

JPRS-SEA-93-012
30 August 1993



JPRS Report

East Asia

Southeast Asia

The following is a list of the
 names of the persons who
 were present at the meeting
 held on the 15th day of
 the month of January, 1948.
 The names are listed in
 alphabetical order.

Mr. J. H. Smith
 Mr. W. R. Jones
 Mr. T. E. Brown
 Mr. C. D. White
 Mr. F. G. Black
 Mr. A. S. Green
 Mr. M. L. Gray
 Mr. P. Q. Red
 Mr. R. T. Blue
 Mr. U. V. Purple
 Mr. X. Y. Orange
 Mr. Z. A. Yellow

The meeting was held in
 the room of the
 building at
 the corner of
 and
 streets.
 The meeting was
 presided over by
 Mr. J. H. Smith.
 The minutes of the
 meeting were read
 and approved.
 The meeting
 adjourned at
 8:00 o'clock.
 Signed: J. H. Smith, Secretary

East Asia Southeast Asia

JPRS-SEA-93-012

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handled and was stored. I arrived to take on both the past and the present. [passage omitted]

[THAI RAT] What do you think of the many times that the prime minister has given orders himself without any consideration to you?

[Uthai] I think you have misunderstood the situation. The prime minister used to be in the Ministry of Commerce and knows the scope of the work well. How many people would know that the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for intervening just in the case of husked rice? He therefore ordered other units to help with unhusked rice.

The prime minister accepts and understands me. He is very supportive. Because the correspondents have beset me, the opposition representatives have beset me. Whenever the prime minister meets me he says that Uthai must be firm and that he understands that Uthai is doing very well. If I were like what others perceive, the prime minister would have abandoned me already.

With regard to the prime minister's ordering an inspection of the rice stocks of the Department of Foreign Trade, I had already ordered this -I had ordered the undersecretary to do this already because it was policy. I asked them to be strict. There were many rumors about the stocks being ruined. The Office of the prime minister inspected and found substandard rice. I had to set up a commission to investigate. I ordered the undersecretary to write a report which was strict and correct. He has been writing the report all day. I do not know whether it is ready or not. [passage omitted]

[THAI RAT] Do you not take your own side too much?

[Uthai] I do not know. I tell the truth. If it's true, it's true. If it's not true, it's bragging. Point out to me where I have been bragging. Everything has to be done. There can be no relaxing. Then everything will turn out well.

[THAI RAT] How much confidence does the government have in him?

[Uthai] As far as I have seen, it has confidence in him. There may be some who are not confident such as Deputy Prime Minister Bunchu Ropnasathian. He got in hot water before I did. But he does not know what changes to make. For example with rice—Thailand no longer sets the price. The country which sets the price is the country with low costs and good quality. It produces enough to supply the market. Those who say that Vietnam is behind us are mistaken. We know what the

problems are now and how to confront them. And we are developing a long-term project to mobilize our thinking and our agricultural and commercial warehouses.

We must help the farmers. We must make it possible for them to make a living. We must not forget that they make up most of the population. If most of the population cannot make a living, how will the country survive? The problem is that we must consider all sides; we must not abandon any group. It would be convenient to abandon some, but a government cannot do that. When I entered office we had to solve the problem of the last season - there was so much rice we could not wade through it. Now we are beginning to deal with the long term and are making plans. [passage omitted]

[THAI RAT] In summary you are confident then.

[Uthai] I am confident and proud while others may consider that I am a failure. It is not the duty of the government to say that something is going well. If something is going well it is kept quiet, and if something is not going well, it is improved. I was prepared for the duties I have had for the past seven months; now I am even more prepared because I have seen more.

[THAI RAT] I understand that the head of the Social Action Party will be taking [your] place. Is this cabinet change necessary?

[Uthai] I should not answer, inasmuch as the prime minister is the head of the government. He has the absolute right to make this decision. I am a member of a small party, but I still insist that I am confident and proud of our administration. Every government official knows our position. If something is not clear, it is normally investigated. If something is wrong, there is a complete investigation, and the accounts are opened.

With regard to the head of the Social Action Party taking [my] place, he has denied it. As far as changing the cabinet, the prime minister has made a clear statement. Why are you asking me? This government has just gotten through a debate over a no-confidence motion. It has been completely cleansed during the past three days and three nights. This has been equivalent to acceptance by the National Assembly. Why not give those accepted by the assembly the opportunity to continue. This means that people should be asking whether the term of office should be four years or longer.

This has all been earnestly discussed. I am ready for these duties because I have been in office for seven months, and I have seen a great deal. I am fully prepared.

POLITICAL

Comments on Outlook for Vietnam-Cambodia Relations

932E0073A Hanoi QUAN HE QUOC TE
in Vietnamese May 93 pp 1, 6-8, 15

[Article by Nguyen Ngoc Truong: "Cambodia's May Elections: Facing an Uncertain Future"]

[Excerpts] [English summary provided by QUAN HE QUOC TE under the rubric "Highlights"] *Cambodia's May Election: Facing an Uncertain Future*, a comment by Nguyen Ngoc Truong (pp 6-8) analyses some basic aspects of the complicated situation in Cambodia prior to its General Election in May and the possible scenarios regarding Cambodia's future.

This important political campaign bears a great significance for Cambodia, depending on its positive or negative outcomes. Cambodia might stop its long civil war, restore national unity and rebuild its country, or sink deeper into civil war.

The major obstacle for the General Election, also a problem for the future of Cambodia is the non-cooperative attitude of the Khmer Rouge, a force which has so far shown its unwillingness to make political compromises. The election campaign has revealed the reality of a dismantled Cambodian society, which doesn't have a political orientation or a national dynamic.

The author provides some arguments based on an analysis of historical and external factor in responding to the question of when would Cambodians bid farewell to arms. Anyway, there are some reasons for cautious optimism. The key point to her future is to keep away from any external interference and let the Cambodian people decide their own internal affairs.

The last part of the article analyses the possible effects of Cambodia's uncertain situation on Vietnam. Vietnam must be patient in rebuilding a new kind of relationship with her neighbor. [end English summary] [passage omitted]

Toward a New Vietnam-Cambodia Relationship

Foreigners are showing interest in the way Vietnam deals with the current situation in Cambodia. At the same time, inevitably, a question is being posed: In what way would postelection instability in Cambodia affect Vietnam, and to what extent?

Owing partly to destiny, partly to the vicissitudes of history, in Cambodia there are sections of the population that have been aroused and have shown persistent hostility toward Vietnam. Similarly, in their history, they had felt hatred for their neighbors to the East as well as the West every time there was in their country the presence of these people, whom they regarded as those who had come to occupy their ancestors' land. The Thai have no qualms about recalling the story that the Angkor

temples had fallen into ruin after being attacked for several centuries by the Siamese army. But the Cambodians' historical complex and suspicions have not prevented contemporary Thai politicians from successfully implementing a Cambodia policy. As for Vietnam, Jacques Bekaert has written from Phnom Penh that he himself has met many Cambodians, including some of the Khmer Rouge faction, who want to maintain good-neighbor relations with Vietnam and acknowledge Vietnam as a "counterbalance" in their international relations, because they think that, willy-nilly, Cambodia and Vietnam are neighbors. Perhaps, as time goes by, clear-sightedness will prompt Vietnam and Cambodia as well as other nations in continental Southeast Asia to view their relations with each other in an objective and clearheaded manner and without misunderstandings, and to renovate these relations on the basis of a constructive and totally realistic new approach.

Since it pulled out its troops from Cambodia and contributed to the process of shaping the Paris Accord on Cambodia, Vietnam has not only resolved to scrupulously live up to its obligations to the agreement, but has also wanted to quickly establish peaceful, friendly, and cooperative relations with a Cambodia promoting national concord and reconciliation in the spirit of the Paris Accord. Past experiences as well as the interests of peace and Vietnam's security and development are the basis for Vietnam to take such a decision. During his visit to Vietnam, the UN secretary general had highly appreciated Vietnam's restraint, which he considered to be a "wise attitude." That behavior is a sign of maturity in international politics. Vietnam has risen above political emotions for the sake of national interests and major objectives.

No matter how the postelection situation in Cambodia will develop, Vietnam will definitely abide by the principle of considering the Cambodia issue to be first and foremost an issue of the Cambodian people, and will not get involved again, nor will it allow itself to be pushed into getting involved again. If the Cambodia issue persisted, first of all it would be an issue of the Cambodians and the entire world community. As an international solution is required, the Cambodia issue must be settled jointly by the international community. At the same time, it is in the interests of the Southeast Asian nations to prevent this issue from becoming a regional tinderbox again.

Looking toward the future, we are patiently building amicable Vietnam-Cambodia relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, establishing and consolidating mutual trust, realistic and mutually beneficial cooperation, and good-neighbor ties between the two countries. While applying ourselves to firmly defending the fatherland's security and borders and frustrating all attempts to carry the conflict into Vietnamese territory, we will also actively promote and strive for the realization of the objectives of ZOPFAN [Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality], thereby bringing about lasting peace and stability in the entire

Southeast Asia region to serve as a firm basis for Vietnam-Cambodia relations. To achieve this goal, it is absolutely essential for us to establish balanced, stable relations with the big countries that are closely associated with Cambodia.

In Vietnam-Cambodia relations, there still are some outstanding issues left behind by history. These are common realities in relations between nations, especially between neighboring countries. We hope that these issues will be resolved through discussions between the Vietnamese government and the new government chosen by the Cambodians in the May elections. We are convinced that solutions satisfactory to both sides will be found through negotiations conducted in a cooperative and constructive spirit and in conformity with the common trend in international relations in the new age.

MILITARY

Changes Proposed for Training Reserve Officers

932E0075A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Jun 93 pp 31-35

[Article by Colonel Bui Nhat Man under the rubric "New Thinking on the National Defense Task - Issues and Solutions (Studies - Exchanges of Views)": "Renovating the Task of Training Reserve Officers"]

[Text] Over the past years, the task of training and improving reserve officers has been developed in all military regions, corps, armed branches and services, military academies and schools, and colleges throughout the country. Together with the officers transferred from active duty to the reserve service, large numbers of reserve officers, newly trained from those noncommissioned officers who were about to be discharged and from college students, have actively contributed to the organization of mobilization-ready reserve units in accordance with the requirements of the mobilization tasks of various localities and sectors. Many Bac Bo delta provinces and districts have acquired enough detachment-level reserve officers for assignment in mobilization-ready reserve units in conformity with the requirements that personnel should be assigned according to their military specialties and that the extent of the areas from which reservists are called up to serve in a unit should be reduced. In 1991, Hai Hau District (Nam Ha Province) organized a regiment that was fully provided with class-one reserve cadres of good quality, thereby fulfilling the requirements that a unit should be fully staffed, that extra personnel should be available for use as replacements, that sufficient officers of mandatory ranks should be appointed, and that all positions should be filled. In the regiment, 66.7 percent of its officers received assignments matching their military specialties; officers were appointed to leadership positions in a suitable ratio, their ages were appropriate, and so forth. At present, the reserve officers commanding infantry and armed-branches detachments are mainly trained from noncommissioned officers nearing discharge. As

for technical and specialized reserve officers, the majority of them are trained from college graduates; a number of these officers have been drafted to serve in various units and defense enterprises, to teach basic sciences and specialized techniques at various academies and officer candidates schools, thereby actively contributing to upgrading the training at the Army schools to higher and college levels at present and in the coming years. Most of these officers have satisfactorily fulfilled their duties. A survey of teaching quality conducted in Hanoi, Haiphong, Bac Thai, and Ho Chi Minh City has shown that 15 percent of them were good, 75 percent average, and 10 percent weak in practical capability. Not a few of them have volunteered for long-term service in the Army.

The annual elementary and advanced training of reserve officers has been carried out according to two formulas: training in localities or in main-force units for 10 to 15 days a year.

It can be said that the elementary and advanced training of reserve officers in the past years has yielded encouraging initial results. This confirms that the recent policy of giving elementary and advanced training to reserve officers has proceeded in the right direction, and that this is a good way to create a source of reserve officers serving as the basis for the organization of mobilization-ready reserve units, thus actively contributing to the task of Army mobilization in the past.

However, we must also see all the remaining problems to be resolved in the coming days. These are:

- In terms of both number and military specialties, commanding reserve officers (platoon leaders) trained from noncommissioned officers nearing discharge are not evenly distributed in all territorial regions (the plains, the midlands, the highlands, the borders, the regions of ethnic minorities, and the South) after they return to their localities. There are both a surplus and a shortage of reserve officers when mobilization-ready reserve units are organized, that is, a surplus of infantry officers and a shortage of armed-branches, political, and logistic officers.
- Technical and specialized reserve officers trained from college students bring with them a fairly good technical knowledge when they are called up to serve in the Army. However, their service is not stable because they do not serve with peace of mind, especially when the country is switching to a market-oriented economic system.
- Registration and managerial work has not been highly efficient. The cause of this state of affairs is that, on the one hand, a number of reserve officers have not yet been fully conscious of their duties and, on the other, the state has not yet adopted attractive remunerative mechanisms and policies.
- Some remunerative systems and policies have been put into effect, but as they have not been renovated in

conformity with the socioeconomic situation, they have failed to motivate and encourage reserve officers to serve in the reserve service or in the regular Army. Once discharged after fulfilling their active military duty, reserve officers suffer losses because they are not given suitable work.

—Not much annual advanced and supplementary training designed to improve reserve officers' capabilities has been carried out; only a very small number of the reserve officers assigned to mobilization-ready reserve units have been given such training. In some places, owing to many causes (budget, funding, materials and equipment, location) the quality of elementary, supplementary, and advanced training has not been high and training work itself still has the character of a "mass movement."

To contribute to satisfactorily carrying out the task of Army mobilization, I would like to present some ideas on the elementary and advanced training of reserve officers in the coming year as follows:

1. There should be a new, more correct perception of the task of building the mobilization-ready reserve force, of which the main effort is building the contingent of reserve officers in the new situation.

There should be new thinking with regard to the task of defending the fatherland according to the spirit of the Resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh Party Congresses and the Resolution of the Third Plenum of the Seventh Party Central Committee on National Defense and Security, which says: "*Consolidating the all-people national defense system and the people's war disposition is the task of all the people and Army and of the entire political system,*" and this includes the task of "*building a powerful mobilization-ready reserve force that is well-trained and well-managed to ensure that it can be quickly mobilized according plan when necessary.*" There should be a new and more correct perception of the Party's viewpoints mentioned above, so that while putting the task of national construction in the forefront, we also apply ourselves to building the all-people national defense system and the mobilization-ready reserve force, thereby helping prepare the country's national defense potential and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. At present, building the mobilization-ready reserve force, of which the contingent of reserve officers is the hard core, is a strategic task of the country. This task is related to many levels and sectors from the center to the grass roots and really calls for the participation of all the people under the state management. To further improve the elementary and advanced training of reserve officers, first of all we should foster the knowledge of and new thinking about national defense among the leadership and management cadres at all levels and in all sectors; after that, in strict accordance with the spirit of Directive 420/CT dated 30 December 1991 of the Council of Ministers (now the Government), we should expand the education in national defense among all the people, in particular the young generation, pupils, and students, the

contingent of workers that will be building and defending the fatherland in the 21st century,

2. Renovating the method of training reserve officers.

In the past few years, owing to the readjustments of the organization of forces, large numbers of regular Army officers have been demobilized and have returned to their localities. This is a very substantial source of reserve-officers replenishment for localities. However, in reality, the majority of these demobilized officers are middle-level cadres. For this reason, there still is a serious shortage of manpower in the contingent of primary-level cadres. In the coming years, after the armed forces organization is stabilized, the pool of reserve officers replenished with demobilized regular Army officers will be greatly depleted. For this reason, reserve officer candidates must continue to be recruited from among demobilized noncommissioned officers and college graduates.

Concerning candidates who are demobilized noncommissioned officers.

—We should continue to train soon-to-be-demobilized noncommissioned officers to be reserve platoon leaders as we have been doing for a long time. But we should pay attention to selecting those noncommissioned officers who, after being demobilized, will go back to areas that still lack reserve officers (such as the South, the mountain regions, the regions inhabited by ethnic minorities), and should train only those specialists of whom there is still a shortage.

—We should select candidates from among reserve noncommissioned officers and soldiers currently appointed platoon cadres in mobilization-ready reserve units for training as reserve platoon leaders in accordance with their military specialties. We should train as many cadres and specialists as needed to fill vacancies, plus a number of extras to make up for annual natural attrition (about five percent, as we know from experience). The 5th Military Region has applied this method of "*training people with permanent addresses*" and have obtained good results. To meet the requirement of "*training people with permanent addresses,*" there should be very close coordination the cadre organ and mobilization organization organ, between the Ministry of National Defense and military regions, and between provinces and the grass roots. *The task of training must be closely linked with the task of mobilization almost in the same way as "producers" are linked with "consumers."* In the conditions of the central and local national defense budgets and expenditures being limited as they are at present, this method has proved to be more economic.

—Concerning the organization of training, it is absolutely necessary that training is organized at military-political schools in order to ensure its good quality; this is because these schools have everything they need for this task (teachers, materials and

equipment, drill grounds, and other support services). On the other hand, only the military-political schools at the military region- and corps-level up have the juridical-person status required to organize training. In cases there is difficulty regarding school locations, or vast areas necessitate organizing training at the local military schools of provinces (or cities), the military regions concerned should give direct guidance, provide supplementary funding, ensure other support services, and send teachers to teach. Such local military schools should be regarded only as providers of training locations.

Concerning candidates who are college graduates.

—We should continue to select a small number of candidates from among those students whose trades and professions meet national defense requirements and correspond with those specialties in which the Ministry of National Defense cannot provide training but which are needed (according to the spirit of Directive 420/CT of the Council of Ministers). After training is completed, most of these reserve officers should be mobilized immediately for active duty for three years (as determined by law), while the remainder (about one-third of the total) are to be retained in the reserve service. When their term of duty is up, they should be transferred to the reserve service (but those who volunteer to serve in the regular Army units on a long-term basis should be allowed to do so). By so doing, we will have a contingent of reserve cadres of better quality because they were trained and grew up in the Army.

—With regard to training organization, experiments carried out over the past several years have shown that sending students to Army schools for training is a step in the right direction because the quality of training in these schools is higher than that in college military departments. Army schools are fully equipped to meet all requirements; *especially, they offer a regular environment for study and training, which gives the training of reserve officers there a higher quality. In 1992, Hanoi Polytechnic College students received three months of formal training at the Air Defense Officers School. After completing training with good results, 100 percent of the graduates were drafted into the Army to serve in technical units or to serve as technical teaching cadres at academies and officer candidates schools. This method was also applied in the past years to students of the Ho Chi Minh City Polytechnic College, the Ho Chi Minh City College of Medicine and Pharmacy, the College of National Economy... and yielded good results.*

—At present, colleges are entrusted with the task of training only a small number of reserve officers. Therefore, we can make studies in order to send students of a number of colleges for formal training at any officer candidates school that is most suitable for the kind of specialized training required and most qualified for the training task. This would facilitate

organizational and logistic work and improve the quality of training while helping eliminate the state of scatteration resulting from the training of too small a number of candidates of the same categories at many different places.

—After setting up the experimental National Defense Education Center in Thai Nguyen and putting it into operation since 22 December 1992 with good results, the Ministries of National Defense and Education and Training have advocated organizing similar centers in those cities where there is a large concentration of colleges and advanced schools. Therefore, in the years ahead, students may be permitted to train to be reserve officers right at such centers. If this is done, higher economic efficiency will certainly be achieved in training.

3. Advanced training for reserve officers.

In the coming years, we should continue to make more investment in the advanced and supplementary training of reserve officers, with emphasis put on certain categories of officers, namely leading and staff cadres, cadres of administrative organs, and specialized cadres already assigned to mobilization-ready reserve units. Two organizational methods are applicable:

—Training in localities: This method has one advantage, namely on-the-spot training, which means less time and money spent in commuting and more financial aid provided by the local budget. However, there are difficulties regarding drill grounds, materials and equipment needed for training, and the management of trainees, who are easily affected by the fact they are close to their homes.

—Training in main-force units or provincial and city military-political schools: This method ensures the availability of materials and equipment and drill grounds as well as a better environment for study and training. But there are also some impediments: greater costs owing to long-distance travels involving long periods of time, a problem requiring very close and smooth coordination between mobilization-ready reserve units and each locality sending out reserve officers for training. Moreover, trainees are reluctant to live far from their families.

Experience drawn from successful implementation of these methods in Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Nam Ha, Quang Nam, Danang, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Tien Giang, Group B01/QKTD [Capital Military Region], Army Engineers Group H29, Artillery Group 45, and so forth, has shown that, in the coming years, neither of the two methods should be rigidly used. Both should be flexibly applied to the concrete situation of each unit and locality in conformity with the characteristics and requirements of each class, each category of trainee in order to obtain the best results. In organizing the implementation of tasks, every effort must be made to secure the guidance and leadership of party committee echelons, the administration, and mass organizations in the localities concerned, and the help and aid of the various sectors in these

localities. In particular, attention must be paid to ensuring the national defense budget of localities. At the same time, there must be a thorough understanding of the guideline that training must be realistic and effective, and that ostentatiousness and formalism must be avoided. The length of training time must be reasonable (seven to 10 days a year). Training schedules should be set in such a way as to avoid agricultural seasons and the busy ending period of the year, when reviews of past activities are to be made. Reserve cadres should be classified according to their quality in order to open separate classes for trainees of the same standards. Training programs and subjects must be realistic and suitable for the characteristics and standards of each category of trainee. In training, we should link cadre training with unit training. Unit training is an exercise aimed at improving the command and training management abilities of reserve cadres.

4. Consolidating once again the organizations and strengthening once again the organs doing mobilization work and the cadres in charge of registering reserve officers and managing their training.

When Army organizations and personnel were readjusted and the regular troop strength was reduced to the essential peacetime level, the reserve force in general and the contingent of reserve officers in particular should have been increased, strictly registered and managed, regularly trained, and prepared for mobilization if need be. That was consistent with the law of development and with our people's longstanding tradition of national construction and defense. However, we have acted in a contrary manner, recalling some cadres attached to key ministries and sectors and reducing the number of cadres in charge of mobilization work at all levels. For this reason, the contingent of cadres doing mobilization work is both understaffed and unstable, and its organization is upset as cadres are transferred to other jobs when they have not been able to gain much experience. To prepare the entire nation for national defense in terms of manpower and material and financial resources, *there should be an organization fully developed from the center to the grass roots to take charge of mobilization preparation, including a force responsible for mobilization work established right inside the various ministries, departments, and sectors of the state.* In the past, such an organization had been set up, namely the Department of Mobilization Affairs (or Department One for short). However, owing to staffing constraints, or because of some localities' failure to perform their functions and duties well, Department One now exists only in the Ministry of Education and Training, the State Planning Commission, and the Government's Office. To meet the requirements of Army mobilization and national economic mobilization work in the new conditions, we

would like to suggest that we continue to consolidate this organization anew, first of all in key ministries and sectors of the socioeconomic system, and to consolidate the contingent of cadres and organizations in charge of mobilization work, the registration of reservists (including reserve officers), and the management of their training and advanced training. The assignment of cadres to this task must be stabilized, so that these cadres can accumulate experience and really acquire great "professional" skills, thereby avoiding being regarded as people appointed to "sinecures."

5. Renovating the mechanisms, policies, and procedures to suit them to the current socioeconomic situation.

We already have a system of state laws and sublaws for use in institutionalizing Army mobilization work, thereby introducing the party's all-people national defense line into life. These documents are the Constitution, the Law on Military Obligation, the Law on Officers of the Vietnam People's Army, Decree 153/HDBT [Council of Ministers] on the System of Reserve Officers of the Vietnam People's Army. The sub-laws, which include the system of directives, circulars... promulgated by each ministry or jointly issued by the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministries of Education and Training, Finance, War Invalids and Social Welfare, and so forth, have laid down concrete regulations on the mechanisms, policies, procedures, obligations, and interests concerning reservists in general and reserve officers in particular. Thanks to this, the task of Army mobilization and the building and organization of the mobilization-ready reserve force and the contingent of reserve officers have recorded encouraging initial results. However, when the country switched to the socialist-oriented multisectoral economic system, although most of these regulations and procedures remain effective, a great many points of their contents have become outdated and have failed to keep pace with the development of the socioeconomic situation. In the days ahead, the responsible organs should promptly serve even better as advisory bodies to the party, the state, the Ministry of National Defense, and other ministries and sectors concerned, so that they can readjust, revise, and supplement the existing regulations, procedures, and policies, and introduce some new ones to ensure social justice in the cause of national defense, to provide incentives (material and moral) for members of the reserve service so that they will stand ready for mobilization when necessary, and to encourage reserve officers to volunteer for active duty. Realities have shown that only by adopting suitable mechanisms and policies will we be able to create favorable conditions for satisfactorily carrying out Army mobilization work in general and for building the reserve force and the contingent of reserve officers in particular.

Corps Commander Discusses Regularization Issues
932E0069A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese May 93 pp 55-58

[Article by Major General Le Van Dung, commander, Cuu Long Corps: "Some Issues Regarding Building the Framework for Regularization in Cuu Long Corps"]

[Text] In order to fulfill all of the glorious tasks assigned to it by the party, state, and army, Cuu Long Corps [Binh doan] has determined that it must build itself to become a regular and gradually modernizing corps. In the field of building itself to become regular, it should first of all standardize all aspects of the troops' activities, discipline, internal order, management patterns, and training and combat readiness patterns on the basis of educating and raising the level of comprehension and solid political background of cadres and soldiers so as to allow all of them to recognize their responsibilities and to seriously carry out orders through their own understanding. At the same time, it should heighten the sense of responsibility and ability to organize and to manage on the part of its cadres, particularly those at the battalion rank and higher, who mostly have been trained in the army's academies and schools and, for the majority of them, have undergone actual combat training challenges. In the course of building totally strong units in accordance with the five needs set by the General Staff, it was paying attention to organizing and building a framework for regularization suitable for the needs of its tasks and the characteristics and actual conditions of the corps being a main-force unit that has been performing a mobility task in an important strategic location.

The effectiveness of the job of building a framework for regularization depends on many factors, the most noteworthy ones being the issues having to do with the level of comprehension, ability to organize management, and habits in everyday activities of cadres and soldiers; the conditions for ensuring material resources, equipment, and so on. In these issues, due to actual historical conditions, the corps encountered definite difficulties. The fact that it was a mobile unit for many years, took part in combat activities, and fulfilled its international obligation on a friendly battlefield under conditions of scattered guerrilla-type activities made many commanding cadres at all levels suffer from psychological effects and have many work habits and behavior that reflected distraction and diversion and were unsuitable for the needs for training within the regularization framework. On the other hand, because of the common difficulties in getting spending appropriations, the material resources needed to ensure the unit's activities, training, and work were insufficient, degraded, and unsynchronized; this greatly and adversely affected the effectiveness of its organizing the building of a framework for regularization. In addition, the construction of the framework for regularization the corps has been difficult because there were annual fluctuations and instability in regard to its staff and organization. The cadres and soldiers in the corps come from more than 40 provinces and municipalities all over the country; as a result, their customs and habits are different in many

aspects. More than 50 percent of the corps' cadres have families living in the northern provinces, thousands of kilometers away. Since the economic living standards of their families and of their own is still difficult and unstable, their efforts to undergo training and to build a way of living and behavior suitable for the regularization framework have certainly been affected.

To build a regularization framework covers a vast area of interest. It creates fairly total needs ranging from outfits, ceremonial manners, behavior, and maintaining of activities and work procedures to the ways to handle relationships among soldiers, relationships between soldiers and the people, and so on. Furthermore, it also creates the need for a degree of highly scientific unity and concentration by all individuals and soldiers' organizations at all levels in the corps. In the organization and building of a regularization framework in the corps, attention has been paid to totally fulfilling all of those needs, but efforts have been concentrated first of all on making actual changes in such issues as behavior, soldiers' ceremonial manners, framework for the procedures adopted, and well-planned and scientific activities of organizations based on rules and programs. The need for building a regularization framework is to be fulfilled by all cadres and soldiers, but for cadres at all levels this need is greater and more total.

In its efforts to organize implementation, the corps was concentrating on these major issues: *to unify comprehension and responsibilities* by all cadres and soldiers toward the need for building the regularization framework; *to materialize regulations, rules, and plans* having to do with all activities and work within the corps as a whole; *to improve and heighten the ability to organize and to manage* of cadres at all levels; and *gradually to create favorable conditions regarding the material base so as to ensure the need for achieving unification and regularization.*

The corps each year organized training courses to improve the training capacity of cadres at all levels. The primary target of this training was those cadres directly in charge of training detachments and serving as trainers of newly enlisted soldiers, and normally lasted for five to 15 days. It improved and merged two schools—the School of Military Administration and School of Logistics and Technology—to create a military school of its own. Tactical and technical training in the school and in units was closely combined with training in the rules about discipline, way of living, and regularization behavior. Attention was being paid to reinforcing the basic view on the relationships among soldiers and their behavior. The purpose of educating soldiers to heighten their comprehension was to make all of them clearly understand that in daily activities, learning, and work, as well as in combat situations, they would face comradely relationships and relationships between superior and lower ranks. The comradely relationships are part of the nature of our army. The reason is that all military personnel, cadres, and soldiers as well, share the same revolutionary ideals and the goal of serving, have the same interests and obligation toward the fatherland, enjoy political equality, and are one another's comrade. The relationships between superior and lower ranks are necessary within the command

and soldier-guiding structure for the purpose of making all soldiers act in a unified and well-organized manner and with discipline, and work together to fulfill all training, combat, building, daily work, and other tasks.

About behavior of soldiers, the purpose is to make all soldiers first of all show that they have a clear conception of organizing discipline; a spirit of solidarity and mutual help, along with a civilized and wholesome way of life; and an attitude based on civility, modesty, simplicity, self-control, and self-respect, both in words and deeds. The outfits they wear must be clean; the way they are dressed must be correct, never sloppy and eccentric. They should be exemplary in terms of obeying the law of the state and the rules about social life.

The effectiveness of the efforts to build a regularization framework is first determined by the high level of self-understanding and sense of responsibility on the part of soldiers, particularly cadres. To pay no attention to teaching cadres and soldiers the concept of responsibility and the need for building the framework for regularization will easily lead to the tendencies to execute orders in a formal, superficial, and temporary manner, and to stick to bureaucratic and excessively orderly and administrative ways of organizing implementation of rules. All of these signs will adversely affect work quality and unit strength. Therefore, in organizing and building a framework for its regularization, the corps should not only set regulations and procedures but also, and first of all, build a correct conception for its cadres and soldiers and heighten their sense of responsibility and self-understanding. This has been affirmed as a common responsibility of all individuals and organizations to be fulfilled on a continuous basis, with the pace of execution depending on their own needs, tasks, and functions. The corps' party committee and command have made the needs and requirements about building the regularization framework a part of the activities of the party organizations, administration, and masses. That would serve as a necessary basis for observing the corps' units, party members, cadres, and soldiers as they fulfilled their tasks and evaluating the results they obtained. Each year the corps organized selection of safe units, military competitions, and building of regularization ways and behavior, and singled out the weaknesses and strengths of each and every unit to help it to set a direction for its subsequent efforts. The building of the regularization framework was also a process for correcting some misconceptions on the part of a few cadres who believed that we must have a total and modern material base before we could achieve such a framework, and for overcoming the signs of psychological weakness—the fear for restraints and difficulties—in the course of implementation.

In addition to raising conception and the sense of responsibility, the corps paid full attention to materializing the needs for building the regularization framework. Leadership was focused on two angles: to organize guidance and control over the contents of current regulations, procedures, and rules issued by superior echelons, and,

depending on the actual conditions of units, to recommend adopting directives, rules, regulations, plans, and so on for units of lower ranks and individuals to use as a basis while executing orders. So far the organs and units of the corps have seriously implemented 11 daily and weekly procedures. As to arranging living quarters and places for various activities, the corps has begun to pay attention to satisfying the needs for training; mobility and combat readiness; conveniences for work, activities, and learning; health protection; and living conditions reflecting the civilized way of life and organized discipline of a regular army and creating troops' attachment to collective life. Barracks of all units now are equipped with "five ropes and three shelves" [clotheslines for hanging various kinds of garments and towels to dry; shelves for rucksacks, dishes, and shoes]. As to the network of warehouses used to store outfits and military supplies, the specifications set by superior professional organs are now strictly applied. The corps' cadres all have to wear shoulderboards, kepis, and shoes whenever they leave their barracks. The procedures for expressing greetings, conducting conversations, making reports, and so on in accordance with regulations have gradually become routine practice in all units.

The efforts to build the regularization framework in the corps were not limited to making outfits, ceremonial manners, and behavior uniformly observed by its troops, but the corps was paying more attention to work patterns by drafting work regulations and plans for different levels and between superior and lower levels. In fact, beginning in the early months of 1992, all levels had to draft their own work plans and to implement them in accordance with a unified plan for work and activities. To draft and implement plans was achieved in the corps as follows: at the corps level, for stages and annually; at the division level, annually, quarterly, and monthly; at the regimental level, monthly; and at the battalion level, weekly. Regulations for such activities as exchanging of views, assigning of committee work, control aimed at assessing the situation, organization of military exercises, control, and so on, and work programs of each and every professional sector were drafted and properly implemented. The drafting and implementation of plans, regulations, and work programs made all levels in the corps succeed in fulfilling their tasks in an orderly manner, led to better concentration and uniformity, and thus helped to raise the effectiveness of their work.

The corps acted on its own initiative to overcome difficulties, to develop active and creative qualities, and to gradually create favorable conditions for satisfying the needs for a material base that would ensure success in building the regularization framework. Its cadres at all levels carefully considered using the annual budget appropriated by the superior echelons for capital construction, training, and regular activities in the key expenditures in order to obtain greater results. Priorities in construction and repair spending were given to facilities used for dining, living, and public activities and the network of training grounds and storehouses, with more attention paid to the more urgent facilities or work,

particularly if they belonged to newly-enlisted soldiers' units, military schools, and military control units. As the corps is stationed in an area where the cost of living is high and its cadres' families in the rear area still encounter many difficulties, it has been making great efforts to contribute to resolving these difficulties. At the same time, every year its units were spending tens of thousands of working days and hundreds of millions of dong taken from production labor funds in economic activities in order to further improve their dining facilities and living quarters, to renovate stadiums and training grounds, and to buy additional supplies, for the purpose of both improving the living standard of cadres and soldiers and contributing to building the material base necessary for ensuring successful building of the regularization framework.

The policy on building a framework for regularization in Cuu Long Corps was first mentioned a few years ago. More specifically, since early 1992 it has been materialized and its synchronized and more effective implementation has been organized. Although there remained many problems that the corps should continue to deal with and resolve, it has obtained a positive change. The corps that in the beginning had many weaknesses in regard to a framework for regularization has now undergone good changes in terms of outfits, ceremonial manners, and behavior of its troops, as well as living and work patterns. The results of many aspects of its work, such as training, combat readiness, and training in discipline, have been better. Since 1991, every year the number of violations of discipline and behavior patterns decreased by 5-10 percent from the preceding year. All units in the corps were able to satisfy the needs for building strong regiments and divisions and were fully capable of fulfilling every assigned task.

In the course of organizing the building of a regularization framework, the corps still encountered certain difficulties that its subjective efforts alone could not resolve right away; therefore, it would need the concern, assistance, and coordination of the Ministry of National Defense, the superior organs in charge, localities, and friendly units. As we hope that the task of building a framework for our army's regularization would bring about better results, we have a few positive resolutions as follows. First of all, all echelons, sectors, and localities must achieve better coordination in the education and recruitment of new soldiers, who must be better prepared in terms of ideological knowledge and conception, as well as the necessary conditions, prior to joining the army so that they could satisfy better in a new environment the needs for training in building the regularization framework. As for the units where the material base shows many shortages and degraded aspects, it is necessary to appropriate more funds and to boost in time the spending for capital construction. At the same time, we must speed up the study of how to improve the form and to raise the quality of a number of military equipment and supplies for cadres and soldiers, and make this study complete and uniform. These are the needs that are

being directly raised in the units today in connection with the process of organizing the building of the framework for regularization.

Management, Organization of Reserve Force in Tien Giang

932E0072A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese May 93 pp 44-47

[Article by Senior Colonel Le Hong Thanh: "A New Experiment in Management and Organization of Reserve Force in Tien Giang Province—Issues To Be Raised"]

[Text] To build the reserve force for mobilization (RFFM) is a strategic issue of important significance aimed at consolidating and strengthening the all-people national defense potential in accordance with the view on the people's all-people, total, and modern war within the framework of the construction and defense of the fatherland. The ministry [of National Defense] has determined the organization and management of RFFM and has issued goals and plans assigned to all echelons, sectors, and localities throughout the country. In the course of doing preparatory work for mobilization, Tien Giang Province was using many formulas and applying many forms in order to find the most effective managerial measures. Although it has just begun, Tien Giang's *model of district-level RFFM battalion* has already opened up new prospects in conformity with the locality's conditions and capabilities. However, the organization and building of the RFFM battalion constituted only an initial experiment, for there remained many obstacles having to do with the superior authorities' plan for preparations for mobilization and requiring further study and gradual resolving in order to satisfy the needs of the task.

After repeated efforts both to develop the mobilizing work and to gain experience and lots of discussions, Tien Giang *combined the organizational models into one, built in each district an RFFM battalion, and issued guidelines for setting up a pilot project in Go Cong Tay District*. Due to the characteristics of the southern provinces in general, and Tien Giang in particular, there were many difficulties in the registration, management—both quantitative and qualitative—and creation of sources, particularly the sources of reserve officers; consequently, as to the preparations for mobilization, very poor results were often obtained, with some units reaching only 30-40 percent of their target figures in terms of organizing training. With the new economic management mechanism particularly, those people who had fulfilled their military obligation had to go elsewhere because of the difficult economic situation to look for jobs and to earn a living. Therefore, the registration, management, and creation of sources for building the RFFM was an extremely hard problem for us to solve. Even after we had adopted the policy on building the RFFM battalion in the district, which had been unanimously approved by

the Standing Committee of the Provincial CPV Committee, Standing Committee, and Military Region, there remained many issues to be clarified in regard to the mechanism of leadership, management, and execution with relation to the RFFM battalion "frame." The district that had been selected to set up the pilot project also was worrying and being afraid because this would be the province's force and wondering how it could lead, manage, and create favorable conditions for them to properly fulfill the task assigned by the superior authorities.

To resolve this issue, we clearly determined the mechanism of leadership and management in regard to the district's RFFM battalion on the basis of linking it with the military organs of the district and villages. All procedures having to do with regular activities, learning, traveling, reporting, and so on were placed under the leadership of party committee echelons, local administration, and primary organizations. The battalion's cadres, now given the additional title of assistant, had to work in the party organization of the district military organ. The cadres of companies and platoons who were sent to reinforce the villages had to work in the security-national defense chapters, where they also assumed the functions of village military unit deputy commanders. All signs of liberalism, acting at one's convenience, and lack of responsibility while doing one's work, as well as any violations of the principles of activities and learning in the locality and primary organizations, would be dealt with in accordance with the law of the state and the army's discipline regulations.

After having adopted the final policy on and plan for building RFFM battalions, we *organized the leadership for practicing the experimental building task* in Go Cong Tay District. Because the permanent frame no longer existed, as we organized the building of the RFFM battalion we had to bring cadres from the provincial military organ to staff the "frame" of the reserve battalion, which consisted of seven comrades. The staff organization included a battalion commander, a deputy battalion commander-political officer, three infantry company commanders, and two branch platoon commanders (coi [mortar] and signal corps). A total of 19 reserve officers and 477 noncommissioned officers and soldiers were positioned in three infantry companies in three villages, the detachments subordinate to them, and the infantry battalion in two villages.

About the activities of the battalion's frame cadres, according to their assigned functions and tasks, they were to take care of registration and management, and to know exactly the numbers and quality of reserve troops in the localities they were in charge of through the meetings they had to hold. Each month all cadres, from squad commanders to company cadres, had to meet once at the headquarters of the village CPV committee, where new troops would be accepted; company commanders, who were also deputy commanders of village military units, were directly in charge of convening these meetings. Squad commanders later were to meet with soldiers

at the home of one of them if the home were convenient and large enough. The battalion's cadres were to take turns attending meetings with companies and squads in order to get to know the situation and to set common leadership directions for all aspects of the work. Once every three months all cadres of the battalion were to meet at the headquarters of the district military organ. Schedules of activities and meetings were uniformly drafted and distributed among party committee echelons and in district and village administrations.

These schedules also included notices on domestic and international events; reviews of the state of implementing the positions and policies and enforcing the laws of the state and locality; and discussions of the measures necessary for maintaining security and order in hamlets and villages, and the relationships of common interest. They particularly contained exchanges of views on production experiences and specialized cadres' articles on the ways to apply science and technology, how to prevent and control epidemic diseases among domestic animals, wide distribution of seeds, breeders, high-yield plant varieties, and so on. As a result, more people became interested and were enrolled as reserve troops, with the numbers of the latter often reaching 90-95 percent of the set goals.

In military training, the RFFM battalion maintained regular and orderly schedules in accordance with the superior authorities' decisions. It organized concentrated training for its infantry companies and branch detachments, with up to 97-100 percent of their troops taking part in it; as to the major training courses, they had the direct assistance and control of cadres from the district and provincial military organs. In actual training, they strictly maintained army discipline and serious learning spirit and attitude among trainees. After the end of every training subject and lesson, there were control and evaluation of results, as well as learning from experience to benefit subsequent subjects and lessons. In 1992, the RFFM battalion received an outstanding-unit score in rifle shooting and during the military competition of the provincial armed forces, in which it participated for the first time, was evaluated as a good unit. The battalion also combined the training periods with organizing masses-proselyting activities in the locations used for its concentrated training and joining with local administrations in building the political base in hamlets and villages. After a period of concentrated training, learning from experience was always organized. Individuals and units having scored good achievements were properly commended and rewarded; those who showed signs of passive behavior, laziness, and poor training quality were sternly criticized and judged.

In 1992, the province issued an urgent order to mobilize two companies in order to judge their actual performance and degree of combat readiness; within 12 hours, they were able to assemble 206 of their 222 troops, or 89.18 percent of their strength, who showed up with full equipment in accordance with staff and equipment regulations. After the number of troops and their equipment

were checked, the battalion organized a 10-kilometer military operation to train the troops in familiarizing themselves with the steps in changing the state of combat. In addition, in other activities, the battalion also selected members and founded an artistic unit, which took part in a mass art festival of the armed forces of Go Cong Tay District and the province in 1992, where the unit won prize A for the subordinate group. The soccer and volleyball teams of the RFFM battalion also scored good achievements in provincial-level sport competitions.

Along with the above-mentioned activities, the battalion also paid attention to building party and youth union organizations. The party members who were working in the villages' security-national defense chapters succeeded in establishing three youth union chapters of reserve troops subordinate to the village youth union chapters.

As to the RFFM battalion's *budget for regular activities*, it mostly was taken care of by the locality, according to the formula of on-the-spot assured spending. Villages were to assure financing all periodic monthly meetings and activities. For the activities and learning of all cadres of the battalion organized in the district military organ, the spending came from the district's budget. The training expenses annually set by regulation were taken care of by the province, with spending for each company ranging from 12 to 15 days and amounting to 8-12 million dong. In addition, the companies organized their own fund raising and collected money from reserve troops, who would contribute according to their means, to cover necessary spending, such as aiding needy families and participating in social welfare projects in hamlets and villages.

On the basis of this model of building the RFFM battalion in Go Cong Tay District, Tien Giang issued guidelines to all districts advising them to adopt it and to build their own battalion, and thus helped the province to properly manage the RFFM and to gradually stabilize the task of making preparations for army mobilization.

In order to gradually overcome the decline in the sources of mobilized troops due to a reduction of the size of the permanent force, a decrease in the annual numbers of enrolled troops, a loss of reserve troops resulting from discharges based on health conditions, age, and so on, Tien Giang organized, maintained, and enlarged the models of economic-national defense units and thus created regular sources that would continue to reinforce the RFFM units. The fact that all soldiers in the economic-national defense units received military training and were trained in discipline and in having a way of living and behavior suitable for the military region's annual unified training program allowed the province to do good-quality work in creating sources of mobilized troops, to properly satisfy its needs, and to fulfill its task. Each year Tien Giang had nearly 1,500 reserve troops who had been discharged from economic-national defense units and now moved into the locality and were

switched to a reserve status. This fact affirmed that Tien Giang's model of economic-national defense units was a new direction that was being really effective, in terms of both economic and national defense effects.

From the realities of the building and management of the RFFM's activities many issues, both urgent and long-term, are raised and need to be studied and resolved in a total and scientific manner so that the province could satisfy the need for making preparations for army mobilization in accordance with the ministry's projects and plans.

The biggest problem now encountered by Tien Giang, as well as by the southern provinces, is the registration, management, and building of mobilized units in accordance with the ministry's "tron khau" [full-circle link] formula as dictated in the assigned goal and plan. According to this formula, the ministry's permanent frame has now been either dissolved or made smaller, and there no longer exist such activities as second inspection, registration, and management of sources in accordance with the common plan. The relationships between the units that are beneficiaries of mobilization sources and the localities have been virtually terminated. Local military organs, meanwhile, do not have staff cadres in charge assigned from the mobilization frame. There is a total lack of the group of reserve officers who can ensure staffing at the battalion and regimental levels in the localities when mobilization comes. As for those cadres and officers who have been demobilized and have retired due to implementation of state policies and have been forced to return to the localities for one reason or another, because they are no longer eagerly interested in their old task and because there are no new policies and procedures for them, this group exerts no effects on the mobilization work. The military region's permanent frame, whose members are regularly scheduled to come only once a month to the district military organ and from there to go to villages to do inspection, is also unable to know exactly the number of reserve military personnel it is in charge of. As to the sources of reserve military personnel, even the localities often are unable to manage them because of complicated changes in the market economy. The RFFM units that have been organized in accordance with the Go Cong Tay District model still encounter obstacles in regard to organizing activities in connection with the party and mass organizations.

On the basis of the above-mentioned issues, we would like to present the following resolution:

—It is necessary to restore and keep the permanent frames; if we are not going to restore all of them, we should keep them at least in the southern provinces. The reason is that the number of reserve officers in the southern provinces today is very small; it is thus impossible to satisfy the need for making preparations for army mobilization. If we do not keep any permanent frames, we must have plans for arranging to have cadres "piled up" in local military organs just like in

the main-force binh doan [corps] so that when necessary we can use them in accordance with the "no noi" [rice rising in the pot] formula.

- If the district level were assigned the task of building and managing a regiment in accordance with the "full-circle link" formula devised by the ministry, the command of this regiment should serve as deputy commanders of the district's military command; the regiment's cadres should be assigned the position of provincial or district assistants; and company cadres should be sent to villages to serve as deputy commanders of their military units.
- The local military schools of the provinces and military administration schools of the military regions must have plans for training reserve officers as future sources of mobilization because there currently is a very serious shortage of these officers as compared to the need for staffing RFFM units.
- It is necessary to study the need for restoring the system of doing army mobilization work in state organs, committees, and sectors, such as departments 1, sections 1, offices 1, and so on. The reason is that this system is necessary to allow making preparations for mobilization within the framework of the general plan for the national economy.
- We propose that the state and Ministry of National Defense consider issuing at early dates supplementary legal documents, such as regulations on registration for military service and registration for management of technical means benefiting the national economy. We propose as another necessity that the National Assembly consider and promulgate a law on wartime army mobilization.

Training of College Reserve Officers Examined
932E0076A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Jun 93 pp 36-39

[Article by Colonel Engineer Le Ke Lam: "Training of Reserve Officers on College Campuses—Problems and Resolution"]

[Text] Our nation's history of national construction and defense, particularly the experience learned from the recent wars of national liberation and for defense of the fatherland have proved that, in order to firmly defend our national sovereignty and independence, we must build a strong all-people national defense, the core of which is the three-component armed forces consisting of the main-force troops, local troops, and militia and self-defense forces. Under peacetime conditions, considering in a general manner the evolving trend of the era, the country's real socioeconomic situation, and the ability to ensure the army's combat strength, and taking into account the experiences of other nations in the world and in our region, our party and state have adopted a policy aimed at building up the people's army to appropriate strength and in the direction of becoming

revolutionary, regular, well-trained, and gradually modernized, with a large reserve force for mobilization, the core of which is well-trained and well-managed reserve officers (RO) who, when necessary, can be quickly mobilized in accordance with our plans. The question we have to raise today is that we must pay proper attention to the RO force and particularly consider in a more serious manner the role of an RO force having great scientific and technical capabilities so as to have the right strategy for its training.

We can affirm that to train students during their studies at colleges and institutions of higher learning in order to regularly reinforce the RO force is a long-term strategic move in which we must have appropriate investment. First of all, this is a source of RO who have great scientific and technical capabilities, are the most numerous group, and belong to an age group that allows them to remain in the RO, class-1 staff long enough to be mobilized when necessary and to be a regular source of supply of new scientific knowledges and potential gray matter for the army. The basic point here is the fact that if they are further trained in the military knowledges needed, members of this group will have the ability to satisfy properly and in time the needs of a future war involving advanced weapons and industry, new strategic views on "soft weapons," "antisystem systems," and so on. Moreover, by this training, we will go one step further toward implementing the policy on "combined training," training in accordance with the "open system," and on "diversification" of the use of cadres in conformity with the needs of the realities in the country's peacetime setting.

In recent years, although the organs in charge made a lot of effort and obtained tangible results, the training of RO among students of colleges and institutions of higher learning generally revealed many problems that we must study and correct:

1. The subjects of training were poor and lacked balance. We only concentrated on training students in the basic movements of soldiers, the use of individual weapons, and infantry strategy. In short, they had only the most basic and minimal knowledge of officers at the detachment level. That training was necessary, but it was extremely insufficient in terms of allowing them to adapt to actual work positions after being inducted into the army. The reason was that they could only develop in an effective manner the specialized capabilities they had acquired when they were in the position of technical commanding officers and in appropriate sectors and occupations. But, in the meantime, they lacked the necessary and minimal knowledges in regard to strategy, specialized military techniques, and the use of equipment for military purposes, and particularly the necessary knowledge to develop a military and national defense thinking and to combine national defense with economic matters in order to put them to use right away while working in different fields of the national economy.

2. If wars were to take place in the future, they would unfold at an extremely urgent pace. War situations would change in a very fast and complicated manner; with a vast combat space, the use of weapons and technical equipment would have to be effected under the conditions of the enemy using a series of measures aimed at electronic interference, destruction, deceitful tactical maneuvers, and so on. This would require our technical commanding officers to have the necessary military knowledge and to be extremely responsive and flexible in dealing with the situation so as to take correct decisions, to develop weapon and equipment efficiency, and to neutralize the enemy's modern equipment and weapons. Our RO were not yet given these extremely necessary knowledges. In our opinion, the problem that needs to be resolved has been the fact that although so much knowledge had to be taught, the time devoted to training was short, and that we have not yet been really interested in fully resolving this contradiction.

3. Due to staff organization limitations, almost all of the cadres who were in charge of teaching the new military subjects were only concerned about the more common ones, for many of them had not even been in college, had a limited knowledge of science and industry, and in some cases even lacked the necessary knowledge of the military campaign art and tactics, particularly at a time when combat formulas were changing because the structure and types of our weapons were lagging behind the development of science and industry and when the enemy's equipment has become more and more modern. We need to emphasize that *to fight with what we have at the present time is very much different from fighting with what we had in the war of liberation 20 years ago*. We must consider this fact as we invest in the body of cadres in charge of training RO in our colleges.

4. The organization of RO training in colleges was not really appropriate. Training that was concentrated in two to three months at the end of the students' program of studies caused fatigue for those who had been studying for five or six years. As for teachers, because they had to teach with a high degree of intensity and monotony, they themselves found a lesser degree of pleasure in teaching and little ability to recommend measures for improving the teaching and learning methods, hence the organization of the forms of learning suitable for combat activities was limited. As a result, the quality of training was not good and the ability to respond to realistic needs still was poor.

In order to gradually improve the RO training program for college students, our school has been exchanging ideas with a number of institutions of higher learning and colleges, mainly those schools that have training specialties in connection with the Navy, such as the Maritime and Marine Products College, within the framework of our program of combined training in this field. In our opinion, if the RO who come from the college student source are to satisfy all realistic needs, there must be a real renovation of their training, and this can be achieved as follows:

1. The training of RO must be carried out on the basis of a long-term general plan for building the reserve force and for wartime mobilization. Although this is not a new task, the training subjects and measures must be based on drafting wartime mobilization plans for different periods and determining the numbers of RO to be mobilized for the different arms and branches of service, and in accordance with various specialized and technical sectors and occupations, so that we have an idea about how many student to use and from which schools. Next, the Ministries of National Defense and of Education and Training assign goals to each school and coordinate their work to provide it with guidelines for organizing fulfillment of these goals. Only by so doing can we, when necessary, have a body of cadres large enough and ensure its quality and a balance among various specializations and occupations.

2. From the above-mentioned plan, in regard to drafting RO training programs there must be a close coordination among officers' schools and colleges. The arms and branches of service that will be using RO must be responsible for coordinating their work with the colleges concerned in drafting programs and taking part in the training, and consider it a part of the combined training program. The subjects having to do with the military science must be considered compulsory, in conformity to the way we now manage training through course sections and curriculums aimed at raising students' responsibility. The present grading method using only a military score reflects simplification, if not underestimation of these subjects.

3. About organization of training, if we let the military department of each school take care of training in its own school, we believe that we cannot resolve the contradiction between the excessively large number of subjects to be offered to divide up RO in accordance with the needs of their use and the limited number of teachers. We would like to propose two organization plans: *One*, let us keep the military departments of the schools but have only a reasonable number of teachers enough to take care of teaching a basic military knowledge to RO at the small detachment level; other subjects will be taken care of by the officers' schools of the arms and branches of service that will be using RO, in accordance with contracts signed in advance for each school year. *Two*, on the basis of the general plan for RO training and division of geographic regions, let us *establish RO training frames, the administrative management of which will be taken care of by the officers' schools or colleges*. The cadre departments, mobilization organizations, and schools will provide professional guidelines and take care of training for a cluster of schools. The cadres who manage these training frames, along with the colleges, must be responsible for drafting plans and assigning work to those cadres being specialized in military sectors in conformity to the training needs of each school cluster. This organizing method will reduce the cadres' staff and at the same time increase flexibility in the organization of training.

4. Let us give concentrated training in basic military knowledge to officers at the detachment level only in their third year (in the four-year training system) and in the first year of phase II (in the five-year system). Other military subjects should be spread evenly in subsequent years just like the schools' specialized subjects. This even spread *will create no excessive work load for students and training cadres*, use military teachers with greater effectiveness, and avoid the situation of sometimes too little work and sometimes too much pressure that exists today.

5. To merge army schools into the national educational system does not solely mean to raise the capacity of organizing the college-level phase of training in the officers' schools up to the common standard, but a very basic requirement is the fact that the national educational system must operate harmoniously to serve the goal of building and defending the socialist fatherland. Let us train cadres for the economic construction, but we must also pay proper attention to the need for defending the fatherland. For this reason, we wonder whether *we need some coordination so that colleges would divide the work and require some students to write essays and to draw blueprints for their graduation regarding military and national defense topics. Or to deal with additional topics regarding a switch of civilian plans to military purposes when necessary.* In fact, this is a very useful measure to improve the specialized capabilities of teachers in the officers' schools, and at the same time, when there is a war, even to mobilize and put into the army civilian specialists having great capabilities but being not members of the RO force.

6. We need to firmly carry out the plan that requires sending RO every year to army units for them to practice military work in accordance with the common plan and to directly exercise their rights and obligation as citizens in the defense of the fatherland (because the majority of students have had deferment of the draft). And the main thing is to let RO become more and more familiar with the position that they will hold later (if we let them wait until a bad situation occurs, we are afraid it will be too late).

7. We need to organize periodic professional training for cadres of military departments and military frames in the officers' schools and institutes on the basis of their specializations to allow them to update their military knowledges (perhaps once every two years). At the same time, let us organize seminars on nationwide RO training in order to perfect the plans for training RO not only at the time they are still college students but also while they do regular work in state organs.

8. We propose that the state institutionalize the party policies on training of RO and turn them into instruments of the law and nonlegal documents to allow localities, installations, and citizens to implement them in a serious and highly effective manner.

The role of the body of RO having great specialized technical capabilities is becoming larger and larger. The main source of supply for the training of this force is college students. We therefore have just set forth some thoughts aimed at gradually improving our training plans and using this RO force in an effective manner.