

from the political control of Party cadres in order to develop its military doctrine unfettered by ideological blinders.<sup>107</sup> The institution of secret police has demonstrated a capacity for terror and power-seeking whenever unleashed.

Factionalism and policies. As the lieutenants and the institutions in which their power is based, grapple in the political arena policy issues provide the medium in which the majority of their conflict takes place. Programs concerning the rate of construction of communism, agriculture, industrialization, ideological controls, de-Stalinization, military strategy, foreign affairs, etc. are subject to remarkable vacillation between the extremes of Communist right and left. Individuals and institutions switch abruptly from one to the other side of specific issues as they seize opportunities to win an advantage in the power struggle. All else, again, is subordinated to the priority of power.<sup>108</sup>

Factionalism and Social Forces. As the lieutenants in control of institutions having cunningly chosen their policy issues, find themselves stalemated or losing the game, they have been forced to reach back into society. Their purpose has been to exploit politically the dissatisfactions and positive political aspirations of various power groups. The method has consisted of breathing political life into

the institutions of power over which the lieutenants preside so that, during the struggle, they reflect popular views upward instead of autocratic policy downward. The price the lieutenants pay is that, to a degree far more marked than during the dictator's reign, they become captives of the policies advocated by their institutional elite. As the factions have found themselves losing in this enlarged arena, the lieutenants have, in some cases, made a still broader appeal to entire social groups. The Russian people and institutions, despite their autocratic history, have inherent reasons to be non-totalitarian and anti-Party. The result is that social forces, once they are brought into play, tend to amplify the divisions of the factions. (One of the great areas for speculation is the extent to which the interplay of social forces can proceed before becoming irreversible.) In both succession struggles factionalism led to an increase in the number and types of people engaged in higher politics; both times this trend has been reversed by the leader after consolidation. In the ascendancy of Khrushchev, however, the restraints have never been fully restored. 109

Duration. Integral to the consideration of the effect of social forces released during a succession struggle is the duration of that struggle. The succession to Lenin, from the time of his illness in

1922 required eight years. Stalin's succession required four years. The length of the institutional portion of the struggle is bound to affect its intensity. A prolonged struggle, like the two which have occurred, is much more likely to activate politically the potentially powerful forces in Soviet society and to set in motion remarkable changes.<sup>110</sup>

Effect on the Party. In both succession struggles the head of the Party Secretariat emerged victorious. The reason is simple. The Secretariat as the head operating staff of the executive machinery of the organization which embodies legitimate authority in a one-party state; prepares the meetings of the Presidium, presents the facts, executes the decisions, controls appointments and publicity. This patronage control has given the lieutenant controlling the Secretariat the power to deprive his opposition, in the long run, of its non-Party institutional support by placing his own associates in key posts.<sup>111</sup>

The development of this apparatus as an extension of the long arm of the dictator constitutes one of the most impressive and formidable organizational achievements of modern totalitarianism.<sup>112</sup> It is made more impressive by the resiliency with which it has responded to evolution in the Soviet System. In the process since 1917, as other institutions have developed, the Party apparatus has had to compromise to retain its dominant position. It has made the transition from agitation

and propaganda to political administration, while making room for the State bureaucracy and police institutions.<sup>113</sup> Serving as both brains and bloodstream of the Soviet system it remains totalitarian-oriented because of its ideology, indoctrination, and the long-term nature of its goals.<sup>114</sup> Since the death of Stalin the apparat has become even more important.<sup>115</sup> Out of the social and institutional pressures in which the last succession crisis was enacted, a refined design of government has been forged. "The personal dictatorship of the leader has embodied itself in the Party dictatorship of the apparatus -- which promises to outlive its creator and to perpetuate his system of rule--".<sup>116</sup>

## Chapter VI

### Projections

Beneath Oppressions fateful hand,  
 The summons of the fatherland  
 We are impatiently discerning;  
 In hope, in torment we are turning  
 Toward freedom, waiting her command--  
 Thus anguished do young lovers stand  
 Who wait the promised tryst with yearning.

Alexander Pushkin

This review of the problem of succession has developed certain thoughts concerning the next succession crisis which, since the projection of historical data is always difficult and since data on current

Soviet political affairs is sparse, are perhaps best labelled impressions:

The contradiction. The future development of the Soviet political colossus, itself a subject of many learned dissertations, is beyond the scope of this research. For the purposes of this project a brief sketch must suffice. The restored hegemony of the Party has brought enormous stability to the Khrushchev regime. Attracting the lion's share of the talented, ambitious, natural leaders from among the youth, it gives them indoctrination, opportunity, and power. Its Khrushchev-oriented cadres are progressively infiltrating in depth the other institutions of power. The relaxation of terror and the continuing de-Stalinization campaign are restoring initiative and progressive efficiency to the regime while the police and Army remain subservient tools for use if required. Yet the requirement for planning and operational staff work to maintain a State managed industrial and agricultural economy has generated over the years a bureaucracy competent to do so within the State system. The economic managerial class tend to polarize on national economic objectives and to oppose the Party's international ideology. The third force is the people. Thoroughly terrorized and atomized by Stalin's reign, they remain today subject to monitoring by the Party at all levels above that of the family. Yet there survived even through Stalin's terror a sense of individual aspiration with which

the collegium had to reckon and which was exploited in the personal strategies of the lieutenants.

The next succession crisis will occur in a nation in which economic and scientific progress will have provided a standard of living in the same order of magnitude as our own. Education and international social intercourse will be of a much higher order. One informed government expert has concluded that the fundamental contradiction to be resolved in the future of Soviet Russia is the retention of the dictatorship of the Party in a nation whose economic base, people, and State bureaucracy have outmoded the justification for the Party.<sup>117</sup> It is against this contradiction, becoming more marked as the Khrushchev reign endures, that the next succession struggle will be resolved.

Chip  
Bohlen

Probable institutional conflicts. The extent and result of the next struggle will depend on whether leaders of non-Party institutions are able to form alliances sufficiently strong to draw support from the instruments of power. Unlike the last succession, the Party apparatus will at the outset probably be in full control of Army and police. The decentralization of the economic bureaucracy has weakened the State apparatus. The problem of converting factional power rivalries based on policy differences into institutional channels will

therefore be more difficult. The prospects are better that the regime will confine the factional argument, as in the case of the Malenkov-Khrushchev phase of the last struggle, to the Presidium. Thus the greater probability is that without the close calls of the Beria phase, there will be gradual envelopment through Party cadres until one leader again becomes "primus inter pares" and deposes his anti-Party opposition. However, if Khrushchev has built up, by his death, a separate base of power in the State bureaucracy, or if the balance within the Party apparatus is so even that there is time for institutional polarization, even the Beria phase of violent coup may not be discounted. If the "weak" Khrushchev school has the correct appreciation of his status, faster polarization into institutional conflict would seem probable since one or more of the lieutenants must have some institutional support now to successfully pressure Khrushchev; and those lieutenants who are Khrushchev's pawns would seize his share of the power tools, thus creating immediate factional situations. Whether Khrushchev is "weak" or "strong" it seems highly probable that the Party apparatus will provide the hierarchial structure within which the next succession struggle will take place, with the other institutions merely supporting rival Party lieutenants, and that the next dictator, as were the last two, will be a member of the apparatus.

Quantum changes. In the next succession the period of the regime's concern for immediate survival will have potential dangers and great opportunities for the West. At the very least the Chinese Communists will play a factional role in the next succession struggle as they did in the last. Communist China may have become such a serious problem as to have an overriding significance in the next USSR succession. The preoccupation of Soviet leaders to protect the progress Russia has made from the devastation of thermo-nuclear war might force the lieutenants to wage their paramount policy conflict over the choice between some accommodation with the U. S. and continuing close orientation with China.

Relations with the satellites and manipulation of cold war crises will complicate the succession.

The tactical gains during the traditional retraction of the USSR in the last succession have been noted. If it is prepared to exploit opportunities in the next succession, the West might hope to eliminate some of the equivalent major confrontations of the new era.

Dramatic internal changes are also possible. The social forces released by the renunciation of terror will be applied with less restraint in the next struggle. These social pressures may be exploited not only by factions in power but also, possibly, by the existence of a new

phenomenon - politically conditioned former leaders, deposed but not put to death. The resilient Party may find itself remolded by these forces into a form of true democratic centralism. Or it could be reduced to an agitational and propaganda arm of the government with the State bureaucracy finally coming into its own. It is also quite probable that the present hegemony of the Party will survive under a fourth Party dictator, leaving the long term contradiction to be resolved at a still later period in the future.

Khrushchev's successor: The Man. Khrushchev, upon the demotion of his former senior lieutenant, Kirichenko, appears to have made an effort to build up Kozlov as his chief subordinate. He has been quoted as considering Kozlov to be his successor.<sup>118</sup> Kozlov's status at the 22nd Party Congress and in seniority listings, and his position in the top bodies confirm that he is the heir apparent. This is consistent with Khrushchev's philosophy of Party control. Yet there remains the problem that he cannot make Kozlov so strong as to be a threat to the dictator. But anything less will not insure the succession. Kozlov does have the advantage that he would start his power struggle as senior member of the Secretariat. Any coalition to deprive him total power would have to remove him, early, from that post, as was done to Malenkov. Should Khrushchev die soon,

Kozlov's opposition would probably have to seek a collegium again to head him off. Either Mikoyan or Brezhnev has the status to serve as an interim head of the corporate body while Kozlov's rivals make their alignments. Should Khrushchev live another five years or more, one of the five new additions to the Secretariat might become a prime threat. Before that time Suslov is probably his only competition.

It has been intriguing to discover that among the five new additions to the Secretariat (at the 22nd Party Congress), all of whom seem quite clearly to owe their selection to association with Khrushchev, were two who have had close association with two of Khrushchev's senior lieutenants. Spiridonov, First Secretary of Leningrad, has served closely with Kozlov; Ilichev, Head of the Propaganda and Agitational Department of the Secretariat, has had a long association with Suslov. Thus even now there may be a subtle groping to improve their interim positions between the only two of the senior lieutenants whose age makes them eligible - both loyal to Khrushchev, both prepared to wait for his demise to begin anew the power struggle. If so, the subsequent removal from the Secretariat in April 1962 of Spiridonov, after so short a tenure, would indicate that Suslov has improved his position vis-a-vis Kozlov.

Researcher's conclusion. This writer did not begin the research

effort with any belief that it was possible to pre-determine the name of the successor to Khrushchev. He did hope to ascertain whether there were important lessons in a study of the struggle to succeed Stalin. It is his conviction now that a full understanding of the character of the struggle for succession, and its relation to the past and future, is an essential for those in policy positions dealing with foreign affairs and defense matters. This knowledge, gained in advance of the event, should make such officials more competent to exploit opportunities for the U. S. The occasional reader who may be stimulated to think along such lines will provide the reward for this project. Certainly the vast range of potentialities for the development of the Soviet regime internally in the crucible of the next succession struggle or even in the next two or three, bespeaks the wisdom of those who counsel patience with strength in our relations with the USSR.

FOOTNOTES

1. Myron Rush, "Khrushchev And The Stalin Succession: A Study Of Political Communication In The USSR", US Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum (Santa Monica, Calif: The Rand Corporation, Mar 20, 1957)(RM 1883, Astia Document Number AD123541), pp xix-xxxiii.
2. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 49.
3. Ibid, p. 39.
4. Ibid, p. 49.
5. Richard Lowenthal, "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power", Problems of Communism (Jul-Aug 1960), p. 2.
6. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 49.
7. Lowenthal, opcit, p. 2.
8. Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror And Progress USSR (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp 23-24.
9. Mr. David Henry, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State, Interview, 22 December 1961.
10. Moore, opcit, pp 186-189.
11. Moore, opcit, pp 186-189.
12. Myron Rush, "The Khrushchev Succession Problem", US Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum (Santa Monica Calif: The Rand Corporation, May 1, 1961), pp 10-11; and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 563.
13. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 38.
14. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 47.

15. Ibid, p. 19.
16. Ibid, p. 18.
17. N H Mager and Jacques Katel, Conquest Without War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 33.
18. David J. Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin", (New York: J B Lippincott Co., 1961) p. 118.
19. Robert Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR (New York: St Martins Press, 1961), pp 195-200 for detailed data.
20. Moore, opcit, pp 28-30; the role played by Army General Moskalenko, then Commander AA Defenses, Moscow, is unknown but offers intriguing speculation in view of Khrushchev's disclosure at the 22nd Congress of the role the General played in the later coup against Beria. Khrushchev is known to have had a close association with this general during the Ukrainian campaigns of World War II. Khrushchev's willingness to trust Moskalenko in the critical role against Beria causes me to postulate that Moskalenko might already have proved his Khrushchev-orientation during the 6 March 1953 power shuffle by using his "on-the-scene" forces in Moscow to help checkmate Beria's troops.
21. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 56; Mager and Katel, opcit, p. 33; and Conquest, opcit, p. 202.
22. Moore, opcit, p. 175; Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 50; and Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, pp. 23-32.
23. Conquest, opcit, p. 204; Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, pp. 50-51; and Moore, opcit, p. 175.
24. Conquest, opcit, pp. 212-222; Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, pp. 50-56; the alleged disclosures of Khrushchev during the recent 22nd Congress, carried widely in the free press, concerning details of this coup are given credence by the several competent observers with whom I have talked. These details serve to emphasize the nearly complete domination of Beria, before the plot, and the closeness of the ties Khrushchev had with General Moskalenko at that time; also see note 20.

25. Phillip E. Mosely, "Soviet Myths and Realities", Foreign Affairs (Apr 1961), pp. 341-342; In November 1961, Alexandr Shelepin, the security police chief, was promoted to the Secretariat. His successor as police chief, Vladimir Semichastny, is only a candidate member of the Central Committee, indicating a continuation of effort to hold down the potential power of that position. (See New York Times, November 14, 1961, pl and editorial) Moreover, both Shelepin and Semichastny have come up from the Secretaryship of the Young Communist League, presumably the most thoroughly indoctrinated young Communists available to resist the feudal power temptations of the police institution.
26. Henry, opcit.
27. Henry, opcit.; Frederick C. Barghorn, "Soviet Russian Nationalism", (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 263-277.
28. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit., p. 18.
29. Conquest, opcit., p. 204; Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, pp. 23-32.
30. Conquest, opcit., pp. 205-227; Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit., pp. 50-51; Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 23.
31. Conquest, opcit., pp-228-328 for details; Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. IV.
32. Moore, opcit., pp. 24-27.
33. Conquest, opcit., p. 331.
34. Moore, opcit., pp. 24-27; Conquest, opcit., p. 331; see notes 20 and 24.
35. Conquest, opcit., p. 332.
36. H. S. Dinerstein, War And The Soviet Union (New York: Praeger Inc., 1959), pp. 91-167.
37. Ibid; Lowenthal, opcit., p. 3; and Conquest, opcit., pp. 335-338.

38. Moseley, opcit, pp. 341-342; and Conquest, opcit, p. 345.
39. Henry, opcit.
40. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 52.
41. Conquest, opcit, p. 217.
42. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 52.
43. Conquest, opcit, p. 292; and Henry, opcit.
44. Conquest, opcit, pp. 202-205; and Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, pp. 50-51.
45. Conquest, opcit, p. 232.
46. Mager and Katel, opcit, p. 35; and Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 230.
47. Conquest, opcit, pp. 241-248.
48. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, pp. 50-51; and Mager and Katel, opcit, p. 35.
49. Conquest, opcit, pp. 257-278.
50. Ibid, p. 279.
51. Ibid, p. 280-283; and Lowenthal, opcit, p. 3.
52. Mager and Katel, opcit, pp. 35-38; Lowenthal, opcit, p. 3; Conquest, opcit, pp. 291-293.
53. Mager and Katel, opcit, pp. 35-38; see note 55.
54. Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 27.

55. As indicated on page 31, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were ousted from the Presidium and labelled as the "Anti-Party Group" at the June 1957 plenum. At the same time Pervukhin and Saburov, who were not yet declared members of the "Group", were demoted to junior member and removed from the Presidium, respectively. Bulganin fell from the Premiership in February 1958, from the Presidium in September 1958, and was added to the "Anti-Party Group", as though he had always been a member, in November 1958. At the 21st Congress in January 1959, Pervukhin and Saburov were added to the "Group" although Pervukhin retained his Candidate membership in the Presidium until the 22nd Congress in October 1961. Voroshilov had an even more prolonged downfall. After the fall of the "Anti-Party Group" four members in June of 1957, there were many leaks to the Western press that Voroshilov was involved. The Communist press failed to carry his speech to the 21st Congress in January 1959. The June 1959 publication of the new Party history failed to list him as one of those who had supported Khrushchev against the "Anti-Party Group". In May 1960 he was replaced by Brezhnev as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In July 1960 he resigned from the Presidium for "ill health". He was finally added as the eighth member of the "Anti-Party Group" at the 22nd Congress where he was seriously castigated and, in the end, forgiven. At each stage in the development, additional charges were levied against the "Group" and they were forced generally down the political hierarchy. For example, Molotov was removed from the International Atomic Energy Committee and several were to be expelled from their local Party units as a result of the 22nd Congress. The continuance of the "Anti-Party Group" issue is demonstrated by the erroneous announcements in the Western press in January 1962, concerning Molotov's returning to the Atomic Energy post in Vienna and subsequent major speculations concerning his status.
56. Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, pp. 378-379; Conquest is the most articulate of the "weak" school, but is representative.

57. Agricultural failures have taken a high toll among Soviet lieutenants with or without a succession struggle. Thus both Andreyev and Khrushchev himself suffered lost prestige in agricultural issues under Stalin. As recently as the Nov. 22, 1961, issue of New York Times, Khrushchev was quoted, on page 8 c, as denouncing Kunayev, First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Party, for wrecking the grain production of the Virgin Lands.
58. Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, p. 387.
59. W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Regime (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1959), pp. 461-473; and David Henry, opcit; these two are examples of the "strong" school.
60. See footnote #55.
61. Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, p. 399.
62. H. E. Salisbury, "After Khrushchev, Who?", Saturday Evening Post, (Mar 5, 1960), p. 20; and Henry, opcit.
63. Lowenthal, locit.
64. Robert Conquest, "The Struggle Goes On", Problems of Communism (Jul-Aug 1960), p. 10.
65. Lowenthal, opcit, p. 1.
66. Ibid, p. 4.
67. Ibid, Moseley, opcit, pp. 342-343; Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 33; and Marshall D. Shulman, "Since Stalin: Have Things Changed", New York Times Magazine (March 16, 1961), p. 113.
68. Conquest, The Struggle Goes On, previously cited, p. 9; and Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, p. 391.
69. Robert Conquest, personal letter, addressed to Capt. Elmo Zumwalt, dated Dec 11, 1961, reproduced in Appendix II.

70. Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, p. 267.
71. David Henry, opcit; however, Mr. Conquest's citation concerning the balance between Khrushchev and non-Khrushchev associates who left the Central Committee at the 22nd Congress is more difficult to refute. Even these figures are explainable in a "strong" school brief, however, as a reflection of Khrushchev's insistence on efficient performance. As a matter of fact this same quality could well explain the decision of a "strong" Khrushchev to make the able Kozlov his senior lieutenant despite his political origins.
72. Myron Rush, personal letter, addressed to Capt. Elmo Zumwalt, dated Dec 18, 1961, reproduced in Appendix II.
73. Conquest, personal letter, previously cited, p. 2.
74. Ibid, p. 3.
75. See note #55.
76. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 6.
77. Ibid, p. 10.
78. Bertram D. Wolfe, "The Durability of Soviet Totalitarianism", in Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, by Alex Inkles and Kent Geiger (Cambridge, Mass: The Riverside Press, 1961), pp. 649-659.
79. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 5.
80. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, pp. 47-48.
81. Ibid.
82. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 53.
83. Ibid, p. 54.
84. Myron Rush, "The Succession Problem and the Transition to Communism", informal document, August 1961 (Revised December 1961).

85. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Problem Of Succession In The Soviet Political System: The Case Of Khrushchev", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (November 1960), p. 575.
86. Ibid.
87. McClosky and Turner, opcit, pp. 163-165.
88. Salisbury, opcit, p. 20.
89. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 47.
90. Moore, opcit, pp. xv1, 189-223; and Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 500.
91. Those observers who have been privileged to view, at close hand for prolonged periods, the Soviet internal scene are less sanguine than some political theoreticians about the possibility of the Army ever taking political initiative. The consensus of such observers is that the Soviet military has developed a tradition of aloofness from such affairs, similar to their U. S. counterparts.
92. W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: New American Library, 1954), pp. 18-20.
93. Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkles, and Clyde Kluckholm, How The Soviet System Works (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 23.
94. McClosky and Turner, opcit, p. 171-175; the first great post-Stalin "Thaw" in arts and sciences occurred in 1953. Malenkov was probably its patron with Khrushchev and Molotov advocating greater ideological control. A second literary and intellectual "Thaw" took place in 1956-57. This relaxation was probably ordered by Khrushchev in the hope that this would lead to voluntary attachment to his regime. He returned to a modified Stalin position when the Poles and the Hungarians used their freedom to choose "wrongly". Nevertheless, despite these swings of the ideological pendulum, the overall trend was liberal. For a more detailed discussion see Conquest's Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, pp. 246-248, 325.

95. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 300.
96. McClosky and Turner, opcit, pp. 170-171.
97. A conference held under Communist auspices in Warsaw in February 1955, undoubtedly set in motion before Malenkov's demotion from the Premiership in January 1955, had made remarkable proposals. There was to be simultaneous withdrawals of occupation armies from Germany and of Soviet troops from Poland, the unification of Germany and free elections under the plan put forward by Eden at the January 1954 Berlin Conference (there rejected by Molotov); the Communists urged that Germany should not enter any military coalition and her frontiers be guaranteed by the European states and the U.S. - see Conquest's Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, p. 261.
98. McClosky and Turner, opcit, pp. 163-165.
99. Henry, opcit.
100. For full details see Conquest's Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, pp. 79-191.
101. Similarly, this cyclical factor is critical in an analysis of Stalin's succession to Lenin. Had Lenin died in 1922 on the occasion of his first stroke, Stalin, not nearly so well fortified by allies, and skillfully placed associates, might have been unable to head off Trotsky.
102. Moore, opcit, pp. 15-16; also see Conquest's personal letter, previously cited, in Appendix II, concerning the "clod" Kirichenko.
103. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, pp. 23-32; and Lowenthal, opcit, p. 2.
104. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 56.
105. Ibid, p. 18.
106. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, p. 19.

107. Bauer, Inkles, and Kluckholm, opcit, pp. 54-59 - for more complete discussion.
108. Conquest, Power And Policy In The USSR, previously cited, see pp. 18-49 for full discussion.
109. Bociurkiw, opcit, pp. 577-587; and Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Struggle, previously cited, p. 18.
110. Ibid, p. 12.
111. Bociurkiw, opcit, p. 588; and Lowenthal, opcit, p. 2.
112. Fainsod, opcit, p. 152.
113. Moore, opcit, pp. 30-31.
114. Rush, The Khrushchev Succession Problem, previously cited, pp. 18-20.
115. Friedrich and Brzezinski, opcit, p. 32.
116. Fainsod, opcit, p. 179; and Schapiro, opcit, p. 563.
117. Henry, opcit.
118. H. E. Salisbury, opcit, p. 20.

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A narrative account of the origins of the Soviet dictatorship, the development of the Communist party and the Soviet regime, the status of the Communist party today (functions, principles of organization, structure, social composition and internal operation), the theory and practice of Soviet government, the totalitarian and terroristic aspects of the dictatorship, and predictions of the future. An excellent overview of the development and present status of the Soviet dictatorship.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Terror and Progress, USSR. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

An analysis of the development of the Soviet dictatorship through the reign of Stalin. This book is now dated but gives the student an understanding of the trends predicted for the Soviet state at the death of Stalin, with which to compare the actual developments.

Rostow, W. W. The Dynamics of Soviet Society. New York: New American Library, 1954.

A now outdated analysis of the evolution of Soviet rule; the cohesive forces, instabilities and tensions in Soviet society; with conclusions as to the future development of the state. Of primary interest to compare predictions of the immediate post-Stalin period with later events and to see how accurately a present close adviser to President Kennedy was able to forecast.

Schapiro, Leonard. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House, 1960.

The narrative and analytical account of the political party which has molded Soviet Russia--including the development of the party as a vehicle of revolution before 1917, its development as a dictatorship in power, the imprint of Stalin on the party, and discussion of recent developments.

#### Periodicals

Bociurkiw, Bohdan R. "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, XXVI, No. 4 (November 1960), pp. 575-591.

An analysis of the process of political expression in the Soviet Union as reflected by the struggle to succeed Khrushchev with special emphasis on the role the party has played in replacing traditional mechanisms in the political process. Especially thorough treatment of the mechanics of the process.

Conquest, Robert. "The Struggle Goes On," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 4 (July-August 1960), pp. 7-11.

An analysis of the nature and extent of the personal power of Khrushchev in the party dictatorship of the U.S.S.R. An articulate exposition of the "weak-Khrushchev" school.

Lowenthal, Richard. "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 4 (July-August 1960), pp. 1-7.

An analysis of the nature and extent of the personal power of Khrushchev in the party dictatorship of the U.S.S.R. An articulate exposition of the "strong-Khrushchev" school.

Mosely, Phillip E. "Soviet Myths and Realities," Foreign Affairs, XXXIV, No. 3 (April 1960), pp. 341-354.

A brief analysis of the current situation within the Soviet Union with primary emphasis on the development of the dictatorship under Khrushchev. An excellent survey of the current Soviet political scene measured against the realities of the state of industrialization of the economy.

Salisbury, H. E. "After Khrushchev, Who?", Saturday Evening Post, (March 5, 1960), pp. 19-21, 84-86.

Shulman, Marshall D. "Since Stalin: Have Things Changed?", New York Times Magazine, (March 19, 1961), pp. 23, 113-115.

A summary of the changes in the Soviet domestic scene since Stalin's death and the implications of the foreign policy of the U. S. and U.S.S.R. A reasoned view of the factors for hope and for concern in the future.

#### Documents

Conquest, Robert. Personal letter to Captain Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., December 11, 1961, (Reproduced in Appendix II of this paper).

A brief analysis of this expert's opinion of the meaning in terms of the power struggle in the U.S.S.R., of the 22nd Congress, framed in response to this researcher's commentary. One of the few authentic unclassified expert opinions on this subject available at the time of submission of this thesis.

Rush, Myron. "Khrushchev and the Political Crisis of June 1957", U. S. Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 23 July 1957), (RM 1947 Astia Document Number AD 133024).

An analysis of the crucial "June days" final resistance of Khrushchev's opposition during which his power broke the majority will of the Presidium, thus ending the limited pluralism that had existed within the party.

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"Khrushchev and the Stalin Succession: A Study of Political Communication in the USSR", U. S. Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, March 20, 1957), (RM 1883, Astia Document Number AD 123541).

An analytical thesis of the Khrushchev strategy in the succession to Stalin oriented primarily in terms of Khrushchev's use of, retreat from and final rejection of the Stalin symbol. Particularly, important to establish an understanding of the method of esoteric communication.

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Personal letter addressed to Captain Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., December 18, 1961, (Reproduced in Appendix II of this paper).

A brief analysis of this expert's opinion of the meaning in terms of the power struggle in the U.S.S.R., of the 22nd Congress, framed in response to this researcher's commentary. One of the few authentic unclassified expert opinions on this subject available at the time of submission of this thesis.

Rush, Myron L. "The Khrushchev Succession Problem," U. S. Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, May 1, 1961), (RM 2763).

A summary of the problem of the succession to Khrushchev in terms of its nature, inevitability and implications. Since this expert is <sup>of</sup> the opinion that Khrushchev won uncontested power after the elimination of the threats of the nonparty institutions, he does not deal in detail with developments since 1957. A significant thesis.

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The Succession Problem and the Transition to Communism.  
Informal Document. August 1961, (revised December 1961).

An analysis of the extent to which Khrushchev has committed his successors to the program for the achievement of communism approved at the 22nd Congress.

Wolfe, Bertram D. Antecedents and Rise of Communism in Russia.  
Washington: The National War College, December 21, 1961.  
(Lecture) (Verbatim record to be published but not yet available.)

An epochal treatment of the historical factors in the rise of communism in Russia. Outstanding treatment of the reasons for the development of communism in Russia and of the Russian modifications to communism.

Membership in Top Soviet Governing Bodies After 22nd Congress

Praesidium

<u>Full Members</u>		<u>Candidates</u>	
<u>Old (14)</u>	<u>New (11)</u>	<u>Old (9)</u>	<u>New (5)</u>
A. B. Aristov		V. V. Grishin	V. V. Grishin
L. I. Brezhnev	L. I. Brezhnev	Y. E. Kalnberzin	
Y. H. Furtseva		A. P. Kirilenko	
N. G. Ignatov		D. S. Korotchenko	
N. S. Khrushchev	N. S. Khrushchev	K. T. Mazurov	K. T. Mazurov
A. N. Kosygin	A. N. Kosygin	V. P. Mzhavanadze	V. P. Mzhavanadze
F. R. Kozlov	F. R. Kozlov	M. G. Pervukhin	
O. V. Kuusinen	O. V. Kuusinen	P. N. Pospelov	
A. I. Mikoyan	A. I. Mikoyan		
N. A. Mukhitdinov			
N. V. Podgorny	N. V. Podgorny		
D. S. Polyansky	D. S. Polyansky		
N. M. Shvernik	N. M. Shvernik		
M. A. Suslov	M. A. Suslov		
	G. I. Voronov	G. I. Voronov	
			S. R. Rashidov
			V. V. Shcherbitsky

Secretariat

<u>Old(5)</u>	<u>New (9)</u>
N. S. Khrushchev	N. S. Khrushchev
F. R. Kozlov	F. R. Kozlov
O. V. Kuusinen	O. V. Kuusinen
N. A. Mukhitdinov	
M. A. Suslov	M. A. Suslov
	P. N. Demichev
	L. F. Ilichev
	B. N. Ponomarev
	A. N. Shelepin
	I. V. Spiridonov

Correspondence Between Researcher and Experts

National War College  
Washington D. C.

1 December 1961

Mr. Robert Conquest  
The Macmillan And Company Limited  
London, England

Dear Mr. Conquest:

I have been doing a research project on "The Problem of Succession in the USSR" in connection with my studies at the National War College. I have found your "Power and Policy in the USSR" by far the best treatment of the subject I have encountered. Because of the great respect I have developed for your evaluation of the power struggle, I am seeking your opinion as to the significance of the XXII Congress of the CPSU and the brief plenum which followed it.

My own tentative conclusion is that the increased size of the Secretariat, achieved by the addition of men who have come through the Party system, makes Khrushchev, at last, a possessor of full control over the administrative arm. I would think also that it tends to confirm that the Praesidium is giving him a reasonably permanent majority, although I still see no evidence, by membership, that he has made it fully beholden to him. His willingness to force the split with the Chinese Communist Party into the open seems to me to indicate a confidence in his own position beyond that exhibited by him a year ago. Moreover, the rather grandiose nature of his "Great Projects" program brings to mind a similar sense of confidence in his power base.

I would be most grateful if you might find a few moments to concur with or dispute the foregoing.

Incidentally, I found myself wondering throughout your book whether Mikoyan doesn't deserve more speculation as a man who has consciously maneuvered, with considerable cunning, to create

an evolution toward a more stable Party leadership. I wonder whether his shift to Khrushchev about the time of their return from China might not have been the result of his evaluation, during that trip and before, that Khrushchev had both the deftness to survive and the disposition toward more tolerant treatment of the deposed elite.

Yours truly,

/s/ Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.  
Captain, U. S. Navy