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OUTLINE FOR THE IRWIN PRESENTATION

I. Introduction

A. Outline

- What I want to do today is to convey my ideas about the strategic situation and to discuss some issues in naval planning in the light of the changing threat to U.S. interests.

B. Main Theme

- The main point I want to leave with you is that the nature of the threat the United States faces is changing.

The growth of Soviet naval/maritime power is expanding the threats that face the United States. But the principal point that I want to leave with you is that Soviet seapower represents a substantially new dimension in world affairs. It is a dimension that is already beginning to trigger a quite different strategic environment for the US than that to which we have become accustomed since World War II.

We are accustomed to think of the USSR as only a land power. Now they are also a sea power. They threaten to "outflank" us from the sea not only in NATO but in other areas where our influence has been enhanced because our principal adversary could not operate there.

We must begin to think of the Soviet presence in global terms. Soviet naval and maritime power make it possible for the Soviets to move beyond revolutionary rhetoric to direct involvement and support of factions anywhere in the world.

To make best use of all of the United States' available resources, we must understand this change.

II. The Change in the Strategic Situation

A. Underlying Historical and Geographical Factors

1. Past U.S. and USSR dependence on seas
 - a. Alliances--contiguous and overseas
 - b. Enemies--contiguous and overseas
 - c. Seaborne trade
 - d. The picture will change in the future
 - o more seaborne trade
 - o more overseas alliances
2. Present U.S. interests overseas
 - a. Economic - most clearly defined - Europe, Latin America, & Asia
 - b. Other interests are more difficult to grasp but are becoming more important.
 - i. Appropriate balance of power
 - ii. Legitimacy of Free World Nations
 - iii. Free World sea lines of communication
 - iv. Respect for international law
3. U.S. commitments
 - a. Treaties - bi-lateral & multi-lateral
 - b. Base agreements
 - i. Steady erosion since Korean War
 - ii. More reductions pending due to budget

B. New Factors

1. Nixon Doctrine
 - a. Implies U.S. supplies naval and tactical air forces
 - b. Implies U.S. provides logistic support and sea lines are essential for logistic support
 - c. Requires control of sea lines of communication
2. Emergence of strategic parity
 - a. Growth of Soviet nuclear forces - what does this mean?
 - b. Most significant question is how Soviets view consequences of strategic parity
 - i. Parity seems to have freed Soviets to use conventional means to challenge us around the world (Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Caribbean, etc.).
 - ii. I expect the Soviets to use this freedom in a series of minor challenges aimed at weakening our alliances.

- c. For the U.S. strategic parity is likely to increase reliance on conventional forces since we no longer can rely on nuclear superiority. We perceive greater risks from nuclear threats, thus we use them less.
 - d. In the rest of the world, strategic parity means that question of local conventional superiority becomes the overriding interest.
 - e. Overall, strategic parity increases the Soviet conventional challenge and our reliance on conventional forces.
3. Growth of Soviet seapower
- a. Indicators of qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet naval forces
 - i. Two major threats to force world sea lines of communication
 - o Anti-ship missiles
 - o Submarine forces
 - ii. Many other military indicators - I will not discuss them - show equally serious trends against us
 - iii. Overall capability of USSR Navy - Okean
 - iv. Soviet Merchant Marine is also growing
 - b. Geographic extension of Soviet fleet in a political influence role.
 - i. Somalia example
 - ii. Mediterranean - accomplished fact
 - iii. Indian Ocean - happening now
 - iv. Soviet foreign trade is growing fastest in overseas less developed areas
4. Decline in USN resources
- a. Define naval capabilities
 - i. Assured second strike
 - ii. Sea control
 - iii. Projection of power ashore
 - iv. Overseas presence in peacetime
 - b. In real terms, 15% budget cut since FY-68
 - c. FY 68-70 cuts center on sea control since we were relying on projection forces and there was no contest for control of the seas
 - d. FY 71-72 cuts center on projection in response to Nixon Doctrine
5. Initiatives to minimize effect of budget situation
- a. Emphasis on Mediterranean
 - b. Emphasis on more extensive platforms and capabilities

6. Expected net military situation
 - a. outcomes of US-Soviet naval battles
 - i. Mod matrix
 - ii. MFE - Support of NATO war
 - iii. War at sea
 - b. Confidence in outcome

7. Summary points

III. Issues in Naval Planning

- A. Problem is to allocate smaller Navy budgets to maximize capability to support national objectives in face of expanding Soviet capabilities. Mutual State Department-- Navy interests increase
 1. Soviet activity creates problems for both
 2. Reduced USN force create problems for both
 3. Nixon doctrine implies changes in Navy relations with allies
- B. Budget situation forces difficult choices, all impact on the options the Navy can provide to State - we would appreciate your views.
 1. Force size vs. force readiness dilemma
 - a. Numbers of ships are needed for broad overseas presence
 - b. Ready ships are needed for time urgent crisis capabilities
 2. Quantity vs. quality dilemma
 - a. Number of ships enhance overseas presence and have some capability against Soviet proxies.
 - b. Quality forces are required to fight a worldwide Soviet navy and their hand-me-down equipment in the hands of Soviet proxies.
 3. Joint capability with allies versus unilateral capability
 - a. We don't have adequate total forces today and hope that our allies can be induced to contribute more.
 - b. There are several measures for which local allied forces are particularly desirable.
 - o Mining and mine clearance
 - o Riverine warfare
 - o Coastal defense and surveillance

- c. We are taking a number of steps to encourage allied participation and to improve its effectiveness
 - o Naval War College Study
 - o Officer specialty for each country
 - o Increased exchanges of Naval personnel
 - o CNO representative to NATO and South American CNO's
- d. In spite of this, I must be concerned with U.S. capability for unilateral actions. This limits the amount of reliance we place on our allies

4. Present vs. future capabilities dilemma

- a. Soviet threat is here today and will become more sophisticated in the future
- b. U.S. Navy must modernize to keep pace
- c. This requires sacrifice of present capability but they are not sufficient today.

IV. These are some of the dilemmas that we face in our planning for the Navy. Our strategic deterrence must continue to have priority claim on scarce resources. We must also maintain a strong sea control and projection capability to protect ourselves and our allies. However, we are witnessing a growing threat in third world areas where the Soviet naval/maritime power not only is eroding U.S. influence but may more actively promote socialist revolution. This is an area of growing and significant threat that we are least able to counter.

We (across Executive Departments and Agencies) must work more closely in the future

- to understand the new strategic situation caused and exploited by Soviet seapower, and
- to cope effectively with the threat by getting the best from our scarce assets for protecting the interests of the United States.