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ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

ROUTINE

R 180022Z OCT 93 ZYB PSN 810345P21

FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//

TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA//

INFO WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/EAP/VLC/CCS/OCS//
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RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH

UNCLAS //N03460//

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SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, NGUYEN VAN THUONG//

REF/A/FAX/CJTFFA DET TWO HANOI/16OCT93//
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTION OF AN ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM FIELD REPORT.//

RMKS/1. BACKGROUND. ON 12 MAY 1993, DET 2, JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN [redacted]. [redacted] INTERVIEWED RETIRED SENIOR COLONEL (SRCOL) NGUYEN VAN THUONG ((NGUYEENX VAWN THUOWNGF)), A 74 YOA RESIDENT OF LY NHAN DISTRICT, NAM HA PROVINCE. MR. THUONG, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT IN HANOI. THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE AT LY NHAN DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS.

2. SUMMARY. DURING THE VIETNAM WAR SRCOL VAN THUONG WAS A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT ((CUC DICH VAN//EPD)) OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE (GPD) OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN). HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DIRECTING PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES. HE HAD LITTLE DIRECT CONTACT WITH U.S. POWS; HOWEVER, HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH PAVN'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CONCERNING INTERROGATION AND INDOCTRINATION OF U.S. POWS. SRCOL THUONG DISCUSSED PRISONER OF WAR (POW) CAMPS IN VIETNAM AND PAVN'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING U.S. POWS

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CAPTURED IN LAOS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR. HE SAID HANOI NEVER PASSED U.S. POWS TO THE SOVIET UNION OR CHINA. HE ALSO SAID HANOI RELEASED ALL U.S. POWS IT WAS HOLDING IN 1973. HE MET CONVICTED COLLABORATOR [redacted] [redacted] SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE 1970'S. HE BELIEVED THE FORMER USMC PRIVATE [redacted] WAS THE ONLY AMERICAN WHO VOLUNTARILY STAYED IN VIETNAM AFTER U.S. POWS WERE RELEASED IN EARLY 1973. SRCOL THUONG SAID HE HELPED IDENTIFY OUTDATED RECORDS RELATED TO THE EPD'S WARTIME PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AND SENT THEM FOR DESTRUCTION IN ABOUT 1979. HE BELIEVED THE EPD DESTROYED MOST TYPES OF RECORDS CONCERNING POWS AFTER THE WAR.

3. DETAILS. SRCOL THUONG PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A. SRCOL THUONG SAID HIS MAIN MISSION AS A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT WAS TO DIRECT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES. HIS DUTIES INCLUDED DEVELOPING POLICY AND ISSUING GUIDANCE TO PAVN UNITS CONCERNING THE HANDLING, INTERROGATION, AND INDOCTRINATION OF U.S. POW'S. HE DID NOT HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH U.S. POWS AND HE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL POW CAMPS.

B. THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT IN HANOI ESTABLISHED POLICY FOR PROSELYTING ELEMENTS AT THE MILITARY REGION LEVEL. EACH REGION PLANNED AND CONDUCTED ITS OWN SPECIFIC OPERATIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EPD'S POLICY DIRECTIVES.

C. WHEN PROSELYTING PERSONNEL AT MILITARY REGION RECEIVED PRISONERS THEY REPORTED BASIC INFORMATION, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF POWS AND WHEN THEY WERE CAPTURED, TO THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT IN HANOI. SRCOL THUONG SAID LITTLE INFORMATION WAS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY, BECAUSE MOST COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR REPORTING TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS WAS RESERVED FOR OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT REALIZED THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING MISSION, ENEMY PROSELYTING ELEMENTS WERE ALSO ABLE TO USE THIS EQUIPMENT. THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT IN HANOI WAS KEPT INFORMED ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM; HOWEVER, SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED THESE NUMBERS USUALLY WERE NOT EXACT. HE SAID ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS IN HANOI ONLY NEEDED TO KNOW WHEN AND HOW MANY PRISONERS THE REGIONAL COMMANDS WERE SENDING NORTH.

D. SRCOL THUONG EXPLAINED THAT VIETNAM'S PRISON CAMP SYSTEM DEVELOPED GRADUALLY. WHEN PAVN CAPTURED THE FIRST U.S. POWS, IT DID NOT HAVE PRISONS EXCLUSIVELY FOR PRISONERS OF WAR, OR A CENTRAL CONSOLIDATED PRISONER OF WAR CAMP SYSTEM. IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR SOME REGIONAL COMMANDS MAINTAINED CONTROL OF PRISONERS. AS THE WAR PROGRESSED, IN ORDER TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD OF PAVN ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SOUTH AND TO ENSURE PRISONER SAFETY, PAVN ADOPTED A POLICY TO MOVE U.S. PRISONERS FROM SOUTHERN AREAS SUCH AS B.1 (MR-5) AND B.3 (WESTERN HIGHLANDS) FRONTS TO PRISON

CAMPS IN NORTH VIETNAM. SRCOL THUONG SUGGESTED THAT NGO DAT TAI (NGOO DATJ TAIF) WOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT PRISON CAMPS IN B.1 FRONT, KHUONG XUAN QUE (KHWONG XUAANS QUEES) WOULD KNOW ABOUT CAMPS IN B.3 FRONT, AND NGUYEN BA MINH (NGUYEENX BAS MINH) WOULD KNOW ABOUT CAMPS IN B.4 FRONT (SEE PARA. 7.A., BELOW).

E. ACCORDING TO SRCOL THUONG, PAVN OPERATED THREE TYPES OF CAMPS IN NORTH VIETNAM: WELL EQUIPPED MAIN CAMPS, TEMPORARY CAMPS, AND CAMPS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. MAIN CAMPS WERE WELL ORGANIZED FACILITIES THAT HAD ADMINISTRATIVE, SECURITY, AND SUPPORT SECTIONS AND REMAINED IN USE FOR A LONG TIME. HE CITED HAO LO ((HANOI HILTON)) AS AN EXAMPLE OF A MAIN CAMP. HE SAID IT COULD BE MISLEADING TO REFER TO THE TEMPORARY CAMPS AS POW CAMPS. IN SOME CASES THEY WERE REST STOPS ENROUTE TO THE MAIN CAMPS. IN OTHERS THEY WERE USED FOR BRIEF PERIODS. HE CITED THE SON TAY POW CAMP AND BA SAO ((AKA NAM HA)) AS EXAMPLES OF A TEMPORARY CAMP. HE EXPLAINED THAT FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES PAVN OCCASIONALLY PUBLICIZED THE FACT THAT IT PUT U.S. POWS AT A LOCATION THE U.S. HAD ANNOUNCED IT WAS GOING TO BOMB--FOR EXAMPLE, THE YEN PHU THERMAL POWER PLANT IN HANOI. PAVN ALSO ISOLATED STUBBORN PRISONERS; HOWEVER, HE SAID, ANY FACILITY USED FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS USED ONLY TEMPORARILY. ((COMMENT: THE SMALL COMPOUND BEHIND NO. 4 LY NAM DE STREET, WHICH RETURNED U.S. POWS CALLED CAMP ALCATRAZ, WAS USED TO ISOLATE THE STRONGEST RESISTERS. OTHER VIETNAMESE SOURCES DESCRIBED THIS COMPOUND AS A SATELLITE OF THE MAIN PRISON CAMP AT 17 LY NAM DE STREET)). SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED THERE WERE NO CAMPS, INCLUDING DUONG THANH (DWONGF THANHF) AND THANH LIET (THANH LIEETJ), USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR ISOLATION. SRCOL THUONG SAID GROUP 875 ADMINISTRATED SEPARATE POW CAMPS FOR U.S. AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) PRISONERS IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM ABOUT APRIL 1972 UNTIL ABOUT DECEMBER 1974. MOST RVNAF PRISONERS IN THE NORTH WERE OFFICERS CAPTURED IN B.4 ((NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE)) AND B.5 ((TRI-THIEN-HUE)) FRONTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND IN LAOS. HE SAID PAVN RELEASED MOST RVNAF ENLISTED POWS AND MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS SHORTLY AFTER CAPTURE. HE SAID
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SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, NGUYEN VAN THUONG//

RMKS/
PAVN SENT JUNIOR RVNAF PERSONNEL AND THOSE CAPTURED IN AREAS FURTHER SOUTH TO HANOI ONLY IF THERE WAS A SPECIAL REASON TO DO SO.

F. MOVEMENT OF U.S. POWS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS TO NORTH VIETNAM. SRCOL THUONG SAID EACH MILITARY REGION OR FRONT COMMAND IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING U.S. POWS CAPTURED IN THE COMMAND TO NORTH VIETNAM. IN SOME INSTANCES THE COMMAND MOVED THE POW TO THE NEAREST MILITARY STATION OF GROUP

559 ON THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER AND TURNED THE POW OVER TO GROUP 559 FOR MOVEMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM. ((FIELD COMMENT: GROUP 559 ADMINISTERED THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION NETWORK FROM VINH CITY, NVN, THROUGH SOUTHERN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, TO BORDER CROSSING POINTS SERVING EACH OF THE FRONT COMMANDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.)) IN OTHER INSTANCES MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND ESCORTED U.S. POWS ALL THE WAY TO NORTH VIETNAM. PAVN COMMANDS IN LAOS FOLLOWED THE SAME PROCESS. BEFORE STARTING THE JOURNEY NORTH, THE FIELD COMMAND NOTIFIED THE PAVN HIGH COMMAND IN HANOI HOW MANY PRISONERS WERE ON THE WAY; BUT SELDOM PROVIDED OTHER DETAILS. WHEN THE ESCORTS ARRIVED NEAR VINH CITY, THE END OF STRATEGIC ROUTE 559, THEY CONTACTED THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT IN HANOI TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. BEFORE APRIL 1972, WHEN THE ESCORTS REACHED HANOI THEY AGAIN CONTACTED THE EPD. AFTER APRIL 1972 THEY CONTACTED GROUP 875. BEFORE APRIL 1972 THE EPD OFTEN DIRECTED THE ESCORTS TO TAKE THE POWS DIRECTLY TO HAO LO ((HOAR LOF)) PRISON, AKA THE HANOI HILTON, AND SOMETIMES TO THE PRISON CAMP AT NGA TU SO ((NGAX TUW SOWR)). ((COMMENT: U.S. POWS CALLED IT THE ZOO. LOCATED IN A PAVN FILM STUDIO IN THE SOUTHWEST OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI AT COORD 210000N/1054930E, UTM 48QWJ8573221?.)) AFTER APRIL 1972 THE ESCORTS OFTEN STOPPED FIRST AT THE GROUP 875 DUTY OFFICE AT 3 DUONG THANH STREET TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO TAKE THE POWS. SRCOL THUONG EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH PAVN COMMANDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS TYPICALLY FOLLOWED THE ABOVE STEPS WHEN MOVING A U.S. POW TO NORTH VIETNAM, THE PROCESS WAS FLEXIBLE AND DETAILS COULD EASILY VARY IN ANY SPECIFIC CASE.

G. SRCOL THUONG OFFERED NAMES OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HE BELIEVED COULD, IF STILL ALIVE, PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WARTIME POW CAMPS:

(1) VO VAN THOI ((VOX VAWN THOWIF)).

(2) PHAM HUAN ((PHAM HUAANS)). ((COMMENT: DET 2 RESEARCH/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED RETIRED MAJOR PHAM VAN HUAN IN HANOI ON 2 JUNE 1992. HE WAS THE SUPPLY OFFICER FOR GROUP 875.))

(3) VU QUAN ((VUX QUAAN)). ((COMMENT: NUMBER 12 ON THE LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 ORAL HISTORY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED THIS INDIVIDUAL ON 18 MAY 93.))

(4) BUI THIEN NGON ((BUIF THIEENJ NGOON)). ((COMMENT: CURRENTLY THE SRV MINISTER OF INTERIOR.))

(5) NGUYEN MINH Y ((NGUYEENX MINH Y)). ((DET 2 RESEARCH/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED THIS COLONEL Y IN HANOI ON 3 AND 10 JUNE 1992.))

(6) NGO DAT TAI ((NGOO DDATJ TAIF)), AKA MUOI TAI ((MUOWIF TAIF)). SRCOL THUONG SUGGESTED TAI COULD KNOW ABOUT CAMPS IN B.1 FRONT ((MILITARY REGION FIVE)). ((COMMENT: NUMBER 3 ON THE LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS.))

(7) NGUYEN BA MINH ((NGUYEN BAF MINH)). ALTHOUGH MINH KNEW ABOUT POW CAMPS IN B.4 FRONT ((MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE)), HE IS DECEASED. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 22 ON LIST OF 83

INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. VNOSMP SPECIALISTS INFORMED US THAT MESSRS

TO DIEU, CHU HOANG BICH, AND NGO TAI HAVE CONFIRMED NGUYEN BA MINH IS DEAD.))

(8) A DECEASED CADRE OF B.3 FRONT WHOSE WIFE IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR LIVING IN NINH BINH. SRCOL THUONG COULD NOT RECALL DECEASED CADRE'S NAME.

(9) CHU HONG BICH ((CHU HONGF BICHS)), AKA CHU HOANG BICH ((CHU HOANGF BICHS)). LIVES IN NAM DONG QUARTER OF HANOI. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT. MIGHT KNOW ABOUT POW CAMPS IN THE HANOI AREA. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 2 ON LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED HIM ON 12 MAY 1993.))

(10) PHAM TAM ((PHAMJ TAAM)). A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT. CURRENTLY LIVES IN THE VINH HO ((VINHX HOOF)) COLLECTIVE HOUSING AREA, HANOI.

(11) KHUONG XUAN QUE. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 7 ON THE LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 INTERVIEWED ON 25 MAY 93.))

H. ACCORDING TO SRCOL THUONG, DURING THE WAR THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT HAD THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POWS:

(1) POLICY RELATED TO POW'S INCLUDING HISTORY BOOKS, BOOKS FOR INDOCTRINATING PAVN PERSONNEL ON POW PROCEDURES, AND POW INDOCTRINATION LESSONS. THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT DID NOT RETAIN THESE TYPES OF DOCUMENTS AFTER THE WAR.

(2) LISTS OF POWS. SRCOL THUONG BELIEVED THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT RETAINED THESE LISTS AFTER THE WAR.

(3) LISTS OF PRISONERS WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY AND RECORDS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL POWS. SRCOL THUONG NOTED THAT MOST POWS WHO DIED IN THE PRISONS, DIED FROM BATTLE WOUNDS. SRCOL THUONG BELIEVED THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT DID NOT KEEP THESE AND MANY OTHER TYPES OF DOCUMENTS AFTER THE WAR.

(4) SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED THAT VIETNAM DID NOT RETAIN MANY TYPES OF PRISONER RECORDS BECAUSE (1) THE WAR WAS OVER AND VIETNAM HAD RETURNED ALL AMERICAN PRISONERS TO U.S. CONTROL IN 1973, AND (2) IN 1978-1979 VIETNAM REDUCED ITS DOCUMENT HOLDINGS AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST LOSING THEM IF THE CONFLICT WITH CHINA EXPANDED TO HANOI. SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED THAT THIS TYPE OF HOLDINGS REDUCTION PROCEDURE TOOK PLACE NOT ONLY IN THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT BUT IN MANY OTHER AGENCIES AS WELL, AND THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY HELPED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS TO DESTRUCT FACILITIES.

I. SRCOL THUONG SAID THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT DID
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SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, NGUYEN VAN THUONG//

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NOT KEEP RECORDS CONCERNING AMERICANS WHO WERE KILLED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE PERSONS BECAUSE THEY WERE DEAD. HE SAID THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR AND DID NOT COLLECT DOCUMENTS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS OF U.S. SOLDIERS KILLED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE ONLY ITEMS OF THIS SORT THAT FIELD UNITS SENT TO THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT WERE ITEMS WHICH COULD BE DISPLAYED IN MUSEUMS OR THAT HAD PROPAGANDA VALUE. SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED THAT THEY DISCARDED THE LATTER CATEGORY OF ITEMS AFTER THEY HAD SERVED THEIR PURPOSE.

J. WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE CASE OF [redacted] (CASE 0087-2-02), WHO WAS CAPTURED IN NORTHERN LAOS AND HELD FOR THREE YEARS AT DIEN BIEN PHU BEFORE BEING MOVED TO HANOI, SRCOL THUONG CLAIMED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE SPECIFIC CASE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE DID, HOWEVER, COMMENT THAT PAVN COULD HAVE KEPT SUCH A PRISONER AS A FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO ITS LAO ALLIES WHO LACKED THE RESOURCES TO ADEQUATELY CARE FOR A U.S. POW. SRCOL THUONG SPECULATED THAT IN SUCH A SITUATION, PAVN WOULD HAVE KEPT THE POW AT A SITE, SUCH AS DIEN BIEN PHU, NEAR THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER, WHERE THE LAO COULD STILL MAINTAIN SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POW.

K. CONCERNING THE LAO PRISON CAMP AT SAM NUA (SAAMF NWA), IN LAOS, SRCOL THUONG SAID THE PAVN HAD MILITARY ADVISORS STATIONED THERE. PAVN ALSO HAD SOME ENEMY PROSELYTING ADVISORS IN LAOS, BUT THEY WORKED AT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL AND WEREN'T DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN POW CAMP OPERATIONS.

L. INTERVIEWER ASKED SRCOL THUONG TO COMMENT ON THE PROCEDURE FOR MOVING RETURNEE LCDR [redacted] (REFNO 1982) AND THREE RVNAF OFFICERS CAPTURED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE IN EARLY 1973

TO HANOI. SRCOL THUONG SAID HE DID NOT RECALL THIS CASE. HE SAID HE RECALLED ONLY A FEW CASES INVOLVING RETURNEES WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT'S PROPAGANDA EFFORT. HE SAID HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF REFNO 9950, A U.S. ARMY DESERTER WHO VOLUNTARILY REMAINED WITH COMMUNIST FORCES AT HEADQUARTERS B-2 FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER U.S. POWS WERE RELEASED IN 1973. HE SAID THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED ONLY TWO AMERICANS IN NORTH VIETNAM TO BE RALLIERS: REFNO 1563, WHO WAS RELEASED EARLY ((17 AUG 70)), AND PVT [redacted].

M. SRCOL THUONG SAID PVT [redacted] WAS THE ONLY AMERICAN SERVICEMAN WHO STAYED IN VIETNAM AFTER THE POW EXCHANGES IN 1973. SRCOL THUONG EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE PVT [redacted] WENT OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE SIDE, PVT [redacted] AND VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES BELIEVED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PROSECUTE PVT [redacted] IF HE RETURNED TO AMERICA. PVT [redacted] ASKED PERMISSION TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM VOLUNTARILY. HE WAS NOT A PRISONER. SRCOL THUONG EXPLAINED THAT

WHEN PVT [redacted] FULFILLED HIS PURPOSE IN THE SOUTH, AND SINCE THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED HIM TO BE A MEMBER OF PAVN, THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT MOVED PVT [redacted] TO NORTH VIETNAM. SRCOL THUONG DID NOT RECALL WHERE PVT [redacted] LIVED IN HANOI, OR ELSEWHERE. SRCOL THUONG SAID THAT AFTER PVT [redacted] DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE U.S. HE WAS NEVER KEPT UNDER GUARD OR IN A PRISON CAMP. SRCOL THUONG DID NOT REMEMBER WHETHER MR. [redacted] HAD EVER VISITED THE PAVN PUBLISHING HOUSE ON LY NAM DE STREET, LIVED AT CAMP TRAI TRE, OR WORKED OR LIVED IN GIA LAM.

N. SRCOL THUONG SAID HE MET PVT [redacted] SEVERAL TIMES DURING SOCIAL VISITS TO THE OFFICE OF GROUP 875 AT NUMBER 3 DUONG THANH STREET, IN HANOI. HE OBSERVED THAT PVT [redacted] HAD A GOOD DISPOSITION. PVT [redacted] WAS FREE TO COME AND GO AS HE PLEASED. THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT COULD NOT FIND WORK IN HANOI THAT PVT [redacted] COULD PERFORM SUCCESSFULLY. ACCORDING TO SRCOL THUONG, ALTHOUGH PVT [redacted] REQUIRED NO TRANSLATOR DURING HIS TIME WITH THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT, HIS VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE SKILLS WERE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO TRANSLATE NEWSPAPERS, ONE OF HIS ASSIGNED TASKS. SRCOL THUONG INSISTED THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT WOULD NEVER HAVE EMPLOYED PVT [redacted] TO TRANSLATE CAPTURED U.S. DOCUMENTS OR OTHER SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS. SRCOL THUONG SUGGESTED THAT NGUYEN THUC DAI (NGUYEENX THWCS DAIJ), WHOM HE SAID IS DECEASED, WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON PVT [redacted].

O. SINCE SRCOL THUONG DID NOT WORK AT THE OFFICE OF GROUP 875 AT NUMBER THREE DUONG THANH STREET, HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER RUSSIANS OR OTHER FOREIGNERS FREQUENTED THE BUILDING. SRCOL THUONG WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE GROUP 875 OFFICE AT NUMBER 3 DUONG THANH STREET HAD A RECEPTIONIST OFFICE OR NOT.

P. IN RESPONSE TO THE INTERVIEWER'S QUERIES, SRCOL THUONG SAID THAT VIETNAM HAD NEVER SENT U.S. PRISONERS TO THE SOVIET UNION OR CHINA. HE INSISTED THAT HAD THIS TYPE OF THING EVER OCCURRED, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A POSITION TO KNOW ABOUT IT.

Q. SRCOL THUONG SAID THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT ((CUCJ TINHF BAOS)) EXPLOITED PRISONERS FOR MILITARY INFORMATION IN IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS OR THE CHINESE SAID THEY WANTED INFORMATION FROM A PRISONER, THE VIETNAMESE WOULD ASK A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT LATER. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WERE NEVER ALLOWED TO DIRECTLY QUESTION A U.S. POW.

4. CORRELATIONS TO EXISTING POW/MIA CASES. NONE.

5. POTENTIAL LEADS.

A. VO VAN THOI ((VOX VAWN THOWIF)).

B. PHAM HUAN ((PHAM HUAANS)). ((COMMENT: DET 2 RESEARCH/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED RETIRED MAJOR PHAM VAN HUAN IN HANOI ON 2 JUNE 1922. HE WAS THE SUPPLY OFFICER FOR GROUP 875.))

C. VU QUAN ((VUX QUAAN)). ((COMMENT: NUMBER 12 ON THE LIST

OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 ORAL HISTORY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED THIS INDIVIDUAL ON 18 MAY 93.))

D. BUI THIEN NGON ((BUI THIEENJ NGOON)). ((COMMENT: CURRENTLY THE SRV MINISTER OF INTERIOR.))

E. NGUYEN MINH Y ((NGUYEENX MINH Y)). ((DET 2 RESEARCH/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED THIS COLONEL Y IN HANOI ON 3 AND 10 JUNE 1992.))

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SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, NGUYEN VAN THUONG//

RMKS/

F. NGO DAT TAI ((NGOO DATJ TAIF)), AKA MUOI TAI ((MUOWIF TAIFF)). SRCOL THUONG SUGGESTED TAI COULD KNOW ABOUT POW CAMPS IN B-1 FRONT ((MILITARY REGION FIVE)). ((COMMENT: NUMBER 3 ON THE LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS.))

G. NGUYEN BA MINH ((NGUYEENX BAF MINH)). ALTHOUGH MINH KNEW ABOUT POW CAMPS IN B-4 FRONT ((MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE)), HE IS DECEASED. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 22 ON LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW

SUBJECTS. VNOSMP SPECIALISTS INFORMED US THAT MESSRS TO DIEU, CHU HOANG BICH, AND NGO TAI HAVE CONFIRMED NGUYEN BA MINH IS DEAD.))

H. A DECEASED CADRE OF B-3 FRONT WHOSE WIFE IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR LIVING IN NINH BINH. SRCOL THUONG COULD NOT RECALL DECEASED CADRE'S NAME.

I. CHU HONG BICH ((CHU HONGF BICHS)), AKA CHU HOANG BICH ((CHU HOANGF BICHS)). LIVES IN NAM DONG QUARTER OF HANOI. FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT. MIGHT KNOW ABOUT POW CAMPS IN HANOI AREA. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 2 ON LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED HIM ON 12 MAY 1993.))

J. PHAM TAM ((PHAMJ TAAM)). A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT. CURRENTLY LIVES IN THE VINH HO ((VINHX HOOF)) COLLECTIVE HOUSING AREA, HANOI.

K. KHUONG XUAN QUE. ((COMMENT: NUMBER 7 ON LIST OF 83 INTERVIEW SUBJECTS. DET 2 INTERVIEWED ON 25 MAY 93.))

6. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: NONE. THIS SOURCE BROUGHT NO RECORDS, NOTEBOOKS, DIARIES, OR ANY MATERIAL EVIDENCE ASSOCIATED WITH UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. PERSONNEL.

7. COMMENTS.

A. DET 2 ORAL HISTORY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED RETIRED MAJOR PHAM VAN HUAN ON 2 JUNE 1992, VU QUAN 18 MAY 93, NGUYEN MINH Y ON 3 AND 10 JUNE 1992, NGO DAT TAI ON 17 MAY 93, CU HONG BICH/CAO HOANG BICH ON 12 MAY 93, AND KHUONG XUAN QUE ON 25 MAY 93. SRCOL

THUONG CLAIMED NGUYEN BA MINH IS DECEASED.
B. REQUEST THE VNOSMP MAKE SRCOL THUONG AVAILABLE FOR RE-INTERVIEW IF NECESSARY.//

BT

DLVR:CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI(1)...ORIG
J2(1)...INFO FOR USCINCPAC HONOLULU H(13)
J30-M(1) J3(1) 00-01-04(1) WWMCS(0) MDT(0) LRNO61PCMT(0) J52(1)
J51(1) J1(1) J032(3) J03(1) CD0(2)

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