



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350

5730 IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 906D2/5U326605
15 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

Subj: CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Ref: (a) OLA memo LA-56-228 of 8 April 1985

Encl: (1) Information on House Budget Committee Hearing of 28
March 1985

1. Reference (a) forwarded a request from ADM Zumwalt, USN (Ret.) for a review of testimony presented before the House Budget Committee on 28 March 1985.
2. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in response to this request for delivery to ADM Zumwalt.

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William E. Kelley", is written over the typed name.

WILLIAM E. KELLEY
By direction of Director
General Planning &
Programming Division

Copy to: (w/o enclosure)
OP-090
OP-90
OP-91A



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO

16 April 1985

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN, Retired
Systems Planning Corporation
1500 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Admiral Zumwalt:

I am forwarding some comments in rebuttal to the testimony and statement given by Rear Admiral LaRocque, USN (Ret.), before the Defense Task Force of the House Budget Committee. You may use them as you wish.

I join Admiral Watkins in thanking you for ensuring the Task Force received a balanced presentation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "C. A. H. Trost".

C. A. H. TROST
Director, Navy Program Planning

OUTGOING MAIL RECORD

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CLASSIFICATION (Of attached material)

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Comments on Prepared Text

ADM LaRocque statement...."A careful consideration of actual military needs, however, appears nowhere in current Congressional debates over military budgets..."

Response ... U. S. Military requirements are not developed in an ad hoc fashion in response to the amount of funding available in any particular budget year. Stated requirements are a result of a laborious and meticulous process of appraisal and analysis within the Department of Defense. This process takes into full consideration not only current force capabilities, but also the current and projected threat and the capabilities assessed to be needed in the future to counter that threat and adequately provide for the security of the country. This analysis takes place both at the individual Service level (Navy: Maritime Strategy/Army: "Air/Land Battle 2000") and at the Joint Staff (Joint Strategic Planning Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Defense Guidance) levels. Furthermore, appropriate Congressional oversight committees are fully aware of the process and are in many cases briefed on the contents and conclusions of the various long and mid-range planning documents that form the foundation of the annual budget submission.

Comments on Prepared Text

ADM LaRocque statement...."From a military point of view, the United States is preparing for two types of war -- war with the Soviet Union and war with some other country. A war with the Soviet Union will be a nuclear war and a short war."

Response:

- ZUMWALT TESTIMONY P. 82

-- "The United States would prefer to deal with the Soviet threat, and intends to deal with the Soviet threat with conventional weapons, and would not use nuclear weapons unless the Soviet Union used them. As a matter of fact, the worst possible thing that could happen to the United States Navy would be for the Soviet Union to go nuclear.."

- Additional comments:

-- The basic mission of the U.S. Armed Forces is to help preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. They also help assure the physical security of the U.S. and its interests and allies overseas. In order to do their job properly, those forces must be prepared for any contingency, conventional or nuclear.

The objective of our current modernization efforts is first to deter attack on the U.S. or its allies. Should that deterrence fail, the objective is to conduct successful conventional operations without crossing the nuclear threshold. We do not subscribe to the absolute judgment that any war with the Soviets will be both short and nuclear. U.S. military planning must be prepared for any contingency, conventional or nuclear. Furthermore, planning only for the worst case, i.e., a short, nuclear war, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Comments on Prepared Text

ADM LaRocque statement...."The Pentagon has asked for every weapon it can dream up regardless of cost and need."

Response.... This statement is patently untrue. The Navy goes through exhaustive efforts to see that all systems are scrubbed to ensure that they are affordable while meeting validated requirements despite, at times, political pressure to the contrary. The following program actions were driven primarily by affordability concerns:

<u>Program</u>	<u>Action</u>
DDG-51:	Cost capped, eliminated helo hangers, torpedo magazine, flag spaces.
155mm Gun:	Despite Congressional pressure Navy opted not to develop because there was no need.
ASAM/AAAM:	Program chartered to maximize commonality to reduce cost.
DDG 37 (NTU):	Cancelled because of capability vs affordability.
VTXTS:	Reduced scope of program to improve affordability.
VFX:	Cancelled because cost to develop technology was unaffordable.
A-6 Upgrade:	Scope of upgrade reduced to improve affordability.

• Program Stretch-Outs/Cancellations.

- The Navy provides DOD and the President a balanced SCN and APN plan which takes into account ship and aircraft requirements necessary to pace the threat, while acknowledging fiscal constraints. Stretching out some of the programs recommended by ADM LaRocque will have a significant negative effect on the SCN/APN account in the outyears of the FYDP and would be a hinderance to attaining the balanced forces required to support elements of the 600 ship Navy.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."Stretch-out production of High technology weapons."

- Response:

- In the near term, deferring the procurement of 12 F/A-18 aircraft saves about half of what ADM LaRocque suggests. However, to buy those aircraft back in later years costs about 50% more than the original savings. This does not consider the "hidden" costs of retaining support for A-7/F-4 aircraft to fill the gaps or the added costs of delaying conversion of the carriers and shore stations which will support these aircraft or training of the personnel to maintain them. All costs, particularly economic production rates must be balanced carefully when contemplating a program stretch-out. More often than not, near-term savings are more than absorbed by the unseen costs of procurement in the outyears.
- 27 CG-47 Cruisers are required to replace aging CG-16/26 class. Procuring two vice three in FY-86 would:
 - require procuring 3 vice 2 in FY-89 or extending procurements by one year at an additional program cost of at least \$500M.
 - Two ship profile will drive up cost of FY-86 cruisers producing uneconomic quantities at both shipyards and major contractors and would effectively eliminate competition at shipyards (one to one split does not entice price competition).
- Four SSN 688 class attack submarines requested in the FY-86 budget submittal are necessary to:
 - Continue the modernization of our SSN force in order to counter the growing Soviet submarine threat.
 - Soviet submarine force is advancing rapidly in technology: quieting, sensors, and firepower.
 - Soviets are rapidly introducing new, improved classes of SSNs.
 - Soviet submarine force out numbers U. S. submarine force 3:1.
- Attain U. S. SSN force level goal of 100 SSNs in 1990.
 - U. S. Maritime Strategy depends heavily on SSNs operating in forward, hostile environment.
 - Many pre-688 class SSNs cannot operate in forward areas and begin retiring in number after 1987 having reached end of service life.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."While slower production rates will delay deployment of these weapons, the effect on military strength is minimal. Where production rates are high, slower production will not cause significant increases in unit costs. In most cases, production rates proposed here are frozen at the 1985 level."

Response... It is true that where production rates are high, slightly slower production will not cause significant increases in unit costs. However the Navy programs that ADM LaRocque proposes to stretch out do not have high production rates, the proposed cuts are not slight, and, for all but one of the aircraft programs, these cuts would result in quantities below the minimum economic production rate.

- ADM LaRocque Statement...."Cancel unnecessary weapons program."

- Response

- The A-6E is the only long range, and only all-weather/night strike aircraft in the Navy inventory. Cancellation would seriously degrade the power projection capability of an airwing. Additional A-6's are required to support the 14th CVW and the Reserve airwings require A-6 aircraft (which they do not now have) in order to match up with the active airwings, as an intergrated part of the 15 CVBGs. The economical production of A-6 aircraft has been looked at carefully in the context of the Grumman business base which produces 4 different tactical aircraft for the Navy.
- Current chemical munitions, because of their unitary design, are not safe to store and handle aboard ship. New binary weapons (e.g. BIGEYE) are required if the Navy is to have any chemical weapons for either deterrence or retaliation.
- "Cancel AMRAAM since it performs same function as SIDEWINDER/ SPARROW, is more expensive and has development problems."
 - AMRAAM has cost more than original estimates and there have been development problems in trying to package expanded capabilities in a smaller missile, but it will perform the mission of knocking down Soviet bombers much more effectively than either SIDEWINDER or SPARROW.
 - AMRAAM is a launch and leave weapon with a higher probability of kill against large target aircraft with sophisticated ECM support. This means two things: fewer missiles are required and more targets can be engaged by a single aircraft. AMRAAM is designed specifically to keep pace with the evolving Soviet threat; cancelling it would put the Navy at a serious disadvantage.

Comments on Prepared Text

ADM LaRocque statement...."It is possible to freeze military spending without reducing military readiness or weakening sound improvements in national defense."

Response: The defense budget request reflects a carefully-reasoned balance between the readiness of today's forces and capability for the future. Any reduction to planned military spending will necessarily result in lowered readiness, reduced future capability or both. The spending cuts advocated by ADM LaRocque would impact not only near-term readiness but also represents a mortgage on future capability which would seriously harm the national defense.

Comments on Non-Prepared Testimony

o Page 21 Lines 458 - 466

ADM LaRocque Statement...."From a purely military point of view, the United States is simply preparing for two kinds of war -- war with the Soviet Union, which will be a nuclear war probably a very short war; and war with somebody else...." "...War with the Soviets will be a nuclear war. There's no way to fight it with non-nuclear weapons and it will be a short one."

- ZUMWALT TESTIMONY P. 82

-- "The United States would prefer to deal with the Soviet threat, and intends to deal with the Soviet threat with conventional weapons, and would not use nuclear weapons unless the Soviet Union used them. As a matter of fact, the worst possible thing that could happen to the United States Navy would be for the Soviet Union to go nuclear.."

- Additional comments:

-- The basic mission of the U.S. Armed Forces is to help preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. They also help assure the physical security of the U.S. and its interests and allies overseas. In order to do their job properly, those forces must be prepared for any contingency, conventional or nuclear.

The objective of our current modernization efforts is first to deter attack on the U.S. or its allies. Should that deterrence fail, the objective is to conduct successful conventional operations without crossing the nuclear threshold. We do not subscribe to the absolute judgment that any war with the Soviets will be both short and nuclear. U.S. military planning must be prepared for any contingency, conventional or nuclear. Furthermore, planning only for the worst case, i.e., a short, nuclear war, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

o Pages 21 and 22 Line 474 - 478

ADM LaRocque Statement...."A careful consideration though, when you take a look at what the Pentagon has come in for and asked for in this Administration, you will find that nowhere in those military budgets is a careful overall analysis or appraisal made of what our military needs are."

Response.... U. S. Military requirements are not developed in an ad hoc fashion in response to the amount of funding available in any particular budget year. Stated requirements are a result of a laborious and meticulous process of appraisal and analysis within the Department of Defense. This process takes into full consideration not only current force capabilities, but also the current and projected threat and the capabilities assessed to be needed in the future to counter that threat and adequately provide for the security of the country. This analysis takes place both at the individual Service level (Navy: Maritime Strategy/Army: "Air/Land Battle 2000") and at the Joint Staff (Joint Strategic Planning Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Defense Guidance) levels. Furthermore, appropriate Congressional oversight committees are fully aware of the process and are in many cases briefed on the contents and conclusions of the various long and mid-range planning documents that form the foundation of the annual budget submission.

ADM LaRocque Statement.... "The Pentagon has asked for every weapon it can dream up regardless of cost and need."

Response This statement is patently untrue. The Navy goes through exhaustive efforts to see that all systems are scrubbed to ensure that they are affordable while meeting validated requirements despite, at times, political pressure to the contrary. The following program actions were driven primarily by affordability concerns:

<u>Program</u>	<u>Action</u>
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A-6 Upgrade:	Scope of upgrade reduced to improve affordability.

o Page 24 Lines 526-528

ADM LaRocque statement..."It is possible to freeze military spending without reducing military readiness or weakening sound improvements in national defense."

Response : The defense budget request reflects a carefully-reasoned balance between the readiness of today's forces and capability for the future. Any reduction to planned military spending will necessarily result in lowered readiness, reduced future capability or both. The spending cuts advocated by ADM LaRocque would impact not only near-term readiness but also represents a mortgage on future capability which would seriously harm the national defense.

ADM LaRocque statement...."I would advocate a cap, a freeze on the retirement pay for all senior military people. There are a million of us and we've been fully rewarded. I think we can take a freeze on increases in our pay regardless of what the Pentagon may say. I can remember in the '30s we, in the military, took a pay cut, an actual pay cut, in order to help the country."

Response:

- Cuts in military pay that occurred in the '30s came at a time when the cost of goods and services in the private sector was declining. Today's increases in retirement pay similarly adjust for changing private sector economic conditions and are necessary to prevent erosion of the purchasing power of retired compensation. Retirement pay is not a "reward" as indicated in ADM LaRocque's statement. Rather, it is deferred compensation for service previously rendered. Placing a cap on retirement pay would be a serious breach of faith with retired military personnel. It would also signal to those on active duty that their retirement compensation is also in doubt.
- Military service is not average service. The unlimited working hours without special compensation, moves and family disruptions, seven and eight month periods away from home, and potentially hazardous situations that all too often become life endangering are not associated with a normal occupation.
- By capping or reducing retirement compensation, we would be making career decisions for many of our most talented personnel, who are as much in demand outside the service as they are within. We cannot afford another hemorrhage of our talented professionals such as we experienced in the late '70s.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."We have been buying weapons much more frequently than we did in the past. It used to be we bought a weapon system that lasted us 10, 15, 20, and 30 years. Now we buy a new weapon system that comes along every 5, 6, or 7 years. So that you have created a problem with this rapid introduction of new systems, faster than, frankly, the military can absorb them."

Response.... Statement is wrong on virtually all counts. The Navy has made a concerted effort to develop systems that will pace the threat for years in the future, and that can be upgraded through pre-planned product improvement programs to offset new threat developments, as opposed to buying new systems as ADM LaRocque suggests. A cursory look at today's ships and aircraft (i.e. 5" 54 gun mount MOD 10/AIM-9M) would prove this point.

- Secondly, last year SECNAV directed the acceleration of 23 CIWS installations. This has been accomplished without the problems ADM LaRocque alludes to.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."Yes, I think on the other points, buying lots of them--I know ADM Zumwalt is going to testify today and he will speak for himself--but when we were on active duty at the same time, I felt very strongly, for example, on the aircraft carriers that we would be much better off with some smaller aircraft carriers in greater numbers than putting all of our eggs in one big basket."

"The same thing is true whether you're talking about the M1 battle tank or the M-60. And I think we would be much better off to have a greater variety--not a greater variety, but a greater number of smaller, more flexible units because none of us know what the next combat is going to really be like."

Response.... Navy has studied this argument thoroughly and, based on 60 years experience in operating aircraft from ships, concluded that the 90,000 ton nuclear carrier (CVN) is the optimum size for the kinds of weapons systems we need in all potential battle areas around the world. Size equates to staying power i.e. - reduced dependence on a logistics train and, therefore, reduced predictability and vulnerability. A CVN is the least sinkable ship because of compartmentation and armor protection of propulsion and magazine spaces.

The aircraft carrier, as the operating base for the CVW, has been designed and modified over time to provide the best possible platform for the embarked sea-based tactical and support airplanes. Its overall dimensions, configuration and installed equipment design are the result of the requirement to match facilities with airplane performance parameters.

The composition of the modern CVW results in great mutual support between types of airplanes; and a great flexibility in the use of each type of airplane. As a bottom line, this creates a force which possesses a synergistic effect in that its total warfighting capability is greater than the sum of its individual elements.

The marriage of the large deck CV/CVN with the modern multi-dimensional CVW is based on the solid foundation of matching the unique warfighting capability of the sea-based tactical airplane with the best possible ship design. This marriage has marked advantages over a concept which used a greater number of smaller bases to house an equal TACAIR capability. Attempting to build a more distributed basing structure using a greater number of smaller carriers would result in the following:

- The inherent synergism of the large deck CVW would be lost or, at least, significantly diminished.
- The logistic base support would be markedly less efficient.
- The smaller bases would be less seaworthy and less operationally safe.

- Each individual platform would be less survivable.
- Nuclear power benefits would be less in the smaller ships.
- The total life cycle cost of such a basing structure, supporting at least as many airplanes but actually requiring more because of the loss of synergism, would be greater.

The NIMITZ class CVN is the best ship we know how to build to do the job in the most effective fashion and at least cost.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."Any war with the Soviet Union, Mr. Congressman, will be a nuclear war. There's no way to fight with the Soviets conventionally at sea for the simple reason that the only way that we can be certain of destroying a Soviet submarine is by a depth charge which we carry in helicopters and P-3 ORIONS. That's the way we destroy Soviet submarines."

"So that means in the Pacific, if a Soviet submarine comes to attack our ships and we detect him, the only way we can destroy him with an certainty is with a nuclear weapon. That's our primary weapon."

Response

Zumwalt Testimony Page 82-83...."This statement is an absolute falsehood. The United States Navy would prefer to deal with the Soviet threat with conventional weapons, and would not use nuclear weapons unless the Soviet Union used them. As a matter of fact, the worst possible thing that could happen to the United States Navy would be for the Soviet Union to go nuclear."

"It is a gross deception to maintain that defense policies indicate that the only defensive tactic that we can employ against Soviet subs to protect our surface vessels in the event of war, is the utilization of nuclear depth charges."

"Congress has appropriated great sums of money for a combination of conventional weapons; torpedoes, depth charges, surfaced-launched, air-launched, sub-launched, for the purpose of avoiding nuclear war by extracting the attrition against Soviet submarines with conventional means. And, it is the preferred choice of the Navy to use conventional weapons. We can be effective, and more effective than we can using nuclear weapons, for the reason that Soviet use of nuclear weapons would rapidly work against the United States Navy and make our anti-submarine defenses far less successful."

Mr. Slattery Statement.... "Are they then capable of obliterating that fleet floating around out there?"

ADM LaRocque Statement.... "Well, you do have a little problem. The time of flight for a Soviet missile is still about 30 minutes. They have to get the detection to figure out where it is and then predict where it is going to be in the 30-minute time of flight."

"Now I think they will get it with their submarines. I think they will destroy our surface fleet, the aircraft carriers, in the first 3- to 5-days of a war with the Soviet Union. They simple can't last any longer than 3- to 5-days. But the Soviets have over 300 submarines, attack submarines, today and they can easily destroy our surface fleet. The era of the submarines, nuclear submarines, is here. Our surface ships simply cannot cope with the fast moving nuclear submarines. The Soviets can't cope with ours, we can't cope with theirs."

Response.... The CVN is the least vulnerable/most survivable ship ever built.

- Through three-dimensional offensive and defensive capabilities (air, surface, subsurface) of CVN and supporting battle group elements, fewer hostile weapons will survive to attack battle group elements.
- CVN greatly aggravates the enemy targeting problem. Because of its sustained high-speed dash capabilities, the CVN is able to use ocean expanse to exploit weather and weaknesses in enemy surveillance and defenses.
- Short of a direct nuclear hit, the CVN is the least sinkable ship and least vulnerable to mission-interference damage. This is due to greater relative compartmentalization, massive protection of propulsion and magazines. Specific engineering features built into CVN to enhance survivability include:
 - Side and overhead plating and new concept internal arrangements to resist penetration to magazines by high and low angle attacking missiles.
 - Torpedo protection provided by a new, energy-absorbing hull design which will counter major caliber torpedo explosive warheads.
 - A new system to protect the ship and crew from effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological attack.
 - Flight deck and lower decks armored with new, high-yield strength steel.
 - Over 2000 watertight and shock resistant compartments to limit damage. More generous stability margins to assure control of the ship after major flooding damage.
 - Extensive fire-fighting facilities throughout the ship, supported by high capacity fire pumps and the latest chemical fire extinguishing agents.
 - Over 30 fully-equipped damage control stations manned by trained and practiced personnel.

- protective fire-fighting and flooding systems for all ordnance and fuel storage and handling spaces.
 - Necessary power and pumps to remove water from flooded compartments for repair of damage.
 - Counter-flooding capability to control list and trim after damage.
- For these reasons, the CVN is: less vulnerable to attack, less vulnerable to sinking, and less vulnerable to mission-interference damage.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."The United States is indeed planning, training, arming and practicing for nuclear war in Europe for a conventional and nuclear war. We have 330,000 U. S. Servicemen and women stationed in Europe for the sole purpose of planning, training, arming and practicing for nuclear war."

Response.... U.S. military forces are not stationed in Europe for the sole purpose of planning, training, arming and practicing for nuclear war. U.S. military forces are in Europe as an important element of our strategy of deterrence and flexible response. They are there to deter attacks against the United States and its allies, limit Soviet capabilities for coercion, and provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) flexibility to respond appropriately to aggression. Therefore, U.S. forces must be capable of meeting regional requirements as well as threats of global dimension by both conventional and, if need be, nuclear means.

For our forces to have a credible deterrent impact they must not only have the weapons both conventional and nuclear, necessary to support their position but also the capability to use them effectively to counter aggression. The capability to fight in a nuclear environment is only one facet of our deterrence strategy in the European Theater. The large infusion of funds over the past four years in improving the conventional readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure posture of our forces has had as its goal the ultimate objective of diminishing the possibility that aggression will occur and that if it does, it will not escalate to the nuclear stage.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."The only threat from the Soviet Navy today against our Navy, the major threat, is their submarines. They do have a capability, if we run our aircraft carriers close to their land, they will have a capability with their land-based aircraft to attack our ships, but the main threat to our Navy is from the Soviet submarines. When we put our effort into building big aircraft carriers, which have no anti-submarine capability at all, none except for those ships which guard it, the aircraft carrier itself becomes part of the problem, not the solution."

Response.... Every CV now carries a squadron of 6 SH-3 anti-submarine helicopters. All but two of the carriers regularly deploy with a squadron of 10 S-3A anti-submarine aircraft. The ASW module is located aboard the CV and is the center for the evaluation and direction of all ASW activity within the CVBG. Finally, the CV's high speed and extended striking range inherent in its aircraft, allow it to avoid areas where Soviet submarines are considered a threat. Additionally, those ships which operate with the CV possess the most modern ASW equipment designed to sink enemy submarines.

ADM LaRocque Statement...."I think we ought to build only surface vessels which we see a need for in connection with an attack against Third World countries. I think we need no surface vessels for fighting a war with a Soviet Union. Aircraft carriers do not have, as a primary role, the attack of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. They have that as a secondary role, because we have far more missiles and bombers than are need for that purpose."

Response.... The assertion regarding surface vessel construction and aircraft carrier utility made by RADM LaRocque are patently false and reflect a total misunderstanding of the Navy's role in support of the National Defense. A careful glance at the NATO North Flank region alone should be sufficient to dispel the alleged non-utility of such forces.

The Soviets have amassed a significant portion of their military might in the Kola region. The Soviet Northern Fleet possesses 64% of the most modern Soviet SSBNs (TYPHOON, DELTA I-III, and YANKEE), 75% of its most modern attack submarines, 95 maritime attack aircraft (Badgers and BLINDERS, capable of being quickly reinforced by 40 Backfires now based in the Baltic), and 66% of the latest (post-1967) combat ships (122 total ships). These forces have the probable mission of protecting the SSBN fleet in the Barents Sea/Atlantic Ocean; preventing a NATO deployment forward of the G-I-UK Gap; and, if the opportunity presents itself, undertaking the interdiction of the Atlantic SLOC to Europe. It is inconceivable to envision any NATO war in which the United States would not be putting several carrier battle groups into the Norwegian sea at some point. In such cases it would be imperative that we seek out and destroy the Soviet capability to limit our uses of the sea.

These carrier battle groups would no doubt be engaged in active operations against Soviet forces. The U.S. advantage in aviation technology, seaborne command and control and pilot training/proficiency should allow for the effective attrition of Soviet air power while minimizing the battle group's exposure to hostile long range weapons. Furthermore, land-based tactical air provided by the Air Force, Marine Corps and Allied Forces would effectively complement the Carrier Battle group's efforts, presenting a formidable obstacle to Soviet war planning and thereby contribute to the containment and neutralization of Soviet maritime power.

To opine that the carrier battle group would play a secondary role ignores the true power and strength inherent in a fully constituted carrier battle group and its potentially decisive role in any combat situation. The Navy's Maritime Strategy postulates a well-coordinated, sequential concept of global and theater-level operations which attempts to capitalize on inherent U.S. naval strengths, exploit known Soviet weaknesses, while minimizing to the extent possible, exposure of the forces to direct enemy attack. The attack carrier battle group is the centerpiece of this strategy. In no way does it perform a secondary role.