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CAT and the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Chronology

June 25, 1950:

North Korea attacks.

[CAT operations had been cut back severely since the Communist victory in China. The airline was flying one round trip daily between Taipei and Hong Kong, one round trip daily between Taipei and Tainan, a round-the-island flight six times a week, a once weekly Singapore-Bangkok-Hong Kong-Taipei-Tokyo service in conjunction with FOAS, and (since early June), one round trip a week for freight only between Taipei and Tokyo. Although there had been a substantial CIA interest since March, and current negotiation would soon result in the Agency exercising options to acquire the airline, attempts to build up business was coming along slowly. Only the skeleton of the organization existed. Most pilots were LWOP, and the aircraft were stored (preserved) at Tainan.]

July 1-19, 1950:

Task Force Smith, 24th Infantry Division, arrives in Korea on July 1, the first American ground unit committed to the war. The unit engages the enemy on July 5. There follows a series of delaying actions as the North Koreans advance rapidly to the south.

The 374th Troop Carrier Wing (C-54's) was the only USAF air transport unit in the Far East at the outbreak of the war. A C-47 unit was formed at Ashiya in early July. These aircraft carried personnel and ammunition to Korea; used at first in evacuation of Korea, then for carrying wounded out (usually landing at Itazuke, near the large Army hospital in Fukuoka).

July 20, 1950:

Taejon abandoned following bitter fight.

Willauer writes to his wife: "We are doing a little operating with three planes carrying Army supplies from Japan to Korea [Operation "AD"]]. Rouss is up there in charge. Our planes are showing the results of having been laid up for so long with lots of little things going wrong, so I have just instituted a program of a lot of test hops."

July 27, 1950:

Burridge writes to Chennault that he is searching for ways to permit CAT's participation in Korea. One possibility "is to ask China to volunteer transports to the Korean UNO forces (as many small governments are doing). Then, charter our planes for the job. This will get China's 'foot' officially in and yet would not raise the political complications that other forms of assistance would."

August 1, 1950:

By August 1, the UN forces establish the Pusan perimeter behind the Naktong River - 80 miles from north to south and 50 miles from east to west. There are three airfields within the perimeter, at Pusan, Taegu, and Pohang. The fields have thin asphalt surfaces and are soon unsuitable for C-54's. The C-54's carry cargo and personnel from Tachikawa to Ashiya (3 hours), where they are transferred to C-47's for Korea.

August 6, 1950:

Willauer from Tokyo writes to his wife: ". . . I came here to work on the project of getting CAT used in this part of the war. It's not going to progress too well, I fear."

August 18 and 19, 1950:

Willauer makes trips to Taegu on the 18th and 19th on one of three CAT aircraft operating between Japan and Korea ("AD"). He writes to his son from Taegu on the 19th: "We are waiting for a load to come, but if it doesn't show up pretty soon I am afraid the North Korean Communists will get here first. They are supposed to be only a few miles away. . . ."

August 25, 1950:

Willauer, in Hong Kong, cables Chennault, in Taipei, that the "Northern Project" (Korea) has been approved. "Cox and Burridge will start work Northern negotiations immediately."

That evening he writes to Corcoran and Brennan and explains that word had been received in the morning "That the contract for Okinawa, Japan and Korea [had] been approved by SCAP subject to negotiations of details. All this means [word also received about FIC] that we can look

forward to a very busy and I hope profitable fall and winter and even more important that CAT will be used in the anti-Communist drive. This latter alone justifies all of us for sticking with CAT even though we lost much money thereby."

August 31-September 7, 1950:

Major North Korean assault against Pusan perimeter. Meanwhile, MacArthur prepares for Inchon invasion.

FEAF airlift capability increases. Three squadrons of C-119's arrive (314th Troop Carrier Group); assigned to Ashiya. Also, C-46 outfit formed at Tachikawa. General Tunner arrives to organize airlift. On September 10, 1950, he forms Combat Cargo Command (Provisional); redesignated 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) on January 25, 1951.

September 2, 1950:

Rosbert notes: "All CAT planes have been checked & test-flown, and are in good shape. As soon as word is received on expansion, all planes which have not been flying will again be test-flown.

If any oper. is planned to use more than 15 add. planes, we will have to unpickle the CAA planes [8 C-46's], provided the latter will renew our contract & allow us to take the planes out of China."

September 5, 1950:

E. V. Wong flies Cessna XT-981 to Japan (following flight 700) for use in Operation AD. Rosbert flies to Japan on 700. Later has conversation with Burrige regarding the military contract, Japan domestic airlines, and Korean flag operation.

September 6, 1950:

Rosbert notes: "Lou [Burrige] said S-4 man in town ready to talk terms of contract. We worked out all points & he will see S-4 in afternoon.

3 AD flites cancelled until tmw. because of cargo difficulty.

Probably will have to move oper. to Tachikawa very soon."

September 8, 1950:

"Settled on rate (\$308 per hr. & 120 hrs. per pl.) & terms of Booklift control. Ordered 4 pls, 2 more crew chiefs & parts fr. Taiwan." (Rosbert notes)

Under the contract signed on September 8 between CAT and FEAMCOM [AF 92 (504)-5], CAT is to fly between points designated by the Commanding General of FEAMCOM. The government guarantees a minimum of 4-hour daily utilization for each aircraft requested. CAT relieved of responsibility for loss of cargo (except in case of gross or willful negligence), and CAT protected against loss of aircraft and/or crew by enemy action. Payment is on sliding scale, based on monthly utilization, with rate of \$307/hr. for over 500 hours a month. No time limit on contract. Expenditure of \$1,500,000 initially authorized. The intention is to use the aircraft to carry critical parts and supplies to USAF units in Korea. The use of CAT is "to alleviate a critical shortage in military aircraft during the early days of the Korean War."

September 9, 1950:

Rosbert notes: "Assigned to 374th Troop Carrier Wing in AM then FEAMCOM in afternoon. Held preliminary discussions. Sched. 2 pls. for OKI for next AM."

September 10, 1950:

Rosbert notes: "Four pls. arrived fr. Taiwan betw. 0515 & 0800. No other sched. that day."

There are now six aircraft available for FEAMCOM. Despite the sense of urgency expressed by military authorities, only two aircraft were used on the 10th - apparently because it was Sunday!

September 11, 1950:

Rosbert notes: "Two more pls. to OKI. Yestdy's two arrived back."

September 15, 1950:

Inchon Landing.

Operation "AD" cut to one aircraft.

September 19, 1950:

Cockrell, in charge of operations at Tachikawa, reports that "we are ahead of schedule" in build up.

Rosbert signs contract with Chinese CAA for use of eight CAA C-46's at \$6.25/hr. and 7% of gross revenue. CAA has been informed that CAT receives \$170/hr. for Booklift.

September 20, 1950:

Report to Executive Management Committee on recent developments:

CAT flew 600 hours in August (DC-4, 83 hrs.; Cessna, 70 hrs.; C-47, 104 hrs.; C-46, 343 hrs.) with an estimated revenue of US\$95,000.

Flying time during first half of September was 520 hours, and estimated revenue \$109,000.

During first half of month "AD" flights were stepped up; on August 7, 1950, flew three planes to Korea and brought back 150 people.

"On September 8, a letter of intent was signed by FEAR for the use of all planes made available by CAT for an indefinite period. The planes would be made available only as FEAR officially calls for them. To date we have eleven planes (C-46's) operating in Japan, eight having been officially called by FEAR, one for "AD" flights, and two as spares to maintain schedules. As of September 15, Operation "AD" was officially cut to one plane."

"With Operation Booklift, Engineering has the biggest of all department jobs. The most difficult problem is obtaining qualified personnel quickly enough. All but four CAT planes are flying. After these are operating the eight CAA planes will be unpickled and pressed into service. Also, de-icing equipment must be installed before the end of next month.

For the Booklift project all 25, 50, and 75 hour checks will be performed at Tachikawa. 100 hour checks and engine changes will be done at Tainan. We have four Crew Chiefs and eleven Chinese mechanics at Tachikawa. . . .

Five pilots on LWOP have been completely terminated. All Captains except Loane and Shilling have returned for duty.

The Chief Pilot has brought crew strength up to 23, and in view of a recent request to bring Booklift up to 25 planes, I have requested the crew strength to be brought up to at least 30."

September 25, 1950:

Cox writes from Tokyo to his parents:

"After many months of very little flying, we are really getting busy, and are trying to rebuild up to peak operations. We have a lot of headaches, but everyone is happy to be working again. I think I spend more time sleeping on the floor of an airplane than I do on a bed on the ground. As a good infantryman I really don't believe in airplanes, but I sure seem to spend a lot of time in them.

The war news seems to be a little better these days, alto I'm afraid there's still a lot of fighting left to be done. And of course, trouble can always break out somewhere else. It's sort of a relief to get out of the cold war stage, and if anything else does happen, we ought to be better prepared."

September 27, 1950:

XT-862 wrecked on landing at Iwakuni at 0730. "This accident was caused by a new co-pilot, Calhoun, (formerly Convair Captain with CATC) who in attempting to open the cowl flaps after landing, inadvertently opened the right throttle and left cowl flap. This immediately caused the plane to veer sharply off the runway. The gear was sheared off on the rough ground, and left wing crumpled, and the fuselage warped." Plane damaged beyond repair.

[One story has it that accident investigation revealed pilot fatigue as major contributing cause of accident. However, this was taken out of the report to protect the company. Calhoun was a "good soldier" and went along with it for the good of the company. Several years later, Calhoun was rehired.]

September 30, 1950:

Periodic report to Executive Management Committee:

Flying time: second half of September: 1040 hours (est. revenue \$220,000). Projecting 3000 hours for October

"During the first half of September our operation was doubled, and in the second half, re-doubled. It is expected to again be re-doubled during the first half of October. This is a tremendous rate of buildup, but still FEAFF is not pleased, because they are demanding twenty-eight planes, even though it is impossible to produce this number immediately."

Re aircraft: CAT has 18 C-46's and 1 C-47; 2 C-46's and 1 C-47 needed for commercial operations. That leaves 16 C-46's available for Booklift. Added to this are the 8 CAA C-46's, giving a total of 24 C-46's available. However, 10 of this total still in Tainan and not yet flyable.

Efforts are being made to lease/purchase aircraft. One C-47 purchased from Hong Kong Airways; one C-47 leased from International Air Transport; six DC-3's chartered (with crews) from Trans-Asiatic Airlines [note: TAAS formed after war by former U.S. Army pilots - issued non-scheduled international air commerce permit by Philippine government in September 1946 - subsidiary, Trans-Asiatic Airlines (Siam) in Thailand - William D. Davis chairman and president, Monson W. Shaver operations manager]

"The Engineering Department had had insurmountable difficulties in obtaining personnel to cope with the buildup. Ninety percent of the maintenance difficulties are not the fault of the Department. . . .

The unpickling of the CAA planes is almost at a standstill due to the lack of manpower. We have barely enough people (with overtime) working 12 to 14 hours per day to handle the 100 hour checks, now up to a rate of about one everyday. If the CAF speeds up the approval of use of its personnel, this situation may be alleviated somewhat.

Lack of strategic parts and material, which even the Air Force does not have on hand, is also hampering operations both in Tainan and Japan.

In order to aid the personnel situation at Tachikawa, Grundy and Bradburn will make another trip to Hongkong to hire mechanics who can be sent directly to Japan. This eliminates the screening procedure by officials on Taiwan."

[The Hong Kong Standard, Nov. 7, 1950, reported that CAT has engaged some 100 pilots and mechanics, many formerly with CNAC and CATC, attracted by pay in US dollars. Some 400 additional personnel had applied for employment. However, clearance had to be obtained from Nationalist authorities to make sure that all new employees had non-Communist background.]

Crew strength has reached 25; Loane and Dexheimer are still due to arrive from States

In order to meet October 10 deadline set by FFAF for maximum buildup, following steps are being taken:

1. Additional flyable planes will be obtained by chartering six C-47's from TAA.

2. Negotiating with CAF for twelve of their flyable C-46's.

3. Obtain mechanics from CAF. "This is necessary because Government restrictions will not allow sufficient personnel to come from Hongkong quickly enough."

4. Chief Pilot has been instructed to spend 100% of his time engaging sufficient pilots to meet commitments. He has been authorized up to fifty complete crews.

5. "We still have ten (10) planes at Tainan which are not yet flyable. Three of these will be in service by October 10. The remainder not flying by then will be covered by the TAA planes, and the CAF planes (if we get them)."

October 1, 1950:

J. L. Orlowski, assistant director of operations placed in charge of Booklift with Cockrell returning to flight operations. Fogg to assist Orlowski due shortage of qualified operations personnel. *Also Stanger and Stewart.*

October 6, 1950: Chiang Kai. Shek approves use of CAF planes.

October 8, 1950:

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, CG, FEAF, writes to Chennault about CAT's operations. Stratemeyer quotes from a letter from the Air Force officer under whom CAT operates:

'... Our success with CAT airlift has been spotty.' while CAT personnel are 'enthusiastic and capable,' the chief problem has been the failure of CAT to provide the number of aircraft promised, plus the high out-of-commission rate of those supplied. CAT personnel are cooperative. 'The difficulty seems to be that CAT overcommitted itself with a lot of optimistic assertions of what they could do.' CAT claimed that they could provide up to 28 aircraft; however, it is important to remember that what they were able to furnish helped us over a very tough period . . .'

Rosbert responded to this criticism as follows:

Date: 7 October 1950

To : President
From : Director of Operations
Subject : Booklift Report

1. The Airforce has tenaciously held us to commitment of 28 planes to be available on short notice. In original talks with FEAMCOM about contract I stated the best we could do would be to have twenty of these planes operational.
2. During the first week in September, the starting date of contract was set for October 1st. Shortly after that FEAF asked if we could have six planes at Tachikawa on September 15, to which I agreed. On September 8, all points of the letter of intent were completed and signed. FEAF then asked us to have four planes at Tachikawa at 6 AM, September 10th. I agreed and had six planes there by that date, but FEAFCOM only used two because it was Sunday. As you will note from the actual operational record they only used two or three planes a day for the next few days. This naturally gave us a false feeling of security.
3. On September 19, a message from Cockrell stated "we are ahead of schedule". At this time the invasion near Seoul took place. We managed to build the number of planes available up to fourteen and FEAMCOM was using about eight except on weekends when their utilization of the planes always drops off sharply (as it also does at night).
4. From that time on, FEAMCOM has lost faith in us because we do not have twenty-eight planes available. General Doyle (Commanding General of FEAMCOM) does not even believe we own that many planes. Now they are in the frame of mind to cancel the contract if, by Oct. 10th, they are not satisfied with what we have done.
5. That is the story from the Airforce standpoint. It is easily seen that before the Korean invasion we were shown every leniency, but none afterwards. I have proceeded on every angle just to get twenty-eight planes in the Japan Area, but as of October 6 we have only been able to reach a total of fifteen. This is what FEAMCOM sees. But actually we will produce four additional planes from the CAF fleet, five from TAA, and up to twelve from the CAF. This would make a total of thirty-four operating planes (not discounting those in 100 hour).
6. Breaking our necks to get these planes, and building up in all categories of personnel is costing us plenty of money. For instance an advance of US \$3,360.00 must be made to the CAF for each flyable plane chartered. This will pay off if the contract continues, but will be sad if FEAMCOM cuts us off because of our inability to meet their demands between the September 20th and October 10th period. The peak of our buildup is

set for October 16th, and there is no doubt that FEAMCOM will not be able to see the improvement until after that date.

7. Our possible potential of employing personnel and the also initial utilization of planes led me to believe we would have sufficient time to reach our peak. The difficulties:

- (a) Lost one CAA plane to TAA in the beginning (CAA awarded plane to TAA for loss of C-47 KMG).
- (b) Lost XT-862 in an accident at Iwakuni.
- (c) Have to use SOL and S&S on commercial business.
- (d) The invasion of Korea decreased the time we had for reaching our peak.
- (e) The Nationalist Government has made it virtually impossible to hire personnel from Hongkong.
- (f) There are few technicians remaining on Taiwan.
- (g) The Government has been very slow in aiding the employment of sufficient personnel.
- (h) FEAMCOM has more cargo to move than even fifty planes a day can handle and naturally we are taking the brunt of all criticism.
- (i) MNA and PAA, reportedly, would be very happy if we fall down on the job, and are influencing certain people in SCAP and FEAP.

8. Remedial Measures:

- (a) Chartered seven C-47's from TAA and TAAS. It will take until October 10th to have five of these in operation.
- (b) Chartered twelve C-46's from the CAF. The Generalissimo only approved this on October 6th, so we will have an additional big job in getting these into operation in Japan by October 10th.
- (c) Cancelled cargo flight 700 for two weeks awaiting PQAS to arrange to take over this run with DC-4.
- (d) Arranged the charter of another C-47 in Hongkong to guarantee flights 200, and 300-400, but will even have to send this to Japan.
- (e) Use as many Japanese in Japan as possible (already hired a total of 33).
- (f) Hire twenty-six more mechanics in Hongkong and send direct to Tachikawa via Okinawa, so as to avoid Taiwan restrictions. This will make a total of 87 Engineering personnel at Tachikawa.

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- (g) Attempt to meet remainder of Taiwan requirements (200 to 300 men) from CAF personnel. This is requiring some negotiation and even if we get the men, will not be completely satisfactory.
- (h) Attempt to obtain co-pilots from the CAF. This is tied up with the political question of our not using Chinese Captains in the past. Col. I. Fu-En of A-3 has almost completely sold General C. J. Chow on the idea that the CAF should have insisted on using Chinese crews on their planes which we are proposing to lease. He will press this point even if and after we have the planes operating.

9. What we have done to date:

- (a) Met three original requests of four planes on September 10, six planes on September 14, and ten planes on September 20th.
- (b) Doubled flying hours during first half September, redoubled during second half September, and again redoubling the first half of October.
- (c) Increased personnel particularly in CPO and Engineering. For instance August 31 we had 206 employees in the Engineering Department. As of this date there are 271 with a proposed total of about 570. Also we will need at least forty crews (now have 25) to do the job.
- (d) Invested in vehicles, parts, and equipment.
- (e) Committed ourselves to other organizations (CAA, CAF, TAA, etc.) for planes which in most cases require an advance guarantee payment and 30 days notice to cancel.

10. There is one other factor, which we may or may not wish to use as a lever; the inefficiency of the Air Force in utilizing our planes. A three hour turnaround is about the best they can do. It sometimes takes 5 or 6 hours. Also on the weekend, and at night efficiency drops way off, (about half).

FEAMCOM admits that it has enough cargo at Tachikawa alone to load out forty or fifty planes a day. This is probably the biggest reason why General Doyle is so frantic about our having twenty-eight planes in Tachikawa. They also forget that many times a plane goes out and does not get back for over 24 hours.

Of course, in view of the fact we since September 20th have not been able to come near 28 planes, it may not be wise to emphasize the above points.

11. We can do a good job on this project. In fact, if we are given only a little more time, I am positive we can do a better job than any other airline. It is impossible to fly at the rate of 3,000 to 4,000 hours per month with about 700 people, and it will take a space of time to double and redouble our personnel strength. In the meantime, everyone is working at twice his normal pace, and this is no exaggeration. If the Air Force considers all of the above facts I am sure it will look favorably on the continuance of the contract.

C. J. Rosbert
Director of Operations

cc: Cox, Burdige, Orlowski, Active File, File

October 9, 1950:

Units of the 1st Cavalry Division cross the 38th Parallel.

October 16, 1950:

Report to the Executive Committee:

October 1-15, 1450 hours (\$350,000). Since October 10, we have been able to maintain an average of 26 aircraft in Japan, with 16 or 17 flying per day. This will increase by 5 by the end of October.

Aircraft situation: Of CAT's 18 C-46's, 2 are on commercial service, 1 in at Tainan for extensive work (awaiting parts to be salvaged from XT-862 at Iwakuni), and 15 are in Japan. Of the 8 CAA C-46's, 2 are in Japan, 5 are expected by late October, and 1 is expected in early November. The 12 C-46's from the CAF were in rundown condition; three were flown to Japan on October 10; at least six of the aircraft will not be needed and contract for them will be cancelled. There are six chartered C-47's in Japan; the contract with TAAS for two of these will be terminated in early November.

Crew strength has reached 30; Shilling, Hobbs, and Bushbaum have reported for duty.

"The two big problems now are supplies and personnel with the former now becoming the biggest headache." Lack of strategic parts and materials has become most pressing problem at Tainan and Tachikawa. "With only half of the month gone, Engineering has already used up its budget with requisitions in process and still has not met its requirements. In order to alleviate this situation at once and not get too far behind, I think that the Company should adopt a temporary policy for about three months of allowing the Chief Engineer to requisition all the things which he thinks are necessary in order to cope with our present operation and that which is expected in the future. Also, in this way we will be able to determine just what the realistic Engineering Budget should be. Right now we are only guessing and apparently much too low. This priority requirement demands immediate attention."

Thirty-five maintenance personnel have been hired in Hong Kong during the first two weeks of October. Most of these people have gone to Tachi, which is now in good shape. Main personnel problem is at Tainan.

"Orlowski is working out exceptionally well in the capacity of coordinator of the Booklift Operation at Tachikawa. Things have been running very smoothly especially since October 10th and FEAMCOM has been provided with sufficient planes to meet its needs."

October 17, 1950:

FEAF cancels CAT's authority to carry passengers "because pilot Dudding violated several safety regulations. . . . Mr. Willauer ordered the cessation of C-47 operation until we could use our own crews and improve the condition of the planes. This immediately decreased our fleet by six badly needed planes, but it had to be done to save the contract."

October 22, 1950:

CAT ordered to detach six aircraft and personnel for shuttle service out of Ashiya.

October 24, 1950:

CAT C-46 XT-840 arrived at Ashiya with operations manager Jim Stewart, Jim Tyler, Ark Lee, George Lee, H. J. Tseng, and James Holt. The aircraft landed at 1730, the men ate dinner, and slept. On the following day, October 25, the 24-hour schedule is established. CAT flies fifteen roundtrips the first day, carrying 11,000 pounds per trip.

Memories of excellent mess hall and the cold wind:
"The field is located on the north end of the island of Kyushu facing an open area from which the wind blew with considerable frequency. In fact about every ten days it blew in accompanied with ice and snow. This made riding a bicycle hard and walking even harder."

By this time, Turner had set up a highly efficient operation, based on recent experience with Berlin Airlift. "Control of all transport aircraft was vested in a headquarters transport movement control center at Ashiya, a control which pilots quickly learned was tight and inexorable. Flight orders came from the TMC through the wings and groups. The TMC was directed to schedule all flights, record all departures or reasons for late departures, record landings, and divert or cancel flight by radio if it was necessary to pick up air evacs or emergency cargo. . . . Pilots were trained to fly in specific airway channels at set altitudes in contrast to the early seat-of-the-pants flying to the mouth of the river and then up to Taegu. . . ."

October 31, 1950:

Report to the Executive Management Committee:

Flying time October 16-31 was 1950 hours (revenue est. \$450,000). Crew situation has eased somewhat but pilots still flying over 150 hours a month and can expect the same for at least one more month. Engineering continues to present the most problems:

"The shortage of parts and personnel may prevent getting two of the CAA planes out of storage for an indefinite period. As each plane has been added to the active fleet, the number of 100 hour checks increases twice as fast. For instance in October we have had about thirty-four 100 hour checks and ten engine changes, but in November this will increase to over forty and thirteen respectively. In other words, the parts and personnel problems are increasing every day. This situation will become even worse as the planes come due for the first number four services in November. This is the heaviest service we perform and many items will ground the planes.

Even with an average of more than one 100-hour check per day and an engine change more than once every three days, this Department is doing exceptionally well, considering the present shortages."

Early November 1950:

UN troops approach the Yalu - hopes of "home by Christmas" - but Chinese troops are pouring across the frozen Yalu. MacArthur unconcerned about possibility of Chinese intervention. Meeting with Truman at Wake Island on October 15, he had predicted that "there would be the greatest slaughter" should the Chinese enter the war.

November 9, 1950:

Orlowski reports that FEAMCOM has requested that funds be made available for an indefinite period for the CAT operation. Orlowski: "Not bad!"

November 10, 1950:

All previous records broken: 21 planes flew 206 hours.

November 14, 1950:

Rosbert writes to Orlowski and Green about handling complaints from "AD" people:

"As you know Cox finds the "AD" Flight people quite difficult to handle at times because they are very touchy about small things. Although the amount of business they give us is only small, they have considerable influence on all of our business in the Japan-Korea area. Therefore, both Cox and myself must follow up on all complaints. Until the responsibility is fixed please do not consider any investigation along this line as a criticism of any of your activities. Criticism will only be meted out after all of the facts are known."

November 20, 1950:

Report to the Executive Management Committee:

Flying time for November 1-15 was 1725 hours (down from 2000 hours in the second half of October). Many planes grounded for a day or more due to lack of some critical part. "The reason is our poor stock position on many items. With so many parts we can fly a certain maximum amount of time. This point has just about been reached and can only be increased in proportion to the improvement of our stock position."

Engineering has 433 men including ~~71~~⁷¹ coolies; there remains a large requirement for line maintenance mechanics.

Flight Operations now has 30 captains and fifty-five co-pilots. "This will meet future requirement as far as can be foreseen now."

*** Ashiya has been producing about 75 percent of Booklift flying due to its efficient operation. ***

"It is hoped that the other bottleneck, inefficient loading at Tachikawa, can be eliminated by getting permission for CAT to do its own loading and unloading at this key point."

November 21, 1950:

New daily record: 22 planes flew 208 hours. (This reveals potential.)

Late November 1950:

Chinese open major offensive in North Korea.

November 30, 1950:

Report to Executive Management Committee:

Flying time November 16-30: 2000 hours. Additional aircraft join fleet from storage; parts remains the critical problem.

"Although the Chief of Supply has stated that the Air Force has a much bigger supply of parts than we could ever hope to have, we still lose much utilization because of red tape inefficiency in getting the parts from the Air Force, through our Supply section, and into the hands of Engineering to be installed on the planes. This situation will continue to exist until CAT has its own stock of parts where it can be used when needed quickly. This loss of flying hours due to lack of parts is somewhat similar to the Air Force cargo handling inefficiency. However, we can exercise little control over the latter unless the Air Force will allow us to do our own cargo handling at strategic spots like Tachikawa. In the former case, the only solution is to invest money in CAT inventory of parts which will pay off in increased utilization by having the part at the right place at the right time."

Captain Kelley terminated for disorderly conduct at FEAMCOM Officers' Club, Tachikawa, leaving 29 captains (including Rousselot).

December 8, 1950:

Captain ^{Dv Free} ~~Dv Free~~ (XT-44) crashes on landing at Chinese-encircled Yonpo airstrip (just south of Hungnam). One military passenger (medic enroute to care for wounded) killed; crew suffered minor injury; plane a complete loss.

December 9, 1950:

CAT plane crashes into Fujiyama (8000-foot level) during early morning hours. Enroute from Tachi to Korea. Crew: Captain Heising, J. Chang (co-pilot), T. W. Wen (R/O).

December 9, 1950:

FEAF authorizes additional expenditure of \$1,500,000 on contract with CAT due heavy useage.

December 10, 1950:

Brongersma (XT-846) crashes on take-off from South Korean field [?] when gear collapses. No injuries to crew. Aircraft O/S for at least a month.

[According to Air Force History, it was about this time that it was decided "that CAT Commandos should be utilized to airlift cargo, rather than people, particularly on long over-water flights. Later, passengers were absolutely forbidden to fly CAT missions to Iwo Jima, Guam and Okinawa . . . Starting in early 1952, the Combat Cargo prohibition on the CAT C-46's was lifted, and the civilian airline was directed to carry passengers, mail or cargo in the same manner as the military aircraft of the Korean Airlift."]

December 14, 1950:

Orlowski reports that utilization for month of December "has been terrible." Averaging only 103 hours per day instead of goal of 130 hours. "The biggest reason is that so many outfits in Korea are redeploying and the materiel consigned to them are not sent until actual firm destinations are known. . . . The situation in Ashiya is not good. Many AF planes are grounded due to lack of loads and or definite destinations. Therefore CAT must scrounge for loads there. If the situation get too bad there I will pull some planes out. However its hard to say at the moment because everybody is confused."

December 15, 1950:

Report to Executive Management Committee:

Flying time for December 1-15: 1775 hours.

"Two main reasons caused a decline during this period. One, because of the military deterioration in Korea our planes were often grounded awaiting a decision from commanders as to where cargo should be sent. This had a most serious effect on utilization. In this connection, the situation has not improved too much and utilization will remain low during the second half of December.

The second main reason for the decline was due to the fact that the Company suffered a serious blow as a result to three major accidents." (DuPree, Heising, Brongersma)

December 28, 1950:

Reports that Rousselot has advised Willauer that Orłowski is not suited for the job in Japan. Rousselot recommends that he be replaced by Fogg.

January 4, 1951:

Chinese offensive reaches high water mark with recapture of Seoul.

January 19, 1951:

M/Gen William H. Tunner, CG, Combat Cargo Command, writes to Willauer:

"The time has now come when I must release the aircraft and personnel of Civil Air Transport from their temporary duty with this command. As I do so, however, I feel that I must express to you my very great appreciation for the outstanding job your people have done through the past four months in support of the Korean campaign. At a time when air transportation was critically short, you made available to us your aircraft and your trained personnel in the quantities required. The unit which you stationed here [Ashiya] cooperated with us to the greatest possible degree. They have always gone out of their way to do their job well and have repeatedly done more than we expected of them."

Tunner singles out Stewart for special commendation.

[As the front stabilizes in Korea around the 38th Parallel (Seoul is retaken by UN forces on March 15), CAT's role in Korea diminishes. There are now sufficient Air Force transport units to handle all demands. The Air Force always felt a bit apprehensive about "civilians" mixed in with Air Force operations and tended to accept such assistance only in emergencies. CAT flies scheduled flights to Korean, northern Japan, and to Pacific Islands, freeing USAF aircraft for direct support missions in Korea. The relationship with the USAF will continue, and will include the beginnings of maintenance work for FEALOGFOR - the foundations of CAT's vast maintenance complex.]