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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Washington, D.C.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR LAOS

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR LAOS

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE OCB:


CONCURRED in the "Operations Plan for Laos," for implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein.
(May 28, 1958, Board Meeting; Minutes approved June 4, 1958)

B. SUPERSESSION:

The attached Operations Plan supersedes the "Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Laos," dated May 29, 1957.

C. DESTRUCTION AUTHORIZED FOR:

Previous draft of this Operations Plan dated May 23, 1958, and the superseded "Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Laos," dated May 29, 1957.


Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer

Attachment:

Subject Paper, 6/4/58

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PURPOSE AND USE OF THE OPERATIONS PLAN

This Operations Plan sets forth agency programs, courses of action responsibilities and timing considerations in order to carry out NSC policy with respect to Laos for which the President has designated the OCB as the coordinating agency.

This Operations Plan does not encompass every U. S. agency program or course of action but it does include those considered as important which are being implemented or definitely planned.

Each agency has agreed to carry out the programs and courses of action contained in the plan subject to modification or review should a change in circumstances so indicate. Such changes will be agreed through normal interagency coordination, where appropriate, and will be made in accordance with usual procedures, and not necessarily with any immediate formal amendment of this Operations Plan. A new plan will be prepared as soon as practicable following approval of a new or revised NSC statement of policy or a major change in circumstances.

The Department of State transmits the complete text of this approved Operations Plan to the chief of mission concerned for his use in exercising his coordinating responsibilities. Other OCB member agencies may transmit the complete plan to their senior field representatives whenever such distribution is determined by each agency to be necessary to the effective implementation of its programs. These field representatives should assure that their operating officials are cognizant of the appropriate courses of action which would be helpful to them in the performance of their duties. In addition, the implementing agencies may extract and communicate appropriate, individual courses of action to their operating officials whenever such distribution is deemed necessary for effective implementation, insuring that no reference to NSC policy is made and that the excerpted courses of action are classified by the agency concerned in accordance with their substance.

Concurrence in this plan by the responsible agencies represented in the OCB does not automatically constitute authorization to operating officials to undertake new programs or modify existing programs, but does serve as a basis for appropriate operating instructions to be developed by each of the participating agencies. All figures contained in the courses of action should be viewed only as planned program levels. Those figures are subject to priority changes and other factors. Appropriations and expenditures not already authorized which would be needed to finance the programs set forth are subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

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June 4, 1958

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR LAOS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. SPECIAL OPERATING GUIDANCE

1. General

a. U. S. Objectives. U.S. operations in Laos should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent Laos from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the communist bloc; to persuade the Lao that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free World; and to assist them to develop toward a stable, free, representative government with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free World.

b. Laos, a Buffer State. Though highly unstable and the weakest of all the states in Southeast Asia, Laos is of great strategic and psychological importance to the Free World position in Asia. A neutral but non-communist Laos serves as a buffer between the communist bloc and the free states on Laos' borders. Its fall would remove this protection, give the communists direct access to Thailand and Cambodia across a long indefensible frontier, permit them to flank South Viet-Nam, heighten the threat to the rest of Southeast Asia, and cause loss of faith in the United States among the uncommitted nations. U. S. disengagement in Laos, even if warranted, would be held an American defeat.

c. Resistance to Communism. The United States through all its representatives in the field can and should attempt, by friendly advice and the leverage of its aid programs, to stiffen Lao resistance to communist enticements and make them aware of the crucial importance of a sustained, coordinated effort in the anti-subversive and related fields.

2. Political leadership.

a. Lao Determination to Develop a Strong Government. Although the United States can contribute much to Laos' resistance to communist encroachment, it cannot substitute for Laos' own determination to establish an imaginative and integrated program designed to neutralize the subversive threat, to reinforce loyal elements, and to encourage the espousal of a positive, democratic philosophy of government.

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Laos

b. Lao Receptivity Toward U. S. Aid. Courses of action should therefore be keyed to the degree of receptivity displayed by individuals and groups that oppose dealing with the communist bloc and possess the willingness and ability to resist internal subversion.

c. Personal Politics. The power structure of Laos depends on working arrangements among dominant local families grouped about individual leaders. Politics is a personal rather than party matter, and personal alignment is governed by convenience and is subject to relatively frequent change.

d. Lack of Anti-Western Bias. The Lao are comparatively free of the anti-Western bias noted in some former colonial peoples, and are generally favorable toward the United States.

3. Pathet Lao-Neo Lao Hak Xat Threat. Pathet Lao entry into the Lao Cabinet, Army and Civil Service, and their achievement of legal party status permitting them to operate overtly throughout Laos afford the communists new and promising opportunities for peaceful penetration and subversion. The naive Lao belief that the Pathet Lao are nationalist rather than communist and the apparent Lao assumption that integration into the national community means automatic severing of Viet Minh control of the movement render the U. S. task extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the U. S. should assist the Lao Government in preventing the Pathet Lao-Neo Lao Hak Xat from using their enhanced position to further their ultimate objective of taking over all of Laos.

4. Contacts with the Communist Bloc.

a. Lao Vulnerability. Laos is acutely conscious of vulnerability to invasion owing to its extensive common borders with Communist China and Viet Minh-controlled north Viet-Nam. At the same time, the Lao are aware of the geographical remoteness of the United States and are uncertain of U. S. and SEATO assistance in the event of Chinese Communist or Viet Minh aggression. They consequently fear offending the communists and mistakenly believe that "neutrality" will earn for them communist good will.

b. Lao Attitude Toward Communist Aid. Although no communist diplomatic missions have been established in Vientiane and no aid has been accepted from communist sources, the Lao may be tempted to yield to communist offers in the future, resulting in the influx of communist political agents providing massive support to the Neo Lao Hak Xat.

c. U. S. Efforts to Minimize Lao-Communist Relations.

The U. S. Government and its diplomatic representatives should try to minimize Laos' contacts with the communist bloc, to stave off recognition of Communist China and the Viet Minh, and to dissuade Laos from accepting a resident diplomatic mission from the Soviet Union, which Laos has already recognized, or aid and economic and technical assistance missions.

5. Attitude Toward the International Control Commission.

Should conditions after the May 4 elections make dissolution of the ICC in Laos desirable from the point of view of free world interests and should it prove impossible to get a Commission decision to dissolve itself then unilateral Canadian withdrawal from the Commission would be the most appropriate course of action. The U. S. should encourage and support such Canadian action, it being understood that it would be independent of the Canadian position on continued participation in the ICC in Viet-Nam where a different set of circumstances prevails.

6. Relations with Other SEA Countries. The U. S. should encourage and support cooperation between Laos and other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and Burma, including such joint efforts in the anti-subversion, economic, communications, and military planning fields as feasible.

7. U. S. -Lao Relations. Withdrawal of American aid means certain absorption of Laos by the communists; there is no guarantee that continuing U. S. support will keep Laos free, but it provides hope of doing so. American aid is essential to the support of the security forces charged with suppression of Pathet Lao-Neo Lao Hak Xat subversion and for such projects as civic action and Operation Brotherhood which can gain popular loyalty for the nationalist, conservative forces.

8. Administration of U. S. Aid Programs.

a. Communist Bloc Activities. To meet the challenge posed by the potential Sino-Soviet Bloc economic offensive in Laos, the U. S. should vigorously press forward its own positive programs to foster a high level of Free World trade and to promote economic development in Laos rather than reacting defensively to Sino-Soviet Bloc programs. Recognizing that it is not always feasible or desirable for nations like Laos to reject Sino-Soviet Bloc aid or trade, the U. S. should ensure that Laos is aware of the opportunities which trade with the United States and the rest of the Free World, and U. S. aid programs, create for Laos to achieve economic progress as an independent member of the Free World. The U. S. should seek to induce the Lao not to accept Sino-Soviet Bloc aid in sensitive fields such as communications, education and aviation,

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not to trade with the bloc on prejudicial terms, or to become unduly dependent on trade with the bloc. In very exceptional cases, the U. S. should take direct measures to counter bloc moves by Free World actions in aid or trade taken specifically for this purpose.

b. U. S. Aid Essential to Laos. To U. S. political, material and moral support may be ascribed the fact that Laos has thus far remained independent. This support has been successful in an emergency holding operation against an openly hostile communist bloc. With the communist shift to ostensible friendliness, however, U. S. programs are presented with an immensely more difficult task. In order to convince the Lao that their real well-being lies in close cooperation with the Free World, it will be necessary for U. S. support to be used less as a subsidy than theretofore and more as a means of (a) inducing fundamental changes in the social and economic structure of Laos so that it may eventually become more self-sustaining and (b) increasing Lao Government participation in the effort toward economic and social progress of the country.

c. Economic Development and Its Political Impact. U. S. economic projects should be designed not only to promote economic development but also to encourage the Lao to believe that their security and welfare will be better served through close relations with the United States rather than through arrangements with the communist countries. Projects should be carefully selected for their economic soundness and political impact and should be administered efficiently. This will require recruitment of highly qualified U. S. personnel and technicians and recourse, if necessary, to qualified third-country nations. The number of American personnel should be held to the minimum required for effective operations. The economic and technical assistance programs should remain modest in size in keeping with the limited absorptive capacity of the country. They should be adequately publicized.

It will be impossible to withstand the appeal of communist bloc aid unless American programs are demonstrably more effective and produce tangible results more quickly, specifically by channeling some aid directly to the people of Laos to achieve maximum psychological impact.

9. U. S. Assistance to Lao National Army. The U. S. should continue support of the Lao National Army to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the Viet Minh. If the Pathet Lao are effectively integrated into the Lao national community without damage to the Free World position, and provided the national police are capable of assuring internal security, the U. S. should

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attempt to induce the Lao gradually to reduce the size of their army.

10. Development of Technical and Managerial Skills. The primary long-range priority in Laos is the education and training of leaders and administrators in sufficient strength and capability to make up the present critical deficiencies in trained personnel and to reduce the degree of external responsibility for direction and execution of programs in Laos. Such education and training should be undertaken by the U. S. in Laos, in the U. S., and in appropriate third countries.

11. Overseas Internal Security Program Guidance. Because of the nature of the subversive threat in Laos, internal security programs are crucial to combatting communist advances; the overseas security program is consequently of basic importance to the success of all U. S. programs in Laos. With due regard for the political situation existing after the recent supplementary elections, the U. S. should continue to give priority to assisting the Lao Government to strengthen its internal security forces, especially its police, and to improve their ability to deal with the increasing subversive potential of communist elements in Laos.

12. Chinese in Laos. U. S. actions with regard to the overseas Chinese community are to be subordinated to and kept in harmony with U. S. objectives for the country as a whole. One primary aim of U. S. policy is to prevent the communists from exploiting the overseas Chinese and to strengthen anti-communist activities within the Chinese communities. The encouragement of the overseas Chinese to identify their interests with the host country is a basic guiding principle, but it is also U. S. policy to encourage support for the Government of the Republic of China in situations where this assists in denying the overseas Chinese to the communists and does not conflict with our over-all country objectives. Detailed courses of action and the principles governing them are contained in the OCB paper, "Guide Lines for U. S. Programs Affecting the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," December 11, 1957, which should be studied by the officers responsible for action in this field.

13. Contact with Buddhist Groups. In developing good relations with a Buddhist country there are many assets and liabilities of a special nature which should be taken into consideration in the development of material and in making recommendations for action. An OCB report, "Regarding Buddhist Organizations in Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia," was developed to provide special guidance which should be studied by officers concerned with the subject.

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14. Attitudes Toward U. S. Personnel Overseas. The Operations Coordinating Board has given particular attention over the past several years to ways and means of improving foreign attitudes towards U. S. personnel overseas. This involves both the positive actions which can be taken to improve these relationships as well as the removal of sources of friction and difficulties. The special report prepared by the Board, "United States Employees Overseas: An Inter-Agency Report," dated April 1958, is an effort to provide on an over-all governmental basis a common approach and guidance in this field. All supervisory employees in the field should familiarize themselves with the substance of this report and all U. S. personnel should know the substance of the Conclusions and Recommendations set forth in Section V, Volume I. Attention is directed to the President's remarks in the Foreword of the report.

B. SELECTED U.S. ARRANGEMENTS WITH OR PERTAINING TO LAOS

15. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees

a. Laos was designated in the protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty for the purposes of Article IV of the treaty on September 9, 1954.

16. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services

a. Military Assistance. Military assistance to Laos for FY 1958 will be continued at about the same order of magnitude as in the past.

b. The Embassy at Vientiane has been authorized to advise the Lao Government that in FY 1958 the United States is prepared to furnish \$10 million under the non-military Defense Support program and \$1.7 million for Technical Cooperation. (The military budget support component of the Defense Support program for FY 1958 has not been finally determined, but it is contemplated that between \$20 and \$25 million will be committed.)

17. Other Arrangements

a. An exchange of notes between Laos and the United States at Vientiane on July 6 and 8, 1955, which entered into force on July 8, 1955 (operative from January 1, 1955), provided for additional direct economic assistance.

b. An exchange of notes between the United States and Laos at Vientiane on December 18 and 31, 1951 and January 16 and 17, 1952, which entered into force on December 31, 1951, contained assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 with respect to military preparedness in furtherance of world peace and in defense of the Free World.

c. Laos has been assured by U.S. officials of continued U.S. political, moral, and material support so long as that support goes to a government vigorously seeking to maintain its independence.

II. CURRENT AND PROJECTED PROGRAMS AND COURSES OF ACTION

Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification. All target dates are continuing unless otherwise specified.

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A. Political

18. Support and assist Laos on the basis of its will and ability to defend and strengthen its independence.

Assigned to: All agencies

19. Respect Laos' choice of national policy for preserving its independence, but make every effort to demonstrate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the free world, as well as the dangers of alignment with the communist bloc.

Assigned to: State
Support: All other agencies

20. Use the leverage of U.S. military and/or economic aid programs as necessary and appropriate to try to block dangerous concessions to the communists. In order to stiffen Laos resistance to communist enticements, remind Laos that it can count upon American assistance - political, moral and material - only so long as that support goes to a government vigorously seeking to maintain its independence.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, Defense

21. If an adverse drift toward pro-communist neutralism or acquiescence in communist subversion is evident but the margin is still in our favor in Laos, be prepared to take measures (such as suspending planning on current programs or reducing or eliminating certain types of assistance) less final than threatening to terminate or actually terminating all aid in order to arrest and if possible reverse the unfavorable trend.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA
Target Date: As required

22. If Lao Government actions should render continued American financial support futile or undesirable, be prepared to give the Lao ample and clear warning by threatening with drawal of aid before finally withdrawing in order first to permit the Lao to reassess their policy and position. Terminate economic and military aid if the Lao Government ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.

Assigned to: State
Target Date: As required

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23. Attempt by diplomatic means to sharpen the Lao Government's awareness of communist intentions and continue to point out the dangers of increased contacts with the bloc. Work to forestall concessions to the Neo-Lao Hak Xat or to international communism which would jeopardize Laos' survival as an independent state. Specifically, try to prevent, among other things, Neo Lao Hak Xat exploitation of its enhanced and legalized political status, the establishment of communist diplomatic missions in Vientiane, acceptance of Chinese Communist or other communist aid and economic and technical assistance missions, and any accumulation of minor concessions which would in their totality destroy Laos' ability to preserve its independence.

Assigned to: State
Support: All agencies

24. To forestall seizure of power by communist or other anti-U.S. elements, promote and support Lao leaders who will cooperate with the U.S., take positive steps to eliminate communist influence from the Lao Government, vigorously pursue economic and social development programs, and secure support of the Army, Police and the Throne.

Assigned to: State
Support: All agencies

25. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Laos to Chinese Communist aggression as well as to indigenous communist insurrection, subversion, and propaganda.

Assigned to: State
Support: All other agencies

26. Hold or reduce the number of U.S. officials in Laos to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs, in order to avoid an adverse political reaction to the presence of a large number of Americans in relatively privileged positions.

Assigned to: All agencies

27. Encourage the Lao Government to assume regional and international responsibilities compatible with its own objectives by (a) consulting with Laos on U.N. matters and other issues of regional and international importance and (b) supporting Lao participation in regional and international organizations and forums such as ECAFE and the Colombo Plan.

Assigned to: State
Support: All other agencies

28. When politically feasible, invite Lao participation in programs initiated under SEATC, and offer to Laos the advantage of any gains from SEATO activity which Laos might accept.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, Defense

29. Encourage as appropriate invitations to Lao officials to attend SEATO exercises and maneuvers as observers. Remind the Lao at appropriate opportunities of the fact of SEATO protection.

Assigned to: State, Defense

30. Influence the Lao Government to establish friendlier relations with the ethnic minority groups in Laos, maximize the contribution of the aid program to their well-being, and direct pro-government propaganda toward the tribal elements in order to persuade them to accept the authority of the Lao Government and to deny the communists this opportunity for subversion.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, USIA

31. Advise and assist the Royal Lao Government as appropriate in order to attempt to insure effective RLG re-establishment of its administration over the provinces formerly held by Pathet Lao forces.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, Defense, USIA
Target Date: Continued planning with RLG

32. Encourage continued French maintenance of their base at Seno and joint French-Lao planning on its utilization in order to enhance the value of this link between Laos and the Free World.

Assigned to: State
Support: Defense

33. Continue to encourage the United Nations agencies and other Colombo Plan countries to expand their technical assistance efforts in Laos for useful projects which supplement but do not duplicate those financed by the United States. Encourage France to continue to provide economic and technical assistance to Laos and to retain French technicians now furnished the various Lao ministries, who are essential to the operation of these ministries.

Assigned to: ICA, State

34. Encourage and support by appropriate means the work of private groups and organizations, such as CARE, the International Rescue Committee, and Operation Brotherhood (the Filipino-manned medical project sponsored by the International Junior Chamber of Commerce), which contribute to the aims and implementation of the civic action program.

Assigned to: State, ICA

35. Promote friendly and useful relations between Laos and its non-communist neighbors, particularly Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, Burma, and Federation of Malaya.

Assigned to: State
Support: All other agencies

36. Endeavor to arrive at a joint position with the French with respect to free world political objectives in Laos.

Assigned to: State

37. Support the joint civilian-Lao Army civic action program (to initiate village self-help activities designed to draw on the people's own resources in the fields of health, security, social welfare, and public works) in order to extend the government's authority and to improve the well-being of the village population with the aim of increasing their loyalty to the Lao Government, thereby reducing and eventually neutralizing the communist subversive capability. In view of the logistics and communications capabilities, organizational character and mission of the Lao National Army, continue to promote its participation as an integral part of the civic action program.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, USIA, Defense

B. Economic

38. Through U. S. aid programs, show that cooperation with the West will mean progress toward economic viability. Select projects which, while meeting economic objectives, provide quick and tangible evidence of U. S. interest in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of American aid.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense
Target Date: Immediately and continuing

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39. Continue negotiations with the Lao Government for the adoption of monetary reform not simply to minimize abuses in the commercial program but also to insure a more effective use of all aid in order to pave the way for eventual reductions in the aid level and to provide a stable currency as a basis for sound development of the economy.

Assigned to: State, ICA
Support: Treasury (W)

40. Promote trade between the U.S. and Laos by continuing to have U.S. economic-commercial staff in Laos, maximize information services to American businessmen on trade opportunities in Laos, and arrange for U.S. and Lao businessmen to meet to develop direct trade.

Assigned to: ICA, Commerce, State

41. Improve all aspects of the access routes to Laos through Thailand and as may be feasible through Viet-Nam and Cambodia, together with supporting arrangements such as in-transit agreements and customs clearance of transit goods. Specifically, improve the transportation facilities between the Port of Bangkok and distribution centers in Laos and river crossings at Vientiane, Pakse and Savannakhet.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State

42. Increase the interest of legitimate Asian businesses, particularly Japanese, Free Chinese, and Thai, operating in Laos. Continue as appropriate to facilitate purchasing in Japan of that portion of U.S. - financed aid goods in the Lao program which the Japanese offer on the most favorable terms.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense

43. Support and encourage Lao participation in feasible regional projects, such as Mekong development planning and the regional telecommunications project.

Assigned to: State, ICA

44. Continue to provide minimum support for the cost of the Lao military establishment on the basis of approved force levels. As the Lao economy develops, however, and begins to yield additional budget revenues, encourage the Lao to assume a share of the cost of supporting their military forces.

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Assigned to: ICA
Support: Defense, State

45. In providing economic and technical assistance, focus attention on transportation and communications including rehabilitation and improvement of the highway network, improvement of the Mekong River crossing facilities and completion of over-all transportation engineering studies. In addition, continue programs such as but not limited to the following: agricultural development and extension, including crop and live-stock improvement, soil conservation and forest products development; industry and mining surveys and small-scale power development; malaria eradication; assistance in the completion of a teachers' training center and demonstration schools and the introduction of new teaching techniques; public administration in general government services, especially foreign trade administration and government procurement; and community development at the village level.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State

46. Continue to encourage the Lao Government to take steps necessary to attract private foreign investment and to maximize the use of local investment resources in its economic development. Attempt to secure provisions in any new investment legislation or regulations attractive to private investors and to obtain fair and liberal administration thereof. Continue to permit the limited use of cash grant dollars for transfer of profits arising from new foreign investment.

Assigned to: ICA, State, Commerce
Support: Treasury

47. Use the technical assistance program to increase the number of technically competent pro-western leaders. Continue to train Lao officials and technicians in appropriate neighboring countries. In order to develop the capabilities of the Lao people in technical, vocational and managerial activities, support expanded aid to Lao education, especially elementary and vocational.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State

48. Increase support to the rural education centers in Laos to provide not only elementary but also self-help adult education in selected villages. Examine and if possible develop USOM field service to enable USOM officials resident in key areas of Laos to focus the various ICA-sponsored program activities effectively on the problems of village life.

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Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, USIA

49. Seek to negotiate a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation when the time for such negotiations appears propitious.

Assigned to: State, Commerce
Support: Treasury

C. Military

50. Provide special orientation visits to the U. S. and offer courtesy military training for middle and top Lao Army officials in order to influence them to resist subversion and to increase the number of pro-Western Lao leaders.

Assigned to: Defense

51. Maintain, in the general area of the Far East, U. S. forces adequate to exert a deterrent influence against communist aggression.

Assigned to: Defense, State

52. Make duly authorized periodic public announcements concerning U. S. forces available to deter aggression in the area in order to give Laos confidence that it is protected and to exert maximum deterrent influence on any potential aggressor.

Assigned to: Defense, State

53. Should overt communist aggression occur against Laos, take actions in accordance with U. S. policy, and prepare appropriate contingency plans now to facilitate such actions.

Assigned to: State, Defense
Target Date: When required

54. On occasion of an imminent or actual communist attempt to seize control from within, take action in accordance with U. S. policy, and prepare planning studies now to facilitate such actions.

Assigned to: Defense
Support: State, ICA

55. As politically feasible, encourage Laos to participate in the Pacific Defense College when established.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

Target Date: When College is established

56. Encourage Thai-Lao contingent defensive planning when political conditions permit, and continue technical planning guidance now being furnished by Chief of the JUSMAAG, Thailand.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

57. Support the Lao Army communications requirements in training (outside Laos) and material support in order effectively to backstop the civic action program.

Assigned to: Defense

58. Maintain current PEO operations, mission and organization. Replace normal PEO personnel losses with former military officers who are qualified by experience in strategic analysis and tactical evaluation. Insofar as possible, they should have experience in strategic planning, forces structure, tables of equipment, military programming, budget and fiscal planning, controllership, and logistic planning operations.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: ICA, State

59. Seek agreement with the French on delineation and fulfillment of responsibilities in a coordinated training program for the Lao National Army.

Assigned to: State, Defense

60. Employ third-country civilians, particularly Filipinos, to train the Lao National Army in selected fields as requested by the Lao Government. In so doing avoid friction with the French who currently have training responsibility.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

Target Date: As required

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61. Establish a U. S. MAAG for the furnishing of training as well as materials as soon as Lao Government agreement is obtained and the Geneva Accords limitations are lifted, in order to conduct efficient support of the Lao National Army.

Assigned to: State, Defense
Target Date: When politically feasible

62. Continue to implement the MAP program for Laos. The FY 1958 program provides for construction and consumable items, spare parts, and training ammunition. The proposed FY 1959 program provides for training and construction. Major items of equipment include shop equipment, POL uniforms, foodstuffs, and medical supplies. (Financial information appears in the attached MSP Pipeline Analysis.)

Assigned to: Defense
Support: State

63. As the police become capable of assuming their responsibilities in assuring internal security, and provided the Pathet Lao have been successfully integrated into the national community and the external aggression threat permits, review the force level of 25,000 troops with a view to its substantial reduction. *

Assigned to: State, Defense
Support: ICA

*In response to Lao Government request in November 1956 to know if we would continue support of the ANL, if then pending negotiations brought Pathet Lao troops into the royal army, the Lao were informed that among other conditions for continued support we envisaged a reduction to a 15,000 force level one year after successful integration of the Pathet Lao into the national community.

D. Information and Cultural

64. Provide appropriate information and public relations support for political, economic, and military policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan.

Assigned to: USIA

65. Seek to convince the Lao through the U. S. information program that the U. S. is a strong, willing, and effective friend, in order to minimize Lao incentive for accommodation to communist pressures. Portray graphically the U. S. contribution to the Lao economy through the U. S. aid program and the permanence of U. S. contributions. Assist the Lao Information Service to build up strong and effective means of reaching the Lao popu-

lation through support of information teams and establishment of newspapers. Utilize English-language instruction as a means of reaching a politically active audience.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: State, ICA

66. Disseminate to politically aware and active audiences reports from neighboring Asian countries which reveal local disillusionment with communist behavior.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: State

67. Continue to demonstrate progress made in the non-communist world through international cooperative effort.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: State

68. Increase the facilities for basic English-language instruction and otherwise prepare a greater number of qualified Lao for training in the United States.

Assigned to: State, USIA

69. Undertake an exchange of persons program and in selected cases attempt to make training available for 3 or 4 years of professional study since long-term training is essential in selected cases.

Assigned to: State

E. Overseas Internal Security Program

70. Continue to influence the Government of Laos to clarify areas of responsibility within its civilian internal security organization, so as to eliminate jurisdictional overlaps.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense

71. As requested by the Lao Government, continue an Overseas Internal Security Program designed to assist in improving and strengthening the internal security forces, and increasing their capabilities in the detection and containment of communist activities.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense

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72. Inform the Lao Government that continued U. S. support for the existing police program and its prospective expansion will depend upon full Lao cooperation with the U. S. police advisory group and upon rapid execution of jointly agreed plans (present and prospective), particularly for training the existing force.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA
Target Date: Immediately

73. Urge the Lao Government to transfer to the National Police the former gendarmerie training school, at least until a fully trained force of 4,000 has been achieved.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA
Target Date: Immediately

74. Urge the Lao to operate national police training centers at maximum capacity, giving priority to training the existing force. Recruit and train additional personnel on a proportionate basis not exceeding one recruit to five restrained in future courses under U. S. auspices in order to achieve a 4,000 force level as rapidly as possible.

Assigned to: ICA
Target Date: Immediately and continuing

75. Develop an administrative organization appropriate to the expanded police force.

Assigned to: ICA

76. Improve and expand the police communication system to correspond to the requirements of the growing force.

Assigned to: ICA

77. Assist in the construction and equipping of police posts and stations for redistribution of personnel as the ability of the Lao police effectively to employ them develops.

Assigned to: ICA

78. Limit military training of the police to that appropriate to armed police, constabulary, or gendarmerie in order not to lead police-type forces into expensive duplication of the role of the armed forces.

Assigned to: ICA

79. Emphasize in the counter-subversive training of the police the early detection of communist penetration of the civilian population.

Assigned to: ICA

80. In addition to the police program furnish guidance, equipment, and supplies to the propaganda, intelligence, and counter-subversive agencies of the government and the army.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense

81. Continue to train Lao military and police officials in appropriate neighboring countries and in the U. S.

Assigned to: ICA, Defense, State

82. Support SIDASP (Interministerial Service of Documentation and Social and Political Action, an intelligence organization now engaged mainly in propaganda, with some counter-subversive functions, operating under the authority of the office of the Prime Minister) to increase its effectiveness as a counter-subversive agency.

Assigned to: State

83. Train Lao Army personnel selected by the PEO in counter-intelligence corps and to replace personnel transferred to SIDASP.

Assigned to: Defense
Target Date: Immediately

84. Provide appropriate training by the United States Army Special Forces in Thailand or the Philippines to personnel selected by the PEO in order to improve the ability of the commando arm of the Lao Army in counter-guerrilla operations.

Assigned to: Defense
Target Date: Immediately

85. Integrate selected tribal elements and other carefully chosen local civilians into the existing auto-defense structure a village defense program, and provide appropriate support in order to enable it to function as an effective, controlled adjunct to the Lao National Army in its internal security role.

Assigned to: State
Support: Defense

86. Urge the establishment of a national arms depot for surplus weapons of all government organizations in order to centralize control of weapons.

Assigned to: Defense
Support: ICA, State
Target Date: As soon as possible

87. Assist the Lao Government: (a) to establish screening and anti-communist indoctrination programs and effective security measures to control the Pathet Lao integrated into the army, the civil service, and local communities in order to minimize the security risk arising from the political settlement; (b) to indoctrinate residents of former Pathet Lao-occupied or contaminated areas; and (c) to indoctrinate selected officials and non-official Lao elements on communist tactics and strategy.

Assigned to: State
Support: Defense, ICA, USIA
Target Date: Continued planning with Lao Government

NOTE:-- The following NIE is applicable to Laos:

NIE 68-57, Probable Developments in Laos over the Next Few Months, August 20, 1957.

Attachment:

Pipeline Analysis.

LAOS
 PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM
 \$* (In Millions of Dollars)

<u>Military Assistance</u> <u>a/ b/</u>	<u>Programs</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>	<u>Carryover</u>
Prior to FY 1957	35	28	7
FY 1957	7	4	10
FY 1958 (est.)	9	4	15
FY 1959 (est.)	12	5	22
	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Carryover</u>
<u>Economic Assistance</u>			
Prior to FY 1957	88.2	64.5	23.7
FY 1957	43.0	47.2	19.5
FY 1958 (est.)	30.0	32.4	17.1
FY 1959 (est.)	30.0	30.4	16.7
<u>Technical Assistance</u>			
Prior to FY 1957	1.0	0.4	0.6
FY 1957	1.5	0.8	1.3
FY 1958 (est.)	1.7	1.3	1.7
FY 1959 (est.)	1.8	1.6	1.9

- a/ Includes value of all grant military assistance, whether on a country, regional or worldwide basis, with the exception of the value of excess stocks. (In the MAP programming process, country programs include materiel and equipment, training and dollar costs of consumables and construction. Regional or worldwide programs include items such as packing, crating, handling and transportation; spare parts; cost of rehabilitating excess stocks; and advanced weapons, as appropriate)
- b/ Excludes \$5 million programmed from stocks excess to U. S. Service or other MAP requirements for FY 1950-59; of which \$1 million was delivered prior to FY 1957 and \$4 million is estimated to be delivered during FY 1957-59.