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NET ASSESSMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NAVIES (U)

SLIDE 1 (U) THIS ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS:

- FIRST, THE MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.
- SECOND, WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE THE MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY PORTEND NEW MISSIONS FOR THE FUTURE.
- AND FINALLY, COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO NAVIES, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE ABILITY OF EACH TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION BY THE OTHER.

(U) THIS ASSESSMENT CENTERS ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES OF BOTH SIDES--THOSE DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR OTHER THAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR. THUS, THE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES ARE EXCLUDED, EXCEPT FOR MENTION OF SOME INEVITABLE INTERACTIONS WITH THE OPPOSING ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES.

MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

SLIDE 2 (U) ASIDE FROM THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSIONS, THE UNITED STATES NAVY HAS THREE GENERIC MISSIONS:

● THE FIRST OF THESE IS PEACETIME PRESENCE:

IN THIS ROLE, SHIPS ARE DEPLOYED OVERSEAS IN PEACETIME FOR A VARIETY OF OBJECTIVES, MOST OF WHICH ARE CLOSELY TIED TO THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

- SUCH AS EVIDENCE OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT ON BEHALF OF OUR ALLIES.
- OR A VISIBLE DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES.
- OR AS A POTENTIAL RESTRAINING FORCE BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS.
- OR AS A WAY OF PROTECTING OR EVACUATING UNITED STATES CITIZENS OVERSEAS.
- OR FINALLY, AS A WAY OF PROTECTING OR EVACUATING UNITED STATES CITIZENS OVERSEAS.

● SEA CONTROL: IN THE SEA CONTROL MISSION, THE NAVY:

- ASSURES THE USE OF THE SEAS FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES, OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, WHILE
- DENYING THAT CAPABILITY TO OUR ENEMIES.
- SEA CONTROL ALSO INCLUDES THE FUNCTION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT (THROUGH NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE) OF U.S. FORCES OVERSEAS AND OF OUR ALLIES.

● PROJECTION: IN THE PROJECTION ROLE, THE NAVY PROJECTS ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY ASHORE THROUGH:

- TACTICAL AIRPOWER OPERATING FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS,
- NAVAL GUNFIRE, PRIMARILY FROM CRUISERS, FRIGATES, AND DESTROYERS, AND
- AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MARINE CORPS.

(U) THESE THREE GENERIC MISSIONS CAN BE COMBINED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, DEPENDING ON THE PARTICULAR SITUATION. SOME REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS WHICH ENTER INTO THE DESIGN OF OUR NAVAL FORCES ARE:

(C) ● IN THE FIRST OF THESE--DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE:

- THE SEA CONTROL MISSION HAS APPLICATION IN THE DEFENSE OF THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. IT IS THE NAVY'S ROLE:

- TO ASSURE SUSTAINED AND ADEQUATE SUPPORT-- IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY RESUPPLY-- FOR THE NATO FORCES FIGHTING IN EUROPE. OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE HERE IS TO ASSURE THAT NATO CAN CONTINUE TO FIGHT EFFECTIVELY WITH

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CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS CAN, AND THAT WE NEVER BE CAUGHT IN A POSITION WHERE OUR ONLY REMAINING ALTERNATIVES ARE ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WARFARE, OR SURRENDER.

- IT IS ALSO THE NAVY'S ROLE TO ASSURE AT LEAST AN AUSTERE MINIMUM LEVEL OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE NATO NATIONS FOR AS LONG AS THE FIGHTING MAY LAST.
- AND TO ASSURE THAT WE CAN USE THE SEA AS NECESSARY FOR PROJECTION MISSIONS.

IN THE EVENT OF A WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE TO CHALLENGE OUR VITAL SLOCs WHEREVER THEY MIGHT BE VULNERABLE. THUS, EVEN THOUGH THE WAR ON LAND MIGHT BE RESTRICTED TO EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S SEA CONTROL MISSION WOULD EXTEND TO ALL THE KEY OCEAN AREAS.

- THE NAVY'S PROJECTION MISSION IN THE NATO SCENARIO HAS APPLICATION ON THE FLANKS OF NATO. IN ADDITION, THE NAVY'S SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL AIRPOWER ALSO HAS A ROLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PARTICULARLY DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF A NATO WAR, WITH THE CARRIERS CONCENTRATED IN A

RELATIVELY SMALL PROTECTED ENCLAVE (SUCH AS THE ENGLISH CHANNEL) BOTH FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT AND TO PERMIT INTENSIVE ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) OPERATIONS, SEA-BASED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CAN HELP TO DEFEND VITAL PREPOSITIONING SITES AND LOGISTIC AIRCRAFT ENROUTE FROM THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS HELP COUNTER AND SLOW A LIKELY WARSAW PACT THRUST ACROSS THE NORTH GERMAN PLAIN.

WHILE UNITED STATES PLANNING IS BASED ON NON-NUCLEAR WARFARE AS THE PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE, AND THEREFORE PLACES A HIGH PREMIUM ON NOT HAVING TO BE THE FIRST TO ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WARFARE, THE CHOICE IS NOT ENTIRELY IN OUR HANDS. SHOULD ESCALATION OCCUR, THE CARRIERS REPRESENT A POTENT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES THROUGHOUT ALL OF EUROPE.

SLIDE 4 (C) ● THE NEXT SET OF SCENARIOS, UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION, INVOLVE THE USE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OUR INTERESTS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF A MAJOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT (SUCH AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY). THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VARIATIONS:

- SUCH AS WHERE AN ALLY IS OPPOSED BY A THIRD NATION WITHOUT DIRECT COMBAT SUPPORT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, (THOUGH SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ADVICE, AS WELL AS SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MAY BE SUPPLIED). AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE THE RECENT WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN THAT CASE, THE NAVY'S PROJECTION MISSION INVOLVED THE USE OF THREE ELEMENTS: TACTICAL AIRPOWER; NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT; AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT. THE SEA CONTROL MISSION PRIMARILY INVOLVED INTERDICTION OF COMMUNIST SUPPLIES ALONG THE COAST AND IN THE RIVERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS THE MINING OF PORTS IN NORTH VIETNAM. SO PERVASIVE WAS OUR CONTROL OF THE SEA THAT NORTH VIETNAM WAS VIRTUALLY DENIED THE OPTION OF RESUPPLYING THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH BY SEA AND HAD, INSTEAD, TO BUILD UP AND RELY ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON LAND LINES OF LOGISTICS.
- A SECOND VARIATION IS WHERE AN ALLY IS OPPOSED BY A THIRD NATION WITH DIRECT COMBAT SUPPORT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. THOUGH NO SUCH SCENARIOS HAVE OCCURRED TO DATE, THEY CANNOT BE DISMISSED FROM OUR PLANNING. A POTENTIAL EXAMPLE WOULD BE THE ENGAGEMENT OF SOVIET FORCES ON THE

SIDE OF THE ARAB NATIONS IN A WAR AGAINST ISRAEL. WERE WE TO BECOME INVOLVED, THE NAVY'S PROJECTION MISSION WOULD BE AS IT WAS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE SEA CONTROL MISSION COULD BE EXPANDED TO INTERDICT SOVIET SLOCs TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AS WELL AS TO PROTECT OUR OWN.

- A THIRD VARIATION IS WHERE WE DIRECTLY OPPOSE SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS IN A THIRD COUNTRY. AN EXAMPLE WOULD BE THE CUBAN CRISIS OF 1962. IN THAT CASE, THE NAVY'S PRIMARY MISSION WAS SEA CONTROL TO DENY THE SOVIETS THE ABILITY TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC MISSILES IN CUBA.

SLIDE 5 (C) ● THE FINAL SET OF SCENARIOS IS DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT A LAND WAR: - OR WHAT WE CALL "WAR AT SEA" - THESE SCENARIOS ARE BASED ON THE PROPOSITION THAT A LAND WAR, PRESUMABLY--BUT NOT NECESSARILY--IN EUROPE WOULD HAVE SUCH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL THAT A SOMEWHAT LESS CATAclySMIC WAY OF APPLYING MILITARY PRESSURE MIGHT BE A WAR RESTRICTED TO THE SEA. THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE MARITIME INTERESTS IN THE AREAS OF FISHING AND, TO AN INCREASING DEGREE, SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS ALLIES, THEY--ACCURATELY--VIEW THE

MARITIME INTERESTS OF THE FREE NATIONS OF THE WORLD AS BEING MUCH GREATER--NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO COMMERCE, BUT TO THE PROVISION OF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES, SUCH AS PETROLEUM. SHOULD THE SOVIETS ELECT THE OPTION OF A WAR AT SEA, OUR NAVY'S SEA CONTROL MISSION WOULD BE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. THE NAVY'S TASK WOULD BE TO KEEP THE SEA LANES OPEN AND FREE FROM THREAT OF SOVIET ATTACK BY SUBMARINES, SURFACE RAIDERS, AND AIRCRAFT--AS WELL AS TO PREVENT ALL SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITIES AS A WAY OF APPLYING COUNTER-PRESSURE.

(U) THE SCENARIOS WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED ARE INTENDED ONLY TO BE REPRESENTATIVE, RATHER THAN EXHAUSTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAVE NOT INCLUDED THE NAVY'S PEACETIME PRESENCE MISSION WHICH--THOUGH IMPORTANT IN DETERRING THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICTS SUCH AS I HAVE JUST OUTLINED--ARE LIKELY TO BE WELL WITHIN THE REACH OF ANY FORCE WHICH CAN PERFORM THE SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION MISSIONS ADEQUATELY.

NOW WITH REGARD TO THE MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY:

(U) RUSSIA HAS LONG BEEN A CONTINENTAL NATION, GREATLY ENDOWED WITH NATURAL RESOURCES, AND LARGELY INDEPENDENT OF SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION. AS SUCH THE RUSSIAN NAVY

SLIDE 6

HAS TRADITIONALLY PLAYED A SECONDARY ROLE IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING, WITH EMPHASIS IN THE RECENT PAST ON COASTAL DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND. WITHIN THE LAST DECADE, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET NAVY HAS TAKEN ON A FAR MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING. WHILE THEIR APPLICATIONS FOR NAVAL POWER ARE NOT THE SAME AS OURS, WE DO BELIEVE THAT, IN A GENERIC SENSE, THEY HAVE THE SAME MISSIONS--FROM THE SEA CONTROL MISSION WHICH STARTED WITH COASTAL DEFENSE, THEY HAVE EXPANDED TO THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSION, OF COURSE--BUT ALSO TO THE PEACETIME PRESENCE MISSION AND-- APPARENTLY--THE PROJECTION MISSION, IF ONLY IN AN EMBRYONIC WAY THUS FAR.

SLIDE 7  
(FIG 1)

(C) ● WITH REGARD TO THE PEACETIME PRESENCE MISSION: FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR II UNTIL THE EARLY 1960s, THE SOVIET NAVY'S MISSIONS APPARENTLY DID NOT INCLUDE THAT OF PEACETIME PRESENCE. HOWEVER, SINCE THAT TIME, THE SOVIET NAVY HAS CHANGED FROM WHAT HAD BEEN LARGELY A COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE TO ONE IN WHICH SIGNIFICANT PEACETIME DEPLOYMENTS TO AREAS WELL BEYOND THE SOVIET LITTORAL ARE NORMAL AND CONTINUOUS. THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE HISTORY OF THIS BUILD-UP. AS RECENTLY AS 1963, THERE WAS NO PERMANENT SOVIET NAVAL FORCE EVEN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. BY 1965, A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE

SOVIET NAVY WAS BEING DEPLOYED. THE RISE SINCE THEN HAS BEEN AT A STEADY RATE UNTIL, IN 1972, 14% OF THEIR FORCE WAS DEPLOYED AWAY FROM HOME WATERS. THEY NOW HAVE FORCES NOT ONLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, BUT ALSO IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND OFF THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA. WE TAKE THIS AS INCONTESTABLE EVIDENCE THAT PEACETIME PRESENCE IS NOW ONE OF THE MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY. DURING THE RECENT MIDEAST CRISIS, THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET SURGED TO 98 SHIPS, AS OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY STRENGTH OF ONLY 65. THE SLIDE ALSO PROVIDES A COMPARISON OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD AND SHOWS BOTH PEAKS OF VIETNAM WAR ACTIVITY. THESE CURVES SHOW ONLY COMBATANT SHIP DEPLOYMENTS.

SLIDE 8 (S)

SEA CONTROL: THE SEA CONTROL MISSION OF THE SOVIET NAVY HAS DIFFERED SOMEWHAT IN THE PAST FROM OURS. STARTING AS A COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE, IT HAS BEEN PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE (I.E., ATTEMPTING TO DENY US CERTAIN USES OF THE SEA), AND, UNTIL RECENT YEARS LACKED AN OBVIOUS PARALLEL TO OUR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES (I.E., THEY DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE EMPHASIZED AN ABILITY TO ASSURE THEIR OWN USE OF THE SEAS FOR COMMERCIAL OR NAVAL PURPOSES). THIS

DEFENSIVE CHARACTER, HOWEVER, BEGAN TO CHANGE AS THE SOVIET NAVY DEPLOYED LARGE NUMBERS OF CRUISE MISSILES, AND WE MAY WELL HAVE TO COPE WITH A TRADITIONAL OFFENSIVE SEA CONTROL MISSION IN THE FUTURE AS THEIR CARRIER FORCES DEVELOP. THUS, WE SEE THE SOVIETS EVOLVING FROM A CONCENTRATION ON SEA DENIAL TOWARD A CAPABILITY FOR SEA CONTROL IN ITS FULL CLASSIC SENSE.

THERE ARE TWO MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE SOVIET SEA CONTROL MISSION: THESE ARE ANTI-SLOC; AND ANTI-NAVAL SHIP.

- ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS ARE ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR SUBSETS OF THE SEA CONTROL MISSION OF THE SOVIET NAVY. ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE SOVIETS' VIEW OF THEIR ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS INVOLVES THE MAJOR NATO CONTINGENCY. AS I HAVE NOTED, WE VIEW THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ATLANTIC SLOC AS A MAJOR ROLE FOR OUR NAVY IN THE EVENT OF A LAND WAR IN NATO. SHOULD SUCH A WAR REMAIN NON-NUCLEAR FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD VIEW INTERDICTION OF THE ATLANTIC SLOC AS A KEY MISSION. HOWEVER, THERE IS ALSO SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY VIEW THIS CONTINGENCY AS LIKELY

TO ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR IN A MATTER OF DAYS--OR PERHAPS A VERY FEW WEEKS AT THE OUTSIDE-- BUT IN ANY EVENT WELL BEFORE ENOUGH MATERIAL COULD HAVE REACHED EUROPE BY SEA FROM THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE AN APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR. IF THAT IS INDEED THE SOVIET VIEW, THEN SOVIET ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS MAY BE BASED PRIMARILY ON CONTINGENCIES OTHER THAN A MAJOR LAND WAR WITH NATO. THESE DISPARATE VIEWS OF THE ISSUE OF THE ATLANTIC SLOC IN A NATO LAND WAR ARISE BECAUSE WE, ON THE ONE HAND, VIEW A REAL NON-NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS VITAL, WHILE THE SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER, DOUBT THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE IT.

BUT THESE SAME DISPARATE VIEWS ALSO LEAD TO A SECOND UNCERTAINTY ON OUR PART REGARDING THE SOVIET VIEW OF ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS, THIS ONE INVOLVING THE CONTINGENCY OF A WAR AT SEA WITHOUT AN ASSOCIATED LAND WAR. OPINIONS AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OR OUTCOME OF SUCH A CONTINGENCY FOR EITHER SIDE ARE MIXED, EVEN WITHIN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT, AND WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIET PLANNING INCLUDES SUCH A CONTINGENCY, OR WHETHER IT HAS AFFECTED THE DESIGN OF THEIR FORCES.

NONETHELESS, IT IS A MISSION WHICH FALLS WITHIN THEIR CURRENT CAPABILITY--WHETHER BY DESIGN OR BY ACCIDENT--AND IS THUS ONE WHICH WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. IT IS ALSO THE STRATEGY THE SOVIETS OUGHT TO SELECT IF THEY BECOME CONVINCED OF THEIR MARITIME SUPERIORITY BECAUSE--WITHOUT THE ASSOCIATED WAR ON LAND--IT DOES NOT FORCE A DECISION TO ESCALATE TO NUCLEAR WAR AS RAPIDLY AS IN EUROPE, AND BECAUSE IT ALLOWS TIME FOR BOTH SIDES TO PROJECT WHO IS WINNING.

A THIRD USE OF THE SOVIET ANTI-SLOC CAPABILITY WOULD BE IN CASES WHERE WE TOOK MILITARY ACTION UNILATERALLY IN SUPPORT OF AN ALLY IN A REMOTE AREA. THUS FAR, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT ENGAGED US IN THIS WAY, THOUGH THEY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO DURING THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TO WHAT DEGREE THIS WAS THE RESULT OF A PERCEIVED LACK OF CAPABILITY FOR LONG-TERM SUCCESS, AS OPPOSED TO A LARGER CONCERN ON THEIR PART WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN ACTION, EVEN IF SUCCESSFUL, IS DEBATABLE. NONETHELESS, WE FEEL THAT IT IS A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF THE SEA CONTROL MISSION OF THE SOVIET NAVY, AND ONE WHICH

WILL BEAR CLOSE ATTENTION AS WE CONSIDER THE CHANGING NAVAL BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS IN THE FUTURE.

- ANTI-NAVAL SHIP OPERATIONS ARE THE SECOND MAJOR SUBSET OF THE SEA CONTROL MISSION (AND WOULD BE INVOLVED SHOULD THE SOVIETS CHALLENGE OUR SEA CONTROL OR PROJECTION FORCES). IT HAS THREE COMPONENTS: AGAINST OUR CARRIERS; AGAINST OUR OTHER SURFACE SHIPS; AND AGAINST OUR SUBMARINES.

WE BELIEVE THAT ANTI-CARRIER OPERATIONS ARE A MAJOR FUNCTION OF THE SOVIET NAVY. WE HAVE SEEN A CONTINUED GROWTH IN SOVIET SURFACE SHIPS AND NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES, BOTH ARMED WITH ANTI-SHIP MISSILES, AS WELL AS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF THE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE ARMAMENT OF THEIR LONG-RANGE NAVAL AIRCRAFT. WE INTERPRET THIS AS A COUNTER TO THE UNITED STATES CARRIERS AND, IN PARTICULAR, A COUNTER TO THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH THE CARRIERS REPRESENT. WE HAVE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET AIR OPERATIONS PLAN WHICH IS DESIGNED TO DESTROY NATO'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY MEANS OF A MASSIVE STRIKE OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS EARLY IN A EUROPEAN WAR. WE BELIEVE THAT THE

ANTI-SHIP WEAPONS WE NOW SEE DEPLOYED ON SOVIET SUBMARINES, SURFACE SHIPS, AND NAVAL AIRCRAFT ARE EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR PHILOSOPHY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET NAVY. WE FEEL THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT OUR CARRIERS WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS SO LONG AS THE WAR REMAINED NON-NUCLEAR, BUT THAT THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY RESORT TO NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD ESCALATION OCCUR.

WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRIMARY SURFACE TARGET FOR THE SOVIET NAVY IS THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THE VERY CAPABILITY WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED TO CARRY OUT THAT TASK ALSO GIVES THEM A CAPABILITY AGAINST OUR OTHER SURFACE NAVAL SHIPS, AND FORMS A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THEIR ANTI-SLOC CAPABILITY DISCUSSED ABOVE. AS WITH ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS, THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO DEMONSTRATE AN INTENTION TO CARRY OUT THIS FUNCTION, THOUGH THEY DID HAVE THE CHANCE TO DO SO DURING THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT AGAIN, AS WITH ANTI-SLOC OPERATIONS, ANTI-SURFACE NAVAL SHIP OPERATIONS ARE TACTICS FOR WHICH THE SOVIET NAVY ALREADY HAS A POTENT CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN NEARBY WATERS SUCH AS THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NORWEGIAN SEA.

THIS CAPABILITY GIVES THE SOVIETS A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS, INCLUDING THAT OF ATTEMPTING TO INTERDICT OUR MOBILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCES INSTEAD OF OUR CARRIERS DIRECTLY, SHOULD SUCH A STRATEGY APPEAR MORE LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

AS FAR AS SOVIETS' ASW OPERATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES IS AN ANNOUNCED GOAL OF THEIR NAVY. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT FOR THE PRESENT IT MAY ACTUALLY BE OF LESSER PRIORITY IN THEIR EYES, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THEY MUST HAVE RECOGNIZED BY NOW--AS WE HAVE--THAT THE TASK IS AT THIS TIME PROHIBITIVELY DIFFICULT. THE SOVIET SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM LENDS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THIS VIEW. WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO BUILD SURFACE SHIPS WHOSE OFFICIAL DESIGNATION INDICATES AN ASW ROLE, THESE SHIPS ACTUALLY ARE BETTER EQUIPPED FOR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS AND FOR STRIKES AGAINST OTHER SURFACE SHIPS THAN THEY ARE FOR ASW. IN ADDITION, THEY INTRODUCED THEIR FIRST HELICOPTER SHIP IN 1967. THIS SHIP HAD AN EVIDENT ASW ROLE AND WE BELIEVE IT WAS INTENDED AS A COUNTER TO OUR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. HOWEVER, AFTER THE CONSTRUCTION OF ONE SISTER

SHIP, AND AFTER OPERATIONAL TESTING AT SEA WITH APPARENTLY POOR RESULTS, ALL FURTHER PRODUCTION OF THE CLASS SEEMS TO HAVE STOPPED. THE SOVIETS HAVE SINCE STARTED A NEW SHIP, A MUCH LARGER CLASS OF CARRIER WHICH COULD MARK A CONTINUATION OF THE CONCEPT, BUT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SHIP MAKE IT SEEM MORE LIKELY THAT IT IS INTENDED FOR AN ENTIRELY NEW FUNCTION, AS WILL BE DESCRIBED LATER. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, THOUGH THE SOVIET NAVY CLEARLY HAS AN ASW ROLE AGAINST OUR SSBNS, AND CONTINUES TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE ITS TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT HAS QUITE AS HIGH A PRIORITY AS IT DID A FEW YEARS AGO.

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● PROJECTION: OF THE THREE (NON-STRATEGIC) GENERIC MISSIONS, THAT OF THE PROJECTION OF MILITARY POWER ASHORE IS THE MOST EMBRYONIC IN THE SOVIET NAVY. AT THIS POINT, WE CANNOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WE SEE REPRESENTS LITTLE MORE THAN TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARD A CAPABILITY WHICH MAY NEVER REALLY MATURE, OR WHETHER INSTEAD WE ARE SEEING THE BEGINNINGS OF A WHOLLY NEW CAPABILITY ON THEIR PART WHICH MAY IN THE FUTURE BE THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL IN SUPPORTING THE EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

AS A BACKGROUND TO THE EVIDENCE WE SEE IN THIS AREA, IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOVIETS DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962 STIRRED THEIR INTEREST IN ACHIEVING A CAPABILITY FOR THE SEA CONTROL MISSION-- THE EVIDENCE OF WHICH WE NOW SEE IN THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THEIR OBSERVATION OF OUR NAVAL ACITIVITIES IN THE PROJECTION MISSION, MOST DRAMATICALLY HIGHLIGHTED IN 1965 BY OUR RAPID INTRODUCTION OF POTENT NAVAL FORCES IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMBAT, MAY WELL HAVE STIRRED THEIR ENVY AND THEIR INTERESTS IN ACHIEVING A SIMILAR CAPABILITY. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THIS HYPOTHESIS IS AS FOLLOWS:

- DEPLOYMENTS: AS NOTED EARLIER, THE SOVIETS HAVE, SINCE 1965, DEVELOPED THE CAPABILITY OF OPERATING IN REMOTE AREAS--SOMETHING THEY RARELY DID PRIOR TO THAT TIME.
- COMMAND SHIP: THE SOVIETS RECENTLY REACTIVATED TWO CRUISERS FROM THEIR RESERVE FLEET AND THESE TWO SHIPS ARE NOW EQUIPPED WITH FACILITIES FOR A FLAG COMMAND AT-SEA--A PREREQUISITE FOR EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS.
- GUN CRUISERS: IN ADDITION TO THE TWO CRUISERS CONVERTED FOR COMMAND PURPOSES, THE SOVIETS HAVE RETAINED 7 OTHER POST-WORLD WAR II CRUISERS WHOSE

MILITARY CAPABILITY RESTS PRIMARILY ON THEIR 152 MM GUNS. THE MOST LIKELY EMPLOYMENT IS IN GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

- UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT: ANOTHER CONCOMITANT OF OPERATION IN REMOTE AREAS IS THE PROVISION OF FUEL AND OTHER SUPPLIES TO SHIPS AT SEA. IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE RELIED ON SUPPORT FROM THEIR OWN MERCHANT SHIPS. WHILE THIS PRACTICE CONTINUES, THEY HAVE RECENTLY INTRODUCED SEVERAL NEW SHIPS WHICH, ALTHOUGH SMALLER THAN OURS, ARE THOROUGHLY MODERN AND SPECIALIZED FOR UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT OPERATIONS.
- AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY: SINCE 1965, THE SOVIETS HAVE PLACED AN INCREASING IMPORTANCE ON THEIR "NAVAL INFANTRY"--WHICH WE WOULD CALL MARINES. FROM A SMALL FORCE, THEY HAVE NOW GROWN TO ABOUT 10,000 MEN--STILL FAR FROM THE SIZE OF OUR MARINE CORPS, BUT UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUS INTEREST IN BUILDING THIS KIND OF CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THEIR NAVAL INFANTRY, THE SOVIET FORCE OF MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS (I.E., LST SIZE) HAS GROWN FROM ONLY 5 SHIPS IN 1968 TO 12 TODAY, AND WE ESTIMATE CONTINUED GROWTH TO 25 SHIPS WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

- CARRIERS: AS NOTED EARLIER, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN A NEW CLASS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER. COMPARED TO THEIR FIRST CLASS OF TWO HELICOPTER SHIPS--WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE INTENDED AS A COUNTER TO OUR POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES--THIS SHIPS IS MUCH LARGER--ROUGHLY THE SIZE OF CARRIERS WE BUILT DURING WORLD WAR II. THOUGH IT APPARENTLY HAS NEITHER CATAPULTS NOR ARRESTING GEAR THUS FAR, IT DOES HAVE AN ANGLED FLIGHT DECK SIMILAR TO OUR OWN CARRIERS. SINCE THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH A FLIGHT DECK IF THE SHIP IS TO BE RESTRICTED TO HELICOPTER OPERATIONS, WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT IT IS INTENDED FOR USE WITH FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT. AND, INDEED, WE HAVE SEEN SHORT-TAKE-OFF AIRCRAFT WITH NAVAL MARKINGS IN DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY FOR SEA-BASED TACTICAL AIRPOWER, AND SOVIET NAVAL WRITINGS INCREASINGLY REFLECT A PREDILECTION FOR THE USE OF CARRIERS.

(C) ON THE BASIS OF THIS EVIDENCE, WE SENSE THAT A MAJOR MISSION FOR THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE FUTURE WILL BE THAT OF PROJECTION. IT APPEARS TO US THAT THEY INTEND TO ASSURE THEIR CAPABILITY FOR THAT MISSION THROUGH THE SAME AVENUES

THAT WE HAVE--SEA-BASED TACTICAL AIRPOWER, GUNFIRE SUPPORT, AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT--AND BACK IT UP AS WE HAVE WITH THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES--COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT.

(C) FINALLY, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DEDUCING THE MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY IS TANTAMOUNT TO DEDUCING THEIR INTENTIONS. EVEN IF WE COULD DO THIS WITH PERFECT ACCURACY--WHICH, OF COURSE, WE CANNOT--INTENTIONS ARE SOMETIMES EPHEMERAL. THUS, IT IS PRUDENT TO BASE OUR PLANNING NOT ONLY ON WHAT WE PERCEIVE SOVIET INTENTIONS TO BE, BUT ALSO ON THE CAPABILITIES WE SEE IN THEIR SHIPS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE SOVIETS' EXTENSIVE PROGRAM FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE AND AIR-TO-SURFACE ANTISHIP MISSILES MAY HAVE GOTTEN UNDER WAY AS A COUNTER TO OUR CARRIERS IN THE CONTEXT OF A TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE--WELL BEFORE MUCH SERIOUS THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE SEA CONTROL MISSION IN ANY WIDER CONTEXT, BUT THOSE ANTISHIP MISSILES--REGARDLESS OF THEIR ORIGINAL MISSION--NOW GIVE THE SOVIET NAVY THE ABILITY TO CHALLENGE ALL OF OUR SURFACE WARSHIPS IN CONTEXTS WHOLLY DIVORCED FROM A NATO WAR. WHETHER THE SOVIET NAVY'S LIST OF OFFICIAL MISSIONS NOW INCLUDES THE USE OF THOSE MISSILES AGAINST OUR SHIPS IN, SAY, A WAR AT SEA, WE CANNOT TELL.

BUT WE CAN TELL THAT THEY HAVE THAT CAPABILITY, AND IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO DISREGARD IT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SUCH A USE MAY NOT FALL WITHIN THEIR CURRENT MISSIONS.

TURNING NOW TO COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO NAVIES, THERE ARE

SLIDE 10 (U) THREE GENERAL KINDS OF COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO NAVIES:

- FORCE STRUCTURE AND PROCUREMENT TRENDS

SLIDE 11 ● GROSS PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS

- ANALYTICAL WAR-GAMING RESULTS

WITH REGARD TO FORCE STRUCTURE AND PROCUREMENT TRENDS -

SLIDE 12 (U) THIS FIGURE SHOWS WHAT HAS HAPPENED OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN SEVERAL MAJOR CATEGORIES OF GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS IN THE SOVIET NAVY. IT DISPLAYS SHIPBUILDING RATES; NET CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF SHIPS; AND A VERY ROUGH INDICATION OF THE TREND IN THE AVERAGE AGE OF SHIPS IN THE FORCE.

(U) THE ABCISSA OR HORIZ AXIS IS LABELED "AVERAGE ANNUAL FORCE GROWTH RATE IN % PER YEAR." THIS SHOWS THE NET RESULT OF ADDITIONS (IN THE FORM OF NEWLY BUILT SHIPS, AND SHIPS CONVERTED FROM SOME OTHER CATEGORY)--AND DELETIONS (IN THE FORCE OF LOSSES, RETIREMENTS, AND CONVERSIONS FROM THE CATEGORY IN QUESTION). IT IS CALCULATED AS AN AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPOUNDED GROWTH RATE OVER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD FROM 1968 TO 1973. FOR EXAMPLE, AN AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF 10% WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO A 61% INCREASE OVER THE PERIOD.

(U) THE ORDINATE OR VERT AXIS IS LABELED "AVERAGE ANNUAL NEW CONSTRUCTION RATE IN % OF FORCE." A FIGURE OF 10%, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD MEAN THAT, ON THE AVERAGE DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BUILT ONE NEW SHIP FOR EACH 10 SHIPS EXISTING AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR. (IN THIS PLOT, CONVERSIONS ARE NOT COUNTED AS NEW CONSTRUCTION.)

(U) THERE ARE TWO THINGS ONE CAN DO TO OFFSET THE AGING OF A FORCE WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE OCCUR: (1) BUILD NEW SHIPS, AND (2) RETIRE OLD ONES. SINCE EVERY POINT CORRESPONDS TO A PARTICULAR BUILDING RATE (THE VERTICAL SCALE) AND A PARTICULAR RETIREMENT RATE (THE HORIZONTAL SCALE, MINUS THE VERTICAL SCALE), EACH OF THOSE POINTS ALSO CORRESPONDS TO A PARTICULAR AGING RATE--PROVIDED ONE IS WILLING TO MAKE AN ASSUMPTION AS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGES OF THE EXISTING SHIPS, AND AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE OLDEST SHIPS WILL BE THE FIRST TO BE RETIRED. THE SERIES OF DIAGONAL LINES IS BASED ON SUCH ASSUMPTIONS, IN THIS CASE THAT THE EXISTING SHIPS ARE EVENLY DISTRIBUTED IN AGE, RANGING FROM BRAND NEW TO 30 YEARS OLD. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THAT ASSUMPTION WILL BE CORRECT FOR ANY GIVEN CATEGORY OF SHIPS. ACCORDINGLY, THESE LINES MUST BE INTERPRETED AS A ROUGH INDICATION OF A VERY GENERAL, LONG-TERM TREND.

(U) THIS SERIES OF LINES IS LABELED "NOMINAL AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGE IN AVERAGE AGE OF SHIPS IN FORCE." FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE RATE OF NEW CONSTRUCTION IS 3-1/3 PERCENT PER YEAR, AND THE RATE OF GROWTH OF THE FORCE IS HELD TO ZERO, THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE FORCE WILL NOT CHANGE. (THIS IS BECAUSE THE 3-1/3 PERCENT BUILDING RATE IS EQUIVALENT TO BUILDING ONE NEW SHIP EACH YEAR FOR EVERY 30 SHIPS IN THE FORCE, WHICH IS JUST ENOUGH TO KEEP UP WITH THE RETIREMENTS OF 30-YEAR-OLD SHIPS.) IF THE FORCE IS INSTEAD ALLOWED TO SHRINK BY, SAY, 8 PERCENT PER YEAR--THROUGH FASTER RETIREMENT OF THE OLDER SHIPS--THE AVERAGE AGE OF SHIPS IN THE FORCE WILL DROP, AS THE PLOT SHOWS, BY ABOUT 5 PERCENT. OR, IF THE FORCE IS ALLOWED TO GROW--BY REDUCING OR ELIMINATING RETIREMENTS, OR EVEN BY ADDING OLD SHIPS CONVERTED FROM OTHER CLASSES--THE AVERAGE AGE WILL INCREASE.

(C) WITH THAT AS BACKGROUND, CERTAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET NAVAL FORCES CAN BE SEEN:

- FIRST THE NUMBER OF SHIPS IN TOTAL (I.E., THE TOTAL OF ALL THE CATEGORIES SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE, WHICH INCLUDE ALL THE MAJOR GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS IN THE SOVIET NAVY) IS TODAY ALMOST EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS FIVE YEARS AGO. THE NEW CONSTRUCTION RATE--A BIT LESS THAN 4 PERCENT OF THE FORCE--

HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TO OFFSET THE AGING OF EXISTING SHIPS AND TO PROVIDE THE SOVIET NAVY WITH NEWER MORE CAPABLE SHIPS.

- SECOND, THE CLASSES OF SHIPS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE EMPHASIZED--AS EVIDENCED BY RELATIVELY HIGH BUILDING RATES, BY INCREASES IN FORCE SIZE, AND BY DECREASING AVERAGE AGE--ARE:
  - AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS,
  - AIRCRAFT CARRIERS,
  - NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES (SSNs)
  - MISSILE SHIPS (THOUGH IN THIS ONE CASE, THE FORCE MAY BE AGING VERY SLIGHTLY),
  - NON-COMBATANTS (OILERS, UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SUPPORT, REPAIR SHIPS), AND--TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER DEGREE--
  - NUCLEAR-POWERED CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSGns).
- THIRD, THE CLASSES OF SHIPS WHICH HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY STATIC SINCE 1968 ARE:
  - NON-MISSILE ESCORTS
  - DIESEL-POWERED CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSGs), AND
  - CRUISERS, WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW CONSTRUCTION, ARE AGING.

- FOURTH, THE ONE CLASS WHICH HAS SHRUNK MARKEDLY SINCE 1968 IS DIESEL-POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES (SSs). - EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO BUILD SOME NEW SSs, THEY HAVE RETIRED MANY MORE OF THEIR OLDER BOATS--PROBABLY ENOUGH, IN FACT, TO REDUCE THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE FORCE (A PHENOMENON SIMILAR TO THAT EXPERIENCED BY THE U.S. NAVY AS A WHOLE).

(C) ON BALANCE, THE TRENDS IN THE SOVIET NAVY OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS SHOW AN EMPHASIS ON SHIPS TO (1) COUNTER OUR OWN, (2) TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN REMOTE AREAS, AND (3) TO CARRY OUT THE PROJECTION MISSION. THE FORCE SIZE OF MAJOR GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS HAS BEEN HELD CONSTANT, WITH THE RETIREMENT OF OLDER SHIPS BEING NUMERICALLY COMPENSATED FOR THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF NEW--AND MORE CAPABLE--SHIPS.

SLIDE 13

(S) THE BLUE OVERLAY IS A SIMILAR PLOT, BUT FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY. THE FOLLOWING CONTRASTS WITH THE SOVIET NAVY SHOULD BE NOTED:

- WHILE THE BUILDING RATE HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE SOVIETS (ABOUT 4-1/2%, INSTEAD OF JUST UNDER 4%), THE RATE OF RETIREMENT HAS BEEN

SO MUCH HIGHER THAT THE TOTAL FORCE HAS SHRUNK AT AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF 8-1/2%, FOR A TOTAL OF 36% OVER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. THIS RAPID RATE OF RETIREMENT OF OLDER SHIPS HAS SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED THE NOMINAL AVERAGE AGE OF THE FLEET.

- WHEREAS THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN A HIGH BUILDING RATE AND AN INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN SEVEN OF THEIR 11 CLASSES, WE DID THIS ONLY IN ONE OF OUR NINE\* CLASSES (SSNs). WHILE WE HAVE BUILT NUCLEAR-POWERED GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES FASTER THAN THEY HAVE, THEY STARTED THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WITH A NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF 55%, AND THEY STILL HAVE A 20% SUPERIORITY TODAY.

- WE HAVE HAD AMBITIOUS BUILDING PROGRAMS IN THREE AREAS IN ADDITION TO SSNs:

- AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS (THE U.S. HAS BUILT 41; THE SOVIETS: 7)
- UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SHIPS (U.S.: 19; SOVIETS: 9) AND
- NON-MISSILE ESCORTS (U.S.: 42; SOVIETS: 15).

HOWEVER, THE RATE OF RETIREMENT OF OLDER SHIPS IN THESE CLASSES HAS BEEN FAR GREATER THAN THE NEW