jack Mefford

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Dong Ha	T. E. Hood (WIA)	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 5-68
Nam Phong	William J. Horan (Deceased)	GySgt	T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	? Howatnick	Cpl	C	67	Bill Behan
Khe Sanh	? Howatnick	Cpl	C	67-68	Bill Behan
Dong Ha	R. S. Howland	Cpl	C	68-69	Bob Marshall
LZ Vandegrift	R. S. Howland	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	T. H. Hudson	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
LZ Vandegrift	T. H. Hudson	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	S. M. Huff	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	G. F. Hurston	SSgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	G. L. Hushagen	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
LZ Vandegrift	G. L. Hushagen	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	Roger W. Irons	Cpl	C	68-69	Matcu-62 CC 3-69
Khe Sanh	Roger W. Irons	LCpl	C	68	Roger Irons
Quang Tri	C. G. "Cliff" Ivey	SSgt	C	68-69	H.L. Causey
Dong Ha	Jim Janke	Capt	A	69	Jerry Bauer
Chu Lai	Jim Janke	Capt	A	69	Jim Janke
Quang Tri	J. R. Johnson	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
LZ Vandegrift	J. R. Johnson	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	W. E. Jones	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	W. E. Jones	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	Charles B. Jones	GySgt		69	TFX Carroll
Dong Ha	E. A. Jordan	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	E. A. Jordan	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	J. G. Kalb	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	J. G. Kalb (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	P. D. Keefe	LCpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	L. F. Kerscher	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	R. A. Kettell	1stLt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	William F. Keys	SSgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Quang Tri	M. Kirchcessner	LCpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	K. R. "Chopper" Klein	Sgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
Dong Ha	W. J. Komsi	CWO	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
LZ Vandegrift	W. J. "Jack" Komsi	CWO	C	69	Jack Komsi
Dong Ha	H. K. Kramer	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Stanley Kramer	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	Fred Krauss	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	J. T. Kurzym	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	A. J. LaBrie	CWO	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	Van C. Lafoon	GySgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
Quang Tri	Joe LaPan	SSgt	T	68-69	H.L. Causey
Nam Phong	Jim Larkin		C	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	G. J. Larson (BS)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	A. E. Lawson	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	C. H. Leach	GySgt	D	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	George Lenhart				Khe Sanh Vet Assoc.
Quang Tri	Gary M. Lewis	Sgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
Dong Ha	W. H. Linnemeier (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	W. H. "Paul" Linnemeier	Sgt	T	68	Richard D'Ambrosio
Nam Phong	Tom Lish	CWO	C	72-73	Tom Lish

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Quang Tri	D. E. Lynch	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Nam Phong	? Lyons		D	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	? Mabry	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	James L. Macaulay	Cpl	C	68-69	Jim Macaulay
LZ Vandegrift	James L. Macaulay	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	? Manfredi	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	R. A. "Bob" Marshall	SSgt	C	68-69	Bob Marshall
Dong Ha	B. L. Martin	GySgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	D. H. McClure (WIA)	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	James McClurg	SSgt	C	68-69	James McClurg
LZ Vandegrift	J. McClurg	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Chu Lai	James McClurg	SSgt	C	69	James McClurg
Dong Ha	R. E. "Mac" McConnell	SSgt	C	68-69	Don Eskam
Quang Tri	R. E. McConnell	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
LZ Vandegrift	R. W. McConnell	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	W. D. McDonald	SSgt	T	69	Chet Newcomb
Dong Ha	Joe McDonough	SSgt	T	66-67	Leo Culp
Dong Ha	J. W. McGee	Capt	A	67	MATCU-62 CC 6-67
Dong Ha	Larry E. McKee	2ndLt	T	66-67	Leo Culp
Nam Phong	Jack McKee	1stLt	T	72-73	Tom Lish
Dong Ha	J. I. "Joe" McMahan	Cpl	C	68-69	Rick Rasmussen
LZ Vandegrift	J. I. McMahan	LCpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	L. N. "Mac" McMaster	SSgt	D	68-69	Don Eskam
LZ Vandegrift	L. N. McMaster	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Dong Ha	T. E. Meadows (AM)	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Nam Phong	Jack Mefford	SgtMaj	A	72-73	Jack Mefford
Dong Ha	R. J. Meldon	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
LZ Vandegrift	R. J. Meldon	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	Robert O. Meyer	Capt	A	66-67	Leo Culp
Dong Ha	W. L. Meyer	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	Clifford S. Miller	SSgt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	D. W. Miller	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	J. C. Mills	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	T. W. Mintz	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Quang Tri	R. D. Moerloos	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Dong Ha	L. E. Moiser	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	S. C. Montgomery	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	A. J. Nazzario	Cpl	T	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Anthony J. Nazzario	LCpl	T	68	Richard D'Ambrosio
Nam Phong	Dick Neuman		T	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	C. P. "Chet" Newcomb	Gysgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
LZ Baldy	Chet Newcomb (TAD)	GySgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Dong Ha	C. S. Norris	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Nam Phong	Davy Northam	SSgt	C	72-73	Tom Lish
Dong Ha	R. W. Norton	Capt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
Khe Sanh	R. W. Norton	1stLt	A	68	Daniel Chase
Quang Tri	R. W. Norton	Capt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	G. R. Nygaard	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	? O'Brien	LCpl	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	D. W. Orciuch	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Dong Ha	W. D. "Big O" Orthman	SSgt	C	68-69	Don Eskam
LZ Vandegrift	W. D. Orthman	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	W. A. Overstreet	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
LZ Vandegrift	W. A. Overstreet	LCpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Quang Tri	T. L. Owen	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	R. W. Pacheck	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	R. W. Pacheck	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	R. C. Pagheca	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	C. T. Paige	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	M. D. Parish	2ndLt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Khe Sanh	M. D. Parish	1stLt	A	67	MATCU-62 CC 3-67
Nam Phong	Al Patterson		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	George Payne (WIA)	GySgt	A	67-68	Leo Culp
Nam Phong	Wyatt Pedigo		T	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	B. F. Peterson	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Nam Phong	Roger Peterson		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	G. P. Petrie	Cpl	S	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	S. P. Phillips	CWO	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Nam Phong	Frank Porter	GySgt	C	72-73	Tom Lish
Dong Ha	J. M. Poston	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	R. E. "Bob" Powell (WIA)	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Khe Sanh	R. E. "Bob" Powell (WIA)	Sgt	C	68	Daniel Chase
Nam Phong	John Prior		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	Robert J. Puskar (WIA)	Capt	A	68	Roger Irons
Quang Tri	J. A. Quick	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	R. L. Ramey	SSgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Dong Ha	T. W. "Ted" Rasa	GySgt	T	68-69	Don Eskam
Khe Sanh	Rick Rasmussen (WIA)	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Dong Ha	Rick Rasmussen	Sgt	C	68-69	Rick Rasmussen
LZ Vandegrift	R. G. "Rick" Rasmussen	Sgt	C	68	Rick Rasmussen
Quang Tri	H. A. "Red" Reda	Msgt	T	69	Don Eskam
Quang Tri	W. S. Reese	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Quang Tri	E. R. Reineke	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Nam Phong	? Reucker	Sgt	C	73	Chuck Henderson
Quang Tri	John E. Revord	Sgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
Nam Phong	Ron Reynolds		T	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	W. G. Richter	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	R. A. Rodda	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
LZ Vandegrift	R. A. Rodda	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	? Rodriquez	SSgt	T	67	Bill Behan
Quang Tri	A. E. Romsos	Capt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Dong Ha	J. P. Ruse	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
Quang Tri	J. P. Ruse	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Dong Ha	J. G. Salgado	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	W. M. Sanders	1stLt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
LZ Vandegrift	W. M. Sanders	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	T. M. Schanaman	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	D. W. Schmidt	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Dong Ha	D. M. Scott	Sgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
LZ Vandegrift	D. M. Scott	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Dong Ha	D. G. Sears	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	D. G. Sears	LCpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Nam Phong	Jack Selders		C	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	G. Sellers Jr.	Sgt	T	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
LZ Vandegrift	G. Sellers	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Khe Sanh	Tony Shaw (WIA)	1stLt	C	67-68	Dan Dorn
LZ Vandegrift	T. R. Sheldon	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Dong Ha	Arthur Shepherd	Gysgt	C	66	Bill Behan
Quang Tri	P. A. Sherman	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	J. R. Silkrave	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	G. R. Simmons	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	T. F. Singletary	SSgt	D	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Tom Singletary	SSgt	D	68	Richard D'Ambrosio
Dong Ha	M. J. Sorg	LCpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
LZ Vandegrift	M. J. Sorg	LCpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	J. N. Spierings	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 12-68
LZ Vandegrift	J. N. Spierings	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Dong Ha	Steve W. Staab	SSgt	T	68-69	Don Eskam
Nam Phong	L. D. Staak	2ndLt	C	73	MABS-15 CC 12-73
Dong Ha	J. P. Stevens	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	J. P. Stevens	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
LZ Vandegrift	J. P. Stevens	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	? Stipp	Cpl	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Khe Sanh	G.P. Stirling	1stLt	A	67	G.P. Stirling
Nam Phong	Bob Stivers	MGySgt	T	72-73	Tom Lish
Quang Tri	E. L. Stough	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
LZ Vandegrift	E. L. Stough	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Nam Phong	Charlie Stuttle		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	? Sullivan	Cpl	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Dong Ha	W. T. Sullivan	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Nam Phong	E. H. Sullivan	1stLt	A	72	MABS-15 CC 8-72
Quang Tri	Jim Sumner	MSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-66 CC 7-69
Dong Ha	Jim Sumner	MSgt	A	69	Don Eskam
Dong Ha	D. L. Taylor	LCpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	? Telfer	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	W. A. Telford	MSgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	K. J. Thomas	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	D. L. Thomas	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Nam Phong	Jerry Thrasher		C	73	Bill Wood
Quang Tri	M. J. Tierney	Sgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Dong Ha	E. B. Tillinghast	Pvt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Quang Tri	T. N. Tingley	SSgt	D	68-69	Gary Lewis
Dong Ha	E. R. Tokarz	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
LZ Vandegrift	E. R. Tokarz	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	John Trosper	Sgt	C	69	John Trosper
Quang Tri	L. J. Van Spriell	1stLt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	G. O. Vasser	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	A. C. Vitas	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	A. C. Vitas	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	D. P. Von Hemel	GySgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68

MATCU-62 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Quang Tri	D. P. Von Hemel	GySgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	J. A. Wahlstrom	MSgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Dong Ha	Jerry Walker	SSgt	T	67	Bill Behan
Khe Sanh	Jerry Walker	SSgt	C	67-68	Bill Behan
Dong Ha	Art Warnack	1stLt	C	66-67	Leo Culp
Khe Sanh	Art Warnack	1stLt	A	67	MATCU-62 CC 5-67
Dong Ha	Ed Wasik	SSgt	C	67	Bill Behan
Khe Sanh	Ed Wasik	SSgt	C	67-68	Bill Behan
Dong Ha	R. H. Waters (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Khe Sanh	Pappy Waters	Sgt	D	67-68	Lonnie Darr
Quang Tri	Donald W. Watson	SSgt	C	68-69	Gary Lewis
LZ Vandegrift	D. W. Watson	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Chu Lai	Gary Weather	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-67 CC 12-69
Dong Ha	A. C. Weaver	SSgt	T	67-69	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	G. G. Weaver	1stLt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Iwakuni	G. G. Weaver	1stLt	A	70	MAG-13 CC 6-70
Dong Ha	T. E. West	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	J. F. Wheeler	SSgt	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
LZ Vandegrift	J. F. Wheeler	SSgt	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	A. D. Wickam	Cpl	C	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	G. M. Wilkinson (AM)	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Dong Ha	R. G. Williams	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	R. G. Williams	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
LZ Vandegrift	R. G. Williams	Sgt	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 5-69
Quang Tri	C. T. Wilson	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	L. W. Wingard	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
LZ Vandegrift	L. W. Wingard	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Quang Tri	R. D. Womach	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
LZ Vandegrift	R. O. Womack	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Dong Ha	R. D. Womak	Sgt	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Quang Tri	J. L. Wong	Cpl	C	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
LZ Vandegrift	J. L. Wong	Cpl	T	69	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Nam Phong	Bill Wood		T	73	Bill Wood
Dong Ha	W. W. Woodruff	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68
Quang Tri	D. G. Woods	Cpl	T	68-69	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Dong Ha	Richard L. Wooten	GySgt	A	67	Dick Wooten
Khe Sanh	Dick Wooton	GySgt	A	67-68	Dick Wooton
Quang Tri	J. F. "Jim" Wright (WIA)	Sgt	C	69	Don Eskam
Dong Ha	Don Ziechi	Sgt	C	67	Bill Behan
Dong Ha	W. J. Zukowski (WIA)	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 3-68

MATCU-66 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Udon	R. L. Allen	GySgt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	A. J. Amato	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 8-69
Futenma	R. A. Anderson	1stLt	C	71	1stMAW CC 1971
Quang Tri	W. B. Andes	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Atsugi	Gerald J. Babin	Sgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udon	J. A. Bagocius	PFC	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	R. A. Barbeau	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	G. H. Baribeault	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Iwakuni	Paul S. Baudanza	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	Jerry Bauer	SSgt	T	68	Jerry Bauer
Quang Tri	E. R. Befern	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	? Betts	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	J. C. Booker	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	M. W. Brackett (WIA)	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 6-69
Futenma	Merrell Branstetter	GySgt	C	70	Merrell Branstetter
Quang Tri	B. W. Braswell	Maj	A	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Udon	J. D. Briggs	CWO	C	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Norman D. Broden	WO	A	65	MAG-13 CC 7-65
Udon	J. E. Bryan	SSgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	D. C. Burke	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Atsugi	Warren J. Butler	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	C. L. Cameron	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	W. P. Carter	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	Hubert L. Causey	Capt	A	68	H. L. Causey
Udon	T. W. Chadsey	LCpl	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	L. H. Charles	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Udon	G. L. Cicora	PFC	T	62	Bob Marshall
Futenma	K. R. Clark	Capt	A	71	1stMAW CC 1971
Quang Tri	R. W. Cochran	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	Robert D. Cole	SSgt	D	68	Robert D. Cole
Quang Tri	D. R. Conley	GySgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Atsugi	Larry A. Connin	SSgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	H. Couteau Jr.	GySgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	T. L. Cox	SSgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Iwakuni	James D. Cruce	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udon	B. D. Currier	CWO	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	R. M. Davis	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	S. D. Davis	1stLt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 9-68
Quang Tri	P. Delorenzi	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 7-69
Quang Tri	D. P. Dial	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	R. F. Dimon	GySgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Futenma	Ron Dodge	Capt	A	68	Ron Dodge
Udon	R. H. Douse	PFC	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	J. F. Driscoll	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Quang Tri	D. G. Dunlap	Maj	A	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Udon	A. P. Eager	MSgt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	D. M. "Doc" Edwards (WIA)	Sgt	T	68	Joe LaPan
Quang Tri	D. M. Ellis	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Quang Tri	Charlie Farr	Gysgt	C	68	H. L. Causey

MATCU-66 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Udon	N. R. Federico	LCpl	T	62	Bob Marshall
Atsugi	J. L. Felter	Capt	A	64-65	1stMAW CC 1964
Udon	O. T. Ferree Jr.	MSgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Scott G. Fisher	LCpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	J. E. Forster	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Atsugi	J. E. Foughner	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udon	H. E. Frisbie	GySgt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Atsugi	Z. J. Fritsche	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Iwakuni	V. J. Fulladosa	Capt	A	65-66	1stMAW CC 1-66
Futenma	V. J. Fulladosa	Capt	A	66	1stMAW CC 1-66
Quang Tri	D.C. Gahan	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Udon	D. J. Garbacz	LCpl	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	R. L. Gentry	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	R. G. Giesen	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Atsugi	R. L. Gilboyne	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	I. S. Graham	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Quang Tri	M. R. Grathwohl	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	Eldon Grebey	MGySgt	A	68	H. L. Causey
Udon	M. J. Grennier	SSgt	D	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Thomas A. Guest	Sgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udon	W. R. Gutt	Pvt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Udon	J. F. Hague	LCpl	T	62	Bob Marshall
Frequent Wind	S. D. Haley	Capt	A	75	1stMAW CC 1975
Quang Tri	B. A. Hansen	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Atsugi	Albert I. Hartkopf	CWO	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Atsugi	W. B. Harvill	Capt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Atsugi	Ronald L. Hess	Sgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	R. C. Hill	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Atsugi	R. W. Hock	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	Thadeus H. Hudson	SSgt	D	68	Joe LaPan
Quang Tri	C. G. "Cliff" Ivey	SSgt	C	68	H. L. Causey
Atsugi	James E. Janke	CWO	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Atsugi	John A. Jaskolka	GySgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	J. M. Jerich	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Atsugi	V. J. Johnson Jr.	Capt	A	64	1stMAW CC 1964
Udon	J. L. Jones	Cpl	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	W. E. Jones	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 2-69
Atsugi	A. P. Kemp	LCpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	M. Kirchcessner	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 3-69
Quang Tri	Fred Krauss	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Udon	Ronald E. Krebs	LCpl	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	Joe LaPan	SSgt	T	68	H. L. Causey
Udon	A. L. Larson	GySgt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	A. E. Lawson	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Iwakuni	Richard W. Leban	Sgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	B. L. LeFever	LCpl	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Quang Tri	Gary Lewis	Sgt	C	68	Gary Lewis
Atsugi	D. G. Llenaresas	Cpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udon	R. L. Long	SSgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	? Mabry	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68

MATCU-66 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Quang Tri	J. D. Mackay	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Quang Tri	? Manfredi	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Udom	R. A. Marshall	LCpl	T	62	Bob Marshall
Futenma	Robert Marshall	GySgt	C	70	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	J. McClurg	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	R. E. McConnell	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Atsugi	J. M. McDonald	PFC	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Iwakuni	Peter A. Merz	Sgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	R. L. Miller	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Udom	R. E. Milliron	SSgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Atsugi	Joseph C. Nemeti	GySgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Udom	M. S. Newbill	Capt	A	62	Bob Marshall
Udom	E. N. Nielsen	Sgt	D	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Eric N. Nielsen	Sgt	D	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Atsugi	W. R. Norton	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	R. C. Pagheca	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Quang Tri	C. T. Paige	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Udom	G. E. Payne	SSgt	T	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Darrell A. Pehrson	Sgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	S. P. Phillips	CWO	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Atsugi	J. V. Plagens	Sgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	R. J. Posner	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Udom	E. Pryor	SSgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	S. J. Quinn	1stLt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Udom	H. G. Rabalais	LCpl	T	62	Bob Marshall
Atsugi	R. L. Readon	LCpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Futenma	D. R. Reed	WO	T	71	1stMAW CC 1971
Udom	B. G. Reid	Sgt	S	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	E. R. Reineke	Sgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Quang Tri	J. E. Revord	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Iwakuni	Houston L. Robertson	Sgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Futenma	W. S. Rogers	Capt	C	71	1stMAW CC 1971
Futenma	Arden Romsos	Capt	A	68-69	Mike Smith
Quang Tri	E. K. Ruiz	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	J. P. Ruse	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Udom	C. H. Salisbury	Sgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	W. M. Sanders	1stLt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Quang Tri	S. C. Schwab	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Quang Tri	J. R. Silkgrave	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 1-69
Udom	M. Smith	MSgt	A	62	Bob Marshall
Iwakuni	Robert E. Smith	GySgt	D	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Futenma	Mike Smith	1stLt	A	68-70	Mike Smith
Quang Tri	H. R. Spellings	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Udom	G. P. Stirling	GySgt	C	62	Bob Marshall
Quang Tri	Jim Sumner	MSgt	C	68	MATCU-66 CC 7-68
Iwakuni	Gene A. Taylor	Sgt	D	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	? Telfer	Cpl	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 10-68
Iwakuni	Gerald S. Tkaczyk	GySgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Iwakuni	George A. Tracey	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	L. J. Van Spriell	1stLt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68

MATCU-66 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Atsugi	Jerry L. Wahl	SSgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	J. A. Wahlstrom	MSgt	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Atsugi	H. A. Walton	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Iwakuni	Curtis R. Weeman	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Quang Tri	J. F. Wheeler	SSgt	C	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Futenma	"Dad" Whiteley	MGySgt	A	68-69	Mike Smith
Quang Tri	G. M. Wilkenson	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 4-69
Quang Tri	C. T. Wilson	Cpl	T	68	MATCU-62 CC 11-68
Quang Tri	C. A. Wold	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Iwakuni	William A. Yonkes	LCpl	D	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Frequent Wind	Robert Young	SSgt	C	75	Robert Young
Quang Tri	H. L. Ziliotto	Sgt	T	68	MATCU-66A CC 8-68
Atsugi	W. S. Zuck	Capt	A	64	1stMAW CC 1964
Quang Tri	R. G. "Big Z" Zvolerin	Capt	C	68	H. L. Causey

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Donald C. Abraham	Sgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Paul E. Akers	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. W. Albin	Sgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	S. E. Alexander	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	S. E. Alexander	Cpl	C	68	MABS-16 CC 5-68
Chu Lai	Fred Alke	Sgt	T	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Richard D. Aragon	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Gerald J. Babin	Sgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Don Badger	GySgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	D. H. Badger	MSgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	? Baker	Cpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Donald N. Barber	CWO	C	69-70	MATCU-67 CC 11-69
Chu Lai	Art Barton (WIA)	Sgt	C	70	John Trosper
Iwakuni	R. J. Beach	Capt	A	64	1stMAW CC 1964
Chu Lai	Dennis Beauchamp			67	James Lague
Chu Lai	Joseph N. Beaulieu	Sgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	John R. Behm	Maj	A	68-69	MAG-12 CC 7-68
Chu Lai	Carl F. Bergstrom	Maj	A	67-68	MAG-12 CC 9-67
Chu Lai	J. D. Berry	Gysgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Peter J. Berry	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Soc Trang	John Bever	1stLt	C	62	Dan Dorn
Chu Lai	John C. Bever	Capt	A	66-67	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	D. D. Bigness	1stLt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	? Bittman	Sgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Charles M. Black	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Wayne G. Boggs	Sgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Frank P. Bonsavage	Sgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	D. L. Booth Jr.	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	S. J. Borries	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Denny Bowen	Capt	A	67-68	Denny Bowen
Chu Lai	Robert L. Bowlin	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	? Boyd	Sgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	G. H. Brandt	Capt	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Kenny Bright	MGySgt	T	66-67	Carl Cullison
Soc Trang	Matthew J. Brill	SSgt	C	62	Matthew J. Brill
Chu Lai	Warren C. Brown	GySgt	C	68-69	W. C. Brown
Chu Lai	Thomas P. Brutcher	LCpl	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	J. B. Bryan	GySgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	S. C. Bullard	LCpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Thomas M. Buntin	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. G. Burgelin	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	R. J. Burger	Sgt	C	68	MABS-16 CC 8-68
Chu Lai	B. R. Burke	Cpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. V. Burns	Cpl	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Walter R. Burroughs	1stLt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Keith A. Burton	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	R. E. Bush	Msgt	D	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Warren J. Butler	Cpl	C	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Joe Calcasola	SSgt	T	66-68	Joe Calcasola

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Joseph Calderon	PFC	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	L. M. Caldwell	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	John M. Call (WIA)	Cpl	C	68	John Call (Hotline)
Chu Lai	D. J. Callahan	Cpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	David L. Campbell	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J.J. Carr	GySgt	C	69-70	J.J. Carr
Chu Lai	J. I. Carter Jr.	Cpl	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	William T. Carter	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	C. D. Casebier	MSgt	T	68-69	Bob Marshall
Chu Lai	Joseph R. Cedris	1stLt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	R. J. Cerveri	SSgt	T	67-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Robert L. Chandler	Sgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Daniel Chase	1stLt	C	67-68	Daniel Chase
An Hoa	Daniel Chase	1stLt	A	68-69	Daniel Chase
Chu Lai	Paul Ciampaglia Jr.	SSgt	D	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	? Clark	LCpl	C	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	S. Cogburn	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Larry A. Connin	SSgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Darrel B. Cooper	Sgt	D	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Howard L. Courtney	SSgt	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	D. G. Crane	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Davy Crocker	GySgt	C	65-66	Davy Crocker
Chu Lai	Paul T. Crombie	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Richard A. Crow	Sgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	D. P. Dalsanders	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Anthony T. Daltrui	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. M. D'Ambrosio	LCpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Jerry Daniels			67	James Largue
Chu Lai	D. A. Darbey	GySgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Jim Dargan	2ndLt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	Lonnie Darr	Sgt	T	68-69	Lonnie Darr
An Hoa	Lonnie Darr	SSgt	T	69	Lonnie Darr
Chu Lai	Roy C. Donahoe	Sgt	D	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Soc Trang	Dan Dorn	2ndLt	C	62	Matthew J. Brill
Chu Lai	S. J. Drago	LCpl	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Mike Dubesa	LCpl	C	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Michael Dubesa	SSgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Larry Duff	GySgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	V. S. Dupuis	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	J. T. Edwards	Sgt	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	W. V. Egan	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	W. V. Egan	Sgt	C	69	MABS-16 CC 1-69
Chu Lai	R. A. Elwell	Sgt	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Don Eskam	SSgt	C	69	Don Eskam
Chu Lai	J. L. Esther	SSgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	D. A. Ethington	LCpl	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 7-68
Chu Lai	David A. Ethington	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	A. J. Farrel	Cpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Jerry Faust	SSgt	C	69-70	Roger McIntosh
Ky Ha	Ron "Hook" Fay	SSgt	C	66-67	James McClurg

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Don Feilen	GySgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	D. H. Feilen	GySgt	C	69	MABS-16 CC 2-69
Chu Lai	Anthony M. Feldes	Sgt	D	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	Jack Fennel	Cpl	C	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	Barrett J. Fenney	1stLt	C	69-70	MATCU-67 CC 12-69
Chu Lai	L. Fifelski	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Jerry Fisher	SSgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Soc Trang	Hank Flood	WO	A	62	Hank Flood
An Hoa	J. E. Forster	Sgt	D	69	MABS-16 CC 1-69
Chu Lai	J. E. Foughner	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Z. J. Fritsche	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	A. G. Garvey	Sgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Robert R. Gerber	CWO	T	69-70	MATCU-67 CC 11-69
Chu Lai	Norman L. Gilbert	PFC	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	R. J. Gilboyne	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	R. A. Ginter	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Walker Goe	GySgt	A	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	Jerome Goode	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	"Good" Goodsel	SSgt	C	65-67	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	R. L. Gordey	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	C. C. Gordon	Sgt	D	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	Carl C. Gordon	Sgt	D	68-69	MABS-16 CC 11-68
Chu Lai	J. E. Goudie	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Eldon Grebey	MGySgt	A	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	E. E. Grebey	MGySgt	A	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Bob Griggs	SSgt	T	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	J. D. Grugan	LCpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	J. D. Grugan	LCpl	C	68	MABS-16 CC 8-68
Chu Lai	Thomas A. Gulino	GySgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	? Gullickson	WO	T	66-67	MABS-12 CC 9-66
Chu Lai	W. S. Hamnett	Sgt	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Roger Hanebutt	Sgt	C	69-70	Roger Hanebutt
Chu Lai	L.E. 'Bud' Harry	Capt	A	69-70	Roger McIntosh
Chu Lai	Albert I. Hartkopf	CWO	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	John P. Hartup	LCpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	W. B. "Bill" Harvill	Capt	A	65	Jim Janke
Chu Lai	Joseph E. Harvin Jr.	Capt	A	65	Jim Janke
Chu Lai	Herman A. W. Hedke	Cpl	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Herman Hedke III	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	J. H. "Jim" Hefty	MSgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	? Hendricks	Sgt	D	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	M. W. Hendrix	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	W. I. Hengel	LCpl	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Ronald L. Hess	Sgt	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	A. T. Hill III	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. W. Hock	LCpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	Michael Holbrook	Sgt	T	68-69	MABS-16 CC 11-68
Chu Lai	Forest B. Holdridge	CWO	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	? Holloway	Sgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Donald L. Horn	Sgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	S. M. Horton	Maj	A	68	MAG-12 CC 1-68
Chu Lai	Herman P. Hudson Jr.	GySgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	J. P. Huff	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	V. R. Hughes	Maj	A	69	MAG-12 CC 3-69
Chu Lai	Arlin W. Humphrey	Sgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Jim Janke	CWO	C	65	Jim Janke
Chu Lai	John A. Jaskolka	GySgt	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. M. Jerich	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. F. Job	SSgt	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	Robert Job	GySgt	T	69	Boyd Murdock (Hotline)
Chu Lai	J. M. Johnson	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	J. R. Johnson	Cpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	J. M. Johnson	Sgt	T	68	MABS-16 CC 5-68
Chu Lai	John E. Jones	GySgt	D	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	William F. Jordan	Capt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	Mick D. Joyce	Cpl	T	68-69	MABS-16 CC 11-68
Chu Lai	Kenneth Jusko	SSgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	John F. Keane	Capt	A	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	Joseph Kelly	Cpl	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Jerry Kelly	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	A. P. Kemp	Cpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	G. L. Kennedy	GySgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Floyd E. Kerr	Cpl	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Richard L. King	WO	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	C. D. King	AC1	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Leonard J. Kline	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	S. L. Klosz	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Felix E. Knybel	MSgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
An Hoa	James E. Koffenberger	1stLt	A	68-69	Boyd Murdock (Hotline)
Chu Lai	James E. Koffenberger	1stLt	C	69-70	MATCU-67 CC 11-69
Chu Lai	William Koretz	GySgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	D. S. Koza	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	J. G. Krantz	Sgt	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68
Chu Lai	Joseph G. Krantz	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Van C. Lafoon (NCM)	SSgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	Harold A. Lamb	LCpl	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	W. E. Land	LCpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Thomas P. Lane	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Norman T. Lang	LCpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	C. B. Lange	MSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Jean R. Langlois	SSgt	C	66-67	Jean Langlois
ChuLai	James Lague	SSgt	C	67-68	James Lague
Chu Lai	James L. Laufer	GySgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	E. N. Lilly	Cpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Ray L. Lively	Sgt	D	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	D. G. Llenaresas	Cpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Arney Lockwood	Sgt	C	65-67	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	R.L. Long	GySgt	C	65-67	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	Richard L. Long	MSgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	James E. "Kiwi" Lott (KIA)	Cpl	C	68	John Rush (Hotline)

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Larry Loudermilk	1stLt	T	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	D. I. Loveday	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	? Luna	LCpl	T	66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Edward E. Luney	MSgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	S. Lux	LCpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	C. T. Mabley	Capt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	L. M. Madson	Sgt	C	68	MABS-16 CC 10-68
Chu Lai	Jarrett B. Markle	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Boze Martin	MSgt	C	67	James Largue
Chu Lai	Alyn A. Marvin	GySgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	James McClurg	SSgt	C	66-67	James McClurg
Chu Lai	J. M. McDonald	PFC	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	T. J. McHugh	1stLt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	J. P. McKay	Cpl	T	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68
Chu Lai	James P. McKay	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	C. W. McNutt	SSgt	D	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	R. S. McRae	Cpl	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68
Chu Lai	Joe Medico	GySgt	T	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	? Meeks		T	65	Jerry Renfeld
Chu Lai	Douglas D. Melton	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	W. L. Mengel	Cpl	C	69	MABS-16 CC 1-69
Chu Lai	George Meshke	CWO	C	67-68	George Meshke
Chu Lai	Stephen R. Metz	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Thomas T. Meyer	Capt	C	66-67	MABS-12 CC 7-66
Chu Lai	Thomas E. Meyer	Sgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Gary A. Modler	SSgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Marshall F. Moll	Cpl	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	J. D. Moore	Capt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	John P. Moorman	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	John "Red Dog" Moskop	MSgt	A	68-69	Don Eskam
Chu Lai	Charles J. Mudio	Sgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Charles L. Mullick	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Boyd Murdock	SSgt	C	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	William B. Murdock	GySgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	Boyd Murdock	GySgt	A	69	Boyd Murdock (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Orin Muse	2ndLt	C	67	James Largue
Chu Lai	Jim Mutter	1stLt	C	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	Gene Nebelung	SSgt	C	65-66	Gene Nebelung
Chu Lai	Ernie Nelson	GySgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Joe Nemeti	GySgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	Jim "RIP" Newton	MSgt	T	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	? Nicol	Sgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Willie R. Norton	LCpl	C	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	J. J. Ohara	Cpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	John O'Hey	SSgt	C	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	G. J. O'Neill	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	? Overman	Cpl	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Dominic Pace	GySgt	A	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	? Palmer	Cpl	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
An Hoa	E. Papis	Cpl	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Richard L. Park	Sgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	James R. Parker	SSgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	John D. Parker	Capt	A	66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	R. Paulaski	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	George A. Peck	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Gerald E. Pelott	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	William E. Pelzer	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Roger Peterson		T	66-68	Joe Calcasola
Chu Lai	J. W. Petrik (WIA)	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Bud Phillips	SSgt	T	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	J. D. Pierce	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Jimmie Plagens	Sgt	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Iwakuni	D. E. Plohocky	Capt	A	64	1stMAW CC 1964
Chu Lai	Frank Porter	GySgt	C	66-68	Joe Calcasola
Ky Ha	R. J. Posner	SSgt	C	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	Garry L. Pote	LCpl	C	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Kark W. Price	SSgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	J. S. Prout	LCpl	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	? Pudwill	Sgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Stephen L. Pundzak	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Iwakuni	Donald Quagliotti	Capt	A	65	MABS-12 CD 3-66
Chu Lai	Frank Quallen	CWO	C	70	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	Herman W. Quest	WO	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	R. L. Readon	LCpl	T	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	H. A. Reda	GySgt	T	67	Hotline Sept 1997
Chu Lai	J. P. Redden	Sgt	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	S. P. Redden	Sgt	T	68-69	MABS-16 CC 6-68
Chu Lai	Chris Reed	Capt	T	68-69	Chris Reed
Chu Lai	D. W. Reilly	Capt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Jerry Renfeld	Cpl	T	65-66	Jerry Renfeld
Chu Lai	Diego Resendez	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	C. A. Reynolds	Maj	A	69	MAG-12 CC 9-69
Chu Lai	C. D. Reynolds	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	Luther Rice	WO	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	W. W. Richardson	SSgt	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Donald W. Ring	GySgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	D. W. Robbins	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Stephen R. Roberts	Cpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. J. Robertson	1stLt	C	67-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. J. Robinson	GySgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	D. H. Rose	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	James C. Ross	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Guy Rowe	CWO	T	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	Ronald L. Runkle (KIA)	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	John F. Rush (WIA)	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	G. Ryser	Cpl	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	B. C. Sanders	1stLt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	P. B. Savin	SSgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Dick Scarborough	MSgt	C	67	James Largue
Chu Lai	J. P. Schults	Sgt	T	67-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	R. D. Schuman	Cpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	R. A. Scott	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	R. A. Scott	Cpl	T	68-69	MABS-16 CC 7-68
Chu Lai	Tom Shafer	SSgt	T	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	Gordon R. Shevis	Sgt	C	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
An Hoa	M. G. Shirk	Cpl	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68
Chu Lai	David B. Shoemaker	SSgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	? Silcox	Sgt	D	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	D. L. Simpson	Sgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. A. Smart (WIA)	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Al Snelson	GySgt	T	65-66	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	George Sobrya	WO	T	65-66	Joe Medico
Chu Lai	J. G. Spoo	Sgt	D	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	S. W. Staab	SSgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Lloyd E. Stanton	Capt	A	69-70	J.J. Carr
Chu Lai	Victor D. Steele	Maj	A	67	Denny Bowen
Chu Lai	Robert Stepp	GySgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	B. D. Stewart	SSgt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	R. F. Stivers	WO	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	P. J. Stone	LCpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	James E. Strasser (BS)	GySgt	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	D. W. Stuart	Cpl	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	F. T. "Silky" Sullivan	Maj	A	66-67	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	L. S. Sullivan	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	L. L. Sullivan	Cpl	C	68	MABS-16 CC 5-68
Chu Lai	Jim Sumner	MSgt	A	66-67	Jim Dargan
Chu Lai	Pete Swain	SSgt	T	67-68	Hotline May 1995
Chu Lai	Thomas W. Swisher	SSgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Dick Szuba	SSgt	C	65-67	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	Dick Szuba	SSgt	C	69-70	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	Dick Taver	Capt	C	66-67	Jim Mutter
Chu Lai	Walter A. Telford	GySgt	T	65-66	MABS-12 CD 5-65
Chu Lai	Richard C. Terry	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	John M. Thomas	LCpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	W. J. Tobesen	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Al Tomer	Sgt	C	70	Al Tomer
Chu Lai	C. T. Tonkens	Sgt	T	67	Hotline Sept 1997
Chu Lai	John T. Trosper	Sgt	C	70	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Thomas J. Tunnell	Sgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	L. E. Van Valkenburg	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	C. F. Varbel	Sgt	C	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	W. E. Vearil	Cpl	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Joseph Veeck	Cpl	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	R. D. Vickery	LCpl	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	R. B. Vickery	LCpl	T	68	MABS-16 CC 8-68
Chu Lai	Danny Von Hemel	Sgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	T. T. Waggoner	Cpl	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
An Hoa	L. E. Waggoner	GySgt	C	68-69	MABS-16 CC 12-68
Chu Lai	L. E. "Rudy" Waggoner	MSgt	C	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	S. L. Wagoner	Sgt	T	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68

MATCU-67 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Chu Lai	Jerry Wahl	Gysgt	C	65-66	Jack Keane
Chu Lai	James Wallace	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Ronnie C. Wallis	LCpl	T	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	Earl A. Walrath	Sgt	D	65-66	Jerry Kelly
Chu Lai	H. A. Walton	Cpl	C	65	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	R. R. Ward	Cpl	C	70	Jim Strasser
Chu Lai	R. H. Waters	Sgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Soc Trang	Jac D. Watson	Capt	A	62	Hank Flood
Chu Lai	Gary Weaver	1stLt	C	69-70	MATCU-67 CC 12-69
Chu Lai	Jesse Webb	GySgt	C	65-66	Davy Crocker
Chu Lai	Harry S. Webster			69-70	Roger Hanebutt
Chu Lai	E. J. Wells	PFC	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Tommy L. Wells	SSgt	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	Michael F. Wendel	LCpl	T	69	Jim Tetzlaff
Chu Lai	J. R. Wheeler	Sgt	C	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	David A. White	1stLt	C	66-67	MABS-12 CC 7-66
Chu Lai	Stuart M. White			66-67	Jim Mutter
Chu Lai	"Willie" Williams	Sgt	C	65-67	Dick Szuba
Chu Lai	William L. Williams	SSgt	C	70	Frank Quallen (Hotline)
Chu Lai	Chuck Wilmot	Sgt	C	66-67	Chuck Wilmot
Chu Lai	Cy Wilson	SSgt	C	66-67	Jean Langlois
Chu Lai	E. Wilson	Cpl	T	68-69	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	W. P. Woodruff	Sgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Richard L. Wooton	GySgt	C	67	Dick Wooton
Chu Lai	J. P. Young	PFC	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080 6-68
Chu Lai	Tom Zerner	Sgt	C	70	Jim Strasser

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Hue Phu Bai	Mike Abel	SSgt	T	68	Skip Redpath
Marble Mountain	M. E. Abell	SSgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	? Adamski	Sgt	D	68	Steve Hulland
Hue Phu Bai	Jay D. Alley	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Ambuske	SSgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	R. A. Anderson	1stLt	C	70-71	MABS-16 CC 6-71
Hue Phu Bai	Richard J. Andrzejczyk	GySgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	D. B. Armour	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	C. R. Armstrong	1stLt	C	70-71	MABS-16 CC 2-71
Marble Mountain	A. D. Arnold	Sgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	R. G. Arthur	SSgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Dan Baczkowski	SSgt	C	68-69	Dan Baczkowski
Hue Phu Bai	? Bailey	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	Steve J. Bainer	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Peter F. Ball	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. W. Balog	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	? Baltins	Cpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	Robert L. Barry	1stLt	C	70	MABS-16 CC 10-70
LZ Baldy	Earl P. Basher	Capt	A	69-70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Earl P. Basher	Capt	C	69	MATCU-68 CC 8-69
Hue Phu Bai	Earl P. Basher	Capt	C	69	MATCU-68 CC 4-69
Hue Phu Bai	? Beals	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	William E. Beech	GySgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Arnold E. Beever	SSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Joseph E. Began	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Larry E. Belcher	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. R. Belcher	Cpl	A	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	Bill Bennett	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	? Bennett	SSgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 10-66
Hue Phu Bai	Kent V. Berchiolli	Maj	A	66	Gene Nebelung
Marble Mountain	? Berg	Sgt	T	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Dong Ha	? Berg	Sgt	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Khe Sanh	? Berg	Sgt	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Marble Mountain	Jerry T. Bess	SSgt	C	66	Jerry T. Bess
Hue Phu Bai	Jerry T. Bess	GySgt	C	66-67	Jerry T. Bess
Hue Phu Bai	John C. Bever	Capt	A	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 1-67
Marble Mountain	Lance V. Bevins	Capt	A	66	MATCU-68 CC 11-66
Hue Phu Bai	Lance V. Bevins	Capt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	Walter Bishop	Cpl	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Dong Ha	Walter Bishop	Cpl	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Khe Sanh	Walter Bishop	Cpl	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Walter Bishop	Cpl	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Charles H. Bodmer	Capt	A	67	MATCU-68 CC 10-67
Hue Phu Bai	Alan E. Boone	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Boos	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Marble Mountain	Dennis R. Bowen	Maj	A	70-71	Denny Bowen
LZ Baldy	J. R. Bowman	1stLt	A	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	James R. Bowman	1stLt	C	69-70	MAG-16 CC 11-69
Hue Phu Bai	Raymond L. Bowsher	SSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Marble Mountain	D. M. Bradford	Sgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Merrell H. Branstetter	Sgt	C	65-66	Charley Cosner
Dong Ha	Merrell H. Branstetter	SSgt	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Khe Sanh	Merrell H. Branstetter	SSgt	C	66	Merrell H. Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Merrell H. Branstetter	SSgt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	Merrell H. Branstetter (BS)	GySgt	C	70	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	? Bresett	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
LZ Baldy	Ron Brigance	Sgt	C	69	Ron Brigance
Marble Mountain	Ron Brigance	Sgt	C	69-70	Ron Brigance (Hotline)
Hue Phu Bai	? Brookins	Sgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	John H. Brown	SSgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	William L. Brunson	MSgt	T	67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Marble Mountain	Gary Bryan	GySgt	C	70-71	Jerry Fisher
Marble Mountain	S. W. Beyer	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Carl W. Buell	GySgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	R. L. Busch	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Gerald A. Byrne	1stLt	A	69	MATCU-68 CC 1-69
Hue Phu Bai	? Cain	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	? Caine	Sgt	T	68-69	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Richard H. Caine	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Jerry Camp	Sgt	D	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Marble Mountain	J. A. Capistran	1stLt	A	69-70	MATCU-68 CC 5-69
Hue Phu Bai	Henry L. Cardwell	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Don Carman	GySgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Don Carman	GySgt	C	66-67	Don Carmen
Marble Mountain	M. A. Carter	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	R. D. Caskey	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	David G. Cassell	Capt	C	70-71	MATCU-68 CC 2-70
Marble Mountain	R. B. Chambers	Sgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Richard L. Champagne	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Victor M. Chandler	SSgt	T	65	Charley Cosner
Hue Phu Bai	William R. Chilson	Cpl	S	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Dan Churan	Sgt	C	68-69	Gerald S. Pahl
Hue Phu Bai	Daniel C. Churan	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Gary S. Clark	SSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	K. R. Clark	Capt	T	70	MABS-16 CC 1-71
Hue Phu Bai	Patrick J. Cleary	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Ross W. Coddington	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	S. F. Cogburn	SSgt	D	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Kenneth M. Cole	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Collins	GySgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	B. D. Collins	Maj	A	71	Denny Bowen
Hue Phu Bai	Dale R. Conley	GySgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Larry Connin	1stLt	C	68	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	Terry L. Conroy	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Frank J. Conti	Capt	T	70-71	Denny Bowen
Hue Phu Bai	John D. Cooper	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Clarence E. Cosner	GySgt	C	65-66	Charley Cosner
Hue Phu Bai	? Costlow	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
DaNang	R. C. Coulter	Capt	A	65-66	MAG-16 CC 9-65

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Marble Mountain	R. C. Coulter	Capt	A	65-66	MAG-16 CC 1-66
Hue Phu Bai	R. C. Coulter	Capt	A	66	MAG-16 CC 5-66
Hue Phu Bai	Arthur W. Covey	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Timothy L. Cox	SSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	T. N. Cox	Capt	A	70-71	Denny Bowen
MCAS Futenma	L. R. Coxe	CWO	A	71	Leon Coxe
Hue Phu Bai	? Craven	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	James D. Croh	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Richard A. Crow	SSgt	C	67-68	Robert Young
Hue Phu Bai	Richard A. Crow	SSgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Pete Cullum	LCpl	C	68	Steve Hlland
Marble Mountain	P. L. Cullum	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Michael J. Dailey	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Dick Dallaire	1stLt	C	68	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	Richard C. Damge	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. R. Daniel	GySgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Jim Davenport	SSgt	C	67-68	Dan Dorn
LZ Baldy	Everett Davis	GySgt	C	70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Everett L. Davis (WIA) (BS)	GySgt	C	70	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	William D. Deatherage	GySgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Harold C. Deatley	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	? DeDominicis	Sgt	C	67-68	Robert Young
Marble Mountain	Les DeHaven	CWO	C	65	Ed LeBaron
Marble Mountain	W. R. Dittman	Cpl	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	? Dobbs	Sgt	D	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Marble Mountain	J. M. Dominguez	Cpl	C	70	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Dan Dorn	1stLt	C	67-68	Dan Dorn
Marble Mountain	Daniel B. Dorn	1stLt	C	68	MATCU-68 CC 6-68
Hue Phu Bai	John W. Dotson	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	John F. Driscoll	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Bill Edwards	Gysgt	C	67	Robert Young
Hue Phu Bai	Ralph L. Edwards	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Gerald M. Emery	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	? Eslick (NCM)	Cpl	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	"Slick" Eslick	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	John E. Etter	SSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Evans	Cpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 10-66
Marble Mountain	D. W. Everett	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Charlie Farr	GySgt	C	67-68	Dan Dorn
Hue Phu Bai	Chris M. Farrell	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Don Feilen	GySgt	C	66-67	Jack Keane
Marble Mountain	B. F. Ferguson	Cpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	William A. Ferrell	SSgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. D. Fish	MSgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Jerrold R. Fisher	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Jerry Fisher	SSgt	C	70-71	Jerry Fisher
Marble Mountain	D. G. Fitzgerald	Sgt	C	70	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	William T. Fleenor	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Henry D. Flood	1stLt	T	66-67	Hank Flood
An Hoa	Joe Follis	Sgt	C	68	Robert Young

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Hue Phu Bai	Joe E. Follis	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Jerry W. Ford	1stLt	A	68-69	MATCU-68 CC 6-68
Hue Phu Bai	Mic E. Fraser	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	R. D. Fratangelo	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	? Freund	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Charles Fulks	GySgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Billy K. Gabriel	Capt	T	68-69	Billy K Gabriel
Hue Phu Bai	Dannie O. Garsed	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Donald F. Gates	SSgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Don Gates	SSgt	C	68	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	Donald L. Gehrig	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	P. M. Giglio	1stLt	C	70-71	MABS-16 CC 6-71
Marble Mountain	Bob Gigure	GySgt	C	70-71	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. P. Gillon	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	Deane H. Gilmore	Sgt	C	66	Deane H. Gilmore
Hue Phu Bai	Deane Gilmour	Sgt		66-67	Terry Terrell
Hue Phu Bai	? Gimble	MSgt	A	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	? Godfrey	SSgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Thomas L. Goldein	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Goodale	2ndLt	C	68	Steve Hulland
LZ Baldy	Ed Goodgasell	MSgt	C	71	Al Tomer
Marble Mountain	Ed Goodgasell	MSgt	C	70-71	Al Tomer
Hue Phu Bai	Carl Gordon	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	William A. Griffith	LCpl	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	D. M. Griffith	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	? Grohnke	Cpl		67	MATCU-68 CC 1-67
Marble Mountain	Phillip A. Grzanich	1stLt	C	69-70	MAG-16 CC 11-69
Hue Phu Bai	Phil Grzanich	WO	C	69	Steve Hulland
Hue Phu Bai	? Gummersheimer	Cpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Alexander W. Gyarfas	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Robert Haas	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Loren E. Hajduk	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Ernie Hall	SSgt	C	68	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	Lawrence J. Hammock	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Wayne Haney	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Khe Sanh	Wayne Haney	Sgt	C	66-67	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Wayne Haney	Sgt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 10-66
Marble Mountain	M. B. Hardy	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Delmer D. Harman	GySgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Herbert W. Harris	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Khe Sanh	J. S. Harvey	SSgt	T	66-67	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	J. S. Harvey	SSgt	T	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	? Hautmaki	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Lowel D. Hawbaker	WO	T	66	Ray Mischock
Marble Mountain	? Hayes	MSgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Dan E. Hedenberg	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	William J. Hejoar	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Charles E. Henderson	GySgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Hershberger	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Marble Mountain	James N. Holk	Capt	T	70-71	MATCU-68 CC 2-70

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Hue Phu Bai	Phillip A. Hood	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Willie Howe	GySgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Robert S. Howland	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Hulbert	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Steve Hulland	Sgt	C	68-69	Steve Hulland
Hue Phu Bai	? Hutchason	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	George C. Ingraham	Sgt	C	68	Steve Hulland
Marble Mountain	B. D. Irving	Sgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Cliff Ivey	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Stanley F. Jacobsen	Capt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	B. T. James	SSgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Michael T. Jarvis	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	G. F. Jobson	MSgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
MCAS Futenma	Gordon Jobson	MSgt	T	71	Leon Cox
Marble Mountain	C. O. Johnson	SSgt	C	65-66	Charley Cosner
Hue Phu Bai	William C. Joiner	Capt	A	67-68	MATCU-68 CC 10-67
Marble Mountain	? Jonely	2ndLt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Richard C. Jonely	WO	C	68	Steve Hulland
Marble Mountain	Richard C. Jonely	1stLt	C	69-70	MAG-16 CC 11-69
Hue Phu Bai	Charles B. "Charlie" Jones	GySgt	T	68-69	Charlie Jones
Marble Mountain	V. E. Karcz	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Jerry Kelly	Cpl	T	66	Jerry Kelly
Hue Phu Bai	James A. Klima	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Kolke	Cpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Dennis W. Kotch	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	G. J. Lannone	Sgt	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	"Lash" Larue	1stLt	C	68-69	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	"Lash" Larue	1stLt	C	68	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Kenneth A. Lawless	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Ed LeBaron	GySgt	C	65	Ed LeBaron
Hue Phu Bai	Jim Ledford		A	67-68	Ed LeBaron
Hue Phu Bai	? Leonard	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	Joe Lollar	MSgt	A	68-69	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	David L. Lovin	LCpl	O	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	M. D. Lucas	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Jim Macaulay	Cpl	C	67-68	Jim Macaulay
Hue Phu Bai	? Mais	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	B K. Malone	LCpl	C	69	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	? Marshall	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	? Martin	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	"Smoke" Mason	Capt	A	65	Ed LeBaron
Hue Phu Bai	Paul Mason	SSgt	C	68	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	Bob Mathais	GySgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Robert O. Mathias	GySgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Bob Mathis	MSgt	C	67	Robert Young
Hue Phu Bai	Jerri R. Matlock	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Steve Maynard	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	? Mays	SSgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	O. B. Mays	GySgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	William E. McCollum	Capt	A	68	Dan Walczak

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Hue Phu Bai	John W. McGee	Capt	C	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	John W. McGee	Capt	A	67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	? McKay	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	Bernie McQuerry	SSgt	C	70	Merrell Branstetter
Marble Mountain	Don Mears	Capt	A	70-71	Al Tomer
Hue Phu Bai	Wilhel J. Meininger	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Meola	LCpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	Ronald K. Miller	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Ray Mischock	GySgt	C	66-67	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Stanley C. Montgomery	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	James Moore	MSgt	A	65	Charley Cosner
Marble Mountain	Bob Moorehead	2ndLt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Robert D. Moorehead	2ndLt	C	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
MCAS Futenma	Bob Moorehead	CWO	C	71	Leon Coxe
Marble Mountain	Skip Morehead	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Hermon B. Moyers	SSgt	C	67-68	Herm Moyers
Hue Phu Bai	James M. Mutter	1stLt	C	67	Jim Mutter
Marble Mountain	James M. Mutter	1stLt	A	67	Jim Mutter
Hue Phu Bai	George E. Namie	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Neal	Cpl		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	Rudolph M. Nebel	Maj	A	69-70	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Gene Nebelung	SSgt	C	66	Gene Nebelung
Marble Mountain	Ed Neely	GySgt	C	70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Paul Nenni	Cpl	C	70-71	Paul Nenni
LZ Baldy	Chet Newcomb	GySgt	C	69-70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	Chet Newcomb	GySgt	C	70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	D. L. Nickles	GySgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	? Nold	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	James W. Nutt	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Michael E. Oberg	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Barry W. Odykinn	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	John O'Hey	MSgt	A	70	Chet Newcomb
Hue Phu Bai	Bill Olahaski	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Marble Mountain	Lance N. Oliver	Sgt	T	68-69	Lance N. Oliver
An Hoa	Lance N. Oliver	Sgt	T	69-70	Lance N. Oliver
Marble Mountain	W. J. O'Sullivan	1stLt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Cecil D. Owen	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	T. J. Pacek	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Gerald S. Pahl	1stLt	C	67-68	Dan Dorn
Marble Mountain	Gerald S. Pahl	1stLt	A	68	MATCU-68 CC 8-68
Hue Phu Bai	Wesley L. Palmer	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Khe Sanh	Mark D. Parish	1stLt	A	66-67	MATCU-68 CC10-66
Marble Mountain	R. L. Park Jr.	GySgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	R. W. Parr	Sgt	D	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	S. A. Parris	Cpl	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Richard C. Pederson	CWO	T	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	? Pitts	Cpl	T	68-69	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Wallace J. Pollok	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Frank S. Poole	GySgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Ron J. Popper	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Marble Mountain	Patrick M. Prout	2ndLt	A	65-66	Ed LeBaron
Hue Phu Bai	Patrick M. Prout	1stLt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Marble Mountain	Gene Pryor	MSgt	C	70	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Jerry M. Pulver	Sgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Rains	Sgt		66	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	? Randall	LCpl	C	68	Steve Hulland
Hue Phu Bai	Ray M. Rasmussen	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Skip Redpath (WIA)	Sgt	C	68-69	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Skip Redpath	Sgt	C	68	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Doyle R. Reed	1stLt	C	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	Dennis K. Reischl	Sgt	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Albert L. Rhodes	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Clyde C. Rogers	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Russell	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Hue Phu Bai	Edward M. Rynne	Capt	C	67-68	MATCU-68 CC 12-67
Hue Phu Bai	Sam Sagarian	Gysgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Marble Mountain	Sam Sagerian	MSgt	C	70-71	Jerry Fisher
Hue Phu Bai	Thomas K. Schiffer	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Donald O. Schultz	SSgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	William F. Schumann	LCpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Floyd E. Seaman	1stLt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	Cam Servick	Sgt		67	Jim Macaulay
Hue Phu Bai	Anthony R. Shaw (WIA)	1stLt	C	67-68	Gerald S. Pahl
Hue Phu Bai	? Sherwood	Sgt		67	MATCU-68 CC 3-67
Marble Mountain	John Silva	Sgt	T	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Jake Sindt	SSgt	C	67-68	Ed LeBaron
Marble Mountain	J. F. Sindt	GySgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Charles H. Sisson	Capt	C	68-69	MATCU-68 CC 12-68
Hue Phu Bai	William D. Skov	Capt	C	66-67	Arthur Faram
Marble Mountain	Neil Smith	SSgt	T	65	Charley Cosner
Hue Phu Bai	Leonard H. "Len" Smith	GySgt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	C. C. Smith	Cpl	C	67	Jim Macaulay
Hue Phu Bai	Thomas T. Smith	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Albert Smith	SSgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Andrew W. Smith	Cpl	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Malcom S. Smith	1stLt	C	70	MABS-16 CC 1-71
Marble Mountain	C. G. Smith	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	Al Snelson	MSgt	T	70-71	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Ray Spears	2ndLt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	S. W. Staab	SSgt	T	68	OPNAV 1080 (67) 6-68
Marble Mountain	P. J. Stankas	SSgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	R. T. Stanton	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Thomas J. Stark	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. P. Stewart	Cpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	Gordon P. Stirling	2ndLt	A	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 1-67
Hue Phu Bai	Gordon P. Stirling	2ndLt	C	66-67	G.P. Stirling
An Hoa	G.P. Stirling	Capt	A	70	G.P. Stirling
FOB Liberty	G.P. Stirling	Capt	A	70	G.P. Stirling
Marble Mountain	G.P. Stirling	Capt	C	70	G.P. Stirling
Marble Mountain	L. P. Stone	SSgt	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo

MATCU-68 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Marble Mountain	J. W. Stuski	LCpl	C	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Marble Mountain	W. J. Sullivan	1stLt	C	70-71	MABS-16 CC 6-71
Marble Mountain	Steve Swanson	Sgt	C	65-66	Merrell Branstetter
Hue Phu Bai	Miles E. Tanner	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Richard G. Tarlow	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Brian Taylor	Sgt	C	68	Skip Redpath
Hue Phu Bai	Leroy W. Taylor	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
An Hoa	Jim Tetzlaff	SSgt	T	70	Chet Newcomb
Marble Mountain	James W. Tetzlaff	SSgt	T	70-71	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Jesse W. Teverbaugh	MSgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	John D. Thorla	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	? Toby	Cpl	C	68	Steve Hulland
LZ Baldy	Al Tomer	SSgt	C	71	Al Tomer
Marble Mountain	Al Tomer	SSgt	C	70-71	Al Tomer
Hue Phu Bai	Robert W. "Bob" Torrey	1stLt	T	67-68	Dan Dorn
Hue Phu Bai	Franklin S. Turner	LCpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Thomas N. Tuthill	1stLt	C	69-70	MAG-16 CC 11-69
Hue Phu Bai	Raymond R. Vaughn	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Henry Vieira	Cpl	C	67	Jim Macaulay
Hue Phu Bai	Joseph "Joe" Voeplak	GySgt	C	66	MATCU-68 CC 6-66
Hue Phu Bai	Danny Walczak	SSgt	C	68-69	Dan Walczak
Hue Phu Bai	William J. Walters	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Angelo Walters	SSgt	D	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Robert I. Ward	CWO	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	J. L. Webb	1stLt	C	70-71	MABS-16 CC 6-71
MCAS Futenma	Jesse Webb	CWO	C	71	Leon Coxe
Hue Phu Bai	William B. Whitten	WO	T	66-67	MATCU-68 CC 9-66
Hue Phu Bai	James P. Williams	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	G. L. Wilson	Sgt	T	70-71	Bob Fratangelo
Hue Phu Bai	Lee E. Wisnoske	GySgt	C	66	Ray Mischock
Hue Phu Bai	Walter J. Wohlpeil	Sgt	T	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Hue Phu Bai	Comer C. Wolfe	Cpl	C	68	Jim Tetzlaff
Marble Mountain	Robert Young	SSgt	C	67-68	Robert Young

MATCU-70 PERSONNEL

LOCATION	NAME	RANK	CT	YEARS	REPORTED BY
Quang Tri	Richard Ale	Sgt	C	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	Ray Anti	1stLt	T	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	R. D. Averill	Sgt	D	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	R. D. Cannon	Cpl	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	A. N. Carlson	Cpl	C	68	OPNAV 1080(62) 3-68
Quang Tri	D. C. Carney	Sgt	D	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	Burt Currier	CWO4	C	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	Dewey Darby	GySgt	C	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	L. Duff	SSgt	T	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	G. L. Dunn	Sgt	T	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	J. M. Fennell	Sgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	Richard V. Garvey	SSgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	N. L. Gilbert	Sgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	M. G. Ivkovich	Cpl	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	K. Jusko	SSgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	Ed Lebaron	GySgt	A	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	A. D. Ludwick	Cpl	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	Pat Prout	Capt	A	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	G. R. Simmons	SSgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	Fred Spivey	GySgt	C	67-68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	Gerald Tkacz	GySgt	A	68	Ed Lebaron
Quang Tri	R. L. Tumbleson	SSgt	T	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	C. F. Varbel	Sgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	C. C. Waller	Sgt	C	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	G. R. Weissenfels	Sgt	T	67-68	Dick Garvey
Quang Tri	R. G. Zvolerin	1stLt	C	67-68	OPNAV 1080(62) 3-68

Bibliography

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reference

ID No.

The HOTLINE – The Official Publication of the Marine Air Traffic Control Association.

Editor and Publisher
Roger and Carole McIntosh
5 Quartz Circle
Fredricksburg, VA
22405

1

Command Chronology of First Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW)
Contained on Compact Disks – VNCD-067 and VNCD-068

Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

2

Command Chronology of Marine Aircraft Group Twelve (MAG-12)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-076

Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

3

Command Chronology of Marine Aircraft Group Thirteen (MAG-13)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-077

Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

4

Command Chronology of Marine Aircraft Group Fifteen (MAG-15)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-077

Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

5

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reference

ID No.

Command Chronology of Marine Aircraft Group Sixteen (MAG-16)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-077
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

6

Command Chronology of Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Six (MAG-36)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

7

Command Chronology of Provisional Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Nine (PROVMAG-39)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

8

Command Chronology of Marine Air Base Squadron Twelve (MABS-12)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-076
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

9

Command Chronology of Marine Airbase Squadron Thirteen (MABS-13)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-077
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

10

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reference

ID No.

Command Chronology of Marine Air Base Squadron Fifteen (MABS-15)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-077

Naval Historical Foundation

Archives Section

Marine Corps History and Museum Division

1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5055

11

Command Chronology of Marine Air Base Squadron Sixteen (MABS-16)

Contained on Compact Disks – VNCD-077 and VNCD 078

Naval Historical Foundation

Archives Section

Marine Corps History and Museum Division

1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5055

12

Command Chronology of Marine Air Base Squadron Thirty-Six (MABS-36)

Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078

Naval Historical Foundation

Archives Section

Marine Corps History and Museum Division

1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5055

13

Command Chronology of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron Thirty-Nine

(H&MS-39)

Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078

Naval Historical Foundation

Archives Section

Marine Corps History and Museum Division

1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5055

14

Command Chronology of Marine Air Traffic Control Unit Sixty-Two (MATCU-62) Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078

Naval Historical Foundation

Archives Section

Marine Corps History and Museum Division

1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5055

15

Reference

ID No.

Command Chronology of Marine Air Traffic Control Unit Sixty-Six Detachment
A - (MATCU-66A)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

16

Command Chronology of Marine Air Traffic Control Unit Sixty-Seven
(MATCU-67)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

17

Command Chronology of Marine Air Traffic Control Unit Sixty-Eight
(MATCU-68)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-078
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

18

U. S. Marines In Combat
The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era 1954-1964
By Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR
History and Museums Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D. C. 20402

19

U. S. Marines in Vietnam
The Landing and Buildup 1965
By Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC
History and Museums Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D. C. 20402

20

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reference

ID No.

The United States in Vietnam

The Defining Year 1968

By Jack Shulimson, Charles R. Smith, LtCol. Leonard A. Blasiol, USMC, and
Capt. David A. Dawson, USMC

History and Museums Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps

U. S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D. C. 20402

21

U. S. Marines in Vietnam

Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970-1971

By Graham A. Cosmas and LtCol. Terrance R. Murray, USMC

Edited by Jack Shulimson and Maj. William R. Melton

History and Museums Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps

U. S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D. C. 20402

22

Order of Battle

By Alan H. Barbour, Historian

USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association

28101 Florence Street

St. Clair Shores, Michigan 48081-1617

23

Chronology of Marine Helicopter Operations in Vietnam

By John Van Nortwick, Alan Barbour, Mike Leahy, Gene Salter, Jim
Shanahan, Roger Herman, Joe Novak, Bob Stoffey, and Ted Read.

USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association

28101 Florence Street

St. Clair Shores, Michigan 48081-1617

24

Vietnam – A History

By Stanley Karnow

The Viking Press

40 West 23rd Street

New York, NY 10010

25

Khe Sanh – Siege in the Clouds

By Eric Hammel

Pacifica Press

1149 Grand Teton Drive

Pacifica, CA 94044

26

Semper Fi Vietnam

By Edward F. Murphy

Presidio Press, Inc.

505 B San Marin Drive, Suite 300

Novato, CA 94945-1340

27

Reference

ID No.

OPNAV 3721.2 Report for February 1968 dated 1 March 1968
By Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 62
Marine Aircraft Group 36
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96602
At Dong Ha, South Vietnam

28

OPNAV 3721.2 Report for May 1968 dated 1 June 1968
By Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 67
Marine Air Base Squadron 12
Marine Aircraft Group 12
First Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
At Chu Lai, South Vietnam

29

GCA Log Book (Selected Pages) January to April 1968
MATCU-62 at Dong Ha, South Vietnam
Contributed by Arthur D. Faram

30

Control Tower Log Book (Complete) March to June 1968
MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh, South Vietnam
Contributed by Daniel D. Chase

31

Vietnam Air Losses
By Christopher Michael Hobson
Midland Publishing
4 Watling Drive
Hinckley LE10 3EY, England

32

Command Chronology of Marine Air Control Squadron – Two (MACS-2)
Contained on Compact Disk – VNCD-069
Naval Historical Foundation
Archives Section
Marine Corps History and Museum Division
1306 Dahlgren Ave, SE
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5055

33

	Title
	Acronyms and Abbreviations
	Vietnam Aircraft
	MATOU Equipment
	MATOU MOS

Glossary

GLOSSARY INDEX

Title
Acronymns and Abbreviations
Vietnam Aircraft
MATCU Equipment
MATCU MOS

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
1stLt	First Lieutenant
1stMAW	First Marine Aircraft Wing
2ndLt	Second Lieutenant
AC	Alternating Current
AF	Air Force
ASO	Aviation Safety Officer
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Air Search Radar
ATC	Air Traffic Control
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
BGen	Brigadier General
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BUNO	Bureau Number
Capt	Captain
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CAS	Close Air Support
CEO	Communications-Electronics Officer
CG	Commanding General
CinCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CinCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CO	Commanding Officer
COD	Carrier On-Board Delivery
Col	Colonel
ComUSMACV	Commander United States Military Assistance Command-Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
Cpl	Corporal
CS	O-Chlorobenzimalinitrille - a micropulverized Riot Control/Tear Agent

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
CWO	Commissioned Warrant Officer
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EB	Engineering Battalion
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
ECCM	Electronic Counter Counter Measures
ERPAL	Electronics Repair Parts Allowance List
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	Forward Air Control also Final Approach Course
FM	Frequency Modulated
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FO	Forward Observer
FOB	Forward Operating base
FOD	Foreign Object Damage
FWD	Forward
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GySgt	Gunnery Sergeant
H&MS	Headquarters and maintenance Squadron
HF	High Frequency
HMM	Helicopter Marine Medium Squadron
Hz(hz)	Hertz
IAF	Initial Approach Fix
ICTZ	I Corps Tactical Zone
III MAF	Third Marine Amphibious Force
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
JATO	Jet Assisted Take Off
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
KIA	Killed in Action
LCC	Landing Control Central
LCpl	Lance Corporal
LF RBn (RBN)	Low Frequency Radio Beacon
LPH	Landing Platform Helicopter
LSD	Landing Ship Dock
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel
LtGen	Lieutenant General
LZ	Landing Zone
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MABS	Marine Air Base Squadron
MACS	Marine Air Control Squadron
MACV	Military Assistance Command - Vietnam
MAG	Marine Aircraft Group
Maj	Major
MATCU	Marine Air Traffic Control Unit
MCAF	Marine Corps Air Facility
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MGen	Major General
MGySgt	Master Gunnery Sergeant
MHz	Mega Hertz
MMAF	Marble Mountain Air Force
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
MSgt	Master Sergeant
MUV	Marine Unit - Vietnam
MVA	Minimum Vectoring Altitude

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
MWSG	Marine Wing Support Group
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATTC	Naval Air Technical Training Command
NAVAID	Navigational Aid
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ	Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters
NAVELECSYSCOM	Naval Electronics System Command
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnamese Air Force
ODO	Operations Duty Officer
OIC	Officer in Charge
PAR	Precision Approach Radar
POL	Petroleum Oil Lubricants
ProvMAG	Provisional Marine Aircraft Group
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RAPCON	Radar Approach Control
RESCAP	Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RON	Remain Over Night
RTAFB	Royal Thai Air Force Base
SAR	Search and Rescue
SATS	Short Airfield for Tactical Support
SE	South East
SEA	South East Asia
SERNO	Serial Number
Sgt	Sergeant
SNCO	Staff Non-Commissioned Officer
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Description
SSgt	Staff Sergeant
SVFR	Special Visual Flight Rules
SVNAF	South Vietnamese Air Force
TACAN	Tactical Aid to Navigation
TAC(A)	Tactical Air Control Airborne
TAD	Temporary Additional Duty
TAFDS	Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System
TAOC	Tactical Air Operations Center
TECH REP	Technical Representative
TERPS	TERminal PRocedureS
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USO	United Service Organization
USS	United States Ship
VC	Vietnamese Communists
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VHF	Very High Frequency
VMA	Fixed-Wing Marine Attack Squadron
VMC	Visual Meteorological Conditions
VMCJ	Fixed-Wing Marine Jet Composite Squadron
VMFA	Fixed-Wing marine Fighter/Attack Squadron
VMGR	Fixed-Wing Marine Refueling/Transport Squadron
VMO	Fixed-Wing Marine Observation Squadron
WIA	Wounded in Action
WO	Warrant Officer

Vietnam Aircraft

Type	Description
A-1	Douglas Skyraider - Single engine prop - Used by USAF and USN Light Attack/CAS/ResCAP
A-3	Douglas Skywarrior - Twin engine jet - Used by USN as aerial refueler and for ECM/ECCM
A-37	Cessna Dragonfly - Twin engine jet - Used by SVNAF for Light Attack/CAS
A-6	Gruman Intruder - Twin engine jet - Used by USN and USMC for All Weather Attack/CAS
A-7	Vought Corsair II - Single engine jet - Used by USAF and USN for Light Attack/CAS
AC-119	Fairchild Gunship III - Twin engine prop - Used by USAF for Interdiction and CAS
AC-130	Lockheed Gunship II - Four engine turboprop - Used by USAF for Interdiction and CAS
AC-47	Douglas Gunship I - Twin engine prop - Used by USAF for Interdiction and CAS
AH-1	Bell Cobra - Single engine jet helicopter - Used by USA and USMC for CAS
B-52	Boeing Stratofortress - Eight engine jet - Used by USAF for Area Bombing
B-57	Martin Canberra - Twin engine jet - Used by USAF for Light Attack and CAS
C-1	Grumman Trader - Twin engine prop - Used by USN and USMC for Light Transport
C-117	Douglas Skytrain - Twin engine prop - Used by USN and USMC for Transport
C-123	Fairchild Provider - Two prop and two jet engines - Used by USAF for Transport
C-130	Lockheed Hercules - Four engine turboprop - Used by USAF for Transport
C-141	Lockheed Starlifter - Four engine jet - Used by USAF for Heavy Transport
C-2	Grumman Greyhound - Twin engine turboprop - Used by USN for Light Transport
C-47	Douglas Skytrain - Twin engine prop - Used by USN, USMC, and SVNAF for Transport
C-7	DeHavilland Caribou - Twin engine prop - Used by USA and USAF for Transport
CH-37	Sikorsky Mohave - Twin engine recip helicopter - Used by USMC for Heavy Transport
CH-46	Boeing Vertol SeaKnight - Twin engine jet twin rotor helicopter - Used by USN and USMC
CH-47	Boeing Chinook - Twin engine jet twin rotor helicopter - Used by USA for Heavy Transport
CH-53	Sikorsky Sea Stallion - Twin engine jet helicopter - Used by USAF for SAR, and USMC
E-1	Grumman Tracer - Twin engine prop - Used by USN for Airborne Command and Control
E-2	Grumman Hawkeye - Twin engine turboprop - Used by USN for Airborne Command and Control
EB-66	Douglas Destroyer - Twin engine jet - Used by USAF for ECM/ECCM
EC-121	Lockheed Warning Star - Four engine prop - Used by USAF and USN for Airborne Command/ECM

Vietnam Aircraft

Type	Description
EF-10	Douglas Skynight - Twin engine jet - Used by USMC for ECM/ECCM
F-100	North American Super Sabre - Single engine jet - Used by USAF for CAS
F-105	Republic Thunderchief - Single engine jet - Used by USAF for Area Bombing
F-4	McDonnell Phantom II - Twin engine jet - Used by USAF, USN, USMC for CAS and CAP
F-5	North American Freedom Fighter - Twin engine jet - Used by SVNAF for CAP
F-8	Chance/Vought Crusader - Single engine jet - Used by USN and USMC for CAS and CAP
H-6	Bell Cayuse - Single engine jet helicopter- Used by USA as light utility helicopter.
H-13	Bell Sioux (Model 47) - Single engine helicopter - Used by USA as light utility helicopter.
HH-54	Sikorsky SkyCrane - Twin engine jet helicopter - Used by USA amd USAF for Heavy Transport
KC-130	Lockheed Hercules - Four engine turboprop - Used by USMC as Refueler and Transport
O-1	Cessna Birdog - Single engine prop - Used by USA , USAF, and USMC as FAC
O-2	Cessna Skymaster - Twin engine prop - Used by USAF as FAC
OV-1	Grumman Mohawk - Twin engine turboprop - Used by USA for Intellegence Gathering
OV-10	North American Bronco - Twin engine turboprop - Used by USN and USMC as FAC
P-2	Lockheed Neptune - Two prop and two jet engines - Used by USN for Maritime Surveillance
P-3	Lockheed Orion - Four engine turboprop - Used by USN for Maritime Surveillance
S-2	Grumman Tracker - Twin engine prop - Used by USN for ASW and USMC for Light Transport
SH-3	Sikorsky SeaKing - Twen engine jet helicopter - Used by USAF and USN for SAR
T-28	North American Trojan - Single engine prop - Used by SVNAF for Light Attack
TA-4	Douglas Skyhawk - Single engine jet - Used by USMC as FastFAC
TF-9	Grumman Cougar - Single engine jet - Used by USMC as FastFAC
U-6	DeHavilland Beaver - Single engine prop - Used by USA and USAF for Light Transport
U-10	Helio Courier - Single engine prop - Used by USA and USAF for Light Transport
U-21	Beechcraft King Air - Twin engine prop - Used by USA and USAF for Light Transport
UH-1	Bell Huey - Single engine jet helicopter - Used by USA, USAF, USN, and USMC for Transport
UH-34	Sikorsky SeaHorse - Single engine recip helicopter - Used by USMC and SVNAF for Transport

MATCU Equipment

Identification	Description
Radars	
CPN-4	Korean era GCA Radar (Separate ASR and PAR)
FPN-36	Multi-Function GCA Radar (ASR and PAR)
MSQ-4	Pre-Vietnam era Medium Range Surveillance Radar Operations Shelter
TPN-8	Multi-Function GCA Radar for TSQ-18 and TSQ-18A (ASR and PAR)
TSN-1	GCA Operations Shelter for FPN-36
TSQ-18	2 Shelter Complex - Landing Control Central and GCA Shelter
TSQ-18A	3 Shelter Complex - Landing Control Central, GCA Shelter, & Surveillance Shelter
UPS-1	Medium Range Surveillance Radar for MSQ-4, TSQ-18 and TSQ-18A
UPX-11	Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
Radar Indicators	
APA-125	Surveillance Indicator in LCC of TSQ-18, and LCC and RSC Shelters of TSQ-18A
OA-8037	GCA Indicator in TSN-1 of FPN-36
Control Towers	
GRC-99	UHF only Small Mobile Watchtower without stand
TRC-131	Improved UHF/VHF/FM Small Mobile Watchtower without stand
TSA-11	UHF only Mobile Control Tower with stand
TSA-13	Mobile Control Tower with stand and both UHF and VHF plus DF capabilities
TSA-28	Improved Mobile Control Tower with stand (deployed in 1969)
Navigation Aids	
GRA-34	Remote Monitor for MRN-21 TACAN
MRN-16	Pre-Vietnam era truck mounted TACAN
MRN-21	TACAN
TRN-14	TACAN
TRN-16	LF Radio Beacon
TRN-21	TACAN
TRN-29	TACAN (Shelter with dual TRN-14s linked to common antenna)
URN-3	TACAN (USAF)
URN-5	LF Radio Beacon
URN-12	UHF Radio Beacon

MATCU Equipment

Identification	Description
Direction Finders	
URD-2	VHF Direction Finder
URD-4	UHF Direction Finder
Radios	
ARC-1	VHF Radio for TSN-1 & CPN-4 (Crystal Control)
ARC-27	UHF Radio for TSN-1 & CPN-4 (Crystal Control)
ARC-51	UHF radio for TSQ-18
ARC-84	VHF radio for TSQ-18
ARC-94	HF (SSB) radios for TSQ-18
PRC-41	Battery Operated Back Pack UHF Radio
PRC-47	Battery Operated Back Pack UHF Radio
TED	Shelter Enclosed UHF Radio Transmitters for TSA-11/13 (Crystal Control)
URR-35	Shelter Enclosed UHF Radio Receivers for TSA-11/13 (Crystal Control)
URC-46	VHF (FM) add-on radios for TSA-11, TSA-13, and TRC-131
Generators	
PU-239	Diesel Powered 60 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-344	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-347	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-348	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-390	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-482	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-588	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-590	Diesel Powered 60 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-608	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator (45 KW)
PU-648	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
PU-670	Diesel Powered 400 Hz Electricity Generator
Tape Recorders	
RC-1510	Tape Recorder in use in Chu Lai TSQ-18A
RD-217	Tape Recorder in use in TSA-11
RD-312	Multi-Channel 12" Reel 24 Hour Tape Recorder in TSQ-18A

MATCU Equipment

Identification	Description
Air Conditioners	
HD-574M	Air Conditioners for TSQ-18 complex.
HD-580A	Air Conditioners for TSQ-18 complex

MATCU MOS

MOS	Description
1341	Engineer Equipment Mechanic
1342	GCA Equipment Mechanic
1349	Engineer Equipment Chief
1351	Diesel Mechanic/Generator Repairman
2851	Aviation Radio Repairman
2861	Aviation Radio Technician
3051	Warehouse Clerk
3071	Supply Man - Manual Account
5905	Electronics Officer
5910	Aviation Radar maintenance Officer
5931	Ground Radar Repairman
5944	Aviation Radar Repairer
5949	Aviation Radar Technician
5951	Air Traffic Control Radar Technician
5952	Air Traffic Control Navigation Aids Technician
6711	Control Tower Operator
6713	Radar Approach Controller
6715	GCA Controller
6720	Air Traffic Control Officer
7041	Aviation Operations Specialist

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Appendix A

Monographs

Author	Location
Can Salford	MMAF-69 Chu Lai
Mike Barry	Chu Lai
Jerry Bauer	Quang Tri
Bill Barton	Dong Ha
Jerry Bass	MMAF-68 Chu Lai
Jerry Bowen	Chu Lai
Cennis Bradford	MMAF-69 Chu Lai
Marion Brantley	Chu Lai
Alan Bull	Chu Lai
Warren Brown	Chu Lai
Joseph Caldwell	Chu Lai
John Campagna	Chu Lai
D. K. Cannon	MMAF-69 Chu Lai
T. J. Carr	Chu Lai
Tom Carroll	Dong Ha
Lacey Causey	Quang Tri
Daniel Chase	Chu Lai
Robert Cole	Quang Tri
Charley Connor	MMAF-69 Chu Lai
Leon Cox	Chu Lai
Les Crisp	Dong Ha
Richard D'Amato	Dong Ha
James Eagan	Chu Lai

INDEX OF MONOGRAPHS

Contributor	Locations	Page
Carl Ballard	MMAF-69, LZ Baldy-69, An Hoa-69, LZ Ross-69	158
Mike Barry	Hue Phu Bai-67, Dong Ha-68, Khe Sanh-68, LZ Vandegrift-68	159
Jerry Bauer	Quang Tri-68	162
Bill Behan	Dong Ha-66, Khe Sanh-66	165
Jerry Bess	MMAF-66, Hue Phu Bai-66	168
Denny Bowen	Chu Lai-67, MMAF-70	169
Dennis Bradford	MMAF-69, LZ Baldy-70	795
Merrell Branstetter	MMAF-65, Phu Bai-66, Dong Ha-66, Khe-Sanh-66, MMAF-70	172
Matt Brill	Soc Trang-62	185
Warren Brown	Chu Lai-68	186
Joserp Calcasola	Chu Lai-66	187
John Campaigne	DaNang-70	188
D. K. Carman	MMAF--65, Hue Phu Bai-66	189
J. J. Carr	Chu Lai-69	190
Tom Carroll	Dong Ha-68, Quang Tri-69	191
Lacey Causey	Quang Tri-66	192
Daniel Chase	Chu Lai-67, Dong Ha-68, Khe Sanh-68, An Hoa-68	193
Robert Cole	Quang Tri-68	194
Charley Cosner	MMAF-65	195
Leon Coxe	Futenma-71	196
Leo Culp	Dong Ha-66	197
Richard D'Ambrosio	Dong Ha-67, Khe Sanh-68	198
James Dargan	Chu Lai-65	199

INDEX OF MONOGRAPHS

Contributor	Locations	Page
Lonnie Darr	Khe Sanh-67, Dong Ha-68	201
Ronald Dodge	Dong Ha-66, Khe Sanh-67	203
Daniel Dorn	Hue Phu Bai-67, MMAF-68	204
Donald Eskam	Dong Ha-68, Quang Tri-69, Chu Lai-69	205
Don Faram	Dong Ha-66	207
Jerry Fisher	Hue Phu Bai-68, MMAF-68, Chu Lai-70, MMAF-70	209
Hank Flood	Soc Trang-62, Hue Phu Bai-66	211
Frank Fodor	Udorn-62	212
Billy Gabriel	Hue Phu Bai-68	213
Dick Garvey	Quang Tri-67	214
Roger Hanebutt	Chu Lai-69	228
Richard Hawes	Nam Phong-72	229
Chuck Henderson	Hue Phu Bai-67, Nam Phong-72	232
Martin Hendrix	Chu Lai-67, Khe Sanh-68, An Hoa-68	234
Steve Hulland	Hue Phu Bai-68	239
Roger Irons	Dong Ha-67, Khe Sanh-68	240
Jim Janke	Chu Lai-65, Quang Tri-69	241
Charlie Jones	Hue Phu Bai-68	243
Jack Keane	Chu Lai-65	244
Jerry Kelly	Chu Lai-65, Hue Phu Bai-66	253
Wayne Komsi	DaNang-68, Dong Ha-68, LZ Vandegrift-69	256
Ronald Krebs	Udorn-62	259
Jean Langlois	Chu Lai-67	260
Joe LaPan	Quang Tri-67	262

INDEX OF MONOGRAPHS

Contributor	Locations	Page
James Largue	Chu Lai-67	263
Ed Le Baron	MMAF-65, Quang Tri-67	264
Gary Lewis	Quang Tri-68	267
Tom Lish	Nam Phong-72	269
James Macaulay	Hue Phu Bai-67, Dong Ha-68, Khe Sanh-68	271
Bob Marshall	Udorn-62, Dong Ha-68	273
James McClurg	Chu Lai-66, Quang Tri-68, LZ Vandegrift-69	288
Roger McIntosh	DaNang-69	290
Joe Medico	Chu Lai-65	292
Jack Mefford	Nam Phong-72	294
Ray Mischock	Hue Phu Bai-66	295
Herm Moyers	Hue Phu Bai-67	303
Jim Mutter	Chu Lai-66, Hue Phu Bai-67	305
Anthony J. Nazzario	Dong Ha-67, Khe Sanh-67-68, Dong Ha-68-69	819
Chet Newcomb	Quang Tri-69, LZ Baldy-69, MMAF-70	309
Robert W. Norton	Dong Ha-68, Khe Sanh-68, Quang Tri-68	799
Lance Oliver	Hue Phu Bai-69, MMAF-69	311
G. S. Paul	Hue Phu Bai-67	312
Patrick Prout	MMAF-65, Hue Phu Bai-66, Quang Tri-67	314
Rick Rassmussen	Khe Sanh-68, Dong Ha-68, LZ Vandegrift-69	315
Skip Redpath	Hue Phu Bai-68, MMAF-69	316
Chris Reed	Chu Lai-68, DaNang-69	318
Jerry Renfeld	Chu Lai-65	320

INDEX OF MONOGRAPHS

Contributor	Locations	Page
John Rush	Chu Lai-67	323
Mike Smith	Futenma-68	325
Steve Staab	Chu Lai-68, Hue Phu Bai-68, Dong Ha-68	326
Bob Stepp	Chu Lai-65	327
G. P. Stirling	Hue Phu Bai-66, Khe Sanh-66, MMAF-70, An Hoa-70	329
Jim Strasser	Chu Lai-70	330
Dick Szuba	Chu Lai-65, Chu Lai-69	332
Jim Tetzlaff	MMAF-71, LZ Baldy-71, An Hoa-71	333
Alan Tomer	Chu Lai-70, MMAF-70	334
Dick Traver	Chu Lai-66	335
John Trosper	Quang Tri-69, Chu Lai-70	339
Dan Walczak	Hue Phu Bai-68, MMAF-69	342
Edward Wargin	Iwakuni-67	343
Stu White	Chu Lai-66, Hue Phu Bai-66, Dong Ha-66	344
Dick Wooton	Chu Lai-67, Dong Ha-67, Khe Sanh-67	352
Bob Young	MMAF-67, Frequent Wind-75	353

Monograph by Carl S. Ballard (Compiled from E-Mails on September 14, 2005.)

I was with MATCU-68 out of Marble Mountain from 10/69 -11/70. I handled the TRN-16 beacons at all the outlying fields, among other duties. My MOS was 2852 Aviation Radio Repairman, though none of us actually worked on avionics...that was another school, at Memphis I believe.

I spent a lot of time shuttling about I Corps to An Hoa, Baldy, and Ross. I also was assigned full time to each outlying field for a period of time. I was at LZ Ross for the spring '70 incident of the NVA overrunning the perimeter and inflicting several KIA on the aid station. I mainly set up and maintained the TRN-16 units at all the 2/5 and 3/7 areas. Later I was the Embarkation NCO for MATCU-68.

I flew several missions with an Army "Blue Team" (I think?) as a gunner/observer in a LOACH...though I cannot recall if it was out of LZ Baldy or LZ Ross. I was flying among all the outlying areas almost full time by then, and with my Embarkation NCO duties was "assholes and elbows" as they say.

**Monograph by J. M. "Mike" Barry
conversation notes on May 22, 2004.)****(Compiled from telephone**

I was transferred from my first duty station at MCAS Beaufort, SC to Vietnam. I arrived at MATCU-68 at Phu Bai during the last week of December of 1967. I was there only a few days and MAG-36 transferred me to MATCU-62 at Dong Ha. I got there in the first week of January 1968.

I was just finished checking in and getting my feet on the ground when the TET offensive began. I remember seeing Captain Puskar, our MATCU-62 OIC, being wounded.

I remember it being very cold and muddy at Dong Ha. When I went through Staging Battalion at Camp Pendleton we were told that we would not need our field jackets, so most left them stored on Okinawa. I sure would have liked to have mine. I remember a GySgt Kudo and a Sgt Kenny Bradford, and a Sgt Franka helping me during this time. I also remember a Cpl Cinquemani from New York running to the control tower when we had incoming. He would bring his 35mm camera and try to get pictures of exploding shells.

I was a Lance Corporal and during February I spent most of the month on mess duty, and then was assigned to Khe Sanh in the first week of March 1968. I flew to Khe Sanh on an H-34 with SSgt McMasters, a diesel mechanic. It wasn't long before he was wounded.

At Khe Sanh I worked in the control tower, even though I was a GCA controller. We operated the control tower just during daylight hours, as there was no traffic at night. I remember one of the first Air Force attempts at a low altitude parachute extraction. When the pallet was pulled out of the back of the low flying C-130 it hit a bunker complex instead of the runway.

I lived in a well-reinforced bunker deep in the ground, and did not really have many problems, except for the rats. I left Khe Sanh for Dong Ha just before the 1st Air Cavalry "rescued" the Marines at Khe Sanh, at least the 1stAirCav called it a rescue, but I don't think that any of Marines there did. I remember Sgt Bob Dale, Cpl Gafney, and Sgt Joe Kalb from this period.

I worked in the Dong Ha tower until March of 1969, except for a short period when I extended my overseas tour, and another time when I flew as a gunner with HMM-262 "The Flying Tigers".

When the Dong Ha ammo dump exploded the second time in June of 1968 (as soon as the rounds stopped flying) all the Sergeants and below were lined up on the runway for a FOD walk-down. We picked up hundreds if not thousands of rounds of damaged artillery and mortar shells.

On the 4th of July 1968 there was quite a celebration and a lot of ordnance was fired skyward. Somewhere people started firing the "pop" flares towards the TAFDS bladders. The OIC, Captain Haynes, told several of us to go and stand on the bladders so as to catch the flares before they landed and started a fire. The mission was accomplished.

One night a diesel mechanic came up to the tower and told me he was going to switch generators, but that I would not lose the radios. When I keyed the microphone I was knocked unconscious and woke up at the 3rd MarDiv Headquarters Battalion aide station. I was told later that the generators had been cross-wired and were out of phase.

Another night in the tower a rat bit me. He just bit me on the thumb. The next day Captain Haynes had me report to Delta Med. They did not have rabies vaccine so I was medevaced by H-46 to the USNS Repose. Same story there, no vaccine, so the H-46 brought me back to Dong Ha; I was then placed on a C-130 with a large load of seriously wounded Marines and flown to the NSA Da Nang Hospital. I took a lot of flak about my little bite from the walking wounded. Finally the Da Nang Hospital got me the needed vaccine and I took it with me, packed in dry ice, back to Dong Ha. I had trouble getting manifested at the DaNang terminal, until a Marine Gunner from Dong Ha saw the fix I was in with the live vaccine that couldn't defrost.

I caught a ride back to Dong Ha one night from Quang Tri in a Marine tank. The tank commander decided about half way there that it was too late and elected to spend the night hunkered down off the road. I don't ever remember being as worried as I was that night.

At Dong Ha when our crew had the night watch two or three Marines would be assigned to the perimeter guard for the night. We would report to the guard officer, usually a Lieutenant from the 3rd Recon Battalion, and after being briefed were posted to a bunker. I remember one bunker was constructed out of the hull of a damaged self-propelled howitzer.

I remember Captain Haynes keeping one of our Sergeants out of trouble with the SeaBees. This Sergeant knew how to operate a bulldozer, and the SeaBees left one unattended, and we needed some dirt excavated for new bunkers. The Sergeant took care of getting the job done. The next morning when a Navy Captain showed up steamed, our OIC somehow made everything go away, with no problems for the Sergeant.

In March of 1969 I was transferred to LZ Vandegrift. LZ Vandegrift was busy. The tower sat on a small ridge looking down on a very small runway and several helicopter landing areas. I remember getting a Marine on emergency leave a ride out on an Army UH-1. The Marine wasn't familiar with boarding a helicopter and walked into the tail rotor.

I was promoted to Corporal at LZ Vandegrift before I left towards the end of June in 1969.

I stayed at Dong Ha until I left country at the end of my tour in August of 1969. I was transferred to MATCU-75 at MCALF Camp Pendleton where I worked as a GCA controller until I left the Marine Corps in 1970. Captain Haynes from Dong Ha was also my OIC at this MATCU.

Monograph by Jerry Bauer (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 23, 2004 and then replaced by hand written monograph on June 1, 2004.)

My ATC tour was initially with the MATCU (MATCU-62A) at Quang Tri during the 1968-1969 timeframe. I arrived just after the ammo dump at Dong Ha was blown up and Joe LaPan had just left. Richard E. Jones and I arrived at about the same time period. I believe Pat Wheeler was on the plane going in country with me also. Some of the other personnel that I remember were SSgt Ramey, Eldon "Top" Bathe (who got married on the Marine Corps Birthday because it was the only day he could get off), SSgt Jim Harvey, SSgt Tony Feldes, and MSgt TFX Carroll. During my tour at Quang Tri the majority of the time was fairly uneventful, however several events stand out. I apologize for forgetting so many names but several do remain with me.

I remember arriving at the MATCU and Major H. L. Causey was the OIC and a Major Braswell was the Fields Ops Officer. He would later relieve Major Causey as the OIC. The control tower was the first thing that really stood out as it was right in the middle of the MATCU and looked to be a hybrid of a TSA-28 and a TSA-11/13. I was told that the control cab had been placed on the tower by helicopter, as the normal winch equipment would not suffice. Sure would have liked to have seen that. I heard it was quite a feat.

All other equipment was normal to the MATCU configuration except at Quang Tri there were two TACAN sets located about a half mile apart. Switching from one to the other did cause some problems. During this time period the SeaBees soil cemented the entire area between the runway and taxiways, which caused the TACANs to multi-path giving the pilots faulty information. I remember Ken Hand, who was with the Wing CEO, having to come to Quang Tri to help solve the problem. Among the talent we had we found that the solution was to remove the antenna from its mast and place it on sandbags at ground level.

It would have been better if we had done this initially as one morning, upon doing routine maintenance; one of the junior technicians came running into the maintenance trailer during the morning meeting screaming that someone was hanging around the TACAN antenna. He was rather shaken up and a trip to the TACAN revealed that a young Marine had committed suicide by jumping off the toolbox at the base of the antenna mast and hanged himself from it. It's hard to forget a thing like that.

Another significant problem we had was that every now and again the pilots would gripe the TACAN information to have a 20 or 30-degree error. This is electronically impossible if the equipment has been properly setup and flight checked. We found out by nearly electrocuting ourselves that there was a 120V AC potential between the TACAN ground and the runway matting. We had been using the matting as ground, and when a vehicle happened to run over the grounding wire and breaking it loose from the matting we got the error. Only by checking all the generators used at the airfield did we find that the main generator at the MAG headquarters had been wired incorrectly.

The equipment at LZ Vandegrift was also the responsibility of the MATCU and from time to time trips were made to service or help upgrade equipment. An interesting sight was to watch the "rock apes" swing from nearby trees and try to grab onto the HF antennas of the communications shelter. To discourage them the operator would wait until one got hold of the antenna and then the operator would transmit. It sure did make those monkeys mad.

There are always people who think up things. One such thing was to see if a PAR (TPN-8) could be set up on an outlying fire base such as LZ Cunningham, a hill about 150 meters long and so narrow at the top that a CH-46 had to land and hover with its nose gear hanging over the edge and rear landing gear on the landing pad in order to deploy troops and equipment. I was sent to the LZ to see if PAR emplacement was at all possible... IT WASN'T. It was suggested that a homing device might work instead. A few days later, along with a young technician whose name I should remember, we were sent to the LZ to setup and operate the portable homing beacon and the little 10KW MEP generator that everyone hated. A few minutes after we had reported to the FAC (Forward Air Controller) and set the beacon in place we began to take incoming. The only shelter we saw, we were to find out, was the company shi... slit trench. We did finally get to dig in, and soon discovered that the device worked as advertised. During the night it rained and the next day it was very overcast. We could hear the incoming chopper, but could not see it until it started landing and heard the rotor blades hitting the beacon antenna.

As every unit did, we got incoming rounds. Very little of it thank goodness. One particular night we did unluckily take two rockets directly into the MATCU compound. One landing in the unit generator area and the second hit the back door of my hootch. There were only a couple of us in the hootch at the time as the others were on watch. No one in the hootch was injured, as everyone got into a bunker right after the first rocket hit the generator bank. The personnel in the adjacent hootch were not as lucky as several good Marines were severely injured. There was some speculation as to why all the personnel in the hootch that got the direct hit made it to a bunker, and the personnel in the adjacent hootch were still in it. The sandbag wall surrounding the generators, used mainly for noise abatement, had really prevented more damage to both equipment and personnel.

The incoming did damage some of the equipment to include the tower radios. In order to provide tower service I remember the outside observer station of the TSQ-18 being utilized by a controller sitting in a chair on top of the shelter with a pair of binoculars directing air traffic.

Toward the middle of my tour the Army began taking over the ATC duties at Quang Tri. Some of us were transferred to the MATCU at Dong Ha. As I recall, Captain Jim Janke was the ranking officer, and Don Eskam was the senior enlisted during most of this time. The unit was fast being reduced by attrition, and to help lessen the workload we began consolidating the living quarters to two or three hootches. During its full operation days Dong Ha was a fairly good-sized unit with several "in house"

recreational facilities. The facilities were put together by some very ingenious, talented, and somewhat out of the ordinary Marines. Those personnel who had the privilege of utilizing, or operating/managing them have some stories to tell.

When I arrived at Dong Ha there was a full operating compliment of equipment, but we soon began utilizing only a portion of the TSQ-18 complex due to the fast dwindling number of controllers and technicians. Although we were fast becoming the smallest MATCU, less than a dozen personnel, we were still able to supply all the functions of a fully manned unit. In addition to providing airfield operations we provided our own camp power and hot shower facilities as well as those for a communications unit we called Gotham City.

Personnel who were at Dong Ha will probably remember the camp mascot who was a dog with the ability to warn personnel of incoming rounds. That dog just may have saved a few good men.

With less than sixty days left on my tour we were told that the unit was being moved out of Vietnam and we were to pack up the equipment. We were given instructions to destroy what was not on the list of equipment that was to be transferred. I know all of us have had to wait on parts or equipment in order to maintain normal operations, and it hurt to destroy so many useful items just so someone else could not use it.

Personnel from both the Quang Tri and Dong Ha units migrated to Chu Lai. By the time most of us got there we had less than a month left on our tours, but we did what we could to help the resident MATCU.

During my tour at Quang Tri I did get to serve with one of the Helicopter units as a machine gunner. This was on a volunteer basis lasting a month at a time. Duties mainly consisted of manning one of the .50 caliber machine guns mounted aboard the CH-46. Some of the things seen while on this duty are better left only to memory. Those MATCU personnel who were assigned this duty know what I mean.

On a lighter note, I know that those who were at Quang Tri during the 1968 time period will remember the infamous duck pond. Thank you TFX for that.

Monograph by Bill Behan (Combined from Emails on December 3, 2003 and edited on May 6, 2004)

Here are my recollections from Nam.

MATCU-62 moved from Hawaii to Dong Ha in late 1966. Some of the Marines (spelling from memory) that were attached and their specialty, if remembered, during my time with them from Jan. 1967 through Oct. 1967 were:

Acosta, Dick	SSgt	GCA Technician	Dong Ha
Behan, Bill Sgt	SSgt	Tower	Dong Ha
Bryan, Gary	SSgt	GCA	
Cannon, Charlie	SSgt	GCA	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh
Cleveland, Ron	Cpl	Tower	Dong Ha
Codgen, Dean	Cpl	Technician	Dong Ha
Covey, Bill	LCpl	Tower	Dong Ha
Culp, Leo	Capt	Admin Officer	
D'Ambrosio, Richard	Capt	OIC	Dong Ha
Davis, Bill	GySgt	GCA	Dong Ha
Dinnan, Ray	MSgt	NCOIC	
Dodge, Ron	Capt	GCA	
Greek, Bill	Cpl	Tower	
Faram, Don	SSgt	GCA	
Farrell, Will	SSgt	GCA (Medevac to Japan summer 1967)	
Flahive, William	Capt	Tower OIC	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh OIC (KIA early 1968)
Howatnick	Cpl	Tower	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh
Larson, Gary	Cpl	Navaid Tech	Dong Ha
Moisier, Lyn	LCpl	Tower	Dong Ha
McKee, Larry	Capt	Maint. Officer	
Payne, George	GySgt	GCA Tech/NCOIC	
Rodriguez	SSgt	Radio Technician	
Shepherd, Arthur	GySgt	GCA (3rd Purple Heart? July/Aug 1966 sent stateside)	
Walker, Jerry	SSgt	GCA Technician	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh
Warnack, Art	1stLt	Tower OIC	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh OIC
Wasik, Ed	SSgt	Tower	Dong Ha, Khe Sanh
Ziechi, Don	Sgt	Tower	Dong Ha (Medevac July/Aug 1967)

I know there are many more that I've forgotten and the spelling is phonetic in a few cases.

The equipment I remember at Dong Ha were a CPN4, MSQ maintenance van, Tacan, Wickes tower (Would you believe with its obstruction light on when I first arrived

in country, didn't last too long after we started receiving incoming on a regular basis), a small portable Tower on the ground, a USAF weather van, and lots of sand bags around most of it.

VMO-2 advanced was on the flight line right in front of the MATCU Admin & Maintenance huts. Its CO was Major Jim Thiese, who was my ATC OIC at Quantico.

It was hard to keep track of Ron Dodge, who would sneak off with Recon patrols every once in a while.

Art Warnack was our Welfare Officer. He and I carried a 4X8 foot piece of ¾ inch plywood about a mile and a half to make into a ping-pong table. I thought I would never be able to uncurl my fingers from carrying that heavy piece of junk. Can't say I ever saw anyone use it, couldn't find ping-pong balls. He also sent me to see my first USO show from the states, a group of gospel singers. I think he's still laughing.

The Air Force had a radar site for bombing the North, call sign "Waterboy" across the runway from us. The CO spent too much time having his guys beautify the place around their Quonset huts. They lost a lot of guys during our first rocket attack.

Bill Flahive would always talk about going back to Fairfield College in Conn. and becoming a college professor. After he was killed at Khe Sanh, I visited his folks in New York City. They took his insurance money and set up a college scholarship at Fairfield in his memory.

We lost our mess hall and a large number of our huts during the summer of 1967 during rocket attacks and when the ammo dump blew up. Luckily one of our scroungers was rummaging around airfreight one day and came upon a pallet that was being shipped to some Army Green Berets. He thought the markings looked like C-ration cases. We made a midnight run and borrowed a dozen cases that night. To our surprise, when we opened the first case, we discovered some of the first Meals Ready-To-Eat (MREs) that had come into Nam. Needless to say they were really appreciated over the next few weeks until our mess hall came back online.

The way I heard it an S2 ran off the runway at Chu Lai and went through the GCA unit. MATCU-62's Gilfillian rep had left Dong Ha because we were receiving too much incoming and he was killed in the accident and one of our guys (Jerry Faust?) got hit by the wing of the S2 when he heard the noise and he sat up on the canvas cot he was resting on in the shade by the CPN.

When MATCU-62 first got to Dong Ha & Khe Sanh the vils were not off limits per say, no official liberty, but visits were made. Then in the spring of '67 we caught some of the locals drawing diagrams of our living area and the surrounding facilities at Dong Ha. The base was then closed to locals and we couldn't go outside the perimeter fence, except on official business. When we first arrived at Khe Sanh, a few of our guys would visit the local French plantation owner down below the waterfall at the end of the

runway. He and his Vietnamese wife welcomed them. After awhile Charlie stopped those visits by threatening the owner.

A few of us, on trips to DaNang, had become friendly with some Army combat controllers. We would stay out in town at their hotel where they were being billeted and visited a number of the local bars and dance halls. Most of us stopped these visits after two of us saw a little kid roll a grenade under the jeep in front of us, killing one and wounding the other. China Beach, south of Marble Mountain, was one of the in country R&R locations and had a lot of activities available on the beach. A few guys would get off the bus on the way to the beach, in the local Vil and visit some of the bars & meet up with the "friendlies". We had one guy who sampled the local talent the night before he left on R&R to Hawaii, and gave his significant other a present he had caught, the day before.

Monograph by Jerry T. Bess (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on April 20, 2004, and edited on April 23, 2004.)

I served with MATCU-68 from March of 1966 through April 1967. I was only at Marble Mountain for a few days before the unit moved to Hue Phu Bai. It was a quiet time and I don't remember any particular problems, incidents or accidents. I remember "L H" Smith as being one of the other controllers, and I remember "G P" Stirling and Hank Flood being there as officers. I remember Captain Bever as the OIC some of the time I was there. I also remember a controller by the name of Mishock and Willie Howe.

I worked radar approach control the entire time I was there. We worked out of the TSQ-18, and had some small problems with cross talk, but the UPS-1 and basic IFF worked well. I don't remember any radar jamming or interference. "Slick" Ellison was one of the radar techs that kept the equipment working.

Most of the traffic at Phu Bai was helicopters, but we had occasional fixed wing transports. There was quite a bit of Air America traffic. They seemed to be moving recruits from a Vietnamese Army Boot Camp that was nearby. The weather was quite often pretty bad, and the MATCU received several letters of appreciation/commendation from the squadrons that we served.

When we first arrived at Phu Bai the unit set up close to the existing civil control tower, and our tower controllers worked there. We set up a portable tower for use if the civil tower failed. Our fighting holes and bunkers were set so that they covered the area across the runway. There were a few incidents where snipers fired at landing aircraft while I was there. I heard that after I left the radar units were moved across the runway from the tower into the area from which we were expecting to be attacked.

Towards the end of 1966 we sent detachments to Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. We also provided approach control service to these outlying airfields. I don't remember ever being able to affect a radar handoff to them. I think we would start an arrival on a TACAN approach and then let the GCA unit at their destination pick them up. Radio communications to the Khe Sanh arrivals was poor; we would often have to relay control instructions through another airborne aircraft.

MONOGRAPH by Major Denny Bowen USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 2, 2003)**MATCU-67.**

I was an A4 driver for my primary MOS and attended the ATC "O" course at Olathe in 62. I worked a year and a half at El Toro RATTC prior to Vietnam in 66/67.

I took over as OIC of 67 in the summer of 67 when I relieved Vic Steele, another NA. Our HQ was at the original site on the east side of the MAG-12 runway. The unit was responsible for the traffic at Chu Lai east and west and the tower at the Ky Ha helo base nearby. We also operated a few portables at some outlying firebases.

By the time I arrived, MAG-13 was already established alongside Chu Lai west with the 10000' concrete runway. Our tower was located in the MAG-13 area. We used an expeditionary cab atop a wooden water tower structure. Our radar was located on the west side of the big runway and ran precision approaches to that west runway. During that time, the Seabees constructed a huge wooden tower adjacent to the radar facility. We moved our HQ to the area and our troops lived in a camp next to the site.

MATCU 67 was administratively attached to MABS-12 and was opcon to the MAG-12 S-3. We dealt with the MABS-13 CO who thought he owned us as well as the MAG-13 CO who had the same idea. MAG-36 was at Ky Ha and they gave us no control problems. Of course, the 1st MAW Comm-Elect officer was convinced he was our boss and he did give us lots of positive support in the equipment area.

We had just over 100 people attached to the unit including outlying operations. My experience with chains of command, both official and unofficial, influenced me to become the action officer for the proposal to create the Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron about 10 years later. But, that's another story.

In the summer of 67, the COD from the Hornet, with an Admiral aboard in the co-pilot seat, lost the starboard engine on takeoff from the west runway. The pilot skimmed over our troop housing area, rammed into the CPN-4 maintenance van and finally came to rest on the crapper. One Gilfillan tech-rep working in the van was killed. No one else was touched. That rep had recently returned from duty servicing the CPN-4 at Dong Ha due to combat fatigue. As I understand it, the GCA at Dong Ha was used as an aiming stake for NVA across the border.

During the month of September 67, the big west runway was closed due to a break in the concrete about midfield, and was shut down from use. We used the taxiway alongside for takeoffs to the south and landings to the north. During that month, we conducted 42000 operations out of Chu Lai, which was quite a feat under the circumstances.

The 4 Chu Lai instrument departures were based on the 4 cardinal headings, and were designated by Asian location names, none of which I can remember. In the summer of 67, we had the names changed to north, south, east and west. The pilots were happy about that.

We also worked with the MACS outfits and came up with what was described as tactical air traffic control for enroute flying, primarily between Chu Lai and Danang. North and southbound flights were assigned altitudes with vertical separation and monitored by the MACS and approach controls. Those were mid range altitudes primarily in the 15M to 30M foot category. I don't recall hearing of any midair, so maybe it was a contribution to the safety effort.

Chu Lai GCA controllers became very adept at directing aircraft to near precision minimums for landing areas not aligned with precision radar, particularly the east MAG-12 runway, and the taxiway alongside the west MAG-13 runway. This was another tactical innovation that worked successfully. I remember attending a joint ATC meeting at Danang where an Air Force officer was horrified when he heard what we were doing. The AF stuck to stateside rules, and the Army didn't know enough about it to give a hoot.

MATCU-68.

I was OIC MATCU 68 from July thru December 1970. I relieved Rudi Nebel and was replaced by Maj Billy Collins, an aviator without prior ATC experience. Capt. Basher was in the unit along with Tom Cox and a Capt Conti. Capt. Basher disliked REMF duty and spent most of his time TAD closer to the fighting. If he wasn't going, he was trying to go. Cox was the Asst OIC. Conti ran Maintenance, and his crew repainted more than one captured Army Jeep for MAG-16 use.

In Sept 70, we had a huge monsoon that put a lot of land south of Danang underwater. The unit devised some special procedures to get the aircraft out of and into MMAF in some very marginal flying weather. Our controllers took the choppers on many rescue missions close to the point of pickup and then return. I remember that the Group CO, Col Heywood Smith, was very pleased with their performance. He even convinced his pilots to routinely fly precision approaches on returns to base. Our unit ops picked up significantly.

To my knowledge, our controllers at MMAF never had to use FM for control. What they did do during the monsoon was give radar headings to outbound helos all the way to evac points that were within useful radar range. Some pilots, in effect, made radar letdowns through the goo at or near the evac point. They then reversed the process and guided the aircraft back to MMAF, normally using necessary precision approaches. We ditched the standard holding pattern south of MM and let the pilots intercept and fly the 10-mile arc to the final approach heading.

Radar service was provided throughout and we had no collisions or near misses. It was a mission enabler during the monsoon for many flights that would have been weather cancelled. A lot of the helo pickup points were within 15 miles of MM. The helos brought in a bunch of stranded Viets plus some of their animals. A number of the aircraft overloaded well beyond weight limits during the ops.

I believe I participated in the anniversary flyover. Former Blue Angel, Doug McCaughey, was the skipper of the Huey squadron, and let me fly co-pilot with him in the demonstration. Once they taught me to land the thing, they let me get plenty of co-pilot time in both the Huey and Purple Fox 46's. There was a definite pilot shortage in MAG-16. A crew shortage to boot. We released some guys from the MATCU to go fly as gunners for 30 days at a time. Most got their fill of combat.

I left the unit at the end of 70 to become XO of H&MS-16

Monograph by MGySgt Merrell H. Branstetter USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from E-Mails on August 11, 2004 and edited on September 4, 2004 and April 18, 2005.)

I am sorry to say that about 5 years ago, after carrying them with me through several moves I discarded two briefcases of orders, directives, SOPs, departures & arrivals and other memorabilia that I thought would be of no interest to anyone other than me. I wish I had retained them now.

I didn't travel to Vietnam with MATCU-68 but flew into Danang and joined the Unit at Marble Mtn when it first arrived. If my memory serves me right there were 13 tents set up when I first arrived and I believe it was in August 1965. My rank was Sgt and I was a 6712. My job was Tower NCOIC.

Marble Mtn was primitive in every way including: nothing on the terrain that we hadn't built with sweat.

The South China Sea at different times of year was not only dangerous because of its rip tides but large jellyfish. In the spring balls of sea snakes would wash onto the beach. The weather at its best was always uncomfortable. There were times it rained horizontally. Whether it was raining or not it was always wet. Everyone had rashes. Before we had a shower unit set up about the best we could do was take a dip in the salt water, douche off and doctor your crotch with powder. I don't know how long we were there until we had a shower unit set up. When it wasn't raining it was so hot and humid that you still lived wet.

Sometime in the spring of 1966 I, with a contingent from MATCU-68, traveled to HUE PHU BAI to take over operations there. Again I was assigned duty as Tower Chief and had both Vietnamese and Marine controllers.

Hue Phu Bai was a piece of cake. We set up our unit inside of the perimeter of the airfield of HUE INTERNATIONAL and I put together 3 crews of controllers with Marines and 1 South Vietnamese on each crew. We used MATCU radios and power and the techs to keep them running. By this time our equipment was definitely feeling the wear & tear from the elements and it was all the technicians could do to keep us on the air, particularly the diesel techs. That is why I felt blessed later on at DONG HA where we were able to operate out of Air Force equipment. But at PHU BAI we had the availability of showers, a club, hootches, and a control tower that except for the most extreme weather would keep you out of the weather.

Approximately the middle to last of August, 1966 I was assigned Ops/Tower NCOIC at DONG HA with one Marine controller-Cpl Walter Bishop, one Radio Tech-Sgt Berg (I think). We had a wheels watch shack, portable generator and 2 Radios, but we operated with 6 Air Force controllers, out of Air Force equipment. I don't remember the nomenclature, but it was nice equipment, a nice air conditioned Van with the bubble on top for the controllers to see the traffic from. We also had new generators (compared to what we had been working with at the MATCU) and a diesel tech. By that time I had

been promoted to SSgt and I was senior to the senior Air Force SSgt so I was responsible.

My stay at DONG HA was mostly uneventful. I can remember one incident when a shot up Air Force (I believe) F-4 had to land on our 5,000 ft (max) r/w. Of course he came in hot, used up all the r/w and still had enough speed to bounce over the perimeter road and belly flop without blowing or burning up and the crew walked away.

Sometime in October 1966 I was called to the S-3 tent where a General advised me that in one hour a C-130 would land. I was to have my Marines with Air Traffic Control equipment and their personal equipment ready to board the plane. We would be advised of our destination en-route.

When airborne I was advised that we were to set up operations at Khe Sanh and at 1400 the next day we would be contacted by an airborne C-130 to land. Everything happened pretty much as planned and that is the way MATCU-68 arrived at KHE SAHN. The day after the 1st operation I received a call from the unit that my orders had arrived, for me to catch the 1st flight available back to HUE PHU BAI for further transport back to CONUS

I have a good story about a Marine at Khe Sanh. As I told you earlier I took my controller and tech to KHE SAHN on a C-130. I believed that I would be the 1st Marine enlisted there so I made it a point to be the first one off the bird when we landed. I needed immediate help to off load the gear so I looked around, sighted a Seabee Chief and asked him for a fork lift and driver. He waved to a young man on a forklift to come to my aid. When the forklift pulled up I was looking at a young MARINE LCpl on a MARINE forklift. I asked what in the hell he was doing here. His reply was; Sarge I was driving down the road back to my unit when some guy with a lot of stripes on his hat waved me down got aboard and took me to a plane and the next thing I knew here I was. I asked him if his unit knew where he was. Of course the unit didn't. So I got his Name, Rank and unit and when I reported to MATCU-68 and told them where I was and what I was doing I asked them to notify his unit. I of course don't know what ever happened in his case but I have a good friend that is a SeaBee and at all his reunions and other get togethers he says that is the best received story told. CAN YOU BELIEVE A SEABEE WOULD DO THAT TO A MARINE?

Khe Sanh wasn't much then. The runway was built to receive C-130 traffic and the off loading of the necessary gear and equipment to accommodate the Marines inbound. You could have thrown a golf ball across the compound and everything was dug in and underground. There were 12 Special Forces advisors and a company of South Vietnamese Army defending the compound. The r/w lay outside the compound and to get the GRC-99 high enough to see for any distance I had a Seabee bulldozer push up a mound to set the tower on.

The next day at 1400 the 1st C-130 contacted us. Then 7 more checked in. they were circling from 8,000 ft to 16,000 ft, if I remember correctly, waiting for the field to

receive them. We only had room to accommodate one off loading one C-130 at a time, but you can't believe how quick the operation was accomplished.

Great memories except that I later learned that a Young Capt received a Bronze Star for installing the control tower at Khe Sanh. I have always burned over that.

We did not provide personnel for perimeter defense at DONG HA and KHE SAHN while I was there.

I have not heard or thought of Ky Ha for 30+ yrs but since starting on this monograph I haven't been able to get it off my mind. At 0200 this morning I woke up with the name Sgt POSNER on my mind. I am pretty sure that he was a member of MATCU-67 and was the 1st Tower NCOIC at Ky Ha. The only reason that I can remember, or think I can, is an incident that was rumored: It seems that he had an accidental discharge of a flare-gun inside the GRC-99 when he first got set up. I may not be totally correct on all the details but am reasonably sure of the person's name. This monograph is presenting a challenge to a memory that is becoming less reliable with each passing year.

When I said I joined MATCU-68 at Marble Mtn I should have been clearer. When I joined the unit the gear was still on the trucks so I was essentially there from start-up. My perceptions, although were those of a Sgt, I had 11 yrs service in the Marine Corps, 8 of which had been spent in artillery, from cannon cocking to FDC. More training is held on defense than any other facet of training. I may have not been an expert but I probably had as much or more knowledge of how to set up a defense than any other Marine in the MAG which was proven by future events, but would never be acknowledged by those of higher rank, even though some junior officers paid attention to some of my recommendations it never got higher than company level, but I am getting ahead of myself.

The perception of MAG support among troops at my level was that the MATCU provided more support to the MAG than vice versa. Even though our defenses were sadly lacking, which was apparent to some of us, we were so busy with other work details that we had to trust others to provide for our safety and welfare.

The junior troops felt more like an engineer unit than an ATC unit. Any time they were not actually on duty in the tower or radar they were on a myriad of work details, most had to do with moving sand with a shovel. Remember, we had to build everything from the ground up, and many things had to be done twice because of lack of knowledge of the person in charge, example: After half the matting for the runway had been laid manually it was determined by a MATCU tech that it had been laid backwards so it had to be removed and re-laid. That is only one example but is consistent with many efforts that affected the troop's morale. Most of the details had a junior officer in charge but couldn't be blamed. In my opinion, we had very few strong NCOs & SNCOs to teach the young officer the proper way to get things done.

An incident occurred in the middle of October that you will never see on War Stories but will lead into perimeter defense by MATCU personnel. At midnight Sappers hit us. They had cut communications between the east side of the runway, which contained the control tower, living area, Group & Squadron Hdqrs and the west side which contained the parking area for all the A/C in the group plus a detachment of army. We were awakened by what turned out to be a Sapper attack. On the flight line a sapper would run from chopper to chopper throwing in grenades. At the same time other sappers were running from the different tents bordering the flight line hosing each one down with an automatic weapon and then throwing in a grenade and running on.

During this period of time I had a controller, Cpl Eslick, on duty in the tower that was a witness to all the devastation going on in front of him but could not communicate with anyone. After having to argue with our NCOIC and convincing him that as NCOIC of the tower my place was at the tower, I found Cpl Eslick in a state of almost disbelief but very coherent and I judged him able to continue working. The only way to get messages from one side of the runway to the other side was by messenger. I felt that Cpl Eslick had been through enough traumas, and since I was the only other person available I delivered messages back and forth. I recommended Cpl Eslick for a NAVY COMMENDATION for his work that night and he received it before return to CONUS, as I remember.

As I remember there was only 1 A/C that got airborne that night flown by Maj Danny Riley, who was later, killed on a Medevac mission. The next morning it was apparent that we had had our asses kicked badly, even though it was believed that all the sappers had been killed. I don't remember the official number but can remember 8 VC bodies lined up for display.

Our flight line and parking area looked like a junk pile. I can't remember for sure but the number 41 A/C comes to mind that were out of action about half of them recognizable as something made by human hands only by the gun barrels that did not melt. I understand that a Corpsman and a relative of TAB HUNTER, brother as I remember, were asleep in the medevac chopper. They were both killed.

The day after the attack truckloads of material used to build a defense started rolling in. We were told at the lower levels that the material had been requested but wasn't available. Of course no one in the junior ranks believed that after the perceived incompetence we had been witnessing.

Immediately after getting hit and receiving truck loads of material used to set up a defense the MAG decided to form the 1ST PROVISIONAL RIFLE COMPANY utilizing personnel from the different units in the MAG. I was so incensed by our getting our ass kicked and knowing I had developed pertinent skills that could be used I volunteered to be a part of the company.

The company was commanded by aviation Capt, whose name I cannot remember. I was assigned to the 4th platoon as the 1st squad leader. My platoon leader

was 2ndLt John J. Barrett who was a former Cpl and who would later win the Navy Cross while piloting an H-53. My platoon Sgt was Ed LeBaron who if I remember correctly was a SSgt. I don't remember how many troops were supplied by the MATCU but probably 6 to 8. I am sure that I had at least 2 from MATCU in my squad but I cannot remember their names, only faces.

My squad had the responsibility of defending about 400 yards of beach and about 250 yards of terrain along the SE perimeter of the airfield. To the east was the South China Sea and to the south was Marble Mtn. At that time we did not know that Marble Mtn was honeycombed with VC tunnels but we should have since there was always activity between the mountain and us at night and no movement during the daytime.

Beginning 12 Nov 1965 to 14 Dec 1965 I worked the members of my squad harder than any human being should have to work. We built bunkers, laid 3 and 4 rows of triple concertina, cleared terrain for fields of fire, set up trip flares, held school on all our defensive weapons such as Claymore mines, M-60 Machine guns, M-79 Grenade launchers, frag & illuminating grenades, shotguns and personal weapons. My men worked from daylight to dusk and then stood guard during hours of darkness. They got in about 16 to 18 hours of duty per day and since I had to keep them awake at night I probably got in 20.

When we first started I knew I had some clinkers, you know the squadrons would not send me their best men, but by the time I had worked with them a couple weeks I felt very confident that we could handle any situation that came up and occasionally found myself wishing the VC would try to attack instead of probe for weaknesses.

As noted earlier the troops proved to be as good as they could be with a couple exceptions but there were decision makers higher up in the chain of command that lacked knowledge about setting up a defense. Lt Barrett had a lot of confidence in me and would bounce my recommendations off his boss. Sometimes they were accepted but many times were rejected for no good reason except lack of training.

About 2-3 weeks into our project an infantry Major was dispatched from somewhere to inspect our defenses. As you would expect there were things that had to be changed to meet his demands, most of which would have conformed if my recommendations had been followed.

The exceptions to the troops being as good as they could be are as follows: One instance happened about 0400 one morning after only 3-4 days after we started the setup. I crawled into a bunker via the opening, found a young Marine asleep, made him believe I was going to kill him, relieved him of duties and ran him up to the CO. He was sentenced to serve 7-10 days in the brig, but we had no brig, so I had him to build an open-air jail in a large opening in the middle of the compound, and there he stayed.

Another troop tried hard but was accident-prone. I can't remember everything that happened to him but he was messing with his rifle once, had it resting on his foot and had an accidental discharge. Although he was accident prone he was lucky the bullet went between his big and 2nd toe and only burned him even though his boot had to be replaced.

Another time I had placed him in a standup hole about 200 Yards outside the concertina to listen and observe. The hole had a small bush directly behind it to break up his outline. Only minutes after he had time to get in position I heard a loud scream and even though it was pitch black I could see a head bobbing up and down outside the concertina. I yelled hold fire and was glad I had the Claymore triggers with me. I met the Marine at the concertina, helped him through, got him to my bunker where he cried that he was snake-bit and was going to die. While he was lying there shaking I checked him over with a flashlight and found where a snake had in fact tried to bite him but had attached himself to a wrinkle in the Marines dungaree jacket and had spilled its venom without breaking the skin.

The provisional rifle company did not have a mortar section but could call for supporting fire through the command. I don't remember the support unit. At the company level we only had Pop-flares and Trip-flares but we could light up an area pretty good. The company supplied us with nearly everything we requested in the way of war fighting material. I believe the company got it through the MAG-16 armory. The way I remember it the only thing I had to bum was Starlight Scopes I would borrow them from Infantry Squads resting up between patrols. In that respect life was good. Ammo was issued to the squads from the company through the platoon. Any ammo to be replaced was issued, no questions asked. I would just send enough men to carry it with a list to platoon to pick it up and distribute among the squad members. I believe the company was supplied by the MAG armory.

The members of MATCU-68 did have ammo for their TO weapon. The way I remember each rifle was issued 1 bandoleer and each pistol one box of 50 rounds. At that time we were armed with M-14s. None of the MATCU Marines were issued M-16s my first tour even though there were some available at the MAG-16 armory for some of the flight crews, but the rifle had already earned a bad reputation for unreliability. Most people who had the option chose the M-14 with auto selector. Of course the M-16s arrived in country the last part of my tour I believe the latter part of 1966.

The MAG had a policy of no personal weapons but was not enforced at first. Some were smuggled in the MATCU gear but weapons were easy to come by in country. Pistols and Grease Guns were easy. Thompson Subs and Carbines were a little harder. All you had to have was a contact in a flying squadron or Seabees and trading material or money and you could get almost anything you felt you needed. I believe the MAG started getting tough on personal weapons shortly after we took over ops at HUE PHU BAI. I say that because I rode shotgun in a PC when we picked up Capt BERCHIOLI at MARBLE MTN at night and transported him to HUE PHU BAI. I was armed with my personal grease gun then.

When my tour with the rifle company ended my relief was Sgt MAYNARD. I believe his first name was Steve. He was a member of MATCU-68. Outstanding young Sgt. seemed to have no fear. He would stand on top of a bunker to get pictures when everyone else was on their belly. I believe he was from Texas. His wife was named Sandy. Steve met her when she worked at the snack bar in the ops bldg at El Toro.

A couple nights prior to my relief one of my men reported sighting a boat off the coast. I alerted everyone and positioned myself with one of my machine guns. As we had orders to hold fire until permission was granted from company I reported the boat and requested permission to fire. I started getting stand bys and a lot of questions from the person on the other end of the line. After a short time I decided a decision was going to be hard to come by so I advised that our communications were breaking up and that I understood that I could open fire. My machine gunner fired until there was nothing to shoot at.

The next morning after a lot of questions we scoured the beach without finding anything. By the time Sgt MAYNARD relieved me I had almost convinced myself that we were all seeing things. Two days after Sgt MAYNARD relieved me he told me that the body and shattered remains of a boat had washed ashore.

I don't have Knowledge of all the different Unit awards that MACU-68 earned while attached to 1st MAW but I am in possession the following:

PUC	1ST MAW	11 May 1965	15 Sept 1967
NUC	MAG 16	1 Nov 1970	3 May 1971
MUC	MAG 16	29 Oct 1970	31 Oct 1970

I know there are other unit awards. In fact during my first tour we were awarded an NUC but I am not in possession of the citation so I cannot advise of the dates.

I can't remember anything about IFR approaches or departures when I was at MMAF the first time. I am as sure as I can be that Danang Approach Control was handling all the flights in the area. I can vaguely remember that on my second tour the MATCU loaned a couple controllers to the Air Force at Danang to work approach control.

I do remember that when we first arrived and before GCA was ready and even after when we had a low, thin ceiling utilizing an aldis lamp approach where I would stand on the catwalk of the tower, shine the aldis lamp straight up, and if the pilot could pick out the beam through the overcast, fly inbound to the beam, make a hovering decent, with directions from me, and the side-slip over the landing zone which was only a couple hundred feet in front of the tower. The pilot could usually pick out the runway lights before side slipping, but not always. I never told my controllers to use this method

and I never advised the command I used it, but I can imagine that the word got around. After flying all day most pilots would use any means to get the chopper on the ground.

After we moved to Hue Phu Bai we set up normal operations, but I can't remember what IFR approaches we had available. I still believe that Danang Approach had control.

One thing we had different at Hue Phu Bai was the posting of "Save-a-Planes". We made a map board of the area with info such as azimuth, distance, and elevation of prominent landmarks and other pertinent information. Every evening artillery would send us a schedule of artillery missions for the night. After the plotting of the schedule we would vector all aircraft in the area outside the zones of fire. I was certain that all aircraft that flew through the airspace knew to contact Hue Phu Bai tower, but it is possible that all The South Vietnamese pilots did not get the word. After 2 to 3 weeks of utilizing "Save-a-Plane" two South Vietnamese pilots came to the tower to witness our operations. One of the three Vietnamese controllers was giving them the tour and when the "Save-a-Plane" plotting board was explained to the pilots they got into a loud discussion with the Vietnamese controller, to the point that the controller became frightened. It was determined that one of the pilot's former friends and pilot was flying back off a mission, and was flying through our area, when he and his plane just disintegrated. I believe that particular pilot failed to get the word.

Duty at Hue Phu Bai was good and easy. We had the best amenities you could ask for during that period of time. There was even a local that would pick up and deliver laundry and he made sure that the Marines always had ice. That was pretty good living in 1965-1966. When I went back on my second tour it was determined that the NVA did him in during TET 1968.

Occasionally I would walk a mile or two to the ville where one of the South Vietnamese controllers lived to have a beer or two. One afternoon I ran into 3 CIA spooks that were operating out of Hue. Every so often they would leave on their spook plane or chopper and about a week later they would come straggling out of the jungle. That particular PM 3 of them plus their Chieu Hoi scout invited me to set down at their table and have a beer with them. When I determined that it was time to return I looked for my watch, which I wore in my lapel. I didn't have it on me but I had been sitting next to the Chieu Hoi and was very sure he had it. After sticking about 1-½ inches of my .45 caliber pistol barrel in his ear and releasing the safety he pulled it out of his pocket and returned it. I said something to the effect that the spooks ran with a pretty sorry lot. They advised that he was in fact a sorry scout and the next time they went out they would come back without him. The next time they came back from a mission they made it a point to give me a thumbs up when they walked by the tower.

When I returned to the NAM on my second tour I had been on an unaccompanied tour on Okinawa. The policy was not to accept requests for transfer to the NAM prior to having 6-months on the rock, but I had requested through the SgtMaj of the Marine Corps and our ATC man in DC and was surprised to get orders after 3-

months. That is how I was able to return to the NAM 1 May 1970. When I arrived at MMAF I didn't recognize it as the same place I had been 5-years earlier. We had all the facilities and amenities we had dreamed about in "65". I returned to MMAF as a GySgt and was assigned as tower NCOIC again. I can't remember the different approaches and departures but I reviewed and updated them for the unit. I then reviewed and wrote a SOP for MATCU units, which I understand, was adopted and employed by other MATCUs in the Marine Corps.

By the time I had accomplished the administrative work I was ready to tackle something more adventurous.

GySgt E. L. Davis had been at LZ Baldy and when he returned to MMAF we agreed to take turns flying and being NCOIC of the tower. NOTE: On my first tour MATCU personnel had had too much money spend on them and were deemed un-expendable, so MATCU personnel were unable to fly or get involved with infantry type ops. During my second tour and after President Nixon started pulling back troops the squadrons would have accepted anyone to help man their aircrews. Their requirements for flying support were the same but they had a fewer number of personnel to fly their missions.

GySgt E. L. Davis flew as a machine gunner first. During his tour he was involved in an H-46 crash where the chopper rolled down a hill into concertina and beat itself to death. GySgt Davis received a Purple Heart, I believe, for cuts and contusions received and a Bronze Star for pulling other crew members from the wreckage and probably saving lives.

I flew with HMM-364 as a machine gunner during a pretty active time. Most of my missions were medevacs and recon inserts or extractions. I flew with exceptional pilots and some not quite so good. I was in 3 H-46's that were shot up so bad we had to land in indian country, and one that blew an engine on take-off and rode it out while the engine was burning up. I received a Combat Aircrewman Wings with 3 stars and 7 Air Medals.

The best pilot I flew with was Captain Blades. I thought the name "Blades" had to be a nickname, but on one day of flying with him I learned different. It may have been my first day of flying or it may have been the second, but the day went like this; our 1st mission of the day, which was at daylight, was to insert a recon team somewhere in the Happy Valley area. The insert went smoothly. Within 3 to 5 minutes after the insert we received a cry for help from the recon team. We had set them into an ambush. When we were inbound and overhead we could see the battle going on. There were so many muzzle flashes that it looked like a Christmas celebration. Where most pilots would have orbited a couple of times Captain Blades, in a very calm voice, said, "We're going Hot", and made a straight-in very fast approach right into the middle of the fight. By the time we were airborne again both the Crew Chief and I were on our second belt of .50 caliber rounds. I will never know how but I don't think we had more than a couple of rounds through the skin of the chopper. Captain Blades had been an infantry platoon

leader on his first tour, and understood the plight of the grunt under fire and never hesitated to fly into harm's way to help them out. Anyway we exchanged rounds three more times that day. I ended up earning my wings and 1-star that day and I believe it was my first day. At the end of the flight day I commented to Captain Blades that at the rate we were shooting it up I couldn't see how anyone could finish a tour without getting hit. He said that we had had an unusually rough day. But keep the guns burning and with a little luck we would be OK. I actually believe that the .50 caliber round made the enemy keep their heads down and made their fire mostly ineffective. The last mission of the day was when I learned Captain Blades name was his real name and not a nickname.

I don't recall where it happened but it was about 20-miles out of Danang where the recon was working. Hill 502 seems to ring a bell but I can't be certain. We received a call from the recon team that was in trouble. They had a member that was injured. We picked up another team with a corpsman and proceeded to the site. When we arrived we were only able to see dissipated smoke. They were at the base of a large tree in a 3-canopy jungle and were taking intermittent fire. It was determined that a ladder or litter could not be used due to the thickness of the tree canopy. The team commander in the chopper, a LtCol I believe, decided they would rappel into the position, but the team on the ground would have to blow a tree to form a hole in the canopy. During the period of time decisions were being made, maneuvering the chopper so the team could see better, Captain Blades was actually chopping off branches with the blades of the H-46. That scared me more than the occasional snap of a bullet that would make it through the tree limbs. That was when I figured the name Blades was a nickname. Then the team on the ground blew the tree and it did make a minor indentation in the canopy, but the team on the ground advised that when the tree fell one of their members got hit by part of the tree and broke his leg. Now we had two injured Marines on the ground. Then the recon team in the chopper decided they could rappel into the jungle, as I remember the LtCol stayed in the chopper, 4-members, including the corpsman rappelled successfully into the jungle, but the last Marine got hung up about 20-feet down the rappelling line and he couldn't go down or up. The decision was made to have him tie himself in place with the line and we lifted him straight up and flew back to Danang with him flopping in the wind. When we got to Danang it was determined that the Marine had both arms dislocated at the shoulders. It was now dark and our fuel was low so another pair of H-46's took over the rescue mission. After we were on the ground at MMAF I told Captain Blades that I now could understand how he had earned the nickname Blades. He told me that it was not a nickname but his real name. I suppose that his was a case of living up to his name. After I retired in "84" I read in the Marine Corps Gazette that the Captain had been promoted to Brigadier General.

The time that I was aboard the flight that the engine caught fire was a day that we also got shot down. We had two wounded on litters in the plane and about a dozen bodies of South Vietnamese soldiers piled on the ramp. After we had picked up our load and were lifting out of the zone we took a tremendous amount of fire with about 20-rounds hitting the H-46 and cutting several hydraulic lines. I was drenched with hydraulic fluid, which overcame the smell of death that emanated from the dead bodies

we were hauling. We were barely able to make it to a landing zone, maybe Baldy or An Hoa, I don't remember. After we got on the ground we transferred the wounded and dead onto another H-46. I was now a passenger. The first dead South Vietnamese soldier which was on the top of the pile looked like he was asleep and in one piece, I grabbed him by the head to reposition the body so I could lift him better. I found he had no head remaining behind his ears. I have seen his face many times since then. After we transferred our load to the other chopper we had climbed to about 3-hundred feet when we experienced a loud explosion from our left side and immediately circled to land. Then we had to make the transfer of the wounded and dead bodies again, now with the chopper burning. I remember that Marines came from everywhere and started off-loading the dead bodies. I don't know how I was able to make myself heard but I was able to redirect the attention of the rescuers to the wounded. We reloaded and took off. I remember that the fire was being fought when we flew out of sight.

Another day we were inbound off another mission, with the Admin Officer of HMM-364, as pilot, when we were asked to get involved in a rescue mission. A Marine Sergeant was wounded and every medevac aircraft that tried to get to his position was shot up. The pilot planned his approach so as to pop up over a ridgeline and fly at full speed to the position, pick up the Sergeant and make our get-a-way. Within a couple hundred yards after we topped the ridge we started taking fire from our 6-o'clock. Of course, neither the Crew Chief nor I could shoot behind us. The first rounds came from directly behind between the Crew Chief and me and between the Pilot and Co-Pilot, and riddled the instrument panel. Then a burst shot up some hydraulic lines. I got drenched again, and again the Pilot was able to land us safely even though we landed in Indian country. After we got back to MMAF we were told that the Sergeant had died of his wounds, that the chopper that I was in was the 8th to get shot up and all missions had been called off. That event is indicative of the extent the Marine Corps will go to help their Marines in harm's way.

Another event that I have relived many times is: On a mission that we were told that we were to pick up two wounded Viet children and their mothers and one NVA soldier that were wounded. We were to pick them up and take them to a hospital facility. There had been no hostile fire for the last so many minutes. We did have to shoot our way in and pick up our load. After we were airborne again and reached altitude I left my gun and went to the rear to see the wounded children and mothers, and to make sure there was nothing for them to blow us up with. Sure enough we were hauling four civilians, but one attracted my attention. It was a baby, probably 12-18 months old, and was being held by her mother. The baby's head was wrapped completely in bandages that probably measured 18" across. One eye was visible and all the rest of her head was covered. The mother was able to convey to me that the NVA were the one's responsible. Of all the atrocities that I had seen this baby that had been shot in the face incensed me more than any to that point, and of course I had gotten harder than I had been before. I guess I lost my mind but I remember that we had an NVA soldier on a litter that had been shot through the leg. I decided that the soldier did not deserve to live. I felt a need to throw the soldier off the plane, but when I leaned down over the soldier it was a she, a young, maybe 16 years old NVA female, whose face was my 14-

year old daughter's face looking at me and smiling. Of course I lost my rage and got myself under control. I believe to this day that if I hadn't had a vision I would have thrown the soldier off the chopper, probably still been in jail.

Another incident would have been comical if the mission had not been so serious. We were on a medevac mission so we had a corpsman aboard. The mission was to pick up two wounded Marines and get them to the Hospital Ship. After we had the Marines aboard and airborne one of the Marines started gasping. The corpsman found it necessary to use his breathing apparatus and help him breathe. Shortly after the first Marine was resuscitated the second Marine went into shock and needed the same attention. The corpsman did not have a second breathing apparatus so he disassembled a ballpoint pen, used a scalpel to open the Marine's trachea, inserted the pen, and while the Crew Chief attended the first Marine the corpsman attended the second Marine. Both Marines were alive when we got to the ship. When we arrived the pilot who had been kept aware of the situation in the back told me I had to direct him to a landing. I directed him to what I thought to be perfectly centered in the center of the landing pad. I don't guess that that is exactly the way it is supposed to be done because upon landing I grabbed the handles of the litter nearest me and backed off the ramp. When I stepped off the ramp there was nothing under my feet except the safety net. Fortunately I had the lightest end and was able to keep the litter relatively level until medical personnel, who were waiting for us, took the litter away. If that platform had not had a safety net we would have had a burial at sea.

It has been a long time and many memories are vague, but I relived some events a thousand times in my mind. I hear the word closure a lot and maybe this monograph will help provide some measure of closure, but I will always wonder what happened to the little baby and if the two Marines, among others, lived. Isn't it strange that the deaths I have witnessed and been partially responsible for "I don't feel that killing someone that is shooting at you is even your responsibility", would haunt a person so long after the event.

After thought: I believe that it was Major Denny Bowen that was convinced that there was talent within a MATCU that could accomplish anything, to the trading of MATCU talent for favors from other units, the local civilian populace, and my subject, a Chaplain. It seems that a Chaplain had an organ that was badly out of tune. The MATCU OIC at the time asked the then Sergeant Jim Tetzlaff if he thought he could help the Chaplain out. Sergeant Tetzlaff looked the organ over; found a sticker with the manufactures name and old address, sent a request for a copy of the schematics. After some time he received the schematics and was able to get some new strings and damn if he wasn't able to tune the old relic.

After witnessing so many things that MATCU personnel have accomplished I feel the same way the MATCU OIC in question did. MATCUs have the inherent talent and genius to be able to do anything to get the mission accomplished.

I will list some names that I can remember.

1965-1966

MSgt Hayes
GySgt Charley Cosner
GySgt Don Carmen
GySgt Jerry Bess
2ndLt Jonley
2ndLt Ray Spears
2ndLt Prout
SSgt Ed LeBaron
Sgt Skip Morehead
2ndLt Bob Moorehead
Sgt John Silva – Technician
Sgt Steve Swanson
Sgt Jerry Camp – Diesel Mechanic
Sgt Berg – Radio Technician
Sgt Steve Maynard
Sgt Bill Bennett
Sgt Wayne Haney
Sgt Freund
Cpl Walter Bishop
Cpl Eslick
Sgt Dobbs – Diesel Mechanic
Sgt Cliff Ivey

1970

1stLt Richard Armstrong
GySgt Everett Davis
MSgt John O'Hey
SSgt Bernie McQuerry
GySgt Ed Neely
MSgt Gene Pryor
Sgt Chet Newcomb
Sgt Lance Oliver
SSgt Jim Tetzlaff

Monograph by MGySgt Matthew J. Brill USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes June 10, 2004.)

I served with MATCU-67 on Okinawa in 1962. In April of that year we deployed as a unit to Soc Trang, South Vietnam. I remember Hank Flood and Dan Dorn being there. At one time during the deployment Dan Dorn was the OIC, but I don't remember who the other OIC was or when the command changed.

We set up our FPN-36 and TSA-11 Wickes tower and tried to get the MSQ-4 that MATCU-66 sent us operational, but it never worked right.

We operated with the helicopter squadrons that MAG-16 deployed, usually keeping them in the local flying area and not transferring them to Saigon Control. With fixed wing transient aircraft we would take a handoff from Saigon Control.

We also had a group of Vietnam Air Force AD Sky Raiders operating out of our very short runway. It was a training command with American instructor pilots.

One day a Marine C-130 was inbound and flight data indicated that there was a Code on board. The pilot asked for a short approach, and I gave them the shortest approach I could. After the Hercules landed the pilot came up on the frequency and said, "It didn't really have to be that short."

One day a new officer in the MATCU was up in the tower trying to tell the controllers there exactly how operations should be conducted. Hank Flood made sure the officer didn't return to the tower.

When the VNAF AD pilots completed training, and flew by themselves for the first time, they caused some damage by dropping bombs on the airfield and then flew off to attack Saigon. We heard that they were shot down before they could do any more damage.

Sometime in September 1962 the Marine helicopter squadron moved to DaNang, and MATCU-67 returned to Futenma, Okinawa. I finished my WestPAC tour at Futenma; came back to the states for a short period, and then went back to MCAS Futenma for a three-year tour.

During the station tour I went on inspection trips to South Vietnam. I got to see Chu Lai, Marble Mountain, Phu Bai, and Dong Ha. I was scheduled to go to Khe Sanh, but then the 1968 TET offensive started and the trip was cancelled.

Monograph by Warren C. Brown 1stSgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on June 8, 2004.)

I served with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai from November 1968 until December 1969. I was a GySgt and was assigned duty as the Tower Chief. Willie Jordan was the Tower Officer. E. E. Grebe was the NCOIC. Tom Gulino was there as was George Meshke.

The Chu Lai tower was a permanent facility built on the west side of the west runway. The MATCU office was at the base of the tower. We did not work out of any of the portable or expeditionary towers. Our watch schedule was 12 on and 12 off, but we had enough controllers so that one could have an occasional day off. We used both the East Field and the West Field with just one pattern. The pattern for both runways 14 and 32 placed the aircraft in front of the tower to the east. Aircraft flew the same pattern whether they were landing on the east runway (MAG-12) or the west runway (MAG-13). I don't remember much use of the crosswind runway. At night and during IFR we did not turn on a rotating beacon.

Civilian aircraft, mostly from Air America, made straight in approaches. Occasionally we would allow one of the Pilatus Porters to land on the taxiway parallel to the west runway. The same was true for Army C-7 Caribous. The large population of Army helicopters at Ky Ha did just about whatever they wanted to do, but they stayed at low altitudes crossing the extended runway centerlines. They rarely contacted Chu Lai tower. We did have a couple of Army controllers assigned for a while. We trained them to work in the same way we did.

The MATCU living quarters were still on the east side down on the beach. We had a 6x6 truck to transport personnel. There was a MAG-13 mess hall near the tower. Other than occasional rocket attacks the living wasn't too bad. All you had to do was walk over a sand dune and you were at the beach.

Air traffic was intense with most of the operations taking place during the day. It was not unusual to have 1,200 operations a day. Many times the local controller could not be relieved because of the rapidly changing pattern and traffic volume. During IFR our coordination with Approach and Departure Control and GCA worked well. It was a competent, professional operation by all concerned.

One day a flight of two Navy A-7 Corsair IIs approached from the east VFR. One had suffered battle damage and his wingman was trying to get him to the airfield. While still over the ocean the pilot of the battle damaged A-7 elected to eject, but the aircraft continued to fly towards us. The wingman attempted to shoot down the unmanned aircraft before it crossed the beach but was unsuccessful. The A-7 crashed 10 feet below the top of the bomb dump berm. Had it cleared the top of the berm and crashed in the bomb dump there is no telling how much damage the resulting explosions would have caused.

**Monograph by Joseph J. Calcasola
and edited on May 6, 2004)**

(Combined from Emails on April 27, 2004

The CPN-4 was MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. It was a COD aircraft flown by an Admiral. When the crew got off the pilot was wandering around muttering something to the effect of "I told you not try the take off". There was a Gilfillan tech rep whose name escapes me that was pretty badly injured; I don't know if he made it.

Frank Porter and myself are the only two people I can remember who were there. Time frame was probably early to mid 1967. I was a SSgt and Frank Porter was a GySgt.

I was at Chu Lai from 66-67 and I don't recall working on the TRN-14 TACAN but a couple of times.

I remember replacing the extended centerline reflector at Chu Lai after it had been taken down by an AF C-130. As I recall it sounded sort of like a rifle range on the other side of the slight hill at the EOR.

A few of us went into the village of Chu Lai once in my 13 months there and I am not 100% sure it was authorized. It was easier to get permission to catch a hop to Da Nang.

I don't recall Special Services but some of the Motor T guys did build a jeep engine powered raft built on a couple of drop tanks that was used in the bay for fishing.

Monograph by John C. Campaigne MGySgt USMC (Ret.) (Combined from E-Mails on April 10, 2004)

I was the 1st MAW aviation ground Maintenance Chief in Danang 1970-1971, I had direct communication with the maintenance chiefs with all the MATCU's, any messages I sent to them concerning their relationship with Nav Elect Sys Command was marked DIRELAUTH, which meant Direct relationship authorized, Wing always received a copy of messages sent.

When I made MGySgt, I was assigned to the 2nd Wing Hq. CEO's office, and had the MATCU's at Beaufort, LeJune area, and Cherry Point as well as the MACS and MASS and the anti aircraft Hawk unit to inspect and learn from, I also was given the job of writing the MOS for E9 job in MATCU maintenance.

I was then transferred to HQ FMF Pac, CEO's office and got to inspect the MATCU's and MACS in California, Arizona, Hawaii, Japan, Okinawa, and Vietnam, and got to know more of the technicians working the gear. I went from there to 1st MAW CEO's office via stops at Nav Elect Sys Command, Vallejo, Calif. to get their input and was assigned to work with the maintenance of MACS at Marble Mt., the MATCU's at Chu Lai, Marble Mt., we already lost the unit at Quang Tri, I had a hand in having the CPN-4 operations trailer and primary mover with generators returned to Calif. The power trailer was destroyed when one of the Gilfillan Tec Reps was killed and I think some controllers were injured, an aircraft ran into the unit. You might also wish to get a hold of Del Basset or CWO Jack Komsi for more input.

It has been a long time; I arrived in Da Nang May 70 and left for retirement March 71. The CPN-4 was returned to the states (what was left of it) about June 1970, it was misplaced in shipment and the unit was found on a bombing range, but before it was bombed.

Monograph by Donald K. "D K" Carman (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 24, 2006, and edited on October 30, 2006.

I arrived in Vietnam during December 1965 and was assigned to MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain. I was a SSgt when I first arrived, but was promoted to GySgt during my tour.

Starting in March of 1966 I was assigned duty as the R & R Coordinator in Bangkok, Thailand. This duty was unique, but only lasted a couple of months. I arrived in Thailand with only wash khaki uniforms, but I was able to purchase tailored tropical worsted uniforms.

Back with MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai I was qualified to provide approach control service. Jerry Bess and I were the only approach controllers available for quite a while. We were busy in that we had responsibility for Dong Ha and Khe Sanh also. We used the UPS-1 to vector aircraft to a PAR final for Runway 27 at Phu Bai, but the other airfields were essentially one arrival via a TACAN approach at a time.

The UPS-1 was adequate as well as the TPN-8s, but during heavy rain it was often difficult to track a target on the PAR final. The main drawback to the TSQ-18 was the placement of the air conditioning ducts directly over the controller working approach.

We had no use for the HF radios, but did use the VHF radios as necessary.

One day a battle damaged Navy F-8 Crusader made an emergency approach to Phu Bai. The pilot managed to land, but ran off the end of the runway and severely damaged the aircraft. The pilot was able to walk away.

I left MATCU-68 in January 1967

**Monograph by J. J. Carr MSgt USMC (Ret.)
conversation notes on February 6, 2004)**

(Transcribed from telephone

I was a member of MATCU-67 from December 1969 until September 1970 when Marine ATC at Chu Lai shut down. I worked approach control out of a TSQ-18 and I was a GySgt. Captain Ed Stanton was the OIC, and SSgt Dick Szuba was also there as a controller.

As MATCU-67 shut down personnel were withdrawn, and eventually all equipment was also shipped out. An Army Colonel commanded the ATC unit that I spent 30 days "training" prior to terminating the Marine ATC presence. I was amazed at the Army method of approach control. They didn't issue many instruction or clearances, just watched as the pilots did their "thing".

MAG-12 was withdrawn first and MATCU-67 was placed under MABS-13. When MAG-13 was withdrawn the MATCU was on its own. When all MATCU equipment and personnel were loaded I was left with Dick Szuba and two others, some C-rations, and a case of whiskey with orders to be at the same point on the loading ramp in 5 days to meet a C-130. It was a long lonely 5 days since Chu Lai was a ghost town during this period.

Once loaded on the C-130 I was the last Marine Air Traffic Controller at Chu Lai. On arrival at Da Nang the three other Marines had orders CONUS, but my orders were to MATCU-66 at Futenma to finish my tour. Dick Szuba and I had one last memorable "liberty" on the Air Force side of Da Nang.

Monograph by Tom Carroll (Combined from emails on February 5, 2004)

I arrived "in country" in June 1968 and assigned to Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-39 which while headquartered at Quang Tri with MATCU-62 providing ATC for that field also had MATCU-62A providing ATC for Dong-Ha, basically a logistics re-supply airfield for the 3rd MARDIV HQ some 5 miles North of Quang Tri.

When I arrived at Dong-Ha from Danang, Major Bill Ganz who was the resident Officer in Charge of Dong-Ha airfield and Capt. Pressley Haynes OIC MATCU-62A met me. Capt. H.L. Causey was OIC/MATCU-62 at the time. Maj Ganz (a former watch officer of mine @ Iwakuni) and Capt Haynes "convinced" me I should stay at Dong-Ha and arranged it with Group S-1. I was at the time a MSgt selectee (putting them on in Dec 68) and thus relieved Gunny Ron (Hook) Fay, a fine marine.

I remained NCOIC of MATCU-62A until being relieved by MGySgt Jim Sumner in Dec 68 while I was on re-enlistment leave in the states. Upon my return to RVN I was reassigned to MATCU-62 at Quang Tri, as the Ops Chief. MGySgt Bob Bethea, a GCI technician type, was the NCOIC. My tour at Dong-Ha was pretty uneventful, as was my tour at Quang Tri. My only night away from Quang Tri (except for R&R in April) I spent on a one day/night trip to Chu-Lai with MSgt Vic Chandler the MATCU-62 Maint Chief. That was the night the MATCU-62 area took direct rocket fire destroying one of our living "SEA" huts. Other than that my tour was pretty uneventful.

I remember the USAF approach control being across the runway at Dong Ha, not Quang Tri. I don't remember any USAF resident at Quang Tri. I wouldn't call what we did at Quang Tri, approach control, more like radar monitoring after clearances were given by the USAF at Dong Ha. That USAF unit was primarily a GCI unit as I remember but for some reason I keep thinking that it also handled a limited approach control for Northern I Corps.

Monograph by H. Lacey Causey LtCol USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 7, 2004 and edited on February 23, 2004)

I started into Vietnam from Okinawa in January of 1968 by touring Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Quang Tri and returned to Okinawa in February or March of 1968.

I then brought 15 MATCU-66 personnel back into Vietnam in April of 1968. The equipment was a new TSQ-18 with 2 TPN-8 PAR radars and an UPS-1 Surveillance radar and portable tower. My NCOIC was Eldon Grebe. Other personnel were SSgt Joe LaPan, Cliff Ivey, and GySgt Charley Farr.

The first FAA flight check aircraft crashed enroute from Hue Phu Bai to Quang Tri. The second FAA flight check aircraft qualified our equipment.

During the withdrawal from Khe Sanh I surveyed the LZ Stud site at the request of BGen Homer S. Hill Asst Wing Commander 1stMAW. We established a portable control tower and a UHF Radio Beacon at the LZ after finding the terrain unsuitable for PAR radar. Survivors from MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh staffed this LZ. The control tower was positioned atop a telephone pole framework by a HH-54 Sky Crane.

During the summer of 1968 the SNCO hootch was hit by a rocket collapsing its bunker, and an AF C-130 crashed while landing and destroyed a TPN-8 radar. I arranged a replacement within 3 days by calling direct to NAVELECSYSCOM at Vallejo, Ca via a "non-standard" phone patch.

Again at the request of BGen Hill two others and I flew on an H-46 to the new 9th marines FOB South of Quang Tri to install a second UHF radio beacon. The H-46's arrival drew incoming fire and the wrath of the 9th Marines.

Preston Haynes was the OIC of MATCU-62 at Dong Ha.

On October 10, 1968 MATCU-66 at Quang Tri was redesignated MATCU-62.

In November of 1968 I was promoted to Major, and in March of 1969 my tour ended and Major Beaux Braswell replaced me.

Monograph by Daniel D. Chase Captain USMC (Ret.) (Combined from Emails and telephone conversation notes on February 5, 2004)

I reported to (Chu Lai) MATCU-67, MABS-12, MAG-12, 1ST MAW on 15 December 1967 and due to a need for personnel at Dong Ha, I volunteered for duty with MATCU-62, MABS-36, MAG-36, 1stMAW, reporting to on 28 February 1968. I was assigned to Khe Sanh from 28 March 1968 to 21 May 1968. I was wounded on April 14th and temporarily replaced as OIC by Lt. Hand the maintenance officer from MATCU-62 at Dong Ha. Sgt Powell was wounded on the same day. After Khe Sanh I returned to Dong Ha.

On 6 Oct 68 I reported to An Hoa as OIC Air Base, reporting directly to Gen Anderson. I worked there with the SeaBees to make the base ready for air operations, and was returned home on 5 Jan 1969.

I was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" on 15 April 1969 by the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, and on 21 July 1970 I received a Letter of Appreciation from the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Three.

Although I was in the Hospital at Portsmouth, VA, I did have assignments as OIC, NCO School and OIC Pre-Deployment School.

Monograph by Robert D. Cole GySgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 25, 2004 and edited on June 3, 2004.)

I served in Vietnam from April of 1968 through the first part of July 1968. I was TAD from MCAS El Toro, California to MATCU-66 at Quang Tri. I was a Staff Sergeant Diesel Mechanic.

I remember Jerry Bauer being TAD from MCAS Yuma as a radar technician. One controller I remember is Cliff Ivey and Joe LaPan was a technician. Captain Causey was our OIC. We were busy keeping the generators PM'd and sandbagging equipment and hootches. We had two large bunkers that were used frequently.

Just after we got there in April the MATCU area was hit by a rocket attack. There were no casualties, but some of our hootches got hit. The VC were trying to hit either the MAG-39 helicopter line or the large lighted U. S. Army building just across Highway 1 from the MATCU. Being right in the middle we had many close calls because the 122mm rockets weren't very accurate.

In May of 1968 The OIC approved a trip by me, Joe LaPan and Cliff Ivey to Clark AFB in the Philippines. On the way back to Quang Tri the Air Force C-130 crashed on landing at Quang Tri. It skidded through the MATCU area and damaged a TPN-8 GCA radar unit and a TRC-131 portable control tower. The C-130 tore off a wing and then caught fire. All the MATCU members were able to exit the aircraft, but there were several casualties amongst the other passengers and crew.

The C-130 came to rest in such a manner that the tail section was creating problems with the display on the GCA radar. One night, after much discussion, and after receiving semi-approval from the TAOC, several others and I made use of a private stash of fragmentation hand grenades. We tried to remove what was left of the already burned tail section by cutting it down by hand grenade. After a couple of attempts, we became aware that we were causing quite a stir, and abandoned the attempt.

In June of 1968 the explosions at the ammo dump at Dong Ha rocked us pretty good. I can't imagine what it must have been like there, because we could sure feel the explosions where we were.

The 1st of July I received a letter and copy of PCS orders from my command at El Toro. The letter stated that I could stay and complete the tour or request a delay in orders and go back to El Toro, take leave, and move my family. I got a 90-day delay in orders and went back to El Toro. Before I went back overseas, my orders were modified and I spent the remainder of that tour in 3rd FSR at Camp Hansen, Okinawa.

Monograph by Clarence E. "Charley" Cosner (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 21, 2004)

I deployed with MATCU-68 from El Toro in the fall of 1965. Our equipment was loaded with the rest of MAG-36 on the USS Princeton LPH-5. We landed at Ky Ha and then moved overland and set up at Marble Mountain.

I was a SSgt and worked mostly in the MSQ-4, but I did go into the tower one time. When I first joined the Marine Corps I served with HMR (L)-262. It was then routine for take-off clearance to be issued to the flight leader authorizing departure from their present position. When I did this at the Marble Tower it caused a great deal of consternation amongst the other controllers. One of them even slid down the rope used for emergency evacuation.

When the MATCU first got to Marble Mountain only the engineers had a hootch. The MATCU hootch was the second one built. We also built the water tower and the Staff NCO Club. I remember many pleasant times playing poker in that club.

Merrell Branstetter was there as a Sergeant. He volunteered for perimeter guard and extended his tour in country several times. He also earned Combat Aircrew Wings flying as a gunner with one of the helicopter squadrons.

I was there when the sappers came in towards the end of October 1965.

The NCOIC was MSgt James Moore and I remember that one of the other controllers was SSgt C. O. Johnson. Two of the technicians I remember were SSgt Neil Smith and SSgt Victor M. Chandler.

I was promoted to GySgt before I was transferred to Okinawa in January of 1966 to help MATCU-66 set up.

Monograph by Leon R. Coxe CWO-4 USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 24, 2006.

I was a CWO-2 at MCAS Futenma when MATCU-68 came out of Vietnam in 1971. 1stMAW assigned me at OIC of the unit that was in a maintenance status. All of the equipment was in good condition, but since MATCU-66 was supporting the MCAS we did not have much to do.

After some coordination with 1stMAW and MAG-36 I arranged for MATCU-68 to deploy to Camp Schwab. After some initial resistance from the 9th Marines who were then in residence at Camp Schwab we set up the MATCU's TSQ-18 and TPN-8s and began making GCA approaches.

Bob Moorehead, Jesse Webb, Gordon Jobson, and "Red" Reda were with me.

It was a somewhat difficult time on Okinawa because of the racial strife that affected all branches of service there.

Monograph by Captain Leo V. Culp USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 3, 2003)

While serving at MCAS Kaneohe, movement orders dated 8 November 1966 were received from Headquarters 1st Marine Brigade directing MATCU-62 (with four officers and 32 enlisted) to join 1st MAW in RVN. Officers directed to lead this movement included: Capt. Bob Meyer (OIC), 2nd Lt's Larry McKee, Leo Culp and Art Warnack.

To make arrangements for MATCU-62's arrival at DaNang/Marble Mountain Air Base, Lt. Culp led a cadre of two SNCOs and reported to MAG-16/1st MAW eleven days later on 19 November 1966. Lt. Warnack previously departed via surface transportation with MATCU equipment. Capt. Meyer and Lt. McKee followed later (by air) with the remainder of MATCU personnel.

I, Larry McKee and Art Warnack had the (typical) 13-month tour. I was the Operations/Admin Officer, McKee the Maintenance Officer and Warnack later became our OIC at Khe Sanh. A couple of months after arriving in RVN, Capt. Bob Meyer was released from active duty and returned to the States. During our initial 13 months, we were joined by Lt. Ron Dodge in Dec '66 for a couple of months while he rotated back to the States and early in '67 we were joined by Lt. Rich D'Ambrosio, Lt. Bill Flahive and SSgt Bill Behan. As the senior lieutenant, D'Ambrosio became our OIC. I believe our senior NCO was GySgt Payne who received the Purple Heart in June '67. Joe McDonough was our senior radar tech

Equipment included: AN/CPN-4 GCA Radar Van, two AN/TPN-8 GCA Radars, AN/TSA-13 Control Tower, AN/GRC-99 Control Tower, TACAN (designation unknown) and supporting equipments for each of these systems. Thanks to an undermanned, but outstanding maintenance staff, our CPN-4 worked great: I don't ever recall the radar being down when we really needed it.

Our mission was to assume ATC responsibility (from MATCU-68 headquartered at Hue Phu Bai) for the Dong Ha and Khe Sanh combat bases. We supported the two sites with the following equipment: CPN-4, TSA-13 and TACAN at Dong Ha and the GRC-99 and TPN-8 radars at Khe Sanh. MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai provided approach control services for both Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. Shortly after my arrival at Dong Ha, I went to Hue Phu Bai and we drafted a Letter of Agreement between the two ATC facilities. During my tour, we never provided ATC service to Quang Tri (other than some radar, navigational assistance to the SAR, Jolly Green Giants.

MAG-16 Forward was in place at Dong Ha when we arrived; later to be designated MAG-36. I don't recall designation of our supporting ground units. Upon arrival at Dong Ha, our base perimeter was the perimeter road manned by USMC tanks.

The AF F-4 was in our salvage yard (west of the runway) during our tour; numerous downed helicopters joined her.

Monograph by Richard D'Ambrosio Captain USMC (Ret.) (Combined from telephone conversation notes and emails on February 5, 2004)

I was the OIC of MATCU-62 at Dong Ha from May of 1967 until replaced by Captain Bob Puskar in January of 1968. When Capt Flahive was killed at Khe Sanh I was assigned there as OIC. Thereafter, I was eventually medevaced out of Khe Sanh near the end of March 1968. There were no other officers at MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh during this period except for a Major and I whose name escapes after all these years. He was 1stMAWs liaison to the 3rdMARDIV.

I remember Tom Singletary as a GySgt diesel mechanic at Khe Sanh, Greg Dixon, Anthony Nazzario, and Daniel Chase.

Monograph by James J. Dargan USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 2, 2003)

I remember Capt Keane; he was the OIC when I arrived in sunny Chu Lai by the sea. I have some pictures somewhere of Chu Lai. Davy Crocker was there also. I was in the tent with Danny Von Hemel, Al Greene, (Ops) and Noddy Gayles, (Motor T) Davy was in the same tent, don't remember who else CRS. As for Capt. Keane, when I arrived in DaNang I ran into him while waiting for direction to where ever, he went and talked to someone and I caught the next plane to Chu Lai. Must have been a coincidence?

I arrived in Chu Lai in early Nov 65 not sure of the date. It was during the Monsoon season as it rained for at least 40 days without much let up. We lived in a tent on pallets so the rain would run under them. I was sent to the Tower per Capt Keane's orders. The NCOIC when I arrived was Dominick Pace from NBC I think.

We had an operating Airfield Ops, Crash Crew, Launch & Recovery, Weather, Refuelers; Our SAR came from Ky Ha on a daily basis. Our comm was EE-8 to everyone; we had a rotating beacon on top of the tower (what an aiming stake). We did not support Ky Ha or MAG 36, except to provide radar at times of really bad Wx. Our defensive perimeter was six sandbagged holes that came equipped with rats, outside we had I believe the 5th and 7th Marines out near where Charlie operated.

We worked 24 on/off with a 2-man crew in the tower. The rest worked in Radar. Our chow relief was from controllers in radar. The tower was a TSA-13. Radar was a CPN -4 and later we received the UPS-1 with a TPN-8 for GCA. I think we had SIF in the radar complex. The TPN-8 was not worth a damn in bad Wx, you had a yellow scope and tried to find the target by making adjustments as you controlled, I much preferred the FPN-36 we had at NKT. We had a TACAN and perhaps a field VOR. We provided a VFR Tower, PAR, Approach / Departure and coordinated with a MACS outfit and Danang Approach. We used SVFR a lot at Chu Lai especially with the helos and many times with the A-4s. Usually during Monsoon season when there was very little good weather and missions had to be met. To my knowledge we never used the CPN-4 except to store gear

Ky Ha was a separate facility, they had a tower, and no radar and the Helos usually flew low under the Wx to get in. When it was really bad they came to Chu Lai. I think a controller by the name of Posner worked up at KyHa.

Ky Ha was to our north with a SeaBee Battalion to our south along the South China Sea. Chu Lai was for all intent and purposes an enclave. In 65 we had 4000 ft of R/W 14/32 Marston Matting with a Morest in the center of the R/W. Later in 66 the Seabee Battalion built an 8000 ft R/W 400 ft at a time while we continued to operate 24/7. The Morest in the middle of the 4000 ft R/W was to trap the A-4's stationed there in 65-66. We later installed a Catapult on the R/W about 2000 ft long. The idea was to fire a/c off instead of using Jato when he had a load, and also to accommodate F-4's

who came in from Danang. The first shot was an A-4 the shot was a dud but luckily the a/c never got airborne and just ran down the r/w to the end. Eventually they got it up and running.

The new 10,000 ft R/W coincided with the old R/W 14/32 it was not close enough to be dubbed 14L/14R etc. The new r/w was 200 ft wide has high-speed turn-offs, a large hold short area and new hangers. A Colonel had the Seabee's come in and build a wooden tower, without consulting ATC (naturally) midway between the runways. Unfortunately it was poorly positioned so the tower operators could not see a/c landing on 14 on the new r/w or 32 on the old r/w. Ergo we had to have the pilots give us a rollout position so we could land the next a/c

Capt Keane left for C.P. and Capt John Bever took the helm, good guy easy to work for, don't remember who the NCOIC was, it could have been Jim Sumner. Capt Bever allowed me to go down and work GCA and radar in the TSQ during the crew 24 on. I qualified on GCA and Departure.

We had a new OIC around the July time frame Maj Silky Sullivan and when he found out I was being promoted to 2ndLt he made me the Tower Officer, and so I ended up the tour in Dec where I started in the tower. As Tower officer I continued to work shifts for relief and wrote a Tower SOP and training program. I worked at night if needed also.

Some of the controllers were Crocker, Stepp, John O'Hey Jim Sumner, Von Hemel, Lafoon, Murdock, Dubesa, Fennell, Nemeti, Neblung and several young controllers to name a few.

Techs I remember were Joe Medico, Snelson, Shafer Grice, Griggs and we had several who were called back to active duty for two years, don't remember who though.

STORIES

An AF C-130 A/C was taking off, veered off the R/W to the left, snapped the wing, hit some flares, they went off ignited the fuel and the A/C was nearly completely destroyed. All escaped except one passenger. It stopped short of the Tower and CPN - 4 units.

An A-4 had an engine seizure over the South China Sea, the pilot punched out and landed off the beach at Chu Lai, the plane continued over the base and crashed just south of us. The ensuing fire cause the rounds to cook off in our direction, our bunker guards of course fired back thinking it was Charlie attacking. Finally they got the word and ceased firing. I was in the Tower at the time, not a bad firefight. A classic case of SNAFU!

**Monograph by Lonnie L. Darr
2004, and edited on April 27, 2004)**

**(Combined from Emails on February 7,
2004, and edited on April 27, 2004)**

As far as Dong Ha goes, the majority of my time in MATCU-62 was spent at Khe Sanh and for most of that time, I was dodging steel, so the sequence of events at Dong Ha are a total blur.

After Christmas of 1967 intelligence information started to drift down to us. After the first week in January 1968, the word came down that something was about to happen and we were forbidden to be outside our hooches without our flak jackets and helmets. By the middle of January, we all had our butts' puckered waiting for the other foot to drop.

In January, about two weeks before the siege started. We saw 2 MIG-17s with their gear and flaps down, flying low and slow, straight down the valley right over Khe Sanh. They were obviously taking pictures. In fact somewhere in the NVA archives is a picture of me standing bare-assed out in front of the shower with my mouth open, incredulous. Not a shot was fired. Nobody could believe what they were seeing.

The prevailing winds seemed to be from the west making runway 28 the most used runway for landings. I know that most takeoffs were on runway 10 even with a tail wind, simply because there was so much air under them as soon as they left the runway. The tower was on the south side of the runway immediately on the west side of the Seabees. Charlie med was to the left rear of the MATCU compound and slightly south of the airfreight ramp.

There was a TACAN at Khe Sanh but surprisingly enough, to my recollection, it was maintained by the Air Force.

Mortar boxes filled with dirt surrounded the tower. The GCA shelter was covered with sand bags. We had a homemade shower with the canvas door and an emersion heater in the 55-gallon drum on the roof. In the generator shelters we had both 60 cycle generators and 400 cycle generators. I remember the TRC-97 antennas and the TPN-8 antennas. In a mid morning sun and you could easily see the incredibly red clay of Khe Sanh. In December of 1967 we had a Sgts hooch and a Staff hooch near where the west end of the "white elephant" would be in a few weeks. We also had a mamasan working for the SNCO hooch. She was probably busy stepping off distances for the NVA gunners.

I don't remember ever having a problem with the reflectors during the siege. I guess once you plant something in the Khe Sanh clay; it tends to stay there.

On January 21st, we started taking incoming about 0500 local. Everyone was blown out of their racks and arrived in the bunkers in various stages of disarray. Some were naked, some had t-shirts and skivvies, some a little more or less but I don't remember anyone in my bunker being fully dressed. I personally had a t-shirt and

sweat pants. Most of us had what we really felt was important, rifle and ammo. I don't think anyone missed or felt a need for their gas masks.

The CS went off in the dump about 0700, pretty much coincident with sunrise. We were all pretty tickled to see the sunrise; none of us thought we were going to see it. And then, the gas started drifting across the base. There was very little wind and the cloud moved very slowly. There was not a single person in my bunker that had a gas mask and there was very little interest in leaving the bunker, while incoming was still falling like rain, so most did what I did, pissed in their t-shirts and used it for a gas mask. There was no aircraft movement in or out in the first 5 hours of the siege and I don't recall anyone talking about controlling aircraft with their mask on. But there was little talk that first morning; we were all too busy gritting our teeth.



Air America Pilatus Porter intersection departure Runway 10 December 1967

Monograph by Ronald L. Dodge Captain USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 6, 2004, and updated from reunion conversation notes on October 10, 2007)

I began my career in the Marine Corps during World War II. I was a Naval Aviation Pilot (NAP) with the rank of Corporal flying the SBD "DAUNTLESS". After WWII I had the opportunity to fly the PV-2 "VENTURA" and the AD "SKYRAIDER". During two tours during the Korean Conflict I flew both the AD "SKYRAIDER" and the F7F "TIGERCAT". After Korea I transitioned to the F3D "SKYKNIGHT" and then flew the F4H "PHANTOM II". Before joining MATCU-62 at Dong Ha I had had a tour flying with VMFA-314 at Chu Lai with MAG-13. I was ordered to accept a "promotion" from Marine Gunner CWO-4 to 2nd Lieutenant. The pay was the same, but it sure didn't feel like a promotion.

I was with MATCU-62 at Dong Ha along with Art Warnack from December of 1966 through the middle of 1967. At Dong Ha we used the CPN-4 and FPN-36 for GCA. The airfield at Dong Ha was operated by MABS-16, but in reality the MATCU Officers staffed most of the billets usually filled by MABS officers.

I was detailed to Khe Sanh where I worked with G.P. Stirling until he left. We had a single FPN-36 for GCA and one of the small portable control towers that we mounted on a raised platform. Some of the younger Marines at Khe Sanh thought they were pretty "salty", so I was occasionally harsh with them. At one time the bulletin board in the ready room/bunker had printed "The Word for the Day - DODGE-IT".

At Khe Sanh I joined an infantry unit and went on patrols outside the perimeter. The Base CO indicated that he thought my efforts admirable, but asked me to remain inside the fence.

I received a head wound during a mortar attack and was transferred to the US Naval Hospital at Yokosuka, Japan. Once I had recovered from the wounds I was transferred to MATCU-66 at MCAS Futenma, Okinawa. This tour then changed to a three year station tour where I served as the Operations Officer.

Monograph by Daniel B. Dorn Major USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 6, 2004)

My tour at Hue Phu Bai was with MATCU-68 from Oct 1967 to Nov 1968. During this period I spent about six weeks at the Marble Mountain Air Facility in the summer of 1968. Capt. Carl Joiner was the OIC of MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai and then Billy K. Gabriel took over in Oct 1968.

MATCU-68 at Phu Bai provided Approach Control Services to Camp Evans, Quang Tri, Dong Ha, LZ Stud, and Khe Sanh until the Air Force took over in Sep 1968. Approach Control to Khe Sanh during the siege period involved the radio relay of control instructions through airborne aircraft.

MATCU-68 was part of MABS-36, MAG-36 and in addition to the organic helicopters there was an Army Squadron of OV-1 Mohawks.

SSgt Jim Davenport, 1stLt G. P. Stirling, 1stLt Hank Flood, 1stLt G.S. Paul, 1stLt Ed Wynn, Charley Farr, Jake Sindt, and John Champagne were also at Phu Bai, but Charley Farr left to set up Quang Tri in Feb 1968. 1stLt Bob Torres was the Maintenance Officer.

Preston Haynes was a 1stLT with the same tour dates as me. We actually flew both into and out of country on the same plane. He left Phu Bai to be OIC of MATCU-62 at Dong Ha.

I also knew 1stLt Tony Shaw who was OIC at Khe Sanh after William Flahive. 1stLT Shaw was WIA in March '68 and medevaced out.

Capt. John Bever was the first OIC of MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai in Jan 1966. John Bever and Hank Flood were the OIC/NCOIC of MATCU-67 at Soc Trang in Apr 1962.

Monograph by Captain Donald T. Eskam USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 21, 2003)

MATCU 62A was the designation for the Dong Ha MATCU. The NCOIC when we got there was MSgt Telford later replaced by MGySgt Jim Sumner. The OIC was Capt Sam Davis, who was later replaced by Capt Jim Janke. Other members were SSgt McMasters (Diesel Mech), SSgt Staab (Maintenance), SSgt R. McConnell {MAC} (ATC), SSgt Orthman {BigO} (ATC), Cpl Rassmussen (ATC), and Cpl Franks (ATC).

Capt Basher was at Dong Ha when we got there. We also had a 1/Lt Anderson who later got out and went to work for the Police Department in Northern California. Don't remember where. Capt Davis went on to Law School at the University of California-Davis and set academic records. I have never been able to locate him.

CWO Komsi went to LZ Stud for a while. Also Jerry Bauer was there as a technician. We also had a PFC Aznaran and LCpl Gauzman. Gauzman came back from chow one day and had a new Jeep. It had 7 miles on it and belonged to an Army Colonel. Needless to say I advised him to take it back and if he got caught to confess that he got into the wrong one and his was now missing!!

I remember SSgt Jackson who had the eastern perimeter security and would go out on patrols. His opening introduction was Jackson's my name, and fightins my game. He ended up going to DI school from there and was awarded the Bronze Star. He just had a small detachment of perimeter people and lived in the area.

Major Causey was OIC of Quang Tri when I got there. MSgt Bathe came later but don't remember when. Do know that he was there when I left in Nov 69. I can't remember the NCOIC. Red Reda was there as a Tech.

I lived with Mac and Bob Orthman. I remember the cold weather. Our little pot belly stove was glowing red in the middle of the night, either because we couldn't get the carb set or was just wanting some heat. It's a wonder we didn't burn our hootch down!!

I remember the rocket attack on Quang Tri but could not remember the date. I knew it was summer and June would be correct. Some wounded. One that I remember was Sgt Jim Wright, a controller who worked for me at El Toro. He had just been there for about 3 months and after he got there came up to Dong Ha to visit with me. He had a severe head injury. I never heard any more about him after his med-evac except that it was bad. I have tried to locate him but have been unsuccessful.

During the summer after Quang Tri got hit, there was big action up north. It started about 11:30pm and lasted all night and ended up at the northern and eastern perimeter of Dong Ha. One particular incident I remember was when a Huey's pilot was severely wounded and the copilot requested clearance direct to Quang Tri. When I inquired if he was having difficulty he stated the pilot had been severely wounded and needed

immediate attention. I then directed him to the Air Force Medical station in the Air Force Compound just Northeast across the runway from the tower. We called the med folks that he was coming. He landed there and they took the pilot. The Co-pilot lifted off and with the gunner returned to the action. He stated that it was like a turkey-shoot. OV-10's also were working right off the approach end of 27. It was so close that you could see the tracers from the gunner of the Huey. About 8:30 am it was over. It was a night that I will not forget, but I did forget the actual date. It was Jul or Aug. I believe July. On day we took incoming that landed in the POW compound, one in the Air Force Compound and one just west of Air Freight and just north of the runway. That one wounded a kid from crash crew as he was diving into a bunker. It got him in the rear end if I remember right.

We had a terrible rain in September of 69. I have a picture of me in water up to my knees. It was a hurricane that hit Dong Ha with extremely high winds. Something like 75 to 90 mph. It took the roof off our old hootch and caused a lot of damage. I left Dong Ha just a day or two before the hurricane hit.

MSgt John Moskop was the NCOIC at Chu Lai. He was with us in MATCU 74. Red Dog was his nickname. Just happened that I ran into my other brother (with 5th Marines) in Da Nang and we both went to Chu Lai the next day. John Moskop took us out to my other brothers unit by 6X.

I left Dong Ha for Quang Tri in Sept 69. Maybe Oct 69 was the last month for ops at Dong Ha. I don't remember what it was for Stud. In October I left with the advanced party for Chu Lai. I don't know what happened to the equipment at Dong Ha or Stud. I left Vietnam and went to the WO screening course in Quantico reporting in December 7, 1969.

No other MATCU was at Quang Tri. After 62 went south the Army took over. Just before I left Quang Tri they were in for some cross training. John Trosper should remember that. I believe he was still there then.

Monograph by Arthur "Don" Faram re-typed from typed letter dated 18 December 2003 titled MATCU-62 in VIETNAM

It was 1966; the place was San Clemente Island off the coast of southern California. We were reloading the MATCU back aboard a fleet of navy ships. Just a few weeks earlier the MAG at MCAS Kaneohe had been ordered on maneuvers. Our mission was to load the MATCU aboard ship, support the MAG on maneuvers and return to Kaneohe. We had been at San Clemente for just one day when the MAG was ordered back on the ships. The reason, we were going to Vietnam. Most wondered why we had wasted the time going from Hawaii to California if we were not going to stay. We were told that the preparations for loading and unloading were what they wanted us to learn and that the exercise was a success.

However, the MATCU was in for a surprise. As we approached Hawaii we learned that the rest of the MAG was to remain aboard ship while the MATCU was to offload their equipment. We were informed that the MATCU was to remain in Kaneohe to support the large airlift from the mainland to Vietnam. Several MATCU Officers, accompanied by an NCO, went back aboard the ships to pay the troops. This presented a huge problem. Since they were not allowed off the ships the Marines that had families had no way of getting their money home. Since there was no advance warning the Marines had not made alternative arrangements for routing their paychecks to their families. (I know, if the Marine Corps wanted you to have a wife....) Needless to say Navy Relief was working overtime.

Being Marines we wanted to be where the action was. We complained daily to the higher ups that we wanted to go to Vietnam. In November of 1966 we got out wish, in spades. We were going to provide ATC for the Air Force outpost at Dong Ha and to the Marine detachment at Khe Sanh. We had ample time to prepare. We painted our equipment Marine green. We packed all the empty spaces with wood to build maintenance shacks. We loaded fans and lights and all the things that would make life comfortable. Little did we know what was ahead?

The MATCU equipment was loaded aboard an LSD which sailed for Dong Ha Vietnam. Dong Ha was an old French base located one fourth of the way between the Gulf of Tonkin and the Laotian border and ten miles south of the DMZ. The town was connected to the ocean by the Dong Ha River. Several weeks later MATCU personnel boarded a C-130 bound for Da Nang. After determining that the gear had arrived myself and another person, the only two checked out in the FPN-36, flew to Dong Ha by helicopter to set up the radar. The interesting thing was that we had also shipped the CPN-4 and all its support equipment to Vietnam. The CPN-4 was to come via another ship to the mouth of the Dong Ha River. It was then hauled by barge up the river to Dong Ha. This was a giant piece of equipment that was intended for duty at a stateside base. I must say that, until it was sprayed by shrapnel from an artillery shell six months later, it served us well. After that we sent the CPN-4 back to Gilfillan and used the FPN-36 exclusively. Due to our remote location MATCU-62 did not have any contact with other ATC units and provided its own Search, PAR, and Tower services.

In the meantime half of our outfit took the other FPN-36 and deployed to Khe Sanh. Khe Sanh was strategically located at the intersection of the DMZ and the Laotian border. Later in 1966 and for a year after, North Vietnam decided they wanted Khe Sanh and Dong Ha vacated. Although Dong Ha did receive some pretty heavy damage Khe Sanh got the worst of it. If you are interested you can purchase the award winning book "I Protest" by David Douglas Duncan. David was a combat photographer and the book contains nothing but photos of the war at Khe Sanh. David truly captured the futility of war in this book.

The North turned out to be great psychologists. They never attacked our airbases until we attacked their airbase in North Vietnam. Their first attack was on April 8, 1967. The next was on April 18, 1967. Of course it didn't take a genius to figure the next attack would be on April 28, 1967. But it wouldn't happen. By setting up patterns like this they were able to cause the same amount of psychological damage without firing a shot. Similar patterns continued throughout the war. Most attacks consisted of rocket, mortar, and artillery fire. We found out that our mess hall workers would carry rockets for the NVA at night and work in our mess hall during the day.

In September of 1967, during one of their artillery attacks, we were in our bunkers when there was a ground-shaking explosion, the severity of which we had never heard. We found out later that the ordnance people had buried five-hundred pound bombs under the ammo dump so that they could blow it up if we ever got overrun. The enemy had succeeded in a lucky shot which had landed right in the middle of the bombs. Needless to say, the crater was huge. The explosion knocked down every structure that was not protected. This included our mess hall and huts. We were instantly converted to Mud Marines. By this time the helicopter squadrons were already leaving Dong Ha. They were losing more ships on the ground than they were in the air. The explosion pretty much spelled the end for Dong Ha.

Our group provided ATC for the next several months until we were relieved in December. As you know a tour in Vietnam lasted 13 months. I understand that MATCU-62 was later moved to Quang Tri. We did not lose any of the original group that left Hawaii. However, I understand that several of our replacements died in 1968.

Monograph by Jerrold R. "Jerry" Fisher, Captain USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 23, 2006.

I had just finished a station tour at MCAS Iwakuni and elected to extend a WestPac tour for six months. 1stMAW assigned me to MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai. I checked into the MATCU as a Sergeant in January of 1968, just a few days before the NVA and VC began the TET Offensive.

I first worked in the control tower on Herm Moyers crew. I really did not believe him at first when he told the crew members to start digging fighting holes just off the tarmac beside the control tower. But it later became apparent the infantry battalions guarding the air base had been reassigned to the fighting in Hue itself, and we were going to have to defend ourselves. I was in a hole with an Air Force technician who had never fired an M-16. I told him to just keep me supplied with full magazines if we ever had to start shooting. After three days of spending our off-duty time in fighting holes, the situation returned to normal.

During this time the weather was mostly IFR. All instrument approaches were to Runway 27, but we used Runway 9 and 27 for departures. We had a lot of C-130s that were used to evacuate the wounded.

I March of 68 I was assigned to Marble Mountain along with Sgt L. E. Hajduk to help set up a GCA Unit. The anticipated FPN-36s did not show up so the project was put on hold and I returned to Phu Bai.

When I returned to Phu Bai I was assigned the radar facility and was shortly IFR qualified to make PAR approaches. Traffic was such that I would make almost continuous approaches. I would be relieved for a break after three or four hours and be unaware of the passage of time.

I was trained on the single position approach control and was the last Marine qualified as an approach controller before the Air Force took over that function. While MATCU-68 as providing approach control services at Phu Bai it was also serving Quang Tri, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh.

I remember two happy Army Warrant Officers giving us a case of beer after we were able to get them to Phu Bai in solid IMC after their O-1 had been hit by an NVA or VC anti-aircraft weapon.

SSgt Paul Mason took over my crew when I left Phu Bai in August of 1968.

I reported to NAS Willow Grove and was assigned to the reserve MATCU there. Working through HQMC I was able to get orders back to WestPac and left Willow Grove in January 1970.

I arrived in Vietnam in March of 1970. Jim Hardy was the ATCO at Da Nang, and because I was a 7324, and Chu Lai was the only Marine facility still providing approach control services, he assigned me to MATCU-67.

At Chu Lai I was assigned to the radar facility and was very shortly IFR qualified to make PAR approaches. We made approaches only to the West field concrete Runway 32 aircraft that operated out of the old East field had to taxi there after landing. Chu Lai was also busy and I would sometimes make continuous approaches.

Generally approach controllers would identify an aircraft and then provide vectors to a PAR final, rather than clearing an identified aircraft for a TACAN approach and then using radar separation. Willy Williams was one of the approach controllers at Chu Lai.

I was waiting in the truck getting ready to leave the East field living areas for crew relief when a VC rocket hit the water tower. Tom Zarnier and Doug Barton were wounded.

In September of 1970 we turned control the airfield to the Army. We had to plainly mark the MATCU-67 equipment as "EXPEDITIONARY" so that the Vietnamese would not claim the equipment. The Vietnamese had laid claim to anything that had been built as a semi-permanent structure.

Since I still had a lot of time on my thirteen-month tour left to go I was assigned to work at Marble Mountain with MATCU-68. When I started working in the control tower Rich Armstrong was the Tower Officer, and the Tower NCOIC was Ed Davis. Gary Bryant was also there. It was a good well-built tower with a 2" steel plate as a floor. Most of our traffic was helicopters from MAG-16, but we also had some VIP fixed-wing.

Good Casell and Al Tomer were with MATCU-68 as well as Sam Sagerian and Al Snelson.

In the fall of 1970 a typhoon struck Marble Mountain with 100 knot winds. There was not a lot of damage, but the accompanying rain caused a lot of flooding and MAG-16 was tasked with rescue of civilians trapped by rising waters.

By the time I was at Marble Mountain the FPN-36's that had originally been the equipment used for GCA, had been replaced by a TSQ-18 complex. Da Nang provided approach control services.

I left Marble Mountain in April 1971.

Monograph by Henry D. "Hank" Flood (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 6, 2004)

I had three tours in the Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.

I was the NCOIC of MATCU-67 in early 1962 and deployed that MATCU to Soc Trang, RVN. The OIC was Captain Jac D. Watson. I was promoted to WO and left in the fall of 1962 for Okinawa to perform an EFM.

My next in-country tour was at Hue Phu Bai with MATCU-68 from October of 1966 thru October of 1967. A Major Bertoulli, a Naval Aviator, was OIC for a short period when I got there. I was promoted from CWO to 2ndLt during this tour. Capt Skov was also with the MATCU, as well as G.P. Stirling.

My last tour was with MATCU-62 at Nam Phong, Thailand, and I brought that MATCU back to Iwakuni, Japan in early 1974.

Monograph by Frank W. Fodor MSgt USMC (Ret.) - (Combined from Emails on April, 10, 2004)

When I was at Quantico, (Electronics Maint) Our Bread & Butter, was EE8's & PRC-6's, the High Tech stuff was the PRC-8, 9, &10. And if you were savvy enough, you could short the filaments of the Modulator tube and get Side tone and could more easily tune up the transmitter. However, if you were even just a little careless, you could also short the filaments to the B+ and blow \$80 worth of tubes (\$80 was a lot of money back then). I only did that once and found myself on Mess Duty, Last time I was on Mess Duty, (except for the last 43 years and that don't count).

However, a few years later, 1962, I found myself in Udorn, Thailand. I was the 2771 Com Tech, for 3/9 MEF and had the Electronics Van (Mounted on a 5 ton) with a 60KW Gen behind it. The camp had a 20 KW Gen but it died within the first week we were there. My Generator was "Borrowed" by the 3/9 Commander and never got it back. I used to love the wake up by the F8's as they buzzed us each morning about 6:00. The 20KW was a PU-239; I don't remember what the 60KW was.

3/9 was about 4 -5 miles away. I was only over to the airfield once, and was unimpressed as it was then I was introduced to "Air America" Civilian Communists. The F100's always came in pairs, at about 200 feet off the ground and normally caught me on the way to breakfast. Maybe we can talk about it in San Diego. The big flap that took place there was the Col that was in charge of the Brig mistreated the prisoners and was relieved of command. I keep thinking he was also the nitwit that commandeered my generator. I needed the generator for my equipment (although it was somewhat of an overkill) and he (the Col) came by one morning and I was shaving (electric razor) while the generator was running. I started it every morning as part of the daily checks and he thought I started it up just to shave. It was not a pleasant scenario.

I'm not certain, but I think mess duty went away with the Drumming out of the Corps. I attended one of those at Quantico. It left a lasting impression.

Didn't marry up with MATCU until 1969, and stayed with ATC until I retired in 1979.

Monograph by Billy K. Gabriel Captain USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 6, 2004 and edited on February 18, 2004)

The first time I went to Vietnam was when I was TAD from MATCU-65 for a brief inspection tour for Fleet Marine Force Pacific. This would have been in late 1966 or early 1967 when I was a 1stLt. I had the opportunity to visit DaNang, Chu Lai, Dong Ha, and Khe Sanh while in country, and Futenma, Iwakuni, and Kaneohe Bay on the way back to MCAS Yuma. The purpose of this inspection was to determine equipment needs of the MATCUs. I remember MGSgt "Doc" Cleveland, MGSgt Maurice Smith, and SSgt Steve Staab being with me. Captain John Bever was the OIC of MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai when we were there.

My second time in Vietnam was a complete in-country tour with MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai when I was a Captain from June 1968 through July 1969. Most of the time at MATCU-68 I was the Maintenance Officer and Assistant OIC, but I was briefly the OIC between Carl Joiner and Ed McCollum. I remember MSgt Joe Lollar being with the MATCU at Phu Bai.

Monograph by Richard V. "Dick" Garvey (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on June 12, 2004 and edited on June 16, 17, and 18, and July 6, 2004.)

Quang Tri, Vietnam (mid Oct 1967- mid Jan 1968)

I was a Staff Sergeant Approach Controller with MATCU-70 at MCAS Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, when in October of 1967, Captain Patrick Prout chose me to be one of the 23 Marines to accompany him to someplace in South Vietnam.

Departure

The men were split up into teams to accompany the MATCU equipment transported on four Air Force C-124's. We departed at various intervals. This was not a formation flight. Each of the C-124's was a single flight.

Enroute

Enroute over the Pacific we encountered and/or skirted a typhoon. My flight landed at Wake Island for a bit over a day. Other flights ended up at Midway Island, Kwajalein Island and one made it to the Philippines. Three of the four flights arrived at Hue Phu Bai the same day. (Orders indicate we arrived October 20, 1967)

Arrival

The first night Capt. Prout calls me in and advises that I just volunteered to lead the advance party to Quang Tri the following morning. I was advised to pick three more volunteers. I picked SSgt. Simmons, Sgt. Varbel and Sgt. Gilbert. Our mission was to verify that the Sea Bees had prepared our site properly for the arrival of our equipment and to fill as many sand bags as we could before the equipment arrived.

We were transported to Quang Tri on a Huey helicopter.

Day One at Quang Tri

Upon arrival we met with a Sea Bee officer and introduced ourselves. The five of us immediately went to the site where we would eventually be setting up the tower and radar unit (TSQ-18). Simmons, Varbel and Gilbert started filling sand bags and I checked in with the perimeter guard at the nearest bunkers to our site.

I was directed to a grunt Sergeant who told me they did not have any officers and since I out ranked him I could assume command. I declined and advised him that I had a special mission. He told me he had a bit more than a platoon and they were spread out in four or five bunkers. He said the Sea Bees protected the remainder of the perimeter.

Early Overview

Bunkers were next to our site and east of Highway One on the west side of the airstrip that was still under construction.

The eastern perimeter was someplace between the runway and the Quang Tri river. The north and south perimeter varied between day and night.

During the day light hours the north and south perimeter was beyond the end of the runway. At night some of each end of the runway was outside of the perimeter.

A few days later more Marines had arrived and moved the west perimeter to the west side of Highway One. The west now had an inner and outer perimeter. The perimeter was extended north and south so the runway was protected day and night. I am not sure what happened to the east perimeter but suspect it was also extended outward.

Equipment Arrives

The Sea Bees were working miracles so that in a day or two matting was down to make a hard surface runway and the remainder of the TANGO team started arriving with our equipment. At about the same time a few helicopters started arriving and we could see the ground crews setting up their operations on the east side of the runway towards the north end of the field. More fixed wing transports started arriving with more troops and equipment before the day was over.

The Set Up

Mr. Anti took charge of the technical aspects of where he wanted the equipment to be located. I believe Ed LeBaron worked along with the team erecting squad tents. One of the technicians was string power cable all over the place and working with the diesel mechanic. The other technicians were either putting together the RADAR unit, TACAN, or radio shack with the help of their assigned controllers. Me and one or two other controllers were erecting the control tower.

Everyone was filling sand bags when the opportunity presented itself.

There was a single squad tent for the unit headquarters of which Captain Prout and Mr. Currier resided; one for the Staff NCOs; one which the Sergeants and Corporals shared; and then there were two squad tents put together end to end for maintenance and I believe LT Anti resided there.

LT Anti took the maintenance officer job very seriously. It seems he was always available to help the technicians with anything and everything they needed to keep the equipment operating. One thing for sure, we controllers had equipment that worked when we needed it. It was a complete team effort.

Late Arrivals

Mr. Currier, Gunney Darby and a few others arrived at Quang Tri the following day. Their C124 arrived late at Hue Phu Bai. When they did arrive at Quang Tri, in

addition to the MATCU equipment, they had a six-by-six loaded with some plywood and a couple of refrigerators. And I believe there were a couple of real bunks with mattresses.

The story was Darby was on the flight line at Hue Phu Bai directing the unloading of our equipment off the C124 and reloading onto a C130 for transport up to Quang Tri. A soldier in the six-by-six asked Darby where he wanted this truck. Darby said, "Put it on this aircraft". Supposedly the soldier responded "I just took this off of another C130 now you want it on this C130. What a way to run a war".

We used the six-by-six for quite awhile until the serial number showed up on some kind of missing truck report. I don't remember what happened to that six-by-six.

Operational

The first day our equipment started arriving the tower was operational in short time; the RADAR unit a bit later after it was certified.

First Operational Snag

One of the first technical snags we encountered to my knowledge was the communications wire running between the control tower and GCA. The vintage was 1940 something and the protective coating was crumbling (old age). It may have been an oversight on our part when we packed in Hawaii or maybe we got the wire when we got into country. We were all just too busy to blame anybody. The poor radio technician hadn't rested in ages and we were operational whether we were ready or not.

While the technicians were figuring out what to do about the wire the controllers made do with it. We rigged up tin cans filled with a couple of rocks at each end of the wire. GCA would pull the wire to rattle the can in the control tower when their aircraft was at the appropriate distance from the field. GCA would again pull the wire to rattle the can, I believe at three miles, then at two and a half miles would un-key the mike and the tower would broadcast on the GCA frequency "Cleared to Land" or "Go Around".

We also set up a code for the tower to rattle the can in the GCA unit if they wanted us to Go Around earlier. I am not quite sure of the mile reporting we did to the control tower. But the bottom line is the operation worked until the radio technician found some workable communication wire.

More Sandbagging

During day light hours a Staff Sergeant not on duty were directed to assemble the ATC Sergeants and Corporals who were not on duty in the tower or in GCA, to fill sand bags. Unlike some of the other Staff I found it a more agreeable relationship joining the team filling sandbags. I was cautioned about doing this by my seniors but chose to ignore their advice.

Quang Tri airfield was built on a sand dune and we eventually ran out of sand for sand bagging. The Sea Bees started bring us truckloads of sand.

We built a few trenches and added a few sand bangs just to make us feel good in case of attack. We sand bagged the equipment, and then we started sand bagging the squad tents. I don't know if this was by the book, equipment first, but that is the way we did it.

This and That

LT Anti took pictures of the site and airfield just about every day and normally from the same spots as the day before. I never did see those pictures but am sure they would make a very good visual of the progress we were making.

From day one we ate in the Sea Bees mess hall. As more Marines arrived at Quang Tri the Marines took over mess hall operations. I was a chowhound. Members of our unit did not waste chow. If they were not going to eat their rations they would give it to me. I most likely lost fewer pounds than the other guys.

Very soon the Sea Bees infirmary was classified a hospital at main side (east side of the field). I was told after I returned to Hawaii a much larger hospital was put into operation.

Transports were arriving to drop off men and equipment throughout the daylight hours. The airport was restricted to daylight fixed wing operations; helicopters around the clock. One late arriving transport had to depart after dark. There were smudge pots for runway lighting in an emergency but somebody considered it better just to disperse a few trucks with headlights on along the edge of the runway to give the pilot just enough light for takeoff.

Many of the helicopters left the field with combat troops and sometimes returned with wounded. Others were Medevacs in and out of the field.

Sometimes the Medevacs asked us to track them to their pick up points. They would keep as much altitude as they could until going in to make their pickups. They further requested when they disappeared on the RADAR for us to wait for them to reappear and get them back to Quang Tri as fast as possible.

Bending the Rules

Operationally the rains did not hinder us as much as the ground fog did. Sometimes the top of the fog was just below the floor of the control tower. The floor of the control tower was about 30 feet above ground level. On the ground you could hardly see; yet from the tower it was clear, and the field was IFR. The ground fog led to an occasional deviation of SOP (Standard Operating Procedures).

It was nighttime hours and a battle was being waged thirty or forty miles or so away from us. The Medevacs were working overtime that night. Going out they would call for takeoff and immediately after clearance was given they would pop up through the fog. It was finding the runway on their return that became a problem.

When the airport is IFR the GCA was required to have an end of runway observer. If the end of runway observer did not see the Medevac GCA was ordered to go around. To compound matters the pilot could not see the runway and he had injured aboard needing immediate medical care.

Just as GCA ordered the Medevac around, the end of runway observer reported that just maybe he saw the helicopter but definitely heard it. I was working the GCA RADAR that night. I do not recall who was working the end of runway. I guarantee it was one of the Sergeants or Corporals because they always got that job.

Whoever it was at the end of runway suggested that I instruct the pilot to stop forward motion when I called "Over End of Runway" and then un-key my mike; further advise the pilot that a controller at the end of the runway would then begin talking him down to the ground by sight and sound; just maybe it would work.

I don't recall if we had a Watch Officer in GCA that night or not. We gave it a shot and it worked.

Somebody let the Medics and the ground crews know what we were doing and an ambulance unloaded the Medevacs while on the runway. The end of runway observer would walk out on the runway to check and then advise us when the runway was clear and we would do it again with the next Medevac. Some of the choppers shut down and were towed off the runway.

Captain Prout did not jump our (backsides) so I suppose what he was not to hear he did not hear. Captain Prout was a stickler for proper behavior and for us to adhere to proper procedures at all times. Thanks Captain. And the Marines in those Medevacs also thank you.

Cannon Rounds and Aircraft

To put this caption in a different light it was a coordination nightmare separating airborne projectiles from aircraft.

Artillery would advise Air Operations when, where and at what height their firing was taking place. Air Operations tried to keep Air Traffic Control informed and we attempted to sterilize those areas by keeping aircraft out of the way.

Many times choppers were on the borderline of these areas waiting to deliver or pick up troops. Most times the artillery would give them a bit of breathing room by either slowing down or stopping their barrages. Either way it was a dangerous situation.

This was one of the main reasons that many of the choppers stayed on our frequencies and asked us to track them out and back. I suspect the pilots assumed we would have more updated advisories as to where these projectiles might be.

Many times choppers returned full of holes from either hits from Charley or just maybe friendly fire. I can only attest to those that returned.

Air America (CIA Airlines)

In addition to the military transports hauling in equipment and supplies Air America flights would arrive now and again. These were C-47 type aircraft. Seldom did uniformed personnel arrive on these flights.

All Vietnamese who debarked from these flights were transported off the airfield. To my knowledge Vietnamese were not allowed to remain at the airfield. I don't ever recall any Vietnamese on the airfield except for these flights.

Let There Be Light

Frequently the grunts needed the lights turned on for night battles. Sometimes they did not have enough flares they could use from their ground positions or they just needed more light than they could provide themselves and called in airborne flare drops. The aircraft I was more knowledgeable of accomplishing these missions were C-130's. I don't know where they flew from but most likely any airport that could handle them. At various times some were Marines and some were the Air Force.

A few different nights our RADAR unit assisted them.

It just so happened one night that a RADAR controller getting bored sitting around and started thumbing through frequencies. He stumbled onto a couple of the C-130's trying to reach their destination to make their flare deliveries. The controller inquired as to where they were and asked where they were going. After that he just hung around the frequency and watched them on the RADAR.

It seems that the first drop was a bit off course to suit the grunt coordinator. The pilot asked our RADAR that since he was watching and knew where he made the run that maybe the RADAR controller could line him up on the track they needed on the ground.

For the next couple of hours the C-130's were vectored along the drop area and much more precise adjustments were made to suit the troops on the ground.

This was not a normal operation for us. I suspect it may have been the same pilots that called us for assistance in later days or weeks.

The Midnight Hours

The control tower and RADAR unit was manned twenty-four hours a day except during the times we were under attack. Unlike the RADAR unit that had to be air-conditioned to protect the equipment the tower did not have a working air-conditioning unit. We did have a couple of very small fans to move the air around.

During midnight shifts we had only one man in the tower and one in the RADAR unit unless operations required more. This was a long lonely shift.

Most nights the only sound in the tower was squelch breaking on the frequency. Every once in awhile an aircraft would call just to say hello and get the latest barometric pressure and the wind direction and speed. Of course the nights when a battle was brewing the Medevac were working hard you had plenty to do.

Sometimes you broke the boredom by selecting the commercial radio station that the radio technician piped up to the tower. You did not have a choice of radio stations. It was whatever station the radio technician had left on before he secured for the night.

Some took the opportunity to write letters home.

Otherwise you might see a flare shot into the sky and maybe hear the crack of a rifle shot. Mostly you were wishing it was daylight and your shift was over.

In the RADAR unit on the slow midnight shifts was a good time to catch some sleep with the comfort of the air-conditioning. That is if you did not mind napping in a chair.

Only the supporting legs for the tower were sandbagged. The tower cab was not protected from any stray bullets or shelling by any armor plating. The cab was constructed of aluminum or some kind of composite material where with your boot you could put a large size dent into it. Half of the construction was Plexiglas windows. Your only protection was your helmet and flak jacket.

After our first attack we attached a rope to the catwalk for a more rapid evacuation. Even with the rope a few of the guys just jumped the 30 feet or so to the ground. No one was ever injured.

Pulling Rank (the wrong way)

We posted a sign at the bottom of the stairs leading to the control tower "Maximum Limit Two Bodies". This was mainly to limit unwanted visitors. In reality we did need a body limit so as not to cause too much weight on the structure.

Internally we kept the limit to three bodies. Two on duty in the tower and the radio technician could be there to make three. Relief was one body up and then one body down.

One day while two of us were in the tower working a grunt LT and GySgt show up on the catwalk. They want to sand bag and install a machine gun position on top of the control tower. It was just one of those days.

I asked them to leave the tower and we could discuss this on the ground. The grunt LT starts pulling rank so I order him out of the tower. A discussion of sorts (argument) ensues and I get on the phone to Captain Prout.

One thing about Captain Prout, when you are right he backs you up completely without question. Just make sure you are right.

The Captain orders the grunts off the tower. A conversation is taking place on the ground and Captain Prout asks me to come down if operations allows. The Captain asks my side of the story while the grunt LT is standing there. Short version I ordered the grunts off the tower and the LT starts pulling rank.

Captain Prout then explains to the LT that when those men are on duty in that control tower not even he can order them out of the tower because they are in charge. They have the complete backing of the Commanding General of the Air Wing. And for all practical purposes until they are properly relieved they may in fact out rank the Commanding General.

I am pretty sure the grunts heads were spinning when they departed the area. I never did see them again.

Highway One

Highway one was just a few hundred yards from our site. We had a good view of the highway from the control tower. During nighttime hours the highway was closed except for an occasional military vehicle. Otherwise it was a free fire zone. Mostly the highway was eerily quiet during dark hours.

At first light we would see a unit of men sweeping the highway for mines, etc. Shortly thereafter the highway would be open until about darkness.

In addition to the normal flow of troops convoying, either walking or in GI trucks, the highway was full of Vietnamese civilians. They were walking, on bicycles, on motor scooters, in busses, trucks, automobiles and some pushing or pulling handcarts. Occasionally, you might see a cart pulled by an animal.

Many were hauling bedding and other household articles. Some bicycles and motor scooters might have five or six bodies on them. The busses were overloaded with people on the roofs. People were hanging on the sides of cars and trucks.

The people were of all ages but the overwhelming majority were the old and the young.

Most of the civilian traffic was heading south. I was informed by the grunts on the perimeter that the civilians were not to stop movement if they were in eyesight of the airfield.

On one occasion I spotted some Korean soldiers probably at platoon strength. They were heading north.

Christmas 1967

I don't remember Thanksgiving 1967. I do remember Christmas 1967; I was working the control tower. A helicopter with a strange call sign calls on frequency and asks if he can get some fuel and maybe a bite to eat. I told him he could get both and that the chow hall was walking distance from the fuel pumps. I was just about to be relieved for the day and head for noon chow. Most of our day watches were four hours or less. I met up with the pilot at the fuel pumps and we went to mess together. No co-pilot. No gunner. This guy was by himself. I don't believe I even saw his rank.

He said he was heading up north to look around and might make some bombing runs and would I like to go with him. I am thinking to myself "Right!! Bombing runs in a Huey". He claimed he was very serious and on our return to his helicopter he would show me the bombs.

Sure enough he had bombs. He had a pretty fair size box full of hand grenades and a couple of crates of what looked like beer glasses. The way these bombs worked was you put the grenade in the glass and pull the pin to arm the grenade. The glass prevented the spoon from flying off. Drop the glass with the grenade in it out the window and when it hit the ground the glass breaks and the grenade blows.

I say to myself what the heck give it a shot. I told the pilot to sit fast and listen on the control tower frequency because I needed permission from the CO. Captain Prout said no. That was pretty much the end of that story.

The pilot never did tell me where he was flying out of or where he was returning. He just said he would say hello to the control tower on his way back heading south. The tower never heard from him again.

New Years 1968

New Years 1968 right after dark we go on alert. Dong Ha is reported under attack; their fuel dump has been hit and is on fire. A few hours later the all clear is passed and we stand down. Normally that is the end of these types of events. Officially it was and is the end of that event.

The following day one of our Marines junior to me asks to discuss something of a personal nature. It so happens he was on duty by himself in the control tower on New Year's Day, nothing much was happening and he was bored. He got on the direct landline we had with the control tower at Dong Ha where one of his buddies was also on duty there alone.

They had compared notes about each other's units, operations and other things Marines discuss. The Marine at Quang Tri tower commented that since we were only a few miles apart maybe we could see each other using binoculars. The distance was just a little too far.

The Marine at Dong Ha says just as soon as it is dark he would fire off a flare and surely you could see the flare. After dark he fired the flare and shortly afterwards advised that he was evacuating the control tower because they had just come under attack and the fuel farm near the tower was on fire.

My advice to our Marine at Quang Tri was "Since you could not see the flare your buddy said he fired apparently he lied to you; he didn't fire any flare. So let's just leave it at that and not talk about it anymore".

New Years 1968 no injuries reported at Dong Ha; no enemy sighted.

Hygiene -The Showers

The Sea Bees had built some showers on main side of which we took advantage of at least once a week. It was one of those types of showers where maybe 50-100 or so can shower at the same time. Get under the shower and get wet; hold that position as long as you can; get out of the way and soap down; find a shower to rinse off.

The "Gunney's Three"; Darby, LeBaron and Spivy scrounged parts here and there and built their own shower next to the control tower. A 55-gallon drum, shower head attached, mounted on the most rickety structure you ever saw. They had to haul their own water from main side to fill the drum. There was plenty of sunshine to warm that water. This was their private domain.

I suppose they got tired of hauling their own water because one night the three of them calculated, when water was controlled, how much water was required to take a shower. They opened the shower to the rest of the unit as long as each person using

the shower provided so many gallons of water. What it amounted to was whoever took a shower provided twice the amount of water necessary.

Hauling water became an extra chore most of us did not really need. Before long the "Gunney's Three" were using the main side showers with the rest of us again.

Hygiene -The Barber Shop

Ever since J.J. Carr taught me how to cut hair when we were in ATC School I always gave haircuts. He told me it would always be a good way to pick up a little money. I did pick up a few coins now and again but mostly I would charge my customers a cold beer when they ran into me at the slop chute. I suppose many of you old MATCU salts sat on my chair or 55-gallon drum for a trim now and again.

At Quang Tri it was no different. Our diesel mechanic ran a convenient electric outlet just outside the Staff NCO tent and most likely he was the one who furnished the 55-gallon drum. All hands got their needed haircuts on a fairly regular basis.

Some of the Air Operations Officers and sometimes a visiting VIP who knew me from the past would get their hair cuts when they stopped by to chat with the Skipper. Rank did not have its privileges and you took your turn. Of course Captain Prout did not wait in line. He would just ask me to give him a shout when it was his turn, same with the VIP's.

It was not always easy for the VIP's to pay with that cold beer at the slop chute. They were returning to the lovely metropolitan cities of either DaNang or Saigon. Instead, now and again, a fifth or two of whiskey would be delivered for their gratuity. Anytime the whiskey arrived it was shared amongst the Officers and SNCOs. I wasn't much for whiskey.

Hygiene -The Hot Box

It was rain, heat, or humidity. Chances were that was the weather yesterday, today, and expected tomorrow. The clothes you were wearing were at the minimum damp. Frequently you slept in your birthday suit to be just a little bit away from the dampness.

Hang fresh washed clothes on a line to dry and normally the best you got were clothes dried to a very light dampness. Even if they were dry and you put them up for a day or two the clothes were damp by the time you put them on.

Fred Spivy scrounged some plywood and made some closet like boxes with an electric light bulb inside. We would hang some relatively clean clothes in these boxes and the light bulb seemed to take some of the dampness out of the clothes.

At least for a little while after putting on these clothes you felt clean.

We were a lot better off than the grunts that might go weeks at a time with the clothes they had on their backs.

Misdirected Delivery

The airfreight pad was next to our MATCU site. There was only one airfreight forklift operator and many times our diesel mechanic would relieve him for chow.

Late one evening when our diesel mechanic was working freight he drives right into our little compound with a pallet of beer. It only took a few minutes for all hands to unload that pallet. I think there were 100 cases of beer on the pallet. There were cases of beer stored every place.

We had two working refrigerators and had cold beer for quite awhile.

We heard scuttle butt later that a helicopter squadron was having a difficult time getting some beer delivered.

Ice Water

One of our Marines visited the grunts on the perimeter one day. It just so happened our Marine had a canteen of water he had just recently taken out of the refrigerator and offered a drink to the grunt. That grunt drinking ice water thought it must be Christmas time and he was a child again.

The grunts would bring their canteens over to us during the daytime and we would chill them in the refrigerator. They always picked them up before dark. This procedure lasted for a couple of weeks until they no longer returned.

After Hours

There was always a poker game going on in the Staff NCO tent. Even poker night after night can get old. Mr. Currier and/or LT Anti would join us sometimes.

The Sergeants and Corporals had their card games in their tent and sometimes Mr. Currier would join them. The Staff NCOs and LT Anti stayed away from these games. In fact we seldom entered their tent unless invited in. Everybody needed a bit of their own space and privacy.

CWO Currier

You might say Mr. Currier was the go between. He always presented himself on equal footing with everybody and was ready to help when needed. I feel sure he was a tremendous help to Captain Prout especially dealing with Air Operations.

The Skipper

Captain Prout never joined us in a poker game. He did join us a few times in the Staff NCO tent for a cold beer and small chat. Captain Prout's socializing, if you can call it socializing that we did, was with LT Anti and Mr. Currier.

The Infantry Flying Officer

It was during day light hours and the field had VFR conditions. I was assigned GCA and enjoying some kick back time in the air conditioning. One of the Corporals was working with me. You old hands would understand this set up; for you knew hands if there were any RADAR approaches the Corporal did that work and I did the coordinating. Sergeant Varbel and a Corporal were working the control tower.

Varbel gives me a call and says they have an observation plane (OE2 was the designator I think) on frequency; the pilot is dead from ground fire and an Infantry Officer is in the back seat flying.

Varbel had a private pilot license and was current with his flying before our deployment to Quang Tri.

I told Varbel to take the frequency, keep that airplane in the air, and fly it to the nearest airport. I told him the Infantry Officer would know about where he was. I further told him that he had all the knowledge to accomplish this.

I instructed Varbel's assistant to coordinate with Air Operations and then I located Gunnery Sergeant Spivy, our tower chief, and brought him up to date on what had so far transpired.

The above is my only involvement in the actual operation except for a bit of relaying information. Spivy tells me later that he only observed because the situation was well in hand.

Varbel located the aircraft using various methods. He inquired of the pilot his last known position, used the tower Direction Finder, and used the assistance of my Corporal in the GCA RADAR unit. All during this time Varbel was instructing the Infantry Officer how to fly the airplane and where to fly the plane.

This type of airplane had a single front seat for the pilot with the controls and single back seat for an observer. The pilot was dead and slumped over the controls in the front seat. The Infantry Officer was leaning over the front seat to reach the flight controls.

Varbel and our GCA had this aircraft lined up on final approach to the runway at Quang Tri when Air Operations was given control of the frequency. After that we in Air Traffic Control just kept other aircraft out of the way.

After two or three attempted landings the Infantry Officer made a darn near perfect landing on the runway. He sat the airplane down perfectly. Apparently when he cut the power he pushed the stick forward a bit fast and the airplane sat right up on the nose destroying the propeller.

The Infantry Officer was safe and alive. The pilot was confirmed dead.

After all of these years from recollecting this story of Varbel, after all my later ATC experiences and life experiences it is beyond me as to why Varbel did not get an accommodation. Yet with further reflection, during those times we experienced so many things out of the ordinary, almost on a daily basis, that it became commonplace for one of us just to tell the other "Job Well Done" and leave it at that.

Expansion

When we first set up operations at Quang Tri the area west of Highway One was jungle. We could barely see parts of the railroad tracks a few thousand yards west of Highway One. Shortly before I was returned to Hawaii this area was sprayed and the vegetation died. The Sea Bees used their heavy equipment and pushed away the dead vegetation. I did not know at the time that the airbase was being expanded. I additionally did not know that the spray was probably Agent Orange.

I was told months later that this area was filled by a much larger hospital, some LZs for helicopters, and numerous grunts moved in.

Summary

We were so short handed setting up Quang Tri and then running ATC operations most of the days just ran together. Most days you did not know the day of the week and most times did not care. The personnel I served with on this mission were top notch; they were highly effective in their job. Everybody carried their weight and then some more. We worked together and we worked around each other when we had to. When a technician needed help there was an ATC standing beside him, regardless of rank, following his directions. The mission came first. This is what a MATCU trained for.

Monograph by Roger L. Hanebutt (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 24, 2006.

I arrived in Vietnam on December 6, 1969 and was assigned to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. I flew from Da Nang to Chu Lai on a C-130. I was a Sergeant and since I was previously qualified it did not take long to become IFR qualified for PAR finals using the TPN-8. We made approaches only to the West field's Runway 32.

In April 1970 I was assigned to work as a local controller in the smaller control tower that controlled the older SATS runway at the East field. The VFR patterns in use at the West field overlapped the patterns used by the East field, so the pattern altitudes for the West field were higher. There were two separate frequencies in use for the local controllers at both fields, so we had to coordinate quite a bit. The traffic at the East field was mostly Army UH-1 and AH-1 helicopters, but there was also a lot of transient fixed wing Army utility and observation aircraft. I don't remember using the crosswind Runway 5/23 at the North end of the Chu Lai complex.

We lived in the area that MAG-12 had abandoned. I survived the rocket attack on May 4, 1970 that hit the water tower in our living area. I had just left the hootch when the rocket hit. It destroyed the bunk of a friend, Harry S. Webster, who had also just left the hootch.

Sometime later in May I returned to duty at the radar facility.

I left Chu Lai on August 15, 1970 when MATCU-67 turned control over to the Army.

Monograph by Colonel Richard E. "Dick" Hawes USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on September 14, 2007).

I had arrived at 1stMAW in late September of 1971 and took command of MWSG-1. I was then ordered to take command of the advanced elements of Task Force Delta (after turning over the group to my XO) in late April 1972. I was relieved as advanced force commander in late May of 1972 on the arrival of BGen Andy O'Donnell. At which time I was designated Chief of Staff Task Force Delta. In late August BGen O'Donnell was relieved by BGen Taylor (his relief as Assistant Wing Commander). I only left Nam Phong in mid to late September of 1972 when I was ordered to Iwakuni to be promoted to Colonel by the Commandant who was on a Far East trip. I returned to Nam Phong the next day and remained until ordered home. I was relieved by Colonel Guy Campo.

Briefly, Delta was formed to augment the Air Force in their efforts to increase the air presence on route package one (taking the fight to the north).

MAG-15 was task organized. Besides H&MS-15 and MABS-15 it included two F-4 squadrons and one A-6 squadron (VMFA-533, VMFA-232, and VMA(AW)-115 along with a detachment of H-46's for helo support (They called themselves the "Phrog Phlyers"). A battalion of grunts also came in to augment MABS-15's security section.

A battalion of Seabees (the 6th I believe) were added for the construction of the base facilities, i.e., Southeast Asia huts, mess hall, ammo berms, plus the AM2 matting for the ramp area.

The 10,000 foot runway was already in place (with high speed taxiways, really first class). The initial construction was done by the Air Force in anticipation to using it as an F-111 base. Needless to say, this fell out of the picture due to gross problems with the F-111. So when Jack Hales flew my advance party of ten Marines two jeeps with trailers of C-rats etc, all we found was an abandoned runway with the jungle growing around it.

Two days later the Air Force arrived with their ALSE (COMM outfit) and the C-141's started arriving shortly thereafter with Seabees and MAG-15 support unit to include MATCU-62. Once the parking ramp was completed and the fuel bladders in place, the MAG-15 aircraft were flown in, and we went operational in some 30 days.

All squadrons at the Rose Garden had been through phase three training (fully combat ready), and no replacement pilots ever arrived to my knowledge. Hence, no FAM-1 flights needed to be scheduled. I remember Rose Garden Departure passed all departing aircraft to Red Crown. And, that Chu Lai was a far more active airfield (five A-4 squadrons with an average of two sorties a day per squadron). Further, the monsoon season at Chu Lai was far more pronounced than at the Garden.

In reference to the name "Rose Garden", remember the song at the time, "I never promised you a rose garden". Well, the troops once they got on the ground picked the name real fast. I can't remember many aircraft that called in "Nam Phong landing". It was always "Rose Garden Landing" or Rose Garden control...hell ...even the Air Force C-141's used it.

The only contact I had with Thai officials was a courtesy visit on the mayor of Nam Phong, (a small town some six miles from the base). I am aware that CG 1st MAW, MGen Les Brown made one or more trips to Japan to visit COMNAVFOR Japan and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. The only contact with the Air Force at Udorn was to use their secure communications for initial Sit-reps to 1st MAW, info FMFPAC. The Air Force ALSE unit had HF that I could use for unclassified data until our communications were up and running. The Air Force also provided the Aerology support.

The Air Force did all the tasking. We received the frag orders in the late evening for the next day's operations. Needless to say MAG-15 was not happy with this arrangement as the frag order often failed to arrive in time to accommodate proper loading of aircraft.

Any air base in Thailand used by a foreign nation must be designated a Royal Thai Air Force facility. The Thai base commander, (whose name slips my mind), was really a great officer and friend. His HQ was a quarter mile from Delta's HQ and his force of some two hundred troops augmented the grunts in base security. On my departure he made me an Honorary Royal Thai aviator (Wings and all).

During the early days marihuana was a big problem. The natives would deliver the bushes (four to five feet tall, root ball and all), to the troops at night. There was no base fencing, only spaced sentries. Needless to say, marihuana in this quantity was hard to conceal, and daily shake-downs led to a lot of bonfires. (We had to keep the troops from getting downwind during the burning).

Native girls also posed some concerns. They arrived almost nightly (like the mary jane) and sold their wares for almost anything the Marines would offer. On quite a few nights BGen O'Donnell and I would take a jeep (lights out) and position ourselves on the perimeter road along the living area and turn the lights on and watch the mayhem of Marines trying to run with their pants around their ankles and the naked girls running toward the jungle, with their clothes in one hand and their loot in the other.

Native theft was not a real problem. Unlike Chu Lai, there was no "people to people" program to put up with so there were none on the base. However, while MABS - 15 was laying the runway lights (at night) when they tested them, the first couple of hundred feet did not turn on. On inspection, the cable was found missing, lights and all.

Copper is money!!! The Marines followed the reel tracks (left by the runway as the lights were installed) and subsequently recovered the cable.

(Please see the letter from LtCol Jack Hales in the Stories section and articles from Bangkok's "The Voice Of The Nation" dated May 27, 1972 in the Significant Documents section for information amplifying this monograph.)

Monograph by Charles E. Henderson Master Sergeant USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 9, 2007 and edited on October 17, 2007).

I was a GySgt when I arrived at Hue Phu Bai to join MATCU-68 in April of 1967. I was initially assigned to work in the control tower with Jim Davenport. The tower was the civilian tower that had been built several years before the war started. We even had a couple of Vietnamese controllers. Traffic was steady and occasionally heavy. Helicopters were the only aircraft to work into a pattern. Air Force C-130s, C-123s, and C-47s arrived from the east for straight in approaches to Runway 27. If we could use Runway 9 for departures we would, but Runway 27 departures would make an immediate turn eastbound to avoid the terrain to the west and south. We also had Air Force O-2s and Army OV-1s.

After I was at Phu Bai for about six months I was granted R&R to Hawaii, and when I returned I was assigned to the radar approach control facility. We used the UPS-1 radar associated with the original TSQ-18. This configuration used only the two small shelters, not the larger landing control center shelter.

I had been previously approach control qualified at MCAS El Toro and had cross trained with the FAA there, so it was not long before I was qualified at Phu Bai. We provided approach control services to Khe Sanh, and Dong Ha, as well as Phu Bai, and later when Quang Tri became operational to there. It was very busy. Jake Sindt, Dick Andrzejczk (we called him "Alphabet") and I worked 12 hours on and 6 hours off for long periods of time. There was space on the console for only about 6 flight strips, so the rest would be balanced on our legs, or just written on a scratch pad. Theoretically, DaNang would pass inbound information, but it was often incorrect, so most aircraft were random radar pickups. Dan Dorn was one of the Watch Officers.

Khe Sanh was a continuing problem. We would terminate radar service with Khe Sanh arrivals when they would report passing six-thousand, and then not clear another aircraft into Khe Sanh until the previous aircraft had relayed its safe arrival. Land line communication was frequently nonexistent.

Incoming mortar bombs were frequent and during TET they arrived almost every night.

I returned to the states in May of 1968.

I was still a GySgt when I arrived at Nam Phong, Thailand in late 1972 to join MATCU-62. The airfield was already operational when I got there. This time I was assigned directly to the radar approach control facility. We still used the UPS-1 radar, but we now had the newer TSQ-18A that was configured with three shelters. Hank Flood was there, and the OIC was a Captain Hollis. Captain Hollis was a good OIC. We worked hard, but when there was time off, we also relaxed hard. Joe Walters was a GySgt engineer that kept the generators running.

Traffic at Nam Phong was not nearly as busy as Phu Bai had been. Most approaches were made to Runway 1, since the pilots did not like to land on Runway 19 because it sloped badly downhill. To start with we worked 24 hours a day 7 days a week, but later we would secure when there was no scheduled traffic.

One night a battle damaged B-52 requested vectors to a GCA final. Since we did not know what would happen to the MATCU equipment when the B-52 landed (Its wingspan exceeded the width of the runway), we notified everyone at the site to get clear. Sgt. Reucker was making the PAR final and I told him to run as soon as the B-52 crossed the threshold. The aircraft touched down near the threshold and slid to a stop short of the MATCU site. The runway was closed for quite a while until the Air Force could jack up and move the huge carcass.

Living conditions were pretty good. We lived in the usual Southeast Asia huts, but the food was exceptional, both in quality and quantity. A liberty schedule was set up and we could get to Udorn once every two or three weeks.

I stayed with MATCU-62 until it returned to Iwakuni after the POWs were released in 1973.

Monograph by LtCol Martin W. Hendrix USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on July 10, 2004 and edited on July 18, 27, and 29, 2004.)

I served in Vietnam from November of 1967 through December of 1968. I was a Staff Sergeant and my MOS was 5951. I was assigned to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai, but was sent TAD to Khe Sanh, An Hoa, and Dong Ha during my tour.

I remember Majors Sam Horton and John Behm as OICs, and MGySgt Eldon Grebe was the NCOIC. MGySgt Ray Dinnan had come down from Dong Ha and was the Maintenance Chief. The Maintenance Officers were WO Bob Stivers and Lt. Chris Reed. GCA technicians included Ernie Pruitt (ITT Gilfillan), MSgt Carl B. Lange, SSgts Wade Richardson, Bob Job, and Sgt John Schultz. Working on communications and NAVAIDS was SSgt Paul Ashe (later retired as a LtCol). GySgt Gerry Kennedy was a GCA technician, but had been assigned duty as the Supply Chief. Some of our controller's were Lt John Rush and 2nd Lt Dave Bigness. I later ran into SgtMaj Bigness at MCLB Albany Georgia, where he was the base SgtMaj.

When I got to Chu Lai Ernie Pruitt had been on "day on stay on" and was ready to leave to get some rest. Turnover was "You got it." And then I went on "day on stay on" until Wade Richardson and John Schultz came on board.

When I got to Chu Lai we were on the 10,000' concrete runway, we never switched the CPN-4 for opposite runway operations. To the best of my recollection the runway wasn't surveyed for opposite direction GCA for the CPN-4 and the revetments behind the unit were so close we couldn't have moved it if we wanted to. With the Quad it wasn't much of a problem to switch to a different approach runway, as there was a switch that slewed the antenna assembly. As I recall we could lock the azimuth antenna at 0 degrees and align the antenna on the parallel/touchdown reflector. The TPN-8 was swung manually, aligning the whole R/T assembly and antenna mount to 0 degrees with a scope.

During the monsoons the field was pretty much set to one direction. The few times it was necessary to check alignment; we had one person at the reflector with one of the battle lanterns at the reflector. The centerline reflector might be a little way out (by the perimeter wire) and we didn't check them too often. Occasionally during the heavy winds one of the reflectors would get blown down. We had them well marked so it wasn't much of a problem to put them back up. There was so much steel at Khe Sanh that we had too many reflective surfaces to align on.

Electronically there wasn't much difference between the FPN-36 and the TPN-8. The FPN-36 may have had a little better circular polarization. The FPN-36 was older radar and many of the techs and controllers were more comfortable with it. Please recall that most MATCU technicians and all controllers were FAPed (Fleet Augmentation Program) to station. They worked with the MPN-5, CPN-4, or FPN-36 on a daily basis. There were very few TPN-8s being used for GCAs at the MCASs. New River and Bogue Field were the lone exceptions for a very long time. At Iwakuni the

controllers would leave the TSQ in a moment if everything wasn't perfect. At Futenma we had to beg to get GCAs in the early 80s. Of course there had been some maintenance problems there.

The circular polarization (CP) on the CPN-4 was hand cranked over the dipole arrays when needed. Both Surveillance and GCA had MTI. I could probably still do the alignment of the MTI today if the need came up.


Early 1968 was eventful with many rocket/mortar attacks. I remember a new (really young) 2nd Lt that checked aboard the MATCU and was assigned as the Plt Commander for the First Provisional Platoon of Marine Staff NCOs. During the first rocket attack of his command, he came running from Office's County all the way down to the Staff NCO hooch area. After the first few rounds had impacted he was up out of his hole yelling for everyone to "fall in on me and muster." A gravely old voice called out of the darkness to "get back into your hole sonny" at about the same time the second salvo began impacting. The Lt quickly learned the value of listening and learning from the Staff NCOs.

In February of 1968 John Schultz and I "volunteered" (WO Stivers was very convincing) to accompany a replacement TPN-8 to Khe Sanh. We had sent other TPN-8 weeks earlier, but it couldn't be located. When we got to Khe Sanh the Crew Chief on the C-130 literally threw us off the aircraft. The TPN-8 was slid off the ramp onto waiting forklifts and the aircraft quickly departed. We found holes next to the off-load area and waited for the shelling, that closely followed all arrivals, to stop. We could see the MATCU compound next to the airfreight ramp and as we walked to the compound, stumbled across the first TPN-8, still in the supply area. We got one of the radar units up and working, but we were very surprised by the amount of ordnance tape it took to cover the shrapnel holes in the radar antennas. Joe Eschelman was the resident GCA tech for Khe Sanh at that time.

John and I were at Khe Sanh on February 9th when the Marine C-130 was hit while on approach to the runway. The C-130 did a tight circle to land opposite direction on the runway. It erupted in flames as it touched down. The pilot, CWO Wildfang, did a remarkable job of flying to get the burning aircraft off of the runway and keep it open. We also saw the Air Force C-130 hit by incoming while it was stopped in the airfreight area to drop off troops. It was later repaired and flown out of Khe Sanh.



The photo titled "Flight out of Khe Sanh 1968" is probably one of the best photographs I've ever taken. We had just lifted out of Khe Sanh and everyone was breathing again. The Marine across from me on the C-130 lit up. You can see a faraway look in his eyes; he had been there for a long time. It wasn't until about two years ago that I found and read the declassified reports on Khe Sanh. When I was there, I didn't know how bad it really was or the risks of the flight in and out.



The "Khe Sanh Bunker 1968" was our sleeping bunker. The roof of the bunker was about 14 - 16 feet below ground. One evening there was an ARC Light off to the west; we could feel the rumble of the bombs through the ground.

It is all a long time ago, but one never forgets the sounds and especially the smells.

Carl Lange and I were having dinner at the mess hall at Chu Lai on the evening of 8 May 1968. We heard rounds impacting in the direction of the unit and quickly exited the mess hall and started back to the hooch area. We reached the hoochs at the same time that Bob Job came racing in with a 6X6. Bob quickly filled us in on what was going on as we headed back to the MATCU. When we arrived we had to work in and around the wreckage of the TSQ-18 to get landline comms reconnected to a backup switchboard that we had earlier installed in the CPN-4.

As each landline was rung up someone on the other end would ask about what had happened. There wasn't time for explanations as we re-established some semblance of ATC services. ATC services were back in fairly short order. The GCA scopes and limited radios of the CPN-4 were not adequate for the high tempo of operations at Chu Lai. Over the next two days 55-gallon drums, steel "I" beams, sweat, and ingenuity created a four scope and multiple UHF/VHF radio control facility. Two TSN-1 operations shelters were butted up against the CPN-4; it wasn't pretty but it worked until we received the replacement TSQ-18. We found some very encouraging words from the folks at NAVELEX Vallejo written inside the TSQ-18 when it arrived.

Many Marines were injured in the attack, Corporal James "Kiwi" Lott, from New Zealand, was killed as he sat in the surveillance shelter. John Call was severely wounded in the left arm as he was working approach in the LCC (Landing Control Central). Lt Rush's calmness and quick life saving actions were instrumental in limiting the MATCU to a single casualty. The destruction of the TSQ was total, but our losses could have been much worse.

Many months earlier the TPN-8 slave monitor from the left side position in the GCA shelter was replaced with a FPN-36 Monitor. When the round hit the GCA shelter the larger, taller, monitor took the brunt of the blast that was focused into the LCC. We found pieces of the GCA shelter 50 - 75 yards away from the TSQ. The LCC looked like a paper bag that had been hit from each end, but didn't come apart. Every monitor in the TSQ had imploded from the blast. The Surveillance shelter had hundreds of holes on the side of the shelter towards the blast. In a bit of irony we were asked to salvage as much as possible from the TSQ; there wasn't much left to salvage.

The OIC had been requesting revetments for months. The MATCU was so far down on the priority list that it seemed like we would never get them. After we lost the TSQ and almost one entire ATC crew, revetments for the MATCU became a critical item. When the new TSQ showed up we needed a crane to lift the boxes up over the walls of Fort Blip.

June of 1968 was a busy month. I first went to An Hoa to work on the TRN-14 TACAN that was having problems there. Later in the month I was sent to Dong Ha to find and recover the azimuth antenna assembly from a FPN-36 located at MATCU-62. Air Freight had a hard time believing the code 999 orders for transportation that I carried when it was time to leave. I returned to the MATCU and got help from the OIC (Captain Preston Haynes I believe). The Capt. provided encouragement to the Air Freight folks

that the orders were in fact genuine. As I recall he said something about "the Marine close air support we get up here comes from Chu Lai. If we want that air support, this part has to get back to Chu Lai." LtCol Haynes would later promote me to the rank of Captain at MATCS-38, Tustin, in 1981.

Has anyone mentioned the Great Rat Hunt on the day the bunkers were torn down so that we could take them back from the rats? There were two things were huge in Viet Nam, the rats and the cockroaches. Well three, if you count the snake that came out and crossed the pad one day during the heavy rains.

For a time we had a Navy controller attached to the MATCU. One of the rocket attacks landed a round in the MAG-12 bomb dump. The resulting explosion broke the nylon bolts that held the TPN-8 radomes together and blew out most of the windows in the tower. Most of the tower crew evacuated down the stairs, but not the sailor; He took the slide for life rope that was tied to the back of the tower. He was on the ground first but his hands were burned and shredded at the end of the trip.

I left Viet Nam in December 1968, but I still have vivid memories of what was experienced there. The experiences of Viet Nam were later used while serving at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-nine Palms while assigned to the MATCS-18 Detachment at the Expeditionary Air Field.

Monograph by Steven R. Hulland, Captain USMC (Ret.) (Combined from E-Mails on February 2, 2004)

I arrived at Phu Bai during late September or early October 1968 - well after Tet and all that went with the celebration. I was but a Sgt., new to the field when stationed with the MATCU-68 at Phu Bai. I had reenlisted for ATC in 67, A school then GCA school in late 67 and early 68. Tustin in late spring of 68 (spent 3 months at NAS Lemoore), Futenma in August, then Top "Dad" Whitely honored my request to go to VN with the next draft.

The operation of the unit was a mystery best left to the SNCOs and Zeros who had much more experience than I. Of course my previous 4+ years as a grunt did cause me to question having someone like Sgt. George Ingraham teach our techs and controllers about the M-60 machinegun or any other "grunt" thing. Good thing we never had to use them while there. Ski, Danny W., G. Ingraham, a Cpl. Toby, LCpl Randall, Sgt Adamski (diesel mech), GySgt Charlie Jones, Capt. Gabriel, WO Joanley (sp), Lt. Goodale, and many others were there. Skip Redpath was at MMAF. WO Phil Grazanich (sp) arrived during the spring of 69'; Joe Lawler (sp) was there too. We worked GCAs within the TSQ-18 complex. UPS - 1 for long-range stuff, TPN 8 for PAR, plus Tacan and all the other stuff. Oh, a LCpl or Capt. Pete Cullum (cannot remember) was also there.

My main function was GCA. The Air Force had Phu Bai Approach, located about a hundred yards west of our site if I remember correctly. We were between the ramp and the old French Tower. Marines ran the tower. I think there were one or two Vietnamese controllers who worked when they needed to (especially when talking SVAF aircraft). Several members worked part-time as Helicopter Gunners with the MAG. Some Gunny arrived and "bumped" one of our controllers from his flight one day. The 46 then crashed in the S. China Sea with the loss of everyone. After that our folks could not fly as gunners. By the fall of 68 Phu Bai was a very tame place. I believe we received rocket attacks about three times during the remainder of 69 and first six or seven months of 70. I did get to ride to and from DaNang a few times on road convoys to get parts, etc. Those trips could be mildly exciting what with the road through the Hi Bien Pass between Da Nang and the coastal plains east of the airfield. We had a detachment in An Hoa that several folks got to visit from time to time. It was much more exciting, but not any way near the amount of traffic that Phu Bai had. Phu Bai's single 5,000' runway often surpassed 1200 ops per day - mostly daylight traffic with a good mix of fixed wing and rotor wing. Wide ranges of aircraft types were represented. C-130, C-133, C-124, DC 4 & 6, OV-1, OV-10, O-2, O-1, CH-47, H-34, H-46, H-53, H-1, Porters, DC 2's & 3's, C-117, C-47, LOHs, H-64s, made up the bulk of the traffic. An occasional A-4 and other jets would take the gear when they had some type problem and needed to divert or land quickly. I was very new to the field, so the first few months were spent trying to learn and become proficient with the gear as well as with my ATC duties. Do not remember much about the make-up of the unit, etc. But I did learn a great deal about MATCU's and Marine expeditionary ATC while I was there. It is hard to believe that I left that wonderful spot 34 years and three months ago. Amazing that I can remember anybody who was there

Monograph by Roger Irons (Combined from emails and telephone conversation notes on February 5, 2004)

I was assigned to the MATCU-62 detachment at Khe Sanh upon arrival in country in February of 1968. 1stLt Daniel Chase was the OIC. I served as a GCA controller at Khe Sanh until April of 1968 when I returned to Dong Ha. Captain Puskar was the OIC. I served at Dong Ha until March of 1969.

I remember a Captain Sam Davis replacing Captain Puskar as OIC. Richard D'Ambrosio was also there as a Captain. Rick Rasmussen was a tower operator at both Khe Sanh and Dong Ha.

Monograph by Jimmie E. "Jim" Janke Captain USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from emails on February 17, 2004)

First off I was assigned to MATCU-66 at Atsugi. Around Oct. of 1964. Roger Macintosh was there working at the Navy GCA unit. I was sent to Iwakuni around March of 1965 along with Al Hartkopf and Bill Harvill to be briefed by Capt Quagliotti who was the OIC of MATCU-67. I was a CWO-2 at the time.

We got our shots and off to the RVN. Arrived at Da Nang, drew ammo and was transported by 5 or 6 choppers to the beach at Chu Lai. They dropped us off a mile from nowhere. Capt. Q. never made it in country because of medical problems I believe. I think we got there about the 5th of April but I'm not sure of that. I do remember that a lot of our troops helped unload the LST with only a couple of forklifts and a six-by.

Initially at Chu Lai we set up a portable tower and worked at getting the equipment set up. We had a problem with getting a hardened site as dirt was at a premium for runway construction. We had TPN-8s and TSQ-18, UPS-1 and I'm not sure about the TACAN.

All of the MATCU-66 controllers were sent to Iwakuni to replace the MATCU-67 controllers that were working at the Air Station and had been pulled to go with the Unit:

The OIC at Chu Lai was a Capt Harvin I believe. Both he and Bill Harvill were NAs.

My tour was up in June of 65 and when I left we only had 5,000 feet of aluminum matting with Morest equipment and one squadron maybe two of A-4's.

MATCU-67 provided a lot of labor to the MABS for working parties getting the area ready for the aircraft squadron's arrival and we also provided some of the perimeter security for the MABS.

As I remember it, Van Lafoon was sitting in the TSQ one night before we were operational and 4 F-100's were high in the stack waiting to get into Da Nang and he came up on guard channel and let them know that we were down there and had 5000 feet of runway. As I recall 1 ran out of fuel on the way down, 2 landed and turned around on the runway and the last one landed and passed the other 2 going the opposite direction on a runway that was only 100 foot wide. I remember the Air Force sent some sort of bird the next morning to pick up the pilots and the OIC was going to write VAN up for an award. I know Da Nang was socked in that night and they were having trouble with aircraft getting low on fuel.

I came back to the States in July 1965, spent 2 yrs at MCAS Beaufort, and then I was sent to NAS Willow Grove PA as OIC MATCU-73. I requested orders back to NAM late 1968. I spent 6 weeks of refresher training at MCAS Beaufort before going back over.

I arrived in Da Nang in Jan. 1969, stopped at Wing Headquarters and was promoted to Captain by my old CO who was the WingAdminO.

I was sent to Quang Tri. When I arrived I think Maj. Causey was the OIC followed by Maj. Bo Braswell. Top Bathe was the NCOIC. When I got there we had about 100 personnel and at the end probably less than 10 as the CG was sending them where he wanted to.

I don't remember when I went to Dong Ha but it was probably around July. There were only about 6 people up there, as they were not being replaced as they left. The only aircraft were a couple of Army O-1's and an occasional C-123.

We suffered a typhoon that wiped out our living area that consisted of 18 SEA huts, only 2 being repairable. I received a nice call from Div C/S informing me that the General would like to see our area cleaned up. I gave everything I could to an Army S/Sgt. running a refugee camp on the Cau Viet River.

I was then told to proceed to Chu Lai to coordinate with MAG-13 to ready them for our arrival. I think this was in Oct. or Nov. Before I could return to Dong Ha they had received word to pack up, and the equipment was on its way.

I don't know what happened to Maj. Braswell but I became the OIC of MATCU-62 and there was no longer a 62A. We had 2 complete sets of equipment, 1 tech, 3 Lt's and maybe a couple of controllers that were sent to MATCU-67.

MAG 13 assumed our spare parts and admin support. Needless to say I got my butt in a crack when I reported 62 as not combat ready while in a combat zone. I had to make a little trip to Da Nang with the Group S-3 Officer.

While at Dong Ha we were supported by MAG 36 out of Phu Bai and ProvMag 39 never had a MABS.

There must have been a CPN-4 at Dong Ha at one time as I received a letter from NAVELEXSYSCOM requesting the whereabouts of the prime mover for CPN-4 xxxx. I found paperwork indicating that it had been shipped to CONUS at least a year or more before. They finally found the prime mover in Da Nang in the custody of a civilian contractor painted a different color.

My tour ended in Jan 70 and I returned to MCAS Beaufort.

Monograph by MGySgt Charles B. "Charlie" Jones USMC (Ret.)
(Compiled from telephone conversation notes on June 14, 2004 and edited on June 21, 2004, and June 25, 2004.)

I served in South Vietnam at Phu Bai with MATCU-68 from April 1968 until May of 1969. I was a Gunnery Sergeant radar technician with a 5951 MOS.

I remember Joe Lollar as the MATCU NCOIC and Willie Beach was the Maintenance NCO. Billy Gabriel was the Maintenance Officer. Both 1st Lt Dan Dorn and 1st Lt Phil Grazanich were there as Watch Officers. Technicians that were there are Tim Cox, Gary Clark, and Carl Buehl. Frank Poole left his retirement job with the Ski Patrol at Aspen, Colorado and volunteered for active duty in Vietnam. He kept us entertained with his stories about the Kennedy clan's skiing. Controllers that I remember are Skip Redpath, and Steve Hulland.

The MATCU was short on personnel most of the time I was there. It was unusual for a Gunnery Sergeant to be a watch stander but SSgt Tim Cox and I were on a port and starboard schedule keeping the TPN-8s. Later on SSgt Gary Clark came on and was a watch stander at Phu Bai for a while then he went to Marble Mountain as the radar tech there. I don't think we had a UPS-1. Perhaps we were receiving our handoffs from DaNang and used the search function of the TPN-8s and then the precision function to land them.

The living conditions were expeditionary standard primitive. The SNCOs lived in hootches and the rest of the enlisted men lived in larger barracks. I only saw a flush commode when I went to DaNang.

We had one radar dome for the two TPN-8s, so one of the TPN-8s was not sheltered. It was just as well, when it rained heavily the radar dome rapidly absorbed water and after only a short time the radar signal could not penetrate the dome. We acquired some clear silicone sealant and tried to seal the surface of the dome. A boatswain's chair was rigged and attached to a block and tackle. I don't remember the name of the Marine who volunteered to be hoisted to the top of the dome, but soon after he reached the top the block and tackle let go and he fell. He was so proud of the fact that he landed on his feet, and was looking around for approval when the block and tackle hit him on the head. He collapsed and blood from a nasty cut on his head soaked into the sand. Since I was in charge of this effort I was sure I was in trouble, but he was OK with only a cut head.

The silicone we acquired did seal the dome's fiberglass. That did the trick, keeping the water from being absorbed into the dome's fiberglass. Range was restored to normal with only the rain clutter to deal with after the dome being sealed.

Monograph by LtCol. John F. "Jack" Keane USMC (Ret.). (Combined from emails on October 26, 2003 and Edited on December 24, 2003, February 14, 2004, February 24, 2004, and February 27, 2004).

I was transferred from MATCU-65, MCAS Yuma Az. during June 1965. My family resided in Tustin, CA. while I proceeded to WestPac via Travis AFB. I stayed with MSGT Don Badger while in San Francisco, and he delivered me to Travis. Don had been transferred from Yuma to Alameda.

After arriving in Japan at Tachikawa I proceeded along with several others to Atsugi Naval Air Station. I thought that I was headed to Iwakuni to be the OIC of MATCU-60. I met Captain John Solan, a fellow MATCU-65 officer, at breakfast, and he informed me that I was going "in country" to Vietnam to be the OIC of MATCU-67. Not only was this startling news to me, but I also was uniform unprepared. My luggage contained Summer Service Charlie, not Utilities. The uniforms that I would need in Vietnam were in a foot locker in transit.

I arrived in Iwakuni late Friday afternoon and was informed at Air Freight that I was manifested on a C-130 to Danang the following morning. Knowing that tent life in Danang would be no match for BOQ living in Iwakuni, I requested a weekend reprieve. My flight to Danang was rescheduled for 0800 Monday morning.

The trip to Danang on a VMGR-152, C-130 was typical of a long flight on a C-130; Red canvas seats along the sides, and down the middle. Every seat was filled. The A/C Commander and the loadmaster experienced great difficulty resolving the manifest with the passengers. We went through the name drill "get on board" several times. We re-experienced the drill attempting to reload after refueling on Okinawa. Nobody seemed to know anything other than we were a fully loaded C-130 headed for Danang, Vietnam. We stopped to refuel again at Cubi Point.

At Cubi I ran into a crew from VMGR-352 from El Toro. I knew several members of the crew and they gave me my first "scoop" on Vietnam. We left Cubi and flew to Danang, arriving there sometime in the early evening. As we were taxiing to Marine Air Freight you could hear all kinds of artillery and small arms fire. We deplaned, were driven to Wing headquarters, checked in and told to find a rack wherever we could. Wg Hq was a small tent compound located next to some French BOQ's.

I was told where the club was (such as it was) where I met some friendly faces giving me the new guy "Ha, Ha". It isn't just enlisted men who do this. Officers enjoy giving each other the "if I had that long to do I would hang myself" routine. At any rate somebody was TAD and I got to use his bunk. The Marine Corps was pretty small in those days (end strength about 170,000), so after you had been in for a couple of tours your network of friends and acquaintances was pretty good. I knew most of the guys who were in the TACC and the OIC was Major Jack Dubois who I had worked for in MATCU-60 in 1959. He is a justifiable legend in Marine Air Traffic Control circles.

The following day I was standing around outside Wg HQ in the Uniform of the Day, Tropical Worsted. Col Brown the wing G3, came out and said something like "Captain what the hell are you doing standing around in the hot sun in the Uniform of the Day". Before I could finish my tale of woe he directed his driver to take me to Cash Sales and get me properly outfitted. Within the hour I was a fully outfitted field Marine. I signed the supply form authorizing the disbursing officer to withdraw the cost from my pay, and was then transported to Marine Air Freight awaiting a flight of opportunity to Chu Lai, RVN. While awaiting a flight to Chu Lai, I ran into a W2 Enrique Mauri who had been the assistant DISBO at Yuma, and was now the DISBO for the 4th Marines at Chu Lai. He filled me in as much as he could on the situation at Chu Lai.

My flight to Chu Lai was on a C117 "Gooney Bird" or "Hummer" as they were referred too. I arrived at Chu Lai in the evening during daylight hours and got my first look at an expeditionary airfield. This was not SATS 29 Palms, CA. The following morning I reported into MAG-12, then to MABS-12 and eventually was delivered to MATCU-67 as the new OIC.

MAG-12 deployed from Iwakuni without an organic MATCU. En route to Chu Lai, the MAG picked up MATCU-67 from Futenma, Okinawa. The basic cadres were helicopter controllers, augmented from MATCU-60. It became evident quickly that the primitive field environment at Chu Lai was not to many folks liking. Two pilots from MAG-12 had been assigned to MATCU-67 and were functioning as co-OICs. They were soon to rotate back to the states, and after some discussion agreed that it was perhaps best that I assume responsibility for the unit. MATCU-67 at that time had not been fully assimilated into MAG-12, and there was a perception among some members that they were an attached unit and not an organic unit. That changed quickly. I was a member of MABS-12 and by default so were they.

We had a sick UPS-1. We followed every procedure known to man to fix that thing and even with priority 1 couldn't get the spare parts. We had a ream of paper with letters and requisitions to no avail. General Krulak was coming to visit and wanted to know the status of the UPS-1. I was summoned before the Group Commander to brief the situation on the UPS-1. I previously mentioned that MAG-12 thought that we were more of a hindrance than a help since they thought that the cool way to go was kick the tire, light the fire and zoom off into the wild blue a la Pappy Boyington. Moments into my briefing I was advised that this is what you will tell the General. "We are on top of it, having our best supply people working on it, and it has not impaired accomplishment of the mission. As a young Captain auditioning for Major, I gave the requisite "Yes Sir". When I returned to the unit, (our CP) was a non-strong backed GP tent in VC sand, I was asked, "Captain, how did it go". When I related what had transpired, the response was less than enthusiastic. The word filtered down to the troops quickly and the feedback was "Captain, you have to tell the General that the UPS is down". Lt Loudermilk and I conferred and I decided that I would advise the General on the true condition of the UPS-1.

The unit area was one huge beach. Although LT. Loudermilk and I were of average height we decided that we would set an area outside of the CP where we would stand so that we were at the same approximate eye level as Lt. General Krulak. The General and Colonel arrived in our area, introductions were made, and the General asked the status of the UPS-1. I responded that the UPS-1 was down. The Group CO was not happy. He attempted to do damage control but General Krulak informed him that he was interested in hearing my reply. I explained the situation in detail. The General thanked me and left. I had not enhanced my position with the Group Commander, but the troops were satisfied that I had briefed the General truthfully as to the status of the UPS-1.

Sometime later Richard Nixon paid a visit to Chu Lai. Proceeding down the runway, he must have indicated that he wanted to visit us. The jeep pulled into the area and as soon as the Group CO saw me exit my tent to greet them he did a 180 and back taxied out of there with Nixon hanging half way out of the jeep. It was a funny sight. Gunny Goe and I had a good laugh.

MAG-36

In the early days of our deployment to Vietnam, Group Commanders of detached groups like MAG-12 and MAG-36 were autonomous. MAG 36 did not have an organic MATCU. Having a group of helicopters flying in close proximity to high performance aircraft without being under air control was an accident waiting to happen. After several near misses, the two Group Commanders discussed the situation and concluded that it was in the best interest of all concerned that all aircraft operating in the Chu Lai control zone would be under positive air control. MAG-36 aircraft then took great pain to avoid the airfield, and when operating in the immediate vicinity would not cross the projection of the runway above 50 feet. Col Brown the new MAG12 Group CO was a convincing proponent of his position.

MABS-12

The original CO of MABS-12 was a Lt. Col named Al Wilson. He was nicknamed "the rifleman". He was tall, lean, handsome and polished. He took a liking to me, and didn't interfere with the management of MATCU-67. His replacement was a Major John Parchen. One of the genuinely smartest officers I have met. He rates right up there with Adm. Stansfield Turner. After we were attacked by sappers one night in October '65, the Group solicited suggestions on how we could upgrade our defenses. The area between the duty and the parallel taxiway and in between the cross taxiways was a series of pits. These were a result of raising the runway/taxiway and using the sand between them as part of the buildup. During the monsoon these pits filled with water. (The water table was only about 2" deep anyway. Maj Parchen's suggestion was to populate them with alligators and advertise it to the VC.

Sapper Attack 27/28 October 1965.

I had just gone to bed, and my head had no sooner hit the pillow, when pandemonium hit. Sirens awailing, I was out of bed like a shot, redressed quickly, grabbed my pistol and web belt and was off to MATCU-67. I had probably a mile to go, and I got my first realization of tracers. We saw a few tracer rounds during live fire demonstrations at Quantico, but they were just demonstrations. If tracers are every fifth bullet then there were a lot of bullets flying that I couldn't see, and they were all outbound toward the MATCU/CRASH CREW side of the runway. When I arrived at the site most of the folks were already there, and the general mood was one of excitement and confusion. We didn't have an appreciation for the situation other than airplanes were on fire on the flight line. We manned a defensive position west of the unit and then waited. The sappers entered the area between Crash crew and us (Closer to Crash Crew). Some got through to the flight line and were satchel charging A4's. Some were not as fortunate and took their last breath short of the runway. The successful sappers met their demise at the revetment area.

The interesting part is that Col Brown would not let indigenous personnel into our camp. RMK the huge conglomerate contractor building the concrete runway west of the SATS strip, was also rebuilding the MSR (main supply route) that ran from somewhere out at Tam Ky through us to MAG-36 and the Fourth Marines. RMK used indigenous labor and as soon as they got to the middle of our camp, the CO said that we are going to get attacked. Sure enough they got to the middle of the camp, quit for the day and that night pulled a sapper attack. Marble Mountain (MAG-16) also got hit so it was a coordinated event.

MATCU-67

Two of our hot controllers were Van LaFoon and Von Hemel. I remember Joe Medico and Joe Nemeti. I don't remember the first NCOIC, but I do remember GySgt Walker Goe arriving and assuming the position. Gy Goe was a go-getter. He and that job were made for each other. Lt Larry Loudermilk was the Maintenance Officer. He was from Hickory North Carolina and a graduate of Georgia Tech. He was a worker, and a great person to have around.

Equipment wise we started with two TPN-8s and an UPS-1 that operated at reduced power. It had a drum problem that I never did understand and we couldn't fix it or get a replacement part for it. We tried to no avail. The TPN- 8's did not have shelters originally and because of the heat and moisture and monsoon the cables would corrode almost overnight so there operational status was marginal at best. Our tempo of operations was heavy and marginal GCA equipment and radar coverage was not helping our reputation. I made the case for a CPN-4 and I think we got the one from Yuma. We had two TRN-14 TACANs and they were a godsend. You could always tell when they went off the air because phones from Air ops and the Group 3 would start chirping. Actually they were the most reliable pieces of equipment that we had. Our biggest problem was UHF radios. We had a hard time getting parts and were unofficially cannibalizing to keep us on the air. The weather took a heavy toll on both

personnel and equipment. One thing I have always marveled at was that Marines can do some fantastic things when left alone to figure out the problem and take corrective action.

Our diesel mech was Sgt Tony Feldes of MATCU-65 in Yuma. Not a parade field Marine, but an extremely hard worker who could make diesels hum. He didn't consider me his best friend, because of my penchant for A. J. Squaredaways, and as a diesel mech that was not one of his strong suits. I fully appreciated his efforts and in hindsight should have been a lot more understanding. Sgt Feldes is a good Marine and fully earned his stripes. He had a Corporal working for him in the diesel section whose mechanical abilities grew in leaps and bounds because of Tony Feldes.

In '65 '66 we were it for MATCUs. Early in '66 MATCU-62 came in country. I think that they were at Dong HA. Don Feilen was with them. We did not have any official contact with them. We did not provide Air Traffic Control for MAG-36 at Ky Ha. They would only check in with us if they thought they might interfere with Chu Lai air ops.

I don't remember whether it was MACS-4 or MACS-7 at KY HA (LtCol Charlie Westcott was the CO. I was his XO about five years later. He was a champ.) We had a GCI/GCA coordination agreement with them that was productive. Previous to that we occasionally interfaced with the Air Force at Monkey Mountain. I met in Saigon with their version of the FAA and negotiated a five-mile control zone and arrival and departure routes as well as a tear drop letdown procedure. We then wrote all of the ATC rules and became a functioning Marine Air Control operation. We had five squadrons on an 8000' runway. Our tempo of operations was hot to say the least.

The GCI/GCA agreement did not include them (MAG-36) per se. However when the monsoon hit and the weather turned to soup, any radar assistance whatever was welcome. Nothing gets people on board quicker than bad weather and other sticky situations.

When I came on board the weather was hot and clear. The only visibility interference was the dust being raised by the Seabee grading equipment. We designed the control zone; the traffic patterns, SID's and a teardrop approach for both the north and south approaches. I got to go to Saigon to liaise with their FAA type out at Tan Son Nhut airbase. There was only one airway going from Danang to Saigon. It was wide-open territory and anything we did was not going to interfere with that. We did not have any communications with Saigon. We were able on occasion to talk to the Air Force at Monkey Mountain, but they were as parochial as we were. We don't need you and you don't need us.

The daily frag was our flight schedule. It was only a guide. If the grunts called for air and they usually did at the first sign of a firefight, they got it. The Air Force HQ in Saigon wanted to control all the air assets in Vietnam. IMAF informed them that Marine air was a dedicated resource for Marines, and that their application and scheduling would be controlled by IMAF Marines. If any sorties were left over they would be

allocated to the Air Force. This actually worked out quite well. Night missions were usually TPQ. Col Brown the Group Commander, as well as everyone else in MAG-12, was a staunch believer that the mission of Marine air was to support the ground Marines, and we did it.

Local training for Approach Controllers was OJT coming up to speed. I have a deep and abiding respect for those folks. You can't learn to do that. You must have the innate ability to picture what your world looks like and how all of the constantly moving parts fit together. I loved the business, but I don't have the ability to be a Marine Approach Controller. One guys name keeps coming to mind. A GySgt named Wahl. His approach control partner and mentor was GySgt Lofton, a tall thin marvelous person, a genuinely nice guy and unflappable. They were the epitome of professionalism. You knew that there would be no screw-ups on their watch.

Names popping into memory are John O'Hey, Joe Vopelak, Van Orden, and Tom Shaeffer. Joe Vopelak was just steady, steady, steady. In 1959 fresh out of The ATCO course at Olathe, Kansas, I reported in to MATCU-60 as a first tour ATC officer. My memory of John O'Hey was me sitting in the CPN4 with him sitting in the TSA-11 and going over RT until I had it right. He was a hot shot sergeant at the time, and justifiably regarded as a hotshot controller. He had a lot of personality and was a born leader. I remember duty nights in Iwakuni with Joe Vopelak when we were in that Iwakuni crud soup. It was CLAVU to Joe. Soup, emergencies, whatever he was just steady Joe. Felix Neibel was the Maint chief in MATCU-60. The CPN-4 was his and he let the controllers use it. Nobody got in his way or on his bad side. It wasn't healthy.

Names that ring a bell:

Major Jim Bacon: a solid performer.

MGySgt Don Badger: more Marine in this fireplug than the law allows. A leader among men. Now serving as Ops Chief, Marine Barracks Heaven

MGySgt Matt Brill: quiet, gentlemanly, a solid performer.

MSgt J.J. Carr: Very impressive. A top flight Marine as a Sergeant. He had great potential and obviously rose to his potential.

Davy Crocker: The kind of guy that you want to have around when the going gets sticky.

J. J. Dargan: This guy is pure gold. I liked being around him. You knew when he was there that everything would work out okay.

GySgt Grice: I think that he is now Sgt of the Guard at Marine Barracks Heaven. He will do a good job there also.

GySgt Medico: Joe is a no BS guy. He is a hard working, straight shooter, and expects the same from you. The kind of person who puts backbone in an organization.

Rudy Nebel: A wonderful man, Had a smile that would melt an iceberg. Presently serving as Ops Officer Marine Barracks Heaven.

MSgt Gene Nebelung: Memory is faint, but positive. A solid performer.

John O'Hey: a dynamic Marine. A leader and exceptional controller. Presently attached to Marine Barracks Heaven.

Maj. Mike Smith: Quiet poise, reliable Marine, had great potential. I am glad to see that he rose to the rank of Major before he retired.

GySgt Bob Sopko: An absolute whirlwind. You had to hold on to him real tight, because he would be out in front in a heartbeat. He had so much energy. Great Marine.

MSgt Robert Stepp. Absolutely reliable. When he had the watch, you could relax a little. If it got really sticky he was at his best.

Richard Szuba: He is Davy Crocker's twin brother.

MSgt Tkaczyk: Super Technician. Quiet and unassuming he just went about his business in a highly professional manner. One of the guys that you count on and are damn glad that he is aboard.

Don Feilen: Steady performer.

MSgt Lowell Hawbaker: Snuffy was no snuffy. He was as good a tech as you can get. A Leader of men. Another one of those backbone guys who quietly make an organization better because they are there.

MSgt John Jaskolka: Felix Kneibel's supernumerary. Every bit as good as Felix, but with personality.

John Moskop: An addition to any organization.

Joe Nemeti: What's not to like. He could do whatever you asked of him and come up smiling.

Van Orden: A fine Marine. Steady and reliable controller. He was a welcome addition to any organization. I liked having him on board.

I have missed a lot of great Marines. I do not mean to leave them out, nor leave the impression that their performance was under the radar screen. It has been almost 40 years since I have been out of ATC, so I beg the indulgence of anyone that I missed.

My memory of my MATCU days is one that I proudly relish. I served with the cream of the crop, and was taught and nurtured by people who really wanted me to grow. It was pure circumstance that I got to be the OIC of MATCU-67. I am glad that I had the opportunity to serve with the Marines that I did, and only wish that I could have done it better because they certainly deserved it.

Chu Lai

The SATS strip at Chu Lai was 8000' of SATS matting laid over laterite that is a red clay material that was locally available in abundance. When the monsoon came we found out that it made excellent gooey mud. At any rate the Seabees were building the runway and grading the surrounding area. We had a problem with our edge of scan markers and asked the Seabees for help. They graded the area aside of the runway to tabletop flat. No more problems with the scan limits. The laterite foundation for the runway could not take the constant pounding of the A-4's and our tempo of operations was heavy. The Seabees resorted to rebuilding the runway in 4000' increments. While one half of the runway was torn up the A-4's used JATO bottles to get airborne. Of course they were launching immediately in front of our area, so we had the noise and the smell. JATO really stinks.

Outside of the "ready tent", we had a real live honest to goodness Lyster bag hanging from a tripod made of tent poles. The hotter the weather got, the colder the water got. What a fantastic invention.

In my office we had a radio so that we could hear the tower transmissions. It was a way of keeping abreast of the tempo of operations. On one occasion we were receiving calls from a helicopter claiming that he was approaching from the south with a Code 4 on board. We knew from the call sign that it was a Marine helo and the only code four we had was Lt. Gen Lew Walt the First Marine Amphibious Force (IMAF) commander. When the tower got a visual on the aircraft it was approaching from the north. The pilot was given clearance to land on the north cross taxiway short of the parallel taxiway. The pilot landed at the intersection of the cross and parallel taxiways effectively denying egress from the flight line or access to the hot refueling area. He was advised of our traffic problem and directed to lift and reposition himself on the cross taxiway so as not to impede taxiing aircraft. The aircraft didn't respond and Gen Walt came on the air, identified himself, and complained about being inconvenienced and requested Col. Brown's immediate presence. The tower controller was naturally reluctant to challenge the Commanding General. Fortunately GySgt Goe and I had been listening to this exchange and immediately started transcribing the tape. It was delivered to Col Brown post haste with a personal briefing from me. He reviewed the transcript, hopped into an A-4, flew to Danang, and presented the evidence to Gen Walt. We never heard another word, and from that day forward knew that we were MAG 12's MATCU.

John Archibold, killed in Vietnam in 1969, was the Base OPs officer.

Aircraft were not kept on a hot pad. There wasn't any room. . . Runway lighting in my recollection wasn't a big problem. The biggest problem was having enough runway to launch and recover. There was a carrier deck mentality with launches and arrestments. That wasn't the intention but it frequently worked out that way. The ATC folks really earned their money. Crash crew was absolutely professional. They had a W1 named Rexroad as the Crash Crew officer. He knew his stuff, and trained his people well. We had an Air Force C-130 crash west of the runway, and south of the site. The plane was a ball of fire. Rexroad without any hesitation attempted to enter the aircraft and extricate the crew. The fire was so intense that he just couldn't do it. Weather was pretty easy. It was either CLAVU or monsoon. No LA smog. Fearless Fred Lacey was the weather guesser. I don't remember what the watch schedule was. We were probably up and operating from 0600 to 2200 or midnight. We did not operate around the clock. In fact the office poguees like me worked a normal day. After awhile Sunday was a semi holiday routine.

I really enjoyed my time in MATCU's. I always thought that we did important work, and our troops were people that you could be proud of. I left at the end of May/first of June 1966 and was relieved by a Capt Jack Parker a Naval Aviator with ATC training. The reference to having been an OIC of a previous MATCU strikes a chord. He took the job on the proviso that it was a temporary assignment until a 6720 Captain came aboard. He was assigned to an A-4 squadron and naturally wanted to fly. At this point my memory fails.

Monograph by Gerald N. "Jerry" Kelly (Combined from E-Mails on February 3, 2004 and edited on May 6, 2004)

I was originally a 5943 (Aviation Radar - Height Finder Tech). Never saw an MPS-16 after school! Went to MCAS Beaufort and was assigned to a new MATCU (69 I think, but can't be sure since I only spent a week or two there.) as a 6641 Search Radar Tech. I was TAD to H&HS to work on the TACAN and Weather gear for about 2 years. I went to MATCU-67 in Chu Lai as a L/Cpl in about June 1965, and moved to Phu Bai (MATCU-68) about February 1966 and left there as a Cpl. I worked mainly on the UPS-1.

The officers at MATCU-67 were Capt. John F. Keane-OIC and 1st Lt. Larry Loudermilk-Comm Officer. The Staff NCOs were: GySgt Cascasola - tech, GySgt Luther Rice - tech, SSgt Joe Medico - tech, SSgt Bud "Bull" Phillips - tech, and SSgt Courtney - tech. The Sgts were: Sgt. Jimmie Plagens - tech, Sgt. Hendricks - Diesel Mech, and Sgt. Silcox - Diesel Mech (Made Sgt while I was there). The Cpls were: Cpl. Butler - controller, Cpl. Kemp - controller, Cpl. Baker - tech. The LCpls were: L/Cpl Willie Norton - controller, LCpl Pote - controller, LCpl "Tommy" - controller, LCpl Herman Hedke III - tech, LCpl Jerry Renfeld - tech, LCpl Ralph C. Wallis - tech, LCpl Mike Dubesa - controller, LCpl George Peck - tech, LCpl Clark - controller, LCpl Ronnie Runkle - controller (I think)-Shot down returning from R&R in Hong Kong, and LCpl G.N. Kelly - tech. Last was Pvt "Herbie", who retired after leaving Chu Lai. I'm sure there are lots more folks, but I just don't remember at the moment.

I didn't get to Chu Lai until about late June, and the original group arrived in May. Jerry Renfeld (MSgt-Ret) was a radar tech with the original group from Iwakuni. In late October, we were still in the old squad tents on the sand. The new strong backs hadn't been built yet. I was in a tent with LCpls: Pote, Renfeld, Hedke, Wallis, Peck, Norton, Runkle, and a Pvt. "Herbie", or something at that time. I think Pote and I just returned from singing our way through 30 days of mess duty in October.

When we moved to the strong backs, the tent makeup was as follows: Cpl Sixcox, LCpls: Wallace, Peck, Clark, Hedke, Dubesa, Renfeld, and some others whose name escapes me at the present. Our only casualty from the October 1965 raid was our water dipper, which we awarded a purple heart. Ronnie Runkel, we were told, was on the plane that was returning from R&R in Hong Kong that crashed in the harbor.

Outside the MATCU office was a water cooler that Sgts Anthony M. Feldes, Earl Waldrath and Ray Lively brought from Iwakuni and set up in Chu Lai. The lister bag fed the water cooler. It was used so much the water never had a chance to get cold though. The water dipper that was awarded the Purple Heart hung on the lister bag.

At the new housing, there is a MATCU-67 sign held up by two long oars. These oars were acquired early on during an assault on the beach by a LFGB. It seems an ONTOS rolled on to the beach and hit the boat with all 6 tubes. The oars were all they found.

At Chu Lai, liberty was pretty much off limits. You had to either know the grunts that guarded the towns or "pretend" to be a grunt and blouse your trousers to get by with it. The distance to An Tan or Ky Lien prevented a lot of folks from going. It was a pretty good stretch of the legs if you couldn't get a ride.

In Da Nang, it was quite a bit more lax. Not much of a problem to get into downtown Da Nang. One quickly learned that the "Off Limits Areas" were the best for liberty. They were crowded with Marines and Nungs. The reason for this was that the MPs, SPs and QC didn't go there.

Phu Bai didn't have an official policy that I know of, but most didn't venture into Phu Lung. Most of the guys in my hooch went there fairly often and nobody seemed to mind. That could have been because the powers to be didn't know we were going there. They didn't ask and we didn't go out of our way to tell them.

The tower at Phu Bai in 1966 was the same type as Chu Lai. A Vietnamese civilian named Twee was manning the civilian tower. He was there to communicate with the Vietnamese pilots who occasionally landed there. I also remember that the guy who replaced me when I went to Phu Bai was a L/Cpl Luna. He came from Phu Bai to replace me.

Phu Bai those days had a pretty small Air Wing presence, and the MATCU was attached to the resident helicopter squadron. I think it was HMM-61 at first followed by HMM-163 later. Since this was a relatively small base at the time, things were a little slack. We were allowed mascots and they were plentiful. Pot Bellied Pigs, Dogs, Parrots and Monkeys were plentiful.

One crew chief had a little Superman suit, complete with leather helmet, cape and goggles made for his pet monkey while on R&R. It was pretty funny to see the monkey accompany the crew chief on the flights in this get up.

The monkey hated the sound of the M60 going off, and would scream and jump up and down on the floor of the helicopter whenever the guns were fired. This came to be his undoing one day over the A Shau valley, when the chopper came under intense ground fire. The pilot made a hard banking right turn and the screaming monkey slid out the door.

I was talking to the crew chief at the EM club bar that evening and he was sadly explaining what happened. "I hated to lose that little "fart" he said before breaking into an unexpected smile. "But I bet it created all kinds of havoc with the VC". "He looked like a little sky diver, with his little cape flapping behind him. I'll bet they had a hell of a time figuring out what he was".

It wasn't long until the crew chief had replaced the monkey with a young male monkey. This one had a definite adolescent personality. And like most adolescent males, he seemed to have only one thing on his mind. He quickly became a serial

rapist, hiding under the strong backs waiting for some poor unsuspecting soul to come within the range of his chain. He would ambush his prey and furiously bite their leg and scream while doing his dastardly deed on their leg.

I went back to the living area one evening to find a crowd of cheering Marines surrounding the monkey. He was wild eyed and screaming while he pleased himself. This was too much for the squadron CO. "Get that damned honney monkey out of here. I don't care what you do with him, but just get him out of the living area. Matter of fact; get all these damned animals out of here. What if some Red Cross worker or News guy saw that damned monkey doing that?" barked the CO.

It was all quiet in Dodge after that, no screaming pigs at night, no ambushes or parrots squawking. A FNG arrived, just about dark, fresh from the states. He was a PFC, probably not long out of Boot Camp, who was scared to death. I guess they really weren't ready for the guy and didn't really know what to do with him for the evening. So, being cruel as hell, they put him on guard duty. Now, here he is, a new PFC, fresh from the states, on his first night in Viet Nam, scared to death, going on guard duty on a moonless night. They did have some pity on him, however, because they put him well within the perimeter at the C-Ration dump. They figured he could just walk around this huge pile of C-Ration boxes, and not get lost or in trouble until he was relieved.

Not long after posting him at the C-Ration dump, World War III began. There were no hand popper flares; it all began with 20 rounds fired in quick succession from the C-Ration dump. Arriving at the dump, they found one terribly shaken PFC, with his M14 still pointed downward, shaking uncontrollably. "I don't know what the hell it was," he said. "It jumped out from between the boxes screaming and grabbed my leg and bit me! I just kept firing until I was sure it was dead or gone!"

That was the last monkey we had at Phu Bai.

Monograph by Wayne J. Komsi from hand written letter dated November 14, 2003 and amended on November 25, 2003 and December 11, 2003.

Equipment and technicians for 1STMAW during my tour were handled by a crusty old W-4 who probably departed the scene long ago. I don't recall his name, Irish fellow. Good Marine. New Captains coming in country would plead to be assigned where they wanted to go. He would say, "You're going where the Corps needs you."

I was only in Danang for a few months, Dong Ha the same, then LZ Vandergrift, then Quang Tri for the last few months.

Gen. Westmoreland insisted on the base at Khe Sanh over objections from the Corps because it couldn't be protected or re-supplied. It was fired on from both Laos and North Vietnam, which the U.S. couldn't shoot into, so when the stuff hit the fan, a withdrawal to LZ Stud, an abandoned small Army field that was closer, was made and named Vandergrift.

When Dong Ha got shot up real bad because there again we couldn't shoot back into North Vietnam, Quang Tri was opened. This went on just before I got there.

During my brief stint at Danang as ATCO, I went to a conference in Saigon and learned South Vietnam did have an ATC structure run by the South Vietnamese and American civilians. The only Vietnamese controllers I was aware of were at Hue Phu Bai. They bugged out just before TET 68. This in I Corps, the Northern third of the country, assigned to the Corps, what a good deal!

Anyway, what do I know about the MATCU's? I can't even recall their numbers, but it seems like the T.O. & E. called for sixty-six people. We had three in country, one at Chu Lai who had their own approach control (two people), and they also took care of a field South of Danang at An Hoa, which was exciting at times.

Then the Marble Mountain one also had folks at Hue Phu Bai, the only civilian tower I knew of.

MATCU-62 then ran Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, Vandegrift, and Quang Tri.

These three did one outstanding job far beyond what they were designed, manned, and equipped for. They did it seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day on generators, and got shot at, everywhere.

When U.S.A.F. (They were always complaining) said the runways at Chu Lai weren't long enough for C-5s they were asked to build one (they can't) they can only operate from fields already there. All quiet. Then they wanted an approach control at Quang Tri. They were told, we didn't have the personnel, you do it. So the outfit that was tasked was in the Philippines. Well they apparently sent those who could be spared. You know who I mean.

I listened at Dong Ha on their frequency when Army aviators would inadvertently go IFR and start calling for help, and as the voices would get fainter, while these guys figured out what to do and then cease, their problems would be over. In 69 we did assign a new arrival SNCO to them. He told me they complimented him on the job.

There just wasn't enough ATC and Comm/Elect when I was in and probably never will be, but the job always got done, when it was ours.

One thing I didn't mention was the MACS on Monkey Mountain East of Danang. I visited the site with my boss, (OIC Marine airfields in Vietnam.) I apparently lacked a need to know to go into the operations center so I don't know what they were doing. I know what their mission is, I served in three locations in them but enemy a/c in South Vietnam were no problem. I understood their radar worked in conjunction with shipboard radars in the gulf. Maybe some of our pilots would know if they performed anything like enroute assistance.

Maybe you read the letter in the MATCA where I wrote that neither HQ USAF in D.C., HQMC, or FMFPAC knew who ran the Danang tower. It was one screwed up war (But it was the only one we had so we did our best.) Plus, this bursting bomb Gunner got to run his own airfield in combat – LZ Vandegrift- for a few months.

At one point the Division or higher wanted a GCA approach into Vandegrift. It was drawn up and sent to D.C., BUNAV or BUAER for the OK. It showed that an A/C on a 3-degree glide slope would impact 600 feet below the crest of a hill some two miles out. End of project. (No Special VFR was required to operate out there.)

The portable UHF radio beacon that then Major Causey remembers going to Vandegrift is probably the one, along with the technician, that went out with the troops on search & destroy missions. These kinds of folks were hard to find on paydays when whoever had the job of having to get their signature saying they wanted it left on the books. The beacon was so the choppers could find, resupply, and medevac.

The runway was short and always full of helicopters refueling and rearming. During February '69 we had over 2500 operations. We had bulk fuel's rubber whales, a crash truck, and ordnance types from MAG-39. Runway lights were laid out on the ground so grabbing the wire and running along in the dark, for quick fixes, we could find breaks from incoming or tracked vehicles. There was a small underground "hospital" and medevac pad with lights on the opposite side from the tower. The tower and our bunker were on a hilltop well outside the base perimeter. I was supposed to go down each day and get the password to get in but figured we were better off to stay where we were and let help come to us if needed. No aircraft were stationed there. We were between where they came from and where they went.

We ran lines down to the grunts tents (1 bulb each) so as to get a better load on our generator. They weren't in much, once for a shower, 2 beers and a steak and out again the next day. Their hair hung down below the helmets. I "rented" my hair clipper out for field jackets for us. When I got back to CONUS the plastic case had melted to conform to the guts, but it still worked. The big mortars were down below us and fired harassment and interdiction all night long at likely avenues of approach just like the artillery did at Dong Ha and Quang Tri

The Seabees had come out and built a nice shiny Quonset hut next to the tower where the whole world could see us out alone so we kept gear in it and lived in the bunker. We sprayed the inside walls with fuel oil for the bugs and snakes but still had rats. We had two rattraps set each night at the exits. These guys were almost as big as rabbits. When one trap would go off after everyone but tower was asleep and the rat would bounce around squeaking it would wake you up like the war couldn't, adrenaline plus, in the dark. But we still lived well compared to most. We had a garbage can with an immersion heater on a stand for showers. Our outhouse had a real toilet seat. Folks would hike up the hill with newspapers and ask to use it. We built steps up the clay hill, an outdoors fireplace, solicited meat from supply aircraft and pretended, part of the time, where we were. We went swimming in a beautiful creek down in the valley.

I brought back a large beautiful brass bell from a village that no longer needed one. I used to ring it on Memorial Day. Then I met a local Marine who was there also. The 3rd, 4th and 9th Marines operated out of LZ Vandegrift. I gave it to him. The 2nd Battalion of the 4th Marines meets every two years now and has the bell. Each year a different Marine is given the bell to ring on Memorial Day.

**Monograph by Ronald E. Krebs
notes on June 9, 2004)**

(Compiled from telephone conversation

I reported to MATCU-60 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan in May of 1962. I was offered the opportunity to volunteer, along with four other Marines, for duty in Thailand. In a few days, sometime in early June, we flew to Udorn, Thailand.

I was a Lance Corporal GCA controller and worked with MATCU-66 at Udorn until the unit was initially withdrawn towards the end of June. Captain Newbill was the OIC; he was a pretty neat guy.

Our primary responsibility at Udorn was the support of an A-4 Skyhawk squadron, VMA-332.

We left Udorn by C-130 and landed in Bangkok. It was a long trip by 6x6 trucks to the docks where we boarded the USS Belle Grove LSD-2. The next day the ship set sail for Subic Bay in the Philippines.

At Subic Bay I spent some time helping repair our equipment that had been damaged during the shipboard trip. Again I was offered the opportunity to volunteer to return to Udorn, and took it. About ten of the MATCU-66 personnel flew by C-130 back to Udorn and operated the airfield for about two weeks until all Marine personnel had been withdrawn.

When we left Udorn we flew to NAS Atsugi, Japan where I stayed with MATCU-66 until the end of my overseas tour. We deployed for training to Taiwan in the spring of 1963 and I returned to EI Toro in June.

I left the Marine Corps in December of 1963 and was hired by the FAA in January of 1967. During my career with the FAA I worked at most of the facilities in southern California including MCAS EI Toro.

I've found it interesting that another employee of the company I now work for flew with VMA-332 during the time at Udorn. We've had some interesting conversations.

**Monograph by Jean R. Langlois
notes on June 18, 2004.)**

(Compiled from telephone conversation

I was assigned duty in South Vietnam at Chu Lai with MATCU-67. I was a Sergeant when I reported in October of 1966, and I was a Staff Sergeant when I left in November of 1977.

The day I checked into the MATCU I was near the office when someone hollered and said that John O'Hey was making a GCA and needed a coordinator. No one else responded so I stepped into the LCC of the TSQ-18 and attempted to get landing clearance from the tower. The GCA aircraft passed three miles and John began to get concerned, and when no clearance was issued at one mile he began to get worried. Tower finally issued clearance at one-half mile and it was relayed to John. I guess you would just have had to be there to really understand John O'Hey, but this was quite a welcome to GCA at Chu Lai.

During the first month or so I was at Chu Lai the radar site and office were at the west field, but the tower was still on the east field. The SeaBees were still in the process of building the tall tower on the west field. The controllers in the east field tower could not see the entire west runway so one of the non-working GCA controllers would sit in the west control tower and respond by phone to requests about the recondition of the west runway.

The radar crew worked 24 hours on duty and then had 24 hours off duty. We lived in hard-backed tent hootches down on the east field beach too close to the fuel storage tanks. Thankfully there were only a couple of rocket attacks during the time I was there. We had a 6x6 truck that carried the crew to the radar site for duty, and there was a tent with racks to allow non-working controllers to try and catch some sleep at night during the 24-hour duty period.

I worked in GCA most of the time I was at Chu Lai, but because I also had some control tower experience from MCAS Quantico I later spent some time in the new tower. GCA made PAR approaches to just the west field runways. When it was IFR we were pretty busy. Runway changes with the TPN-8 GCA radar were time consuming because a technician had to physically rotate and align the radar set.

I was there when the TECH REP was killed and Jerry Faust was injured when a C-1 crashed into the CPN-4 at the radar site. We did not know about Jerry's injuries for a while, but when he was found we took him to Delta Med near Ky Ha for treatment of his broken jaw. Delta Med wired Jerry's jaw shut and kept him in the hospital for several weeks. Joe Bryant, Cy Wilson and I smuggled beer to Jerry while he was hospitalized. He may have had a problem with solid food, but the beer went down just fine.

When the C-1 crashed it came to rest in a four-holer. I had just left the four-holer a few minutes before the accident. When the investigation was over and it was

apparent that the Navy wasn't going to do much with the remains of the C-1 we took a part of the tail section and gave to Jerry Faust as a souvenir.

The west concrete runway built by RMK-BRJ lasted until about the summer of 1967 and then it developed a split near the crown. It was feared that an aircraft landing on the centerline would catch its nose wheel in the crack. Our landing clearance to resolve this was "CLEARED TO LAND LEFT SIDE - CRACK IN RUNWAY." Eventually the runway had to be closed for repairs forcing us to use the parallel taxiway as a runway.

Monograph by Joe LaPan MGySgt USMC (Ret.)
conversation notes on May 25, 2004.)

(Compiled from telephone

I reported to MATCU-66 at MCAF Futenma in October of 1967, and was a member of the detachment that Captain Causey took to Quang Tri in April of 1968. I was a SSgt radar technician, but like most techs we worked on just about everything, including diesel generators. We had Tony Feldes and Thadeus Hudson as diesel mechs and they taught us a lot about the diesel maintenance procedures.

The next night after we arrived at Quang Tri we heard the tower sound the siren and headed for the bunker between the hootch area and the radar site. We were lucky to have some warning because our hootch took a direct hit. We lost just about everything we had. MAG-39 re-issued uniforms and 782-gear, but I don't think we ever recovered the personal items that were shredded or burned. Cliff Ivey and Robert Cole were in the same hootch as I was.

I worked on the TPN-8 GCA radar. We started out making approaches to only runway 35, but after awhile when the tower changed the runway to 17 we would swing the TPN-8s around also.

We made quite a few runs to Dong Ha, driving a "Searless" truck up Highway 1. One of the communications technicians, a Mike "Doc" Edwards was blown off the road. This was just after we had started putting sandbags on the floor of the truck, so they may have saved his life.

In May of 1968 Captain Causey made official/unofficial arrangements for Cliff Ivey, Robert Cole, myself, and three other MATCU Marines to have a quick R&R. The Air Force C-130 bringing us back to Quang Tri crashed on landing. It slid off the runway and through the MATCU equipment site. When it left the runway one wing was torn off and one of the turbo-prop engines tore into the fuselage just forward of where I was sitting. With the fuselage open, the flames entered quickly. The only way to avoid them was to get as low as possible. The MAG-39 crash crew got to the aircraft just as soon it stopped, but they had some difficulty getting to the passengers. Those of us that were still functioning were able get most of the injured out through one of the side hatches, but there were some casualties. All of the MATCU Marines survived.

The burned out hulk of the C-130 stayed where it came to rest for a while, and was causing a problem with the GCA radar by blocking the signal. We tried to cut the tail off with hand grenades one night, but weren't successful.

One of the diesel problems concerned the TACAN. A MAG-39 diesel was grounded to the runway matting near the TACAN and it was cross-wired. Normally a green cable was ground, but on some generators the black and green cables were reversed, as was this case. It took a long time to find.

I left Quang Tri in November of 1968.

Monograph by James Largue III (Compiled from email on August 15, 2004.)

I arrived in Chu Lai in early March '67 and departed on 8 April '68. Jerry Faust and I went over together and came back together.

The OIC when I got there was Maj. V.D. Steele, an A-4 pilot. The Ass't OIC was Capt. Pat Slagle, an ATC officer out of El Toro (I think). The NCOIC was a 5900, MGYSGT Bright. Jim Sumner was the Ops NCOIC. He left a couple of weeks after we got there. Just after I got there, Boze Martin came in, as did Dick Scarborough. Both were GySgts at the time but made Master while in Chu Lai. Dick Wooten was there and he was NCOIC of the MATCU 67 Det that went from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh. That happened in late spring/early summer of '67.

We had another 59xx NCOIC around Thanksgiving. I can't remember his name. E.E. Greeby came in right after Christmas as NCOIC and was until I left. Bowen was the only other OIC we had, other than Steele, while I was there.

Some of the other members that I recall are 2ndLt. Jim Mutter (my watch officer), Jean Langlois Charlie Farr, Frank Porter, John Call, John Rush, Dennis Beauchamp, Jerry Daniels, Cy Wilson, Joe Calcasola, Al Goode, Lt. Orin Muse, Kiwi, Al Smart, Danny Simpson, and a lot more that aren't coming to mind right now.

The approach control operation was out of a TSQ. We worked port and starboard (24on/24off) with either 2 or 3 approach controllers to a crew, most of the time it was 2. During the monsoon season on a 24 hr watch you worked six on and six off unless we were really busy and then we would split approach and departure and then you were on until traffic died down. There were many watches where you were on the scope 16 to 18 hours during a watch.

Also, we were bingo field for "Yankee station". The entire time I was there, Yankee station always went down between midnight and 0400. You would be sitting on position with a board full of inbound from missions out of Chu Lai and all of a sudden you would get an oddball call sign calling "Chu Lai approach, this is ____ ____". Right after that the shit would hit the fan. Now we had an additional 40 to 50 strips on our board. There would always be battle damage to go with it. During the monsoon season in late 67, early 68 we had more IFR operations than Chicago O'Hare every month for four months in a row. We did this with less than 30 total controllers in the entire MATCU.

Probably the biggest event while I was there, other than TET '68, was the crash of the C-1 off of the Hornet. It wiped out the CPN 4 and killed a Gilfillian tech rep. He had just transferred down from Dong Ha because it was getting too hot up there for him. Scuttlebutt had it that an admiral was flying right seat and stalled it on takeoff. If it had come across the tarmac 50 ft to the left of where it crossed, it would have wiped out the TSQ and half of the controllers in the MATCU. Faust was sleeping one off in the crew tent (8 man GP tent). One of the wings broke off, went through the tent, and all Jerry got was a broken jaw.

Monograph by Ed Le Baron re-typed from typed letters dated 28 November 2003, 8 December 2003, and 18 December 2003.

Quang Tri (later designated Quang Tri Combat Base) was being built in the fall of '67 and was to be staffed and operated by a USAF unit from Okinawa. We were told that they could not meet the schedule due to having less than 100% spares, which would prevent them from going on the air for approximately three months. Having been in numerous MATCUs, there was some difficulty comprehending this because I've encountered 35% spares (seldom the right assortment) and innovative technicians who bartered (and "found") parts to keep things running.

MATCU-70 (enjoying surf and sun at Kaneohe) was tasked with the assignment. We had two TACANs, two FPN-36 units, a couple of PU-235 generators, and a portable tower. Most of the controllers were TAD to station. We formed MATCU-70 Alfa with about 20 people. The Marine Corps did not have sufficient transport to get us there fast enough, so on short notice the Air Force sent in three small cargo planes (C-123s) that were like miniature C-130s with tail ramps. The OIC was Capt. Pat Prout, not a naval aviator but an Annapolis grad. Also, CWO Burt Currier – an older, well-known transport pilot and Lt Ray Anti, our Maintenance Officer (I was NCOIC; Fred Spivy was ops and the TERPS specialist). We island hopped all the way to Phu Bai (between Da Nang and Quang Tri). Our approach was a 30-degree glide path (something about Phu Bai being surrounded by bad guys and ground fire). The ramps were lowered during taxi and with engines still running; we were off loaded in about seven minutes. They were wheels up, in a steep climb, in record time. The local MATCU was an excellent host and we encountered many friends. I recall Jake Sindt and Jim Leadford (NCOIC) and several others I knew but their names escape me.

From there on, it was hitch hiking. In a day or two, we found a C-130 that had just unloaded and the pilot agreed to haul us on the short trip to Quang Tri. Many will remember the chaotic atmosphere found at the loading ramps. As we were loading our equipment, another C-130 had arrived and was parked tail to tail with ours. A six-by was sitting between the two planes. It must have *mistakenly* been driven up the ramp of our transport.

Quang Tri was a new runway surrounded by sand and nothing else in sight. Without the truck, it would have been impossible to move our equipment into position. The very first priority was to put a TACAN on the air. This was done in record time, GCA and the tower followed shortly thereafter. Several helicopter squadrons moved in.

One day an Air America DC-3 circled and using the aldis lamp it was given a green light. It taxied up to our area and parked on the runway. Several civilians deplaned. They were all former Marine pilots and of course, Burt Currier knew just about everyone who had ever flown in the Corps. They asked why we didn't have radio contact with them. We explained that we did not have VHF frequencies. The next day they returned with a couple of portable radios that were better than anything we had.

One of our first problems we encountered was ground troops on the runway. Grunts walking through sand for some time found a mile of concrete was a lot easier to traverse. Helicopters were not a problem but as fixed wing traffic increased, it became necessary to drive out on the runway to clear it. After we shut down for the night, some of the controllers (such as Sgt. - later Lt. Richard Ale) started giving "unofficial" vectors and latest WX to med-evacs and gunships. Late one night a helicopter landed right next to us. The pilot, just returning from a mission, went on for five minutes raving about the help and great service we provided med-evacs.

We also ran into occasional parts problems. We found a landline contact that would hook us into the ham radio network about every week or two. We would line up and take turns talking for 2-3 minutes to our families back in the land of the big PX. Our TACAN needed a new klystron (a great big tube of some sort). So I asked my wife for one. She in turn went to see my counterpart back a Kaneohe, Gunny Jerry Wahl, who went to supply and then to the flight line. Within 3-4 days, it arrived.

Sometime about mid-January, we learned that the Air Force was still not able to meet the commitment. Another group from Kaneohe, Gunny Gerald Tkaczck NCOIC traveled to Quang Tri and relieved us. Gunny Dewey Darby stayed in country as he already had three months off a tour. Of course we had to hitch-hike home. The second group was also there about three months before returning.

Best I can remember, our second group brought back most of the equipment but left at least one TACAN in place. This was late spring of '68.

Regarding Marble Mountain, I don't recall where this MATCU (with a full T/O of equipment) came from but it was a separate unit from the one at Chu Lai. I left Beaufort in the summer of '65 with specific orders to a MATCU (number escapes me) in MAG-16. I arrived at El Toro and met Brandstader and several other ATC types. In a short time we had a flight on a C-130. All loaded up, engines started - and they had an oil leak. Flight was cancelled and it was three weeks before we finally moved on MATS, stopping at several places. The last I knew we were to join the unit in Chu Lai so I went to flight ops and hitched space going there. Arrived there and was told that they had moved last week to Marble Mountain. We found a helicopter ride there the next morning. Nothing was on the air as yet. The OIC (pilot) was Capt. "Smoke" Mason; assistant was Lt. Prout (Later MATCU-70A). I was assigned as Tower Chief and met Tower Officer CWO Les DeHaven, a really imposing guy - I admit I was intimidated. He was big, tough as nails, a good Marine and as I soon learned a good guy. We had a Wicks tower right in the unit area. The air group was all helicopter squadrons. They'd take off in the morning and return from every direction just before lunch. While we were still hooking up everything, I'd listen on a common frequency and it was real chaos both on the air and in the air. It was about 1000 (mid-to-late September '65) that I was finally able to key the mic and report that Marble Mountain was up and ready. I established the duty runway, advised winds and broadcast that everyone should enter downwind and report call signs, Within minutes, and with great pilot cooperation, we had a continuous, organized flow of landings and take-offs.

A couple of days later, I was in the tower and observed a jeep drive up. I looked down and saw what appeared to be a silver eagle on the collar of the lone occupant. I lost sight of him as he started up the stairs. I went out on the catwalk to report and noticed that it was a star instead of an eagle. I don't recall his name but he said he was driving around and heard we were on the air and decided to stop. The tower window was open (remember the 3" fan in lieu of air conditioning) so I introduced the two controllers to the General. He stayed about 6 or 7 minutes, observing and asking questions. He was very gracious and thanked us for what we were doing.

A little after midnight on 30 October, the flight line started blowing up (I believe Chu Lai was hit the same time). 19 sappers came through the wire; all of them were either killed or captured. Walking down the flight line the next day, I remember the ash and junk piles that were hardly recognized as aircraft. We lost a big part of the group in just minutes. It was later determined that some of the infiltrators actually worked on the base. Later at Quang Tri, there were no indigenous personnel allowed inside the wire – or near it.

Then one day, we learned the grunts in the area had to move out for an operation. A Provisional Company was formed to set up a perimeter around the entire base. I was assigned a platoon of three squads on the beach (east) side. During the day, we dug two man bunkers. At night we always had one man awake – unless on heightened alert. I had one M-60 in the first squad area north, miles of concertina wire, trip flares, and claymores to the south. We were all cooks, comm types, and mechanics. It's surprising how those basic training classes come back to you when you need it. I was relieved by another controller 3 or 4 weeks later. I learned a lot and it was one of the highlights of my career.

Monograph by Gary M. Lewis (Combined from E-Mails on February 3, 2004)

My first tour of duty with ATC was at Quantico Oct 1964-Oct 1966 as a tower and GCA controller with H&HS. The famous broom closet FPN-36 was our only radar. The NCOIC was GySgt Switzer and the OIC was a Maj. Janke.

In Oct 1966, I transferred to MCAS El Toro where I was TAD to MATCU-70 at LTA. The equipment was new; a TSQ-18 with two TPN-8's in separate attached shelters. The UPS-1 was also attached, but I never used it although it was at least operational. Can't remember the OIC's name, but believe he was a flying CWO-4.

In Mar 1967, I was transferred back to El Toro after loading MATCU-70 equipment onto an LSD at Long Beach destined for Viet Nam (I think).

In Jan 1968, I was TAD back to LTA with new equipment MATCU-74, H&MS-56, and MAG-56. To my knowledge, I was the only qualified GCA controller at this MATCU until I left to join MATCU-66, MAG-39 at Quang Tri in early July'68.

MATCU-66 had a mobile tower mounted on scaffolding about 20 feet in the air. We had VHF/UHF PRC-25 capability in the tower but a loud brrrrrrp was heard every time the UPS-1 would sweep the tower. We often wondered if we would be sterilized after the experience, but that was not the case. The TSQ-18 and associated shelters were at the base of and close to the tower. The generator shed was just south of the TSQ complex. The TSQ-18 housed what I would categorize as a standard configuration complex with TPN-8 shelters attached to the TSQ-18 in a T-formation. We had UHF/VHF and HF capability, but UHF was of course primary. I know the HF worked. Since I was a licensed HAM, I procured a Collins 75 A3 receiver from the Army at Dong Ha and began running phone patches back to the states for some of our members including GySgt Charley Farr and OIC H.L. Causey. I don't remember a common freq. for the PRC-25 although I'm sure there was one. I don't remember ever using it except when we were out of business from the attack.

On October 10, 1968 MATCU-66 was redesignated MATCU-62 with the same equipment present.

I remember Maj. Causey as OIC of MATCU-66 (then MATCU-62) until approximately June'69 when Maj. Braswell assumed command. Maj. Braswell was an aviator who flew helicopters. His NCOIC was MSGT Jim Sumner. Other personnel were a SSGT Tingley (diesel mech) and controllers; "Chopper" Cline, Van C LaFoon, Steve Best, Charley Farr, John Revord, Rex Barbeau, Jim Harvey, and Don Watson.

From April 1 to May 1 1969 I was TAD to HMM-262 as a gunner.

On June 11, 1969 122MM rockets attacked Quang Tri. The TACAN site was hit first, then the MATCU hooch area, and then the generator shed. The MATCU was off the air except for a battery operated PRC-25 in the tower for about 4 hours. I was

wounded along with everyone else in the Sgt's hootch. Sgt Wayne Bracket (diesel mech who I had flown with in 262) received the bronze star for rescuing many wounded during the attack. We were all sent to MAG-39 dispensary for treatment. Jim Wright was injured the worst. He was medevaced out to the hospital ship Repose for initial treatment. I spent some time with Jim back in the states circa 1971. He had been discharged and was on disability. He was about six feet away from me when the rocket hit the eve of the hooch next to ours. A piece of shrapnel went through the back of his neck causing some major nerve damage. He spent 9 months in a rehab hospital and endured many surgeries. I lost touch with him after that.

In Aug 1969, I rotated back to the states to SOES Cherry Point where I was discharged in 1972.

Monograph by Tom C. Lish, Captain USMC (Ret.) (Combined from E-Mails on February 2, 2004)

I was in MATCU-60 in Iwakuni, when MATCU-62 was assigned to be deployed to Nam Phong, aka Rose Garden. I was assigned to 62 and was put on the advance party to Nam Phong. Five of us were dropped off at night by a C-130 with no markings. We landed at night with no runway lights or any other type of Navaid, other than a radar deflector at each end of the runway. There was myself, The Wing Chief of Staff, a LtCol, whose name I can't remember, and the CO of MABS whose name I can't remember, a Navy Corpsman, whose name I can't remember, and a driver, whose name I can't remember, a vehicle whose name I can remember - Jeep- to go along with the driver, a few cases of rations and that was all. The plane dropped us off on the Runway without shutting down and left us there all alone. It -up to then- was the most deserted feeling I ever had in my life. I am happy to say that things got worse, which erased some of the feeling I had at the time.

We were supposed to make arrangements for some Thai troops who were being trained by the CIA to move out of their bivouac area and clear it for the Marines. We learned the next day that plans had changed and they were not going to leave and we would have to develop our own tent city, water supply, etc. After we were there for five days, sans communications, some other people from the MATCU started arriving. Among them Larry McKee, Bob Stivers, Davy Northam, Frank porter, and the MATCU OIC named Anderson. Stivers and Mckee were both Technicians'. Stivers was the NCOIC of the MATCU when I left, he had reverted and was a MGYSGT. Northam and I were controllers, although I did hold a secondary MOS as a MATCU Maintenance Officer. Lt. Mckee was selected as a "temporary officer" about that time and was later chosen as a permanent warrant. Captain Ron Anderson was the OIC who took the MATCU into Nam Phong. He was relieved as OIC after about 4 months and was sent back to Iwakuni. Damn, they sure knew how to punish people in the old days. I don't know what happened to him when he left Iwakuni. At that time I was between Lieutenancies (my word.) I had been one and then reverted to CWO-3 - excuse me Marine Gunner 3. Later I was appointed as a 1st Lt. LDO and retired as Captain. My enlisted rank was MSGT. I think with all the ranks I held they were always trying to find one of which I could honorably fulfill the duties. Never did. I remember the CO's "Prohibited 'P's" - Pussy, Pot, and Pineapple, which we later built a list of about 50 "Prohibited 'P's", which included pharting, phucking, and phondling. To the best of my knowledge there were no other deployments, unless they used the field after the war to make people suffer.

As I recall the runway ran basically North/South. The Radar site was set up about 3000 feet from the South End of the Runway, between the Runway and the Taxiway - closer to the runway. The tower, as I recall was a TSA-28 it was close to the South end of the Runway about 1500 feet from the numbers on the opposite side from the Radar vans. The reason we chose that spot was because there was a small hill which allowed us to see the entire runway. The runway was very long either 12,000 or 14,000 feet. It slanted downhill from South to North and it was difficult, almost

impossible to see the end of the runway without considerable elevation. The living area was very close to the flight line. The ramps were made of MARSTAD Matting. We laid enough matting to handle parking for 3 squadrons - God it was hot. I believe we had it ready to receive A/C from RVN in about 3 weeks.

C-140 ACCIDENT.

A C-140 sheared a wing when it hit a wire-laying truck on the side of the runway - after they assured us they were well clear of the runway (the truck not the C-140) Frank Porter was working the "A" stand and I was the Airfield Operations Officer on duty. The Crash crew doused the fire with the last squirt from the last truck. No one was injured or killed but the Air Force hated our guts. The aircraft was disassembled and flown away in a C-5

Monograph by James Macaulay (Combined from Emails on December 3, 2003)

Let me give you some information about the guys that were at my reunion last month. This was part of the bunch I served with in MATCU -62 at Dong Ha and at Khe Sanh during Tet '68. They were Joe McMahon, Denis Burke, Pat Keefe, Rick Rasmussen, Roger Irons, Bob Powell, Greg Dixon, and John Driscoll. John didn't make the reunion...he sent a last minute e-mail saying something had come up and he couldn't attend. However, he was with me at Phu Bai (MATCU-68, as I remember) prior to going up to Dong Ha. (My memory is fading fast, too; CRS and more and more "senior moments"!). There was another that couldn't make it, because his wife has cancer and was failing. That was Stan Montgomery. Several of the above could possibly supply you with much more of the technical information than I, and (according to the stories floating around here about a month ago) also more of the anecdotes.

I left Dong Ha in late July of '68 and went back to the "world". "Boonies" first name might also be Ray...although I may be getting mixed up with the baseball playing family...Roger may be able to come up with it. I showed some slides at my reunion and Boone was in them. We put a name to everyone except for one, so he (Irons) may be able to remember. I know Boone was a huge Met's fan, though. His whole corner of the hooch was covered with Met's articles, pictures, etc.

Phu Bai definitely had GCA. I was one of the only IFR rated controllers while I was there. There was just one other scope in use and it had responsibility for all traffic in northern I-Corps. He had approach and departure for Phu Bai and all enroute traffic for, in addition to Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Khe Sanh and Quang Tri; literally all of northern I - Corps! I worked primarily GCAs there although some on the other scope, too. I then went to tower for a time; we used the old civilian tower. When I went to Dong Ha, I was solely tower.

MATCU - 68, as far as I recall, didn't have any relationship with Marble Mountain at the time and there were no Air Force there helping with any of our work. At Dong Ha, we had an Air Force weatherman, only, and only for one month at a time. It was too dangerous for them to stay any longer! They came up from Da Nang as I recall.

When I first arrived in country at Phu Bai, we were living in hard-back tents...then moved to former offices near our ready room, the "Alamo". Just before I left to go north, they built us some two story barracks across the runway. Go figure! I don't recall too many names from here, either. Some that do come to mind are Cam Servick, Henry Vieira, C.C. Smith, (the young "snuffy", not the other one). I do remember an incident at Phu Bai where a C-130 hit just a little short of the runway and crashed!

There are a lot more memories than I care to recall, let alone speak of out loud...but these are those, as you say, are not all that personal.

I don't recall there being any Vietnamese controllers at Phu Bai, but I wasn't in the tower much in my early "career" there. I never spoke to one from GCA, either, that I

can recall. Now this doesn't preclude them from them being there...I just don't remember them. They may well have been there, perhaps before I got there, maybe while I was there, and were kicked out by us. They weren't very good; I seem to remember, maybe from there at Phu Bai. But I always consider myself as being with MATCU-62 for some reason, not 68. It may have been something about the closeness we felt, being where we were and what we all were forced to go through, maybe only because I was there last, I don't know. As I said earlier, I have some good stories from Phu Bai, though and some slides from there as well as from Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. I do seem to remember something about them "bugging out" around that time, the more I think about it. That may be why I was transferred to the tower, to fill in necessary spots.

Monograph by Robert A. "Bob" Marshall MSgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from memory on April 9, 2004)

In May of 1962 MATCU-66 was just returning from their annual spring deployment. This year it had been to Mindoro Island in the Philippines where we had supported MAG-11 and its F4D and F8U squadrons. The senior members of the unit had flown to and from the island on VMR-152's R5Ds. I was not a member of that lucky group and had accompanied the MSQ-4, FPN-36s, and other equipment in the well deck of an LST.

I remember arriving back at the MATCU Office at NAS Atsugi anticipating some liberty, even if it was "Cinderella". We were still in the back of a 6x6 truck when we were told that we had four hours to get ready to deploy again. No destination was mentioned. As I remember it, we were split into two groups. One group of mostly senior approach controllers and technicians were to accompany the MSQ-4 someplace, while the rest of us were to take the two truck mounted TACANs, the two FPN-36s, and the TSA-11 portable control tower someplace else.

Just before sunset we were loaded into a new VMGR-152 GV with a 6X6 truck, TACAN, and generator. Every available space was packed with our seabags, and folded GP tents. We had our M-1's, but I don't remember wearing a field transport pack or the presence of the rest of our 782 gear. It was a cold flight, no one had a field jacket, and the high altitude capability of the GV was unanticipated. We landed at what we were told was Kadena AFB in full dark and waited on the parking ramp while the GV was refueled. I remember being impressed the number of Air Force transports there. This was the only time I ever remember seeing the larger version of the GV, the C-133. After re-boarding our aircraft we were told to get some sleep if possible, as we could expect to work all day once we got where we were going.

In the dim gray light of dawn we grouped around Captain M. S. Newbill in a less than military formation and he told us we were in Udorn, Thailand, and that we were going to take control of the airfield from its Thai controllers. It was 20 May 1962. The technicians began to prepare a site for the TACAN, while the controllers accompanied Capt. Newbill to the concrete two-story control tower at the approach end of runway 30. After a brief discussion with the Thai airport authorities we all crowded up into the tower. The Thai controllers were still present and gave a brief as to the use of their VHF radios. I think we had some sort of jury-rigged semi-portable radio, maybe and ARC-47, that we expected to use for UHF communications. At some time during this brief we were asked to please be careful and not kill the "pet" cobra that had taken up residence in the tall grass just outside of the control tower.

VMA-332, a squadron of A4Ds from MAG-12 at Iwakuni, had flown into Udorn the preceding day and had not yet begun local flying, and the locally based Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) AT-6 squadron was not expected to fly much. This left the traffic the first few days to arriving Air Force and Marine transports, and a local based civilian air

carrier flying unmarked HUS helicopters and small fixed wing aircraft. It was just as well that the weather was VFR, hot, humid, but still generally VFR. Weather observations were hand delivered; there was no operations section, and no landline contact with Bangkok. The first we knew of an arriving aircraft was on initial radio contact.

Traffic the first few days was slow and steady, again just as well. The airport was originally a WWII Japanese dirt strip. At some point PSP or Marston matting had been used to cover this single runway. Recent construction had produced an 8000' by 150' concrete runway 12/30, but the planned parallel taxiway had only been cleared and leveled. It was unusable by aircraft. The transient line was the old runway that joined the new runway at a 90-degree angle at the approach end of runway 30. Northeast of the approach end of runway 30, on an extension of marston matting, was where the RTAF AT-6's parked. Arriving transports landing on runway 30 would have to execute a 180-degree turn and taxi to the transient line. There was a concrete terminal taxiway southwest of runway 30 at midfield leading to a partially constructed airport terminal building. VMA-332 parked its aircraft southwest of the approach end runway 12. All of its departures were on runway 12 and all of its arrivals were on runway 30. I don't remember wind conditions ever requiring any different procedure. It was a left break for runway 30, but most of the civil traffic arriving from Vientiane would enter a right pattern for runway 30, or left for runway 12.

We ate WWII C-rations for about three weeks. Fresh water was for drinking only. There were about 10 cots per GP tent, with no separation between officers, SNCOs, NCOs, and the rest of us. It was hot morning, noon, and night, so the sides of the tents were usually rolled up. We were located on the Southwest side of the runway just south of the intersection of the runway and the midfield terminal taxiway. This is also where the TSA-11, FPN-36s, and the TACANs would be located.

By the 27th of May all equipment had arrived and was operational. I did not mind not having to spend a mid-watch in the Thai tower imagining every sound of the multitude of lizards scurrying about to be the "pet" cobra slithering up the stairs. We had a M1911A1 with 5 rounds that was passed from crew to crew, but with the instructions that we weren't to use it. One amusing situation happened while we were still in the Thai tower. The transient line was busy and there were several groups of Marines from 3/9 in full gear waiting for transport to their camp when a newly arrived Air Force C-130 parked near the tower. Their tail was facing us and as the ramp opened four or five crewmembers ran out of the aircraft with their M-1 carbines and took up firing positions. The on looking Marines could be seen to be razzing them pretty good. After awhile the Air Force gathered its act up and one of the pilots came over to the tower to ask where they could go to get their orders stamped "Inadequate Quarters". I don't think we were very helpful.

With the TSA-11 in place everything seemed to fall into place. MABS-12 set up aerology, operations, crash crew, and more. The SeaBees came in and built platforms for our GP tents. Eventually there was a mess hall and shower point. VMA-332 operated during daylight hours, as did HMM-261 when it arrived in the middle of

June. There was an unusual mix of transport aircraft Air Force C-124s and C-130s, Marine GVs and R5Ds. One day a Royal New Zealand Bristol Freighter made an appearance. I was continually amazed by the fact that a C-124 got any lift from, what I thought was small, wing. A fully loaded C-124 would not lift off until after it had passed the 3000' remaining board. I could not believe that the Bristol Freighter was even an aircraft.

I don't remember there being any real formal training, one day Captain Newbill stood outside the tower cab on the walkway and watched for a while. He then asked some questions and left. I was later told that I was tower and approach control qualified. VMA-332 at some point started holding reveille on an Air Force F-100 Super Saber squadron stationed at Korat. The Air Force started returning the favor. Our Sky Hawks were badly outclassed by a four- plane flight of F-100s in full afterburner. Usually the Air Force would request permission for a high-speed low pass, and traffic permitting it was usually approved. The approach would be to runway 12 and the burners would be lit as they passed the VMA-332 area. All good things come to an end. One day I observed a single F-100 in a steep decent Northwest of the airport, its visible smoke trail aligned with runway 12. The CO of the ProvMAG was on a FAM II flight, and as luck would have it, he had been cleared for a touch and go on runway 30. He was just turning final, with his wingman/instructor in formation when I informed them of the unidentified aircraft approaching. They reported the aircraft in sight and gave it enough room to split the difference between them. After the F-100 passed them and departed they entered a normal downwind and landed. That was the last F-100 I ever saw at Udorn.

During our stay at Udorn air operations were generally routine. I don't remember any emergencies. One time a helio-courier (small fixed wing STOL) called for take-off with a C-124 on a 1-mile final for runway 30. When instructed to hold the pilot declined and took off using a short run on the marston matting taxiway and then across the threshold of runway 30. The pilot later said he had an urgent mission and could not wait. The C-124 landed normally, and I have been impressed by the performance of the helio-courier for forty some odd years.

Our FPN-36s were operational during our deployment, but were little used because of the good weather. At some point the radar approach controllers that went with the MSQ-4 rejoined the MATCU and attempted to work out of the MACS-4 GCI site. This lasted for about two weeks and then the operation came to a halt. Just before the operation closed down we received a draft of controllers from the states. I think that B. D. Cole and W. C. Brown were a couple of Sergeants that were with this draft.

For some reason MATCU-66 was one of the first units to leave Udorn. Just after VMA-332 left on July 28th we boarded GVs and flew to Bangkok where we reloaded our equipment on the USS Belle Grove LSD-2 and sailed for Subic Bay. When we got to Subic Bay we were given liberty and then quartered in transient barracks at Cubi Point. The controllers were sent TAD to the Navy GCA unit there. I remember making one or two GCA approaches at Cubi Point. These were the first since

completing GCA school at Olathe. After less than a week at Cubi Point Captain Newbill asked about ten of us to "volunteer" to take the TACANs and tower back to Udorn. We again boarded GVs and were back in Udorn the next day.

Apparently during our absence the weather had deteriorated as everything that was not covered by concrete or marston matting was just a huge mud puddle. I remember seeing several 6X6 trucks buried up to their fenders. We were back to eating C-rations, but were lucky enough to find that the locals had not yet scavenged the tent platforms.

Our operations during this period were again un-remarkable and the weather returned to VFR. Without the A4Ds and HUS helicopters traffic was just the transport aircraft that came to remove the 3rdMEB, and the civilian air carrier. We operated for about two weeks and then boarded GVs and flew direct to NAS Atsugi. The rest of the MATCU that had stayed at Cubi Point had also returned with the heavy equipment. I remember the radar techs were disappointed with the condition of the FPN-36s. They had gotten water logged in shipment and it was months before we were operational.

Monograph by Robert A. "Bob" Marshall MSgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from memory on November 10, 2003)**Arrival**

After three days at Camp Hansen in Okinawa it was a relief to finally get to Vietnam. The commercial flight into Danang from Kadena was un-remarkable. The noise and confusion at the 1ST MAW assignment desk was not unusual to those that worked there, they seemed use to it. I was with a group of Marines that had traveled together more or less since leaving MATCU-70 at MCAS Santa Anna in early October. After delays enroute we had met again at the transient barracks at the Terminal Island Navy Base, and shared the commercial flight from Travis AFB to Kadena. After a period of confusion 1ST MAW assigned us to our in-country MATCUs. We seemed to be evenly divided between MATCU-67 at Chu Lai and MATCU-62 at Quang Tri. We said our good-byes and promised each other to meet again "back in the world". The next step in the process took us to the Air Force transportation desk, and if I thought the 1STMAW desk was confusing this place was chaos. Eventually our orders were processed and we were merged together with passengers from all the services and marched six abreast up the loading ramp and into the cargo hold of an Air Force C-130. Once the first rank reached the forward bulkhead the rest of us were asked to continue to move forward to close the spaces between ranks. We were then told to turn around and sit down between the legs of the person now behind us. Once all the servicemen were seated Vietnamese civilians were boarded and filled the area between the last of the Americans and the hinge on the lower loading ramp. I was pretty far forward and could not see in great detail, but I believe some chickens and small pigs may have accompanied the Vietnamese. Once the loading ramp closed and the engines started there was only a short delay before we were airborne. So as to avoid possible ground fire the C-130 pilot climbed at a steep angle so as to cross the field boundary as high as possible. This angle was steep enough that passengers slid back onto the loading ram. There was nothing to restrain our movements, except other passengers. The experience has defined "closeness" to me ever since. We made a quick stop at Hue Phu Bai, circling down from enroute altitude within the base perimeter and then making a steep descent to land with a very harsh series of jolts. During the approach and landing the passengers that had slowly managed to recover from the departure at Danang now slid forward compressing us against the forward bulkhead. I can only guess that the aircraft was over-powered for the load it was carrying. I cannot imagine how the pilot compensated for the continually changing center of gravity. Once at the Phu Bai terminal passengers were exchanged and the whole process was repeated with the aircraft arriving at Quang Tri about two hours after it had left Danang.

Once at Quang Tri the new arrivals were quickly cycled through MABS-39 and issued jungle utilities, green underwear, weapons, and liquor ration cards. Checking into the MATCU office we were greeted by Major Causey. I think I was the only controller that he assigned to MATCU-62X at Dong Ha from this group of new guys. It was still early in the day and since he had some administrative task to attend to at Dong Ha I rode in the back of his jeep with my sea bag and newly acquired organizational

equipment. I remember being impressed by the track mounted Army quad 50's and dual 20mm cannon guarding the North gate at Quang Tri. It was about halfway between Quang Tri and Dong Ha Major Causey had his driver stop as we neared a group of urchins that were trying to get our attention. One of the children had a dud illumination mortar round with him that the Major exchanged for a small amount of Piastres. He then proceeded to place the dud round in the back seat with me. When I asked if this was standard procedure he assured me that it was. I don't know that I have ever been happier to get to anyplace, as I was to get to Dong Ha that day.

Emergency Leave

An old friend, Don Eskam, smoothed my introduction to MATCU-62X. We had been through AC "A" school at Olathe together, and met again at MATCU-70. He had preceded me at Dong Ha by only a few days. I think the NCOIC was Bob Telford. A Captain Basher was there, but I don't know in what capacity. No matter how hard I try I cannot visualize the other members or even come close to remembering their names. I was soon checked in, given a tour of the MATCU area, and assigned to a crew. Within a day or so after checking in I was in my hootch just after dark when word was passed that the MABS-39 C.O. wanted to speak with me and a VMO-6 UH-1E helicopter was on its way to pick me up. No one would provide any additional information so I grabbed my gear and met the helicopter at the base of the tower. The crew chief on the right and the gunner on the left made room for me in the middle, and made sure I was secured to the aircraft. It was too noisy for conversation. Departure was to the East with a climbing circle to reach an altitude greater than 3000 'AGL before flying South to Quang Tri. The night was pitch-black by this time. I remember being astounded by the number of parachute flares in the air to the West of the corridor between Quang Tri and Dong Ha. I don't remember seeing any tracer rounds, this was a very quiet period in combat activity. Upon reaching Quang Tri the helicopter did not descend from its altitude until we had crossed the perimeter. After an un-eventful landing we air taxied to the "Seaworthy" line and shut down. I was given a guide to take me to the MABS-39 office. On arrival, I met with the Commander and was informed of the reason for my trip, and that I had been granted ten days emergency leave. It was decided that it was too late to frag another aircraft to take me back to Dong Ha so I was put up at MATCU-62 for the night. Everyone there was kind. I wish I could remember their names. Someone had a refrigerator with a case of cold Budweiser, and I was told to help myself. Sleep was fitful that night for several reasons, not the least of which was the outgoing mortar rounds that everyone else no longer noticed. In the morning I rode a 2 & ½ ton truck back to Dong Ha, grabbed my sea bag and proceeded to the air-freight office. I was soon booked on a C-123H to Danang.

On arrival at Danang I was told to change out of jungle utilities and booked on a commercial aircraft to Kadena. The only close to presentable uniform I had was a set of wash khakis, so I changed into them with the green raincoat covering my non-standard liberty uniform. I expected to be able to recover my stored sea bag from Camp Hansen and change into greens, but that was not to be. At Kadena I was rushed from one commercial aircraft to another, and with hardly an hour on the ground was enroute to

Norton AFB. The pilot had a headwind problem and elected to refuel at Elmendorf AFB in Anchorage, Alaska. Once on the tarmac the passengers were asked to de-plane while refueling was in progress. This was well before modern terminals and their jet-ways. We walked a good $\frac{1}{4}$ mile to the terminal in bitter cold, made even worse by my lightweight uniform. After an equally cold trek back to the aircraft the rest of the flight to Southern California was routine. At Norton some agency was able to change my MPC to greenbacks and I purchased a commercial ticket to Des Moines. The quickest flight was from Los Angeles International so I took the Air Force bus there. Once at the terminal I had to wait for the scheduled departure. The terminal was somewhat crowded and I tried to find an inconspicuous place to wait. Unfortunately two squared-away young Marine Lieutenants in spotless uniforms chose to wait near me. From their audible conversations I judged them to be going to where I had just come from. They seemed to come to the conclusion that I was just out of the brig and left me to my misery. Eventually it was announced that the airport had gone below departure minimums and that I would be bused back to Ontario for the flight. I did eventually get to Des Moines and spent the time dealing with family and lawyers. The flight back from Des Moines was via Denver, Phoenix, and Yuma where I stopped to see some friends. Then I was off to Travis AFB, Kadena, and Danang. The stay this time at Camp Hansen was minimal, and the flight from Danang was on a lightly loaded C-130 direct to Dong Ha. From the time I left Travis AFB I think only two days passed before I was back at Dong Ha.

Daily Life

The daily activity at MATCU-62X at Dong Ha in December of 1968 was controlled by the three-section watch system in effect. The tower/GCA crews worked two-day watches, two night watches, and then had two days free of ATC duty. The watch periods were from 0700-1600 and then 1600-0700. If I had the day watch breakfast would be from part of a C-ration. Finally the WWII C-rations that I had come to hate at Udorn in 1962 had been replaced by Cold War era C-rations canned in 1956, I think. If I did not have the day watch then it was a choice of a ten-minute hike down into and up-out of a snake infested ravine that separated the hootch area from the 3rd MARDIV headquarters area mess hall. If I did not care to hazard the ravine, then it was about a thirty-minute walk on an improved internal road to the same mess hall. We usually were able to manage to arrange for controllers on duty to have a break for lunch and dinner at the mess hall. For those that could not be spared, it was generally C-ration crackers and cheese/peanut butter on position. If I was not on watch I would occasionally attend the evening meal at the mess hall, but that was not our only source of sustenance. Each of the living areas had a small area that was in essence the kitchen. From the inventive and relentless scroungers we had a good supply of bartered food items. Cans of freeze-dried shrimp and freeze-dried tenderized beefsteak were particularly memorable. Air Force flight crews seemed to be willing to trade cases of food items that inexplicably had been damaged in flight, for a case of C-rations. I never could understand their desire for C-rations. The time not spent on duty was spent trying to sleep and recover from a night watch, or prepare for the coming night watch. Occasionally working parties were organized for some clean-up project. Our living area

was in what use to be the MAG-16 headquarters area, and as such the buildings were reasonably well constructed. The bunkers were also reasonable, and I don't remember ever seeing a sand bagging detail at work. Being a MATCU our diesel mechanics made sure we had a steady source of 60Hz AC. Most of the kitchens sported electric coffee pots and electric skillets. These appliances had been carefully handed down from one person to another as their tours ended.

You generally think of Vietnam as being hot, but in the winter in Northern I Corps it did get cold. Each hootch had an oil-fired heater that worked, after a fashion. I remember sitting around the hootch in an old wool sweater that I had brought back from the States. The MATCU, in all, did not have it bad. Again, I stress that this was late in the conflict, and all those that came before us had paid dearly for the conveniences we took for granted. There was a Vietnamese laundry that we could use. It was on the North side of the runway, past the POW compound, and just outside the internal perimeter gate. The returned clothes were clean, but they were dried within a building that was heated by burning water buffalo chips. I am sure that they were not as odorous as I imagined, but I never felt real clean wearing them. There was a Vietnamese run barbershop next to the laundry. I used it once or maybe twice, but did not feel real comfortable that close to a VC suspect with a razor. Someone in the MATCU started selling haircuts so I used his services the rest of the time. We shaved with cold water in helmets at the central water buffalo (iron, not the chip producer). We did have the luxury of an occasional hot shower. A schedule as to the availability of hot water was posted. There was a small PX in a hootch near the mess hall that sold health and comfort items. Occasional trips were made to Danang to the Freedom Hill PX, and you could usually get someone on the trip to purchase items for you.

Social activities were centered on the Staff and Officers Club that we contributed our liquor rations to. Many pleasant hours were spent there playing cards or just BS'ing. As was usual the club was decorated with Playboy centerfolds, and at sometime an artist had painted an original work defaming the ancestry of Ho Chi Minh. Each of the major commands supported some sort of club within the Dong Ha combat base. The only fancy one I remember going to once was the Air Force GCI site "WATERBOY" club. It had nice concrete construction, jukebox, slot machines, pizza, and other food items. This was just what I had come to expect from the Air Force. We were not exactly asked to leave and not come back, but the reception left no doubt that the amenities were intended for Air Force personnel only. Again, just what I had expected from the Air Force. All in all life was pretty good at Dong Ha during this time. The VC and NVA were regrouping after TET 68 and the Paris peace talks were in progress. Please don't think that life was always like this at Dong Ha. I was very lucky to have enjoyed such a quiet time.

Things that went "BOOM" in the night

The introduction to Dong Ha included the usual briefings from the old hands. Be careful not to pick up any unexploded ordnance still left over from the September detonation of the ammunition dump. For years I thought that the explosion had just

occurred a month or so earlier, and not in September of 1967. Useful information was to watch out for the open trench shelters that had been dug every hundred yards or so between the MATCU living area and the runway. It would have been very painful to inadvertently fall into one of them. These shelters provided a place to avoid injury in the event of a NVA rocket attack. In December of 1968 these attacks had only recently slowed. The trenches were a constant worry as you made your way between the two MATCU areas at night in low or no light conditions.

I would imagine that everyone new to combat conditions is a bit jumpy and responds easily to loud noises. I was no different, and even though I had been told about, and I had seen the 81mm mortar position halfway down the ravine behind the living area, every time that it fired I was startled. They were part of the Southern perimeter defense team and fired on-call illumination over the top of the living area. It was several weeks before I did not react when I heard their sharp "THUMP", and then some old salts "AW, THAT'S ONLY OUTGOING, YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN HERE WHEN" About the time I got used to them they shifted positions and I did not see or hear them again.

It was always an amazing sight to watch the horizons at night. Starting in the West you could identify Cam Lo, then to the West Northwest Con Tien, and finally to the North Camp Carroll by the almost constant parachute illumination flares. On Christmas 1968, New Years 1969, and Tet 1969 constant streams of tracers fired vertically added a unique beauty to the not so festive scene. I don't think that the expenditure of ammunition was limited to the Vietnamese.

One of the most vivid memories I have of this time is that of either a "SPECTRE" or "SNOOPY" fixed wing gunship firing its either a 20mm or 7.62mm gatling gun from a low level left hand orbit at some target on the ground. I could stand on the ridge south of the living area overlooking the Southern perimeter and watch these aircraft work over a target between Dong Ha and Quang Tri. The tracer rounds were so close together that they looked like a bright red line. The aircraft stayed out of the Dong Ha traffic patterns, and as far as I know we never made voice contact with them. Because of their rate of fire one would remain on station only a short while before being relieved by another. One night in January 1969 we did monitor a tactical frequency and listened to the pilot's side of the conversations between a "BASKETBALL" C-130 flare ship and the ground commander they were supporting. They managed to loiter on station about three hours before expending their load of parachute flares. The pilot apologized for having to leave before sunrise.

One night in late January or early February 1969 I was alone in the control tower when a series of bright loud explosions erupted to the East and Southeast. I remember the rapidity of the explosions was such that I could not identify an individual point of detonation, and the glare was widespread. The concussive force was not enough to cause problems, but you knew it was there. I announced on guard channel that Dong Ha was taking incoming, and that the tower would be off the air. We had no traffic, and there was none scheduled. This was not an uncommon traffic situation at night at this

time. I left the tower rapidly via the metal stairs. We had a one-inch rope strung at about a forty-five degree angle between the tower and the ground that could have been used, but I did not feel that threatened. The barrage continued, and I met the TSQ-18 crew of controllers and technicians on the way to the large underground bunker just behind the TSQ-18. About the time that everyone had finished stumbling down the steps to the buried conex box the explosions stopped. Ever mindful of the fateful stories of what happens to those who leave a shelter too soon I waited a few minutes, and when there was no additional activity, we re-manned the TSQ-18 and tower. Quang Tri approach wanted all the details, but we had no damage or equipment outages to report. The whole thing was over within five minutes, and I don't know that the sleep of those in the living area was even interrupted. In the morning the relief informed us that it had been no big deal. At some later time that day it was rumored that the cause had been an Army artillery unit having a real bad day, but no official mention of this occurrence was ever made. It was just one of those Dong Ha nights when something went "BOOM".

Air Traffic Control Operations

Don Eskam had one crew, I had one, but I cannot remember who had the third crew, and other than Corporal Howland, a tower controller, I cannot remember anyone that was on my crew. Don and I were both Staff Sergeants, but I don't remember there being any senior SNCOs in the ATC side of the MATCU. I don't remember a tower chief, a radar chief, or an operations chief. Not much went wrong, but when it did, it seemed as if the chain of command was direct between the crew chief and the OIC (Who I can now visualize, but still cannot name).

Air traffic was generally slow; the only permanently based squadron was a detachment of O-1 FAC's from the Army's 220th Recon Airplane Company (Cat Killer). Their ramp area was adjacent to the MATCU and their operations were simple in and outs. Air Force C-130s and C-123Hs (Bookey or Toomey) made multiple logistic flights daily, but I rarely saw more than one on the ground at any one time. The Air Force made an effort to not provide the NVA with a tempting target. This was a lesson learned from previous years. Aircraft from the Marine squadrons at Quang Tri would occasionally stop in and refuel at the TAFDS site just east of the tower, but again they did not loiter, and I never saw them RON. HMM-164 (Spanish Fly), HMM-165 (Lazy Boy), HMM-462 (Space), and VMO-6 (Sea Worthy) were the flying squadrons in ProvMAG-39. The two HMMs flew H-46s, the HMM flew H-53s, and VMO-6 operated O-1s, UH-1s, and OV-10s. From time to time an isolated type of Army aircraft would arrive, sometimes a C-7 Caribou or U-6 Beaver. We had a VMGR-152 (Basket Ball) C-130 land and depart several times a week. There was no pattern work. Generally all approaches were made straight in to Runway 25 from the East, and all departures were from Runway 7 to the East. The artillery pits west of the combat base made pilots leery of go-arounds, or missed approaches. Only the Cat Killer O-1's would make a left base entry to Runway 7 when they were returning from a mission over the DMZ. The helicopters did pretty much what they wanted, and we kept everyone else out of their way. The only unusual standard operation was a Marine O-1 FAC from VMO-6 that

would make a very low altitude message drop into the 3RD MARDIV headquarters. He never interfered with traffic; it was just unusual to watch.

Once, the tower received a call from a Cat Killer FAC. The pilot stated he had a rough running engine and wanted to land as soon as possible. His stated position put him just south of the DMZ about six miles north of the field. He was issued instructions to enter a left base for Runway 7 and to report one mile north. Traffic was not a factor. Those of us in the tower started to watch for the aircraft, not really expecting to see it for a while. We couldn't see the aircraft, but we sure knew where he was. Circling above the O-1 was a flight of F-4's, gear down, flaps down each element separated by about 1000' vertically. I think their smoke trails could be seen all the way to Quang Tri. Once the O-1 had the field in sight and landing was assured the F-4's re-grouped and departed, without ever contacting the tower. From their markings they were either Navy or Marine, but I have no idea from which squadron.

As far as I remember we never had to use the crash crew for their intended purpose. They had some sort of hybrid truck(s), not the usual MB-1s or MB-5s, and some sort of tracked vehicle for use if they had to leave the immediate runway area. Crash crew controlled the runway lights, and we needed some time to get them all lit. At times smudge pots filled in where part of the circuit was damaged. There was no approach lighting. One night we were notified that crash crew was needed to illuminate a landing zone in front of the tower with the headlights of their trucks. An Army helicopter was inbound with wounded members of a recon team tied to an extraction ladder. The pilot of the Army UH-1E intended to hover out of ground effect and allow ground personnel to assist with the removal of the injured on the ladder. It worked as was expected. The UH-1E had bullet holes through its rotor blades and whistled loudly. The pilot had his hands full maintaining a stable hover as the weight on the ladder kept changing. His crew chief did a great job keeping him centered over the illuminated runway area. When the last soul was removed from the ladder, the pilot just let the aircraft settle to the runway and shut down. His rotor blades were jury-rigged with ordnance tape and he departed an hour or so later. Nothing was ever mentioned about this operation, but it must have been SOG. We had an occasional Vietnamese H-34 (King Bee) in the area.

On a slightly lighter note, there is the story of the "Green Pickle Award". I don't know how far back in the history of Dong Ha Tower this started, but it was alive and well when I was there. The "Green Pickle" was an expended 106mm Recoilless Rifle shell casing painted lime green. It was lettered with the call sign of the current recipient, with past awardees memorialized on the back. Corporal Howland seemed to have been in charge of the award. The recipients were the flight crews, usually Air Force that had performed the greatest number of touch and goes while attempting to make a single full stop landing. Bookey 750 was awarded the "Green Pickle" while I was there. The pilot had his picture taken while Corporal Howland presented the award. It seemed to improve the morale of all involved, and was an endless source of interest for the controllers who judged the landings. With only 3000' of aluminum plank matting 75' wide (I think) the runway was a difficult target for the larger aircraft.

Weather observations were provided by a very small army detachment that was associated with the Cat Killer FACs. I don't remember a visibility chart in the tower so the weather unit must have made all of those observations when we went IFR. We also did not have an organic SAR helicopter (Pedro). If we lost an aircraft outside of the runway area we would have had to frag one of the Quang Tri aircraft for the rescue mission.

One thing about working with the MATCU, we had no problem diverting a willing pilot to haul personnel between Dong Ha and Quang Tri, or Dong Ha and LZ Stud (Vandergrift). The MATCU operated a small detachment of tower controllers and radio technicians at the remote LZ about half way between Cam Lo and Khe Sanh West of Dong Ha. At least twice a week someone from the MATCU would be tasked to deliver mail and comfort items to the LZ.

GCA was usually very simple. A straight in TACAN approach had been designed to Runway 25. Quang Tri Approach would notify us well in advance of any proposed inbound aircraft and a thirty-degree turn from the TACAN approach would usually be enough to identify the aircraft. This turn was usually a necessary turn to intercept the extended runway centerline. Radio contact was usually established about the time the aircraft left the IAF out over the Tonkin Gulf. No attempt was made to establish a radar hand-off between the two facilities. Our UPS-1 medium range surveillance radar was never operational. I don't think it was a technical problem, we just were not allowed to use it. This meant we had no IFF/SIF, and relied only on the TPN-8 radar in search mode to vector aircraft to the FAC. The two TPN-8 radars were well maintained, as were the radios. While I was there I was not aware of any equipment outages. The TPN-8 radar worked well in light rain and fog, but with no MTI and only FTC and STC to remove clutter trying to vector an aircraft in heavy rain was difficult, if not impossible. Luckily those times when the scope was wiped out by heavy rain there was either no traffic or the weather was at or above TACAN minimums. I made several approaches each week, but the traffic volume was nowhere near what I had been use to. All approaches were to a full stop only, and were generally requested by air logistics aircraft.

One incident comes to mind. I was working in the tower early one morning when I noticed that the smoke from the daily burning of the residue from the four-holers instead of rising was being trapped under, what was later determined to be, about a 300 foot inversion layer. This really doesn't sound like much, but when you consider that the combat base covered a huge area and that there were literally thousands of four-holers this was a lot of smoke being trapped. There was no traffic anticipated so when the ceiling and visibility lowered below VFR requirements it was no big deal. Apparently the inversion layer also affected Quang Tri since they were also soon being reported as IFR. I had another qualified tower controller relieve me and headed to the TPN-8 shelter. The only other person in the TSQ-18 was the flight data operator monitoring the landlines. I verified the alignment of the TPN-8 PAR centerline and glidepath cursors and selected the Quang Tri Approach Control frequency, just to listen to what was going

on. I did this quite often. I was surprised to hear Sea Worthy 97-1 a VMO-6 O-1 making repeated and unanswered calls for assistance. To this day I do not know why Quang Tri Approach did not answer him. I could identify a single target about seven miles Northeast of Dong Ha, so I called Sea Worthy 99-1 on guard channel and asked him to contact Dong Ha GCA on one of our frequencies. He immediately contacted me and declared emergency fuel state. He was VFR above the smoke layer at 5000' with two souls on board. I made one turn to identify the aircraft that placed him on a vector to intercept. Sometime during this I had sent the flight data operator to get the duty officer, so this left me as the only person in the TSQ-18. I had started the O-1 down as soon as I had it identified it, but it was well above the glidepath most of the way through the approach. From the pilot's tone of voice it left no doubt that I did not have any time to box the aircraft for a proper glidepath intercept. The pilot tracked the assigned headings well and was on course from about four miles on in. My problems started at about 3 1/2 miles when I heard a C-130 taxi by on the runway. I knew the tower had not been notified that an approach was in progress, and the flight data operator had not yet returned with the duty officer. I selected tower frequency and informed them of the emergency. The C-130 was really no factor since they would hold him in the warm up ramp off the approach end of Runway 7. I received landing clearance over the landline at about two miles when the duty officer arrived. The aircraft tracked on course, and by now, on glidepath until the decision height. At this point he started to deviate, I issued the standard missed approach command, but kept giving instructions. The pilot made contact with the tower when he found a place to park his aircraft, off to the side of Runway 25 about 1000' from the threshold. He did not have the fuel left to fly to Quang Tri, a distance of some five miles, so his squadron dispatched a fuel truck. While they were waiting for a fuel truck to make the journey from Quang Tri the pilot and his AO walked down to the tower and I had a chance to meet briefly with them. The AO's eyes were still saucers, and he had a death grip on his high dollar gyro-stabilized monocular. He was worried about leaving it in the aircraft. The pilot did not seem fazed by the whole thing, but did thank me for the approach. He had launched on an early morning sneak-and-peek and had not expected to encounter IFR conditions upon his return. I never heard anything more about this, and never could figure out why the Army FACs would not refuel his aircraft. This was not the best approach I ever made, but it was the only one that I think had to be successful. This guy did not have anyplace else he could go, and did not have the fuel to even taxi very far. I've always been amazed at the role chance played in this. We did not routinely monitor the approach control frequencies, and there was no requirement for us to monitor the airspace. I'm glad that it worked out OK, and I hope that the pilot survived the rest of the war. I think he used up a lot of his luck allotment that day.

End Thoughts

For whatever reason several Staff NCOs, me included, were assigned to attend the 0800 brief held at the 3RD MARDIV headquarters each morning. At sometime during the brief the daily password challenge and response was issued. We were to write it down, and then give to the ATC office when we returned. The word had been passed that the proper uniform at these briefings was full combat gear, including weapons. I

have no idea why. The briefing area was only a short distance from the mess hall and no such uniform requirements existed there. But, not one to question SOP I would rise early on the days I had the briefing duty and dress appropriately. This meant the pistol belt with canteen, first aid pouch, .45 caliber magazine holder, K-Bar, and service weapon, was covered by the flak-vest. After strapping the field protective mask to my leg I would don the helmet and make my way to the briefing hootch. It was a good idea to be early as there were usually a large number of attendees and briefers. The seats were reserved for field grade officers, all the rest stood in the back and jostled for a view of the maps and charts. Getting there early allowed me to find an inconspicuous place in the rear. I must have been successful as no one ever challenged my right to be there. The only reason I even remark on these briefings is that they were for the Commanding General of the 3Rd Marine Division; at that time it was Major General Raymond Davis a recipient of the Medal of Honor. He questioned the briefers closely and if any points were unclear he would demand amplification from one or more of the regimental or battalion commanders present. I have always felt honored to be present at such historical meetings. It was an experience I will never forget. I also had the opportunity to observe my first commanding officer Homer S. Hill meet with Major General Davis. I had served with then Lt. Colonel Hill when he was the CO of the Marine Detachment on the USS Princeton LPH-5 in 1959. Now, here he was a Brigadier General and the Assistant Wing Commander of the 1ST MAW. A retinue of advisors always accompanied General Hill, so I never tried to speak with him. He's passed on now and I regret never having taken advantage of the opportunity.

Mail from home was always welcome. Normal delivery time was only about two weeks. This was a real improvement from the month or so earlier in the conflict. Care packages were a constant source of enjoyment. If someone in the hootch received a large package he suddenly had more friends than usual. I received one care package from relatives that lived in New Jersey. Their concept of a care package was to have Bergdorf-Goodman prepare and ship something. What I received would have been appropriate at some English tea party. They were nice people so I never said anything to them except thank you. The best care package of all was sent to a friend who was from Texas. He graciously shared the large bag of tortilla chips and several cans of jalapeno peppers. I think that this was the first time that I had been introduced to this combination.

At some point the PX had a large multi-band short-wave radio for sale. I bought it with the idea that I could pick up Hanoi Hanna. I never could, and ended up selling it to a technician when I found it too large to carry home with me. We did receive the AFRTS radio station, and it was enjoyable and informative. During certain hours at night the small TV in the club would receive the TV signal from the AFRTS TV station in Saigon. Some news and old TV shows. Legend has it that the signal was relayed to Northern I Corps by a Navy EC-121 in orbit mid-country, but I think that was just legend. Pacific Stars and Stripes was always present, sometimes you could actually read it in the week it was published. The articles were well written, the news was recent, and the comics great.

Towards the end of my tour the MATCU decided to throw a picnic. Steaks were acquired from the mess hall, and beer and sodas iced down. The day selected was a Sunday, and the weather was clear and dry. This was unusual for late February. A volleyball net was set in place, and various teams selected. I don't know where the charcoal came from, but there was enough to fuel a large grill. The steaks were huge. Each one had to be well in excess of a pound. Arrangements were made for the relief of the Marines on duty so that they could also have a steak. I believe even the two compound dogs; Arty and Morty were well fed this day. The war had remained quiet for several weeks, and all of us were exposed in the open with our attention diverted towards the steaks, beer, and volleyball. All of a sudden there occurred a loud explosion, and we started looking for cover. We looked towards the direction of the explosion, but could see no secondary indications of a problem. Then motion caught our eyes as we spotted a flight of two Navy or Marine F-4s that had just broken the sound barrier east of the field. They were at about 4000' and heading South at a great rate of speed. I've never seen F-4s not leave a smoke trail, but there was no evidence of one following these two. I think they just wanted to say hello, in their own fashion to the Marines on the ground this beautiful day in Northern I Corps.

Monograph by James McClurg MGySgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 24, 2004.)

I served two separate tours in Vietnam. The first tour was from February of 1966 through March of 1967. I was a Sergeant and worked in the control tower at Chu Lai with MATCU-67.

When I first arrived at Chu Lai the MATCU was still set up on the west side of the east runway at midfield. Later in the year when MAG-13 moved in and the west field opened the MATCU moved the radar site over to the west runway. The control tower did not move to the west field until the radar site was in position, and then we moved to a new tower that was built on the north end of the west runway. We could see aircraft on the west runway without a problem, but aircraft rolling out on the east runway 14 were hard to see. The east side was used mostly for the MAG-12 A-4s, as was the crosswind runway. After the west runway opened radar approaches were made to it only. We had radar approaches to both runway 14 and runway 32 so GCA and approach changed runways when the tower changed the runway. Though we had three separate runways, there was just one pattern. The pattern kept aircraft over the ocean on downwind, no matter which runways were in use. The crosswind runway (3/21) was used in VFR weather only.

I remember one time an A-4 departing on the east runway lost its load of 500-pound bombs on takeoff.

I was aware that MAG-36 and its helicopters worked out of Ky Ha, but we had very little to do with their controllers. I think that MAG-36 had their own controllers, as I don't remember any from our MATCU working there. The only Ky Ha controller I remember is SSgt Ron "Hook" Fay.

While I was with MATCU-67 I was promoted to SSgt.

My second tour in Vietnam started in November of 1968. I was with MATCU-66 at MCAF Futenma, and then was reassigned to MATCU-62. I worked in both the control tower and GCA at Quang Tri. In the late spring of 1969 I extended my tour and was given a 30-day special leave. I missed the rocket attack that hit Quang Tri in June.

At Quang Tri I only remember making GCA approaches to runway 35.

During my tour with MATCU-62 I was assigned to LZ Vandegrift. I was told that I was to be the first NCOIC of the ATC detachment at LZ Vandegrift. Prior to my being assigned there had always been an officer assigned to lead the detachment. LZ Vandegrift was busy, with many O-1s and helicopters operating from there, and stopping by to refuel.

I also had an opportunity to fly with one of the helicopter squadrons for a month while I was at Quang Tri. That was an active month. I earned 8 Air Medals.

Just after Quang Tri took approach control from the Air Force in August of 1969 a typhoon came in and caused a few problems. I remember walking with Ernie Nelson in the hootch area. He had just arrived and had only one clean and dry set of utilities, which he was wearing. A sheet of corrugated tin ripped off a hootch and in dodging it Ernie slipped and fell into a pool of water about four inches deep. We had an on-base laundry facility, but it still took two or three days to get clean laundry back.

I was the MATCU-62 Embarkation NCO so I accompanied the equipment on the LST that took it to Chu Lai. This was in the fall of 1969. When the MATCU got to Chu Lai some of the controllers went TAD to MATCU-67, but I got there so late that I just had orders back to the states.

Monograph by Roger A. McIntosh Captain USMC (Ret.) (Combined from E-Mails on February 2, 2004 and edited on May 16, 2004)

I was at wing from Dec. of 69 to Aug. of 70. The MATCUs were still in place when I left. My immediate predecessor at wing was Jim Hardy, who became the CG's Aide de Camp. I'm trying to recall the issues I dealt with during my tenure at 1st Wing. Not much was done by me involving the drawdown of the MATCUs. My jobs were to: Assign incoming personnel to MATCUs as needed by MOS, coordinate save-a-plane information (the RVN artillery was notorious for firing missions without ever telling us), coordinate Marine air control asset information with 7th Air force and USARV. It seems to me that the MATCUs pretty well took care of themselves as far as operations and maintenance. Rudi Nebel had Marble Mountain and Bud Harry had Chu Lai and both did a great job. Much time was spent funneling messages between the MACS outfit on Monkey Mountain and the TACC. The one burning issue I recall was the TACAN at An Hoa was never really reliable during the time I was there. When I went into the job a LtCol was the ACO and I was his assistant. When he left to go home the job had been reduced in importance to the point that I simply replaced him and at the end of my tour we were all planning the turnover of I Corps to the Army. LtGen Melvin Zaise, USA, took control at Red Beach just before I left.

I can't recall ever having anything to do with the Wing CEO. The only time I had any contact was as an OIC and at the group/air station level. The ATCO, pronounced "at-co" did control the transport ops of the wing. He was responsible for "teeny weenie airlines", the C-130's based out of Danang. My billet was Air Control O and covered MATCUs, MACS, Hawk Batteries and such. We advised the CG on placement, personnel and integration with other services operations.

On ECCM from a Wing G-3 approach. We were very aware of the NVA's ability to monitor and interfere with our radio frequencies. A tactical call sign was rotated daily for the emergency identification of individual aircraft. We did know of an attempt to divert the C-130 aircraft carrying Gen. Walt enroute from Okinawa to Danang. A false TACAN signal was used to lure the a/c over an area where a SAM could reach it. The pilot detected the attempt and reported it. Rudi Nebel reported an intrusion by the NVA over an ATC net set up for use at MMAF. He said they came up on frequency speaking very good English. There was a severe shortage of KY-28 secure radios for general use and frequency allocation was strictly controlled. My guess is that there were not enough frequencies to be able to effectively change them and doing so would cause confusion among all the air elements operating in I Corps.

Red Beach was a real place. It was HQ for the Third Marine Amphibious Force, and the beach area North of Danang where the Marine forces first came ashore. When I was there LtGen McCutchen was CG. The Coast Guard also had a HQ there. Two stories about Red Beach; I almost received a speeding ticket from a first Division MP while driving there from Danang in an old jeep that would not go over 25 MPH without the front end shaking off. Told the MP I was from Wing and if he wrote such a foolish ticket in a war zone, he would walk the rest of the war. I went up there another

time to be interviewed by a Brigadier Gen about using CH-53's to tow busted tanks and Amtracks off the battlefield. Strangely enough, the CH-53 comes with ship towing gear. The theory is a pair of 53's can attach cables to a ship the size of a destroyer and pull it. The G-3 sent me to Red Beach to meet with this one star grunt. He was planning for the pull down of Marines from I Corps and had heard of this capability. He wanted the Wing to "clean up the battlefield" by towing in busted tanks and LVTs. When I mentioned sliding friction he ended the meeting with a "Just forget it."

Gen. Thrash in April of 1970 directed an operation that was the first tactical use of CH-53's. It was planned in our G-3 bunker. We soaked an NVA Division HQ with napalm and torched it off with WP rockets. A quick test before the raid proved that the 55 gal drums dropped from 1500' would burst. The drums came from the previously talked about Red Beach area, and the napalm was mixed at Marble Mt. The Air Force B-52 bombing raids were called "Archlights". We named the CH-53 attack a "Thrashlight" in honor of the general.

I don't recall any status of forces agreement on airspace. The US, I'm guessing did pretty much what it wanted in setting up the air control system there. There were civil Vietnamese air traffic controllers who worked alongside ours, and everything was set up "by the book." I have no recollection of special VFR rules being in force.

I can't remember if the detachment at An Hoa was from Marble or Chu Lai. They had the TACAN and a portable tower planted on top of a mound of dirt. The generators were in a dugout area and the crew had a bunker dug into the dirt mound under the tower. I remember when I was there they had a sign going into the bunker that read "Rat count - 78." The base was choppers and OV-10s, had an aluminum plank runway. A battery of 175MM arty operated there also. No GCA.

In regard to the S-2 hitting the gear at Chu Lai; when I was there in 69-70 the S-2 was still sitting out in back of the unit. I knew Jerry Faust, but don't remember anything about him being involved. In 69 & 70 L. E. "Bud" Harry was the OIC. He and I were good friends. He died of cancer in Savannah after he retired and bought an Ace Hardware store, and his wife died within two years of him. They are buried in Beaufort National Cemetery. They had two children who played with my kids at Beaufort, and I have not been able to find either one of them.

On MATCU-60 - I was OIC in Iwakuni from Aug. to Dec. of 69. John O'Hey was my NCOIC. Group treated that slot as a command billet and I had a Change of Command ceremony when I came in and had Summary Court Martial authority, which I used once.

Monograph by GySgt Joseph E. Medico, Sr. USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 3, 2003 and June 10, 2004.)

I joined MATCU-67 in May of 65, as a Radio Tech. Captain John F Keane was the OIC. Eldon Grebey was the NCOIC; Jim "RIP" Newton was the Maintenance chief. We had an AN/TSA-13 as the tower. Now my age is showing. It's been 38 years since that time period.

My MOS was 2851. I also took care of the TACAN AN/URN 3 & 6, plus the URD-4 direction finder plus the towers. Captain Keane was there all the time I was there. I arrived about a month after the invasion of Chu Lai. They had about 2/3rds of the matting runway completed by then. We had TEDs for UHF and I cannot remember the nomenclature of the VHF radios. Arc 27's and ARC1's were used in the CPN and MSQ approach vans.

I went from there to MCAS El Toro and was assigned H & HS-3 as maintenance chief. After a while after serving on the CG's speaking staff I was assigned to the Long Beach Naval shipyard as the Marine Corps liaison officer for the AN TSA-28 portable control tower. This had all 400-cycle equipment, i.e. ARC-52's and is VHF type radios. It initially had no air conditioning for the equipment shelter. When I spoke up at the first meeting at the shipyard and told them it was not worth the powder to blow it to hell. I did not know there was a Major from HQ in DC. I guess when he went back and told them what I said then I got the job. When the six towers were finished they offered me MSgt to take the six back to NAM. I already had my retirement papers in. They said they could take care of that. BUT when I went home to higher headquarters (WIFE) she said if they wanted me with two broken legs go for it. Guess what I did?????????

When I was on the Generals speaking staff the film library at El Toro had a film in which the MATCU with its equipment was shown in detail. I could never find a copy of it. Maybe someone in at HQ in DC can help. It was made in 1965. One other item one time Nixon, when he was running for president, visited Chu Lai. He shook hand with Captain Keane. After Nixon left I said to the Captain. "It's funny as hell that Nixon came to Chu Lai to shake hands with JFK". Seems Kennedy and the Captain had the same initials.

I was there, as you know, in the same hootch as John O'Hey, Rip Newton, Gene Neblung, and Davy Crocker plus the refrigerator, when we got it back from the MABS CO who thought he deserved it more than the MATCU. I think we had twelve in all bunking. I know Van Lafoon was in my tent on the beach I can't remember if he was with us in the hootch.

If I remember correctly the OIC at Iwakuni was a Captain Miller. He showed up at Chu Lai one day and had a talk with Captain Keane. He promised he would send the best down to MATCU-67. If I remember correctly we are still waiting for them to show up. Captain Keane, now LtCol, was one of the OIC's. I probably gave him a few headaches once in a while. I had orders to Iwakuni. When I went there to check in the 1st Sgt grabbed the phone, called the tower to hold the C-135 that they had one more

passenger. ME. They drove me to the plane as it was supposed to be the last MAG-12 plain out of Iwakuni. I showed up at Chu Lai in tropical uniform etc. All set for combat.

The only units on our side of the runway were MATCU, the most people and the crash crew. If attacked they wanted us to run to the other side of the runway with the rest of the group pointing rifles etc at us. And we could not load our weapons until an attack was occurring

At Chu Lai a C-130 ran off the runway and in its travel hit some trip flares and burnt all to hell. If it had traveled a few yards more it would have hit the CPN-4. The pilot was Vietnamese and probably not use to landing on the marston matting or whatever they called it.

Fortunately I was on emergency leave at the time of the sapper raid. When I got back to Chu Lai I tried to tell the guys that the only reason he sappers tried was that I was on leave. They knew better than to tangle with the ITALIAN STALLION. Now if you want to hear a lot of BULLS--- wait till they all read this. HA HA

Monograph by John "Jack" R. Mefford (Compiled from E-Mails on February 2, 2004)

I arrived at Rose Garden in the summer of 1972. Nam Phong (Rose Garden) was located about 30 miles South of Udorn. We put our troops on busses to Udorn for liberty. This was the only place that MAG 15 was permitted to go on liberty except for an occasional flight to Bangkok. Other cities in the country were off limits. We lived in strong back tents with wooden floors. A good friend of mine Harry Surplus was the Mess Sgt and as far as I was concerned put out real good food. The MATCU was located about half way between the two high-speed turn-off taxiways.

I spent about 11 months there much of that time I was as Acting Sgt Major of MABS 15. Capt Hollis had the MATCU with WO Anti as maintenance officer. I remember Hank Flood being there as one of the watch officers. We had a TSQ-18, Wicks tower and TACAN. All was operational. I thought the UPS 1 in the TSQ-18 was good. Whatever we had at Cherry Point was very good. But I guess good is in the eye of the beholder. A lot was based on how good the techs were. I guess I was always blessed with good ones.

We had our own little chunk of airspace, and accepted hand offs from Udorn Approach Control and Korat Approach Control.

When Nixon sent the B-52s North we became an emergency recovery field for them. One of the first nights we were working a battle damaged B-52 that was on fire. The crew had to bail out before we could get him on the runway. Our SAR people picked up the entire crew okay.

Another night we landed one that the tail gunner was wounded. I understand that there is no way to get back to the tail gunners position while in flight. Anyway we landed the aircraft and they got him out and sent him on his way to the hospital. The airplane then took off and went to U Tapao.

One night while Chuck Henderson was crew chief they landed one and it stayed at Rose Garden for several weeks while they repaired it. It flew out the day the Bob Hope show was on the base.

Our F-4s and A-6s would run bomb runs over Vietnam. After they pulled out of Vietnam we had all of these bombs left over so we started to bomb Cambodia. Long flight and our pilots would have to air refuel from our KC-130 tankers. Most of these flights were A-6s. Don't remember any accidents or much IFR weather. I think things kind of run together working 12-14 hour days 7 days a week.

I was on the advance party in 1973 when the Taskforce Delta returned to Iwakuni.

Monograph by E. A. "Ray" Mischock (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 23, 2004, edited on June 6, 2004, and entirely replaced by proposed HOTLINE Article on October 22, 2005.)

Contribution to "A History of Marine ATC in Vietnam 1962-1973"
By E.A. (Ray) Mischock

MATCU-68: Hue Phu Bai, South Vietnam March 1966-April 1967

I served with MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai, South Vietnam from March 1966 to April 1967. L.H. Smith and I reported in at Marble Mountain after flying from Okinawa on an Air force C-124 Globemaster that landed at Da Nang. We both came from instructor duty at the ATC Schools at NAS Glynco, Georgia. L.H. Smith was at the B School and I was at the GCA School. Jerry Bess was at Marble Mountain at the time we reported in. Jerry had reported in several days prior to our arrival. A small detachment from MATCU-68 was operating the tower at Marble Mountain and also gave support to incoming MATCU personnel. After a few days, the three of us flew up to Phu Bai in a Marine CH-37C. When we boarded the CH-37C, the crew chief passed us noise-suppression headsets to protect us from the noise emanating from the twin engines powering the heavy lift helicopter. The noise in that chopper was unbelievable, and ear shattering. We were very grateful for the headset. The flight up to Phu Bai was uneventful. However, we noticed after take-off, that the pilot flew easterly and took us over the South China Sea, and then turned northwest hugging the coastline. The crew chief explained that the high terrain located between Marble Mountain and Phu Bai was infested with VC, and aircraft took small arms fire unless they climbed high enough to be out of range of their weapons. As we flew along the coastline and looked at the landscape, it appeared that South Vietnam was a truly idyllic place. There were white sandy beaches, emerald blue water and lush green vegetation along the route. There also were several large inland lagoons dotted with small sampans, and what appeared to be large angular fish traps. Walt Gimple, NCOIC of MATCU-68 was on hand to greet us when we landed at Phu Bai. MATCU-68 had recently moved to Hue Phu Bai located about 40 clicks northwest of Marble Mountain to support HMM -163 and the 131st Army Aviation Company (Night Hawks). The Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron flew UH-34D helicopters, and the 131st Army Aviation Company flew OV-1 Mohawk fixed wing aircraft, mostly at night. The OV-1's call sign was Spud, and the HMM-163 helicopters call sign was Super Chief.

I remember shortly after arriving while we were still talking with Walt on the tarmac, a UH-1E Huey slick landed nearby. On board was a Special Forces Team that had just recovered several bodies of their teammates from a Special Forces Camp in the Ashau Valley. The camp located near the Laotian border and was lost when the 95th NVA Regiment and VC overran the camp earlier in March. Helicopters from HMM-163 pulled out most of the men during that evacuation, losing three UH-34 helicopters. LtCol House, CO of HMM -163 was piloting one of the choppers that were lost. After landing and picking up a full load of men, his A/C was disabled by ground fire just as he was lifting off. Being senior officer there, he took charge of the remaining men and

walked them out to safety. He received the Navy Cross and was up for the Congressional Medal of Honor. The recovery team told us that the NVA stuck the heads of the dead Americans on stakes, booby trap the bodies and placed them so that they could be observed from the air. The SF Team had to use grappling hooks to retrieve the bodies and get them into the chopper. This was my first encounter with body bags. In the coming months, I would see many more being unloaded from C-130 aircraft on the Phu Bai tarmac, usually late at night. That same day, a Marine C-130 landed and off-loaded an in-flight casualty on a flight from Dong Ha. Sadly, a Marine MSgt on his way home after completing his tour of duty received a fatal wound from that "Silver Bullet" which came through the belly of the aircraft as it was approaching Phu Bai for a landing.

Hue Phu Bai Airfield was located approximately 8 miles southeast of the city of Hue just off Highway 1. The runway was 09 and 27, 150 feet wide and 5,600 feet long. There was a permanent terminal building that had a four-story tower, with a waiting room and small restaurant on the ground floor. There also was an airfreight shed attached to the west side of the terminal building operated by the U.S. Air Force. Charlie Med was located across the road in front of the terminal building, and a detachment of Seabees quartered a mile or so south of the field. The terminal building was located mid-field on the south side of the runway and had a large aircraft parking ramp on the runway side. At each end of the parking ramp was a taxiway that intersected the runway approximately one-third distance from either end. After landing, many fixed wing aircraft would have to turn around and taxi on the runway to get to the taxiway. The parking ramp was large enough to hold several C-130 size aircraft. HMM-163 had a parking ramp for its helicopters with two taxiways to the runway on the southwest corner of the airport. MATCU-68 operations site was located mid-field, directly across from the terminal building, between the two taxiways, the parking ramp and the runway. There was a small unit from a Marine Air Control Squadron (GCI) located next to the runway approximately 100 yards east of the MATCU site. Their call sign was Water boy.

MATCU-68 had a TSQ-18 complex with two TPN-8 radar units. An ASR MMR with no working secondary radar (we worked with pure raw radar) a Wicks Tower, a long shed for our diesel generators and several squad tents. One TPN-8 radar transmitter site was housed in a geodesic dome. Later, Walt Gimple contracted to have a ready room built for us out of mud brick using local Vietnamese labor paid for out of our soft drink fund. We named the new ready room "The Alamo". (An Army SFC ATC controller who I worked with at the Army ATC School, Ft Rucker wrote me that the Alamo was still standing and in use after the Marines left Phu Bai). I remember that there were rats as big as jackrabbits prowling around our unit site at night. To take care of the problem, Hank Flood, one of our duty officers sent home for a powerful air pistol. Our living area was located approximately 150-200 yards from radar site on the other side of the west taxiway. We were quartered in an area next to the personnel from HMM-163 in squad tents, using wood pallets as a floor.

My first few days at Phu Bai were spent familiarizing myself with the TSQ-18, TPN-8 radar sets and the control area. Some of us were CPN-4 and FPN-36 controllers

and had not worked with the TSQ-18 Complex and the TPN-8 radar sets. Much time was spent reinforcing our position with sand bags. There was an abundance of sand, in fact we were situated on a big pile of sand and it dusted us constantly. Everyone helped to fill sand bags. Later, several of us were promoted to GySgts. I was on Gene Nebelung's crew and took the crew over when Gene returned to the states. Hank Flood was one of my duty officers and he also commanded a perimeter defense unit. Jerry Bess, Sam Sagarian and Willie Howe also had their turn as crew chiefs. We were on Port & Starboard watches until we obtained more personnel. The weather was six months of clear VFR, followed by six months of monsoon in which the weather was always IFR and many times at or below GCA minimums. We had a mixed bag of military air traffic. In addition to the local OV-1 and CH-34, there were C-130, C-124, C-123, C-47, A-1E, U-8, U-6, UH-1, Ch-46, and later CH-53 traffic. Occasionally a civilian Air Vietnam DC-9 would come in. Most of our traffic was Air Force and Marine C-130 aircraft out of Da Nang, Dong Ha and Khe Sanh. From Da Nang, C-130's would depart and climb out to Point X-ray (a TACAN fix) that was about 30 miles northeast of Da Nang. At Point X-ray, Da Nang departure would release the aircraft to contact us (we had no ground communication with Da Nang). This made it simple to give them a left turn for identification and put them on a long straight-in approach to runway 27 our primary IFR runway. The C-130 pilots came to trust our GCA controllers and made many landings in weather at or below GCA minimums. Don Feilen, who worked day watches because of our shortage of controllers made many of these approaches. I don't recall one aircraft making a missed approach on a GCA final during IFR weather while I was there. There was one C-130 pilot (Air Force) who made several missed approaches attempting straight-in TACAN approaches one VFR night with no moon. Our runway lights were out and we tried to get him to make a PAR approach and turn on his landing lights at 1/4 mile, but he eventually returned to Da Nang. An Air Force pilot of one of the C-130 aircraft told me that they often threw their A/C in full reverse prop when passing the runway threshold, 10-15 feet in the air when landing at Phu Bai and short strips. The C-130's never could make that last taxiway and always had to turn around and taxi on the runway.

MATCU-68 was chronically short of qualified radar approach and GCA controllers. When it was VFR and we could conduct training, the tactical aircraft didn't have time to shoot a GCA, and when it was marginal, the pilots wanted qualified controllers on the scope, and didn't want to hear "would you accept a supervised trainee". During VFR weather, I would spend more time in the tower with my tower crew. We used the Vietnamese tower in the terminal building and kept our TSA-11 tower located at the TSQ-18 site as a backup. There were several Vietnamese civilian controllers also operating with our Marines in the tower. They would mysteriously disappear whenever our perimeter came under attack usually from small arms fire. There was a Vietnamese NDB located in a building adjacent to the terminal building. Our maintenance personnel kept the NDB working. The Army OV-1 Mohawks at Phu Bai were not equipped with a TACAN NavAid, and had to use the NDB. There was one case when an OV-1 (Spud -21) contacted us for an approach around 0300 in the morning. The OV-1 was coming in from a mission over the Ho Chi Minh trail, and Laotian border area. He reported his position inbound as approximately 25 miles

northwest of Phu Bai heading 120 degrees. The ASR scope was clean except for one target tracking 120, but that target was about 15 miles southeast heading outbound from Phu Bai over the South China Sea. Spud -21 was immediately given a turn back to Phu Bai and we requested his fuel state. The pilot questioned the turn because he felt he was being turned away from Phu Bai with only 40-45 minutes of fuel remaining. He did not believe his radar position after his turn was observed. So we let make another turn on his own, and identified the direction of his turn and his present track. He had over-flown the NDB. We vectored him back to Phu Bai and he landed with about 20 minutes of fuel remaining. It was determined that the VC had a strong beacon on a boat off shore overriding the NDB at Phu Bai, according to Army sources.

A few weeks after arriving at Phu Bai, Wayne Haney, one of our controllers and a radar technician SSgt Harvey, was sent to Khe Sanh with an FPN-36 Quad Radar set to provide ATC and GCA service there. They were there until relieved by personnel from MATCU-62 that set up operations at Dong Ha. We continued to provide approach control service to Khe Sanh and Dong Ha without the luxury of ground communications. Don Carman and Jerry Bess worked approach control and provided this service with a lot of in-flight coordination. Aircraft landing at Khe Sanh or Dong Ha would be advised to contact the GCA there, bingo our frequency if no contact. We would then close that air space to IFR traffic until they departed and climbed high enough to re-establish radio & radar contact. Our control area for IFR operations began north of Da Nang to the DMZ, and from the Laotian boarder to the South China Sea, from the surface to 10,000 feet. We were always short of flight strips, and had to use them a second time by turning them over.

MATCU-68 took control of the base camp operations at Phu Bai from HMM-163, and ran the utilities and the clubs. Between watches Sam Sagarian and I tended bar at the "O" Club and Jerry Bess at the Staff Club. L.H. Smith became manager of the Staff Club and EM Club. A former Mess Sgt who got picked up as a 2nd Lt, became Mess Officer, and managed the "O" Club with our help. Sam and I got to know many of the HMM-163 pilots personally. Sam would occasionally play cards with them before the bar opened. I remember one incident receiving a call from one of them on a MedEvac flight from Dong Ha to Phu Bai late one pitch-black night, requesting a vector home. He reported having a bad case of vertigo. He recognized my voice and then it became a real personal matter. We got him home safely and he thanked me the next night at the club.

Several out-of-the-ordinary events happened. An Air America (CIA) Pilatus Porter PC-6 turbo prop made a short takeoff and bounced one wheel off our geodesic dome. It actually put a dent in the dome. Weeks later we got a visit from a CIA operative wanting information on the aircraft. The A/C was missing. We had a Navy F-4 make an emergency landing and sailed off the end of runway 9 in a cloud of dust. The pilot survived. After the engines were removed, an Army CH-54 Flying Crane airlifted the aircraft to Da Nang. We also had an A-1E make a wheels up landing also on runway 9. It fouled our runway for several hours until we got it removed through the efforts of the 3rd Division Motor Transport Section. This all happened during VFR conditions. One

unfortunate incident happened during a radar-monitored departure. Willie Howe was monitoring an OV-1 departing on runway 09. Radar contact was lost 2.9 miles east of the field and the scope was marked. A chopper was vectored to the spot and found that the OV-1 had crashed with no survivors. Ground fire was the blame.

There was an event that I still chuckle over. One bright and clear VFR day we got a call from an Air force C-140 Lockheed Jet Star out of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. They wanted to check out the TACAN NavAid and our GCA procedures. The TACAN, Channel 69 was installed and maintained by the U.S. Air Force and located at the west end of runway 27. They requested a GCA approach to be conducted by a qualified controller. They were instructed that the approach would be made using a 4-degree glide path because of reported ground fire in the local area. They insisted on a 3-degree glide path. Throughout the approach, their radio transmissions sounded as if the pilots were flying a corporate jet, sitting in an executive armchair, drinking coffee, smoking a cigar and having a causal chat with the controller. We gave them the requested 3-degree glide path with another warning about the ground fire. About three miles out on the GCA final the A/C pulled up abruptly and the pilot screamed over the Guard frequency that they took a round through their instrument panel. Bedlam reigned in the cockpit, and their voice patterns were several octaves higher and near hysterics. We requested their intentions with a blanket landing clearance. They requested a clearance direct to Clark AFB, and departed the area never to return. They must have spilled coffee all over themselves.

I remember waking up one night hearing thuds at a distance and found Jerry Bess sitting at the entrance of our hooch. There was a Marine artillery unit from the 11th Marines stationed nearby that conducted fire missions usually at night, so we were used to the sound of outgoing. We both quickly determined that this wasn't outgoing but INCOMING. Apparently the VC was aiming to mortar the HMM -163 helicopters parked adjacent to our living area. The first mortar rounds fell short in an empty field between Highway 1 and our quarters. The mortar rounds peppered the officer's two holer trap door head located near our perimeter defense wire. The next batch of mortar rounds fell well to the left of the helicopter parking area and into a Marine Supply Unit located west of the field. They must have readjusted their elevation but screwed up their azimuth. Unfortunately, several Marines were lost from the supply unit during that attack. If they had not changed their azimuth with the elevation correction, those rounds would have dropped right on top of us. Later we learned that a Quad 50 position on the perimeter of some 3rd Div unit, observed flashes from mortar tubes coming from a nearby village, and requested a fire mission. The mission was denied, because it was deemed a friendly village.

Late one morning I was on my way from the radar site to the tower. I had noticed earlier that morning that there were several ARVN armored cars and troops in ranks at the terminal building. Tower had called down to the TSQ-18 where I was that morning that a C-54 with South Vietnam in large letters painted on the fuselage had landed. A person from the A/C was taken with a military escort toward Hue. I was curious, and I stopped on my way to the tower at the C-54 boarding ladder. Just then, Nguyen Cao Ky

in a leather flight jacket, white scarf and carrying a swagger stick came over to me with his hand extended and said "How are you Sergeant". "Fine thank you", I said shaking his hand. He boarded the aircraft. I had a camera hanging on my shoulder and never thought of taking a photograph at that moment. Later we found out that President Ky had come to Hue that day for a political rally to shore up support for him in the upcoming election.

Across Highway 1 from our living area was an old French Army compound with permanent buildings being occupied by the U.S. Army 8th Radio Research Field unit. They had a bathroom building with hot and cold running water for their showers and flush commodes. We were living on the ground with a three holer trap-door head, cold-water showers and drinking water out of jerry cans. To get to the Army unit we would have to pass through our perimeter defense wire next to the officer's head and cross the empty field where the mortar rounds first landed, then cross Highway 1, and talk our way past the Army gate guard. At first this was no problem, and then the Army decided that we couldn't bring our weapons into their compound. We got around this for a while by surrendering our weapons to the gate guard for safekeeping. The Army then decided that the gate guard couldn't accept weapons. Always resourceful, we would stuff our holsters with an empty zipped dust cover most of us used to cover our 45 Cal pistols, making it look like we were still armed to a casual VC observer. I never felt really comfortable outside our perimeter wire without a weapon, but the lure of a warm shower and to sit on a stateside flush commode was just too much. This Army unit had air-conditioned house trailers for their living quarters and believe or not, a swimming pool.

Special Forces people who were stationed at a nearby MACV compound invited several of our SNCO's to a steak dinner at their club. The compound was located a ½ mile or so northwest of the Phu Bai perimeter next to Highway 1. This was an ARVN boot camp overseen by MACV. We piled into a truck and drove over one afternoon. We all had our side arms. I was with Jerry Bess, L.H. Smith and several others having a good time. The steaks were great and there was much fellowship with the Army. My crew was coming on duty the next day so I decided to leave early before it got dark and walk back to our perimeter. I did not want to break up the good time they were having to have one of them drive me back to the compound. I walked through the MACV gate, the ARVN sentry popped me a salute and I turn left on to Highway 1 and started to walk back to our perimeter. Then it struck me like a ton of bricks. Highway 1 was absolutely deserted in both directions and I was alone walking with my back to the setting sun, up to a roadblock with wire barricades, guarded by an M-48 tank, and a bunch of 3rd Division Marines. I remember it was so quiet I could hear my boots hitting the deck. I decided to walk in the center of the road, and as I approached the roadblock, I could see the Marines getting excited and scurrying around getting into a defensive position. The hair in the back of my neck started to bristled. Thinking fast, I began to sing as loud as I could a song I remembered when I was with the 1st Marine Regiment in Korea. "The First Marines went over the hill, parlay voue, the Second Marines went over the hill, parlay voue, the Third Marines stayed behind, *loved* all the women and drank all the wine, inky dinky parlay voue". The Marines must have heard because they settled down

and as I passed the roadblock they acted as if nothing was happening and gave me a "Good Evening Gunny".

The most memorable time I had in this tour of duty was when I took my first R&R. I passed up several R&R opportunities because my wife of four years wanted us to meet in Hong Kong. So I waited over six months to take my R&R. There was a lot of coordinating with the R&R office so that I could give her a definite date that I would be there. When I got to Da Nang for the PanAm flight to Hong Kong, they gave me the number 2 boarding priority behind a LtCol Troop Commander to the wonderment of a Major and several Captains. During the two-hour flight I began to worry if my wife had gotten to Hong Kong. This was her first foreign travel. After landing, the Hong Kong R&R team came aboard and gave us a quick rundown on the available hotels they would take us to, and items of importance. As this was going on I was looking up at the terminal building's second floor open-air observation deck where many people were standing. My wife was nowhere in sight. We departed the aircraft at same sequence as we boarded following one of the R&R staff members to the terminal building and a waiting bus. As we entered the doors of the terminal building with sun shining through the windows on the opposite side, I saw a shadow running toward us and recognized a pair of legs. The R&R staff member we were following put up his arms, I guess to protect something and ended up between us in our embrace. The next few seconds she and I were on cloud nine. The R&R staff member extricated himself and regained his composure, shoved a card into my hand and told me to let them know where I would be staying. We were still hugging and kissing when the rest of troops filed pass and all of them patted me on the back. We had an exciting week, and have many wonderful memories of the joyous time we had there.

I left Phu Bai April 1967 with orders back to NATTC, NAS Glynco for instructor duty. I retired there in 1969 and went to work for the Department of the Army at Fort Rucker, Alabama as an instructor at their newly formed ATC School. There were several Navy and four former Marine ATC instructors from Glynco working with me there. The Marines were "Whammy" Maurer, Al Becker, Lee Wisnoske and Hiram Peterson. All the former Glynco Navy and Marine instructors were pickup as GS-11's whereas most of the other services were given GS-9 positions. Several years later, Dewey Sund came on board. While at Fort Rucker I earned a BS Degree with a major in business, and a MS Degree in Education System Engineering from Troy State University. Then I moved up from the ATC School to the Department of Aviation Training Developments at Fort Rucker as an Education Specialist. Al Becker also left the ATC School for a controller position at Libby Army Air Field at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Later he moved up and became the Facility Chief. He retired as a GM-13 and is living in Tucson, Arizona.

From Fort Rucker, I accepted a position and promotion with the Naval Warfare Training Systems Center located in Orlando, Florida as a Training Systems Analyst. I was assigned to the Subsurface Warfare Branch with collateral duties on Naval and Marine Air Traffic Control training systems. In the Subsurface Warfare Branch I worked on training systems and equipment for nuclear powered fast attack and ballistic missile

submarines that included: Los Angeles class, Ohio class and the Sea wolf class. Later I moved up and became the Assistant Branch Chief and Senior Analyst for the code. The Branch Chief was a USNR two star Admiral. I had the privilege with two other Department Of The Navy civilians from my code (all Naval Academy Graduates and former submarine commanders) to have a Captains Tour of the Navy's first Trident Submarine, the USS Ohio SSBN 726. The Ohio came to Port Canaveral, Florida just after commissioning for the boats initial weapons testing. Wearing my ATC hat several times, I prepared the analysis, training plan and development for new radar training equipment for the RATTTC, GCA and CATCC courses then located at NATTC Memphis, Tennessee. I also developed a tower trainer concept that used computer-generated visuals that was later used and further developed by the FAA. I retired in 1988. I am now and have been a state licensed residential contractor in Florida since retiring.

Monograph by Hermon B. "Herm" Moyers (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 24, 2006.

I arrived in Vietnam on September 6, 1967 and was assigned to MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai. I was a Staff Sergeant and was assigned as a crew chief in the control tower. We had four Marines on a crew and worked a different watch schedule than that of the radar facility. We used the civilian control tower and had a couple of Vietnamese military controllers working with us.

Before the TET offensive of 1968 began we could occasionally get to Hue. Not really on liberty, but "official duties" gave us a chance to look around. I had to spend a night in the Hue Citadel before being able to catch a ride back to Phu Bai.

When the NVA and VC began the TET offensive in January of 1968 Phu Bai was also the scene of fighting with thirty-seven casualties being recorded at the base. Air Force C-130s using the call sign "Mother Hubbard" carried the more seriously wounded off the base.

During the fighting to reclaim Hue we had a lot of traffic inbound to "Alpha Med" which was set up behind the tower. One day just after TET began; an Air Force C-133 landed and off-loaded two Marine 8" self-propelled howitzers. They set up just across the tarmac from the tower.

Most fixed wing traffic was straight in to Runway 27. Helicopters would initially contact us at either Point "A" or Point "D" and be sequenced into the pattern. Transiting helicopters caused GCA a few concerns as they could see them crossing the approach path to Runway 27 but the transiting helo would not be in contact with the tower.

Just after the fighting at Hue began we had a damaged A-4 land on Runway 9 and take the MOREST gear. His squadron was able to repair the aircraft after a few days. We also had an Air Force C-130 land with the wing on fire.

One day two Vietnamese Air Force A-1s declared an emergency because of damage from anti-aircraft fire to one of the A-1s. The undamaged A-1 landed first and was still on the runway when the damaged A-1 landed. The second aircraft sheared its gear and skidded off the runway, but the pilot was uninjured. He exited his aircraft and ran to the other A-1. The flight leader did a 180-degree turn and took off without receiving clearance.

Another time a Vietnamese Air Force H-34 landed and elected to park in front of the operations building. The Operation Officer was LtCol Winchester and he did not want helicopters taking up space. He had the helo towed to a helicopter parking area. The pilot of the Vietnamese H-34 was a senior officer and when he returned to find his helo missing he threatened to kill the operations officer.

I had the opportunity to fly with the Army's 119th Aviation Company as an M-60 door gunner. This was done without orders as were my flights with VMO-3's slicks. Eventually I was forced to stop flying because I could not get orders to do so.

E. L. Davis flew as a door gunner on Marine H-46's and received a Bronze Star for helping to evacuate the injured when his H-46 crashed.

Dan Dorn was with MATCU-68 at this time as well as SSgt Paul Mason, GySgt Frank Poole, and GySgt Chuck Henderson.

I left MATCU-68 in September 1968.

Monograph by James M. "Jim" Mutter Colonel USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 10, 2007, and edited on October 25, 2007, January 15, 2008, and January 25, 2008).

In the summer of 1966 I was a 31-year old 2ndLt who volunteered for RVN duty but was transferred from MATCU-65 at MCAS Yuma to MATCU-66 at MCAS Futenma, Okinawa. MATCU-66 had limited air traffic control authorization so I asked for and was sent via permissive TAD to the Naha, Okinawa AFB to work with their GCA Unit. I became IFR qualified at Naha and then was transferred to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in late 1966.

At Chu Lai, the new concrete West runway 14/32 was open by the time I got there and we used the TPN-8 PAR or CPN-4 for GCA approaches. The weather was frequently bad and we were very busy. I served as an ATC Watch Officer and also became IFR qualified for PAR finals, and later worked in the tower, which we canoed to sometimes. We had a few rocket attacks while I was at Chu Lai.

As the ATC Watch Officer I would try to insure that Marine tactical aircraft got priority. The Group COs did not want their aircraft to divert to DaNang or Udorn. I remember once having to discuss delaying an Air Force aircraft during terrible weather and carrying Martha Ray in for a show. They were claiming Code 6 priority, but were last to land because I would not authorize priority positioning in front of tactical aircraft. The Group CO later supported the decision when semi-formal complaints were registered by the AF pilot and USO coordinators.



Stuart White provided the above picture of the MATCU-67 Officers. The two officers on the left are unknown. Captain Dick Traver is on the right in the front row. I am standing to the right of Captain Stuart White, who is in the center of the back row.



Stuart White provided the above picture of MATCU-67 in formation.

We were short of qualified controllers at Chu Lai and for a short time I was the only IFR qualified PAR controller on the crew. I was making an approach one day with an Air Force aircraft and realized that the pilot was not following my instructions. He was very low on Glide Path and would not recover. Thinking that the pilot was not familiar with Marine phraseology I changed to the Air Force method and started using Air Force control phraseology I learned at Naha. The aircraft still did not recover and I issued missed approach instructions. The pilot reported that he had the runway in sight and was landing. After he had landed it was found that the threshold radar reflector had disappeared. Later a couple of senior Air Force officers showed up and tried to hassle us about the damage we caused to one of their aircraft. The tapes backed our handling of the aircraft up and nothing else was heard about this incident.

Once the weather improved at Chu Lai in late spring I was assigned to MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai. Hank Flood and Captain Bill Skov were there. Captain Chuck Bodner was the OIC. I became IFR qualified for PAR finals there also, but was soon transferred to the Marble Mountain Air Facility to run that MCAF's ATC operations. We also had a couple of rocket and mortar attacks there.

Like most junior officers I was assigned many collateral duties. At one time I flew to Khe Sanh in an ordered but vain attempt to sell savings bonds. Another time I went there to conduct a cash payday. For both experiences the base was under fire and

it was quite obvious these Marines were in a very tough situation. Marines died during both these visits, and aircraft approaches to Khe Sanh were also, to say the least, hairy.

Stuart White provided the following picture of the MAG-13 flight line on the West Field at Chu Lai.



Later in 1967 the TSA-11 at Marble Mountain was hit by rockets during one of the attacks and our generators were damaged, so we reverted to back-pack radios for a couple of days. I stayed there until I returned to CONUS in about August 1967.

In the states I retrained at NATTC Glynco to become a GCI Officer and was qualified as such at MACS-1 at Yuma, Arizona. Then I went to El Paso, Texas for missile training and became a HAWK qualified Air Defense Officer with the 5th LAAM Battalion at Yuma, Arizona.

I volunteered to return to Vietnam in 1968 and served with the 1st LAAM Battalion at DaNang. Initially as the Battalion Operations officer and then as Alpha Battery CO at the Hai Van pass, following the fragging of the two consecutive previous COs. I tightened things up a bit and had no major problems other than relieving a totally unsatisfactory SNCO.

The site was approved for a major test firing of HAWK missiles by all the battalion firing units using Alpha's equipment. It was the most successful HAWK firing

held by the USMC to that point in time, all due to the great equipment preparation and maintenance by the battery officers and enlisted men.

I was the CO of Troops aboard the USS Belgrove, LSD-2, when the battalion returned to the US in mid 1969. Colonel Ed House was the LAAM Battalion CO at that time.

During the time the ship was enroute the 5th LAAM Battalion received a message that reduced it to "cadre" status, and the USS Belgrove received notification that it was to be de-commissioned upon completion of this tactical move. We were all a bit morose for a few days on that approximate 30-day trip.

Monograph by GySgt Chester P. "Chet" Newcomb USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 3, 2003, and edited on March 10, 2008)

I went to Nam and Quang Tri late June /early July 1969. It was MATCU 62, PROVMAG 39. I relieved TFX Carroll as Operations NCO. Bob Bathe was NCOIC. Don't recall who the skipper was but Capt. Capistran was there and a Lt Bowman, a maintenance type. I worked approach control along with Ernie Nelson and Baczkowski. As for equipment we had a souped up FPN-36 etc. The MATCU had detachments at Dong Ha and at LZ Vandergriff (Stud).

Roughly Sept/Oct 69 the ProvMAG was breaking up, we were closing Quang Tri. Our MATCU was to be dissolved and absorbed into Chu Lai and Marble Mountain. I left early, with a handful of controllers and techs plus one diesel tech with Lt Bowman in charge. We had a radar unit and a tower, plus generators and made an over the road convoy to Danang and then on to LZ Baldy where we set up as a detachment of MATCU-68 at Marble (MAG 16). We had an old Wickes Tower set up on a wooden platform built by the SeaBees. We never unpacked or set up the radar unit there. At that time John O'Hey was NCOIC at Marble and Rudi Nebel was our skipper. We also had a detachment at An Hoa and Tetzlaf (don't know which one) was NCOIC there.

In late December 69 Capt Basher relieved Lt Bowman at Baldy and shortly thereafter, say mid January of 70 Everett Davis relieved me and I went back to Marble and flew gun with HMM-263 during Feb of 70, and finished tour as tower NCO at Marble. I'm getting bad with names; only one I remember from Marble was Easy Ed Neely.

I left Marble in June of 70 Rudi Nebel was still skipper of the MATCU. One note, when I left Quang Tri for Baldy, skipper was a LT. Bowman, mustang technician (twidget), fine officer. He was relieved at Baldy by Capt Basher, say, late Dec / early Jan 70.

Rudi Nebel was fully qualified and flew H-53's all the while when he was the skipper of MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain. The napalm drops, like Agent Orange were done for a lot longer period than has been alleged here. Rudi Nebel had written a nice dissertation on this a couple years back. Fact is, when Rudi flew, especially at Baldy, when we recognized his voice, we changed his call sign to "Sagamore 6". Where the Sagamore came from I'm not sure, but as we all know a '6' was a CO and we gave him that as MATCU skipper.

Ron Brigrance was one of my Marines at Baldy, fine young gentleman, couldn't ask for better. He has now retired from the Dallas PD. I communicate with him far too infrequently, but his story is true. We had a real \$@#&% Skipper at the artillery unit at Baldy (6th Marines?) He was doing things like throwing mortar rounds, including WP, over the fuel dump. Even after repeated warnings. Then one night, bingo, one willie peter round came up short and 100,000 pounds of jet fuel went up. What a weenie roast. I lost one of my crash trucks in that fire, watched it explode from the heat. Great

crew I had though, the entire wing detachment, controllers, techs, wx guessers, crash crew & whatever, contained the fire basically to the berms and only the fuel farm was lost.

I remember the artillery CO calling for a quiet hour when Archbishop Spellman from Boston (I think) was to be a guest and say mass for the troops. Seems another of those wild F-4 flights on the way back to Chu Lai came to visit with the high-speed low pass, kick the ass on full burner and just rock the Hillside. Of course my tower crew swore they were unmarked silver colored Air Force birds and we sure never knew how they got there.

If any of y'all develop anything, and you served in country, go to the VA and go through the screening. It is a pain in the ass, however continuing studies add to the list of what is considered qualified under Agent Orange disabilities. You know none of us knew any of this at the time. Like many others, I flew with the choppers; we carried many unknown 55 gal containers in slings underneath, dropped into many defoliated zones. Direct contact, maybe? But do follow up.

Monograph by GySgt Chester P. "Chet" Newcomb USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 3, 2003, and edited on March 10, 2008 and September 7, 2009)

I went to Nam and Quang Tri late June /early July 1969. It was MATCU 62, PROV MAG 39. I relieved TFX Carroll as Operations NCO. Bob Bathe was NCOIC. Don't recall who the skipper was but Capt. Capistran was there and a Lt Bowman, a maintenance type. I worked approach control along with Ernie Nelson and Baczkowski. As for equipment we had a souped up FPN-36 etc. The MATCU had detachments at Dong Ha and at LZ Vandergrift (Stud).

Roughly Sept/Oct 69 the ProvMAG was breaking up, we were closing Quang Tri. Our MATCU was to be dissolved and absorbed into Chu Lai and Marble Mountain. I left early, with a handful of controllers and techs plus one diesel tech with Lt Bowman in charge. We had a radar unit and a tower, plus generators and made an over the road convoy to Danang and then on to LZ Baldy where we set up as a detachment of MATCU-68 at Marble (MAG 16). We had an old Wickes Tower set up on a wooden platform built by the SeaBees. We never unpacked or set up the radar unit there. At that time John O'Hey was NCOIC at Marble and Rudi Nebel was our skipper. We also had a detachment at An Hoa and Tetzlaf (don't know which one) was NCOIC there.



Chet Newcomb photo

In late December 69 Capt Basher relieved Lt Bowman at Baldy and shortly thereafter, say mid January of 70 Everett Davis relieved me and I went back to Marble and flew gun with HMM-263 during Feb of 70, and finished tour as tower NCO at Marble. I'm getting bad with names; only one I remember from Marble was Easy Ed Neely.

I left Marble in June of 70 Rudi Nebel was still skipper of the MATCU. One note, when I left Quang Tri for Baldy, skipper was a LT. Bowman, mustang technician (twidget), fine officer. He was relieved at Baldy by Capt Basher, say, late Dec / early Jan 70.

Rudi Nebel was fully qualified and flew H-53's all the while when he was the skipper of MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain. The napalm drops, like Agent Orange were done for a lot longer period than has been alleged here. Rudi Nebel had written a nice dissertation on this a couple years back. Fact is, when Rudi flew, especially at Baldy, when we recognized his voice, we changed his call sign to "Sagamore 6". Where the Sagamore came from I'm not sure, but as we all know a '6' was a CO and we gave him that as MATCU skipper.

Ron Brigance was one of my Marines at Baldy, fine young gentleman, couldn't ask for better. He has now retired from the Dallas PD. I communicate with him far too infrequently, but his story is true. We had a real \$@#&% Skipper at the artillery unit at Baldy (6th Marines?) He was doing things like throwing mortar rounds, including WP, over the fuel dump. Even after repeated warnings. Then one night, bingo, one willie peter round came up short and 100,000 pounds of jet fuel went up. What a weenie roast. I lost one of my crash trucks in that fire, watched it explode from the heat. Great crew I had though, the entire wing detachment, controllers, techs, wx guessers, crash crew & whatever, contained the fire basically to the berms and only the fuel farm was lost.



Ron Brigance on Left at LZ Baldy Hootch. (Chet Newcomb photo)

I remember the artillery CO calling for a quiet hour when Archbishop Spellman from Boston (I think) was to be a guest and say mass for the troops. Seems another of those wild F-4 flights on the way back to Chu Lai came to visit with the high-speed low pass, kick the ass on full burner and just rock the Hillside. Of course my tower crew swore they were unmarked silver colored Air Force birds and we sure never knew how they got there.

If any of y'all develop anything, and you served in country, go to the VA and go through the screening. It is a pain in the ass, however continuing studies add to the list of what is considered qualified under Agent Orange disabilities. You know none of us knew any of this at the time. Like many others, I flew with the choppers; we carried many unknown 55 gal containers in slings underneath, dropped into many defoliated zones. Direct contact, maybe? But do follow up.



Control Tower at LZ Baldy late 1969. (Chet Newcomb photo.)



Control Tower at LZ Baldy late 1969. (Chet Newcomb photo.)

Monograph by GySgt Lance N. Oliver USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from email on August 27, 2004, and edited on September 11, 2004.)

I was a GySgt radar technician and I got to Da Nang about April of 1969 and reported to Phu Bai. I thought Wing sent me to MATCU-62, but maybe not. I went immediately to MMAF. We were called MABS-16 Base Ops (Tower). I don't think we were MATCU-68 yet.

I had two FPN-36s at Marble and they were all we had thru all of 1969. I took a reenlistment leave over the holidays, and MATCU-68 came to MMAF. Shortly after that MATCU-68 brought two TPN-8s and other gear (Tacan, UPS-1) and the FPN-36's were replaced. I don't know where they went.

While we were still a detachment the OIC was Capt. Capistran and a Watch Officer was Lt. Larue.

I went to An Hoa in early 1970 and found a TPN-8 and TACAN (The TACAN had been rode hard and put away wet, and was unreliable.) I put some hours into it, and it worked OK for a few months. I reported status to Wing Comm daily...I don't think it went thru MATCU-68.

I left An Hoa sometime around April 1970 when my tour was up.

Monograph by 1st Lieutenant Gerald S. "G S" Pahl USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on May 20, 2004 and edited on June 12, 2004.)

I served in Vietnam with MATCU-68 from October of 1967 to November 1968. Dan Dorn was there at about the same time. He and I stood duty as ATC Watch Officers, and the Maintenance Officer was Bob Torre. One of the other ATC Officers was Ed Rynne. Hank Flood was just leaving when I got there.

Captain William C. "Carl" Joiner was the OIC most of the time I was there. He was restricted by personnel and material resources, and had limited support from above. He performed in a highly commendable manner. Under unusual and difficult conditions he quietly did his job, and he did it very well.

While I was with MATCU-68 it was attached to MAG-36 and we operated the airfield at Hue Phu Bai. We also had a detachment of tower controllers at Marble Mountain Air Facility. We had nothing to do with An Hoa.

At Phu Bai we operated approach control out of a TSQ-18. The UPS-1 had MTI and basic IFF, and was reliable enough that we generally operated in a radar approach control environment. GCA to Phu Bai was to Runway 9 only with the TPN-8s associated with the TSQ-18. We also provided approach control service to Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, and Quang Tri. Approach control to the outlying fields was generally non-radar and we had to relay control instructions to aircraft inbound to Khe Sanh through other aircraft that were waiting to make an approach.

We were short of experienced controllers, especially approach controllers, and spent most of the time on a port and starboard watch schedule.

During the Tet offensive that started towards the end of January 1968 we were really very busy. It wasn't just the increase in transport aircraft, but it was also the monsoon season and the weather was marginal a great deal of the time. During this 2 and a half-month period I remember only one major accident. That was an Air Force C-130 that crashed just short of the runway while on a GCA in bad weather. A number of helicopters were lost while flying missions from Phu Bai.

The tower and radar controllers worked on separate watch schedules, and Ed Rynne was the Control Tower Officer.

The MATCU had just finished building a recreation center/ ready room called "El Alamo" when I got there. I think that Hank Flood was mostly responsible for its unique construction. I remember many pleasant times in the building. Several times other organizations made attempts to acquire the building for their own purposes, but we were always successful in fending them off.

I spent a short period over at the Marble Mountain Air Facility when it was decided to give them GCA capability. We were trying to install an FPN-36. It was

working, but not flight checked when I left. During this period we were tasked with building a bunker for the GCA site. Through some skullduggery we were able to acquire a conex box that we buried, and then covered with sand bags. It was a fine bunker, but soon filled with water and was unusable.

After the war I saw a TV program that showed that the VC had tunneled into the Marble Mountain. They were reported to have a full hospital there. One time they even managed to take control of the top of the mountain for a brief time.

When the OIC of the MATCU-62 detachment at Khe Sanh was killed one of our officers, 1stLt Tony Shaw, was detailed as his replacement. Tony lasted only a week or so before he was wounded and medevaced.

At Phu Bai we had the U. S. Army's 131st Aviation Company who flew the OV-1 Mohawk. They were a great group, and allowed us access to their club.

When I left Phu Bai I was on orders to Grosse Ile, Michigan where I retired. I then went to work for the FAA at the Willow Run, Michigan facility. One day the chief told me that a new controller was being assigned. I walked Dan Churan, one of the tower controllers from Phu Bai. We have been close friends, and faithfully celebrate the Marine Corps Birthday together each year.

Monograph by Patrick M. Prout (Combined from E-Mail on April 10, 2004)

Thanks for reaching out as the era was becoming lost in the recesses of my cranium. I am not sure that I will have all the facts straight and some I do not quite recollect clearly. But MATCU-68 originated at El Toro, California or was domiciled there during the early 60s. A Capt. Coulter was Commanding Officer and he took it in country during August '65. The entire unit was deployed in late July arriving at Chu Lai in late August '65. My understanding was that the 3rd MAF stationed at Da Nang was building up the airfield at Chu Lai; which was named after Gen Krulak and was the closest Vietnamese translation. The unit arrived there and after acclimating for 6 to 8 weeks was deployed to Marble Mountain following the build of that auxiliary airfield (annexed to Da Nang) for only helicopters. They moved all of the Marine Corps helicopters out of the Da Nang airfield as troop levels and fixed wing aircraft levels increased.

It was perhaps in December '65 that we got hit with a mortar attack followed by a sapper squad attack as they penetrated the North side of the field and the base took casualties though no one in the unit was hurt. The Navy corpsmen had been sleeping in the on-call med evac choppers in an effort to reduce response time. So when the sappers threw incendiary charges into the helicopters, it took its casualty toll. I cannot remember the exact date when the unit moved to Phu Bai but it did as you learned and some of the equipment was left at MMAF. At Phu Bai, the unit was located at the civilian airport as the Marine Corps had taken it over as we did at Da Nang, so tower and a great deal of operating equipment was already there. We also did set something up at Dong Ha but that whole episode escapes my memory.

I left in September '66 and was stationed at Kaneohe, Hawaii only to return in country one year later when I took MATCU - 70 there and set up at Quang Tri for the Tet offensive.

Monograph by Rick Rasmussen (From telephone conversation notes on February 5, 2004)

My tour with the MATCU-62 detachment at Khe Sanh was from January 1968 through March 1968, and then after recovering from wounds I was with MATCU-62 at Dong Ha from May of 1968 through September of 1969 with occasional periods at LZ Stud.

At Khe Sanh Preston Haynes as the OIC following William Flavhive, and Rick D'Ambrosio and George Brandt were also there. The enlisted controllers and technicians lived in a bunker called the "White Elephant". It was made of dirt filled 55 gal drums stacked two high, covered with marston matting and dirt. It was about 12 x 50 with racks on both sides with a 3' walkway through the middle.

Other Khe Sanh personnel were Dennis Burke, Joe McCan, Henry Bradford, Sgt Brown, Joe Kalb, Stanley Kramer, Larry Gaffney, Walt Frame, Bob Dale, Chris Bernard, Sgt Albey, SSgt Harvey, Joe Eskam, and Tony Nazarian.

Monograph by Howard J. "Skip" Redpath GySgt USMC (Ret.) (Combined from Emails on February 4, 2004 and edited on July, 4, 2004, and July 9, 2004.)

When I got to Phu Bai, they were using the tower at the Airport (I guess that was the old civilian tower?) Danny Walczak was there as a tower operator. I was GCA until I went to Marble Mountain; where I was STILL GCA!! (1969)

I was assigned to GCA at Marble Mountain in April of 1969. Marble Mountain had a small GCA Detachment and a Tower Detachment of Controllers/Techs from the MATCU at Phu Bai.

A Seaboard World Airlines (government contract airlines) was flying new troops in to DaNang. Unfortunately, they thought Marble Mountain was DaNang! They landed at Marble Mtn! Can you imagine that pilot seeing 3,000 ft remaining, vs. 8,000 ft remaining! They did get it stopped though. When it landed, being in GCA, I was sleeping in the hooch next to the runway. Lt Larue was our OIC ("Lash Larue") and we thought it was the biggest rocket in the world, and we were dead for sure!

I think it took 10+ hours to clean all of the shit from inside the aircraft. It was defueled. They got all the weight possible out of it and a tug was brought over from DaNang. It pushed the aircraft backwards down the runway for takeoff. I heard that it had just enough fuel to leave Marble Mtn and get to DaNang to land. I watched the takeoff. Marble had runway lights welded on to sections of Marston matting along the runway, as I recall; these were "twirled about" like little twigs, as that airliner rolled down the runway.

Sunday April 20, 1969...I was at Marble Mountain Radar Unit...Lt. "Lash" LaRue was our Radar Detachment OIC...

I was a SGT; E-5...the Sgt's mess was closed that day due to a special "Steak BBQ" for all Sgts at the Sgt's Club. I had the "duty" (we were 24 on, 24 off)... Lt. LaRue told me to go to eat, and he took the duty for that short time. I went, ate. (Pretty darn good, too)...and returned to the GCA unit.

Shortly thereafter, we got hit pretty bad... incoming was heavy, with targets on the flight line and, at each Club, i.e. the enlisted Club, Sgt's Club, Staff Club, and the O Club. (Tell me that certain facilities at Marble weren't "zeroed in").

The worst hit was at the Sgt's club (where I had just been about 30 minutes sooner). A rocket or mortar hit between the club and the bunker. I believe it was 5 Sgt's killed and 40+ wounded.

At the GCA site, we ran for the bunker. I had been in a few other smaller attacks, but nothing like this one... Just makes me shudder to think about what Chu Lai and a few other larger bases were like.

Anyway... after the all clear, and we climbed out of the bunker, I felt a sharp pain in my right side, and there was a bloodstain in my T-Shirt.

Closer inspection showed a very nasty gash or abrasion, about 6-8" long. To this day I have no idea how that really happened, but... the Lt ordered me to the medical area to get checked.

I was in the "assembly line" for aid...and, obviously near the back of the line.

When I was treated, it was a very bad abrasion...it was cleaned, some anti-biotic ointment put on, and bandaged. I was given a tetanus shot, some ointment/bandages, and told to return if it got any worse or did not heal.

I never did go back, and I had a pretty good scar for almost 20 years (Very faint scar now).

When I was shipped out to go home, I went via Okinawa, Japan, Okinawa and home...While in Japan, the H & HSA office, in checking my records told me that I had the Combat Action Ribbon award, and that I should have received a Purple Heart...Paperwork would catch up to me, I was told.

Well...I came home...served another 7 years, then got out to join the "civilian ranks". (That's another long story.)

I never did receive a Purple Heart, and until now I have never questioned that. I have begun the process to check into that circumstance. I just hope that waiting 35 years hasn't hurt the effort too much. I wish I had known then what I know now, I would have gotten on this much, much sooner.

Monograph by Chris Reed (Transcribed from reunion conversation notes on October 10, 2007 and edited on January 21, 2008.)

I was a 1stLt when I arrived in Country and was assigned as the Maintenance Officer of MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in October of 1968. The MATCU had recovered from the rocket hit the previous May and was operating from a new TSQ-18A. We continued to live in the MAG-12 area on the east beach. The MATCU site was on the West side of the new concrete runway at about midfield. The MATCU had "recovered" a throw away jeep which we used for transport back and forth until the powers that be took it away from us. From then on we had to depend on the motor pool.

The MATCU T-O for technical personnel was still suffering from a lack of proper training at that time. Many of the GCA technicians were TACAN trained, so they maintained the GCA radar and NAVAIDS. The radio personnel and Techs for the UPS-1 were primarily from MACS, however, and many had never been in a MATCU before. Of course the normal radios were avionics type, so the radio technicians had never seen them before. We did have HAMS support on them, though.

MATCU-67 had a collage of equipment. They had received the new TSQ-18A, of course and had the two TPN-8s, two TRN-14s and UPS-1 that goes with it. They also had two FPN-36s and two domes (which were being used for storage), and two extra TRN-14s. There was some damaged equipment still left. They had also been assigned a station type GRN-5 TACAN trailer which had not yet been commissioned. I requested and got a team from NAVELEXWest to come in and do a site survey. We got the thing commissioned and the pilots loved it. The two FPN-36s and two extra TRN-14s were installed at AN HOA shortly after I arrived.

The Chu Lai control tower was a wooden structure on top of a derrick style tower which was quiet tall. There was a room under the cab that contained the radios. We had some station type transmitters and receivers there, so the MACS type radio techs felt a little more comfortable with them. The ladder wells that had to be climbed to reach the operations cab became increasingly steep as you reached the upper levels. I can testify to the fact that running up that ladder could do wonders for the cardiovascular system. During Christmas an illuminated cross made with fluorescent lights was displayed on the top of the control tower cab. Some pilots said it could be seen from 40 miles at sea.

Chu Lai continued to receive intermittent rocket attacks. Once an A-4 pilot was landing and observed a series of rockets lift off. He had no ordnance, but was able to communicate on guard channel and find a fully armed F-4. He led the F-4 to the rocket site and we had no further attacks, at least from that site. The OIC asked me to apply special security handling for the tower tapes of this incident.

At mid tour I was re-assigned to the office of the 1stMAW Communications-Electronics Officer at DaNang, replacing Captain Ken Hand. The day after I arrived an ammunition storage point went up and the office we worked in was destroyed. It was an

interesting job trying to recover the scattered files. I was told that all the 2000 lb bombs in country were blown up.

At the CEO's office my responsibilities included assigning all incoming personnel to the in country MATCU's as well as monitoring up status of all equipment. The Wing G3 office did not have a MATCU knowledgeable officer assigned to them at that time.

I depended heavily upon the expertise of NAVELEXWest. They were always ready and willing to help us out. When the ammo dump at An Hoa went up, both TRN-14 antennas were destroyed, but one of the shelters was still in good shape. NAVELEXWest was able to get us another antenna shipped in within 48 hours. When MATCU-62's TACANs at Quang Tri were damaged by rockets, one of the antennas was still good, but the box wasn't. The other antenna was destroyed, but the box was OK, so they swapped the antenna and we had it flight checked and back on the air within 24 hours. That rocket attack was prior to the one which did so much damage to MATCU-62's living quarters.

Shortly before I was due to rotate out, I learned that an old friend, Capt Jim Hardy had just arrived in country with a MASS unit, and was going to pack up the old MASS and rotate out of country. I convinced the Wing G3 that it would be beneficial to have Jim assigned to their office. We worked closely together for the rest of my tour. He did a fantastic job and took a big load off me.

Monograph by Jerry Renfeld MSgt. USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from email attachment on May 31, 2004, and edited on June 7, 2004.)

I reported to MATCU-67 MABS-12 MAG-12 at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan in May of 1964 as a Lance Corporal. I was an Aviation Radar Repairman, but the unit was short on Ground Control radar repairman, so I was put to work learning and working on GCA radars.

In the early part of 1965, word was passed that anyone who wanted to extend their tour overseas, all you had to do was say "yes". Understanding that previous to this, it was practically impossible to extend your overseas tour. Something should have registered at that time that something was up.

In April 1965 two significant events happened. One was I was promoted to Corporal. The other was on April 26th. A few of us were in the Enlisted Club on "wingside". An announcement came over the club PA that all MABS-12 and support personnel to report to their places of duty. We were told to pack up and that ships were waiting. Not knowing if this was practice or for real, we proceeded to pack up everything we could, even the water cooler out of our bldg. Why?

We started loading our equipment onto LST 1170 that evening. By midday on the 27th of April we were heading out of Iwakuni to who knows where. After several days at sea, I awoke one morning to see that we had joined up with major navy task force. Everywhere I looked; there was what seemed to be every type of ship imaginable.

About a week later, while we were still out to sea, we were called together and finally informed where we were heading. Vietnam, wherever that was? Also this was not a training exercise but the real thing.

About 2 days later we came into view of land. The 4th regiment landed and moved inland and then on 11 May 1965 we were ready to disembark. Initially there was a little problem of getting to the beach. I guess the reconnaissance was a little off. The LSTs hit a sand bar too far out so they had to connect the causeway from 2 LSTs together to reach the beach.

For the 1st week after landing we were used mostly for guard duty in the evenings. We set up a perimeter shaped like a horseshoe with the bay at our backs. This area included the beach area where our equipment was being unloaded and staged and the living area of the soon to be base. During the days of that week, we were used to clear the area of brush and scrub pines where the main part of the base was to be set up. Also during this time we were augmented with other MATCU personnel that were brought in from Atsugi, Japan.

While we were doing this, the SeaBees had been busy, since they landed just after the 4th Regiment, preparing the area to put down the matting for an airstrip.

After the first week we started setting up our equipment. Also filling sandbags for bunkers, fighting holes and protection for our equipment.

On June 1, 1965, the first fixed wing aircraft landed. It was an A4 from VMA-225 flown by Col. Noble. We then set in our daily routine of maintaining the equipment and air control for the area.

One problem we continually had was that the foundation for the airstrip was very sandy and had such a high water table, either one end or the other of the strip was being reworked and matting re-layed. Therefore most of the planes had to use JATO on takeoff and MOREST to land.

For security, since our unit was the one farthest inland, our night crews also had to man bunkers and fighting holes in our area. The main security for the base was provided by the Infantry who set up a defense line several "clicks" inland from the base. These infantry companies were rotated periodically with units from the "bush". I guess it was done like this so as to give these "grunts" a little break.

These grunts did get me a little irritated though. Remember that water cooler we brought with us? One of our diesel mechs hooked an electrical fuel pump to it and ran a hose to the lister bag and we now had an operational water cooler. This cooler was even written up in the Saigon Daily News of September 15, 1965 with a picture of Gerald Kelly, Ralph Wallis and I getting a drink. The infantry soon found out about our cooler and they were constantly filling up their canteens from it and ended up burning up the cooler.

This was after we rigged them up some showers out by the unit. We took a piece of approx. 1' pipe and popped some holes in it with a torch, suspended it overhead. Then had a SeaBee with a bulldozer dig a short trench about 18" deep about 8ft long and because of the high water table we now had a pool. We then took a gas powered water pump, put a hose into the pool and hooked it to the pipe we had put up.

On the eve of 28 October, some "sappers" hit the base. Some aircraft were destroyed, most of the sappers were killed, and to the best of my knowledge the only damage we incurred was a bullet hole in our water ladle hanging on a lister bag.

Here are some other events that occurred. I did not include them earlier because I do not recall the chronological sequence and also not having all the facts. I am including them now just in case somebody else may have brought them up or maybe you can jog some other memories of the happening.

Upon going operational, the first few aircraft would be on a perfect glide path but just off the end of the strip, they would go off glide path. After a number of these we questioned the pilots. It seems we had a tree out there that was quite a bit taller than the rest and was in the glide path.

We had an aircraft, an F-104 I was told, crash at about the 2000 ft mark inland of the runway. We couldn't find any piece big enough to identify what type of aircraft it was.

A C130 was taking off and for some reason it came down off the side of the runway and hit a trip flare and was destroyed.

An A-4 was taking off, popped his "JATO" and for some reason he dropped his hook and caught the MOREST. The jolt knocked some of his load off the racks. Needless to say, we were hitting the deck fast. The bombs had not been armed yet, so there were no explosions

I was going on duty and doing pre-flight checks on the TPN-8's. I had just checked the 35-degree mode and put it in 10-degree mode. The switchboard operator at the other end of the op hut hollered at me to shut off my radar because the antenna had fallen off. I told him, he was crazy. He insisted, I looked out the door and there was my elevation antenna, hanging by the waveguide

An A-4 coming back from a strike with his tail bent up and elephant grass hanging from it.

In late July or August, I was told I go to Hong Kong for R&R. I did not feel like going so another person went in my stead. He never came back. He was in the C-130 that went down in the bay at Hong Kong and was killed.

We used to go swimming in the bay every chance we could get to cool off. After the first heavy rain and wind of the typhoon season, I was on the beach and lying there was about a 4ft hammerhead shark.

I was transferred out of Viet Nam on 29 January 1966.

Monograph by John F. Rush Captain USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes on June 6, 2004, and edited on June 10, 2004.)

I served from May of 1967 through June of 1968 with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai, South Vietnam. I was a Staff Sergeant and worked almost all the time as Chu Lai Approach. I was also one of the Approach Control Crew Chiefs. Either John Call or Jim Largue served as one of my Assistant Crew Chiefs during this period. Jim took over the crew in May of 1968 when John and I were wounded.

When I got to Chu Lai the west runway was just finished being built. The MATCU-67 office was still with the tower on the west side of the east runway, but approach control had been set up on the west side of the west runway near midfield. Later in the tour a new control tower was built on the west side of the west runway near midfield.

We worked approach control out of both the CPN-4 and the TSQ-18 at various times during this period. We were very busy, and most of the operations were IFR. The radar was pretty good, and when we lost a radio a technician was able to swap out the bad radio very quickly. The UPS-1 gave us a wider coverage and IFF/SIF, but we used the 40 NM radar of the CPN-4 also. The TSQ-18 was unique in that it had the LCC shelter, and the Surveillance shelter, but that FPN-36 indicators connected to Quad radars had replaced the TPN-8 indicators in the GCA shelter.

There were radar reflectors in place so that we could align centerline cursors with the crosswind runway and the SATS runway at the east field. The ASR approaches to these runways had been flight checked by the FAA. We made PAR approaches to only the west runway. During September of 1967 the new west runway had to be closed for repair, so we were forced to use the west parallel taxiway as a runway. The MAG-12 A-4's used the east runway and the crosswind runway. The MAG-13 F-4s parked along the north side of the west runway and would depart on the taxiway parallel to the west runway 14. They would land on the taxiway parallel to the west runway 32. It was just the opposite for the MAG-13 A-6s. They parked on the south side of the west runway, departing on the runway 32 parallel taxiway, and arriving on the runway 14 parallel taxiway. Now remember that this was a busy time and we were solid IFR a great deal of the time. After a few weeks of running this type of operation we were all pretty shaky. Our missed approach procedure was straight ahead, you can imagine the potential conflicts, and I don't remember having an airborne tanker available except during the peak periods of the Siege at Khe Sanh.

We used just about everything we could to establish arrival and departure sequence and separation. I helped establish the TACAN approaches to both runways 14 and 32 at the west field. The common IAF was called HORNET and it was 20 DME on the 110 degree radial. Aircraft would proceed inbound and then fly a 10nm ARC to the FAC. Somewhere on the ARC we would vector the aircraft for an ASR or PAR approach. We occasionally used the LF NDB at Ky Ha to position an aircraft so that we could then vector it for approach.

Flight data was pretty good, in that we usually had a strip on an arrival before its ETA. We had problems with aircraft transiting our airspace in IMC without filing IFR with us, or any known agency. Air America was a frequent violator. I once had an A-6 pilot report seeing an Air America C-46 in time to avoid a collision. I had called traffic but had no idea as to the identity, altitude, or intentions of the opposing aircraft. We also occasionally provided radar vectors to U. S. Army aircraft landing at airfields other than Chu Lai. About our only contact with Vice Squad was when they issued Save-A-Plane notices.

Once the west tower was built all of our co-ordination was with it, but the expeditionary tower at the east field was also operated by MATCU-67. If the east control tower needed approach control approval for an operation they would contact the west control tower, and the west control tower would relay the control instructions.

The MATCU-67 office moved to the west field near the control tower during my tour, but even though we were on the MAG-13 side of the complex we continued to be supported by and report to MAG-12.

Our living quarters were still on the beach near the east field. We were near the large fuel storage tanks that were frequent targets for VC rockets. Many of the rockets were duds, or the VC overshot and the rocket landed in the ocean. This was much to our relief, as the spilled and burning fuel would have immolated our quarters.

Living on the beach had some drawbacks, but not many. There was some kind of large multi-colored lizard, not quite as big as a Komodo dragon, but still good sized that also lived on the beach. We also had the usual problems with rats and mice, particularly in the bunkers at night. I felt particularly vulnerable jumping into an unlighted bunker wearing just skivvies and flak jacket.

On August 7, 1967 a Navy Admiral flying the C-1 COD from the USS Hornet over rotated on takeoff from the west field. He hit the mooring unit and scattered its crew. My crew had just gotten off watch in the CPN-4 and watched as the C-1 spun around and lost a wing that crushed a tent in which Jerry Faust was taking a nap. It then hit the maintenance van of the CPN-4 and killed the ITT Gilfillian TECH REP who was inside. Continuing past the CPN-4, the C-1 came to rest on a four-holer and caught fire. The Admiral and his co-pilot came out of the wreck covered in crap. We couldn't find Jerry for about an hour after the accident. He was knocked unconscious and was covered by what was left of the tent and the wing. The C-1 was not salvaged, and remained where it came to rest. It was still there when I left in June of 1968.

On May 8, 1968 my crew was on duty when a 122mm rocket hit the TSQ-18. The only thing that saved me was that the FPN-36 radar indicators absorbed most of the force before it got to me. My wounds were treated at Chu Lai and I was returned to the unit, but not to duty. My hearing was completely gone.

(Read more about the Rocket Attack at MATCU-67 in the MATCA Hotline Articles by Boyd Murdock, John Rush, and John Call.)

Monograph by Major M. Z. "Mike" Smith USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 3, 2003)

Though I made 4 trips in country from Futenma, have no intimate details of those MATCUs. MATCU-74 was formed at LTA in '67. I checked into the same huts as a 2ndLt that I'd helped set up as a Sgt in '63. I was Ass't OIC of the forming of MATCU-74 at LTA. Arden Romsos was OIC, "Dad" Whiteley was NCOIC & Tom Gotta showed up somewhere along the line. Milas Turney was MaintO.

In the spring/summer of '68, I went TAD to Hawk Missile School at Ft Bliss. Upon return, walked in the hut & Arden said don't unpack; you're taking the advance party to Futenma to replace the MATCU there (MATCU-66). Then things got confused & we all went as a group on individual orders. After the equipment was enroute, & before the bodies could leave, they changed us all too individual orders instead of a unit deployment. Seems that under the "?" agreement, could only have x # of each unit in country. I remember on Okinawa being called up to Hansen & chewed out by the Chief of Staff as to why I had not reported my unit aboard. What unit? We were on individual orders! The Ass't CG was kinder about it.

Anyway, we reassumed the flag, with our equipment, of the MATCU they'd sent in country & I was the OIC until Arden arrived. Dad Whiteley was the NCOIC & Milas was the MaintO. Tom Gotta was FAPed over the station with most of the controllers. A MSgt Williams was the Maint NCOIC.

I guess the reason for TAD from Futenma was to cycle folks in country. My goal was to visit each MATCU there, which I think I did. Quang Tri, Chu Lai, Marble Mountain, and I think there was one more, the name of which now escapes me. Do remember the hair-raising H-46 ride to get there. I remember my first trip in country. We went straight to Dong Ha. That night we had a long talk over some cans of Bud. White t-shirts in the doorway made for great targets had anyone been around who cared.

My memory banks are suffering from "sometimers" as well. "Somewhere" in a box, have most of the unit emblems of most of the MATCUs I served with.

Monograph by Stephen W. Staab MGySgt USMC (Ret.) (Compiled from telephone conversation notes and emails on May 22, 2004)

I left MATCU-65 at Yuma in late February 1968 and arrived in Vietnam in early April 1968. I was first at MATCU-67 at Chu Lai and stayed there until after a rocket hit the TSQ-18 on May 8, 1968. I was then transferred to MATCU-68 at Phu Bai and then after about a month to MATCU-62 at Dong Ha.

I was a radar technician and worked mostly on TPN-8s, but like most others I worked on anything that needed fixing.

In answer to a question about radar reflector usage the following is offered.

The purpose of the centerline and touchdown reflectors is simply to establish a known reference. When GCA was first established at Khe Sanh the "regulation" reflectors were certainly well within the area controlled by us. Once the first FAA certification was issued it could be that few if any adjustments were necessary and the absence of the CL reflector was a moot point. Due to the conditions I kind of doubt this to be the case but that radar was very stable compared to the old Quads and CPN-4. I just had a thought. Didn't we have to replace at least one TPN-8 during Tet? How did they get the new radar adjusted initially? See next best guess below.

With all the junk scattered in and around the airfield maybe there was other metal objects that served as reflectors (dead tanks work real well). Using Kentucky windage it could be the techs were able to make adjustments and with the cooperation of the FAA and a theodolite to keep the equipment within specs. It was kind of like reverse engineering. The purpose of the theodolite was to check the accuracy of the radar but it could have been used to establish or adjust settings. The pilot flies the light beam and the tech makes adjustments to the radar to match the flight path. While not the "FAA approved" method it may have keep the Marines fed and armed.

I have another idea, with only helos, C-130s, C-123s and other relative slow flying aircraft, and the need to get resupplies in a very hot combat zone, could it be that the rules were relaxed a little? Remember in combat one of the primary rules is "just get it done".

The real answer is probably a collage of all the above. Again, please remember that this is all "I suppose."

Monograph by MSgt. Robert L. Stepp USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails on December 2, 2003)

MATCU-67 Radar Operations

I might be wrong (crs) but the CPN-4 that came to Chu Lai from Yuma was never used, was never turned on. It arrived at about the same time as the monsoon season. It was parked on the only concrete pad in the area and the techs were ready to go to work on it when the rains came and delayed the program. On one of the first good days a tech went over and opened the door and water, lots of water ran down the stairs. The unit had been at Yuma for years and the sealant around the top had dried out and let all that rain in. It may have been used later on the, then new, concrete runway but it was never used while I was there (65/66).

Approach control using the UPS-1 was fine; it had to be because we had no recourse. As I remember we had very little trouble with the equipment. The bad days must have been before I arrived in Sept 65. The methodology, I think, was more like Cherry Point because the 1st approach controllers were Cherry Point trained. We, as far as I know never used the FPN-36 for any part of APC. We had little or no contact with Ky Ha. During the time I was there our only contact with anyone at Ky Ha was thru MACS-1 and in trying to improve that they damn near got me killed, but that's another story. We did not have IFF capabilities at that time, maybe later. We had no anti-air detection responsibilities, that all belonged to MACS-1. Our contact with MACS-1 had to be with night H/I flights. Outbound we would get them airborne and hand them off to MACS-1. On return it was visa versa. I don't remember the call sign but I do know that MACS-1 was the air tactical control in our area. On their H&I missions at night they would switch from departure to MACS-1 for further control.

At Chu Lai in 65/66 I can mentally picture each item but I can't seem to come up with the names. I think the radar unit was a TSQ-18, and the approach/departure radar was the UPS-1. The precision radar was TPN-8. It has been too long ago for me to remember everything but I do not remember any major problems with any of the equipment. Approach Control operated from the TSQ-18. We had 2 UPS-1 scopes one for APC and the other for Departure. We also had 2 precision scopes in there and the Flight data position.

We had plenty of controllers at the time with the exception of qualified approach controllers. During most of my tour the approach controllers stood 24 on 24 off. They relived each other at noon each day. My relief was Jim Sumner he's gone now and I miss him a lot.

On what turned out to be my last day in Chu Lai Approach Control some wiremen were laying a new direct phone line from MACS-1 to us. It was a fairly busy day; traffic wise and they kept making line checks. The phone (EE-8) was right by my elbow and the calls were becoming a large pain in the ass. There I sat in front of the UPS-1 scope working while storms passed and everything was wet. The phone rang again and as

soon as I could I picked it up and pushed the radio headset away from my ear and when I put the phone to my ear LIGHTNING hit the line. I can remember a loud noise and I realized that I couldn't see, breath or move. About then I heard Davy Crocker (in front of me on the FPN scope) say, "Oh my God he's dead". I felt a thump on my breastbone and I inhaled a huge breath and started panting. They hauled me outside and sat me down to recover. Davy was immediately qualified on approach and inherited a sky full of A/C. I went to group HQ the next morning and got my check out slip and never went back.' The thump on my chest, I later learned was a full right arm blow to my chest by the OIC of MATCU-67 and I am ashamed that I can't remember his name.

C-130 Accident

I think that the Vietnamese who died was just a passenger. The C-130 was piloted by an air force w/o. The reason for the crash was the attempted obstacle takeoff with some cross winds. This was done even though they had been informed that there had been no ground fire for a long time. I remember the event clearly because I was working departure control when it happened.

A-4 Accident

The A4's at Chu Lai using JATO for takeoff happened often. After the monsoon rains came the runway was in bad shape. Aircraft just taxiing down the runway would hit holes under the pierced steel matting and water would spray in every direction. The runway was then cut in half (down to 4000') the matting removed and the whole area resurfaced. Then the old matting was replaced with solid (no holes) aluminum matting. As each half of the runway was reworked we continued operations day and night. Jato was used for takeoff and morest for landing. The wrong JATO bottles being installed caused the accident.

The night it happened I was again working departure. After takeoff an A4 driver came up on departure and said "Departure we sure have some strong cross winds down there. I think I hit something on takeoff could you get someone to check me out?" Another A4 pilot immediately volunteered. After closing with the other A4 he said "(quote) oh my God you have nothing left under here, the gear is gone, the bomb racks are gone and it looks like there might be other damage." Needless to say that the pilot had to eject but that's another story. That night I along with others learned that Jato came with different nozzles. On the a/c in question there was a 30-degree nozzle on one side and a 15-degree nozzle on the other. On takeoff this had pushed him into the morest gear and stripped everything off, gear, bombs, and bomb racks. It was a certified wonder that he got airborne. The crash crew was sent to check the runway and as soon as they got to the runway the radioed that there were bombs and a/c parts everywhere and please send EOD. Of course we closed everything down until it was cleaned up. War is hell!

Monograph by Gordon P. "G P" Stirling Captain USMC (Ret.) (Transcribed from telephone conversation notes on February 6, 2004)

My first tour in Vietnam was with MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai. I was there from October 1966 through October 1967. Hank Flood was also there. The early equipment at Phu Bai was an MSQ-4, and FPN-36. I was a 1stLt at this time.

Sometime during the Phu Bai tour I was assigned to MATCU-62 at Khe Sanh taking over as OIC before being relieved by Bill Flahive. This MATCU reported to MABS-16 at Marble Mountain during the time I was there.

During 1970 as a Captain I served with MATCU-68 at the Marble Mountain Air Facility before being re-assigned as OIC of the ATC detachment at An Hoa.

While at An Hoa I was also detailed to set up another FPN-36 at FOB Liberty for a short period.

During this period John O'Hey was the NCOIC at Marble Mountain.

Monograph by James E. "Jim" Strasser

**(Compiled from
telephone conversation notes on June, 15, 2004 and edited on June 25, 2004.)**

I served with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai, South Vietnam from January of 1970 until the MATCU was transferred back to the United States in September and October of 1970. I was a Gunnery Sergeant and was assigned duties as the Tower NCO and the Training NCO. The OIC when I got there was Captain Harry, but Captain Ed Stanton soon took over. The NCOIC was MSgt R. L. Long, who was called "Dancing Bear." Jim Hefty and Ernie Nelson were also there, as were Tom Zerner, Fred Alke, Van Dupuis, J. J. Carr, and Dick Szuba.

The control tower was very shaky when I first got to Chu Lai, I don't mean personnel, I mean physically unstable. Some senior controllers did not even want to climb the ninety-feet to the tower cab. The SeaBees came in and stabilized the tower supports and installed new radios sometime in the spring. During this construction period we had to work out of a small home built shack by the side of the west runway that we called "The Hot Dog Stand." I was sure glad when the control tower was returned to service.

Chu Lai was a busy airfield almost all the way until the end. When I got there MAG-12 was just getting ready to leave so the A-4s were still flying out of the east field for a couple of weeks. When they left MATCU-62 went with them to Iwakuni. After that the east field was used by OV-10's and some helicopters. MAG-13 was set up on the west field and their F-4s kept us busy. Air Force logistics flights also used the west field.

The control tower had continuing problems with its radios. I remember one time that we lost all transmission capability, and the aldis lamp also did not work. We had a flare gun, but only red flares to fire. If we had to give a wave-off we would fire a red flare, but to approve an operation we would have a Lance Corporal stand on the catwalk and wave a green Marine Corps blanket. Our receivers worked, so the pilot would acknowledge seeing the blanket on tower frequency and proceed to land or take off.

When I first got to MATCU-67 they said they were glad to see me because I was direct from NATTC Glynco and was familiar with TERPS. In December of 1969 an H&MS-13 C-117 crashed, killing the crew, about ten miles south west of the base. The aircraft crashed into a ridge while IFR at an altitude that was previously calculated to have provided sufficient terrain clearance. We had to recalculate the MVA charts and the Minimum Safe Altitudes for the nav aids. The error we found was that the topographical charts that gave the altitude in meters did not show accurate heights.

Later on we also had an Army UH-1 with the CG of the Americal Division as a passenger crash south of the base. Under command pressure the pilot took off from a remote LZ in an aircraft that was not IFR equipped, and flown by a pilot not trained for flight in IFR conditions. While attempting to establish radar contact with the aircraft GCA lost a possible target when the pilot descended well below an altitude at which the radar

could provide a useable return, all the time incorrectly reporting that he was operating VFR. Once radio contact was lost rescue procedures were initiated and the crash site was located, but it was the next day before the injured could be extracted.

During my tour the MATCU moved from its tents on the east field beach to some abandoned Army Quonset huts. They were a little bit better accommodations, but for some reason the Army had the water turned off when they left. We continued to use our water buffaloes, but were a little bit put out by not having a promised convenience. One evening late, and after some discussion, Top Long made a call to the CG of the Americal Division, who was responsible for the water supply. The Top managed to get either the CG's aide or assistant on the phone and proceeded in typical Marine fashion to explain the facts of the situation to his listener. Included in the conversation were vague intentions to notify the Medical Officer of the unsafe living conditions. When asked to identify himself Top ended the conversation with a few pithy remarks. We were all a little surprised the next day when a group of Army engineers and a medical officer showed up and we soon had running water.

Our relief was short lived because within a week or so a VC rocket attack brought the east field water tower crashing down on our living area. I was in the truck waiting for the rest of the crew when the rockets hit. Two MATCU marines were wounded, but I don't remember their names. One was a gung ho Sergeant who was medevaced and eventually medically discharged because he lost two fingers, the other was Lance Corporal who spent a week in the base hospital and was then returned to duty. Tom Zerner and I were recommended for Silver Stars for our efforts to rescue the wounded from this attack, but it was many years before the paperwork and reviews produced Bronze Stars.

(See the Bronze Star award in the Significant Documents section.)

As Chu Lai was being prepared for turnover to the U. S. Army we were involved in attempting to train what the Army considered controllers for duty in the control tower. The Army controllers were trained to work in LZs, and had little knowledge of ATC as was in use at Chu Lai. They made little or no effort to identify the position of an aircraft; and just cleared it for whatever had been requested. For example, one day a soldier identified a B-52 contrail high overhead as the position of a flight of F-4s requesting to land. On another occasion the soldier working local control cleared an H-54 Sky Crane to cross the west runway to get to the refuel point. He then immediately cleared two MAG-13 F-4s for takeoff. Being on a hot mission they lit their burners and started to roll just as the H-54 was reaching the runway. I broke in on tower frequency and gave the H-54 a 360 degree turn. He stated that he had seen the conflict building and had already had started a turn to avoid the departing Phantoms.

**Monograph by Richard M. "Dick" Szuba
conversation notes on February 7, 2004)**

(Transcribed from telephone

I had two tours with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. The first was from December of 1965 thru January of 1967, and the second was from December of 1969 until the unit was withdrawn in September of 1970. Then I spent the rest of my 13-month tour at Iwakuni.

With me at Chu Lai during my first tour were GySgt Tom Schaefer, SSgt "Good" Goodsel, GySgt R. L. Long, Sgt Arney Lockwood, Sgt Willie Williams, Cpl Mike Frenel, and Cpl Mike Dubesa. I was promoted to Sgt during my first tour, and was a SSgt during my second tour.

CWO Frank Quallen and SSgt Jerry Fisher were also at Chu Lai during my second tour.

J.J. Carr and I were on duty when an Army helicopter with a MGen passenger was lost. After 7 investigations no fault was found with Chu Lai ATC. The primary cause was inexperienced Army WO's trying to practice IFR procedures and falsely responding to instructions intended for another aircraft.

Monograph by James W. Tetzlaff MSgt USMC (Ret.)
telephone conversation notes on May 25, 2004.)

(Compiled from

I served in Vietnam with MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain during all of 1971. I was a SSgt radio technician. I remember Major Bowen as the OIC.

I also remember MSgt Al Snelson as a radar tech, and GySgt Bob Gigure as a controller. I also remember Chet Newcomb.

I remember several rocket or mortar attacks at Marble Mountain, even though the Marines were leaving, the war was still going on. I was assigned to the perimeter guard as a guard chief several times.

The weather was pretty bad many times, but we worked through it.

I remember being assigned to LZ Baldy and An Hoa for short periods to help with the repair of a radio or NAVAID. I particularly remember having to spend the night on Hill 55 when a helicopter tore up the straps of a low frequency radio beacon.

**Monograph by Alan R. Tomer MSgt USMC (Ret.)
telephone conversation notes on May 29, 2007)**

(Transcribed from

I was a senior Sergeant when I arrived at MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in January of 1970. During the time I was there I worked in both the West Field Control Tower and the radar site.

The control tower was sturdy and I was young and in shape so I had no difficulty in climbing the ladder. VFR traffic was steady with occasional increases to heavy. IFR traffic was to Runway 32 only.

I don't think the East Field was active during this time as I don't remember any traffic or procedures for its use.

I remember working with Frank Quallen, Dick Long, Jerry Fisher, Jim Strasser, Wayne Boggs, and Mike Dubesa.

I was in the east side hootch area in May of 1970 when the adjacent water tower was hit by a 122mm rocket. It was early in the morning and we were just getting into the truck that was to take us to the MATCU area at the west field. I was already sitting in the truck when I was reminded that I did not have my flak-jacket. So I went back to my hootch to put it on. I was just finished when the rockets hit. The Marine who had taken my seat in the truck was wounded.

In August and September of 1970 we turned the operation of the Chu Lai airfield over to the Army. I was transferred to MATCU-68 at Marble Mountain.

While at Marble Mountain I was promoted to Staff Sergeant and moved into the Staff NCO hootch. I remember Gary Bryant also living in the hootch.

I worked in the control tower at Marble Mountain until I was sent TAD to LZ Baldy about 25 Ks southwest from Marble Mountain. I replaced Ed Goodgasell and he returned to Marble Mountain. MATCU-68 was only operating a control tower at LZ Baldy while I was there.


I left Vietnam in February 1971 in time to arrive home on Valentine's Day. It was quite a homecoming.

Monograph by Dick Traver (Compiled from telephone conversation notes October 15, 2007, and edited on October 25, 2007 and on January 16, 2008).

As a 1stLt I was assigned to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in July of 1966, I had been previously PAR qualified as an ATC Watch Officer at MCAS Cherry Point. I had also spent some time observing control tower operations there.

After a couple of days in transit at Camp Hansen on Okinawa while enroute from Cherry Point, I arrived in DaNang. I had to wait in a hangar for three or four days for a flight to Chu Lai. In Chu Lai I was immediately assigned to MATCU-67. MABS-12 issued me a .45 caliber pistol, a couple of magazines, and a box of .45 caliber shells. I also acquired a helmet, but I had no flak jacket or field protective mask during the entire tour. No one there had them.

The MATCU was overloaded with Radar Watch Officers so I was assigned as the new Control Tower Officer. The previous officer with that title was a Warrant Officer who was about to finish his tour. I shadowed him for approximately a month and during that time began the assignment of erecting the new control tower at the West Field. Below is a picture of the old SATS Field Control Tower.



A water tower had been partially constructed on the east side of the West Field Runway 14/32. After the tower was completed, I was given a jeep and a driver and told to go to a civilian contractor location just south of the base and ask for the use of one of their cranes. The civilian contractor was accommodating, and invited us to a surprisingly well stocked buffet style meal. The crane performed as expected and we soon had two control tower cabs on the platform originally planned for a water tank. External ladderwells were added to provide access to the cabs. I also built a radio maintenance shack at the base of the tower. On top of the shack I had a second story added that I used as my office. One day a high ranking Naval Officer, after exiting his plane walked to the tower and climbed the ladder to my office while looking for the base CO. He remarked that if the office wasn't the COs, it should have been. It was the only second story office on the base.



Stuart White provided the above picture of the new tower just prior to the cabs being lifted into place.

With the arrival of MAG-13 and their F-4s we began operations from the West Field. Both MAG-12 and MAG-13 parked their aircraft on the East Field and used taxiways or the crosswind Runway 3/21 to taxi to the West Field runway. We kept one controller in the East Field control tower to coordinate ground operations there.

I was lucky to have SSgt Jim McClurg as the Tower Chief during my nine month tour. We worked a 10 hour on, 14 hour off, followed by a 14 hour on, 10 hour off

schedule. VFR operations used both Runways 14 and 32 depending on prevailing winds. Instrument approaches were only made to Runway 32. Rarely was Runway 3/21 used for take-offs and landings, and then only when required by excessive crosswinds. The mobile arresting gear was used often, primarily to recover aircraft with battle damage.

Usually we averaged about nine controllers in the tower section, but that would increase by three or four when new arrivals were training. We were also required to provide two controllers for the MAG-36 control tower at Ky Ha. At Ky Ha the controllers worked 12 hours on, 12 hours off, 7 days a week. And, they seemed to enjoy the duty since they annually asked to be extended in that duty, instead of being replaced.

I enjoyed working with the tower controllers. They were intelligent and motivated. Most indicated they had plans to attend college when their enlistments were finished. I remember one day a no radio (NORDO) C-130 was observed straight in to Runway 14, while VFR departures were in progress on Runway 32. The local controller properly used the aldis lamp to control the situation. I don't remember having to replay tower tapes at Chu Lai during my tour as Tower Officer, but I did have to be part of an accident investigation at the Ky Ha mats.

Throughout my tour I lived in a hootch near the East Field beach and most of the time, walked to work. During the rainy season a lake would form in the depression between the East Field and the West Field. We acquired a small row-boat used it to get to the control tower. It was easier than walking all the way around using the taxiways.

One night, while sleeping in my hootch, mortar rounds started falling on the living area. I had only a minute or so to make it to the bunker. A mortar bomb hit the hootch directly above my bunk and destroyed it.



I was promoted to Captain sometime in December of 1966, and returned to CONUS in April of 1967.

**Monograph by John T. Trosper
2004.)**

(Compiled from E-Mails on July 6,

I arrived at Quang Tri the first week of September 1969. MATCU-62 had the responsibility for the approach control. I did not come in contact with any Air Force ATC. We had mostly helicopters and one air force squadron of OV-1's. The approach control at Quang Tri was simplistic to say the least. The air space was limited and as I recall we did not have all that many operations compared to Cherry Point. We utilized a UPS-1 radar, channeled into an airborne type radar display. I think its designation was APA-125. (Thirty-five years sure does take a toll on the memory!!) . The final approach radar was the FPN-36. We did have daily flights of C-130's and 123's. Most of the traffic was vectored to the airfield and then would make visual approaches. We did have a TACAN approach but most of the aircraft were sent into a holding pattern and then would be vectored for a PAR.

Approach control was a single position. In the Cherry Point vernacular, it was approach, departure, and feeder control rolled into one. The limited airspace made it practical to only have one operating position. The IFF/SIF was displayed as a mode train. It was sometimes challenging reading the mode train due to the small size of the radarscope. What the hell have all the departures squawk 0400 and all the arrivals 0100 and you could reduce radar clutter!

I know the TACAN approach was set up for the north runway and the duty runway was north bound the majority of the time. The few times the wind dictated a southern approach it would be an approach to 35, circling to 17. We did not run any approach control to Dong Ha.

I really don't remember the watch schedule. We all shared the duties both in radar and tower. We lived at the site and there was not a lot of recreation time. I stood "rocket watch" in the tower, 2400 to 0600, and both day and night watches in radar. Since we never left the immediate area, I'm not sure of the "schedule".

Special VFR was not used all that much due to the proximity of army helicopters. The army did not have ramp space on the airfield so they had a number of landing zones at their camps adjacent to the airport. I can't remember how many LZs that they had, but it didn't take long to find out that army pilots were not well versed in what special VFR rules meant. It seemed that no matter what the weather conditions were, the army would fire up their flying machines and launch into the air. After becoming airborne they would call for traffic and separation. It was an interesting way to run ATC.

As far as qualification time, it was probably a couple of weeks. I know there has always been a "Cherry Point syndrome", but the air space and control was simplistic compared to the Point. I am of course prejudiced because of the training I received at

the Point. The Marines and civilians that showed me the ropes were so demanding and knowledgeable; going to another airfield was not too difficult.

I left Quang Tri in January 1970. We departed on a C-130 that was loaded to the gills with air force pallets containing MATCU and personal gear. The only person I remember that went on that flight was Ernie Nelson. He had been my crew chief at Quang Tri. I'm sure there were others from the units that were on the flight but names escape me. The take off was memorable in the fact that it was the first time I was in a C-130 that had to back up into position in order to get the maximum use of the runway length. As I recall the runway was a shade less than 5000 feet. Needless to say it did seem like an eternity to get airborne.

I was assigned to one of the two crews upon arrival to Chu Lai. We worked 24 on 24 off schedule. The training was minimal compared to Cherry Point. The airspace we had control of was only 10,000 feet and only extended 40 or 50 miles at the farthest point. We got our handoffs from the TACC from the south and Da Nang from the North. If memory serves me correctly, Da Nang was only 40 or 45 miles north. We had a TACAN approach and one holding fix. Most of the approaches were vectors to GCA. The main runway was 32/14 with a crosswind runway 5/23. The only approaches to the crosswind were vectors to visuals. We also had an east field runway for helo ops.

As far as complexity of approach control, Cherry Point was much more challenging. I think the greater area of responsibility, the amount of airspace and the numerous approaches added to the degree of difficulty. (There was so much more to remember!!). I can't remember how long it took to be qualified, but it was not long.

Due to the time of the year the weather at Chu Lai did not seem too severe, mostly heavy rain. We had TPN-8's and one FPN-36 QUAD. Must have been my training at the Point on the QUAD's; but I preferred using the QUAD to the TPN-8. I also was in a hooch with the only QUAD tech in the outfit, Fred Alke. I didn't want to hurt his feelings by telling him the QUAD was a piece.

Approach and departure control was mostly a one-position operation. There was no feeder controller as such. You would hand off aircraft to the final controller while they were in the surveillance mode. The most important guy in this operation was the coordinator that would go between the approach van and the GCA van. There was a lack of approach controllers as I remember. I think each crew only had two or three approach controllers and that meant you would split the watch between the two or three on crew.

I was there in May of 1970 when the water tower took a direct hit. The water tower was not located on the east field; it was actually in the living quarters. The truck, that took us across the base to the tower and "Fort Blip", was normally parked adjacent to that tower. I was headed to the truck when the round hit the tower. Art Barton, another of my hooch mates, was severely wounded that morning. I'm sure you have

been told the story about easy Ed Neeley being at Chu Lai that morning for his R&R!! He had three more days to R&R but he decided to leave that day!!

In October of 1970 we turned the base over to the Army. We loaded our gear (2 1/2 MATCU's worth) on Mike boats and transported it to the deep harbor at Da Nang. Jim Hefty, Mike Dubesa, and I got a free boat ride to Da Nang. After we turned the gear over to the Navy, we went to Marble Mountain and bummed a ride on an army H-58, back to Chu Lai. By the time we got back, the majority of the Marine living areas had been vacated. I checked out and caught a C-130 back to Da Nang. While at Da Nang awaiting the freedom bird, I had the opportunity to meet Al Snelson and get in the R.L Long jeep wreck driving through dog patch.

I left the beautiful Southeast Asian country of Vietnam in October of 1970.

Monograph by Daniel Walczak (Combined from emails on February 5, 2004)

I was at Phu Bai from September 1968 until October 1969 with MATCU-68. I spent my entire tour at Phu Bai. Except, I did spend one night at MMAF on my way to R&R, and then I spent about 2-3 days there checking out when I rotated back to the states.

When I arrived Captain Billy K. Gabriel was the OIC. Captain Ed McCollum later relieved him. Capt Gabriel was a maintenance officer and Capt McCollum was an ATC officer. Other officers that served while I was there included Lt Dan Dorn, Lt Larry Connin, Lt Dick Dallaire, and Capt Earl Basher. The NCOIC was MSgt Joe Lollar. Other SNCOs that were there were SSgt Paul Mason, SSgt Don Gates, and SSgt Ernie Hall. I was a Sgt when I arrived and was promoted to SSgt before I left. Other enlisted that I can remember included Sgt Mike Jarvis, Sgt Joe Began, Sgt J. D. Alley, Sgt Danny Churan, Sgt Dennis Reichel, Sgt Steve Hulland, Sgt Rick Champagne, Cpl Dennis Koch, and LCpl Dusty Rhodes.

MATCU-68 originally provided full ATC service to the airport at Hue. We provided radar service from a TSQ-18A and tower service from the Vietnamese tower at the Hue Airport. We had three Vietnamese civilian tower controllers who worked with us. By the time I arrived in September 1968 the Air Force had taken over the approach control and the Marines provided the tower and GCA. We supplied a detachment to the MMAF that ran the tower and GCA.

In August 1969 the MATCU moved from Phu Bai to MMAF. I stayed at Phu Bai with a detachment of 6 controllers and a tech to run the tower until the Army could assume control. The Air Force had taken control of the GCA. The Army eventually relieved my detachment in October. I rotated back to the states later that month.

Monograph by Edward F. Wargin (Compiled from E-Mail on February 2, 2004)

I can't help you on info regarding Viet Nam but here's some background on Iwakuni. I was in Iwakuni from May of 67 until June 68. I was assigned to MATCU 60, which stayed in Iwakuni the entire time I was there. (As I remember) I was a tower crew chief along with Danny Simpson and Dave Broadfoot. There were three crews covering a 24-hour tower, working a 10-day shift and 14 hour night shift. Jim Fry was there right about the time I was leaving. Or at the beginning of my tour, can't remember for certain as the overlap was brief. Bill Jordan was tower officer - had received his bars in late 67. C.C. Smith was the NCOIC of MATCU 60. Major Orville V. Hoffman was CO. He was a C-130 jock who was assigned to MATCU due to a loss of his flying status. Or that was the story anyway.

Don't recall much about any of the equipment other than we worked out of a Wickes tower for about 6 weeks in October - November 1967 while the main tower was being remodeled. No radar other than what GCA used. All approach control was non-radar. Airway system was colored airways using mainly radio beacons with a VOR or TACAN here and there. We provided approach control for Hiroshima and Matsuyama as well as Iwakuni. I can still remember the IFR clearance from Hiroshima to Tokyo. Amazing, since I usually can't remember what I had for lunch the day before.

Traffic was mainly a permanent P-3 squadron, plus rotating squadrons from Nam. Another P-3 squadron came after the "Pueblo" was captured by North Korea in Jan 68. Also, there was increased A4 and F4 traffic. We would be the divert field for carriers operating in the Sea of Japan and occasionally would have some interesting situations when a flock of planes had to divert from the carrier all at once.

Monograph by Stuart M. "Stu" White (Compiled from telephone conversation notes October 15, 2007, and edited on October 25, 2007.)

I was a 1stLT when I arrived at MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in May 1966. I had been previously qualified as an ATC Facility Watch Officer at MCAS Beaufort, but the OIC of the MATCU decided that he had enough GCA Watch Officers and had me re-assigned to MATCU-68 at Hue Phu Bai.

I stayed at the Phu Bai MATCU only long enough to have a quick trip to Dong Ha, where they were setting up a new control tower, and then when offered the opportunity I elected to return to Chu Lai.

Back at Chu Lai I was assigned as a Radar Watch Officer and worked on crew most of my time there. We were still using the East Runway 14/32 as the new West runway was still under construction. MAG-12 had an active schedule of flight operations and we were very busy. At this point the MATCU was using only the CPN-4 for GCA and each controller made a pick-up of his aircraft and vectored it himself to the PAR final. I was pleased to see my run totals on the status board usually leading the monthly race. We made approaches only to Runway 32. Our watch schedule was 24-hours on duty and 24-hours off.



Above is a picture of the East Field as it appeared during my tour.

The East field was very short having been reduced to only 3500' of usable runway while the Sea-Bees worked on it. Their simultaneous construction of the West field caused us some problems. Occasionally arriving aircraft would report having the runway in sight, and then switch to tower. The only problem was that they had identified the partially complete West concrete runway.

During the period when the East runway was shortened a group of high level Department of Defense officials arrived to observe the use of an expeditionary catapult to launch an A-4. The catapult failed to get the jet to flying speed and the pilot had to eject. He landed safely.

During this period we were still set up to the west of the East runway. It was very noisy with the A-4s required to use JATO for each take-off. I also think I remember some F-8s taking off because of the noise of their afterburners.

One night after MAG-13 had arrived I was the duty officer at the GCA site and the tower notified me that there might be some debris on the SATS runway. I walked out to the runway and could see in the dim lights the remains of two Marines who had been hit by a departing A-4. They were beyond any mortal help, so I returned to the GCA site and notified the tower. I again walked to the runway when a Flight Surgeon arrived to inspect the bodies. He picked up and then smelled some tissue and pronounced that the victims had been drinking alcohol. Two young MAG-13 Marines had been at the enlisted club and wandered onto an active runway while trying to find their work areas. They never heard the noise of the A-4 taking off.

I avoided most collateral duties because of the nature of my duties as a Radar Watch Officer, but I was assigned to a couple of investigations involving accidental shootings and discharge of weapons.

In October of 1966 I was promoted to Captain and we moved to a new radar site on the west side of the West Runway. The MATCU also occupied a new control tower on the east side of the West Runway. It was here that we began using a new TSQ-18A.



The previous picture shows the new MAG-13 West Field.



This picture shows the construction of the new MATCU radar site at the West Field.

During my tour I lived in the MAG-12 hootch area on the East Beach. Conditions were primitive to say the least. When I checked in I had to wait for someone to leave who had a blanket before one could be issued, and then I never had more than one. During the winter months and at night it was cold. I often wore two sets of sateen utilities. Only towards the end of my tour did incoming Marines start to be issued field jackets. We built a makeshift shower from a discarded external fuel tank, but I did not see a hot shower until very late in the tour. It was somewhat discouraging to travel to Army and Air Force bases and see the outright luxury (comparatively) in which they lived.



The previous picture is of the hootch area on the East Field near the beach.

The following picture is of the home built shower.



The Chu Lai Officers Club was right down on the ocean and I took most of my meals there. We did not have Vietnamese bartenders, cooks, or waitresses as they were not allowed on the base. MABS-12 ran a service that passed for laundry. Our hootch did have electricity, but we weren't supposed to run any heavy use items. Some Marines had electric blankets sent to them that they used quietly.

After the MATCU moved operations to the West Runway we still had to walk to get to the new site. It was a long time until a 6x6 truck and an old jeep were made available. So as to not to have to walk back to the East Beach for meals we would eat C-Rations at the site.

We dug a bunker near our hootch and had a larger bunker near the radar site. During one mortar attack the Officers Head was hit and destroyed. In another attack shortly after that we had some slight warning and were in the living area bunker when a mortar round hit the hootch next to mine. It hit directly over where Dick Traver had been sleeping and destroyed his bunk.

The following pictures are of the damaged Officers Head, and Dick Traver's bunk.



The MATCU left perimeter defense to the infantry unit assigned, all we had was some wire around the radar site. Once again I was the duty officer when a large flight of C-130s arrived to deliver an Army unit that was to take over defense of the Chu Lai base from the Marines. The C-130s would land and off-load and then taxi immediately for takeoff. This activity did not go unnoticed by local VC, and the mortar bombs started flying over the MATCU site and landing on and near the runway. We headed to our large bunker and I reported that the airport was closed. While the mortars were still falling I was notified that an A-4 was emergency low fuel and could not divert. I ran to the radar site and made a GCA with him, and he landed safely.



This picture shows MATCU personnel constructing one of the new bunkers.

I had renewed a friendship with a MATCU radar technician who was from my hometown and had been a year or two ahead of me in high school. One night he was driving a van back from the MAG-36 area at Ky Ha when the van overturned in a ditch and he drowned in about six inches of water before anyone could get him out.

It was not an entirely bleak tour. Several of us from the MATCU and others from MAG-12, started playing soccer on our off nights against the Korean Marines who were stationed south of Chu Lai. Some visiting general noticed and asked that we form the First Marine Air Wing Soccer Team. We traveled into several Vietnamese villages and played the locals in cow pastures as a "people to people" program. We also traveled to several bases playing our inter-service rivals. Some time in spring of 1967 we traveled to the Citadel at Hue for the inter-service play offs. Proud to say we won first place and the inter-service trophy. These matches generated crowds of Vietnamese that were number in the thousands.



The above picture is of the soccer team after practice at the Chu Lai Beach.



The above picture is of the crowd at Hue after the Championship match.

I remember that Rick Cuneo was the Special Services Officer that was in charge of the speedboats, water skis, and surf boards that were available on the beach. We also watched movies on screens set up on the beach.

One of my room-mates was a Navy Dentist, and he wanted some practice in removing wisdom teeth. I was having some problem with mine so I agreed to allow him to practice on me. One afternoon when I was off duty he gave me some pills and told me to come see him in a couple of hours. It was a good thing that I was feeling no pain when I walked into his office and found him reading a dental text book on the step by step method of extraction.

One day I went over to the naval port near Ky Ha to see an old friend who was a Naval Supply Officer. While visiting, he introduced me to his roommate, to my surprise he said Hi ...I'm Roger Staubach", who was stationed there.

I returned to CONUS in May 1967.

Monograph by Richard E. Wootton MGySgt USMC (Ret.) (Combined from emails of February 5, 2004)

V.D. Steel was OIC when I reported in to MATCU-67 at Chu Lai in March of 1967. Jim Summer was NCOIC. At the time Ky Ha came under MATCU-67. I left MATCU-67 in July of 1967 for MATCU-62 at Dong Ha.

My rank at that time was GySgt and I was a controller. The OIC of MATCU-62 was Capt D'Ambrosio. I'm not sure of rank of the NCOIC Ray Dinnan. He left in September of 1967. I was NCOIC from September, October, and November of 1967. Don Badger took over as NCOIC in December 1967.

I was sent to Khe Sanh in August of 1967 to work for Lt. Warnack as his NCOIC for the detachment from MATCU-62. I then left Khe Sanh for 3 months and came back in December of 1967. I stayed there until February of 1968. Capt Flahive was OIC and then Maj Causey.

Monograph by Robert J. Young (Compiled from E-Mails on August 11, 2004 and edited on April 21, 2005.)

Marble Mountain was a detachment from MATCU-68 in Phu Bai. When I checked in the NCOIC was GySgt Bill Edwards (now deceased). After he rotated we had MSgt Bob Mathis (also deceased) for a couple of months and then a SSgt by the name of Crow. He left and I was the senior enlisted, a Sgt E-5, during this time we did have an OIC his name was 1st Lt Jerry Ford. After several weeks he was relieved and went up north to Dong Ha or Khe Sanh. I never saw him again. Although never designated the NCOIC I was senior enlisted until I rotated in May of 68.

We worked out of the Wickes until the new tower was commissioned. I think that was in July or August of 67. The old console and radios were ripped out of the Wickes and installed in the Tower. A FPN-36 was brought in but never flight checked. I understand it was shipped up north after I left.

Personnel wise we had 5 Marine Controllers (a L/Cpl by the name of Rhodes a red headed kid is the only one I can remember) and 3 Army Controllers TAD to us, 2 Radio Techs and 1 Diesel Mech as I can best recall. As for equipment it was as basic as could be a Wickes tower. Light gun and flares. We communicated with Danang Tower on a Double EE-8.

When I arrived at Marble Mt in April of 67 had a controller assigned to An Hoa. He was a Cpl named Dedominiquez. After he rotated we had a Cpl whose name I forget but transferred into the U.S. Army to become a chopper pilot. After that Sgt Joe Follis known by many and loved by few took over. He was still there when I left in May 68. The controllers assigned there did provide very basic ATC service to choppers and fixed wing and kept the aircraft from flying thru the areas that artillery was using for their fire missions.

In early 1975 I was assigned to MATCU-66 on Okinawa. MAG-36 had contingency plans for the evacuation of U. S. personnel from Phenom Penh, Cambodia code named "Eagle Pull" and the evacuation of Saigon, South Vietnam code named "Frequent Wind". In early April 1975 a warning order was issued and our OIC, Captain S. D. Haley, chose a detachment of controllers and technicians to embark aboard the USS Oriskany CVA-34 with a TPN-8.

We weren't involved with "Eagle Pull" but did assist Navy controllers in vectoring inbound helicopters to the ship during "Frequent Wind". We were prepared to deploy the TPN-8 ashore if necessary, but it was not needed.

The ship returned us to Okinawa and all MAG-36 personnel were ashore by June 22nd.

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Appendix B

MATCA Hotline Articles

INDEX OF HOTLINE ARTICLES

Title	Contributor	Page
Letter	Ron Brigance	357
Reflections and Profiles	Boyd Murdock, John Call	359
Khe Sanh	Lacey Causey	361
Wild Ride at Quang Tri	Lacey Causey	366
MATCU-62's USS Constitution Connection	Leo Culp	368
MATCU-62's Baptism of Fire in Vietnam	Leo Culp	369
An Hoa	Lonnie Darr	371
A Few Minutes At Khe Sanh	Lonnie Darr	377
ATC Admin	Martin Hendrix	378
Letter	Jack Komsi	380
A War Story (Sort of)	Boyd Murdock	381
Rudi Nebel Remembers	Rudi Nebel	382
Another VFR/IFR And Who Cares Story	Rudi Nebel	383
Combined USMC/USAF Operations	Mike O'Rourke	385
Reflections and Profiles	Boyd Murdock, John Rush	387
Combined USMC/USAF Operations Part Deux	Charlie Tonkens	389

MATCA Hotline letter by Ron Brigance dated February 2002

I wanted to write just to relate a story concerning Col. Rudi Nebel. Maj. Nebel (back then) was my CO during my time at Marble Mountain. Gunny Newcomb was our NCOIC. I was Crew Chief for a crew in GCA. I had over 600 GCA runs and thought I was pretty good.

On a bright, visibility unlimited day in July 1970 with about two weeks left to go in the "Nam" I was monitoring a trainee making runs with an Air Force OV-10 who was making a number of "touch-and-goes". It made me no beans that all transmissions were taped; including what was said over the intercom. It also seemed I was on a roll that day, verbally, and had much to say about the inability of the Air Force to be able to fly a straight line, even if we went up there and painted them one to follow. There are many other "quotable" remarks made by a voice with a Texas twang on the tapes, but I've chosen not to remember any more of them.

On the last touch-and-go of the day for this Air Force pilot I decided to make the run and further inflate the GCA runs made by myself. With all the cold professionalism I took over and repeated the often-said lines "maintain VFR at all times" along with the other stuff we had to say. I have to say, I did a good job on that approach. He, the OV-10, was on course and on glide path all the way until he hit the dirt barricade at the approach end of the runway, runway 35 as I recall, with his landing gear. I was dumbfounded as I saw him turn hard left without even saying thank you and good-day. He then asked me what it was that he had hit. I may have asked him what it looked like, I don't remember.

A few days later I was informed of the investigation being conducted in Major Nebel's office and was requested to attend. I didn't feel so professional as several Air Force O-6's and below and, I guess, every officer in our MATCU listened to the tapes of some Texas twanged Sgt. speaking so lowly of the talents of Air Force pilots.

At some time during the days preceding, someone had dug a trench across the approach end of runway 35 and mounded up the debris parallel to the trench. We, and me specifically since I was the Crew Chief, had failed to advise the pilots of this obstruction to flying. To this day I have no memory of the tower even calling and advising us of this obstacle and I still stand by that story.

But this letter is not about my experience of humiliation of "trash talking" Air Force pilots. All pilots that flew in Viet Nam are heroes in my book and especially Col. Nebel. As best I know Maj. Nebel stood by me and never once questioned any talent I may have had as a GCA controller. He never questioned my integrity nor criticized my poor judgment in how I conducted myself on the radio. He let the experience speak for itself.

I never had an opportunity to salute Col. Nebel after that nor say good-bye or just thanks for the support. So after thirty years I just wanted to say "thanks" and I'm glad you got home OK. Also thanks for taking some of us on a napalm strike one day. That was some neat stuff.

Ron Brigance

MATCA Hotline article by Boyd Murdock and John Call dated May 1993**Reflections and Profiles by Boyd Murdock**

On May 8, 1968 at Chu Lai, RVN the TSQ-18 with 7 people inside took a direct hit from a 122mm rocket. The following will be an account of the event by John Call.

May 8, 1968 our crew was scheduled for work at the MATCU site for the next 24 hours. I was one of the Approach Controllers on duty that day along with John Rush. The crew was split into two sections for breaks and for sleeping. Each section consisted of four or five persons.

The day was beautiful, and as I remember traffic was almost nonexistent for the radar section, as most flight were departing and returning under VFR conditions.

At the meal break around 1630 I decided to stay at the site and wait until mid-rats were brought out. I walked around the site and stopped at the maintenance shed to shoot the bull with one of the technicians. I returned to the radar van around 1700. Kiwi was sitting in back of the T extension reading a book or newspaper. One of the technicians, along with another controller was sitting on the connecting bulkhead that leads into the T extension. John Rush was at the Approach Control console and another controller was working the data desk for John. I remember there was no traffic, and we were involved in small conversation.

When the rocket exploded at the base of the van, it felt as if someone had hit me in the back of the neck with a baseball bat. I remember losing my balance and falling forward. I don't believe I passed out, but remember seeing all kinds of things flying through the air. I later discovered that most of this was bits of wire and glass walls of the van. Over 50 pieces of wire and glass were removed from my face at the hospital, with no permanent effect.

I remember thinking to myself to get the hell out of the van, and thinking that some stupid SOB had released a bomb while taking the arresting gear and that the bomb had rolled into the radar site. About that time another rocket exploded and I knew we were being shelled.

As I got outside the van I realized I had been hit and my arm was pumping blood in spurts. As I tried to remove my belt to make a tourniquet, the belt hung up on a belt loop and I couldn't remove it. I must have lost more blood than I realized, as I felt I was about to collapse. I remember feeling helpless.

John Rush (God bless him) walked up behind me and grabbed my arm. It immediately shut off the bleeding. John then I think was able to get my belt off and make a tourniquet. John helped me to the bunker next to the sleeping tent and went for

help. I believe the Crash Crew from across the runway furnished a medic or corpsman, which came to my aid.

They put me in a chopper and took me to the Army hospital up the coast where initial surgery repaired the artery in my arm. The doctor told me later I was very lucky to be alive, as I had lost a tremendous amount of blood. I know if it had not been for John rush I would not be here today. I do not remember much about the first few days in the hospital as they kept me sedated. I was medevaced two weeks later to DaNang, then to Japan, then Great Lakes. I returned to duty at El Toro late in 1968. Additional corrective surgery was performed in 1979.

MATCA Hotline Article titled KHE SANH By LtCol Lacey Causey dated September 1995 (Editor – Boyd Murdock)

Here's my story of the "Siege of Khe Sanh". It is certainly not the definitive view...it is simply the point of view from one Marine who was there along with a lot of other Marines.

First a bit of official history from U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1971, an article by LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon; "Although not part of the tactical air control system, the Marine Air Traffic Control Units (MATCUs) played a vital role in the control of air traffic. Their mission was terminal traffic control around an air base. They provided approach control, ground controlled approach, and tower facilities. The Corps is authorized one MATCU per jet group and, because of dispersed operations, two per helo group. In Vietnam, the wing operated MATCUs at Chu Lai and Marble Mountain throughout the war and at Phu Bai, Quang Tri, Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, An Hoa, and Baldy as long as Marine units were operating at those bases. Without those units, air operations during the monsoon season would have been next to impossible."

NOTE: We also operated a tower at LZ Stud, later called Vandergrift, when we withdrew from Khe Sanh. I well recall the day we hoisted the telephone poles into position with a CH-46 and put the tower cab on top...yes, I did say telephone poles or the closest thing to them in S.E. Asia. I was also called into BGen Homer Hill's hooch one day to discuss the feasibility of placing a radio beacon on top of the tower so that helos could get a fix during inclement weather and rotate down to break out under the overcast before they ran into one of many surrounding hills. It was a lively discussion and I was flattered that the General sought my opinion even though I did not share his enthusiasm for the project. I guess he thought better of the idea because it never came to pass.

ANOTHER NOTE: I'm sure that LtGen McCutcheon meant no slight to MATCUs but, I've always smarted just a bit at the reading of that first paragraph. Having lived in I Corps with units at Dong Ha, Khe Sanh, LZ Stud and Quang Tri I saw on a daily basis that the Marines of the MATCUs not only performed the basic and highly technical mission but, performed those functions which we were all trained for, that being a Marine rifleman. We fortified our positions, laid out defensive fields of fire and withstood artillery, rocket, mortar and small arms fire both hostile and friendly. (Mostly hostile though the ARVNs did blow up one of our TAFDS berms at Quang Tri one summer day with an errant artillery round.)

GEOGRAPHY

To appreciate Khe Sanh we must review some geography. Routes One and Nine were the major roads over which vehicles moved from base to base. Route one parallels the coast in a general north/south direction. It intersects Route Nine about five miles east of Cau Viet at Dong Ha. Route Nine runs generally east/west. West of Dong Ha was a village, Cam Lo and further west Camp Carroll. Route Nine continued west for

a few miles and turned south at The Rockpile. A few miles south of the Rockpile at the village of Ca Lu the road turned west again and a long ride of some miles later you arrived at a road junction. If you continued on Route 9 and failed to make a right turn, you would end up at the village of Khe Sanh. The combat base at Khe Sanh was just a few clicks to the north of the village. Three miles southwest of Khe Sanh was the village of Lang Vei. The best way to travel of course was by helicopter. And when I could get a ride I chose that method of transportation. But most of my traveling was done in the M-38A1 jeep which Charlie Farr "borrowed" from the MPs at the 3rdMarDiv. He never let me forget that I "owed" him for the period of time we had the jeep. I used to tell Charlie that we were even because when the MPs came for the jeep I did not let them haul his butt away and court martial him.

My first trip to Khe Sanh was in a Huey. It gave me a great opportunity to see how precarious the situation was. As we flew over the waterfall at the east end of the runway I thought what a spectacular resort this place could be. Then the NVA started shelling the base. My first and only trip in a convoy convinced me to travel with just our one jeep. The convoy was ambushed because it made a better target. Of all the trips I made alone and made with Bo Braswell on Routes 1 and 9, I was shot at only once.

BEFORE TET

In December 1967 there were two NVA divisions operating along the DMZ: the 324B division along the eastern half, and the 325C along the northwestern corner of Quang Tri province, threatening Khe Sanh. The decision had been made to put the Marines at Khe Sanh to entice the NVA into a major set battle. Once the enemy came out in the open to fight he could be destroyed by our superior air and ground forces. By mid-January, the 304th Division had come across the border from Laos and had joined the 325C outside Khe Sanh. The 320th NVA Division next was identified, apparently poised for an attack against Camp Carroll. On 21 January, interrogation of a rallier from the 325C Division indicated that elements of the 308th and 341st NVA divisions were also south of the DMZ. On 31 January 1968 Capt. William Flahive, MATCU, was killed at Khe Sanh when an artillery shell exploded near a generator sending shrapnel in all directions.

SOME OF THE PLAYERS

LtGen R. E. Cushman was the III MAF commander who had under his command, in addition to all Marine assets, two Army divisions, the 1stAirCav and the 101st Airborne. MGen Tompkins commanded the 3rdMarDiv. Col. David E. Lownds was the 26th Marines commander and base commander at Khe Sanh. Disposition of the regiment during December 1967 was as follows: Regimental headquarters and 1st Battalion were at Khe Sanh, the 2nd Battalion was at Camp Evans and the 3rd Battalion was at Phu Bai. The 1st Battalion was further dispersed around Khe Sanh thusly: one company on Hill 881 south, commanded by Capt. Bill Dabney, (son-in-law of Gen. "Chesty" Puller), one company on Hill 861, one Platoon on Hill 950, and one company on the perimeter of the combat base itself. There were two platoons in reserve. And let's

not forget the other Marines trained and prepared to defend the base... that also had other duties to perform.

General Westmoreland made this evaluation of the importance of Khe Sanh: "Were we relinquish the Khe Sanh area, the North Vietnamese would have had an unobstructed invasion route into the two northernmost provinces from which they might outflank our positions south of the DMZ-positions which were blocking North Vietnamese attacks from the North."

General Cushman proposed a battle plan for Khe Sanh which Westmoreland approved: reinforce the garrison modestly and to depend upon our massive air and ground firepower to destroy the enemy, all with the realization that Khe Sanh would, logically, have to be supported from the air during a season when flying weather would be marginal at best. And this is where the MATCU came into its own. But first let me set the stage.

Even under ideal circumstances, the airlift would have been a massive undertaking. The difficulties however were compounded by the poor visibility which was below minimum for airfield operations 40% of the time and heavy volume of antiaircraft and artillery fire directed at the incoming transports. NVA gun crews positioned their antiaircraft weapons just off the eastern threshold of the runway and fired in the blind whenever they heard the drone of incoming planes. Several aircraft were hit while on GCA final and completely in the clouds.

The key to survival for the pilots was a steep approach through the eastern corridor, a short roll-out, and a speedy turnaround after landing. A small ramp paralleled the western end of the strip which the transport crews used as an unloading point. After roll-out, the pilot turned off the runway onto the eastern most taxiway, and then wheeled onto the ramp while the loadmasters shoved the pallets of supplies out the back.

OPERATIONS

On 10 February a Marine C-130 heavily laden with bladders of fuel was making its approach to the field under intense fire. Just before touchdown, the cockpit and fuel bags were hit by antiaircraft fire. The aircraft careened off the runway about 3100 feet from the approach end, spun around, and suffered two explosions. It was burning furiously. The pilot, CWO Wildfang, and the co-pilot, though burned, managed to crawl out the overhead hatch in the cockpit. The crash crew worked heroically and did save several crew and passengers. Six did not survive. This incident closed the field to C-130's.

A new unloading process had to be developed. The U. S. Air Force innovation. The Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System or LAPES was put into effect. This self-contained system allowed the aircraft to unload their cargo without landing. Simply stated the pilot would make an approach from the east, hold the aircraft about five feet off the ground, deploy a parachute and the cargo would be snatched

from the cargo bay when the chute deployed. Once the load was out the throttles were pushed forward and a steep climb out ensued to try and avoid small arms fire from the west. During the siege 52 LAPES deliveries were made.

Another technique was the Ground Proximity Extraction System of GPES. It was used only 15 times for reasons which become apparent when describing it. With this technique a C-130 flew low over the runway and the pilot tried to snag an arresting cable similar to the one used on aircraft carriers; in this case the tail hook was attached to the cargo bundles and not the plane. When the hook engaged the cable the pallets were jerked from the rear hatch and came to a dead stop on the runway. The problems with this system were that it occasioned Marines to expose themselves to hostile fire when they initially installed the GPES.

Most of the time, however, the low overcast prevented the use of either extraction system and the preponderance of supplies was delivered by paradrops. This technique required close air/ground coordination and the C-130 pilots relied on the MATCU to guide them in to the drop zones. The controller lined the aircraft up on the centerline and proceeded with a normal GCA final. When the C-130 passed a certain point over the eastern threshold of the field, the controller called "Ready, ready, mark." At "Mark," the pilot pushed a stop watch, activated his Doppler navigational system, turned to a predetermined heading and maintained an altitude of between 500 and 600 feet. The Doppler device indicated any deviation from the desired track to the drop zone, which was west of Red Sector, and the release point was calculated by using the stop watch...20 to 26 seconds from "Mark," depending on winds. At the computed release point, the pilot pulled the C-130 into an 8 degree nose up attitude and 16 parachute bundles, contained 15 tons of supplies, slid from the rear of the aircraft and floated through the overcast into the 300 meter square drop zone. Under VFR conditions the average computed error for the drops was 95 meters. Under IFR, the average distance that the bundles landed from the intended impact point was 133 meters...well within the DZ.

Beginning on 20 February, ASRT-B also assisted with supply drops whenever the MATCU was off-the-air. Normally, the controllers could have guided the transport pilots to an exact release point but, at Khe Sanh, the C-130's had to fly directly over the station and the TPQ-10 would break lock, therefore, the ASRT personnel used the same technique as the MATCU controllers and called a "Mark" when the 130 was over the eastern threshold and the pilots completed the runs with Doppler and stop watches.

NOTE: The ASRT normally operated 23 hours a day and shut down one hour for maintenance. The MATCU Det. Operated 24 hours a day and was kept operable 95% of the time.

Although the fuel berms were prime targets, the ASRT, MATCU, FDC, 26th Marines communications center, and other units which depended on sophisticated and delicate equipment, suffered from the heavy shelling. Consequently, they all had one common problem, maintenance. The normal difficulties associated with keeping the

various radars, radios, antennae, generators, and cooling components in an "up" status were complicated by the constant incoming, the dust, and the limited supply of replacement items. The vans and bunkers were heavily sandbagged but antennae and some communication lines were exposed and frequently knocked out by enemy rounds. To keep the NVA from zeroing in on his communication bunkers, Col. Lownds ordered that fake antennae be placed on every structure at Khe Sanh ... including the four-holders.

ED. NOTE: As we point out from time to time, one of the purposes of the Hotline is to record the entire ATC history. The "Siege of Khe Sanh" is the most famous battle of the Vietnam War and Marine ATC was right in the middle of it. Colonel Causey has done a wonderful job of showing the purpose for the MATCU being involved. We have asked that he and Lonnie Darr also provide us with some stories of a more personal nature. Quite a few MATCA members were there and we invite all of you who participated in this or any other action in any other war to contribute your stories.

MATCA Hotline Article titled Wild Ride at Quang Tri By LtCol Lacey Causey dated May 1996 (Editor – Boyd Murdock)

The Seabee Battalion, MCB-10 located at Quang Tri was being relieved by another battalion. They were to be rotated out over about a seven or eight day period to Clark AFB in the Philippines. Cliff Ivy, Charlie Farr, Joe LaPan and the Big Z (Bob Zvolerin) made me aware of the rotation one day and allowed as to how nice it would be if some Marines could make the round trip and RON in Angeles City. As you know Angeles City had a fine reputation for art galleries, museums, parks, and concert halls.

I checked with the folks over at PROV-MAG 39 and was told that there was no way orders could be cut to allow Marines out of a combat zone no matter how short the time. So I returned to the unit and had Top scrounge up a typewriter and we cut our own orders. The Air Force plane captains and crew chiefs were interested only in seeing a set of official orders. They had no objection to having six to eight Marines along for the ride. And over the period of the rotation with every C-130 headed to Clark AFB, there were MATCU Marines aboard.

The total turnaround time was thirty three hours and allowed about 8 hours in the ville. Everyone who went seemed to enjoy the time out of country and returned with a boost in morale. I'm sure that they were made to feel welcome and enjoyed all the uplifting things to do while there. They all had wide grins for sure.

Everything was going great right up until the last aircraft returned. Of course I was sweating bullets for fear that one of my own would decide to stay in Angeles City or miss the ride back. Anyway the afternoon that the final flight called in found nearly everyone in the Unit either in the tower or on top of the equipment to welcome back the last group. I remember very clearly seeing the 130 as it entered downwind and commenting to someone standing by me at the tower rail that now I could breathe a little easier. The reply was, "They ain't down yet skipper."

The tower had the frequency on the overhead and we heard them call base, then final. At the base of the tower in the taxiway waiting to take off after the 130 cleared the runway was an Air Force C-124. When the 130 cleared the fence it was high and hot. As it began to flare it ballooned but the pilot had anticipated sticking the bird on the numbers and had begun to reverse the props...over the frequency someone (C-124) said, "Wheeee..."

At that instant the left wing of the 130 rotated under, broke off at the wing root and exploded in a ball of flame. Both engines separated and remained behind. The rest of the aircraft continued down the runway until it bore-sighted our portable cab, the TPN-8s and assorted other equipment. It went through everything like a knife and finally came to rest on its right wing in the sand between the runway and the taxiway. It blocked the other radar until I had it removed...but that's another story. Anyway, here we are watching with eyes wide and mouths open in total disbelief of what's happening

right in front of us. Talk about a ringside seat...The crash horn was sounded immediately and everyone began to run to the burning wreck.

The right wing continued to burn...both engines were on fire...there was fire in the fuselage on the left side at the wing root. Few fire bottles worked and the pumper truck could not pump water. What we ended up doing was throwing sand into the engine nacelles and elsewhere to try and douse the fires. I jumped into the right rear parachute door yelling for Ivy and the others who were on the flight. I had seen Cliff's ditty bag lying on the ground when I approached the 130 and just hoped and prayed that he had made it clear of the flames. He had! I remember being dragged out of the back by two Marines telling me that the smoke had gotten to me and that they thought that everyone had gotten out.

Eventually the fires burned themselves out. The Seabees lost two and had a few others injured. I witnessed that day many instances of heroism...throwing sand into a burning engine with fuel still in the wing tanks...trying to save the lives of the injured men with belts as tourniquets. Thank God we lost no one. It did put a sobering effect on an otherwise happy occasion.

I hope that the statute of limitations has run its course for me as far as cutting the orders. But all things considered, I would do it again in a heartbeat.

MATCA Hotline Article by Captain Leo V. Culp USMC (Ret.) titled The MATCU-62 U.S.S. Ticonderoga Connection dated May 1997.

During November 1966 with 4 officers and 32 enlisted Marines, we relocated MATCU-62 from MCAS Kaneohe Bay into the Republic of Vietnam. Our mission was to relieve MATCU-68 and assume air traffic control responsibility for the Dong Ha and Khe Sanh airfields.

Early in 1967, the U.S.S. Ticonderoga was stationed off the coast of South Vietnam approximately 20 miles from Dong Ha. An AD aircraft attached to VA-52, operating from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, was forced to make an emergency landing at Dong Ha. Instead of landing his aircraft on our mud covered 3000-foot expeditionary runway, the pilot mistakenly landed on the dirt adjacent and parallel to the runway. As a result of this error, we placed a moniker upon the pilot (whose name was Cal) as “**Dual Runway Cal.**”

Taking pity on Cal, MATCU-62 played host until a Ticonderoga maintenance crew could be flown into Dong Ha to repair Cal’s aircraft. That evening, we celebrated Cal’s successful landing with a bottle of Jim Beam. As the evening progressed, we elected to make Cal an Honorary Marine. We acquired a can of red paint and in large, bold, red letters painted “**USMC DONG HA**” on the side of Cal’s aircraft. In smaller letters (just to the right of USMC) we painted “**TO DUAL RUNWAY CAL FROM HIS DONG HA PALS.**” Also included was a handprint when one of us inadvertently stuck his hand in the paint.

Epilogue: Upon Cal’s return to the Ticonderoga as an **Honorary Marine**, Cal took some good natured “flak” from his squadron. Apparently our indiscretions were forgiven – several days later Cal returned to Dong Ha with a much appreciated gift: two crates of apples and oranges.

MATCA Hotline Article by Capt Leo V. Culp USMC (Ret.) Titled MATCU-62's Baptism of Fire in Vietnam dated July 1997

Arriving in the Republic of Vietnam during November 1966, MATCU-62's first four months at the Dong Ha and Khe Sanh Airfields were relatively uneventful. The only errant missile to come our way during this period was a .45 caliber slug dug out of our CPN-4 surveillance radar antenna; most likely an accidental discharge by a careless Marine. I affixed this slug to a board with a sign that read "1st Round Fired at MATCU-62 - Vietnam Conflict 21 December 1966" and facetiously posted this signboard on our Admin/Operation tent's Bulletin Board.

MATCU-62's days of serenity would soon come to an end. On 27 April 1967, just before dawn, SSgt Bryan and I were on duty in the CPN-4 radar van. As the first rockets exploded near our MATCU operations site, I had a C-130 (inbound from DaNang) under GCA final control. SSgt Bryan and I looked at each other knowing what the "thump, thump" sound must be but not wanting to believe it. To verify, I opened the radar van's door just as a third rocket explodes near the MATCU maintenance hut, I yelled at Bryan to get into our bunker. I then communicated to the C-130 pilot that Dong Ha was under attack and recommended he return to DaNang; pilot observes rockets hitting airfield and concurs. Throwing my headset off, I immediately jumped out of the radar van, looked up at our control tower and saw the two tower operators looking down at me. I yelled at them to get into their bunker, they didn't hesitate!

As operators descend the tower ladder way, I started running toward the maintenance hut to insure that our on-duty diesel tech (GySgt Oliver) was okay; met him running toward me. I yelled at him to get into the bunker by the perimeter road whereupon I turned and started running back toward the tower bunker. Enroute another rocket impacts close by; I hit the deck and end up against sand bags protecting our CPN-4 radar van. I lay there while additional rockets impact in the helicopter parking area. Rather than lying in the open, I decided to try for the bunker by the perimeter road; I dove head first into the bunker while someone (I believe Oliver) grabbed my arms and pulled me in.

When the rocket barrage stopped, my first thought was that this could be the covering fire of a ground attack; fortunately that was not the case. The sun was now starting to show above the horizon and the crews of our two VMO observation aircraft had reached their flight line. Upon hearing their engines, I climbed up into the control tower to assist in their departure. MATCU personnel started to arrive from our billeting area to survey the damage and assist in operations.

Our Marines were quick to respond to this attack: by the end of the day our Marine ground units had captured a sizable amount of enemy weapons, ammunition and support equipment.

Aviation casualties during this attack included two Crash Crew personnel killed when they responded to a fire caused by a direct hit on the MEDEVAC area. MATCU-62's extensive sand bagging effort was a success; we had minimal damage to MATCU equipment. Other Dong Ha units were not as fortunate.

Epilogue: The remaining nine months of our Vietnam tour was one of continuous harassment by the enemy. Noteworthy during this period was the destruction of our mess hall and food supply; the destruction of Dong Ha's Ammunition Dump, (where ammunition would "cook-off" causing projectiles to rain down upon us an hour after the attack); destruction of our fuel farm; the extensive damage to our billeting area and the continuous damage/loss of MAG-36 helicopters which ultimately forced the MAG to relocate their helicopters south to the Hue/Phu Bai Airfield.

MATCA Hotline Article titled AN HOA by Lonnie Darr dated July 1995

(Editor - Boyd Murdock)

*

***ED NOTE:** An Hoa was a small artillery fire base in the An Hoa Valley about 15-20 miles SW of DaNang. In addition to artillery, it was a jumping off point for LRP's (long range patrols) and scout/sniper teams. It had a 2500' Marston Matting runway which was used by various light aircraft, choppers and C-130s which ferried ammo from DaNang.*

It was staffed by a small ATC detachment out of Chu Lai. Just prior to the incident that Lonnie relates, I was the NCOIC and Lt Koffenberger was the OIC. "Gunny Job" was former MATCA member Bob Job, the maintenance chief. More on all this is another story.

Lonnie had a front row seat at An Hoa, Khe Sanh and Chu Lai and will be relating more stories in the future.

*

Winter is a wet cold season, even at Chu Lai. Occasionally the temperatures would dip all the way down to 70. The frequent rain kept everything smelling like mildew, my clothes, my rack, the floor, the outside, and the never ending varieties of roast beef in the mess hall, and even my socks (which wasn't altogether bad since they usually smelled like raw sewage). And, even though I had to dodge an occasional rocket, and walk, not ride, to the staff club, the unbelievable tranquility and resort-like qualities of Chu Lai, at least compared to Khe Sanh and Dong Ha, were making my second extension in Viet Nam a pleasant time indeed.

And then, while enjoying an idyllic reverie after making a repair on the UPS-1, I received word that the old man would like to see me. Upon reporting, and accepting a walk to the mess area to get a cup of coffee, he [name unremembered], (NU)] mentioned that he had noticed in passing that I had just returned from special leave to start my second extension and that I was one only two people in MATCU-67 that was qualified to work on the TACAN (I hate it when they notice things like that). He also said that since I was well experienced at coping with the less glamorous places MATCUs might reside, he was sending me to the little mud hole of An Hoa to replace a TACAN qualified tech that was rotating home. So of course I smiled, thanked him profusely for his confidence in my abilities and for the Vaseline, even though the shaft felt the same. I then proceeded to suggest to him in the wisest Staff NCO tone I could muster, that he might want to reconsider since he was denying the other TACAN tech (NU) the incomparable opportunity that serving in a mud hole like An Hoa could provide. He thanked me for the suggestion, told me to pick up two replacement radios, grab my seabag, 782 gear and be at the air freight ramp by 0900 (so much for giving advice to your CO).

The flight to DaNang in a C-7 Caribou was as uneventful as the flight attendants. However, the arrival at the Marine air freight terminal at DaNang brought an interesting

surprise. I was going to pick up a few TACAN parts from the Air Force as soon as I could arrange transport to their side of the base but at the bottom of the C-7 ramp sat an Air Force Colonel behind the wheel of a jeep, and he was asking for me. Now, I still hurt when I sat down from my last officer interface, so I was, not surprisingly, a bit suspicious. Boy was I surprised when he said he had the parts with him and that he was giving me a ride to Marble Mountain. (Do you have any idea how embarrassing it is to be driven around by a Colonel?) I couldn't help thinking, on the ride to Marble Mountain, that the Air Force must have more Colonels than the Marine Corps has corporals or maybe they had O-6s to drive everyone around, hell I didn't know.

Anyway, enough of this controller-like dribble. I caught an H-46 to An Hoa and enjoyed the scenery on the way out except for the couple of times we got shot at. But then I already knew what a wonderful thing it was to be shot at and missed.

GySgt Job and the Sub-Unit 1 OIC (NU) met me on the ramp and helped me unload gear. When the smell of JP4 and burning feces hit my nostrils, I knew I was home. Gunny Job showed me to my rack; then I went back to a welcome aboard chat with the OIC 1stLt (NU). It was a little hard to talk with an 8 inch battery firing a support mission right behind us but I did hear that I was now in charge of the 1st Wing reactionary platoon and should mosey over to the COC for a briefing on my area of responsibility. I told you it way my lucky day.

I know, I know, you guys want to hear the good stuff. Well hell, this is all good stuff. Anyway, I was amazingly able to keep channel 50 TACAN on the air and occasionally give Gunny Job a suggestion about how to maintain the FPN-36. He loved my suggestions. Sometimes near the middle of February 1969, about 2 ½ weeks since my arrival, I was kicked back in our underground living quarters reading a Playboy, thinking about a McDonalds hamburger, and listening to the incoming rockets and mortars, when the EE-8 jingled. COC wanted me to take my reactionary platoon and occupy our assigned bunkers on the north perimeter. It seemed troops, assumed to be VC, had been spotted due north of the perimeter about 300 meters out and were trading small arms and RPGs with the north perimeter security forces. I called 1stLt (NU) and Gunny Job to tell them I was taking the troops out. Five minutes later we were deployed so I cranked up the PRC-25 and reported in on the COC net. Incoming small arms fire was not a great volume but steady. Just east of our position on the perimeter was a 106 recoilless rifle. Every two or three minutes the 106 crew would get on the net and ask permission to fire the 106. COC kept saying no. Then I heard the 106 crew call to the next bunker east and ask them to get on the horn and say "Fire the 106". About 30 seconds later I heard on the net "Fire the 106", followed almost immediately by the roar of a 106 beehive round being fired at the source of our incoming small arms fire, directly to our front. All incoming small arms fired stopped, though we were still catching an incoming mortar every 10 minutes or so. We stayed on alert the rest of the night. The next morning we found that the ARVN had a patrol to our front but neglected to tell us about it. The result after the 106 fired was 10 dead ARVN. (I always said they should improve their communication skills). Of course the incoming mortars and rockets were the real thing, so we had a good excuse to stay up all night and freeze our asses off.

Intel reports had been saying for the last couple of days that there was increased VC activity in the area and the manufacture of caskets locally was in high gear. They said that was not a good sign. I asked them why not---after all they were making caskets for them, not us. The intel officer smiled and said that they weren't expected to die in their sleep.

I mentioned to the Gunny that it would not be a bad thing if we could get hold of a machine gun for the reactionary platoon. He said he would work on it. Fifteen minutes later he called me to his quarters which were on a small knoll overlooking the north perimeter. He had an M-60 that he had convinced the crash crew that we needed more than they did. Easy for him to do, he was ranker than me.

For the next few days, tension was building steadily. Intel said that something was about to happen, so stand by for a ram. At about 2200 on the 18th of February, amidst incoming mortars and rockets, I was once again asked to reinforce the north perimeter with the reactionary platoon. Tensions were high, mortar flares were being fired continuously and passing out grenades to our fighting holes did little to give me a warm fuzzy feeling in the pit of my stomach.

An Hoa was no bigger than Khe Sanh. Really just a brown postage stamp with a runway. The base was narrow on the north-south axis and wider on the east-west axis. The 2700 feet or so of runway ran east-west. The control tower was roughly mid-runway on the south side. Just across the runway and on the north side of a wide drainage ditch, was the MATCU living quarters dug into a small hill that stood between the runway and the perimeter. Just north of the east end of the runway was the ammo dump and less than 50 yards from the north east end of the ammo dump was the TACAN site, also a mere 50 yards from the perimeter.

Anyway, the close proximity to everything on the base, especially the ammo dump, was wearing uneasily on everyone's mind, when the COC net crackled to life talking about sappers in the wire on the east end of the base and sending other reactionary units that direction. From our positions we could hear the sounds and see the flashes from RPGs, hand grenades, claymores and small arms fire. I kept telling my guys to keep their eyes to the front. I didn't want to be caught without pants down in our area of responsibility.

It was shortly after midnight that we heard and saw the first of hundreds of explosions from the ammo dump. The base supported multiple 105 and 8 inch batteries as well as many other remote artillery sites. We had a lot of ammo! So much in fact, that all of it didn't fit in the dump and much of it was stacked along the north side of the runway west to nearly the halfway point between us and the ammo dump.

There was a 90 foot watch tower 25 or 30 yards north of the edge of the dump. After several minutes of explosions from the dump, I saw one of the two Marines manning the tower jump the 90 feet to the ground. I just knew he had to be dead, until I

saw him get up, climb the tower ladder, and carry his wounded partner back down. I don't know if he lived through the attack, but that young Marine had balls of steel.

We had been receiving and returning sporadic small arms fire for over an hour when the net said the east end of the base had been over run and that it was about even up on whether there were more Marines or VC on the base. We got word to fall back to the south side of the runway and consolidate. I sent my guys over the hill and across the runway 2 at a time after alerting the other side to be careful who they were shooting at. It wasn't exactly a long trip back, but it sure seemed long, when you consider the amount of steel that was falling from the ammo dump and the fact that there were lots of running targets and not all of them were Marines. After watching the last of my men go over the hill heading south, without machine gun, I decided that I was in a bad place to spend the night by myself. I called across the runway and told them I was actually coming now and not just breathing hard. They said oh sure and promised not to shoot me when I showed myself. I jumped up, popped over the hill and started down the south slope heading for the ditch between me and the runway when the largest explosion of all from the dump knocked me off my feet. I looked to my left and saw this huge mushrooming wall of fire and wondered what it would be like to be hit on the head by a 150 lb 8 inch round falling from oh fifteen hundred feet or so. Somehow I came to the conclusion that I didn't want to find out, so I rolled the rest of the way to the ditch and scooted into a 3ft diameter culvert. It felt pretty good to have this long round oasis with dirt over my head, while just two feet away there was a steel snow storm. Like most things that make you feel good, they didn't last very long. Scooting into the other end of the culvert were two VC hiding from the same snow storm that I was. When one of them turned and saw me, I decided that three was definitely a crowd. With one of only a handful of times I ever fired an M-16 on full auto, I emptied a magazine their direction and nearly blinded myself when the brass bounced off the culvert and hit me in the face. Anyway, I left and ran the rest of the way across the runway figuring it was safer out there than it was in the that culvert.

Just as I get up beside the tower, Gunny Job nearly ran over me heading back down the stairs to the runway level. He jumped in a jeep that was parked down there and started east on the runway toward the ammo dump. I looked down the runway to see that two crash crew guys had driven down to put out fires that had started in the ammo alongside the runway. There had been a healthy explosion and both of them had been knocked down. The Gunny had seen it happen and had taken off in the jeep to help. As I watched, he grabbed both the crash crew men, carried them back to the jeep, jumped in and drove them back down to the field hospital. He sure as hell had my respect!

About the time Gunny Job was coming back down the runway, I heard small arms fire behind me and turned to see what was happening. I joined several Marines that were running to an area between the COC and the mess tent. We arrived at the east end of the mess tent at the same time as 3 VC rounded the west end at a full run. We started firing, and the three of them went down and just about as fast I returned to

the MATCU area. I found out later that the three VC were a flame thrower team obviously heading for the COC.

Though most of the small arms fire died off a couple of hours before daylight, the ammo dump kept cooking. There was now barbed wire strung across the runway about 1/3 of the way down from the east end and an M-60 tank parked in the center of the runway facing east. This was the new perimeter.

As with all nights like that one, it was great to see the sun rise. The ammo dump was still cooking off and the mess and debris around the base was unbelievable. The OIC came to get me to go to the COC and talk to 1stMAW on the phone. Some very irate Major in DaNang was reading me the riot act because I had allowed channel 50 TACAN to go off the air. I asked him if he had been up all night and knew where two of his C-130 flare ships had been dropping flares all night. He said no. So I told him that I could still see the TACAN but it was now 300 yards outside the perimeter. This took him back a couple of step but he came back with an order to go check out the TACAN to see if it needed to be replaced. I thanked him for the great opportunity he was giving me and told him I would get back to him.

I went to get Gunny Job, and we grabbed our rifles, jumped in the jeep and drove down near the end of the runway. As we were getting out of the jeep there was a large explosion from the dump. We were only about 75 yards from the edge of the crater so we hunkered down on the south side of the jeep waiting for the debris to stop falling. A few seconds later, another explosion rocked the ground. As soon as it happened, I reached out and thumped Gunny Job pretty hard on the back of the helmet. Now I'm not saying that he wet his drawers, but it had to be close. At least it kept me laughing for the next 5 minutes.

To get to the TACAN, we had to get in the trench line and circle the entire east end of the base stepping over unexploded chi-com grenades and dodging steel snow along the way. About half way to the TACAN we found a seriously wounded Marine who rolled himself in the water filled ditch after being injured by a chi-com grenade. We pulled him out of the ditch, kept him warm and called for help.

The TACAN had been mostly dismembered by explosions from the ammo dump, so when I called the Major back, I told him we needed a new one. He said he would have one up there that afternoon.

Sure enough, an H-46 arrived early in the afternoon with a new TACAN slung underneath. We were waiting for him on the air freight ramp as he came to a hover. As soon as the load stabilized, two of the cargo straps broke, dumping more than 1000 lbs of TACAN on its top on the air freight ramp. UPS couldn't have done it better. Back to the phone. The Major was thrilled, but we had a new TACAN by the end of the day and had it back on the air by daylight the next day.

I ended up spending another two weeks at An Hoa before being replaced by a new TACAN tech that had just arrived in country. Chu Lai wasn't exactly a vacation in the Bahamas, but everything is relative.

MATCA Hotline Article titled A FEW MINUTES AT KHE SANH by Lonnie Darr dated September 1995 (Editor – Boyd Murdock)

***ED NOTE:** Lonnie Darr is a veteran of Khe Sanh, An Hoa & Chu Lai. He is one of our regular correspondents, and it seems appropriate to follow our feature story with his anecdote of a lighter moment during the Khe Sanh operation.*

During the siege, Khe Sanh was like living on a big red clay target, with the MATCU-62 compound as the bullseye. Everyone lived in a bunker. Some above ground, some below. But no matter where your bunker was or how it was built, it still made your sphincter squint to leave it for any appreciable time.

One morning, sometime in February of '68 I was just finishing up my morning check of the TPN-8 revetments. Rejoicing that we hadn't had incoming for about 15 minutes and I had no new holes from the previous night. I was enjoying the cool morning air when rockets and mortars started slamming into the air freight ramp and east taxiway and sounded like they were moving our direction.

I made it to my bunker doorway in about 2 seconds flat, made a turn inside the door, crashed into the south bunker wall and slid to the ground with my back against it. About 3 seconds after my butt hit the ground another Olympic sprinter hit the wall above me and fell into my lap. I'd never seen the guy before, so I said hello. He said hi, but didn't offer to move. Before I could say either kiss me or get out of my lap, a mortar landing just outside the doorway got my attention. The bunker rocked like California and a huge cloud of smoke, dirt and debris burst through the door.

As the smoke cleared, some 2nd Lieutenant finished crawling through the door like a snake on hot asphalt and rose to one knee at the end of a rack. Breathing like a Chihuahua with asthma and with the baby face and voice of a new parish priest, he said, "Gentlemen, if you know any prayers I suggest you say them now."

Well hell, I didn't know this guy and besides, I had just made a 25 yard sprint in under 2 seconds, had a new friend in my lap and I wasn't planning on dying that day, so I said, "Yea sure, as long as we don't pray to the same God you do, right, Lieutenant!" Now I don't know for sure, but someone said they could hear us laughing over the incoming clear down to the COC.

MATCA Hotline Letter titled ATC Admin by LtCol Martin W. Hendrix USMC (Ret.) dated September 1996.

For introduction I got my start in ATC in 1965. As a student at NATTC Memphis, the Marine Corps wanted to see if first term techs out of "A" school could make it in the ATC maintenance field. Reporting to Glynco that first time was a real treat: "What, you are on your first enlistment? You don't belong here!" A short, stout Gunny by the name of Hawbaker stated very emphatically that "You'll never make it through MY school." The Marines of Glynco tried to make sure that the ATC field was kept pure of us first term guys that this particular change would never take place; some of us survived and stayed. For my part the relationship has lasted for more than 30 years.

I've noted that the ATC field has enough folks that will tell you what will not work (and are accommodating of the failure) to fully staff a GCA Unit, MATCU, MACS, or MCAS. With the exception of a GCA Unit (which were gone by the time I entered the field) and getting a position qualification as a controller, I've served in all aspects of the ATC field. Any of the combinations will work, if the participants are willing to make it work. The willingness is the core of the problem.

Your comment of how to "professionalize the USMC ATC community" is baffling. Marine Corps ATC is a very professional community, if it were not, how many of us would have stayed with it? If you are attempting to indicate a desire to develop a career pattern for the enlisted Marine that will take controllers into the Warrant/LDO community, then I understand the comment.

Right, wrong or otherwise, the Marine Corps performed a study several years ago to redefine the program. Each and every OCC field was looked at. In those communities where there was an unrestricted officer MOS (with the exception of the Marine Gunner program), the Warrant Officers and LDOs were done away with. LDOs were given the opportunity to re-designate to regular officer status. Warrant Officers were given the opportunity to laterally move into another MOS. Did the Marine Corps lose in this? You bet! We lost the years of experience that one gains working within a specialized field and moving into the Warrant and LDO ranks. We now have officers that do not have stick time running the show. Does ticket punching happen? You bet. Does it place an additional burden on SNCOs? YOU BET!

I well remember a day in Vietnam. We were in the middle of the monsoon season, the weather was terrible and the NVA/VC were keeping everyone busy. We were Bingo for the carriers; the flights in and out of Chu Lai were nonstop. Just another typical day in Vietnam. Van C. Lafoon, Danny Simpson, Dewy Darby, or one of many controllers may have been working approach when a call came in; the transcript was about like this:

A/C "Chu Lai Approach, This is WF-25"

Approach "WF-35, This is Chu Lai Approach control"

A/C "Chu Lai Approach, I'm declaring a low fuel emergency"

Approach "Roger WF-25, what's your fuel state?"

A/C "Chu Lai Approach, I have 10 minutes of fuel remaining"

Approach "Roger WF-25, you are number 12 in the low fuel emergency pattern"

The transmissions were given in a calm, professional manner, the pilot knew that everything was under control, there was no panic; he landed number 12. With the exception of a couple of SNCOs that had recently put on the bars of a 2ndLt, all of the approach Controllers were enlisted, Sgts, SSgts and Gunnies. The OIC of the MATCU wasn't an ATC guy he was just a pilot. Most of the other ATC officers were new guys, just out of Glynco, without a qualification. Who made it all happen? The professional NCOs and SNCOs of the MATCU.

The Marine Corps is soon to have its 221st birthday. Over those years we have gone through many cycles. One theme that repeats is the Warrant/LDO program. Ron Dodge and Hank Flood (these are real OLD TIMERS) went through an era where there were no Warrant Officers made. What we have today is not what we had when I became a Warrant in 1975. It is probably not what we will have in another 20+ years. How do these programs change, new Marines have new ideas; it happens about every 20 years or so. The reasons for change fade with age and memories. The members of MATCA can tell you what it was like 20 or 30 or 50 years ago. What worked then will not necessarily work today. What was needed then may not be what is needed today; that is left to those of you that work today's challenges.

The common thread that binds us together is the ability in each of us to perform up to standards established by the early pioneers of this community and to carry these standards forward. As we entered the community we were challenged by those who came before and we had to meet their measure to be accepted. It is yours to carry forward.

MATCA Hotline article by Jack Komsi dated September 1999

In Mid '68 I was 1st MAW ATCO. This was short because I got sent out to the hospital ship Sanctuary for an x-ray. As soon as I got aboard, they had to go out to sea to avoid a typhoon, plus the x-ray machine went down. After avoiding the wx, the ship got sent up north. The machine stayed down and I got a vacation.

In the meantime I, of course, had to be replaced. However, while I was in DaNang 1st MAW got this horrible letter through all the channels. A USAF reserve C-130 from Texas complained about Tower procedures at DaNang. The letter came with endorsements from Reserve HQ, HQ USAF (Wash. DC), HQ USMC, and HQ FMFPAC, wanting an explanation. I looked up the language used. It was seldom used by us but it was in the ATP 7110.xx. I put everything I could justify in the reply and then informed THE WORLD in the last sentence that DaNang was a USAF installation and the tower was staffed and run only by USAF personnel. Even 1stMAW (except me) didn't seem to know (or care). When I showed my Colonel the letter he couldn't wait to show it to the CG, 1stMAW.

I think that shows how much attention was being paid (at least in those days) to ATC at upper levels anywhere. I would hesitate telling this story if I hadn't shown the papers to Major (now LtCol Ret.) Causey, who happened to be in DaNang and stopped in at the office.

Maybe this might prompt some recollections from other old hands about the comments made by our monitor. ("If you think I'm going to tell the CMC that, you're crazy") when he summoned us to DC to tell him what was wrong. This was in 1970.

Anyway, it's all water under the seven bridges of Kin Tai (Iwakuni), or Cape Fear, or Broad, or Anacostia. It's Happy Hour time.

Semper Fi
Jack Komsi

MATCA Hotline Article titled A War Story (Sort of) by Boyd Murdock dated January 1994.

During three wars, probably the most intense hostile action in which USMC air traffic control was involved was that of MATCU-62. In 1968 they were at Khe Sanh, Dong Ha/LZ Vandergrift and Quang Tri. I have tried for two years to get even a small first person account of what went on there to no avail. This, in spite of the fact that many MATCA members were right in the thick of it.

I have no business trying to write of this because I was having my own problems down at Chu Lai and An Hoa. But I have a large stack of reports from there donated by Toney Couteau and Don Badger who was the NCOIC. I am going to list some of the personnel and some of the damage done to them and the equipment. This is taken from the comments section of the monthly reports. It will give you a sense of what it was like there but will not be complete and probably not totally accurate. That can only be done by those who were there and I'm very sad no one has chosen to do so. If I've left out anyone or anything do not hesitate to write or call.

Some of our members who were there are Ron Fay, Dick Wooton, Dewey Darby, Toney Couteau, Tom Carroll, Jim Sumner, Charlie Farr, Gary Lewis, and Wayne Komsi. NCOICs were: Don Badger, W. A. Telford, R. G. Bathe, Jim Sumner, Tom Carroll, and E. B. Denger. OICs were: R. J. Puskar, P. D. Haynes, H. L. Causey, and S. D. Davis.

Wounded in action were: Greek, Albin, Dale, Linnemeier, Shaw, Bywater, Zukowski, Covey, McClure, Waters, Puskar, D'Ambrosio, Harvey (3), Eshelman (2), Kalb, Gaffney, Rasmussen, Chase, Powell, and Hood. Sgt G. J. Larson was awarded the Bronze Star. MATCU-62 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

Equipment also sustained a lot of "wounds" and we now include some of those: GRC-99 took direct rocket hit and destroyed, TRC-131 took direct hit by mortar on sandbagged roof - blew out all windows, FPN-36 shrapnel damage to rec/trans case and antenna drive, TPN-8 shrapnel holes in az and el antennas (3 separate units), numerous sets of cables destroyed, UPS-1 shrapnel damage to antenna, disposition instructions for CPN-4, TSA-11, TSN-1, FPN-36 and TSN-1 have been received but intense fire at Dong Ha and Khe Sanh preclude movement. There was much more other damage and Don closes the March 1968 monthly report with "outside of that, we're all O.K.!"

This covered February 1968-January 1969 and is in no way meant to be complete. It is only designed to show the intensity of what ATC endured in the very famous defense of Khe Sanh by the 26th Marines and action at the bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri. We strongly encourage corrections and additions.

(See the February 1968 OPNAV 3721 report by MATCU-62 in the OPNAV Reports section.)

MATCA Hotline Article by Rudi Nebel dated May 2001.**Rudi Nebel Remembers**

North of Dong Ha, spring of 1967. Early morning med-evac mission. Wind less than five knots. Temperature/dew point conjunction. So, what do these latter two phenomenon create? Fog! So here we were, at 1,500 feet, a flight of two trusty H-34s, looking for the zone. Talking with the radioman on the ground got us near the zone as he could hear us but neither of us could see the other. Once I knew we were close, wondering how I was going to get down through the fog to execute my mission.

I remembered some high school physics that would resolve the problem. A smoke grenade would put out warm smoke. The surrounding fog was cool. Warm air rises. Ergo, "Hey, whoever 6, go ahead and pop-a-smoke. I'll call the color." My high school physics teacher was right!! Soon after they had popped their smoke, a spot on the top of the fog bank started to change to green. The fog was maybe 300 or 400 feet thick – maybe even 500, but I'm not sure though, it was probably lower as at 500 feet I don't know if the smoke would have made it.

Anyway, leaving my wingman at 1,500 feet, I eased on down until I was heading downwind over the green spot just over the fog. Really pretty, you know, with the sun glistening off the cotton-like moisture saturated layer. Continuing south for a couple of minutes, I executed a 90/270 and put myself and my trusting crew back on final heading north. Setting up a rate of descent that I thought adequate to put me over the zone at an altitude of around fifty feet, I eased down into the fog using the green spot as a guide until it was no longer visible. Slowly and slowly we descended through the fog enshrouding the aircraft reducing visibility to zip. I held a steady 60 knots and about a 300 feet per minute decent. At 150 feet I advised the crew to start looking for the ground and, hopefully, people. Even more hopefully, our people.

Well, my friends, there they were. Once we had visual contact, an uneventful landing was made, the med-evacs boarded, and a simple instrument climb out to the top of the fog put us back with our wingman and on our way to the ship. We must be careful that this sort of innovative daring-do not become common place or it might be the end of air traffic control as we know it.

MATCA Hotline Article by Rudi Nebel dated July 2001.**Rudi Nebel Remembers – Another VFR/IFR and who cares story.**

Flying an H-53D south of DaNang one day on a med-evac mission plus. First, the D model of the 53 must be explained. By increasing the engine's combustion chamber heat limit by 100 degrees with, I am sure, some other adjustments; they were able to increase the aircraft's lifting capacity by about, well, I can't remember exactly but, a bunch of tons. That made it possible to be tasked with a mission to lift a bulldozer from a hilltop at the same time we were tasked to pick up the med-evacs from the same pos.

OK. So here we go off toward the hill down toward and west of Baldy. I guess the hill was in the 2,500-foot range. Clear day, simple mission, single plane, no escort required, cold zone. Well, except when we approach the site. All of a sudden there was a shroud of clouds over and down the hill, which once enshrouded, became a mountain, and visibility above 1000' or 1200' was zip. If it were just the bulldozer I might have elected to pass and come back another day but there were med-evacs and, though not emergencies, still in need of attention.

I'm starting to impress my co-pilot now as I nose the trusty old 53 in toward the trees on the side of the, now, mountain. By slowing to about 40 knots and maintaining visual contact with the tree tops, we eased the aircraft slowly and cautiously around the hill as we gained altitude to the peak. Fortunately, this hill was somewhat symmetrical and we didn't run into any surprises though my main concern wasn't the trees as much as perhaps uncovering a pocket of bad guys while in a vulnerable position. No sweat. Eventually we saw dirt clearing at the top and our Marines waving at us. Sliding over to the LZ, I put it down and they loaded the med-evacs.

Now, the fun part. You thought it was fun so far? OK. We lift up and are guided over the bulldozer with an external sling in place. We're only fifteen or so feet off the ground so all is well. The bulldozer is hooked and I start to lift into a high hover to pick up the load. Starting to get a little anxious here as we went IFR just as the slack was taken up and the load broke free from the ground. My choices were limited. I could have probably have eased it back down and pickled the load but, once IFR in a hover, you have no indication of drift so that option could have been disastrous to anyone on the ground. So I eased in more power and lowered the nose to pick up some air speed where I would have all my instruments to assist in control. I knew the terrain locally and that the area south, the direction we were headed, was clear of other hills and that we would eventually fly out of this shroud level or be able to descend below it safely. Oh, man, but then the load started to shift. It was swinging back and forth and the aircraft was being jerked from one side to the other through about 30 degrees of arc!! My co-pilot was becoming more impressed as each minute passed. I think he thought it was pretty cool getting up to the top of the hill but wasn't too sure about this wildly gyrating bitch coming off the hill. Well, talking myself through it, I kept from pickling the load and

in not too many minutes, though it seemed like many, we broke into the clear and made it home OK.

Sweat soaked would not sufficiently describe my flight suit but it was a satisfying experience successfully complete thanks to good instructors in the past and many hours since.

MATCA Hotline Article titled Combined USMC/USAF Operations by Mike O'Rourke USAF dated July 1997.

In late 1966, our PAR van got paged by a Navy C-47 that was operating as an embassy flight from Saigon to DaNang. On landing roll, the C-47 left runway 35R and headed straight for the PAR van. SMASH! The nose pushed both the PAR and equipment van to the west by several feet while the #2 prop began to turn the PAR van into french fries. When it was over, we became a non-radar approach control facility for about two days.

The solution to our problem was to import a U.S. Army quad radar from the 125th ATC Company from Vung Tao down south to be used as a search set. AND, to import the two quad units from the USMC, one at Hue and one out of storage at Futenma. Also, we used all of the qualified radar controllers from MATCU-68 at Hue to run the PAR systems. This made for a very interesting operation to say the least.

Being assigned to DaNang and fully rated in the now chewed-up USAF equipment (and airspace), it was determined that we would monitor all PAR approaches while the very capable folks from MATCU-68 did the talking. However, it seems you folks had a requirement that during periods of IFR, a USMC officer was required to be present and monitor the enlisted man actually working the aircraft. This USMC requirement proved a bit strange in that you could only plug in two headsets, but in this situation three jacks were required.

Did you ever see an F-104 or F-105 screaming down the PAR final while being controlled by a "committee"? We (USAF) never could figure out why the officer was required to be present since only one of the four present (a warrant officer) had even been a controller.

Anyway, we operated, and actually called ourselves Dogpatch Approach, for about three weeks like this before the USAF could get us a replacement system. When it was all over, our operational boss, the 3rd MAW DO threw us one great booze banger of a party.

During the course of operating Dogpatch Approach, I developed a great respect for the controllers from MATCU-68. They were as professional as any controller I have ever encountered. Since Hue was mainly a fling-wing base they had little experience at working fast fighters or a holding pattern full of tired trash haulers who thought they were #1 in the pattern. However, they caught on quickly and soon learned some of the traits we AF types used to place a mouthy type last in the pattern, and make him think he was #1.

Oh yes, I forgot one thing. We AF types could still drink them under the table!!!

(See the MATCA Hotline article by Charlie Tonkens also in this section.)

MATCA Hotline article by Boyd Murdock and John Rush did May 1993

Reflections and Profiles by Boyd Murdock

On May 8, 1968 at Chu Lai, RVN the TSQ-18 with 7 people inside took a direct hit from a 122mm rocket. The following will be an account of the event by John Rush.

On May 8th, 1968 the crew went to work at 0730 and it was a routine day. I was the Crew Chief, John Call was Assistant, and after twenty-five years the only other one I can remember was Cpl. James "Kiwi" Lott from New Zealand.

About 1630 the crew split for chow but John Call decided not to go with his half. About 1715 we were sitting in the TSQ-18 with me at the Approach Control position, John standing up, Kiwi was in the radio room and a Flight Data man was at his position. Two techs were also present.

Suddenly a terrific explosion occurred and glass, Plexiglas and shrapnel were flying everywhere. My first thought was that some idiot had driven a six-by into it. Instead a 122mm rocket had made a direct hit on the TSQ right behind the quad radar. The quad protected me from the worst of it but one piece of shrapnel hit me in the side of the head.

I yelled for everyone to get to the bunker and as we exited everyone sort of scattered. John Call, a Cpl. and I made it into the bunker and looked back as I did at the remains of the TSQ and was amazed any of us lived.

John got in first and was lying there bleeding profusely from the left arm. Instinctively I grabbed his arm and squeezed to stop the blood but I knew I couldn't hold it long. The way the blood was spurting it was obviously a damaged artery and John was about to pass out. The Cpl. had a piece of shrapnel in his side but wasn't bleeding too badly. I told John to get his belt off with his other arm while I held on to the wound. He managed to get it off and we made a tourniquet of it.

I told the Cpl. to keep John awake while I called for a medevac. I headed for the tower office and in the bunker behind it were two young kids who had bailed out of the tower. I was covered in blood and scared the hell out of them. I went into the office, called the tower and requested a medevac. I grabbed a first aid kit and as I got back to the TSQ the chopper was landing.

As I hit the bunker the two corpsmen were behind me and they immediately took John and the Cpl. to the hospital. About that time the Crew Officer approached and asked for a status report. I had no idea and excused myself saying I had to look for my people. I found the two techs and other controller in the bunker and they were OK.

So we had everyone but Kiwi and no one had seen him. I went back into the TSQ and into the radio room portion and that's where I found him. He had been reading the Sunday paper and it appeared he never knew what hit him. Needless to say it was a terribly traumatic time for me as a Crew Chief to lose one of my men.

I went back outside and the Captain was there and I gave my report. Jim Lague's crew was called in and I went to Sick Bay for treatment. My wounds were superficial but I was deaf from the concussion and even today my hearing is diminished.

MATCA Hotline Article titled Combined USMC/USAF Operations – Part Deux! by Major Charlie Tonkens USMC (Ret.) dated September 1997.

I read the article about combined USMC/USAF operations at DaNang by Mike O'Rourke and thought I would make a few editorial comments.

There were two quad radars involved – and Mike O'Rourke may be right about the origin of the radars, but the radars were with MATCU-67 at Chu Lai. As I remember, we were going to use them as a source for spare parts. "Red Reda" and I were told to pack both radars on the morning of January 13, 1967 (not late 1966) and accompany them to DaNang. We arrived in DaNang late on the 13th and after several hours of troubleshooting, Red determined that one of the Quads had a problem in the rotary joint leading to the AZ antenna. We used that radar for parts and concentrated on the other Quad.

After completing repairs late on the 14th and informing all involved the radar was "up", (we had some pretty high-ranking flashlight holders that night – no small wonder since DaNang was pretty well closed without approach or PAR radars) we waited for a flight inspection bird from Clark AFB in the Philippines. The Quad passed its flight inspection on the afternoon of January 15th and DaNang airfield was once again open for business.

The controllers, the ATC officer (a mustang 1stLt), and radio tech were supplied by MATCU-68 and they were top-notch folks. Mike O'Rourke's comments about the number of ATC officers and their qualifications may have had more to do with the fact that being attached (however temporarily) to the 192nd Comm. Squadron, USAF, allowed one to use one's ration card to purchase whiskey by the bottle at their club – a commodity often in short supply at Chu Lai and other places – so we had many "visitors", all with TAD orders and ration cards after about the first week or ten days of operations there.

An Army TPN-18 (a TPN-8 on a trailer) from the 125th Air Traffic Company also arrived at DaNang on the 13th or 14th, but never did pass flight inspection for final approach.

(A letter of commendation from the 1st MAW CEO follows).

(Also see the MATCA Hotline Article from Mike O'Rourke also in this section.)

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco 96602

17 Jan 1967

From: Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Anderson 048854/2502

To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group - 12

Subj: Augmentation of 1972d Comm Sqd by MATCU-67

1. On 13 January 1967, a short notice augmentation requirement for the 1972d Communication Squadron, DaNang AB, was passed to Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MATCU-67). The response to this request was prompt and professional. The request was passed at 130720H: first increment arrived at DaNang at 131410H and equipment was prepared for operation at 150940H.
2. In this respect, the performance of GySgt H. A. Reda, 1326988 and Sgt C. T. Tonkens, 1924729 was commendable. Tasked with the requirement to install an AN/FPN-36 as rapidly as possible, these men worked continuously from arrival at DaNang until 154000H, under the most adverse conditions, securing only when nothing remained to be accomplished except an optical alignment of the equipment. At first light they were at the site and completed the installation. Disregarding obvious fatigue, they remained at the GCA site until the equipment was flight checked late that afternoon.
3. Their efforts contributed directly to 25 GCA landings the night of 15-16 January and 8 GCA landings the afternoon of 16 January.
4. Parenthetically, it is noted that an Army G. A. Unit (AN/FPN-8) arrived at DaNang at about the same time as the MATCU-67 equipment and as of 161600H was not completely checked out.

R. V. ANDERSON

Copy To:
OIC, MATCU-67