

**The  
President's  
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board**



**News Service**

November 6 - 12, 1999

# PFIAB NEWS SERVICE

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# **LAB SECURITY**

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The Times-Picayune

November 9, 1999 Tuesday, ORLEANS

SECTION: NATIONAL; Pg. A3

LENGTH: 680 words

~~HEADLINE: SENATE COMMITTEE OKS MOSELEY-BRAUN~~

BYLINE: From wire reports

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

**BODY:**

**\*\*\* Energy chief offers nuclear document \*\*\***

WASHINGTON -- Energy Secretary Bill Richardson made an 11th-hour offer of a classified document to a House subcommittee Monday, moments before the panel was to vote to subpoena the material in an inquiry into the alleged Chinese theft of nuclear missile warhead technology secrets. Richardson made the offer in separate phone calls to Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the Armed Services Committee's military procurement panel, and to Rep. Norman Sisisky, D-Va., the subcommittee's senior Democrat, Hunter and Sisisky announced. The panel met and took no action on the proposed subpoena, agreeing to take Richardson at his word. Hunter said, however, that if the document wasn't delivered to the panel Tuesday morning, "then we will have another meeting tomorrow afternoon and we will issue the subpoena." At issue is written testimony -- prepared for an Oct. 6, 1998, committee meeting -- by Notra Trulock, the Energy Department intelligence officer who triggered a probe into alleged Chinese spying at the nation's nuclear weapons labs. Trulock, who later resigned, has said he was prevented by superiors, including Elizabeth Moler, then deputy energy secretary, from sharing information with Congress about the Los Alamos investigation. The subcommittee demanded the original, unedited and classified copy of Trulock's testimony in a March 24 letter to Richardson. Hunter contends the testimony he actually gave the committee was heavily edited by the administration. "I think we've been very patient on this matter," Hunter said. "Dr. Trulock had prepared testimony for this committee. That testimony had been changed. We don't know what Dr. Trulock was going to tell us."

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**Document 1 of 1.**

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**November 8, 1999, Monday, Final Edition**

**SECTION:** OP-ED; Pg. A20; LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

**LENGTH:** 195 words

**HEADLINE:** Nuclear Weapons: Safe and Secure

**BODY:**

The Oct. 20 editorial "Fission at the DOE" criticized Congress's establishment of the National **Nuclear Security Administration** (NNSA) to better manage and secure the nation's nuclear weapons programs. However, for two decades, the Department of Energy has been afflicted with an oversized headquarters staff, a confusing multiplicity of oversight organizations and unmanageable lines of authority.

The new law replaces this complex structure with a streamlined organization that has a clear chain of command. The NNSA administrator now is under the explicit "direction, authority and control" of the secretary of energy, and the secretary of energy is given sole responsibility for setting policy for all of DOE -- including NNSA.

Both the House and Senate have, on a bipartisan basis, overwhelmingly approved these reforms. The resulting legislation will make significant strides in streamlining DOE's dysfunctional bureaucracy, dramatically improving accountability and, most important, the security of some of the nation's most important secrets.

FLOYD SPENCE

U.S. Representative (R-S.C.)

Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

Washington

Clips 4

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**Document 1 of 210.**Copyright 1999 Associated Press  
AP Online

November 09, 1999; Tuesday 03:24 Eastern Time

**SECTION:** Washington - general news**LENGTH:** 459 words**HEADLINE:** House Panel Wants Nuke Document**BYLINE:** TOM RAUM**DATELINE:** WASHINGTON**BODY:**

Averting a subpoena battle, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson is promising a House Armed Services panel material it has been seeking for nearly eight months in an inquiry into alleged Chinese espionage at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory.

Just moments before the military procurement subcommittee met Monday to consider issuing a subpoena, Richardson made the offer in separate phone calls to Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., the panel's chairman, and Rep. Norman Sisisky, D-Va., the panel's senior Democrat, Hunter and Sisisky announced.

At issue is written testimony prepared for an Oct. 6, 1998, meeting of the committee by **Notra Trulock**, the Energy Department intelligence officer who triggered an investigation into alleged Chinese spying at the nation's nuclear weapons labs.

Trulock, who later resigned, has said he was prevented from sharing information with Congress about the Los Alamos investigation by superiors, including Elizabeth Moler, then deputy energy secretary.

The subcommittee demanded the original, unedited and classified copy of Trulock's testimony in a March 24 letter to Richardson. Hunter contends the testimony he actually gave the committee was heavily edited by the administration.

"I think we've been very patient on this matter," Hunter said.

"Dr. Trulock had prepared testimony for this committee. That testimony had been changed," Hunter

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said. "We don't know what Dr. Trulock was going to tell us."

Richardson offered to deliver the unrevised, classified version of Trulock's original testimony to the panel today, Hunter and Sisisky said. If the document isn't delivered, Hunter said, "then we will have another meeting ... and we will issue the subpoena."

Hunter asserted that Energy Department officials "didn't tell us the truth" in October 1998 when they said there were no recent thefts of nuclear missile technology secrets from the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico.

A former Los Alamos computer scientist, Wen Ho Lee, was fired in March for violating security rules. Although not charged with a crime, he has been the FBI's prime target in the nearly four-year investigation of the alleged theft.

Lee, a Taiwan-born computer scientist who worked with the top-secret weapons design team at Los Alamos since the late 1970s, has denied giving any secrets to China and has accused the government of singling him out because he is Chinese-American.

China has repeatedly rejected any allegations of espionage.

Sisisky cautioned that "nothing has been proven that anything has been stolen."

Still, he said, the panel is entitled to the unrevised testimony. "Some of us might not agree on the need for the document, but that is another matter."

**LANGUAGE:** ENGLISH

**LOAD-DATE:** November 09, 1999

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The San Francisco Chronicle  
NOVEMBER 11, 1999, THURSDAY, FINAL EDITION  
SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A26

**LENGTH:** 613 words

**HEADLINE:** Livermore Lab Laser Project Officials in the Hot Seat;

Energy Dept. probe of huge cost overruns

**BYLINE:** Bernadette Tansey, Chronicle Staff Writer

**DATELINE:** LIVERMORE

**BODY:**

Managers of a \$1.2 billion laser project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will be publicly questioned next week by a U.S. Department of Energy task force concerning mammoth cost overruns and possible delays that were not immediately reported to the government.

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson is sending a team of technical experts to the Livermore lab Monday and Tuesday for the first of a series of hearings on technical snafus that may boost the budget for construction of the National Ignition Facility by as much as \$350 million.

The high-powered laser project managed by the University of California is an essential element of the Energy Department's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is intended to test the safety and reliability of the nation's **nuclear weapons** through laboratory simulations instead of test blasts. The stadium-size ignition facility was designed to use an array of 192 lasers to mimic the intense heat and pressure of a thermonuclear explosion.

But problems arose in plans for building the test equipment with a minimum of dust that could affect the lasers' performance, lab officials revealed in September. The news angered Richardson, who had been told as recently as June that the project was proceeding on schedule and within its budget.

The task force descending on the lab is one of a handful of outside bodies investigating past management of the ignition facility and closely monitoring its continuing operations. The primary mission of the task force, a committee of the independent Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, is to advise Richardson how the technical problems can be solved and the facility completed.

"The intent of the secretary is to get the project back on track," said Robin Staffin, Richardson's senior policy adviser for science and technology.

But the task force may question Lawrence lab Director Bruce Tarter, as well as ignition facility managers, who are among the first speakers at the Monday hearing, about what was apparently a delay before the technical hitches came to light, said Betsy Mullins, executive director of the Energy Secretary's advisory board.

Richardson, who has already decided to withhold \$2 million of the \$5.6 million performance fee due the University of California for administering the ignition facility contract, has said he may slash the fee further. The lab and the Energy Department's Office of Defense Programs are being required by Richardson to absorb any excess costs from their own budgets so that taxpayers do not foot the bill for errors made by either agency. He has also ordered lab officials to contract out the rest of the major assembly work on the laser complex that was to have been handled in-house at the lab. Work on the project is now 70 percent completed.

Mullins said the task force will scrutinize the contract solicitations being prepared by lab officials "to make sure they're taking everything into account." She had no dollar estimate of the value of the contracts being offered to outside firms.

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The task force may hold as many as three more hearings at Livermore before issuing a report -- by early December -  
- to the advisory board, which will deliver the findings to Richardson. Members of the public may speak during  
comment periods or submit their comments in writing.

Management of the ignition facility contract is also being reviewed by the General Accounting Office, the  
University of California and an Energy Department unit that investigates contract compliance, as well as by an  
Energy Department deputy secretary who oversees a "watch list" of projects under heightened scrutiny.

# ROLL CALL

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## Policy Briefing: Energy

### Should Congress increase oversight of the Department of Energy?

### Security Risks Require Prompt Action

By Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-KANSAS)

It is certainly evident that the Chinese government stole countless vital U.S. nuclear secrets over the past 20 years. The lax security at Department of Energy nuclear laboratories has compromised the technology to miniaturize nuclear warheads, neutron bomb technology and nuclear "legacy codes."

Why has this been allowed to happen at our most sensitive nuclear weapons laboratories? According to the General Accounting Office in testimony before Congress, lax security at the Department of Energy is caused by two systemic problems. The first being "DOE managers and contractors have shown a lack of attention and/or priority to security matters." The second problem is a "serious lack of accountability at DOE. Efforts to address security problems have languished for years without resolution or repercussions to those organizations responsible."

For example, the Department of Energy's fiscal 1997 budget for counterintelligence was \$5 million. Of that \$5 million, \$1.4 million went to DOE headquarters and \$1.5 million went to overhead at the laboratories. That left \$2.1 million of the counterintelligence budget actually going toward counterintelligence. This level of budgeting shows how important security is to the Department of Energy. It doesn't make sense that managers and contractors dealing with the most sensitive nuclear weapon secrets this world has to offer would show such a lack of attention to security issues.

Certainly, over the past two decades there has been little action taken to address these serious security concerns. The discovery of the theft of our most sensitive nuclear secrets has warranted the need for prompt and decisive action. I, along with many others, introduced legislation to address the lax security at our nuclear labs. While we did not all see eye to eye, we reached a bipartisan consensus that it was Congress' responsibility to ensure tightened security at our labs. A DOE reorganization plan was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2000. The President signed the act, which included the most comprehensive reorganization of DOE since the agency had been created more than 20 years ago.

The reorganization legislation implemented the recommendations made by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by former Sen. Warren Rudman (R-N.H.). A semi-autonomous agency - the National Nuclear Security Administration - within DOE was created and given the responsibility for nuclear weapons research and production. The head of this agency is to work for, and report directly to, the secretary of Energy.

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The agreement also includes several safeguards to ensure that the secretary of Energy retains policymaking authority for the NNSA by:

- Establishing a clearly defined charter and mission statement for the new agency;
- Drawing clear lines of authority of accountability from the nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities directly to the administrator for nuclear security, who would run the new agency;
- Creating a statutory charter for counterintelligence and intelligence offices reporting directly to the secretary to develop and ensure the implementation of strong and effective counterintelligence and intelligence programs within DOE;
- Allowing the secretary of Energy to retain the authority to ensure full compliance with all environmental, safety and health laws, regulations and requirements;
- Providing the new agency with necessary personnel authorities to create a cadre of highly qualified managers to supervise the extensive contractor base supporting the NNSA;
- Requiring significant improvements in the budgeting and financial management practices of the new agency;
- Developing procedures for the use of the national security laboratories by outside entities to ensure the multi-mission nature of the science conducted at those labs.

Although the President signed the Defense Authorization Act, the administration has sent a disturbing signal about its plans to uphold the spirit and intent of the DOE reorganization agreement. In the Defense Authorization Act signing statement, the President said, "The accountability of a Cabinet department head is not complete without the legal authority to meet the legal responsibilities for which that person is accountable." The President went on to say the NNSA provisions "skew that authority" and "impair the secretary of Energy's ability to ensure compliance ... in meeting his national defense responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act."

These concerns are unfounded. Not only were the NNSA provisions the result of the President's Advisory Board, but the NNSA was specifically left under the authority of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. This was done over the objections of many who wanted to remove responsibility for the nuclear labs from the DOE to the Department of Defense.

However, the President went on to appoint Richardson as the head of the NNSA. In addition, he allowed Richardson to appoint current DOE officials to dual roles within the NNSA. In effect, the Congressional intent of implementing an agency independent of the current DOE structure to manage the nation's nuclear programs is being intentionally circumvented.

Members from both sides of the aisle are considering prompt, appropriate action to ensure that the law is followed. It is my hope that the administration

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will not continue to ignore the bipartisan Congressional plan on this crucial national security issue. Rather, Congress and DOE should work together to ensure that our most vital secrets are no longer compromised.

To better oversee the implementation of the DOE reorganization legislation, House Armed Services Chairman Floyd Spence (R-S.C.) appointed a Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization. The panel will hold hearings, briefings and site visits to ensure security measures are being carried out.

As a member of the panel, I will take an active part in oversight of the plan. I intend to ask tough questions of Richardson, the lab directors and all relevant DOE officials. If the concerns with improving security are not satisfied, I am prepared to report the need for Congress to step in and further tighten the security of our nuclear labs.

**Rep. Jim Ryun (R-Kan.) is a member of the Armed Services Committee.**

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# **INTELLIGENCE**

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Chicago Tribune  
November 12, 1999 Friday, CHICAGO SPORTS FINAL EDITION  
SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 29; ZONE: N

**LENGTH:** 912 words

**HEADLINE:** ENTREPRENEUR PUTTING SAVVY TO USE FOR CIA

**BYLINE:** By Michelle Quinn, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service.

**DATELINE:** SAN FRANCISCO

**BODY:**

In a blue Nissan, Gilman Louie is driving a back route to San Francisco International Airport, coolly ignoring his pager. A ticket awaits him at the airport VIP lounge for a seat on the next flight to Washington, D.C.

As he navigates the city streets, he is ticking off methodically the tasks he faces: Meetings inside the Beltway. Offices to set up. Checking on the **KGB** background. Hunting for new technology to make the country safer.

Oh yeah, there's one more thing on his list: Change the culture of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It might sound as if life for Louie, a San Francisco entrepreneur, has turned into a B-movie script or pulp fiction spy novel since earlier this fall when he agreed to set up a CIA-funded nonprofit company. With \$28 million in tax money, his goal is to invest in or partner with technology companies that can help overcome the CIA's technical difficulties and make money for themselves in the process.

The CIA isn't trying to make money on the side, Louie said, but to encourage the tech-savvy who have started companies to help other companies make a profit in solving some of the CIA's thornier information problems.

At 39, Louie has had more lives than a John Le Carre character: a precocious college student who took over his parents' home to create video games, a failed candidate for the San Francisco school board, founder and CEO of a hot game company, an unofficial adviser to Vice President Al Gore on education and technology issues and, most recently, an executive at the on-line division of toy giant Hasbro.

And now Louie is Q, as in chief executive of In-Q-It, the name of the CIA-funded nonprofit.

The company moniker is a playful reference to the technologist Q in James Bond movies who demonstrates the latest gadgets for 007. The "In" refers to "intelligence," the "It" to "information technology."

After the announcement, the London Independent's headline read: "Q Turns Double Agent To Work For America."

The spook jokes are inevitable. "I enjoy it," Louie said. In fact, he thinks it's good for the CIA to be given exposure, even in snickering form, by the likes of Jay Leno and Comedy Central. It will help the secretive agency find the technology it needs and change its culture, Louie said.

The CIA's technology is getting stale. It has security issues, such as how to keep precocious teenagers or real spies from hacking the agency's Internet site. And there's a data-management problem. Louie will be looking for companies that make data management and knowledge tools that can process terrabytes (1,000 gigabytes) of data. CIA agents need to be able to search text, video and audio, Louie said.

Louie may appear to be an unlikely choice--he has limited investing experience from his job as chief creative officer at Hasbro Interactive. But he has survived the hard-knock life of an entrepreneur and learned to survive.

He grew up in San Francisco, the grandson of a Chinese immigrant. His father worked for the Department of Public Works. In 1981, as he finished his business administration degree at San Francisco State University, Louie created a

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flight simulator game called Falcon and started his first company, Nexa. That became Sphere and then Spectrum Holobyte and then MicroProse, through mergers.

He also was interested in politics. In 1986, he ran for the San Francisco school board and lost. Since then, he has demonstrated against state ballot initiatives to end bilingual education and affirmative action in the schools.

In August 1998, MicroProse was sold to Hasbro, the Rhode Island-based toy company, for \$70 million, although earlier it had been valued at up to \$400 million.

"I think the high points and the low points are the same thing," Louie said. "They give you a chance to reinvent yourself."

Meanwhile, Louie, a registered Democrat, was hobnobbing with Gore on education and technology issues with Silicon Valley movers and shakers, such as Netscape's Marc Andreessen and venture capitalist John Doerr. Louie and his wife, a product manager at Excite@Home Inc., were invited to the White House in February 1998 for a dinner hosting British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Last spring, Louie had a chance meeting that led to the CIA job. Known for his flight simulation software, he was invited to attend the real thing at an Atlanta aerial dog-fighting school. With an experienced co-pilot, he engaged in a mock fight with Randy Jayne, a partner at Heidrick & Struggles, the executive search firm. Jayne won, having flown fighter jets for more than two decades, including in combat.

In June, Jayne contacted Louie about the CIA job and sent him a document titled, "The Enterprise," which laid out the business plan for In-Q-It. "I didn't understand half the words," Louie confessed.

Funded with \$28 million from Congress, the nonprofit wanted to attract the kind of people who have lately gone to companies like eBay or Yahoo to come up with technologies the CIA can use, such as data search and retrieval.

"What the CIA wanted was the classic Silicon Valley success story," Jayne said. "But they also wanted someone who had old-fashioned patriotism who wanted to do service to their country."

"Why me?" Louie asked In-Q-It's board, which includes William Perry, the former secretary of defense, and Norm Augustine, chairman of Lockheed Martin Corp. They told him: "You are more prototypical of the valley. We want you to infect us with a cultural change."

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The New York Times  
November 6, 1999, Saturday, Late Edition - Final  
SECTION: Section B; Page 2; Column 3; Metropolitan Desk

LENGTH: 622 words

HEADLINE: C.I.A. Chief Slips In to Study Police Department Program

BYLINE: By JAYSON BLAIR

**BODY:**

Cloaked in a befitting amount of secrecy, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, was quickly shuttled into police headquarters in Lower Manhattan yesterday morning to see the nerve center of the city's war on crime.

Mr. Tenet, the Queens-born head of the C.I.A., is the latest in a long line of agency officials who have visited to study the program known as Compstat, in which the department uses block-by-block crime statistics to measure police performance, detect crime trends and quickly deploy resources to trouble spots. The program, which the department began using in 1994, got its name for its use of computer statistics and has been widely credited as being at the heart of the city's success in reducing crime.

One police official who attended the session said the C.I.A. director was "really impressed" with the Compstat meeting, which was held early yesterday in the eighth-floor command and control center at police headquarters. Lower-level C.I.A. officials visited the sessions in previous years and the department had sent the agency tapes of the meetings, the official said.

During the first year of the Giuliani administration, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton began holding the weekly meetings of police supervisors, during which commanders were forced to explain crime patterns in their precincts and devise strategies. The meetings frequently included bitter criticism of supervisors under whose watch crime had increased.

The Compstat process has continued under Commissioner Howard Safir, and the crime rate has declined sharply. Two years ago, the National Performance Review, Vice President Al Gore's task force that seeks to "reinvent government," gave the program an award.

Police officials said Mr. Tenet is considering a system similar to Compstat to coordinate the efforts of the C.I.A. and other U.S. intelligence agencies. One police official who helped devise the system said it could prove very useful.

"Generally, we humans just don't play well together," said Jack Maple, a former deputy police commissioner for operations who was Commissioner Bratton's chief anticrime strategist. "The C.I.A. could use this method effectively. I am sure that with this system they would more easily be able to pick up on when a government is about to be overthrown."

In yesterday's meeting, police officials reviewed trends in the command that covers northern Queens, which includes the neighborhood in Little Neck where Mr. Tenet grew up.

Mr. Tenet became the director of central intelligence in 1995 after serving as the deputy director of the C.I.A. and on the National Security Council. Mr. Tenet's father, John, ran the 20th Century Diner, in Little Neck. His father and mother, Evangelia, who speaks mostly Greek, still live in Queens.

"We really got grilled today because the director of the C.I.A. was there, but he's gone now," said one Queens police official, breathing a sigh of relief after leaving the first section of the three-hour meeting.

"He was really impressed with it, how they used maps and grids to track things, and how if someone failed, there was always someone to follow up," the official said. "I guess they hope that they can use it."

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Police officials were, officially, mum on the top spy's visit. The department's chief spokeswoman, Marilyn Mode, referred all questions to C.I.A. officials in Langley, Va., who said the agency generally does not comment on the director's schedule. But Mr. Tenet and his security detail were spotted leaving police headquarters at 8:35 a.m.

City officials said that they had recently contacted the agency to discuss terrorism threats and expect to meet with senior officials later this year.

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November 10, 1999, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final  
SECTION: Section A; Page 14; Column 5; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 172 words

HEADLINE: Israel Supplying Advanced Radar to China

BYLINE: AP

DATELINE: JERUSALEM, Nov. 9

**BODY:**

Israel is outfitting a Chinese air force plane with an advanced airborne early-warning system that will allow the aircraft to conduct long-range radar **surveillance**, an Israeli official said today.

The Soviet-made Ilyushin-50 aircraft has been in Israel for more than two weeks, being mounted with the Phalcon radar system, said the Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The radar system is made by Elta, a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries. It designed the system for the Israeli air force using a Boeing 707 airliner as a platform.

A United States Government official confirmed that Israel was providing such material for a plane for China, and said Israel had assured Washington that no American technology was involved.

The Chinese Defense Minister, Chi Haotian, who visited Israel last month, discussed the possibility that Israel Aircraft Industries might upgrade China's MIG-21 fighters, which form the backbone of the Chinese Air Force but are antiquated, the newspaper Haaretz said.

the benefit of SCSSI. Another matter linked to information security is causing concern at SGDN; namely, how to protect classified information from possible disruption by the Y2K bug. An entire unit headed by SGDN's deputy director, gen. Pierre Costedoat, has been assigned to the task. The actual switchover to Jan. 1 doesn't seem to present much danger to the most sensitive systems. But the unit nonetheless will keep a close watch for several weeks, paying particularly attention to how systems react to the date February 29, 2000.

## Russia

### New Espionage Push in Southern Europe

Russian intelligence is on the move in southern Europe and around the Black Sea in what seems a drive to promote Russia's economic interests although nobody knows specifically what interests are involved. Bulgaria and Romania seem the main target of the offensive.

European diplomats have noted a major build-up of the foreign intelligence service Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) in Sofia. This has taken place through the Overgas company, Bulgarian affiliate of Russia's Gasprom group. The role of SVR agents has been to pump Russian money into the Bulgarian economy through Overgas, using the cover of working for the affiliate. Technically, the investments are made through another company, a well-known, Sofia-based insurance company controlled by Russian businessmen. Nobody has a clear idea about the origin of their money.

The Russian military intelligence agency Glavno Razuznavatelno Upravlenie (GRU) is also thick on the ground in Sofia. According to Bulgarian interior ministry sources, the GRU's local bureau sees to the smooth execution of Russian military and industrial export contracts, as Bulgaria has emerged as a major commercial and financial crossroads for the Russians.

The GRU station chief, Ravil Hayrullin, steps in directly when a sale is made. Customers are asked to pay for their goods in an account opened at the Rosseximbank and the money then leaves the country for an account at the Banco Vital in Mexico City.

### NOTES

**UNITED KINGDOM - Your Master's Voice.** A retail CD company based in Britain, IrDial-disc, has begun marketing compact disks that contain secret messages sent over the airwaves by the world's intelligence agencies in recent decades. They are sound recordings of short-wave broadcasts sent by the agencies to their spies as they move about on assignment. Four CDs contain 150 recordings spanning the last 20 years. Since the outset of the Cold War the agencies have been using short-wave radio to send anonymous, one way communications that can be heard by anybody with a transistor radio on condition the exact frequency is known. This has permitted spies of every stripe to receive instructions from head office without carrying any compromising equipment on them. The system works by voices repeating strings of numbers or

phonetic letters known only to the spy in the field - a perfectly unbreakable "one-time pad." The system - known as Numbers Stations - is still very much in existence today despite the end of the Cold War that spawned it.

**FRANCE - The Latest in Psychological Ops.** France's Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique has just published a paper entitled "Modern Aspects of Psychological Action" compiled by Francois Gere, founder of the Observatoire des Operations Psychologiques. In the paper he outlines the most recent developments in the branch, focussing particularly on the period 1998-1999. He provides a detailed rundown of a SFOR-backed propaganda campaign that has used various media and lobbying techniques to gradually persuade the different communities to live together once again. The paper also provides insight into Battalion 950, the German Army unit that specializes in psychological operations.

**UNITED STATES - Backdoors Used in Operation.** According to American experts, a law enforcement drive spearheaded by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) against a Colombian drug cartel provided an occasion to use the most sophisticated equipment to crack encrypted computer and telephone messages. When DEA agents started gathering evidence against a Colombian cartel they discovered it was using highly secure encrypted telephone and computer systems. After they had cracked the codes, a few guarded words by attorney general Janet Reno let it be known they had probably done so by using a secret backdoor installed in the encryption software. A DEA official said: "The defendants used very sophisticated communications equipment but in the end it was these very devices in fact that led to the devastating evidence used in court against them."

**UNITED STATES - Work on Information Security "Largely Fruitless."** Several leading information industry specialists and academics have concluded that all the work done by NSA, Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and a group of four European countries to set new information security standards had been "largely fruitless." The experts who form a panel known as the Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness, had been commissioned by NSA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to study the effectiveness of current systems. One expert, Steven Kent, said of the new version of the Common Criteria "It is not clear it will work any better than previous criteria." He also bemoaned the fact that most network security defenses in use today are ad hoc and, as such, ineffective.

**INTERNATIONAL - New Interpol Intranet.** The international police organization Interpol recently inaugurated a world-wide network that provides staff with a data bank on crime across the globe and on all persons wanted by the police. Named Interpol Criminal Information Service (ICIS), it is run by a six-man team of agents working under superintendent Damien Calamand at Interpol headquarters in Lyons. Truly operational since September, the International Intranet not only contains files of criminals or traffickers but also information on go-betweens and people merely suspected of wrongdoing. Given the sensitivity of the information, only Interpol offices throughout the world have access to it, but some intelligence services do as well. Other police services are connected to a degraded version of it, the Automated Search Facility. (ASF)

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National Review

November 22, 1999

**SECTION:** On the Right; Vol. LI, No. 22**LENGTH:** 810 words**HEADLINE:** Amnesty for Spies**BODY:**

NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 17

It was bandied about last week that if President Clinton could grant the Puerto Rican community a pardon of the 14 terrorists, why couldn't he do something for the Jewish community? Like what? Grant a pardon to Jonathan Pollard.

Several years ago, after I addressed an annual gathering of Jewish New Yorkers who did me the honor of an award, a questioner at the end of the hour asked whether I agreed with her that Jonathan Pollard should be pardoned. I said no, I hoped, on the contrary, that he would be executed. There was some dismay on the part of the questioner, shared with most of the audience, I judged from the general (though by no means unanimous) moaning over my reply. In subsequent months, the case for Jonathan Pollard was widely advanced. What it said, essentially, was that 1) the information stolen from the Navy by Pollard was not really critical in importance, and 2) in any event, it was conveyed not to the Soviet Union, which was our enemy, but to Israel, which is our friend.

The gentrification of Mr. Pollard's offense was interrupted by a massive article last January in The New Yorker by Seymour Hersh which 1) described in devastating detail the importance of the information stolen by Pollard; 2) explained how the information even in the hands of an ally was greatly dangerous; and 3) revealed that the transaction had been commercial. Pollard was indeed pro-Israel. But his services were being paid for in cash. And anyway, United States law does not distinguish between giving state secrets to Moscow and giving them to Luxembourg.

The plea to let Pollard go was renewed at the time of the Wye Accords a year ago, when Mr. Clinton pressed upon Arafat and Netanyahu one of the episodic detentes. When it was learned that Mr. Clinton was leaning favorably to the request by Netanyahu to release Pollard, word got out that the head of the CIA and (reputedly) other high officials in the American intelligence establishment would resign in protest. Clinton backed down. The gravity of espionage is wilting.

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And at another level, with the end of the Cold War the practice of treason has sprouted little retroactive buds of derring-do and childlike wantonness. The climax in the prettification of dishonor came last week with the preliminary revelation of the Mitrokhin Archive (documents from a Russian KGB official who defected to the West), about which Prof. Christopher Andrew, a Cambridge scholar, has written a book. He identifies a British spy whose description, age, activity, and motives are as from a novel by Agatha Christie.

Her name, if you can stand it, is- Melita Norwood.

How old is she?-Eighty seven.

Where does she live? In . . . Bexleyheath! Forsooth. That's southeast London.

How was she dressed, when last seen? "In a wide-collared lavender floral print blouse and gray tweed skirt."

Where did she do it-whatever it was that she did?

Well, she worked as a secretary for something called the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association, which is evidently the home of the tube-alloys project.

What on earth is the tube-alloys project?

It is a code name for nuclear-weapons research. Dear Mrs. Norwood, year after year, copied secret documents developed by British nuclear researchers and passed them along to the Soviet Union.

Why did she do that?

Because, she explained, after the war she concluded that Stalin was giving "ordinary people food and fares which they could afford, a good education, and a health service." Moreover, the Communist government was doing this for the people "at great cost." Mrs. Norwood did not describe that cost as including some 20 million dead of starvation and torture. She said only that she thought it important to provide a "counterbalance" to capitalism, and wrong for the West to have a monopoly on nuclear weapons. "In the war," she explained to a television interviewer, "the Russians were on our side, and it was unfair to them that they shouldn't be able to develop their own weaponry."

How many of these types are there around? Many more, successive revelations seem to be telling us, than Sen. McCarthy ever suspected. The Mitrokhin Archive will "unmask" a dozen more Britons who worked for Soviet intelligence including, writes Warren Hoge of the New York Times, "a former Scotland Yard officer and a person described tantalizingly by the author as 'a prominent public figure who is now dead.'"

But he didn't die on the gibbet. And no one will harm a hair of Norwood's head. And we do not know how many plans were ruined, security precautions thrown to the wind, lives imperiled by the activity of Jonathan Pollard, one of only a half-dozen of the family of Aldrich Ames who thought it appropriate-for whatever reason-to write their own policy on national secrets.

-Universal Press Syndicate

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**Document 15 of 58.**Copyright 1999 Newsweek  
Newsweek

November 15, 1999, Atlantic Edition

**SECTION:** EUROPE; Pg. 35**LENGTH:** 878 words**HEADLINE:** The White House and the Wall**BYLINE:** By Condoleezza Rice**HIGHLIGHT:**

Ten years after the collapse of communism, an aide to President Bush recalls how Washington dealt with events in Berlin.

**BODY:**

The days leading up to Nov. 9, 1989, had been at once disorienting and exhilarating. Poland and Hungary were free; the revolution was headed for the heart of Germany. That morning, there was a briefing for President Bush on the deteriorating situation in East Germany, the refugee crisis and the futile attempts of the East German regime to right itself. The CIA briefer joked that he had torn up his report three times on the ride from Langley--trying without success to keep up with the tide of new information.

Late in the afternoon I was in the office of European Directorate Chief Bob Blackwill when the phone rang: Brent Scowcroft urgently needed an assessment of events in Berlin for the president. Do you mean an update of this morning's briefing? Blackwill asked. No, he was told. He wants to know about the fact that the East Germans have opened the wall. Turn on CNN. I went home that night and watched the spectacle on television, joyful but shocked that this 30-year symbol of Europe's division had fallen with hardly a whimper.

By the next day my jubilation gave way to the realization that we suddenly faced a policy problem of enormous gravity and complexity. Deputy national-security adviser Bob Gates and I were asked to receive the Russian ambassador at an unconscionably early hour. Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev had sent a letter to President Bush that emphasized the Soviet Union's role as one of the four occupying powers in Germany and reminded us that the Soviets could veto events in Berlin and in Germany as a whole. Gorbachev warned that Helmut Kohl and the West Germans might go too far and inflame passions on both sides of the wall. And he made it clear that Moscow would defend its interests, pointing out not too subtly that the Soviet Union had 390,000 troops in East Germany. It

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was clear that nothing could be taken for granted in bringing the cold war to an end.

Everything changed that day. For those of us directly involved, there was no other issue but Germany. The revolution in Czechoslovakia and the bloody Romanian revolt were still to come. But I can barely remember our response. The fall of the wall was the start of the cold war's endgame and everyone understood that.

We knew immediately that American triumphalism would backfire. We had to find a way to make the end of Soviet power in Europe and the continued existence of NATO seem to be in everyone's interest, including Moscow's. And we needed a Soviet Union coherent enough to agree to Germany's eventual unification. It was not long before we realized that Gorbachev was the Soviet leader most likely to make that decision. Speed was of the essence as the Kremlin's problems mounted at home.

There were other challenges, too. Managing the French and the British, neither of whom was particularly in favor of a united Germany, was one such problem. Some worried about a separate deal between Moscow and Berlin, but that possibility seemed remote. Indeed, President Bush was so strong in his personal belief in German democracy and the country's Western orientation that we worried little about the emergence of a strong Germany in the center of Europe. Still, at times, the Germans seemed tone-deaf to how their slogan of the moment, one nation, one people, sounded.

Personally, I could not believe my great fortune. I was witnessing the kind of diplomacy that only comes at the end of great wars, when foreign ministers and presidents, not assistants and bureaucrats, sit across tables designing the geopolitical future. It was remarkable to watch East Germany and the Soviet Union weakening before my very eyes. By September Gorbachev had told his aides that with Eastern Europe and Germany lost, the task was to defend the integrity of the Soviet Union itself. That task, too, was beyond the Soviets' power.

Ten years later Europe bears no open wounds from the resolution of the German question. The statecraft of the time must be judged a success. But the fall of the wall was not just a matter of Europe's political future. Nov. 9 and what followed also changed forever the lives of Germany's people.

I vividly recall one incident that brought that point home. I traveled to Berlin on July 1, the day of monetary unity and the day that the checkpoints between East and West were opened to permit a free flow of traffic between the two sides. During the cold war U.S. drivers drove Americans into East Berlin. This time, I was picked up by a West Berliner, now ostensibly free to drive into the East. As we approached the checkpoint he became visibly nervous. But when we arrived, there were no guards there. I thought about times past, when stern and threatening East Germans had insisted on searching the car. I do not know what went through the driver's mind at that moment and I did not ask. But I could see the tears flowing from his eyes.

I was surprised to find that I was crying, too. For better or worse, the German people were no longer divided by a confrontation between great powers. The psychological, economic and political gulf between them remains; it may be generations before they are actually one. But the process that began that November day continues and Germany's future is finally for Germans to decide.

**GRAPHIC: PHOTO:** Team Bush: Once an aide to the president, Rice now advises his son

## TECHNOLOGY

## NOTES

## Cybercrime

**Revolutionary Hacker Trap.** The Japanese company **Hucom** has begun developing software that can detect hackers trying to use stolen passwords to gain entry into networks. The program, which Tokyo-based Hucom wants to start marketing next year, is based on a server that monitors a local area network to create a profile of the computer habits of each legitimate user – their keyboard and mouse operations, for instance – before tying the profile to the user's password. If a user with the same password shows a completely different profile the software assumes a hacker has accessed the network and cuts the line. The software was developed in conjunction with a laboratory at the University of Tokyo. The initial program will be able to deal with small networks numbering only a few dozen users but Hucom says it plans to work with the university to build a faster and more precise version that can handle networks of up to several hundred users. Hucom has hooked up with **NexPoint Networks**, a leading software provider to sell the hacker trap in Japan, the second largest network market in the world.

## Biometrics

**DNA Recorded on Chip.** The French armaments board, **Délegation Générale pour l'Armement (DGA)**, will begin consultations at year's end on launching a study to create "a DNA chip for biological and chemical identification purposes." The work will be carried out under the authority of DGA's **Force Systems** department and be closely monitored by the department's **Nuclear Programs Service**. The aim of the venture will be to develop a DNA system to identify certain categories of military personnel by recording their DNA on a chip. The research contract will be reserved exclusively for French companies with security clearance to take part in military projects.

## Research

**New Partnerships for DERA.** Britain's **Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA)** will stage its annual meeting at Ascot on Nov. 24 with the firm idea of promoting partnerships with other U.K. research outfits. The **Pathfinder Conference**, organized by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), informs corporate and academic R&D units about military research programs and asks them to propose projects. Once a project is selected the MoD can take a full year to evaluate it before agreeing to put up money but the contract can be well worth the waiting – up to this year the Pathfinder system has given rise to 412 contracts worth £79 million to over 80 organizations. Another 100 proposals are currently being processed and could be worth an additional £13 million.

## FBI Picks Top Fingerprint Scanner

An exhibition organized by the **International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)** on Oct. 30 in Charlotte, North Carolina, provided an occasion to put one of the world's best fingerprint scanning systems through its paces. Developed by the U.S. concern **Cross Match Technologies** at West Palm Beach in Florida, the new **ID1000** system beat all of its rivals when the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** held a competition to find its future fingerprint scanner. ID1000 won hands down and will be used by the agency.

The system will form part of the FBI's new **Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)**, a new computerized fingerprint identification system that will permit law enforcement agencies to obtain an instantaneous match regardless of where they are operating, by using a simple laptop computer. The various part of IAFIS are being evaluated by the FBI's **Communications & Technologies Branch** which determines the quality and capacity of each part and the speed that data can be transmitted.

The ID1000 comes in a steel box some 3.75 inches in height, 8 inches in width and 17.5 inches in length. To get a print, the finger is pressed on a glass plate under which a digital **Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor** camera is placed. The device then transfers the data to any PC running **Windows** via a 200 Mbps **IEEE 1394** interface. The interface, also known as **FireWire**, was developed by the manufacturer who was looking for a new way to communicate scanner data without any deterioration in picture quality. In addition to defining the image produced by the scanner the main problem was preserving it once it was transferred to the PC. For the moment the ID100 can achieve imaging at 500 dpi and a next generation will probably attain 1,000 dpi. The manufacturers also met with other FBI requisites because their system can compress data and encrypt it before sending it to the user. Founded in 1996 and specializing in the development of biometric devices, **Cross Match** hopes to capitalize on its endorsement by the FBI to market a version of the ID1000 for the private sector.

## NRO Peers into the Future

The U.S. space-based intelligence agency **National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)** has lifted a further veil on the invitation to tender it issued on Oct. 4 to private and public U.S. research centers to produce ideas enabling it to meet the most fundamental technological challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In a memorandum dated Oct. 21, the NRO listed the fields in which it was seeking innovative ideas. They cover satellite surveillance technology allowing for the "detection, identification, characterization of advanced systems" such as "cruise missiles, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and submarines."

But the NRO said it was also keenly interested in new ways of guaranteeing that tactical and strategic ballistic missiles could be identified and tracked, as well as ways of protecting against electromagnetic signals. As a sign of the times, it also appealed for new technology to monitor drug-producing regions.

Spearheaded by the NRO's **Advanced Systems and Technologies Directorate (ASTD)** – one of the agency's eight sub-divisions – the project aims to fulfil the requirements of the **Director's Innovation Initiative**. That initiative is designed to help NRO preserve its scientific and technical lead, an overarching aim of the agency's current deputy chief, **David Kler**, a former senior official at **NASA** who went on to work in the **Office of Development and Engineering** in the **CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology** before transferring over to the **National Reconnaissance Office**.

Government and private research bodies have until Nov. 17 to submit their ideas. Those selected by the NRO will be given seed money up to a maximum of \$350,000 and are expected to elaborate their projects within a period of nine months. The evaluation procedure will be different depending on whether the submissions are by government or non-government organizations.

The NRO says that, historically, 1 in every 13 proposal submitted to its experts wins funding. Additional money beyond the initial feasibility phase isn't possible with the **Director's Innovation Initiative** but a full 15% of DII projects get money from other NRO offices to pursue their work. NRO says the thrust behind the yearly competition is to give developers who aren't traditionally associated with the NRO to participate in helping the agency fulfil its mission to "revolutionize global reconnaissance."

## China

### The Quiet Men Behind Jiang Zemin

Several prominent Chinese intelligence aides figured discreetly in the delegation that accompanied president Jiang Zemin on his recent tour of the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Morocco. European experts noted the presence of You Xigui, presented officially as deputy head of a service connected to the Chinese Communist Party's central committee but who, in reality, is in charge of the central security bureau (Zhongyuan Jingwujie). He counts among the president's closest advisors on security questions. In Lisbon You and his deputy, Jiang Guangqing, teamed up with Liao Hui, director for Hong Kong and Macau affairs on the State Affairs Council, to conduct sensitive talks with Portuguese officials on Macao's handover to China on Dec. 31. According to *Intelligence Newsletter* sources close to the Portuguese side, the talks focussed essentially on the future state secretary for security who has been chosen by China to ensure the hand-over passes smoothly in the most sensitive areas. The Chinese divulged his name to the Portuguese, Cheong Kuok Va. One of his first duties will be to resolve the problem of criminal gangs that have set up shop in the Portuguese colony. In doing so he is expected to work in close conjunction with Gong'anbu, the public security agency.

## United States

### Civilians Bucking Change at NSA

National Security Agency insiders say the organization's new director, Lt.-Gen. Michael Hayden, who took up his job in March, has run into opposition in his attempts to revamp the agency. The resistance has come from career officials at NSA, including Hayden's deputy, Barbara McNamara.

Hayden has been virtually absent from a number of official NSA functions because he has been constantly tied up in meetings trying to overhaul the increasingly lethargic and top-heavy agency. Hayden and his allies feel NSA has lost much of its ability to conduct SIGINT operations around the world because of two main technological factors: fiber optics and the wide availability of 128-bit and higher encryption.

Hayden and other senior officers at NSA feel the time has come to recognize the wide availability of encryption and challenges posed by the Internet and re-gear NSA to deal with SIGINT in new ways. However, he is said to face both opposition and technical ignorance from long-standing civilian managers who have been with the agency for over 20 years.

This is particularly the case with his deputy, Ms. McNamara, and for gen. Barbara Fast, deputy head of the Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) which deter-

mines the American government's encryption policy. Other long-standing executives are Joann Grube, deputy political director, and Frank Blanco, executive director.

**I**n The tension comes at a time when hitches have occurred in missions normally handed to the agency. During a recent meeting of the National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security Committee (NSTISSC), an intelligence community agency that answers to the National Security Council, a NSA official told of lapses in his agency's training, accreditation and certification procedures for information systems security. During a hearing described as "for official use only," Vic Maconachy said Russia and Greece were more advanced than the U.S. in training systems security personnel. As an example he said that no less than 900 officials from Central Bank of Russia had followed intensive training courses.

## France

### SGDN in Growing Security Role

According to senior defense ministry aides, France's Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale (SGDN) plays a pivotal role in the security of information systems and should do so even more in the months ahead. The aides say that 40% of the cases that SGDN deals with at present concern information security.

The change began in May when the SGDN's Defense & Nation service was overhauled (IN 359) to make way for a Protection & State Security service headed by Jean-Yves Audoin. The service now has three sub-departments; one deals with the security of France's defense system and compliance with state secrets; a second plans security arrangements; and a third sees to the security of telecommunications networks.

The latter sub-department now plays a central role in monitoring the installation of security systems across the entire French civil service, an installation that has gone hand in hand with linking the administration to the Internet. Officials who see to the defense of France's national interests in each government department have met regularly to coordinate the effort.

The technical side has been overseen by the Service Central pour la Securite des Systemes d'Information (SCSSI). The latter is also likely to play an ever-more important role in the future and could even become a fully-fledged department, with its own budget and bigger staff.

Indeed, that metamorphosis could begin in the spring. Some sources believe that SCSSI's 60-strong payroll could increase by 50% in 2000. And the service is slated to leave its premises at Issy les Moulineaux south of Paris for roomier offices.

SGDN's budget was increased by 20% this year by prime minister Lionel Jospin and 70% of that extra money has been earmarked for information security, to

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November 11, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition  
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A02

LENGTH: 990 words

HEADLINE: FBI to Restructure, Adding Emphasis on Crime Prevention

BYLINE: David A. Wise; Lorraine Adams, Washington Post Staff Writers

**BODY:**

In its most dramatic organizational overhaul in decades, the FBI is changing its structure to address internal problems with the handling of information and put a greater emphasis on preventing terrorism and espionage, rather than simply responding to such crimes after they happen.

In an interview, FBI Deputy Director Robert M. Bryant characterized the restructuring, which bureau officials plan to announce today, as a "sea change" that will encourage the sharing of information between divisions and better communication between analysts and senior officials.

"We collect a lot of information, but . . . our predictive intelligence is poor," said Bryant, the second-in-command at the bureau. "The bottom line is, 'We don't know what we know.' "

The reorganization is an integral part of a broader transformation of the FBI under Director Louis J. Freeh and reflects his commitment to the bureau's growing role in fighting terrorism in the United States and around the world. The FBI's counter-terrorism budget has more than tripled in the past three years, while its overall budget has doubled from \$ 1.5 billion to about \$ 3 billion since Freeh took the helm in 1993.

Under the restructuring, the number of major operating divisions at the bureau will increase from two--the Criminal Division and National Security Division--to four. A new Counterterrorism Division will focus on terrorist threats and include the bureau's National Infrastructure Protection Center and its computer crimes unit; an Investigative Services Division will consolidate analysts who had worked in separate divisions and will also include the bureau's hostage rescue team and negotiators.

Bryant said the old system left analysts in different divisions focused too narrowly on their areas of expertise. For example, a suspect could be investigated separately for being a possible spy, terrorist or criminal, and information gathered about that person by various FBI specialists would not necessarily be shared. Bryant said such failures to share intelligence between divisions had resulted in senior FBI officials not always being aware of critical information in cases under investigation, including recent probes into campaign finance and Chinese espionage.

Bryant said the goal is to bring about a fundamental change in the bureau by transforming the FBI from a law enforcement agency with a structure and culture that revolved mostly around investigating crimes after the fact to one that puts more emphasis on identifying threats and preventing crimes from occurring.

"The FBI for the next century has to not only be able to react to a bombing in Oklahoma City and put a thousand agents on it [but] to be able to prevent that," said Bryant, who has worked at the FBI for 31 years and is leaving at the end of the month to take a job in the insurance industry fighting fraud. "It is very easy to revel in our glory where we solve crimes that happened. I think our greater obligation is to prevent them."

Bryant's assessment of the difficulties inside the FBI is unusual for a senior official of the bureau, which is better known for trumpeting its achievements. And it comes as senior FBI officials are actively implementing the first stages of the sweeping reorganization, following the plan's recent quiet approval by Congress.

Bryant, himself a former head of the national security division, said one problem with the existing structure is that the national security chief frequently becomes preoccupied by serious terrorist threats, leaving no senior official to

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pay sufficient attention to counterintelligence. The creation of a new, separate anti-terrorism unit will permit the head of the National Security Division to focus heavily on counterintelligence. This change will enable the FBI, Bryant said, to adopt a more aggressive posture on espionage threats and other foreign intelligence matters where the FBI works closely with the CIA and the Department of Defense.

Despite the need for changes, Bryant said the FBI does a solid job of investigating and solving the vast array of crimes. He said the new design for the FBI followed vigorous debate within the bureau and is linked directly to a new five-year FBI strategic plan that creates three tiers of priorities for the bureau, with the greatest emphasis on a group of "Tier One" programs: foreign intelligence, and combating terrorist and criminal activities that affect national and economic security.

In the short run, Bryant said the new structure will not require additional funding for the FBI. But the deputy director said additional funding would be needed in the years ahead to help the FBI catch up with fast-moving changes in technology.

Bryant said the FBI's aggressive efforts to develop better predictive and anti-terrorism capabilities would raise some concerns about civil liberties issues. But he said the bureau can accomplish its new mission while holding fast to traditional standards of gathering intelligence that respect the public's right to privacy and the need to handle classified information properly.

"We are going to carefully adhere to the guidelines and the rules of the road," Bryant said. "It is just basically making sure that we are getting the most out of the information we have."

Bryant called the structural changes the FBI is making "overdue" and said the bureau has moved too slowly on some matters in the past, primarily because of its structure and the way it handled information.

"The violent crime issue in this country, in my opinion, got way out ahead of us," Bryant said. "When we finally did mobilize, I think we were very effective. But I think if we basically had been doing more predictive intelligence, we would have moved resources much faster."

Deputy FBI Director Robert M. Bryant describes the restructuring as a "sea change" that will encourage internal sharing of information.

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Armed Forces Journal International  
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## Grave New World

### *The Hart-Rudman Commission Presented Its Sobering Vision Of Future Security Threats. Did Anyone Notice?*

By Jason Sherman

Ensnconced in a suite of offices, minutes by foot from the Pentagon, a retired Air Force general and a full-time support staff head to work each day in a Crystal City, VA high-rise, laboring to one day break down the current US national security structure. This, however, is no seditious mission. To the contrary, the aim of their toils was conceived by the House Speaker, sanctioned by the president, and chartered last year by the defense secretary. The objective is to deliver—to the next president of the United States—a well-considered, reasoned, and relevant set of recommendations on how to revamp America's national security apparatus for the next century (December 1998 AFJI).

In September, this panel—now known as The US Commission on National Security/21st Century—delivered the first of two interim reports to Defense Secretary William Cohen. The findings present a sobering vision of the future and a conviction that the existing mechanisms established under the National Security Act of 1947 are increasingly outdated to address threats the US will face in the next century.

The commission, chaired by former Sens. Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Gary Hart (D-CO) (who replaced former Sen. David Boren on the panel), found that Americans will become increasingly less secure, "much less secure than they now believe themselves to be," in a new report. "The evidence suggests that threats to American security will be more diffuse, harder to anticipate, and more difficult to neutralize than ever before. Deterrence will not work as it once did; in many cases it may not work at all. There will be a blurring of boundaries: between homeland defense and foreign policy; between sovereign states and a plethora of protectorates and autonomous zones; between the pull of national loyalties on individual citizens and the pull of loyalties both more local and more global in nature."

These findings were the work of a commission composed of retired military brass, politicians no longer in office, former executive branch appointees, a onetime mayor, a retired journalist, and a defense industry captain. Original plans called for the panel to include more leading thinkers based outside Washington, DC; historian and writer Stephen Ambrose and former California governor Pete Wilson, for instance, both planned to take part, but later opted out.

By design, the report makes no recommendations; it simply sets out to describe the global security environment the US will face in the early part of the next century. The council has now begun work on identifying what it believes US strategic interests in the next century will be; these will be outlined in a second report, due in April. A third and final report, expected in February 2001, will recommend changes to the national security structure necessary to ensure protection of the identified strategic interests.

The authors can only hope that the next two reports generate more attention than the findings released in September, which barely made a splash. Many of the findings bear a resemblance to assessments of the future security environment that other commissions have made in recent years. Among these are expectations that the US will not have a global competitor for decades, that the US will remain the dominant military power, and that weapons of mass destruction will likely be used on US soil. The commission hopes to differentiate itself from previous defense reviews, such as the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions, and the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel of 1997, by taking a more comprehensive view of US security needs.

"I think our charter is much broader and deeper and more profound than any of the other studies [that have been done since the end of the Cold War]," said Sen. Hart. "If we do our work well, it will force a national discussion about US national security in the 21st century, which none of the others have done. We are attempting here to begin to get the American people involved in a sweeping national discussion about what dangers we will face in the next century, [and] not just military dangers—economic dangers, military dangers, terrorist dangers, all kinds of things."

While the September report made no recommendations, its findings imply that calls for major changes will be forthcoming in the final report. For example, the prospect that America's homeland will become increasingly vulnerable to attack suggests a need for homeland and civil defense that would require a "significant redistribution of authority and power," said former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, now a member of the commission. The report also finds that weapons will likely be put into space. "That has all sorts of implications," said Gingrich. "It means that a truly global power—that is, a truly space-based power—may, in fact, be permanently everywhere, by having both overhead access for

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intelligence and overhead access for delivering firepower in a way that has no resemblance to delivering a World War II-style theater campaign with an expeditionary force that John Wayne would have understood."

Getting the US public to understand the need to overhaul the current national security organization may be the Commission's biggest challenge. By comparison with the changes made in the National Security Act of 1947, "our task is much more difficult," Hart said. "The central organizing principle in 1947 was explainable in three words: containment of communism. Those three words were a centerpiece of this country's foreign policy and our defense policy for a half-century. The amazing thing to me, personally, with this debate that we're trying to stimulate here is that it's taken 10 years to get going; it's taken the full decade of the 1990s. If this document begins that debate, then we've been more than successful."

## WHO'S WHO

**Rafi Abdulatif Talfah**

Iraq

Iraqi president Saddam Hussein named Rafi Abdulatif Talfah as head of Iraq's General Security Service on Oct. 15. He replaces gen. Jalil Haboosh al Takriti who has been asked to head another intelligence agency. Talfah is a former officer of the Special Security service headed by Qusay Hussein, an organization that controls other Iraqi intelligence services and protects Saddam Hussein and his family. Talfah's promotion clearly stems from his family ties with Saddam. He is, in fact, the cousin of the president's wife, Sajida, and as such belongs to the Takriti clan, the group closest to the seat of power. He joined the Baath party at an early age before being recruited as an intelligence operative. Following the outbreak of the war with Iran in 1980 he enrolled at Al Bakr university in Baghdad, taking a course in security studies. After tracking down the regime's Shi'ite opponents he joined the Special Security service in 1988 just when it was being set up. Since that time he has been one of Qusai's favorites. And that connection with the president's son has spared him in the purges that regularly strike security circles.

**Ronald Zimet**

Israel

The former chairman of a U.K.-based business directories group **Freepages** and a Virgin Islands investment company named **Trellis International**, **Ronald Zimet**, is expected to give evidence at the Old Bailey in London in January against fugitive businessman **Andrew Regan** and two former colleagues, **Allan Green** and **David Chambers**. All three have been charged in connection with a £2.4 million bribe linked to a hostile takeover bid for the **Co-Operative Wholesale Society (CWS)**, a retail food chain with revenue of \$1.2 billion in 1997. Zimet is crucial to the success of the prosecution's case. He was a shareholder in **Hobson**, a company controlled by **Andrew Regan**, when the bribe was allegedly paid via **Trellis International's** offshore accounts to **Green** and **Chambers**, executives of **CWS**. **Regan** fled the U.K. two years ago just as Britain's **Serious Fraud Office (SFO)** was beginning its inquiry into the **CWS** takeover. The complicated case of corporate corruption based on the business relationships between former colleagues,

company executives and entrepreneurs is being closely monitored in British business circles not least because of the SFO's expensive and unsuccessful prosecution of the sons of **Robert Maxwell** some years ago.

✓ **Anthony Harrington**

United States

President **Bill Clinton** has just nominated **Anthony Harrington**, a lawyer with longstanding connections to intelligence, as U.S. ambassador to Brazil. The nomination was striking inasmuch as it came after long months in which no American ambassador was serving in Brazil, a leading commercial partner of the U.S. in Latin America. Up to now, **Harrington** had played a leading role in monitoring the U.S. intelligence community in his capacity as chairman of the **Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)** and vice chairman of the **President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)**. In those posts he drafted a report that appeared in

June, 1996 on CIA dealings in Guatemala. His investigation revealed that the CIA knowingly hired Guatemalan military officers suspected of political assassinations as informers. He has long enjoyed Clinton's trust; during the president's 1992 electoral campaign he served on the Clinton team as an advisor. Last spring Clinton asked the PFIAB to evaluate the damage from the national security compromises involving China. Some quarters felt that **Harrington**, with his known allegiance to Clinton, might understate the damage. Born in North Carolina and graduating with a degree from the Duke University School of law in 1966, **Harrington** began working as a lawyer with the firm **Hogan & Hartson** in Washington in 1968. A specialist in mergers and a known expert on telecommunications, he holds interests in the **MCI WorldCom** long distance telephone company. That firm is currently in dispute with Brazil over \$650 million in back taxes owed by the Brazilian long distance carrier it bought last year, **Embratel**.

## AGENDA

**COMPUTER SECURITY - Preventive Action.** The 15<sup>th</sup> Computer Security Applications Conference is to be held between Dec. 6-10 in Phoenix, Arizona on the theme of "practical solutions to real-world security problems." As such the conference will be geared to exploring technical solutions and several workshops are planned to enable experts to trade notes on various subjects. Among those expected to attend are **Holger Vogt**, **Henning Pagnia** and **Felix Gartner** from Darmstadt in Germany who specialize in protocols security; a team from Britain's **Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA)** will discuss trustworthy access control to web servers; **Deb Cooley** of the NSA will assess the robustness of security systems while **Mike Skroh** of DARPA is to talk on using **Red Team Metrics**; another speaker, **Ron Ross** of NIST, will talk on training for future security specialists. Contact: fax + 1 407 628 3186. Web: [www.acsac.org](http://www.acsac.org).

**BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE - Monitoring Methods.** A series of conferences devoted to competitive intelligence monitoring will be held in Paris between Nov. 17-19 on the theme of "monitoring procedures and strategic intelligence." The organizers have invited a number of professionals to present operational methods that are used in companies or institutions. A lot of very practical problems are to be broached, such as how companies should deal with feedback; the subject will be discussed by **Francois Thonin**, in charge of competitive intelligence at **Chronopost**; **Patrick Balldt**, director of scientific and technical information at France's **Atomic Energy Commission**, will deal with added value to be culled from the Internet. A run-down of the **Triz** method to detect weak signals will also be given. Contact: tel + 33 1 46 99 50 10.

**COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE - Focus on Insurance and Financial Services.** A conference on the tactical uses of competitive intelligence in the insurance and financial services industry will be held in New York on Dec. 6. Most of the speakers will be corporate specialists in the field, including **Phillip Lawson**, senior vice president for strategic marketing, **GE Financial Assurance**; **Alan Thomson**, vice president, **Marsh Financial Services**; **Mark Chusid**, president, **Advanced Competitive Strategies, Inc**; and **Sam Chiodo**, vice president for corporate and strategic marketing at the **MONY** group. Included in the subjects will be: using competitive information as a marketing tool; using Internet technology to improve a company's approach to competitive intelligence and analytic tools for effective pricing assessments. Contact: SRI tel+212 967 0095; fax +212 967 8021.

# Sticking to His Guns

**Retired Admiral stands behind his decision to use Agent Orange in Vietnam.**



Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr. was chosen over 35 more senior officers to become Chief of Naval Operations in 1970.

**R**ETIRED Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr. didn't plan on a Navy career. The man who in 1970 became the youngest-ever Chief of Naval Operations came within two weeks of attending West Point. Swayed by a family friend's tales of seafaring adventure, Zumwalt instead went to the Naval Academy, graduating cum laude in 1942. Zumwalt, 79, is best remembered for supporting racial integration of the Navy, and for increasing the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Zumwalt retired from the Navy in 1974 and is now involved with many humanitarian projects, including the National Marrow Donor Program, Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped and the Agent Orange Coordinating Council. He talked with *The American Legion Magazine* Assistant Editor Terry Coffey about his Navy years, and some of his post-retirement work.

**AMERICAN LEGION MAGAZINE:** In 1965, you became the youngest rear admiral in the Navy. In 1970 you became the youngest admiral. How did your relative youth affect your outlook and the job you did?

**ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT JR.:** When I became Chief of Naval Operations, I said I thought that compared to my predecessor, Admiral Moore, I had far less experience. But I thought an advantage was that, just nine years earlier, I had been in command of a ship. Therefore I was probably better able to relate to the problems and requirements of the younger generation of the Navy.

**Q.** What was your toughest decision as a leader?

**A.** It was when I had to send people into battle instead of being with them. In World War II, I was with my men. In the Korean War, I was with my men. If my ship got hit, I was at risk along with them. In Vietnam, although I was in a helicopter every day visiting sites, I had to send boats and aircraft into battle. I couldn't be with them. That's much tougher.

**Q.** What led to your decision, in 1968, to order the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam?

**A.** As the new commander of U.S. Naval forces in Vietnam, I changed our strategy, taking small craft away from the coasts and major rivers, where we no longer had a problem, and putting them into the narrow rivers and canals along the Cambodian border. This stopped the infiltration of logistics by the Viet Cong from Cambodia, but we were taking casualties at the rate of 6 percent a month, which meant the average young man had a 70 percent probability of being killed or wounded during his one year tour. The Army had been using Agent Orange for three years. The Pentagon reported to us that the chemical companies had said there were no serious health effects on humans and animals. Faced with the terrible attrition, I had the Air Force spray the narrow rivers and canals along the Cambodian border and other areas where we operated, which reduced the casualties to less than 1 percent a month. There are many thousands alive and unmaimed today because of this. The price we paid was that Agent Orange was carcinogenic, and

# INTERVIEW ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT JR.

has caused several hundreds of people to be seriously affected.

**Q.** Had you known this, would you have made the same decision?

**A.** Yes, I believe I would have had to, if we had no other defoliant, because we saved thousands at the expense of, later, hundreds. I've never bumped into any veterans, including our own son, who didn't say to me they were glad we defoliated.

**Q.** You mentioned your son (Elmo Zumwalt III), who died from cancer caused by exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam. His son, your grandson, has learning disabilities due to that exposure. Did you discuss your decision a great deal with your son?

**A.** Yes, I did. It was his belief that he was alive 15 more years as the result of the use of Agent Orange. He thought that his volunteering for the dangerous missions he volunteered for would quite likely have led to death or wounding, had it not been for the defoliation.

**Q.** You participate in many humanitarian projects, including the effort to assist Vietnamese amputees from both sides of the war. Why do this - especially for some who were, at one time, your enemies on the battlefield?

**A.** When I was a young lieutenant, I had the thrill of spending a day with Gen. George Marshall, who had just finished his tenure as secretary of state. I remember saying to him, "General, you've done so many things and have had so many honors. Why do you continue to serve instead of enjoying your retirement?" He said, "Young man, when you end up commanding forces in war, you'll find you automatically inherit two lifetime obligations. One is to continue to look out for the men who fought under you, and the other is to help bind up the wounds with the former enemy, so we can get on with a prospering world."

**Q.** In recent years, the Navy has been rocked by scandals, including "Tailhook." To what would you attribute those problems?



Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, meets with two young men representing his home state of California during the annual visitation to the Department of Defense by the American Legion Boys Nation. The youths are David P. Morgan, left, of El Cerrito, and Howard H. Hallman, of Vista.

## Path of Excellence

- Nov. 20, 1920: Born San Francisco, Calif.
- 1942: Graduates from U.S. Naval Academy.
- Oct. 22, 1945: Marries Mouza Coutelais-du-Roche, 21 days after meeting her.
- July 30, 1948: First son, Elmo III, is born.
- 1959: Takes command of frigate *USS Dewey*, the Navy's first guided-missile ship.
- 1965: Becomes U.S. Navy's youngest rear admiral.
- 1968: Named commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Vietnam; orders Agent Orange to be sprayed along canals and rivers near the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.
- 1970: Becomes youngest admiral and Chief of Naval Operations.
- 1974: Retires from U.S. Navy.
- 1977: Elmo Zumwalt IV is born; his learning disabilities are blamed on his father's exposure to Agent Orange.
- 1983: Elmo Zumwalt III is diagnosed with cancer - also



U.S. NAVY

- blamed on exposure to Agent Orange.
- 1986: *My Father, My Son*, the account of the Zumwalts' Vietnam experiences, is published.
- 1988: Elmo Zumwalt III dies of cancer.
- 1994: Zumwalt travels to South Vietnam for the first time since the war.

**A.** I think every generation has its own problems. On my watch, when we began to integrate the Navy after 200 years of racism, we had some problems as the increasing numbers of minority personnel began to come on board, and perceived no minorities in senior positions. One of my successors, Adm. Thomas Hayward, had difficulties with regard to personnel using drugs, and Adm. Frank Kelso had the problem with Tailhook. Military society reflects the young people who are brought in from each generation. Therefore, the problems that we have to deal with are reflective of the problems on the outside. The country was in the process of integrating racially when I was CNO. The country was dealing with the drug culture when the Navy had that problem under Adm. Hayward.

**Q.** How successfully has the Navy adapted to life after the Cold War?

**A.** I think the Navy has successfully transitioned from a Cold War Navy to a Navy able to deal with conflicts in more than one place. The Tomahawk cruise missile, which we began developing on my watch, has made it possible to turn any surface ship or submarine into an offensive platform. That means you don't have to have an aircraft carrier in every theater. You can show the flag with an offensive capability with a wide variety of ships.

**Q.** What is the biggest threat facing America today?

**A.** Our combined military forces are not adequate for a two-war capability. They are forced to be progressively extended, as a result of the frequent crises that we've had to deal with.

**NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL  
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION**

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The Christian Science Monitor  
November 12, 1999, Friday  
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LENGTH: 963 words

HEADLINE: Forcing a rethink of global security

BYLINE: Justin Brown, Special to The Christian Science Monitor

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

**HIGHLIGHT:**

An unrelenting US push for a missile-defense system raises concerns offriends and foes about a new arms race.

**BODY:**

The US desire to push forward with a national missile-defense system in the coming years is having a ripple effect across the globe, drawing criticism from allies and adversaries and threatening to spawn a new arms race.

The dispute has heated up this month as American and Russian officials exchange jabs over the US initiative, which is likely to permanently alter the landscape of international security strategy.

Designed to protect the entire country by shooting down incoming missiles, the defense system would give the US such a huge security advantage that other world powers would be forced to reexamine their most basic defense strategies.

Perhaps most significantly affected would be China, a country considering an overhaul of its defense doctrine ranging from deterrence to air power to nuclear arms. "A missile-defense system comes at a very crucial time, and there certainly will be a relation between what we do and what decisions the Chinese make," says Ronald Montaperto, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington.

Russia is also in strong opposition, as are NATO allies Germany and Britain, who are nervous about falling into an unprotected category while their most powerful ally is safe.

At the very least, these countries will have to consider similar systems or find a new way to remain secure in a vastly different environment. "The proliferation of long-range missiles - which could be equipped with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads - is as much of a threat for Europe as it is for North America," Alexander Vershbow, the US permanent representative to NATO, said this week.

The concept of a national missile-defense system is supported by most US leaders and military experts. With long-range missile technology becoming more accessible, building a shield is considered the only way to counter rogue states, some of whom may soon be able to wipe out a major US city at a moment's notice.

"With the ballistic-missile genie now out of the bottle, the US has to think very thoroughly about protecting its homeland," says Ariel Cohen, a researcher at the Heritage Foundation here. "It's no longer competing with [relatively] stable countries like the [former] USSR or even China, but it's competing with Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea."

What US politicians disagree on, however, is how fast and how extensively the Pentagon should move forward in deploying a system, a debate spurred by international resistance. President Clinton says he will decide as soon as next summer, although some analysts question whether he has enough time left in his term to tackle such a divisive issue.

Republicans generally support deployment as fast as possible, while Democrats favor a slower pace. A major sticking point is the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed in 1972 with the Soviet Union. It was written

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precisely to prevent a national missile defense, at a time when the risk of retaliation was a standard deterrent.

The Clinton administration has been trying to negotiate with the Russians to revise the treaty, but Moscow has refused to budge. Rather, the Russians tested an antiballistic missile last week and have repeatedly threatened to increase production and deployment of offensive missiles, should they ever need to overwhelm a US defense shield.

For the moment, the US is paring down the missile-defense plan to make it more compliant with the ABM Treaty - but critics warn of weakening the system to the point where it no longer justifies a cost of \$ 128 billion over 30 years.

"We've already compromised the system so much that it's not effective," says Dan Goure, who heads a missile-defense project for the Center for Strategic and International Studies here. Mr. Goure argues that a proper system cannot be built even loosely within the confines of the ABM Treaty and that if the treaty were scrapped, it would take 10 to 12 years to redesign a more thorough system.

The Russians oppose the US plan because it would change the scope of national security and put emphasis on costly systems that Moscow cannot afford.

The US has tried to reassure the Russians that the missile-defense system is designed for rogue states - who may only be able to fire a limited number of missiles at one time - and that it could not possibly stop their sizable arsenal. "The missile system we are planning is not designed to defend against Russia and could not do so," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in a speech Wednesday.

Still, some US officials vow that the United States will go ahead with an antimissile defense even if it means withdrawing from the treaty. As Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe put it last week: "We will not permit any other country to have a veto on actions that may be needed for the defense of our country."

While much of the Clinton administration's effort has focused on winning Russian support, China may loom as a greater danger. At the moment Beijing relies on a "minimal deterrent," in which they keep a small number of well-protected, advanced missiles in case they have to respond to an attack.

With a national defense system, China's ability to threaten the US would be limited - and it would need to develop new weapons.

China is also concerned about theater defenses the US is developing and deploying. The smaller-scale systems, such as the Patriot missiles, could be used to protect traditional Chinese rivals Taiwan and Japan.

"China is an even bigger problem than Russia," says Mr. Montaperto. "In the long run, they are more difficult and complex."

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November 8, 1999  
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HEADLINE: Russia's Defense Facing 25-Year Rehabilitation

BYLINE: PAUL MANN

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

**BODY:**

Russia will remain a Eurasian military power well into the next century, but the defense ministry's goal of fully upgrading the nation's forces by 2025 may take longer than that, according to National Defense University.

In its latest strategic assessment, the authoritative NDU says the Kremlin will have a tough time holding defense spending to no more than 3.5% of annual gross domestic product, while absorbing the high cost of modernizing and streamlining its sprawling military infrastructure.

As Moscow's war on Chechnya stretches out, the university warned that the decline in Russian military power is creating a vacuum in Central Asia and the strategic Caucasus. "Historically, Russia has provided regional stability," the assessment said, but its "capacity to dominate militarily is declining precipitously. The Russian armed forces are in disarray and will require two to three decades to recover."

Regarding Russia's nuclear forces, the university warned that despite eight years of U.S./Russian cooperation, Moscow remains unable to guarantee full control over its nuclear weapons, fissile material and scientific know-how. The turmoil confronting Russia -- including extremist Islamic forces in the Caucasus and Central Asia -- will exacerbate this danger well into the future, certainly the next 10 years, the NDU analysis said. "Continued economic and political crises could significantly degrade Russia's ability to maintain fail-safe" nuclear control.

A counterpart report by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) contains similar findings, although its trusted annual survey, The Military Balance, says Russian forces did gain the necessary resources in the past year for additional exercises and improved readiness. Those upticks stemmed from domestic reaction to NATO's springtime air campaign against Yugoslavia, the IISS report said.

But the overall state of operational readiness remains low for all Russian forces except the nuclear ones, at the same time that trouble in the North Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan) puts more demands on the Russian military (AW&ST Aug. 16, p. 21).

IN COMPLIANCE with the long-delayed but still-pending START 2 arms reduction treaty, Russia has begun deployment of a new generation of single-warhead missiles, the SS-27 (or Topol-M). Ten were deployed last year, two successful flight tests were conducted this year and 10 more are slated for deployment during 1999-2000, the IISS said. Under START 2, Russia is to relinquish all of its multiwarhead, land-based strategic missiles.

Having delayed deployment of the new Dolgoruky-class ballistic missile submarine to 2006 from 2002, Russia has postponed decommissioning its Delta 3 submarines from the Pacific fleet, electing to upgrade them and extend their life to 2005, the IISS added.

START 2 and START 3 approval ran afoul of Russian displeasure with NATO's air campaign to liberate Kosovo, but in pure military terms Moscow needs the treaties, the IISS assessment concluded. Without them, "it will have difficulty in maintaining its strategic forces at higher levels due to obsolescence of some systems and the cost of necessary modernization."

U.S.-sought revisions to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have superseded Kosovo as the obstacle to

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Russian ratification of START 2. Russian officials say they are unalterably opposed to ABM Treaty changes the White House seeks, as it readies to make a deployment decision in June on a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) at a single site in Alaska. The treaty largely prohibits such defenses, but the Administration argues that relaxing some of its provisions could not possibly threaten Russia because Moscow would retain thousands of nuclear warheads -- even under START 2 and 3 -- that could easily overwhelm America's 100 NMD interceptors.

The Russians have said repeatedly over the years that their adherence to START was strictly conditional on preservation of the ABM Treaty, and it has shunned Clinton Administration proposals for NMD cooperation, which in various forms have been offered as inducements to Moscow by three U.S. administrations.

NOT ALL RUSSIAN affairs specialists here are persuaded that the U.S. has heard the last word from Moscow on the ABM Treaty, however. Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), chairman of the House Armed Services research and development subcommittee, said in a recent interview he believes Russian opposition to the Administration's latest proposals is "posturing," and that eventually the Kremlin will come around. Asked if Administration offers to collaborate with Russia on NMD radars, satellite tracking and other technologies would be enough to lure Moscow into an ABM compromise, Weldon replied that he would prefer that any such agreement be arranged by the next Administration in 2001. He is a longtime ardent advocate of NMD deployment.  
URL: <http://www.aviationweek.com>

The Washington Post  
November 12, 1999, Friday, Final Edition

**HEADLINE:** Funds to Hire Russian Atom Scientists Cut

**BYLINE:** Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

**BODY:**

A sharp cut in funding will force the Department of Energy to curtail its effort to employ Russian nuclear scientists in civilian jobs and keep them from peddling their bomb-building talents to other countries, officials said yesterday.

The \$ 7.5 million appropriated by Congress last month for the so-called Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal 2000 is half of what was allocated this year and a quarter of what the Energy Department requested. As a result, the administration will limit the program to scientists in one Russian nuclear city instead of three, said Rose E. Gottemoeller, director of the department's **nonproliferation** office.

The program began in September 1998 as a response to desperate economic conditions in Russia's "secret" cities, which during the Soviet era were ringed with security fences and did not appear on official maps but received special supplies of food and luxury goods.

Since the end of the Cold War, the special supplies have stopped, Russia's production of nuclear weapons has plummeted, and many nuclear workers have lost their jobs. The 17 facilities that make up the Russian nuclear weapons complex once built up to 4,000 warheads a year but now produce just 200 to 300, said Oleg Bukharin, a Princeton University expert.

Nevertheless, the complex still employs 100,000 professionals in seven former secret cities and around Moscow, about twice the number of facilities and four times as many nuclear weapons workers as in the United States, according to Bukharin.

Gottemoeller said the Energy Department will focus solely on the city of Sarov, formerly known as Arzamas-16, the Russian equivalent of Los Alamos.

The program's most publicized success was the opening last month of a computing center in Sarov that will produce software for sale around the world. It uses IBM computers that the Russians bought in 1996 and had begun using for nuclear weapons work in violation of U.S. export laws. Months of negotiation led to their removal from the weapons facility and their transfer to the open, commercial venture.

The budget cut by Congress stemmed primarily from a report by the General Accounting Office that said some U.S. funds appeared to be going to Russian scientists who were still working on weapons. In response, Congress inserted a provision in next year's nuclear cities appropriation that requires Energy Secretary Bill Richardson to certify that Russia has agreed to close some facilities engaged in nuclear weapons work.

Kenneth N. Luongo, a former Energy Department official who helped establish the program, said he found on a trip to Russia this fall that the directors of its nuclear facilities have come to support the U.S. employment effort, despite initial skepticism.

"If you give them a career, [Russian scientists] will loosen their grip on military programs," Luongo said, adding: "The opportunity is on the table now. It may not be there five years from now."

The nuclear cities program, however, is just one part of a wide-ranging, \$ 1 billion U.S. government effort begun in 1991 to help Russia reduce its enormous nuclear arsenal and secure its stockpiles against theft.

The portions of the initiative run by the Pentagon and State Department, which account for more than half the total funding, also have been cut or reshaped by Congress this year. At the insistence of the House Armed Services Committee, \$ 110 million requested to help pay for a plant to destroy Russian chemical weapons was eliminated, and the funds were redirected to destroying some of Moscow's strategic nuclear warheads under arms control agreements.

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Congressional Quarterly Weekly  
November 6, 1999  
Pg. 2633

## National Security Team Holds Out Olive Branch

By Pat Towell, CQ Staff Writer

The Clinton administration's national security team, badly shaken by the party-line split that derailed the nuclear test ban treaty in the Senate on Oct. 13, has launched a behind-the-scenes effort to rehabilitate its relationships with both Democratic and Republican heavyweights whose support it will need to deal with thorny issues in U.S.-Russia relations. Among the thorniest is the administration's plan to negotiate changes next summer in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that would allow deployment of a limited anti-missile defense.

While the Clinton team's goal is to restore bipartisanship to foreign policy debates, its initial attempts to build bridges followed party lines. On Nov. 4, White House national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Deputy Defense Secretary John J. Hamre met with six Democrats, including Delaware's Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Michigan's Carl Levin, the ranking members on the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, respectively. Among the topics discussed was how the administration should keep potential supporters abreast of its talks with Moscow about the ABM Treaty.

Over breakfast at the Pentagon that same day, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen -- a former senator of the GOP persuasion -- discussed a much wider range of issues, including the fiscal 2001 defense budget, with a pair of key Republican senators: Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens of Alaska and foreign policy maven Richard G. Lugar of Indiana.

These administration initiatives come on the heels of an effort by Lugar and Levin to organize a bipartisan group of senators to better educate themselves on U.S.-Russia issues. Their first meeting, on Oct. 28, attended by eight senators, grew out of discussions over a spaghetti dinner at Levin's house the night the Senate refused to approve the test ban pact.

Lugar hopes this group can give the administration early warnings of political problems for its Russia policies. While President Clinton has often sought his assistance on foreign policy issues, Lugar lamented, the calls for help typically have come at the eleventh hour.

"Usually, the barrel is going over Niagara Falls," Lugar said. "Even if you offer a good suggestion, it probably is too late for it to be tried."

The Washington Post  
November 11, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition  
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01

**HEADLINE:** China Warns of New Arms Race; Official Says U.S. Missile Shield Would Shift Balance of Power

**BYLINE:** John Pomfret, Washington Post Foreign Service

**DATELINE:** BEIJING, Nov. 10

**BODY:**

China's top arms control official assailed the United States today for its campaign to develop a shield against ballistic nuclear missiles, warning that such a program could lead to a nuclear arms race and dangerously alter the strategic balance in Asia and the rest of the world.

Sha Zukang, the Foreign Ministry's arms control director, also lambasted the Senate for its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last month, arguing that such an act could make countries like China reluctant to enter into arms control agreements with the United States.

"Because I'm a negotiator I ask myself, 'What should I do?' " Sha said in a rare, wide-ranging interview. "Should we follow the same practice? We know the United States is a superpower, but that does not give you super rights."

Sha's statements reflect China's deep unease with current American strategic thinking, specifically the push to amend or even abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Underlying Sha's comments is a perception, shared by some European officials, that Washington is capitalizing on its status as the world's most powerful country to lock in a strategic advantage that would make it immune to intimidation.

The U.S. plan to create a shield against missiles would affect China because it would trump Beijing's single strategic ace. China's armed forces are still decades behind the American military. Its missiles, however, are top-notch and are the part of its arsenal that give it hope of becoming a world, or even regional, military power. "They are missile savants," said one Western military expert.

But creating an American national missile defense system would deny China the ability to threaten the United States with its nuclear warheads. That would severely skew the Asian security equation and leave China feeling trapped and powerless to pursue its interests, non-American Western diplomats say.

"Any amendment, or abolishing of the treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences," Sha warned. "This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament now between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt multilateral disarmament as well."

Russia has already protested the American plan to modify the ABM treaty. On Nov. 3, Russia announced that it had tested a short-range interceptor rocket for the Moscow anti-ballistic missile system in what appeared to be a blunt warning about its own plans for an expanded ABM system. Western diplomats predict that an enhanced American missile shield will result in even closer security ties between Moscow and Beijing. Russia already sells about \$ 1 billion of weapons a year to China.

In addition, some diplomats warn that a tough line from Washington on missile defense could prompt China to relax its new controls on nuclear proliferation and allow Chinese companies to resume selling nuclear weapons-related technology. And Sha said it would also threaten U.S. plans to bring China into the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international agreement that would place restrictions on China's sales of missiles and missile-related technology.

The American missile defense question is just one of several issues that have increased China's wariness of late. The May 7 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and allegations of Chinese espionage in the United States have roiled Beijing's ties with Washington.

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Over the summer, the Communist Party is believed to have increased China's defense budget substantially. President Jiang Zemin met this week with officers from the armaments department of the People's Liberation Army and promised them more resources. The commander of China's air force, meanwhile, said his forces were planning to change their focus from a territorial defense force to one capable of attacking beyond China's borders.

Sha's comments revealed a significant shift in China's views about American plans for a missile defense system. In March, a senior Chinese official spent three hours warning a group of Western reporters that the most dangerous aspect of the U.S. campaign would be any moves to sell missile-defense technology to Taiwan, which China views as a renegade province.

Today, Sha did not mention Taiwan and instead focused on how the U.S. move threatened to skew the global strategic balance.

"It's the national missile defense that's really the most important," Sha said. "We are not rejecting the concept of missile defense completely, such as air defense to protect troops. But it is the advanced systems, in space and elsewhere, that are the problem. These are a violation of the ABM treaty. These may disturb or destroy the strategic balance."

Signed in 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one of the building blocks of the Cold War security system. Basically, it said that the Soviet Union and the United States would agree to forgo the development of weapons that could block a nuclear missile attack. The treaty was one of the main pillars of the strategic concept of mutual assured destruction, which said that the use of nuclear weapons by one side would immediately trigger a massive response by the other.

Washington has justified its interest in a missile defense system by saying it would not be targeted at any traditional power but rather at "rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq.

Sha said this was difficult to accept. It is ironic, he contended, that the "United States . . . has been teaching the international community that the ABM treaty, though bilateral, is a cornerstone for strategic stability, that it's a precondition for further nuclear disarmament. Now suddenly they are attempting to amend it and threaten to abolish it. We have no words for this. Should we assume that the United States monopolizes all the truth in the world? This cannot be the case, I believe. So this will erode U.S. authority and credibility."

"Does this mean," Sha continued, "that the United States will negotiate treaties only for others, that the United States will expect others to honor all treaty obligations while the United States is free to do anything it wants? . . . Psychologically, that's bad for any new negotiations."

Sha said China is particularly worried that U.S. researchers have begun working with Japan to develop a missile defense system for U.S. allies in Asia. Chinese officials are alarmed by closer defense ties between Tokyo and Washington, which they see as part of a string of American defense relations--with South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, and now Kazakhstan and even Mongolia--that are designed to surround China.

Sha also condemned the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He said neither of the Senate's two main arguments--that verification measures were weak and that the United States still needed to test its nuclear warheads--were persuasive. The United States has conducted more than 1,000 tests, he noted, greater by far than any other nuclear power; China has conducted fewer than 50. If the Americans say they need more tests, "other nuclear countries should have even more reason to have more tests," he said.

As for the verification issue, Sha was blunt. "As the chief negotiator for China, I would say this is an insult to the intelligence and capabilities of all negotiators who worked so diligently day in and day out and for so long on the treaty. I would strongly advise those guys to read the treaty, particularly the verification protocol, before jumping to such a conclusion."

China, he added, plans to stick to the terms of the treaty and press for its early ratification by the National People's Congress.

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**HEADLINE:** USA and China work to resume military exchanges  
**BYLINE:** GREG SEIGLE JDW Staff Reporter

**BODY:**  
US and Chinese officials are working to re-schedule high-level military exchanges that were cancelled earlier this year in the wake of a **spy** scandal and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during Operation 'Allied Force'.

Talks between senior military officials from both countries could come as early as next month, although US Secretary of Defense William Cohen last week cautioned that no plans have been finalised. Speculation that Beijing and Washington might renew military contacts came after the latest round of diplomatic talks resulted in China allowing a US Navy destroyer, the USS O'Brien, to make a port call to Hong Kong last week.

Under an initial blueprint drawn up by the US Department of Defense (DoD) early in the year, the US planned to send several top officials to China, including Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Hugh Shelton and outgoing US Marine Corps Commandant Gen Charles Krulak.

The USA planned to host several top People's Liberation Army (PLA) officials, including Lt Gen Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of staff of the PLA, and Vice Adm Shi Yungsheng, commander of the PLA Navy.

Initial plans called for PLA generals to view training manoeuvres by the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division and an airdrop by the 82nd Airborne Division.

In addition to the high-level contacts, middle ranking US and Chinese officers were to have participated in a variety of exchanges in several military specialities from logistics to special operations. US critics of the exchanges have complained that the exchanges help the PLA more than the DoD.

These plans were put on hold after the US Congress released an unclassified version of a investigative report that accused China of stealing US nuclear secrets, then scrapped after US aircraft bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May, killing three Chinese citizens. Washington has called the bombing an accident and is offering financial restitution to Beijing.

Cohen said he hopes the DoD resumes its exchanges with China by mid-2000 at the latest. "We do hope to re-establish the kind of military-to-military contacts that we had prior to the incident in Kosovo and [the Chinese] have indicated that they would like to re-establish these contacts," he said on 3 November. "I'm open to any suggestions they might have in terms of timing."

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Baltimore Sun  
November 7, 1999

## Counterterrorism Coordinator Employs Finesse, Force

*U.S. diplomat served in hot spots such as Central America, Somalia*

By Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- Michael A. Sheehan once kicked down doors to confront terrorists.

Years later his mission is the same, but his technique has changed: He recently led diplomatic overtures to Afghanistan's ruling Taliban army in hopes of winning its help in seizing suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden.

And diplomacy on Capitol Hill will be needed if Sheehan is to address what he calls the "unconscionable" 36 percent reduction by Congress in the budget of the U.S. counterterrorism office.

The retired Army lieutenant colonel is the nation's latest coordinator for counterterrorism -- a post that carries the rank of ambassador at large in the State Department. He is the point man in the government's efforts to prevent attacks like last year's bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people, including 12 Americans.

Sheehan, 44, is a veteran of world hot spots: Central America, Korea, Somalia. In Panama, he was the leader and youngest member of a U.S. Army Special Forces counterterrorism "door-kicking team" whose actions he says he cannot discuss.

But while tough talk and swift action are still part of the fight against terrorism, persuasion has been added to the mix.

"The bread and butter of what we do is diplomacy," Sheehan said in an interview after the Senate approved his appointment without dissent. "We try to depoliticize terrorism around the world."

The task includes building an international consensus against terrorist organizations, isolating states that sponsor or shelter them, and sharing information with law enforcement officials in other countries.

It includes the sanctions imposed by President Clinton against the Taliban government in Afghanistan for harboring bin Laden, the suspected mastermind behind the embassy bombings.

And it includes military force, such as last year's U.S. missile assaults against camps in Afghanistan after the embassy bombings.

Since the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism is at the intersection of military might and diplomatic finesse, prospective coordinators are drawn from either arena. Sheehan, a military veteran, succeeded a career member of the foreign service, Philip Wilcox Jr., who held the post from 1994 until his retirement in 1997.

Born and raised in New Jersey, Sheehan joined the military after high school.

After Panama, Sheehan served as a company commander in an Army unit at the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. He then worked as a military adviser in El Salvador before seeking a master's degree in international relations at Georgetown University.

State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright "hand-picked Ambassador Sheehan for this post precisely because he has a unique combination of field experience and Washington policy experience."

Testifying in July before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sheehan said international terrorism has changed since 1980, when Americans were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran.

Groups involved in last year's bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, "are more in the mold of the new

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terrorist threat -- groups that are often self-financed with less direct linkage to state sponsors," he said.

The embassy bombings put terrorism on the front burner in Congress. In July, the House unanimously authorized \$1.4 billion for security upgrades at embassies.

Sheehan said the challenge will be maintaining that attention.

"I think it's the type of effort that we have to sustain over the long time -- indefinitely really," he said. "You can become exhausted if you're at a heightened state of security all the time."

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Defense Week  
November 8, 1999  
Pg. 1

## Official Urges Spooks, Doctors To Join Forces Against Terrorists

By Ron Laurenzo

In order to more effectively deter and respond to potential terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological weapons in the United States, intelligence agencies should cooperate more with the medical community, a senior White House official said last week.

"There must be a way where we can reformulate our intelligence requirements and more thoroughly involve the health-care community," said Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, director of Infrastructure and Counter-terrorism on the National Security Council. "There must be some new and improved way to capture the vast intellect in the medical community."

Speaking at a Defense Week conference on weapons of mass destruction and domestic preparedness, Gordon-Hagerty called the relationship between the medical and intelligence communities "our toughest nut to crack."

"Sometimes we find ourselves devoting our energies exclusively to planning for the consequences of a biological attack rather than devoting some brain cells to engagement with the intelligence community," she said. "We must never lose sight of the fact that our prime directive in the counter-terrorism world is to prevent such an attack from ever occurring."

Getting the two together may not be easy, the director admitted, joking that "a doc and a spook [slang for an intelligence agent] seem to do better at Halloween than they do in an interagency working group."

In addition to calling for stronger links between the medical and intelligence communities, Gordon-Hagerty also said media reports such as a recent ABCNEWS Nightline series that speculated about an anthrax attack are more harmful than beneficial to the public. After the series aired, many viewers wrote the show lambasting the series, claiming it gave away too much information to potential terrorists.

The five-part series, titled Biowar, aired in early October. According to a disclaimer on ABC's website, the series was intended to "educate viewers on the potential risks of a terrorist biological attack" on a metropolitan area. The series was controversial, as ABC admits on its website, and much of the viewer response in the network's chat rooms was negative.

"How could you?' 'Are you guys nuts?' 'Way to go, you morons.' That's just a sample of some of the e-mail responses to the beginning of our series ...," writes Nightline producer Leroy Sievers on the site, defending the program as necessary to educate the public.

Gordon-Hagerty said she did not watch the series, but she did check out viewer response in ABC's chat room.

"I was heartened because ... my interpretation of that was that the general public wants to know about this, but they don't necessarily want it presented in that fashion," she said. "I'm looking for some level-headed approach where we can inform the general public without scaring them, without them having to go back and dig up their shelters in their backyard [because] they're expecting one of these attacks to be imminent."

She agreed with many of the show's critics, who thought ABC was giving valuable information to potential terrorists.

"Why, for once, can't we be just a bit paranoid and imagine that an adversary is watching what we are doing and developing his counter-measures based on our activities," she said.

On the other hand, she also noted what producers at ABC might claim: In addition to the public's need to know—even if the subject is terrifying—public knowledge about some of the government's countermeasures can be a powerful deterrent.

"If an adversary believes its mission's success is predicated on the number of casualties, and we have a comprehensive recovery plan, they may think twice about whether they can carry out their plan at all," she said.

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Additionally, Gordon-Hagerty said, the time has come for people to get over unfounded fears that the Pentagon would do anything but support civilian government in the aftermath of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Facts about the military's involvement in the Waco, Texas, standoff have given rise to new fears about the armed services taking too much control in the aftermath of such an incident.

"I'm really becoming frustrated with the attitude of some, whether they're elected officials, policy makers, special interest groups, conspiracy theorists or, in some cases, members of the armed services themselves," she said.

To lessen those fears, the Pentagon has changed the name for such activities from "Homeland Defense" to "Civil Support," said Ellen Embrey, a special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs.

"There's a number of areas where we can provide assistance, but we are never in the lead, we are always in support," said Embrey, who also spoke at the Defense Week conference.

"We're working very hard to understand the concerns of state and local authorities and especially how the federal government can provide effective support," said Embrey, who is responsible for coordinating National Guard and Reserve programs, which include the National Guard's RAID (Rapid Assessment and Identification) teams, training assistance to civilian teams and equipment testing.

Embrey said 10 RAID teams, whose job is to assist civilian first responders by plugging them into the Pentagon's vast arsenal of equipment and expertise, as well as using military assets like air lift and disaster relief, will be fielded by March 2000. There are plans for plans to field 27 of the teams, in addition to smaller RAID Light teams.

A primary Pentagon mission is to take its knowledge about dealing with chemical and biological agents in war and apply it to civilian situations, training the civilians—firefighters, paramedics, emergency-room doctors, hazardous-material workers and police officers—who would be the first to respond to a domestic terror incident.

So far the Pentagon, in cooperation with its interagency colleagues, has trained more than 18,500 first-responder trainers in 67 cities, Embrey said. By training trainers, a common military approach to disseminating knowledge, the Pentagon hopes to quickly build expertise in civilian circles.

The "train the trainer" program is focused on the nation's 120 largest cities as cited in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to improve domestic preparedness. The lead military agencies for executing the programs are the Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command and the Army's Director of Military Support.

Recognizing that many critics see obsession with weapons of mass destruction as a way for government agencies to justify bloated budgets now that the Soviet threat is gone, Gordon-Hagerty said the National Security Council is working with the Office of Management and Budget to kill redundancy among the dozens of federal agencies and offices involved in countering doomsday weapons.

"We are eliminating some things that we believe aren't useful to the greater good," she said, but declined to pinpoint which agencies were considered dead wood.

No single federal agency can manage all the parts of the puzzle, which include technical issues, law enforcement, intelligence, medical issues and public health, to name a few.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead federal agency for consequence management, and the FBI is the lead agency for responding to terrorism. The National Domestic Preparedness Office, part of the FBI that was formed this year, is the lead coordinating office, but no one has overarching control.

Congress, albeit unintentionally, sometimes negatively affects counter-terrorism, she said, because the 13 appropriations subcommittees involved with counter-terror programs don't coordinate their efforts.

For instance, Gordon-Hagerty said, if the Veterans Affairs appropriations subcommittee makes a major change in the Veterans Affairs agency, it can disrupt the NSC's efforts to "maximize the relationship" between the VA and the Environmental Protection Agency, even though they appear to have nothing in common concerning their budgets.

"Call me an idealist, call me out of my mind," she said, "but one of the things that the NSC has undertaken in parallel with the Office of

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Management and Budget, is to look at every single program that somehow is affected by combating terrorism" and "look at them from the ground up."

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Washington Post  
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Pg. 21

## Dangerous Fictions About Bioterrorism

By Donald A. Henderson

Biological terrorism is a hot media topic these days, but by confusing fact and fiction, coverage could cause more harm than good. While national security and public health experts become increasingly concerned about bioterrorism, misleading stories are appearing -- including the recent anthrax scenario on ABC's "Nightline."

In a five-part series that aired between Oct. 1 and Oct. 8, "Nightline" presented "Biowar," a fictitious scenario of a bioterrorist attack in which an epidemic was unleashed when unknown terrorists broke glass bottles containing anthrax spores in a city subway. Panelists on the show, who in real life hold elected office or serve as governmental or public health authorities, represented the beleaguered professionals trying to cope with the fictional attack.

The "Nightline" series endeavored to call attention to a serious national security problem. It did succeed in illustrating how poorly informed and unprepared the country is at this time. In so doing, it also presented several inaccuracies.

First, "Nightline" incorrectly portrayed medical and public health intervention as ineffectual. In fact, an epidemic caused by bioterrorism would benefit from the application of expertise similar to that required in responding to a naturally occurring disease outbreak. These efforts include clinical recognition of cases, confirmation by laboratory testing, epidemiological investigation by public health staff, and the initiation of treatment and control measures. Medical and public health professionals would bear the primary responsibility for designing and executing such a response. Thus far, however, health professionals have been little involved in bioterrorism response planning sponsored by the federal government and were not much in evidence on "Nightline" either.

In "Nightline's" scenario, inhalation anthrax was depicted as having a three- to seven-day incubation period. What this means is essentially that all those infected in the scenario became ill within a week after exposure. By the close of the scenario, 65,000 had fallen sick, and 80 percent were expected to die. In the "Nightline" story, antibiotics were erroneously depicted as being of little value, and vaccines, arriving by airlift by Day Six, were too late to be beneficial.

The truth is, the incubation period for anthrax would extend far longer than the seven days portrayed. So too would the window of opportunity for carrying out life-saving medical interventions extend beyond a week. The only known epidemic of inhalation anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979 when anthrax spores were accidentally released from a bioweapons factory. About 80 cases followed, some occurring as early as two days after exposure and some as late as 47 days later.

Why does this matter? "Nightline's" story ended at Day Seven, implying -- incorrectly -- that no further interventions would be useful. In the real world, an anthrax epidemic is unlikely to be recognized any sooner than three or four days after the attack. It would take another 24 to 48 hours to obtain and distribute large quantities of antibiotics and vaccines. By Day Seven in the real-life epidemic at Sverdlovsk, 75 percent of cases had yet to show the first signs of illness; antibiotics and vaccines given at this point still could have saved many lives.

Other misleading scenes showed emergency health personnel wearing space suits and helmets; it was suggested that persons bringing in food or essential supplies might have to be similarly garbed. This is curious because, as the scenario correctly notes, anthrax does not spread from person to person, and workers run no risk of becoming infected after the event.

It is hoped that a terrorist attack using biological weapons will remain in the realm of fictional scenarios. But should such an event occur, professionals and the public need to be accurately informed and appropriate measures need to be taken to mitigate the effects. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and others have begun to raise awareness of the need for coherent medical and public health responses to potential bioterrorism. These efforts should be improved by increasing public understanding of the true threat of bioterrorism -- a result that can only come from careful media coverage of this easily sensationalized topic.

*The writer, a public health physician, is director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies.*

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**Periscope**

## **New Evidence Ties Iran To Terrorism**

As Iran's Islamic leader rallied demonstrators last week against reformist rapprochement with the United States, new evidence emerged tying Iranian officials to the truck bomb that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut 16 years ago, as well as to the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. NEWSWEEK has learned that a National Security Agency phone tap recorded a Sept. 24, 1983, call from the Iranian ambassador in Syria to his foreign minister, in which the ambassador relayed orders he'd given to Abu Haidar, leader of the Husaini Suicide Forces Movement. The ambassador told Haidar to get weapons from Yasir Arafat's Fatah group to "undertake an extraordinary operation against the Marines" in Beirut. A CIA source says U.S. military officials had the intercept in hand a month before the bombing, but failed to prevent it.

Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk told Congress last month that while there is "information about the involvement of some Iranian officials" in the Khobar bombing, none of it would hold up in court. But an official with access to the material says, "We have hard evidence on the Iranian government's role." CIA sources say terrorists received money and passports from Iran and that Iranian agents were casing American facilities in 1995. Despite the evidence, lawmakers are concerned that Iran will go unpunished. "My big fear," says Kansas Sen. Sam Brownback, "is we won't pursue it because of some rapprochement with Iran."