

12 August: B/3-16 (-) displaced from PHUOC THUOC to TIEU THUOC.

13 August: H, 2-320 (-) rear displaced from TAN KY to CAMP SONG.

Recapitalation of ammunition fired:

UNIT	TOTAL MISSIONS	TOT. L ROUNDS
A/2-320 (105T)	3,471	20,756
C/2-320 (105T)	3,540	18,815
B/1-14 (105T)	3,983	19,451
C/1-14 (105T)	3,06	14,399
B/3-16 (155T)	1,426	5,676
3-18 (8" / 175mm SP)	876 (8") 715 (175mm)	2,460 1,164
A/4-77 (AA)	544	17,653 (2.75)
	969+03 hr	258,200 (L)
		21,517 (I)

4. (C) Analysis:

a. When the Brigade initially deployed, the mission was to relieve enemy pressure on LZ PROFESSIONAL. The artillery developed a counter-battery fire plan which provided immediate fire on suspect or confirmed enemy firing positions. The executed plan proved effective as LZ PROFESSIONAL received no enemy fire since 14 June.

b. At the start of the operation, enemy anti-aircraft fire was intensive throughout the AO. To counter this situation, tube artillery and AA were instructed to immediately engage all suspect or confirmed locations. This program significantly reduced enemy fires.

c. ARVN and US artillery were co-located on the same fire base which facilitated clearance procedures and thereby provided more timely and effective fire support.

d. AA was employed extensively against anti-aircraft fire, in support of visual reconnaissance missions and in close support of infantry operations. When necessary, close fire support was fired to within 50 meters of friendly positions.

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Inclosure 11 (Army Aviation) to Combat Operations after action Report,
Operation LAMAR PLAIN (U)

1. (C) Mission:

- a. The mission of the DS assault helicopter company was to provide lift capability for redeployment of ground forces by combat assault and extraction, administrative movement and aerial resupply.
- b. The mission of the assault helicopter support section was to provide lift capability for administrative troop movement and logistical resupply.
- c. The mission of the Brigade Aviation Platoon was to provide command and control, courier and visual reconnaissance aircraft.

2. (C) Concept of Operation: The concept of supporting the operation was that the direct support helicopter company commander controlled all direct support assets, under the supervision of the brigade operations officer, and the Brigade Aviation Leader controlled all aviation platoon assets, again under supervision of the operations officer.

3. (C) Execution: Each preplanned airmobile operation was characterized by deliberate preparations in the form of an air mission commander's meeting which normally incorporated coordination among the ATFC, AMG, Pathfinders, ARA, gunship, artillery, Tac Air and any other special agency concerned with the mission. Map and visual reconnaissance preceded and followed these meetings, whenever possible. All efforts were made to complement and support the tactical ground maneuver plan. Flight routes were basically determined by factors of distance and fire support; formation were basically determined by factors of number of aircraft and LZ/PZ shape and capacities.

4. (C) Analysis: The aviation support rendered during the operation was considered extremely effective. Of significant importance was the high availability rate of aircraft.

a. Maintenance. The high availability rate can be attributed to the combined general support efforts of both the 101st Abn Div and the Americal Division which provided increased replacement parts. The large amount of sand found in the eastern portion of the AO created a significant maintenance problem. This sand caused undue wear on bearing surfaces and pitting of windshields thereby requiring frequent replacements of bearings and windshields. Engines had to be flushed more frequently (2-3 days) thereby increasing man-hours. Generally speaking the PLL was not adequate to meet these demands for replacement parts.

b. Weather and terrain: Generally speaking the weather and terrain were favorable for aviation activities. The salt water in the air did require daily washings of the aircraft to preclude erosion of bare surfaces.

c. Suitability of LZ/PZ: LZ/PZ sites were generally adequate throughout the AO.

d. Organization of pickup zones: Ground commander demonstrated thorough knowledge of PZ techniques thereby enhancing efficient airmobile operations. Air to ground communications was excellent.

Inclosure 11 (Army Aviation)

c. New techniques: To avoid the intensive ground to air fire, the technique of high overhead approach and departure was practiced which reduced aircraft exposure time. Another technique, relatively new to the AH company was the practice of flying logistics missions with two aircraft instead of single aircraft. This technique allowed one or the other aircraft to respond to a downed aircraft or to place suppressive fires in enemy firing positions.

d. Problem areas: None other than previously stated.