CONSTRUCTION RATE, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE FORCES HAVE SHRUNK IN TOTAL SIZE TO A MARKED DEGREE. IN THE AGGREGATE, THESE THREE CLASSES HAVE SHRUNK AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 11-1/2%, COMPARED WITH THE FASTEST-SHRINKING SOVIET CLASS (DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES) AT ABOUT 6-1/2% PER YEAR.

IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED, OF COURSE, THAT THE NEW SHIPS WE HAVE BUILT IN THESE CLASSES HAVE MORE CAPABILITY THAN THE ONES WE HAVE RETIRED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE RETIRING 4,000-TON, 12-KNOT LSTs, AND REPLACING THEM WITH 8,000-TON, 20-KNOT SHIPS. BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE SOVIETS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE RETIRING 1200-TON, DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES AND REPLACING THEM WITH 4200-TON NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES.

(C)

- OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WE HAVE COMMISSIONED VERY FEW--IF ANY--NEW SHIPS IN FIVE CATEGORIES:
  - MISSILE SHIPS (THE U.S. HAS COMMISSIONED 1; THE SOVIETS: 19)
  - REPAIR AND SUPPORT (U.S.: 2; SOVIETS: 19)
  - CARRIERS (U.S.: 1; SOVIETS: 1--THOUGH THEIRS IS A MUCH LESS CAPABLE SHIP THAN OURS)

- DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES (U.S.: NONE; SOVIETS: 16)
- NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS--CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS (U.S.: NONE; SOVIETS: NONE).

IN ADDITION, IN ALL THESE CLASSES EXCEPT MISSILE SHIPS, OUR FORCE HAS BEEN GREATLY REDUCED THROUGH RETIREMENTS.

(U) THUS, THE MAJOR TREND WE SEE OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN THE U.S. NAVY HAS BEEN A LARGE DECREASE IN NUMBERS AS MANY OF OUR OLDER SHIPS HAVE BEEN RETIRED. IN NUMERICAL TERMS, ONLY OUR SSN FORCE HAS HAD A RELATIVELY HIGH BUILDING RATE AND INCREASE IN NUMBERS. ALL OTHERS HAVE DECLINED, IN SPITE OF AMBITIOUS BUILDING PROGRAMS IN AMPHIBIOUS AND UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT SHIPS, AND IN NON-MISSILE ESCORTS.

(C) THE GREATEST DISPARITY, AND ONE OF NO SMALL CONSEQUENCE, HAS BEEN IN THE BUILDING RATE OF OFF SHORE COMBATANT SHIPS (WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DATA BASE FOR THE PREVIOUS SLIDES). ON THE SOVIET SIDE THIS INCLUDES THE 800 TON NANUCHKA CLASS GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOAT, THE 200 TON OSA AND THE 100 TON KOMAR.

THESE BOATS CAN AND DO OPERATE IN OFFSHORE AREAS SUCH AS THE LEVANT COAST OF THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND DURING THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR A NANUCHKA WAS KEPT IN COMPANY

WITH THE U.S. CARRIER JOHN F. KENNEDY. ON THE U.S. SIDE, WE HAVE BUILT A LIMITED NUMBER OF PGs, PGMs AND PGHs AND WE HAVE EMBARKED UPON A BUILDING PROGRAM OF HARPOON-ARMED PATROL HYDROFOILS (PHMs). BUT THE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN OFFSHORE SURFACE COMBATANTS IS AND WILL REMAIN HEAVILY WITH THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD TO BUILD A BIG SHIP NAVY BECAUSE OUR FOREIGN POLICY DOES NOT PERMIT US TO ACQUIRE OVERSEAS BASES FROM WHICH OFFSHORE COMBATANT SHIPS CAN BE UTILIZED EFFECTIVELY. OUR PATROL HYDROFOILS WILL GIVE US THAT CAPABILITY IN AREAS WHERE WE HAVE THE LUXURY OF ADVANCED BASING, SUCH AS THE CARIBBEAN, THE MEDITERRANEAN, JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES, AND WE PLAN TO HAVE A MODEST CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THESE OFF SHORE COMBATANT SHIPS FROM "MOTHER SHIPS" IN OTHER AREAS. BUT IN THE BROAD WORLD WIDE CONTEXT, THIS DIFFERENCE IN BASES AVAILABLE FOR OFF SHORE COMBATANT SHIPS REPRESENTS A POLITICAL ASSYMETRY BETWEEN OUR TWO NAVIES.

TURNING NOW TO GROSS PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS -

(U) TO GIVE A ROUGH IDEA OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE TWO FLEETS TO CONTEND WITH EACH OTHER, WE CAN GO A STEP BEYOND THE COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF SHIPS, AND CONSIDER--IN THE MOST ELEMENTAL WAY--SUCH THINGS AS THE OFFENSIVE FORCE EACH MIGHT BRING TO BEAR ON THE OTHER, AS WELL AS THE DEFENSIVE FORCE EACH MIGHT USE TO PROTECT ITSELF. SINCE

THESE COMPARISONS WILL NECESSARILY BE HIGHLY AGGREGATED, AND THUS OVERSIMPLIFIED, THEY SHOULD BY NO MEANS BE INTERPRETED AS ACCURATE PREDICTORS OF THE OUTCOME OF ANY REAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO FLEETS. RATHER, THEY ARE INTENDED MERELY AS SOMEWHAT BETTER INDICATORS THAN MERE SHIP COUNTS.

(U) AS OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, WE WILL BE COUNTING THE WEAPONS MOST LIKELY TO BE USED AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE'S SHIPS. THESE ARE, FIRST, ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND, SECOND, ANTI-SHIP MISSILES.

(S) WE HAVE INCLUDED SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE MISSILE-ARMED, BUT HAVE OMITTED OTHER NAVAL BOMBERS FROM THESE COUNTS. THE SOVIET NAVAL BOMBERS NOT EQUIPPED WITH ASMs HAVE FAR LESS CAPABILITY AGAINST SURFACE SHIPS THAN DO ANTI-SHIP MISSILES OR ATTACK AIRCRAFT, AND IN ADDITION HAVE OTHER ROLES TO PERFORM, SUCH AS ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURES, RECONNAISSANCE, AND IN-FLIGHT REFUELING. SOVIET MISSILE ARMED PATROL BOATS ARE NOT INCLUDED ALTHOUGH THEY ARE VERY MUCH A PART OF THE BALANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH SEA AND OTHER AREAS CLOSE TO SOVIET BASES. IN WEIGHING THE BALANCE IN DISTANT OPERATIONS, THEY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

SLIDE 14 (U) BEFORE COUNTING THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES, WE FEEL IT IS WORTH LOOKING AT THE NUMBER OF PLATFORMS ON WHICH THOSE SYSTEMS CAN BE CARRIED.

AT THE MOMENT ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE PLATFORMS ARE MAINLY OUR CARRIERS, WHICH CARRY OUR ATTACK AIRCRAFT. THIS NUMBER, OF COURSE, HAS DECLINED WITH THE RETIREMENT OF OUR EARLIER ESSEX CLASS CARRIERS. HOWEVER, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE HARPOON ANTI-SHIP MISSILE WILL ALLOW MANY ADDITIONAL SHIPS, AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES, TO CARRY OFFENSIVE ANTI-SHIP MISSILES.

(S) ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THE MAJORITY OF PLATFORMS ARE THE SSM-EQUIPPED SUBMARINES, AN INCREASING PROPORTION OF WHICH ARE NUCLEAR-POWERED. THEIR FORCE LEVEL WILL CONTINUE TO RISE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW SSM-EQUIPPED SURFACE SHIPS AND, TOWARD THE END OF THE 10-YEAR PERIOD COVERED HERE, CARRIERS EQUIPPED WITH FIXED-WING V/STOL AIRCRAFT.

SLIDE 15 (S) THIS FIGURE SUMMARIZES THE TOTAL OF OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS (EXCLUSIVE OF OFFSHORE SSM EQUIPPED UNITS). AT PRESENT, THE SOVIETS OUTNUMBER US BY ABOUT 4:1--THOUGH OUR CARRIERS ARE INDIVIDUALLY MORE POTENT THAN THE SOVIET SUBMARINES OR SURFACE SHIPS. INTRODUCTION OF THE HARPOON MISSILE WILL REDRESS THIS BALANCE, BRINGING US TO NUMERICAL PARITY BY 1978.

SLIDE 16 (U) GIVEN THOSE OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS, THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS THEY CAN CARRY. AS NOTED EARLIER, THIS IS A SIMPLIFIED COMPARISON; WE COUNT AN ANTI-SHIP MISSILE AS EQUIVALENT TO AN ATTACK AIRCRAFT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ANTI-SHIP MISSILE IS PROBABLY MORE ACCURATE AND LESS AFFECTED BY POOR VISIBILITY, AND THAT THE ATTACK AIRCRAFT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS OFTEN LESS VULNERABLE TO ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES MAY PROVIDE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, AND, ABOVE ALL, IS REUSABLE. NONETHELESS, THIS FIGURE DOES GIVE AT LEAST A FIRST APPROXIMATION OF OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

(U) ON THE U.S. SIDE, OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER HAS SUFFERED FROM THE REDUCTION IN OUR CARRIER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT FORCES. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE HARPOON WILL REVERSE THIS TREND DRAMATICALLY IN THE LATER YEARS OF THE PERIOD.

(C) ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THE NUMBER OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES RISES AT AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 3% OVER THE 10-YEAR PERIOD, THE INCREASE OF SHIP-LAUNCHED AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED ANTI-SHIP MISSILES BEING MORE THAN ENOUGH TO OFFSET THE SLOW DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF ASMs. THERE WILL ALSO BE A SMALL INCREASE IN CAPABILITY TOWARD THE END OF THE PERIOD IN THE FORM OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM THE NEW LARGER SOVIET CARRIERS, BUT THEIR NUMBERS WILL NOT BE LARGE ENOUGH TO SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE COMPARISON UNTIL AFTER 1978.

SLIDE 17 (S) THIS FIGURE SUMMARIZES THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS' SUPERIORITY HAS GROWN--BECAUSE OF GAINS OF THEIR SIDE AND LOSSES ON OURS--TO ONE OF ALMOST 90% TODAY, BUT INTRODUCTION OF THE HARPOON WILL REVERSE THE TREND DRAMATICALLY AND BRING US TO NEAR NUMERICAL PARITY BY 1976.

SLIDE 18 (C) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES. THE PARAMETER WE HAVE CHOSEN HERE IS THE NUMBER OF SIMULTANEOUS INTERCEPTS POSSIBLE AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE'S ATTACK AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-SHIP MISSILES. THIS CAPABILITY IS PROVIDED BY SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (SAMs) FIRED FROM SURFACE SHIPS, AND BY INTERCEPTORS. IN MAKING THIS COMPARISON, WE HAVE COUNTED ONLY A THIRD OF THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS IN THE INVENTORY AS A WAY OF REFLECTING STEADY-STATE AVAILABILITY. WHILE A MISSILE SHIP CAN MAINTAIN STATION 24 HOURS A DAY, OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT MAINTAINING ONE FIGHTER ON AIRBORNE COMBAT AIR PATROL, AND ANOTHER ON DECK READY FOR LAUNCH, REQUIRES A FORCE OF 6 IN TOTAL. AND AGAIN, AS IN THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY COMPARISON, THERE IS A DEGREE OF ARTIFICIALITY IN ASSUMING EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN DISSIMILAR SYSTEMS. IN THIS CASE, WE RECOGNIZE THAT INTERCEPTORS ARE EXTREMELY MOBILE, WHEREAS MISSILE SHIPS ARE TACTICALLY STATIONARY: THAT INTERECEPTORS HAVE LIMITED AMMUNITION, WHILE MISSILE SHIPS HAVE RELATIVELY LARGE MAGAZINES. SO ONCE AGAIN, WHAT WE SEE HERE IS ONLY A FIRST APPROXIMATION OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

(U) ON THE U.S. SIDE, CAPABILITY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY FLAT IN THE RECENT PAST, BUT WILL DOUBLE BY 1978 WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE F-14, WHICH CAN INTERCEPT SIX TARGETS SIMULTANEOUSLY, AS OPPOSED TO THE F-4s SINGLE-TARGET CAPABILITY. THIS IMPROVEMENT RESULTS NOT FROM A FORCE LEVEL CHANGE, BUT FROM MODERNIZATION.

(C) ON THE SOVIET SIDE, CAPABILITY DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON SAM SYSTEMS BASED ON SURFACE SHIPS, AND THIS WILL RISE AT AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 15% OVER THE PERIOD. TOWARD THE END, THEIR NEW LARGER AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WILL ADD SOME INTERCEPT CAPABILITY, BUT NOT IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE TOTAL UNTIL AFTER 1978. AND EVEN THEN, WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THESE CARRIERS WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT AN INTERCEPTOR WITH CAPABILITIES EVEN REMOTELY APPROACHING THAT OF THE F-14.

LIDE 19

THIS FIGURE SUMMARIZES THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THOUGH OUR INITIAL SUPERIORITY OF SEVEN OR EIGHT TO ONE HAS BEEN CUT TO ABOUT THREE TO ONE, WE WILL MAINTAIN THAT RATIO THROUGH THE END OF THE PERIOD, IN SPITE OF THE GROWTH IN SOVIET CAPABILITY.

IDE 20

(U) THIS FIGURE SHOWS A DIFFERENT KIND OF DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY -- ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) FORCES. HERE WE COUNT

U.S. SSNs, SURFACE SHIPS WITH AN ASW CAPABILITY (SONAR AND ASW WEAPONS), AND ASW AIRCRAFT, BOTH FIXED AND ROTARY WING, AND BOTH LAND AND SEA BASED. ONLY SOVIET THIRD GENERATION SSNs ARE INCLUDED.

(U) ON THE U.S. SIDE, TOTAL ASW FORCES HAVE DROPPED MARKEDLY IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ONLY IN THE SSN CATEGORY HAS THERE BEEN GROWTH. THE RETIREMENT OF OUR ASW CARRIERS (CVSs) HAS REDUCED THE NUMBER OF SEA-BASED HELICOPTERS AND FIXED-WING ASW AIRCRAFT (S-2s), AND WE HAVE RETIRED BOTH SURFACE ASW ESCORTS AND LAND-BASED PATROL AIRCRAFT. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, HOWEVER, THE TREND WILL BE REVERSED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RETIRE MORE ASW-CAPABLE SHIPS THAN WE BUILD, BUT AT FAR LESS THAN THE RATE OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS. THE NUMBER OF LAND-BASED PATROL AIRCRAFT WILL STABILIZE, THE SSN BUILDING PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO ENLARGE THAT FORCE, AND OUR SEA-BASED ASW AIRCRAFT FORCES WILL INCREASE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE S-3 AND THE LAMPS HELICOPTER.

(C) ON THE SOVIET SIDE, ALL CATEGORIES OF ASW-CAPABLE FORCES, AND PARTICULARLY THE AIRBORNE COMPONENTS HAVE INCREASED OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THE TOTAL INCREASES OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE AS GREAT WITH THE SINGLE EXCEPTION OF ASW SURFACE SHIPS -- WHERE SOME OF THE OLDER AND SMALLER SINGLE-PURPOSE ESCORTS WILL BE RETIRED.

(S) THESE COMPARISONS DO NOT REFLECT THE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND SOVIET ASW FORCES, SUCH AS: (1) SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY (E.G., SOSUS); (2) SUBMARINE SELF-NOISE LEVELS; (3) LONG RANGE CAPABILITIES OF DETECTION SENSORS ON ASW PLATFORMS; AND, (4) VARIATIONS IN PLATFORM CAPABILITIES. THE U.S. GENERALLY LEADS IN THE ABOVE AREAS, BUT THIS LEAD IS AT LEAST PARTIALLY COUNTERBALANCED BY THE ASSYMETRY IN U.S. AND SOVIET NEED FOR USE OF THE SEA. FURTHER, THESE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES DO NOT CHANGE THE PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRENDS INDICATED BY THE FIGURES.

SLIDE 21

(C) THIS FIGURE SUMMARIZES THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ASW-CAPABLE FORCES. IN 1968, WE HAD A NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF ALMOST TWO-TO-ONE. BUT DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, OUR FORCES HAVE SHRUNK AT AN AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF ABOUT 7%, WHILE THEIRS HAVE GROWN AT ABOUT 7%, RESULTING IN OUR LOSS OF NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT A MODERATE GROWTH IN OUR FORCES OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, COMPARED WITH A VERY SMALL SOVIET GROWTH, AND THE COMBINATION SHOULD GIVE US A SLIGHT EDGE IN THE NUMBER OF ASW UNITS BY 1978.

(U) THESE PLOTS HAVE COMPARED UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES IN SIMILAR CATEGORIES. BUT OUR OFFENSIVE FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE, DO NOT COMPETE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES: RATHER THEY COMPETE WITH THE SOVIET DEFENSIVE FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF ATTACKING THEIR TARGETS.

THOSE TYPES OF COMPARISONS WILL COMPLETE THIS PART OF THE ASSESSMENT.

SLIDE 22

(S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE IN RATIO TO THE NUMBER OF TARGETS THEY WOULD HAVE TO ATTACK. THE TARGETS IN THIS CASE, ARE THOSE CONSIDERED AS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY: SURFACE SHIPS EQUIPPED WITH SAMs AND SSMs, AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. THE UNITED STATES IN 1968 HAD A SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION OF MORE THAN TWO-TO-ONE, BUT WITH THE REDUCTION IN OUR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY RESULTING FROM THE DECLINE IN OUR CARRIER ATTACK FORCES AS WELL AS THE GRADUAL GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SHIPS THEY HAD TO COPE WITH, THE SOVIETS ACHIEVED NUMERICAL PARITY IN 1971, AND NOW HAVE A SUPERIORITY OF ABOUT 50%. IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT ONLY REGAIN NUMERICAL PARITY, BUT AN EVEN GREATER NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY THAN WE STARTED WITH IN 1968. THIS RESULTS, OF COURSE, FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF HARPOON, WHICH NOT ONLY INCREASES OUR OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER, BUT ALSO DILUTES THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER BY PRESENTING THEM WITH MORE HIGH-THREAT PLATFORMS WITH WHICH TO COPE.

SLIDE 23 (U) THIS FIGURE ALSO SHOWS THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, BUT THIS TIME IN RATIO TO THE NUMBER OF OPPOSING DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THE CURVES MAY BE INTERPRETED AS A MEASURE OF EACH SIDE's ABILITY TO PENETRATE THE OTHER's DEFENSES.

(C) ON THE U.S. SIDE, OUR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS DECLINE DURING THE EARLY YEARS, BUT RISE RAPIDLY THEREAFTER, WHILE THE SOVIET DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS GROW QUITE STEADILY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD. THE NET RESULT HAS BEEN A VERY SHARP DROP IN OUR ABILITY TO SATURATE THEIR DEFENSES. THIS IS FOLLOWED BY AN EVEN MORE RAPID RECOVERY -- BUT NOT ENOUGH TO RECOVER THE 1968 ADVANTAGE WHICH WE HAD OVER THE SOVIET DEFENSES.

(C) ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THEIR OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS INCREASE OVER THE PERIOD, BUT LESS RAPIDLY AT THE END THAN AT THE BEGINNING, WHILE OUR DEFENSES INCREASE QUITE RAPIDLY IN THE LATTER YEARS AFTER A RELATIVELY STATIC INITIAL PERIOD. THE NET RESULT IS A GRADUAL GAIN IN THEIR ABILITY TO SATURATE OUR DEFENSES OVER THE FIRST FOUR YEARS, FOLLOWED BY A STEADY DECLINE OVER THE REST OF THE PERIOD TO A POINT ROUGHLY 25% BELOW THEIR 1968 CAPABILITY.

(C) COMPARING THE TWO CURVES, THE UNITED STATES HAS A CLEAR ADVANTAGE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD, THOUGH FAR GREATER AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END THAN IT IS NOW.

SLIDE 24 (U) THIS FIGURE IS THE FINAL COMPARATIVE PLOT, AND SHOWS THE NUMBER OF ASW SYSTEMS IN RATIO TO THE NUMBER OF SUBMARINES

WITH WHICH THEY HAVE TO COPE. WE HAVE INCLUDED ONLY GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES IN THIS COMPARISON, EXCLUDING THOSE WHICH LAUNCH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE CURVES CAN BE INTERPRETED AS A MEASURE OF EACH SIDE's ABILITY TO SUPPRESS THE OTHER's SUBMARINES.

SLIDE 24

(C) ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE DECLINE OF ASW FORCES IS PARTIALLY COMPENSATED FOR BY THE DROP IN SOVIET SS FORCE LEVELS, AND THUS THE U.S. RATIO DROPS ONLY SLIGHTLY THROUGH 1974. AFTER THAT, THE GROWTH OF U.S. ASW FORCES CAUSES A RISE IN THIS RATIO. THE SOVIETS ENJOY A LEAD IN THIS INDICATOR WITH A MAXIMUM LEAD OF 3:1 AT THIS TIME. THE RISE IN SOVIET FORCES THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD IS MAGNIFIED IN THE FIRST SIX YEARS BY U.S. RETIREMENTS OF DIESEL SUBMARINES, AND THEN IS OVERTAKEN IN THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD BY OUR SSN BUILD-UP.

(C) IN <u>RETROSPECT</u>, THE LAST THREE PLOTS SHOW A GENERALLY SIMILAR TREND. UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES AGAINST THEIR SOVIET OPPONENTS SHOW A MARKED DECLINE OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, AND A GENERAL RECOVERY IN THE NEXT FIVE. THE SOVIET CAPABILITIES AGAINST OUR OPPOSITION SHOW A DIFFERENT TREND: A RISE DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, AND A TENDENCY TO FALL OFF DURING THE NEXT FIVE. THE NET RESULT IS THAT WE ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT <u>RIGHT NOW</u>. WHILE WE HAVE MORE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY RELATIVE TO ENEMY DEFENSES THAN THEY HAVE, THE

SITUATION DOES NOT LOOK AS FAVORABLE WHEN WEIGHING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY PER SHIP TARGET NOR ASW CAPABILITY AGAINST SUBMARINES.

(C) IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING OUT OUR PLANNED PROGRAMS, AND IF OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE CORRECT, THE SITUATION OF THE U.S. NAVY RELATIVE TO THE SOVIET NAVY SHOULD IMPROVE IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THOSE TWO CONDITIONS WILL BE FULFILLED. FOR ONE THING, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE RATE AT WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL RETIRE THEIR OLDER SYSTEMS. IT IS ALSO DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE TECHNOLOGICAL SUCCESS OF THEIR NEW DEVELOPMENTS -- AND THAT FACTOR ALONE COULD EASILY BE AS IMPORTANT AS ALL THE CRUDE ANALYSES SHOWN HERE.

(U) NUMEROUS OTHER PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS COULD BE MADE WHICH WOULD ALSO OFFER VALID INSIGHTS INTO THE RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE TWO NAVIES. A NUMBER OF THESE ARE EXAMINED IN APPENDICES. ALTHOUGH THEY OFFER DIFFERENT ABSOLUTE MEASURES THAN THOSE JUST EXAMINED, AND IN MANY CASES HIGHLIGHT OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, THEY ALSO TEND TO INDICATE SIMILAR OVERALL TRENDS DURING THE 1968-78 TIME SPAN. I WILL GO THROUGH SOME OF THESE AFTER COMPLETING THE MAIN THRUST OF THE NET ASSESSMENT.

TURNING NOW TO ANALYTICAL WAR GAMING RESULTS -

(U) IN ADDITION TO COMPARING TRENDS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE TWO FLEETS, AND COMPARING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, WE CAN ALSO EXAMINE THE RESULTS OF WAR GAMING ANALYSES. THE NARAC G AND SEAMIX ANALYSES PROVIDE FURTHER INSIGHT IN ASSESSING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NAVIES. THOUGH BOTH DEAL WITH NON-NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE (IN 1973, AND IN 1981, RESPECTIVELY), THEY CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED TO COVER UNILATERAL CONFRONTATIONS SINCE THE FORCES AVAILABLE IN ALL THE VARIOUS THEATERS ARE CLOSE TO WHAT WE COULD PROVIDE IN A SINGLE SPECIFIC PEACETIME CRISIS SITUATION.

SLIDE 25

(S) NARAC G SHOWED THAT THE SOVIET SURFACE AND SUBMARINE THREAT IN 1973 WOULD NOT BE GREAT ENOUGH TO DENY US CONTROL OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IF WE AUGMENTED OUR FORCE THERE TO A TOTAL OF FOUR CARRIERS. THOUGH WE COULD EXPECT A CARRIER TO BE DISABLED, WE WOULD PREVAIL. HOWEVER, IE THE SOVIETS COULD MOUNT AIR ATTACKS AGAINST US -- EITHER THROUGH OVERFLIGHT OF YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, TURKEY, OR THE MIDDLE EAST, OR THROUGH OPERATION FROM AFRICAN BASES -- CONTROL OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WOULD REQUIRE A FORCE OF FIVE OR SIX CARRIERS, TOGETHER WITH ASSOCIATED SURFACE COMBATANTS -- A FORCE BEYOND REASONABLE PEACETIME CAPABILITIES. WITH ONLY FOUR CARRIERS, WE COULD AT BEST HOLD ONLY THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

(S) THE SEAMIX STUDY INDICATED THAT THE BALANCE AND QUALITY OF FORCES WOULD IMPROVE BY 1981 TO THE POINT WHERE PERIODIC FORAYS INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COULD BE MADE BY A 3 OR 4-CARRIER FORCE WITH MODERATE TO HEAVY LOSSES, BUT THAT A GREATER MASSING OF FORCES WOULD BE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE CONTROL.

(S) THESE STUDIES ALSO EXAMINED THE NAVAL BALANCE IN THE PACIFIC DURING THE LAND WAR IN NATO. THE FORCES NECESSARY FOR THE PRIMARY U.S. NAVY EFFORT IN THE ATLANTIC DO NOT LEAVE ENOUGH TO PROTECT OUR SLOCs IN THE PACIFIC, NOR TO PROVIDE THE ASSISTANCE JAPAN WOULD REQUIRE TO PROTECT HER SLOC TO THE PERSIAN GULF OIL PORTS. THE MAJOR FACTOR IN THE VICINITY OF JAPAN AND KOREA IS THE LONG RANGE SOVIET LAND-BASED AIR THREAT ALONG THE EXTENDED SLOCs, IT IS THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT. EXTRAPOLATION OF THE ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT PERHAPS SIX OR MORE CARRIERS WOULD BE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A FAVORABLE POWER BALANCE, WITH U.S. AND ALLIED LAND-BASED AIRPOWER UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COVERAGE.

(S) THESE ANALYSES DO NOT PAINT AN OPTIMISTIC PICTURE OF THE U.S. NAVY's ABILITY TO MEET ALL ITS COMMITMENTS IN A NATO CAMPAIGN. THEY INDICATE THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE ATLANTIC SLOC WOULD REQUIRE A HEAVY ALLOCATION OF NAVAL

FORCES, AND EVEN THEN, SHIPPING LOSSES DURING THE FIRST MONTH WOULD BE HIGH -- ABOUT 45% IN 1973, AND ABOUT 30% IN 1981. IN 1973, THE REMAINING ATLANTIC FORCES, AUGMENTED BY SOME FROM THE PACIFIC WOULD ENABLE NATO TO HOLD THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BUT NATO's SOUTHERN FLANK ALONG THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTHERN FLANK IN SCANDINAVIA WOULD NOT BE COVERED, AND THE REMAINING FORCES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD THE WESTERN PACIFIC. THE SOMEWHAT BETTER SITUATION IN 1981 WOULD ALLOW US TO MAKE PERIODIC FORAYS TO AID THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO, AND TO PROTECT OUR OIL SLOC BETWEEN ALASKA AND THE WEST COAST.

(S) THESE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT, GIVEN TIME, THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT CAN BE CONTAINED. HOWEVER, THE PROTECTION OF OUR ATLANTIC SLOC, WHICH THESE STUDIES EXAMINED, IS FAR FROM OUR MOST DIFFICULT ASW TASK; THE CAMPAIGN WOULD BE IN AN AREA WHERE (1), WE HAVE OUR BEST SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS, (2) WE HAVE ADEQUATE AND WELL-POSITIONED BASES FOR OUR P-3 ASW AIRCRAFT, (3) ACCESS FOR THE SOVIET SUBMARINES IS THROUGH A SERIES OF NATURAL CHOKE-POINTS WHICH ARE VULNERABLE TO BARRIERS OF OUR OWN ATTACK SUBMARINES, LAND-BASED PATROL AIRCRAFT, AND CAPTOR MINES, AND (4) IT IS AN AREA IN WHICH WE CAN BRING A SUBSTANTIAL CONCENTRATION OF NAVAL FORCE TO BEAR. BUT IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO THREATEN US NOT ONLY IN

THE ATLANTIC, BUT OVER MUCH LARGER PORTIONS OF THE EARTH's SURFACE -- SUCH AS OUR OIL SLOC TO THE PERSIAN GULF, OR OUR RAW MATERIAL IMPORT AND EXPORT SLOCs THROUGHOUT THE WORLD -- UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY COULD RESUPPLY THEIR SUBMARINES IN SANCTUARIES (E.G., "NEUTRAL" PORTS), OUR TASK WOULD BE VERY MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN THE ATLANTIC. WITHOUT EXTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM COVERAGE BEYOND THE REACH OF LAND-BASED PATROL AIRCRAFT, WITHOUT THE ADVANTAGE OF CHOKE POINTS WHERE WE COULD ESTABLISH BARRIERS, AND OVER AREA TOO LARGE TO PERMIT CONCENTRATIONS OF ASW FORCES, THE SITUATION WE WOULD FACE WOULD BE ANALOGOUS TO GUERILLA WARFARE. EXTRAPOLATION FROM EXISTING ANALYSES TO SUCH A SITUATION IS ADMITTEDLY TENUOUS, BUT IT CLEARLY COULD TAKE FROM MANY MONTHS TO A YEAR OR MORE TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF SEA CONTROL ADEQUATE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MORE THAN A MODEST FRACTION OF OUR SEABORNE TRADE -- A SITUATION WHICH COULD HAVE GRAVE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ESTIMATES THAT WE HAVE ON THE ORDER OF A 30% ABILITY TO PREVAIL AGAINST SOVIET FORCES IN A CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT OUR SLOCs WORLDWIDE.

CONCLUSION

SLIDE 26 (S) IN THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL TERMS, OUR NET ASSESSMENT OF OF THE NAVIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS AS FOLLOWS:

- THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES HAS DETERIORATED MARKEDLY IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS;
- SOME IMPROVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE NEXT 5 YEARS (IF WE CARRY OUT OUR PLANS AND IF OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE CORRECT);
- BUT EVEN FIVE YEARS HENCE, THERE WILL BE MANY ENTIRELY PLAUSIBLE SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD SEVERELY STRAIN OUR NAVAL CAPABILITIES, AND MANY IMPORTANT TASKS WHICH WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT;
- THE SOVIETS HAVE EMBRACED NAVAL POWER AS MAJOR ELEMENT OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY, WITH THE CAPABILITY TO COMPETE MOST EFFECTIVELY WITH US IN THE PEACETIME PARA-DIPLOMATIC USE OF NAVAL POWER. THEY MAY OBTAIN A CAPABILITY TO DETER OR THWART U.S. INTERVENTION AND MAY ALSO BE BUILDING THEIR OWN CAPABILITY FOR INTERVENTION.

(U) I WOULD LIKE TO SHOW YOU NOW A NUMBER OF OTHER INDICATORS OF U.S./SOVIET NAVAL BALANCE WHICH I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND SHED ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON THE SUBJECT.

SLIDE 27

(S) THIS FIGURE DEPICTS THE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS OF THE SOVIET FLEET AS OF MIDYEAR 1973. AS CAN BE SEEN, APPROXIMATELY ONE-FIFTH OF THESE SHIPS HAVE JOINED THE FLEET WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS. BUILDING

PROGRAMS OVER THE LAST DECADE HAVE PRODUCED 92% OF THE FRIGATES, 54% OF THE OCEAN ESCORTS AND 30% OF THE DESTROYERS. THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE SHIPS IS APPROXIMATELY 11-1/2 YEARS. THE DESIGNATIONS OF SHIP CLASS ARE NEW ONES USED BY THE CIA, BY THE WAY; NOT THOSE OF JANE's OR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. A BIG DIFFERENCE IS IN CLASSIFYING A NUMBER OF SOVIET CRUISERS AS FRIGATES.

SLIDE 28 (U) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. FLEET MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS. APPROXIMATELY ONE-FIFTH OF THESE SHIPS HAVE JOINED THE FLEET WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER, AND ONE FRIGATE (NOT SHOWN), ALL THESE SHIPS WERE OCEAN ESCORTS. THE CORRESPONDING ONE-FIFTH OF THE SOVIET FLEET WAS COMPRISED OF CRUISERS, FRIGATES, DESTROYERS AND OCEAN ESCORTS. OF THE U.S. SHIPS CITED APPROXIMATELY 34% ARE GREATER THAN 20 YEARS OLD.

SLIDE 28A THIS FIGURE IS ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING AT COMPARATIVE AGE TRENDS.

SLIDE 29 (S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE COMPARATIVE TONNAGE OF SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUBMARINES. THESE CURVES INCLUDE FIGURES FOR MAJOR COMBATANTS DOWN THROUGH OCEAN ESCORTS/U.S. NAVY PGs, SOVIET NANUCHKA CLASS MISSILE PATROL BOATS, AND ATTACK

SUBMARINES. OSA AND KOMAR CLASSES ARE OMITTED, AS ARE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES, IN KEEPING WITH THE RATIONALE PRESENTED EARLIER. IN INTERPRETING THIS FIGURE, IT IS USEFUL TO NOTE THAT THE U.S. CURVE CONTAINS UP TO 17 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, 9 CRUISERS AND 28 FRIGATES, WHILE THE SOVIET CURVE CONTAINS ONLY ONE CARRIER (SMALLER THAN ITS U.S. COUNTERPARTS), 2 HELICOPTER SHIPS, 13 CRUISERS AND 13 FRIGATES. IN SHORT, THIS FIGURE ILLUSTRATES GRAPHICALLY THAT THE U.S. NAVY BUILDS LARGE SHIPS -- A FACTOR WHICH IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE NAVY's MISSIONS AS STATED EARLIER IN THE ASSESSMENT.

WE NOW EXAMINE THE MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. AND USSR.

SLIDE 30 (S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF MINES IN INVENTORY FOR BOTH SIDES. MOST OF THE SOVIET STOCKPILE CONSISTS OF WWII AND EARLY POST-WWII CONVENTIONAL MOORED CONTACT AND BOTTOM INFLUENCE MINES WHICH ARE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO SWEEP, EXCEPT FOR PRESSURE COMBINATION MINES WHICH MUST BE HUNTED AND NEUTRALIZED OR SWEPT WITH "GUINEA PIG" SHIPS. MORE RECENTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE PRODUCED DEEP MOORED MINES SUCH AS CLUSTER BAY WHICH ADDS NEW DIMENSIONS TO THE MINING THREAT AND THE COUNTERMEASURES PROBLEM.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE OVER 10,000 CLUSTER BAY MINES IN INVENTORY AND WILL BUILD THIS NUMBER TO 20,000 BY 1980. CONCURRENTLY THEY ARE EXPECTED TO RETIRE SOME OF THE MORE OUTDATED MINES FROM INVENTORY.

(C) THE U.S. STOCKPILE IS COMPOSED OF CONVENTIONAL MINES, MK-75 DESTRUCTORS, QUICKSTRIKE, AND CAPTOR IN THE OUT YEARS.

(S) IN TERMS OF GROSS INVENTORY, THE SOVIET UNION LEADS BY A FACTOR OF 3 NOW; THIS LEAD IS PROJECTED TO BE REDUCED TO 2 BY THE END OF THE PERIOD.

SLIDE 31

(S) MINESWEEPING CAPABILITY IS SHOWN HERE IN MSO EQUIVALENTS. FOR THIS COMPARISON, U.S. MINESWEEPING HELICOPTERS ARE EVALUATED AS BEING EQUIVALENT TO 2-1/2 MOSs BASED ON AREA COVERAGE PER UNIT TIME. THE U.S. CAPABILITY DIPPED EARLY IN THIS PERIOD WITH THE RETIREMENT OF ACTIVE FLEET MSOs, BUT REBOUNDED TO A LEVEL OF 77 AS THE RH-53D HELICOPTERS ENTERED FLEET INVENTORY. THE SOVIET FORCE REMAINS NUMERICALLY GREATER THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE 21 RH-53D MINESWEEPING HELICOPTERS (55 MSO-EQUIVALENTS) REPRESENT A DISTANT AREA SWEEP CAPABILITY WHICH THE USSR IS UNABLE TO MATCH.

SLIDE 32

(S) THE SOVIET UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT (UNREP) CAPABILITY HAS INCREASED STEADILY DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN TERMS OF DEDICATED PLATFORMS, AND IS PROJECTED TO CONTINUE BUILDING AT AN INCREASED RATE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD. THIS FIGURE COMPARES THE NUMBER OF DEDICATED UNREP SHIPS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FUEL. THIS CATEGORY INCLUDES AO, AOE, AND AOR FOR U.S. FORCES; AO, AOE, AOR AND AORL FOR SOVIET FORCES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE U.S. SHIPS ARE, IN GENERAL, LARGER SHIPS WITH GREATER DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE. THOSE SHIPS DEPICTED FOR THE SOVIET NAVY CONSTITUTE THE ENTIRE INVENTORY OF DEDICATED UNREP SHIPS. THERE ARE NO USSR SHIPS CONFIGURED SOLELY FOR THE REPLENISHMENT OF AMMUNITION, REFRIGERATED STORES, OR ELECTRONIC/AVIATION SPARE PARTS. THE U.S. NAVY, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS A SIZEABLE GROUP OF SHIPS SO CONFIGURED,

SLIDE 33

WHICH INCLUDES THE AE, AF AND AFS CLASSES. THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE GROSS COMPARISON OF UNREP SHIPS INCLUDING THIS LATTER GROUP.

SLIDE 34

(S) THIS FIGURE IS AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT CAPABILITY WHICH RELATES THE UNREP FORCES TO THOSE SHIPS WHICH MUST BE SUPPORTED. THE COMBATANT SHIPS CONSIDERED INCLUDE MAJOR COMBATANTS DOWN THROUGH THE DE CLASS PLUS AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS DOWN THROUGH THE LST CLASS. FROM THE FIGURE, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE

U.S. NAVY MAINTAINS A RELATIVELY CONSTANT RATIO OF ABOUT 9:1 THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD. THE ACCELERATED UNREP SHIP BUILDING PROGRAM OF THE SOVIET NAVY STEADILY REDUCES THE COMBATANT TO UNREP SHIP RATIO OVER THE PERIOD UNTIL IT REACHES A VALUE OF ABOUT FIVE IN 1978.

(S) TO COMPLEMENT THIS QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION A QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IS IN ORDER. THE SOVIET UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT TECHNIQUES ARE, IN GENERAL, NOT AS REFINED AS THOSE OF THE U.S. NAVY. A KEY ELEMENT IN UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT IS THE TIME DURATION OF AN EVOLUTION, SINCE THE SHIPS INVOLVED ARE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO SUBMARINE AND AIRCRAFT ATTACK WHILE THEY ARE ENGAGED IN REFUELING, REARMING OR REPROVISIONING. THE MOST RAPID METHOD OF REPLENISHMENT IS THE ALONGSIDE METHOD, AND U.S. NAVY SHIPS ARE TRAINED TO A HIGH LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY IN THIS METHOD. THE SOVIET NAVY, CONVERSELY, HAS LITTLE TRAINING OR PROFICIENCY IN THIS AREA. MANY OF THEIR TANKERS ARE EQUIPPED ONLY FOR THE ASTERN METHOD OF REFUELING -- A LENGTHY AND LABORIOUS UNDERTAKING. HOWEVER, AS THEIR UNREP FORCE GROWS, ADDITIONAL TRAINING EFFORT WILL NO DOUBT BE EXPENDED TO IMPROVE THE LEVEL OF CAPABILITY IN THIS AREA.

(C) THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN THE PAST, INDICATED A CAPABILITY TO AUGMENT THEIR UNREP FORCES WITH MERCANT MARINE ASSETS.

A SIMILAR CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THE RECENT CHARGER LOG PROJECT. THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCE WHICH MUST BE RECOGNIZED IN THIS CAPABILITY IS THE VARIANCE OF MERCHANT SHIP AVAILABILITY AND THE TIMELINESS THEREOF. THE USSR, REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, MUSI BE ACCORDED THE EDGE IN FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA.

SLIDE 35

(S) THIS FIGURE DEPICTS THE NUMBER OF U.S. ATTACK AND ASW CARRIERS AND SOVIET CARRIERS. WITH THE DECLINE OF U.S. ASW CARRIERS, THE ROLE OF THE ATTACK CARRIER (CVA) BEGAN TO EVOLVE TO INCLUDE AN ASW CAPABILITY (CV) IN 1972. BY 1979 ELEVEN OF THE CARRIERS WILL BE CVs VICE CVAs. THE SOVIET CARRIER FORCE BEGINS IN ABOUT 1975 WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE KIEV, A CV SMALLER THAN THE ESSEX CLASS AND CAPABLE OF OPERATING ABOUT 25 V/STOL FIGHTERS OR A MIX OF FIGHTERS AND ASW HELOS.

SLIDE 36

(S) THIS FIGURE DEPICTS THE AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT IN U.S. CARRIER AIR WINGS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SOVIET V/STOL. THE U.S. CURVES INCLUDE ONLY CARRIER-BASED FIGHTER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT WHICH DECLINE TO A LEVEL FORCE OF ABOUT 750 IN THE LATER YEARS. THE SOVIET V/STOL IS A LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER/INTERCEPTOR WITH LIMITED ATTACK CAPABILITY.

SLIDE 37

(S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C^3) IN THE 1974 TIME FRAME. THE ANALYSIS WAS MADE BY GENERAL TYPE OF FORCES -- SUBSURFACE, SURFACE, AND AIR, AND BY THE OVERALL ABILITY TO COORDINATE ALL TYPES OF FORCES. THE FORCES ARE RELATED TO SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO C^3 POSTURE. THESE ARE RELIABILITY OF TRANSMISSION;/SECURITY OF CONTENT; SPEED FROM WRITER TO READER;/ VOLUME CAPACITY;/ INVULNERABILITY TO DIRECTION FINDING, JAMMING, AND DECEPTION;/ SURVIVABILITY UNDER ATTACK, SABOTAGE, OR HOST COUNTRY NEUTRALITY;/ AND ABILITY TO DERIVE USEFUL INFORMATION FROM THE ENEMY's C^3. THE FIGURE INDICATES THAT, IN THE CAPABILITIES CRUCIAL TO FIGHTING A WAR -- RELIABILITY AND INVULVERABILITY -- THE SOVIETS HAVE THE ADVANTAGE.

PAUSE

SLIDE 38

(S) THIS FIGURE DEPICTS GRAPHICALLY THE TREND IN OUR RELATIVE CAPABILITIES. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT C^3 IS A RELATIVELY NEW TYPE OF CAPABILITY AS WE NOW KNOW IT, AND THAT BOTH SIDES ARE ESSENTIALLY STILL GROWING IN THIS AREA. THUS, CONSIDERING THE MAGNITUDE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE DURING THE CITED PERIOD, LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE CAN BE GIVEN TO PAST TRENDS. THE MOVE AWAY FROM THE SOVIET PREDICTED LINE OF 1970 IS DUE PRIMARILY TO THEIR SUPERIORITY IN ACOUSTIC COMMUNICATIONS AND FORCE COORDINATION.