

**ANTI-DEFENSE POSITIONS OF
CERTAIN U.S. ORGANIZATIONS**

**PREPARED FOR MEMBERS OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY SPEAKERS BUREAU
BY
THE LIBRARY STAFF
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL FOUNDATION**

NOVEMBER 1982

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

Positions Taken on U.S. Defense Posture

B-1 Bomber "The B-1 is an extravagance that the U.S. cannot afford at a time when hard choices must be made throughout the defense budget... By 1980, without the proposed B-1, the U.S. will have over 12,000 nuclear weapons on nuclear-powered submarines, land-based missiles, and long-range bombers. The B-1 is not needed for our strategic deterrent /sic/... Deterrence is now provided by more reliable, less vulnerable, and less costly Minuteman ICBMs and Poseidon/Polaris submarine-based missiles. In an era when missiles can reach their targets in 30 minute, bombers that take eight hours can only play a relatively minor role."

Defense Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1975.

Cruise Missiles "There is no persuasive military rationale for long-range cruise missiles... And because cruise missiles are no faster than bombers, neither is likely ever to be needed in a nuclear war dominated by ICBMs."

Defense Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 7, 1976.

ICBMs "Move all U.S.-based nuclear weapons, those Soviet aim-points, as we call them, to sea in ships and submarines."

Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No. 4, 1979,
"The Obsolete ICBM"

MX "All our /existing Minuteman and Titan/ ICBMs could survive a Soviet surprise attack if launched within 30 minutes of the initial Soviet volley... Our submarine force is nearly invulnerable. In peacetime, 60 percent of our submarines are on station and their 3000 nuclear weapons cannot be detected, identified and destroyed."

Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No. 9, 1979.

"the MX may actually increase risk of nuclear war... The proposed MX system is dangerous, costly and manpower intensive. We don't need it, we may not be able to afford it, and we should not build it."

Defense Monitor, Vol. X, No. 6, 1981

No-First-Use "The image of the U.S. is one of a certain recklessness, with regard to the first use of nuclear weapons while the Soviets appear to be more measured and rational. The U.S. declaration of no-first-use could test the Soviets' sincerity."

Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1982.

Civil Defense "The active pursuit of and belief in a civil defense program of significant size will increase the likelihood of nuclear war."

Defense Monitor, XI, No. 5, 1982.

Chemical Warfare "The defense of the U.S. and its military forces will not be enhanced by more chemical weapons."
Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 10, 1980.

Space "...our obsession with fancy technology should not blind us to the long-run disadvantages of an anti-satellite arms race." Further, "The U.S. and the Soviet Union should move quickly ahead on a treaty to limit anti-satellite weapons."

Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, Number 9, 1980

Soviet Expansionism "Soviet foreign involvement has to a large extent been shaped by indigenous conditions and the Soviets have been unable to command loyalty or obedience... Temporary Soviet successes in backward countries have proved costly to the Soviet Union. They provide no justification for American alarmism or military intervention."
Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1980.

Persian Gulf "No threat to the U.S. exists that could provide the justification for going to war for oil... The use of military forces will not insure foreign oil supplies."

Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1979.

Conclusions

From the above examples and numerous others, it is quite obvious that the Center for Defense Information exists primarily to induce the American public and the Congress to accept a minimal defense posture, by opposing quite literally all proposed new major weapons systems. This is done by the device of attacking each such system piecemeal, one at a time, and declaring it unnecessary because other existing systems are adequate to do the job. But a review of all CDI literature shows that at one time or another CDI's analysts have condemned them all. Thus, cruise missiles are not needed because they are no faster than bombers, and ICBMs can take care of our needs anyway. Then, in another issue of CDI's Defense Monitor, we are told to scrap all land-based systems, that sea-launched missiles are all we need. This intellectually dishonest approach is well illustrated by a table printed in the Defense Monitor Vol. X, No. 3 for 1981:

"List of Unjustified Nuclear Weapons Programs"

	Requested fiscal 1982
MX	\$3.0 billion
Trident submarine	\$1.6 "
New manned bomber /B-1B/	\$2.5 "
Trident II missile	\$243 million
Ground-launched cruise missile	\$532 "
Sea-launched cruise missile	\$391 "
Anti-ballistic missile defense	\$439 "