

**UNION OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS**

JUN 02 1995

May 30, 1995


Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Admiral Zumwalt & Consultant, Inc.
1500 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Admiral Zumwalt,

I am writing to you today because my organization, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Council for a Livable World are together collecting signatures for the enclosed statement supporting UN peacekeeping in the face of isolationist attacks. The statement will be circulated to the White House and Congress, the media, and to local organizations with the list of signers. We are hoping that it will demonstrate widespread support among opinion leaders for strengthening the U.N.'s ability to resolve conflicts.

Although I am sure you have signed on to others, this statement would not be complete without your signature, so I hope you can subscribe to it.

Most sincerely,



Jonathan Dean
Advisor for International
Security Issues

*MFR 6-12-95 5PM
Called to see if you would sign on*

enclosures

**SIGNATORIES TO STATEMENT ON U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS
(May 30, 1995)**

Ruth Adams

Director, Program on Peace and International Cooperation, MacArthur Foundation (ret.)

Jack Scheinkman

President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union

Charles D. Gray

International Affairs Director

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

Eugene T. Rossides

Chairman, American Hellenic Institute

David Beckmann

President, Bread for the World

Barry Blechman

Chairman, The Henry L. Stimson Center*

Robert L. Borosage

Director, Campaign for New Priorities

Rev. Drew Christiansen

S.J., Director, Office of International Justice & Peace, U.S. Catholic Conference

Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan

Director, Center for Defense Information

William Goodfellow

Executive Director, Center for International Policy

Douglas M. Johnston

Vice President, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Marguerite Belisle

General Director, Church Women United

Morton Bahr

President, Communications Workers of America

John Isaacs

President, Council for a Livable World Education Fund

(over)

Chic Dambach
President, National Peace Corps Association*

Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean
former arms control negotiator, Department of State*

Alice Slater
Executive Director, Economists Allied for Arms Reduction

Jeremy J. Stone
President, Federation of American Scientists

Evelyn P. Foote
Brigadier General, U.S. Army (ret.)

Joe Volk
Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation

Maurice S. Paprin
President, Fund for New Priorities in America

Gerald Mische
President, Global Education Association

Richard Hahnen
President, Global Security Research Institute

Barbara Green
Associate for Peace and Africa Issues, Presbyterian Church/USA*

Randall Forsberg
Executive Director, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies

Charles H. Norchi
Executive Director, International League for Human Rights

Rev. Peter J. Klink, S.J.
Director, National Office, Jesuit Social Ministries

John B. Kidd
Major General, U.S. Air Force (ret.)

Becky Cain
President, League of Women Voters of the United States

Ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard
former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1977-79)

Rev. Charles S. Miller
Executive Director, Division for Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

I.M. Destler
Director, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland

Charles W. Maynes
former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations (1977-1980)*

John A. Lapp
Executive Director, Mennonite Central Committee

Gregory A. Bischak
Executive Director, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament

Rita Greenwald
President, National Council of Catholic Women

Rev. Dr. Joan Brown Campbell
Secretary General, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Kathy Thornton RSM
National Coordinator, NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

Janne E. Nolan
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution*

Ambassador (ret.) Robert S. Oakley
former Special Envoy to Somalia
Visiting Fellow, National Defense University

Charolett Rhoads
President, Pax World Service

Dr. Robert K. Musil
Director, Policy & Programs, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Victoria Markell
Vice President, Population Action International

Caleb Rossiter
Director, Project on Demilitarization and Democracy

Dr. Michael Wessels
President, Psychologists for Social Responsibility

Michael Renner
Senior Researcher, Worldwatch Institute*

Sam Harris
Executive Director, RESULTS

(over)

Jane M.O. Sharp
Director, Defence and Security Programme, Institute for Public Policy Research, King's College

Judith Sloan
Director, Asia Society*

John D. Stempel
Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy & International Commerce, University of Kentucky*

Julia Taft
President, InterAction*

Howard Ris
Executive Director, Union of Concerned Scientists

John A. Buehrens
President, Unitarian Universalist Association

Anna Rhee
Executive Secretary for Public Policy, Womens Division, United Methodist Church

Thomas B. Morgan
President & CEO, United Nations Association of the United States of America

Roger P. Winter
Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Jerry Genesisio
Executive Director, Veterans for Peace

Imani Countess
Executive Director, Washington Office on Africa

George R. Vickers
Executive Director, Washington Office on Latin America

Susan Shaer
Executive Director, Women's Action for New Directions

Edith Villastrigo
National Legislative Director, Women Strike for Peace

John B. Anderson
President, World Federalists Association

Gaddis Smith
Director, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University

*affiliation for identification purposes only

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations is playing an increasingly critical role in preventing and resolving conflicts that have broken out across the globe. We welcome this expanded mission envisioned in the original U.N. charter but impeded by the Cold War. While the U.N. has not proved a panacea, it has achieved remarkable successes in countries such as Namibia, El Salvador and Cambodia.

International peacekeeping is not an altruistic endeavor; it directly serves U.S. security, political and commercial interests. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright said in June 1993: *"Whether measured in arms proliferation, refugees on our shores, the destabilization of allies, or loss of exports, the cost of runaway regional conflicts sooner or later comes home to America. In 1993, the U.N. will spend over \$3 billion to stem or stop those conflicts, and we will pay one third of that. But without the U.N. both the costs and the conflict would be far greater."*

However, the fate of peace operations hangs in the balance, in part due to crippling funding shortfalls and decreasing national political support for the United Nations as it seeks to reform and to meet new challenges. Although the U.N. is often a first line of crisis response overseas, the United States and other nations consistently fall behind in paying dues and peacekeeping assessments. These overdue bills cripple the U.N.'s ability to respond rapidly to crises and to implement needed reforms. In addition, Congressional critics have singled out U.N. peace operations as a vehicle for expressing their dissatisfaction with broader issues, from the defense budget and military readiness to U.S. interests abroad, and have sought to curtail already limited participation of U.S. armed forces in U.N. peace operations.

We endorse multilateral, burden-sharing approaches to preventing and resolving conflicts. In particular, we support strengthening the United Nations' ability to conduct peace operations. To encourage these approaches, we strongly urge the United States and all nations to pay on time their dues and peacekeeping assessments, and to pay all their arrearages to the United Nations. The United States must avoid the costs and dangers of a unilateral role as world policeman.

A policy that provides only weak financial and political support for peacekeeping jeopardizes the United Nations' long-term future. If the U.N. is not given the resources and encouragement to improve its capabilities, confidence in it will be undermined. The world community will have sacrificed the chance to establish a truly effective multilateral peacekeeping process, with emphasis on conflict prevention. The world will become more dangerous, to the detriment of our own security.

We should take advantage of the post-Cold War situation and apply the lessons of peacekeeping from the past several years to reform and expand U.N. peace operations and make them more effective. Peace operations, which give the U.S. an opportunity to help in

reducing the worldwide level of armed violence with minimum risk and cost, are squarely in our national interest.

(name of individual) _____

(Title, if appropriate) _____

(Name of organization, if appropriate) _____

Please sign and return to either:

Victoria Holt
Project on Peacekeeping and the United Nations
Council for a Livable World Education Fund
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Suite 409
Washington, DC 20002

or Jennifer Weeks
Washington Representative
Union of Concerned Scientists
1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 310
Washington, DC 20036

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

June 1, 1998

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, USN, ret.
FAX: 703-528-5795

Dear Admiral Zumwalt,

Following on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, my organization, the Union of Concerned Scientists, is organizing a letter to all members of the U.S. Senate requesting rapid Senate action to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The letter is being endorsed by a group of prominent scientists and senior military officers.


We believe the fact that India and Pakistan have each conducted five new nuclear weapons tests requires a renewed push for treaty ratification with the Senate. To be frank, we think it necessary for real impact on the Senate that you and other former senior officers endorse this letter as well as prominent scientists. Unless we can regenerate some momentum for ratification after the damage from the Indian and Pakistani tests, the long-term prospects both for the CTBT and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself will be uncertain.

We need to get the CTBT in force to provide us the assurance that other nations are not testing either and also to provide a treaty framework for Indian and Pakistani restraint.

We realize you receive many requests for your assistance. However, we believe the national security component in this request is very large.

The enclosed letter to the Senate contains the names of people who are willing that their names be used to endorse it. Would you be willing for us to add your name to this list? Please let me know as soon as you can.

Sincerely,



Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues

fax'd 6-3-98
Fax to Jonathan
yes
Red Zumwalt

Enclosure

Washington Office: 1616 P Street NW Suite 810 • Washington, DC 20036-1488 • 202-332-0900 • FAX: 202-332-0906
Cambridge Headquarters: Two Brattle Square • Cambridge, MA 02238-9105 • 617-547-5652 • FAX: 617-864-9405
California Office: 2397 Shattuck Avenue Suite 203 • Berkeley, CA 94704-1587 • 510-843-1872 • FAX: 510-843-3785

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Sincerely,



Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean
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Fax to Jonathan
yes
Red Zumwalt

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California Office: 2397 Shattuck Avenue Suite 203 • Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 • 510-843-1872 • FAX: 510-843-3785

DRAFT June 1, 1998. **Embargoed until Thursday, June 4.**

Dear Senator:

As people with a long involvement with nuclear weapons and their implications for national security, we urge you to actively support rapid ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests strengthen the case for decisive Senate action. This important Treaty, signed by the five "original" nuclear weapon states and 144 other nations, would prohibit nuclear explosive testing for all time and thus would be a central part of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to American security today; ratification will strongly reinforce our efforts to manage this problem and thus enhance the national security interests of the United States.

Now more than ever, it is crucial for the United States to send the clearest possible message that nuclear testing is not legitimate and will not be tolerated by the international community. This message is relevant not only to South Asia but to any nation that may consider following India and Pakistan's example. Moreover, the CTBT would help defuse tensions in South Asia by limiting weapons development and a possible regional nuclear arms race.

For its part, the United States does not need nuclear explosive testing to maintain its nuclear deterrent. The Department of Energy's Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program will sustain high confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile over the long term. The capabilities of our existing nuclear weapons more than meet all military requirements, and there is no justification for postponing CTBT ratification until every element of the Stewardship Program is in place. A 1995 report by the JASON group of nuclear weapons experts, some of whom are among the signers below, concluded that the U.S. nuclear arsenal can be maintained under a CTBT of unlimited duration that includes a standard supreme national interest clause, as this Treaty does.

The Treaty augments our capability to detect nuclear explosions of military significance because it establishes an international monitoring system and allows for challenge on-site inspections to clarify ambiguous events. Although US intelligence did not predict the Indian nuclear tests, the CTBT monitoring system is charged to detect militarily significant nuclear explosions after the fact, not before. India's first test series was clearly detected by the provisional CTBT monitoring system, as were Pakistan's. India's second series of tests was reported to be very small and was below the monitoring threshold. Such tests, which are not significant in terms of U.S. national security, cannot be monitored with high confidence. The Indian and Pakistani tests support the conclusion that no would-be violator could be confident that a nuclear explosion of sufficient yield to threaten US security would escape detection.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests are a wake-up call for those who question the importance of the CTBT to US security. The US must take the lead in locking in the test ban regime before other nations follow India and Pakistan's path. But without the advice and consent of the Senate, the Treaty cannot go into force and the benefits of the verification system cannot be fully achieved. In the interest of U.S. national security, the United States Senate must consent to ratification of the CTBT without delay.

Sincerely,

Dr. Hans Bethe
Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell University; head of the Manhattan Project's theoretical division

Adm. William Crowe
US Navy, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Dr. Freeman Dyson
Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Dr. Richard Garwin
Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; IBM Fellow Emeritus; consultant to the Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos National Laboratory

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster
US Army, former Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Dr. Henry Kendall
Nobel Laureate; Professor of Physics, MIT; Chairman of the Board, Union of Concerned Scientists

Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University; Recipient of National Medal of Science and Lawrence and Fermi Awards of the Department of Energy

Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan
Professor of Physics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Adm. Stansfield Turner
US Navy, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Herbert F. York
Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of California, San Diego; founding director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

**UNION OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS**

File U

July 7, 1999

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, USN, ret.
FAX: 703-528-5795

Dear Admiral Zumwalt,

Thank you for agreeing to sign the letter on the CTBT to the U.S. Senate; I have attached the final product as it will be delivered on Friday.

There is a very real possibility that the letter will receive *New York Times* coverage on either Sunday, August 1 or Monday, August 2. I will forward this coverage when available.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues

File

Washington Office: 1010 P Street NW Suite 310 • Washington, DC 20020-1405 • 202-332-0000 • FAX: 202-332-0005
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Web: <http://www.ucsus.org>

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

July 30, 1999

The Honorable Trent Lott
United States Senate
487 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-2403

ATTENTION: Defense Aide

RE: Chinese Espionage and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Dear Senator Lott:

In response to reports of Chinese nuclear espionage, Congress is considering important steps to reduce the risk of future spying. In the Senate, strong measures, such as a semi-autonomous agency inside the Energy Department with limited scope and a strong security component, have been approved. But preventing future losses of sensitive information is not sufficient. Congress must also seek to prevent information that has already been lost from damaging US and global security.

In our judgement, there is one essential step—which only the Senate can take—which would greatly help to protect the United States against the weaponization of stolen nuclear secrets: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Whatever information on thermonuclear weapons China may have obtained, it is implausible that Beijing would deploy weapons that incorporate this information without first conducting nuclear explosive tests outlawed by the CTBT. China signed the CTBT and has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1996. But the treaty cannot enter into force—and the verification system cannot be fully implemented—until the US Senate provides its advice and consent to the President.

The report of the House Select Committee led by Rep. Chris Cox states that "If [China] violates the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by testing surreptitiously, it could further accelerate its nuclear development." An even more serious problem is that without the CTBT, China would be entitled to conduct nuclear tests openly and make gains that could in no way be redressed by the resumption of testing by the United States.

The Senate has the power to help prevent this from happening. With the CTBT in force and its verification system fully operational, China and other nations would be unable to conduct clandestine nuclear tests of even the triggers for smaller and lighter thermonuclear warheads for use on long-range ballistic missiles. This is the central security value of the CTBT, and one that the Senate cannot afford to ignore.

We may never know whether Chinese nuclear weapons development benefited significantly from espionage. According to the April 21 Damage Assessment prepared by the US Intelligence

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Community and reviewed by an independent panel chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah, "China's technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with US and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified US weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined."

Even if China did acquire detailed design information on sophisticated nuclear weapons, there is no basis to assume that China would field a warhead based on this information without new nuclear tests. As Dr. Harold Agnew, former director of Los Alamos Scientific (now National) Laboratory, observed: "If China doesn't resume testing, no harm will possibly have been done other than to our egos." Computer simulations alone cannot provide confidence that a new thermonuclear weapon will perform properly, and the more sophisticated the design the greater the need for explosive tests.

The likelihood that other countries with relatively little nuclear weapons experience are involved in spying makes the case for the CTBT still more compelling. Nuclear explosive testing would be more important to nations that do not already have sophisticated, well-tested designs, than it is now for China.

Nuclear proliferation—aided by espionage or not—is one of the greatest threats to American security. US ratification and entry-into-force of the CTBT will greatly strengthen the nation's ability to contain this threat, and thus enhance the national security interests of the United States.

Sincerely,

Dr. Hans Bethe
Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell University;
Head of the Manhattan Project's theoretical division

Dr. Freeman Dyson
Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Dr. Richard Garwin
Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; IBM Fellow
Emeritus; consultant to the Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos
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Dr. Kurt Gottfried
Professor of Physics, Cornell University; Chairman of the Board, Union of Concerned Scientists

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July 30, 1999

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Affiliations for identification purposes only

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FAX: 703-528-5795

Dear Admiral Zumwalt,

We are still trying to get the U.S. Senate to act in ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Last year, you added your signature to a joint letter based on the need to ratify the CTBT in order to limit the damage from the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Now, we are sending a new letter to all senators based on the Cox Report. Six prominent scientists have already signed. We would like to include some senior military officers and would like to ask you to add your name. We intend to forward the letter by the end of July. The text is enclosed.

Sincerely,



Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues

fax 7-16-99

Fax to Jonathan Dean

You have my permission to add my name



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The report of the House Select Committee led by Rep. Chris Cox states that "If the PRC [People's Republic of China] violates the [CTBT] by testing surreptitiously, it could further accelerate its nuclear development." The Senate has the power to help prevent this from happening. With the CTBT in force and its verification system fully operational, China and other nations would be unable to conduct clandestine nuclear tests of smaller and lighter thermonuclear warheads for use on long-range ballistic missiles. This is the central security value of the CTBT, and one that the Senate cannot afford to ignore. Without the CTBT, China could test overtly—making gains that in no way could be redressed by a resumption of testing by the United States.

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