

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, R.I. 02840  
9 November, 1974

Dear Admiral Zumwalt,

The purpose of my writing is to solicit your views on an organizational development issue that occurred during your tenure as CNO. I am a student in the Command and Staff Course here at the Naval War College, and my aim is to develop a case study that can be used by the school as a teaching device.

Students of management theorize that one of the ways to overcome the effects of bureaucratic inertia is to create project management centers with broad charters to solve the problem at hand. The specific issue I am addressing in my study is the creation of OP-093 to solve the TEMP/ASMD problems of the Navy. In my research so far I seem to be coming to the conclusion that OP-093 may have created more problems than it solved. The evidence for this lies in the persistence of OP-093, the reluctance of OPNAV to "buy" the program, and the deviseiveness among the Admirals in OPNAV on the ASMD question. When VADM Bardshar retired he was replaced by a frocked RADM (C. Ward Cummings), and the organization was absorbed into OP-95 (954). At the same time there was a shift in emphasis from EW to Hard-Kill. When Admiral Cummings left OPNAV, the remains of OP-954 were further spread throughout OPNAV. Now, organizationally speaking, we are in the same position now as we were in 1969.

I would appreciate very much Admiral, your views as to the rise and fall of OP-093. Why it was needed, did it help or hinder you, did it accomplish anything, and why it was disbanded? I will, of course, follow a non-attribution policy for any remarks you extend to me personally, and will not quote you directly without your authorization.

I feel certain that the Navy will be faced with problems of a similar nature in the future, and that there may be some lessons to be learned from the OP-093 experience. For information I am including a list of questions which I hope to develop in my case.

I would appreciate very much any help you can give me on this.

Very respectfully,

*Kenton W. Van Lue*

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LCDR US NAVY

*I will be delighted, of course, to furnish you with a copy of the completed study even if you choose not to comment. I hope to finish this up sometime early in December.*  
*KWL*

### OP-093 Post-mortem

1. Reasons for the existing(pre OP-093) organizational structure to be ineffective.
2. Why was a special organization formed?
3. Why a three-star position?
4. What was the Charter, and was it followed?
5. Were the objectives and missions clearly stated, and did the TEMP organization and the CNO see them as one and the same?
6. Did OP-093 fail, or is the Navy better off now than it would have been without OP-093?
7. Would the Navy have been better off without a special TEMP office?
8. What specifically, if anything, did OP-093 accomplish?
9. Why was the organization downgraded to a junior two-star position (OP-954) and then to no position at all.
10. Did the very nature of EW (the special technical knowledge skills of people in the business, and the secrecy of the EW process) play any part in the life-cycle of OP-093?
11. What part did the seniority of the TEMP director play?
12. What were the key decisions and who made them?
  - a. to include ASMD as part of TEMP.
  - b. to push EW.
  - c. to push Hard-kill.
  - d. to adopt the 2-3-3 plan.
13. Did OP-093 self-distruct?
  - a. the impact of personalities.
  - b. the players and their positions.
14. Are there any principles of organization or lessons to be learned from this?

21 November 1974

Dear Kenton,

With regard to your letter of 9 November concerning the rise and fall of OP-093, it is very difficult to sort out all of the inputs that went into the fall. The rise is rather easy to describe.

The rise was the result of a conviction that a number of us had that ASMD had been neglected too long, and we simply had to give it emphasis in the OPNAV scheme of things in order to ensure that it was placed at a high enough level and given the impetus to be put properly into focus in the budgeting process.

The "fall" was the result of the following factors:

1. Personalities involved.
2. The unions (submarine, aviation, and surface) found it in some ways easier to neglect a separate program than they had when they were personally responsible.
3. The downward pressure to receive billet reductions in all headquarters staffs.
4. The scarcity of funds with which to support it.

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5. The evolution of the theory that OP-95 ought to become more and more the overall "sea control" czar which required him to deal with the ASMD part of the equation as well as the ASW.

I think you might get more definitive rationale if you contact the several VCNO's who wrestled along with the details of the organization more than I did, but I think you will find that it all boils down to the above.

In any event, the ASMD question is still an area of significant weakness on the part of the Navy and one which is going to require great attention from whatever organizational position over the years.

Best of luck in your research.

Sincerely,

E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.

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