

SLIDE 39

(S) AMPHIBIOUS TROOPLIFT CAPABILITY IS INDICATED HERE. U.S. LIFT CAPABILITY HAS DROPPED APPROXIMATELY 40% SINCE 1968; IT WILL RISE SLIGHTLY TOWARD THE END OF THE PERIOD, AND THEN LEVEL OFF AS THE LAST OF THE NEW LHAs ENTER ACTIVE SERVICE. SOVIET LIFT CAPABILITY HAS RISEN STEADILY AND IS PROJECTED TO CONTINUE MODERATE GROWTH. THE TROOPLIFT CAPACITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES DIFFERS BY LESS THAN 10,000 TROOPS, BUT THE U.S. SHIPS OFFER ADDITIONAL CARGO AND EQUIPMENT SPACE BEYOND THAT OF THE SOVIET SHIPS. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. HAS A DISTANT AREA LIFT CAPABILITY AS OPPOSED TO THE SHORT-LEGGED SOVIET LIFT. IN TERMS OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, THERE IS LITTLE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FORCES. THE USSR IS ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO DEVELOP A VIABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CAPABILITY, AND HAS A NAVAL INFANTRY WHICH NUMBERS ONLY ABOUT 10,000 MEN.

SLIDE 40

(C) THIS FIGURE DEPICTS THE BARRELS AVAILABLE FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. U.S. FIGURES INCLUDE 5", 6", 8" AND 16" GUNS. USSR FIGURES ARE BASED ON GUNS OF 100 MM (3.9") SIZE AND LARGER. THE UNFAVORABLE BALANCE THAT EXISTS FOR THE U.S. FROM 1971 ON IS GRADUALLY ELIMINATED AS THE SOVIET RETIRES OLDER SHIPS.

SLIDE 41

(S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS DEPLOYABLE OFFENSIVE ORDNANCE IN TONS. THE WEIGHTS INVOLVED ARE WARHEAD WEIGHTS FOR ASM AND SSM, AND COMPLETE BOMB WEIGHT WHERE BOMBS ARE INDICATED. THE CURVES WERE COMPOUNDED AS FOLLOWS:

- SSM LOADS WERE TALLIED FOR THE OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS CITED EARLIER (SUBMARINES, SURFACE COMBATANTS -- NO OSA/KOMAR).
- SOVIET ASM LOADS FOR ALL APPLICABLE AIRCRAFT WERE TALLIED.
- U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE LOADED WITH A PROVEN COMBAT LOAD - LESS THAN MAXIMUM, WHICH ENSURED AT LEAST A 300 NAUTICAL MILE STRIKE RADIUS. THIS REDUCED LOAD TENDED TO REFLECT A STAND-OFF WEAPON LOADOUT.

CLEARLY, WE CANNOT EQUATE THE 2,000 POUND WARHEAD OF AN ASM TO ONE 2,000 POUND BOMB -- EITHER IN EFFECTIVENESS OR CEP OR DESTRUCTIVE POWER. HOWEVER, THE CURVES PROVIDE A FIRST ORDER COMPARISON OF THE DESTRUCTIVE PUNCH EACH FORCE CAN DELIVER.

SLIDE 42

(S) THIS FIGURE BREAKS OUT THE OFFENSIVE TONNAGE DISPLAYED BEFORE BY STAND-OFF RANGE DIVIDED INTO THREE ARBITRARY CATEGORIES.

1. SHORT - WITHIN CLOSE-IN DEFENSES (ABOUT 10 NM).
2. MEDIUM - WITHIN MAXIMUM SAM RANGE (ABOUT 30 NM).
3. LONG - WITHIN INTERCEPTOR RANGE (ABOUT 250 NM)

IT IS INTENDED TO PORTRAY THE CAPABILITY OF A WEAPONS PLATFORM TO ATTACK A TARGET FROM OUTSIDE THAT TARGET'S DEFENSES. THE U.S. NAVY LONG RANGE CAPABILITY REACHES NEAR PARITY WITH THE SOVIET LONG RANGE TONNAGE BY THE END OF THE PERIOD. THE PORTRAYED U.S. NAVY MEDIUM CAPABILITY CONSISTS OF 25 WALLEYE II PER AIR WING, POSSIBLY MUCH LESS THAN A MAXIMUM LOAD OUT. SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE CAPABILITY RESIDES PRIMARILY IN HER NEWER SHIPS. U.S. SHORT RANGE CAPABILITY IS THE SAME AS THAT IN THE PREVIOUS FIGURE. AS NO SOVIET BOMBS ARE CONSIDERED, NO SHORT RANGE CAPABILITY IS PORTRAYED FOR THEM.

SLIDE 43

(C) THIS FIGURE SHOWS A COMPARISON OF ANTI-SHIPING TORPEDOES WHICH INCLUDES BOTH SUBMARINE LAUNCHED AND SURFACE SHIP LAUNCHED WEAPONS. U.S. FIGURES ARE BASED ON A STANDARD BRAVO (WARTIME) SUBMARINE LOAD.

(S) IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NET ASSESSMENT, SOVIET OSA AND KOMAR CLASS MISSILE PATROL BOATS WERE NOT INCLUDED AS OFFENSIVE WEAPON PLATFORMS. HOWEVER, THERE IS A VIABLE ROLE FOR THESE BOATS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH SEA, AND OTHER AREAS CLOSE TO SOVIET BASES. THE FOLLOWING PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS WILL INCLUDE THESE OFFSHORE SHIPS.

(S) THE BASIC NET ASSESSMENT SHOWED THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE IN RATIO TO THE NUMBER OF TARGETS THEY WOULD HAVE TO ATTACK. THE TARGETS IN THIS CASE INCLUDED ONLY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND SAM/SSM-EQUIPPED SURFACE SHIPS ON THE PREMISE THAT THEY WERE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. IN THE PARAMETRIC COMPARISONS WHICH FOLLOW, THE TARGETS ARE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL SURFACE COMBATANTS, AS ANOTHER INDICATOR ONE COULD JUSTIFY ON THE GROUNDS THAT INCOMING MISSILES CANNOT DISCRIMINATE AMONG TARGETS.

SLIDE 44

(S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE BREAKDOWN OF OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS BY PLATFORM TYPE. THE EFFECT OF ADDING THE SSM OFFSHORE SHIPS (OSA/KOMAR) IS SUBSTANTIAL, INASMUCH AS THEY REPRESENT THE MAJORITY OF SSM-EQUIPPED PLATFORMS.

SLIDE 45

THE NEXT FIGURE SUMMARIZES THE TOTAL OF OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS. AT PRESENT, THE SOVIETS OUTNUMBER US BY ABOUT 8:1 -- THOUGH OUR CARRIERS ARE INDIVIDUALLY MORE POTENT THAN THE SOVIET PLATFORMS. INTRODUCTION OF THE HARPOON MISSILE WILL BRING THE RATIO DOWN TO 2:1 BY 1978.

SLIDE 46

(S) GIVEN THOSE OFFENSIVE PLATFORMS, THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT EACH PLATFORM CAN CARRY. THE ADDITION OF SSM OFFSHORE SHIPS APPROXIMATELY DOUBLES THE SOVIET SSM SYSTEMS.

SLIDE 47

THE NEXT FIGURE SHOWS THE SUMMATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS FOR BOTH SIDES. THE EFFECT OF THE OSA AND KOMAR WEAPONS IS AN INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY 60% IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THE USSR THUS SHOWS A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS, UNTIL THE EFFECT OF THE HARPOON MISSILE ASSERTS ITSELF LATE IN THE PERIOD.

SLIDE 48

(S) THIS FIGURE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS ON EACH SIDE IN RATIO TO THE NUMBER OF TARGETS THEY WOULD HAVE TO ATTACK. THIS DIFFERS FROM SLIDE 22 IN THE NET ASSESSMENT IN THAT BOTH THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND THE US/USSR TARGETS WERE INCREASED, AS INDICATED EARLIER. THE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES DRAMATICALLY ALTERS THE COMPARISON. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, THE USSR ENJOYS A FAR MORE FAVORABLE SYSTEM-TO-TARGET RATIO THROUGH THE ENTIRE PERIOD, AND MAINTAINS A SUPERIORITY THROUGHOUT.

SLIDE 49

(S) THIS FINAL FIGURE SHOWS THE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN RATIO TO THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THE EFFECT OF ADDING OSA/KOMAR ASSETS IS TO BRING THE USSR ATTACK RATIO NEARLY INTO COINCIDENCE WITH THAT OF THE U.S. DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1972 THROUGH 1975. AT THAT POINT, THE ADDITION OF HARPOON TO THE U.S. ARSENAL WIDENS THE GAP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR.