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death, they were premature. My wife and I have been trying very hard to decide first where we wanted to live and I'm in the process of writing a book at the present time, and doing some public lectures around the country, and some teaching; and I visualize that that first core of work is a kind of a pay-back tour for a country that paid me honor beyond compare. And when that's completed this summer, I hope to settle down and decide what's next. I don't rule out a political career, but, frankly, I don't see at the present time a military man having any real prospect of success in a political career. We've got a data sample of one in General Westmoreland's experiment in South Carolina which is probably one of the most viable states for a military man. Although it's true that I, by tortured inspection, could be said to have a liberal side if one examines what we did in the Navy to try to integrate the services and provide racial and sexual equality and to improve the lot of the common man, you don't have to scratch very hard to find that drooling fanged approach to world affairs which is the anti-Christ of today.

QUESTION: Would you comment for us your opinion on the Soviet's intention in the Indian Ocean and in particular why they are concentrating their activities in the vicinity of Barbarous, Somalia and the Arabian Sea?

ADMIRAL: The Soviets with their superior ability to go from planning to action, superior because they can tell their newspapers what kind of lies to print, superior because they can

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tell their parliament to rubber-stamp their decisions, superior because they can fool their domestic public and perform lobotomies on those few who don't understand how well off they are. The Soviets have set out to do in 1960 what we were planning to try to get done in the Pentagon and never have been able to get done, to ensure that there is a military presence of a significant nature in the Indian Ocean in the face of what was way back 10 or 12 years ago the clearly, apparent fact that the UK was going to have to withdraw from their traditional role. And so the Soviets set out to get themselves the best possible infrastructure they could. And by a classic example of performance in changing a country from a status of uncommitted to a client state, through a series of brilliant salami slices, they converted Somali into a client state. The final step of which was to have a Soviet trained Somalian General shoot the existing President and become the President. This has led to their improvement of the naval port of Berbera--it's a far better port than Diego Garcia will ever be, and it's got a captive population to service it. Airfields there and at Mogadiscio which when finished will service an aircraft of any size and a naval communication station that covers the whole Indian Ocean; with Soviet personnel ashore in Somali, in very small numbers but there, manning the facilities; in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, the old British port of Aden and an adjacent airfield; on the island of Socotra of that country another airfield which they haven't used yet, but have improved a little bit and use it for a naval

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anchorage; another set of facilities then in that country superior to Diego Garcia; and then in Iraq, the very unsatisfactory port of Umm Qasr--unsatisfactory because it is all the way up the Persian Gulf--but they've also built for the Iraqis 4 or 5 airfields to which they have access. So they've got three sets of facilities that are superior to what we would have in Diego Garcia if and when the Congress ever gets around to letting us finish it. We've got the ability to anchor 4 or 5 ships at Diego Garcia to launch C-5 aircraft but not B-52s out of Diego Garcia; and we can carry out a modest fleet support operation from that island--an unpopulated atoll in the center of the Indian Ocean.

Now there's been some talk in recent years about restoring sweetness and light to the Indian Ocean by removing naval forces of both sides. If I were the Soviets, I would grab this, it would be the sweetest deal in town. The removal of naval forces from both sides means that Soviet power is absolutely unopposed as their land armies are poised on the littoral nation's borders and as their air power is able to reach from Soviet airfields across all of the Indian Ocean area. We have nothing from which we can apply any kind of power if we remove ourselves with naval forces.

Now the impact of this, in my judgment, is that it gives the Soviets that visible presence, that demonstration that they can strangle our oil jugular. It has, we know from our allies over there, a very debilitating affect on them; and we know that

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the presence of U.S. forces in the area has been one of the reassurances to Faisal and others; and as we, if we do, continue to attenuate our power in the Indian Ocean, there is going to be that same subtle process of accommodating more to Soviet desires under their carrot and stick approach.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you broaden your response earlier on the role of the JCS? You told us that with regard to the SALT consultation that there was really sort of a _____ consultation with JCS, wasn't very meaningful or very complete. Is this systematic of the general problem of making the military voice heard when it comes to the government?

ADMIRAL: There is, I think, a concern to keep military advice pretty diluted. This is a concern that I think was stronger in the Nixon Administration than in any previous Administration with which I have associated. I don't know yet how it's working with regard to Mr. Ford, but I can't believe that it is having much greater success because the conduit for it is through Henry Kissinger and that's a very peculiar osmotic process. What comes through is a different color than what starts through.

Let me give you an example. At one point I was quite concerned about what was happening in Iceland, did a lot of work on both the political and the military aspects of it because it was the Navy's very special preserve and requirement if we lost that Iceland defense force in Iceland, the whole bottle is open,

the cork comes out of the bottle, and the calculations are quite clear that it's the equivalent of billions of dollars worth of defense forces; and I didn't get any feeling that the government was as concerned as I was concerned about it. So I decided that under the statute which designates the Chief of Naval Operations as naval advisor to the Secretary of the Navy and the President, not a statute that applies to anybody else, it's a quirk of the law, I would write a letter to the President via the Secretary of Defense stating these views and I cited the statutory authority that was given me. The answer came back, "Thank you very much for your views," from the Secretary of Defense, "and at some convenient point I'll make the point to the President," and the letter was never delivered. The concern seemed to be not to have on record any written advice in the White House. Now this made it very difficult for the Chiefs as a body to function. We had three--that is with regard to their separate statutory role as Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide military advice to the President --we had three formal meetings with the President during my four years. The first two of them were meaningful in a sense that each of the members were able to give--never more than 10 minutes as I recall--to the President of their capsulized views of the military balance and what the budgets would permit him to do and what they would not permit him to do. By the third year, the preoccupation with the war was so great that the period we were suppose to have used for that was instead used to give us a lecture about the importance of supporting the very bad truce

that was about to be negotiated in Southeast Asia. The fourth year we went for our session and by this time Mr. Nixon was, in my judgment, a vegetable and it was a monologue of him talking to us for two hours on random subjects.

QUESTION: You may have noticed in Newsweek and yesterday's Post an upgrade in the public relation activities of South Africa, and yesterday's Post had a one page article saying why not a NATO base in South Africa, and let's let NATO give some money to our supporting requirement. Our speakers have basically backed away from Africa's importance and particular from South Africa because of its racial problems. I wonder if you care to comment on the importance of the Union of South Africa and what you see as the possibility of requirement for bases in that area in the future?

ADMIRAL: Here I guess I'm kind of a non-conformist. My view is that clearly the facilities of South Africa would make a quantum improvement in the total U.S. power. If you were operating out of them, it would make a significant difference. Yet the minuses that we would pick up with regard to domestic tranquility are such that I don't think we should do it at the present time. I think it's very important, if one believes as I do that one of the great long term assets of the United States is its dedication to the improvement of the lot of its individual citizens, that we go to fairly great lengths and pay some significant price for our dedication to racial equality; and that kind of altruistic view is further supported, I think, by the

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practical fact that if one examines the way in which these things flow if we got in bed with the government of South Africa today and when the inevitable turn over comes and the very large black majority takes power, we'll pay a price at that time in terms of strategic access. So I believe that both what's right from the standpoint of our own domestic scene and what's right in view of the long term is for us to be very guarded about our relationship with South Africa; but to assume in war time, if we had to go to war tomorrow or 6 months from now, that we would then have to work out some arrangement with them and if that would be supported just as our people supported making league with the devil himself, Stalin in WW II.

QUESTION: I have read through various reports which indicated that we were expending _____
I've been exposed to several propogandas to the effect that we have the world's most powerful military machine gathered. Accepting your description of the world as you see it, when did the balance shift and did it shift as a result of failure on our part or simply an over commitment 10 or 15 years ago?

ADMIRAL: The day that I took over as Chief of Naval Operations, I had completed a two-month review of all of the analytical calculations--the war games, the fleet exercises, I had been fairly familiar with them up until 20 months earlier as the Director of Systems Analysis--so I had reviewed the ones

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that had been done since then and brought myself up to date, and it was my judgment that, which civilian authority didn't argue, the odds at that time were about 55% that we could prevail a war with the Soviet Union, slightly better than half, and that by the end of that Fiscal Year there would be about 45%. So that in our case, in the case of the Navy, the change was in that year--Fiscal Year 1971. By the end of that calendar year 70 and the budget briefings with the President, I showed him that by every judgment we could make and I pointed out to him that as his senior naval advisor I had to be his "Jimmy the Greek" for naval odds making and I showed him how I did it, looked at the performance of both teams, looked at the weights, looked at their win and loss record, looked at the calculations--the fleet exercises, the shortage of personnel and so forth--that I had to tell him that with the budgets that he was then considering, we would be down to something like a 20% probability. He added back nearly a billion dollars to the Navy's budget and we then gave him a 35% probability, with which we were able to ride pretty much for the rest of my tour. I think it's probably a little lower than that now based on what Congress did to us last year. We presented it as a calculated gamble, a desire to begin modernizing a fleet which was obsolescent--on the average 19 years of age, 50% of it obviously over that--and that he would lose capability in the near years, but if we could really get Congress behind us to support the construction programs in the out years

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like 1980, he'd be back up above the 50% line. Well, Congress has kept us from ever turning the corner of the bilge by their cuts, and will, in my judgment, for the foreseeable future.

Now in the case of the Air Force by calendar 1971, General Ryan was saying to the President that in his judgment the odds were less than 50%--a new Chief of Staff put him back above 50%.

The Army, privately, their Chiefs of Staff have always said to me, in their judgment, they couldn't hack it since 1970 in a war in Europe. I don't know when they came to the conclusion that that would be the case.

So you had the situation of the calculations and the judgments being you can't hack it in a war in Europe with the Army that's there, by 1971 the Air Force that was there, we were saying in the Navy that we can't reinforce you as early as 1970 and increasingly so from thereon; you, in addition, had had demonstrated to you earlier than that--the chicanery involved in talking about a two and a half war strategy. When we were involved in a half war in Southeast Asia and the North Koreans came out and seized the PUEBLO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff before my time, recommendation was don't get involved with North Korea, you don't have the capability to take on another half war. So we had the inability to perform two one half wars, while talking about a two and a half war capability. Now a President of the United States, three Secretaries of Defense have said to me that they agreed with my judgments, privately--none of them have ever said it publicly.

QUESTION: Admiral, in your remarks you addressed the current low level of the fleet. During the various fleet reduction programs, when we pushed the old fleet out of service, the majority of those ships were laid up in the mothball fleet. Those ships went up equipments which were critical in the fleet at the time in full storerooms on the premises that if activated again those ships would have to be self-sustaining for "X" period of time. The experience with the NEW JERSEY shows that we almost have to gut a ship on activation again to get it compatible with communication wise and electronic wise what's in the fleet. So we have two problems that are created for the Navy Material command. One is an inability to recapture valuable assets at the time of inactivation which later turned out to be useless assets that you junked. Secondly, everytime we go foreward with a new ship construction program, Congress looks up the river and sees all these mothball ships and say what do you need more ships for. My question is then, what value do you place on this mothball fleet?

ADMIRAL: It's a good question. We examined it twice during my tour. We did give away about 250 ships to foreign navies during that period because of the same general conclusion to which you have come that there isn't much honey left on those ships once they go into the graveyard; and that if you put them into the possession of a Turk or a Greek, you get two things out of them. One you get very cheap labor to maintain the ships,

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and you've got probably another 10 years of useful life out of them by virtue of the fact that they are able to operate much smaller percentages of time--they don't ever have to deploy, they're always right where they are going to fight as soon as they leave port, and because their labor is cheap it made it a cost-effective thing to do in terms of the overall alliance. So we got some value out of 250 of the ships. The others there was some categories of ships that you couldn't give away and probably had enough residual value that they were worth keeping, like the aircraft carriers, because flatops are always useful whether even just for logistic ferrying of supplies. It is accurate that it's very little value, we never got it quantified to my satisfaction, but I always felt that you had to first say to yourself, "It will be at least a year before you began to get any payoff from these ships. It will be the result of full-scale mobilization, you will have to have dedicated industrial capability to those ships that probably would have been better spent in building new ships and when you finally got them back, you have maybe a 2 to 5% increasing of capability as a result; and you'll have to have done some things at least with the communications equipment to get them ready." However, when we looked at the alternative of just scrapping those ships, the cost of maintaining them are so low--as I recall it was like 15 or 16 million dollars a year--in comparison to that 2 to 5% payoff that you might get,

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that it looked as though it made sense to keep them and you had one additional factor and that was the political fact of life that there were a lot of Congressmen who just didn't feel that it was right to tear up a ship. So you have to kind of go through a period of having lie and wait in the graveyard for a decent burial. And that's what is going to be the ultimate fate of most of those.

QUESTION: Last month a Senate Seapower subcommittee reported out a recommendation for a 5-year, 30 billion dollar shipbuilding program to get us to the 600 level in the 1980s. How do you think the Navy is going to react to that and the Congress to just going to become another piece of paper or is it going to be worked upon?

ADMIRAL: It will be just another piece of paper in my judgment. The Navy, it's my understanding, has embraced the concept as it certainly ought to do. The 6 billion dollars a year is roughly what they have in this year's budget and that's not replacing at the replacement rate even the surviving number of ships, given the huge cost of inflation which have hit the shipbuilding industry particularly hard because now, after years of shipbuilding going overseas, the commercial shipbuilding is coming back into the United States-- the cost of labor overseas in the industrialized nations having gotten much more competitive with labor in the United States. This is at least the fourth or

fifth time in my memory that Congress has tried to do something like this and it always been the House Arms Services Committee. Mendal Rivers asked me essentially for the same kind of a program in my very first testimony before him; and at that time we gave him a 5 billion dollar program for 5 years which given inflation was probably funded a little bit more generously than this new 6 billion dollar plan and it just got snickered at by the Executive Branch.

QUESTION: Toward the very end of the Nixon Administration it has come out in the newspapers that Secretary Schlesinger become concerned that there might be some unauthorized intrusion by the military into the process and that in light of that concern he tightened the lines of command and control to the military forces in the field. I wonder if you would comment on that episode?

ADMIRAL: If it happened, the tightening process was so invisible that I didn't feel it. To the best of my knowledge and belief, Secretary Schlesinger never talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about any element of the problem except to caution that there be no discussion, no speculation on the part of military personnel which was an extremely appropriate advice to give because we should properly have stood aside from the whole debate. The final month or two of that process went on after I left, but my associates tell me that they never saw any such signal given later. I don't believe that that was an accurate report,

and you'll notice that the White House almost immediately came out with a denial that it did take place. I don't believe that there was any real concern in this country for a man on a white horse. I believe that when the whole process of these last four years really gets knitted together, as only the historians can do 20 or 50 years from now, that people if anything will need to feel concern about how far down the totem pole military advice was pushed and how diluted in getting to the President of the United States.

QUESTION: First with everything you have said today, I like to go back maybe to the bad news part of your initial comments. What do you see are the viable military options available today to support national policy?

ADMIRAL: Let me give you a general answer first and then see if I can get a little bit more specific. I believe that we have to go back to those sacred words of the preamble of the constitution which said that, "We undertake to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, to ensure domestic tranquillity, to provide for the common defense, and to ensure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to posterity," and I believe that what we having been going through in this terrible Watergate era has been a national focus on the forming of that more perfect union and on the establishing of justice and on the insurance of domestic tranquillity not in the narrow sense in which Mr. Nixon and his associates saw it, but in the broader sense of

achieving a national consensus. That's the process that's taking place. As you have seen from my remarks, I think it's far from perfect and that it has to go forward in a way that really brings into the open the debate that has gone on only in the privacy of Tanks and Executive Oval Offices and so forth. And that until we do that, we're not going to create the essential inner-core of strength in this country without which any amount of military force is useless; because we lack the will to use it and it's so clear to our allies and to our adversaries that we lack the will to use it.

Now as that debate takes place, I believe that there will be an increasing consciousness on the part of the people that we have let our guard way down and that we have got to do something to make ourselves more competitive with regard to military capability. I believe that an informed number to use is another 1% of our gross national product. I believe that that 1%, both Secretary Schlesinger and I would agree would be adequate to turn the strategic budget around to build enough additional submarines, submarine launched cruise missiles, B-1 aircraft, to do enough anti-ballistic missile R&D, that the Soviets would feel driven to the negotiating table to give us essential equivalence at reduced levels of expenditures, rather than to engage in an arms race. And I believe that within that 1% of our gross national product there would be plenty to spare to turn around the conventional military balance and that it is mandatory that we begin to do that. I believe that we have to be aware, as I've said, that we've got to accommodate in the most

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sophisticated and facing-way we can to Soviet initiatives where it gets to a "push on shove" situation until we start up. And I believe that the minute the Congress of the United States begin to get so restive that they add to the President's budget instead of subtracting, you would see those fever charts in the Abartov Institute and in the Dobrynin readiness room begin to go up and the signal would go back, "Hey fellows, cool it, the natives are getting restless, slow down the rate of acceleration, sweetness and light for the next five years." Just the mere decision to start doing something about our defense capability would improve the strategic environment in the world today.