


Delivered to SASC Staff
23 Jan 1974
By RADM H.D. Train II

NET ASSESSMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET



THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

- MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY
- MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY
- COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO NAVIES

MISSIONS OF U.S. NAVY

PEACETIME PRESENCE

- EVIDENCE OF COMMITMENT TO ALLIES
- VISIBLE DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES
- RESTRAINING FORCE BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS
- PROTECT / EVACUATE U.S. CITIZENS

SEA CONTROL

- ASSURES USE OF SEAS FOR OUR PURPOSES
- DENIES THAT CAPABILITY TO OUR ENEMIES
- LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PROJECTION

- TACTICAL AIRPOWER FROM CARRIERS
- NAVY GUNFIRE
- AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS

MISSION APPLICATION TO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE

SEA CONTROL

- ASSURE SUSTAINED AND ADEQUATE SUPPORT OF NATO FORCES FIGHTING IN EUROPE
- ASSURE AUSTERE MINIMUM LEVEL OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO NATO NATIONS
- ASSURE WE CAN USE SEA FOR PROJECTION

PROJECTION

- FLANKS.
- CENTRAL REGION FROM SEA POWER ENCLAVES
- TACTICAL NUCLEAR BACKUP

MISSION APPLICATION TO UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION (SUPPORT OF ALLY OUTSIDE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT)

- ALLY OPPOSED BY THIRD NATION WITHOUT DIRECT SOVIET COMBAT SUPPORT.
SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE. IN VIETNAM
 - U.S. PROJECTION MISSION-TACAIR, NGFS, AMPHIB ASSAULT
 - U.S. SEA CONTROL MISSION-INTERDICTION OF COMMUNIST COASTAL SLOC AND MINING OF PORTS
- ALLY OPPOSED BY THIRD NATION WITH DIRECT SOVIET COMBAT SUPPORT.
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT A POTENTIAL EXAMPLE. IF SOVIET HELP ARABS,
 - U.S. NAVY PROJECTION MISSION COULD INVOLVE ALL ELEMENTS ABOVE
 - U.S. NAVY SEA CONTROL MISSION COULD BE TO INTERDICT SOVIET SLOCs AND PROTECT OURS
- DIRECT OPPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THIRD COUNTRY,
e.g., CUBA IN 1962; PRIMARY MISSION WAS SEA CONTROL.


DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT A LAND WAR

- BASED ON PROPOSITION THAT A LAND WAR IN EUROPE WOULD BE DISASTEROUS TO ALL, AND THAT A LESS CATAclySMIC WAY TO APPLY PRESSURE WOULD BE A WAR RESTRICTED TO THE SEA
- SOVIETS VIEW MARITIME INTERESTS OF FREE WORLD TO BE MUCH GREATER
- NAVY'S MISSION WOULD BE SEA CONTROL:
 - KEEP SEA LANES OPEN
 - PREVENT SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITIES AS A WAY OF APPLYING COUNTER PRESSURE

● SOVIET NAVY HAS TAKEN A FAR MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN PAST DECADE

- IN A GENERIC SENSE, THEY APPEAR TO HAVE SAME MISSIONS:
- SEA CONTROL: COASTAL DEFENSE EXPANDED TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND COMPLETE SEA CONTROL SPECTRUM, PLUS
 - PEACETIME PRESENCE, AND
 - PROJECTION (ALBEIT EMBRYONIC THUS FAR)

NAVAL FORCE DEPLOYMENTS US vs USSR



SEA CONTROL

- EARLIER CONCENTRATION ON SEA DENIAL WEAPONS NOW GIVING WAY TO SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF SEA CONTROL IN ITS FULL CLASSIC SENSE (INCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES AND CARRIERS). CUBA MISSILE CRISIS (1962) PROVIDED MAJOR IMPETUS.
- TWO MAJOR ELEMENTS:
 - ANTI-SLOC:
 - PRINCIPAL UNCERTAINTY IN NATO IS SOVIET VIEW OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION. IF THE WAR REMAINS NON-NUCLEAR ANY LENGTH OF TIME, ANTI-SLOC MAY BE A KEY MISSION.
 - WAR AT SEA FALLS WITHIN SOVIET CURRENT CAPABILITY-- HAS MANY ATTRIBUTES WHICH FAVOR SOVIET.
 - COULD BE A KEY FACTOR IN SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION. MIGHT HAVE TRIED IT. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
 - ANTI-NAVAL SHIP:
 - ANTI-CARRIER A MAJOR FUNCTION
 - ANTI-SURFACE SHIP CAPABILITY FALLS OUT FROM ANTI-CARRIER AND GIVES SOVIET A WIDE RANGE OF FUTURE OPTIONS
 - ANTI-SUBMARINE A MAJOR MISSION, THOUGH ANTI-SSBN MAY BE OF LESSER CURRENT OPERATIONAL PRIORITY DUE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY.

PROJECTION

- MAJOR IMPETUS FROM U.S. ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN 1965.
- EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTEREST:
 - OUT OF AREA DEPLOYMENTS
 - COMMAND SHIPS
 - CRUISERS
 - UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT
 - AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY
 - CARRIERS -- ANGLE DECK AND VSTOL

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO NAVIES:

- FORCE STRUCTURE AND PROCUREMENT TRENDS
- GROSS PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS
- ANALYTICAL WAR-GAMING RESULTS

FIGURE 2

SOVIET NAVY, '68-'73





FIGURE 3


U.S. NAVY, '68-'73




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OFFENSIVE SURFACE SHIPS & SUBMARINES




US





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OFFENSIVE SURFACE SHIPS & SUBMARINES




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

OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS




OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS





DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY




DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY




ASW FORCES




ASW FORCES



OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS PER TARGET




OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS PER DEFENSIVE SYSTEM*



* Rated On Basis Of Number Of Possible Simultaneous Interceptions

ASW FORCES PER SUBMARINE



ANALYTICAL WAR GAMING RESULTS

NARAC-G AND SEAMIX GIVE USEFUL INSIGHTS (NATO NON-NUCLEAR WAR)

NARAC-G -- 1973:

- 4 CARRIERS COULD HOLD EASTERN MED UNLESS SOVIET AIR CAN REACH FROM AFRICA--THEN 5-6 CV NEEDED.
- ATLANTIC AND WESTERN MED CAN BE HELD IF PACIFIC AND NORTHERN FLANK DROPPED.

SEAMIX -- 1981:

- SITUATION IN ATLANTIC IMPROVES--CAN SUPPORT FORAYS INTO EASTERN MED
- NORTHERN FLANK AND W. PAC STILL NOT COVERED

GENERAL INSIGHTS:


- SOVIET SUBS CAN BE CONTAINED IN TIME IN N. ATLANTIC; HOWEVER NOT ALL RESOURCES AVAILABLE THERE COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.
(SOSUS, VP, ETC.)

CONCLUSIONS:


- BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. AND U.S.S.R. HAS DETERIORATED MARKEDLY IN PAST FIVE YEARS.
- SOME IMPROVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED IN NEXT FIVE YEARS (IF WE CARRY OUT OUR PLANS AND IF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE CORRECT)
- BUT EVEN FIVE YEARS HENCE, THERE WILL BE
 - PLAUSIBLE SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD SEVERELY STRAIN OUR NAVAL CAPABILITIES
 - AND
 - MANY IMPORTANT TASKS WHICH WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT.
- SOVIETS HAVE EMBRACED NAVAL POWER AS MAJOR ELEMENT OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. THEY MAY OBTAIN A CAPABILITY TO DETER OR THWART U.S. INTERVENTION AND MAY BE BUILDING OWN CAPABILITY FOR INTERVENTION.

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS


CARRIERS




CRUISERS



FRIGATES



DESTROYERS



OCEAN ESCORTS

