

CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN A SEPARABLE FIRST
STAGE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

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I

INTRODUCTION

The discussion within the Administration concerning a Separable 1st Stage Disarmament Agreement (hereafter referred to as SFSDA) has been unsatisfactory because the parties to the debate have started from divergent positions. One school has tended to look at the problem primarily from the standpoint of what appears to be negotiable with the Soviets judged primarily in the context of the Geneva negotiations or, if not negotiable, of what would have favorable propaganda implications for the United States. Another school has become convinced that none of the Separable 1st Stage proposals so far suggested are to the U.S. interest but has tried to accommodate (within the limit that no such SFSDA be actually agreed to) to the propaganda demands of our situation at Geneva. A third school has held that the USG should seek out and analyze the substantive elements of potentially desirable SFSDAs, ones the U.S. could live with, before considering the tactical and propaganda issues of negotiation (whether at Geneva or in other forums).

This paper endeavors to continue the evaluations of the latter school. It deals first with certain basic considerations, second with the four main substantive elements: strategic systems, conventional forces, tactical systems, and concurrent

political developments and only indirectly with the tactics of negotiation.

II

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

The fact without which the entire disarmament effort would have collapsed long ago, is that control and reduction of armaments can benefit both sides, that it is not entirely a zero sum game. But in part it is a zero sum game; what improves the relative position of one side, harms the relative position of the other. The Soviets will certainly attempt to optimize their relative position. Not only must we attempt to optimize ours as an offset to their attempt, but also to offset a very real asymmetry in the position of the two blocs: We proclaim, and are, a defensive alliance; they proclaim and are an offensive alliance, in which the debate is only as to the level of violence to be used in pursuing the aims of the alliance. Our task in devising a SFSDA is therefore complex. It involves fully exploiting the potential of the non-zero sum aspects of arms control (those which benefit both the USSR and ourselves) while preserving or improving the relative Western position in the zero sum aspects.

Principal U.S. interests are: (1) the maintenance of our ability to contain Soviet or Chinese expansion; (2) a reduction in the risk of nuclear war, either from escalation

of undeterred Soviet or Chinese expansionism under (1) above or in the form of a direct nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies, and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear war should it nevertheless occur, and (4) continuation of the prospect that U.S. (nuclear and other) forces surviving a nuclear war would be able to ensure a settlement of hostilities favorable to the United States.

Principal Soviet interests are: (1) a reduction in the prospect that the U.S. might escalate to general nuclear war a local confrontation resulting from what the Soviet leadership would consider the inevitable expansion of the area of Communism: (2) a reduction in the prospect that U.S. military forces surviving a nuclear war would allow the U.S. to dictate terms of settlement of hostilities and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear war should it nevertheless occur. From the Soviet standpoint very substantial cold war gains could occur if we failed to preserve our objective (1) while they succeeded in achieving their objective (1). In such a situation they could expect a rapid dissolution of NATO and a loosening of the ties holding together the forces standing in the way of clear Communist domination of the European-Asia land mass. They could then concentrate their full effort on securing their primacy over their Chinese "partners".

III

THE FOUR SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Strategic Nuclear Relationship

1. Present Trends

Projections through 1968 of programmed U.S. strategic forces, on the one hand, and NIE estimates of Soviet forces, on the other, indicate that without arms control the U.S. should be able to maintain a 2 to 3-fold superiority in numbers of intercontinental alert weapons, and a superiority in the average survivability factor of those forces. The megatonnage of the Soviet strategic forces may, however, come to exceed those of the U.S. forces and under all but the most favorable circumstances the percentage of the U.S. population expected to be casualties after a nuclear exchange might exceed that of the USSR. Under no foreseeable circumstances, however, could the USSR, even if it struck first, have high confidence in ending the initial exchanges with a superiority in surviving strategic forces.

In the absence of arms control the U.S. should therefore be able, at least through 1968, to maintain a very credible deterrent, a deterrent adequate, not only to protect the U.S. against a premeditated nuclear attack (Class I Deterrence), but also to keep low the risks of escalation the Soviets could prudently face in bringing pressure against Europe or in support of their policy in other areas vital to the West (Class II Deterrence). The sacrifice of this advantage in any SFSDA would have to be weighed against US non-zero sum and other zero-sum gains.

2. Objectives

Combinations of strategic forces and defensive systems in the present era can be designed to accomplish one or more of the following purposes:

- (1) limit damage to the U.S.
- (2) deny military victory to the USSR and to insure it for the US;
- (3) wreak unacceptable damage on the USSR.

Of these purposes, number 3 is, of course, the easiest to achieve. Many countries might aspire toward the acquisition of sufficient forces to achieve this purpose. Reduction in SDV's to conform to this strategy could accelerate diffusion of nuclear weapons by providing additional incentive to nations to acquire them. This strategy could, therefore, be polarizing or divisive to the West.

Of the foregoing range of purposes, (1) is obviously very difficult to accomplish. Although some reduction in US damage is feasible, our studies indicate that even under the most favorable circumstances of war outbreak and of initial U.S. strategic preponderance, we would be very fortunate to limit our urban-industrial damage and civilian casualties to 25%. On the other hand, (2) seems wholly possible for the foreseeable future.

We therefore must consider, in any reduction of strategic delivery vehicles, the resulting shift from a capability to accomplish (1) and (2) toward a capability to accomplish only (3), the result of which will certainly be to remove from our strategic forces a capability for Class I deterrence. This

in turn means that we must be aware that the responsibility for Class I deterrence will inevitably shift toward tactical nuclear and conventional forces and in a world in which there is added incentive for diffusion of nuclear weapons.

Within the foregoing frame of reference, the following specific objectives come to mind for use in the consideration of any specific SFSDA:

- a. To reduce the size, weight, and likelihood of success of a Soviet strike against the US or its allies.
- b. While doing so, insure against unacceptable risk to our security, or to that of our allies, through cheating including withholding of undeclared weapons, clandestine production, or improvement of weapons, and abrogation with the purpose of gaining a significant time advantage in rearmament.

Discussion

If both sides reduce the size and weight of their strategic attack capabilities, it should be possible to retain and even enhance Type I Deterrence. As the strategic forces are brought under control, major instabilities resulting from the psychology of the arms race should diminish. Decreased concern on either side about the survival of its retaliatory force should remove lingering incentives toward, or fears of, premeditated attack against one another.

The same course could seriously damage Western deterrence in Type II situations to the extent it is based on quantitative

superiority. Compensations would have to be sought in arrangements either contained in the disarmament treaty or permissible under the treaty. These might involve (1) a full spectrum of deterrence below the strategic level, and/or (2) capabilities for deliberate, selective, controlled response.

None of the reductions contemplated would reduce the possible destructiveness of an all-out war, if it occurs, even close to the levels known through World War II. Since it takes relatively few missiles to target the major cities on either side, and since substantial fractions of each side's missiles are targetted on each other's strategic forces mutually agreed reductions in their number could proceed with little effect on the number of cities which might be at risk to residual forces. The casualties experienced in any actual war perhaps would be reduced somewhat because of (1) reduction in collateral damage with diminished counterforce exchange, and (2) decreased number of nuclear detonations in any one area resulting from lower damage expectancies because of smaller force levels. In other words, the number of nuclear hostages might be better controlled at roughly the level considered necessary for effective deterrence. The level of prospective own damage (in terms of percentages of population casualties or of industrial destruction) at which the USSR would certainly be deterred is an arguable figure. It is probably higher for the USSR than for the US.

3. Other Variables

Important variables in analyzing the optimum solutions to these objectives are the assumptions as to the general political context including the possible impact of arms control measures on our European allies, the provisions of other portions of the SFSDA and the degree of inspection which is considered desirable or negotiable. This paper assumes that a SFSDA will not come into being except after, or concurrently with, a comprehensive test ban agreement, a comprehensive non-diffusion agreement, some improvement in the Berlin-German Reunification situation and other points of immediate high risk. The variables in other parts of the SFSDA will be taken up as they appear pertinent. Different solutions will be proposed for a high inspection case, a medium inspection case and a low inspection case.

4. How many?

Some number of permitted U.S. strategic delivery vehicles between 100 and 1000, should assure the U.S. a high order of counter city, Class I Deterrence, provided the number permitted the Soviets were smaller or, at least, no greater.

Let us assume no controls over Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, no control over civil defense programs, no control over nuclear materials or warheads and a low level of permitted inspection. At the upper range of the suggested numerical limit, say 1000 weapons, it should still be possible

for us to create a mix of super-hardened, dispersed, large, multiple-warhead missiles, plus Polaris submarines plus dispersed, or air-borne planes with improved air-to-surface missiles which would be able adequately to survive any conceivable Soviet attack. Such a Soviet attack must be assumed to include the permitted Soviet vehicles, plus vehicles which could escape detection plus vehicles which could be produced and deployed during any time gap in rearmament by clandestine Soviet preparation for abrogation. US forces should be able to survive in sufficient volume to penetrate to at least 50 Soviet cities with sufficient weight to wreak very great destruction on these cities and cause casualties of at least 10% of the Soviet population.

Such a solution would not, however, make any substantial contribution to the objective stated in III A 2 a. above of significantly reducing the possible size and weight of a Soviet attack below what is now projected without a SFSDA. The USSR could theoretically opt for missiles of 100 MT or larger size up to its full permitted number if only numbers are to be limited. Within any plausible ratio of Soviet numbers to US numbers, say 50% of the US permitted figure, the weight of a Soviet attack could be virtually totally devastating. Therefore, more complex solutions must be considered.

Two measures which would greatly increase the certainty of effective US retaliation within lower numbers would be measures prohibiting the deployment of ABM Systems or

prohibiting the construction of elaborate civil defense shelters. (Of these two categories prohibition of ABM Systems would have less problems since it is psychologically more difficult for a nation to deny its citizens the basic individual security of civil defense.) Both of these measures could be reasonably well monitored through unilateral surveillance and intelligence. The cost of a strategically significant ABM system would be of the order of magnitude of at least 10 to 20 billion dollars. A significant shelter construction program would also be costly. Both would probably be necessary substantially to reduce the destruction and casualties to be expected even from two or three hundred multiple-warhead weapons on target. No such large scale programs could be clandestinely executed.

If one did not have to be concerned with substantial ABM and civil defense programs, it would be possible to assure unacceptable damage without hardened multiple or multi-megaton warheads. 150 one-megaton warheads (of say 500 lbs weight) on target would certainly be able to demolish the fifty leading industrial and population centers of the USSR and leave a reserve for contingencies.

Soviet cities are, of course, only one part of the target structure as presently understood. Other main components, and their implications for disarmament, are as follows:

a. The Soviet Nuclear Threat. In present war plans, Soviet bombers and missiles and their supporting bases are

the highest priority class of targets. If strategic forces are stabilized at anything approaching parity, counterforce targetting probably will be less and less remunerative. Depending on vulnerability of the opposing forces, some reduction of enemy capabilities may continue to be attractive as a first-strike objective; but the level of reduction achieved probably could not be decisive. To make strategic bases less compelling second-strike targets, missile refire or bomber recycle capabilities might be controlled.

b. Other Military Capabilities. Certain tactical airfields and general military targets in Europe are now targeted by SAC. These could just as well be covered by European theater forces, if survivable weapons systems were provided SACEUR. A consistent set of categories would have to be constructed for the disarmament agreement in order to prevent strategic force limitations from injuring the position of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries.

The conclusion here seems to be that, provided theater forces are considered separately, one alternative would be to relate the number of strategic weapons more or less directly to the urban-industrial (second-strike retaliatory) target structure.

What number of permitted strategic delivery vehicles, then, would be necessary to assure the ability to detonate 150 warheads on target? The answer is a function of the survivability of the vehicles and their reliability. If one assumes

a reliability of .66 (in other words, two out of three surviving vehicles could be expected to reach target with adequate accuracy), we would then have a requirement that 225 of our vehicles be able to survive any counterforce attack the Soviets could aspire to mount with (a) their permitted vehicles, (b) vehicles not declared, vehicles clandestinely produced, and vehicles converted from civil aircraft, etc., and (c) vehicles produced during any time gap achieved by preparation for hostile abrogation. No precise computation of the starting number of U.S. vehicles required is possible; too many variables are involved. 500 vehicles would, however, not seem to be an unreasonable figure.

If both sides were limited to permitted delivery vehicles with a lifting capacity sufficient only for one megaton warheads, a fantastic improvement in present day standards of accuracy and reliability would be needed to give the Soviets confidence in taking out one of our hardened missiles without devoting at least three to the task. (A 1 MT weapon with a CEP of 1/4 NM would have 72% chance of severely damaging a 400 PSI Silo). If a method could be devised to limit guidance systems to a CEP no less than one mile at intercontinental range, they would have to devote about 30 missiles to take out one of ours. In any case, such of our missiles as were in Polaris submarines at sea would be comparatively invulnerable to this form of attack, as would air-to-surface

missiles in air alert aircraft. Moreover, in the evolution of weapons mixes under any such agreement the US might make major shifts away from hardened, fixed strategic missiles in favor of mobile land and sea based types.

The magnitude of effort required to supplement the permitted system with covert delivery means sufficient for a counter-force attack effective against the opposing strategic delivery system (considered as a whole) seems so great as to make the attempt hardly worthwhile. Even if one were to assume a clandestine force as large as the permitted force, and a force created during the time gap after hostile abrogation of equal size again, this would give the Soviets only a three fold superiority in numbers which, assuming present day reliability and accuracy factors, would not be adequate to assure a high level of destruction even of the fixed base portion of our permitted systems. Future improvements could, of course, change this estimate.

In summary, it appears that something of the order of 500 permitted vehicles would be adequate to protect against the risks of deception provided, (a) ABM systems were prohibited, (b) major civil defense shelter construction were prohibited, and (c) the lift capacity of permitted systems were limited to one megaton warheads, (d) no great improvement in accuracy to the order of 1/4 NM CEP, were in prospect.

The most sensitive variable in arriving at this judgment is that CEPs of less than a 1,000 ft. at inter-continental

range will not be within the state of the art until the 1970's. Thought should be given to prohibitions and controls over terminal guidance, etc., designed to make such super accuracy impossible. The increasing yield and decreasing CEP of the attacking weapon can be offset to a degree by hardening the target.

5. Larger and Smaller Yields

It is generally agreed that a very difficult thing to hide, and therefore easy to control, is a launching facility for an inter-continental missile. It cannot, however, be demonstrated that it would be impossible, assuming the necessary effort, to conceal individual launchers. That it would be possible to hide hundreds of such launch facilities becomes less credible.

To check on the accuracy of the system will be still more difficult. It would require: 1) mutual observation of strategic missile test firings of the other side to observe accuracy plus sufficient inspection of emplaced missiles to be sure they were the same design as those tested; 2) construction of strategic delivery vehicles by a third state (e.g. Sweden) for both sides; or 3) other radical inspection procedures.

There has therefore been a tendency, in considering SFSDA's to concentrate on number of launch vehicles rather than on yield or accuracy. With sufficient yield, accuracy and reliability, it is possible to approach a one-for-one kill probability against even super-hardened dispersed launch

sites. With multiple, guided warheads it might at some future time be possible to reduce the exchange-ratio to less than unity, but this is not within reach of present technology. Furthermore, the destructiveness of even 50 100-megaton warheads is such as to fail to meet the objective in III A 2A, while less than a hundred permitted delivery vehicles would seem to present far too great a risk of successful elimination through counterforce or covert attack. Control over super-weapons, therefore, seems indicated. One possible alternative would be to prohibit all intercontinental land-based missile launching facilities, relying solely upon sea or airborne vehicles. But 25,000 lb. warheads can also be carried by plane and probably sub-based missiles could be devised to launch such weights. Substantial inadequacies therefore would appear to inhere in any SFSDA which provides only for control over numbers of launch vehicles.

If controls over lift capacity and accuracy are to be included in a SFSDA, then the question becomes pertinent as to whether limitation of warhead weight and yield below one megaton might not be advisable. Against most Soviet unprotected industrial and population centers, 100 KT would be adequate for destruction; against large industrial areas such as Moscow and Leningrad, 5 to 8 such weapons would be adequate. An adequate surviving U.S. deterrent force of 100 KT delivery systems, therefore, might be 300-350 as

opposed to the 225 one-megaton vehicles suggested in the previous section. If the Soviets are similarly limited to 100 KT weapons, the number of weapons they would have to allocate to insure killing one of ours would be three times that necessary with one-megaton weapons. No significant increase above 500 in the permitted number of delivery vehicles would therefore seem required even if lift capacity is limited to 100 KT warheads (say 150 lbs.). A crucial question, however, is whether the weight carrying capacity of a given system can be accurately enough controlled to guard against substantial deviations in the yield of warhead which could be delivered. All existing ICBM systems would have to be scrapped and new ones meeting precise criteria substituted. The closer both sides come to the practical limits of improvement of yield-to-weight ratios, the more feasible weight limitations would be since the margin for clandestine yield/weight improvements would be narrowed.

6. Other Possible Controls

In the above light, a suggestion worth exploring is the prohibition of all inter-continental delivery systems except for submarine-based missiles. This could be coupled with limitations on the number, size, range and deployment of such submarines and missiles. Let us assume that each side is limited to 100 missile-carrying submarines, each submarine being limited to four launch tubes capable of lifting a 200 lbs. warhead 2,500 miles, with no weight allowance for

inflight course correction equipment. Peacetime deployment of these submarines within 3,000 miles of the other's territory would be prohibited and monitored. There might also be a limitation on the number and range of attack submarines and a prohibition against deep sea mining. Under such an arrangement it is difficult to see how a counterforce attack would be conceivable. (An alternative would be to limit all intercontinental missiles to hardened land-based sites. The 1 MT yield limitation would make a counterforce attack extremely unlikely. The need for monitoring submarine deployments would be unnecessary and the expense would be less.)

The principal difficulty with such arrangements is that the principle of a mix of retaliatory systems is sacrificed. It may be that this difficulty is less than that of allowing a mix of systems, some of which, particularly bombers, seem to be inherently uncontrollable as to precise small scale lift capability.

A further possible control is over nuclear materials and warheads. As will be seen, later, some such controls may be required in the tactical nuclear field. The confidence which one can have in such controls is not, however, adequate to give much assistance in the strategic field where the number of warheads is small and the amount of fissionable material required to produce major changes in capabilities insignificant. It would be reasonable to back up controls over numbers, lift capacity, accuracy, range, etc. with

production controls to guard against clandestine improvement in numbers or characteristics. The elaborateness required in controls over production would vary with the sensitivity of the arrangements to detect cheating.

7. Optimum Solutions Varying with the Degree of Inspection which can be Negotiated

a. Low Inspection

On-site inspection is probably not required to control an agreement prohibiting the deployment of ABM systems, or an elaborate shelter construction program. It also would be difficult clandestinely to deploy large numbers of inter-continental missiles with large weight lifting capacity. Clandestine production and deployment of large numbers of submarines or heavy bombers would also appear difficult.

If little on-site inspection can be negotiated, weight yield, range and accuracy limitations would be impossible. Numbers limitation, which would not be critically upset from a counterforce viewpoint by clandestine deployment of several hundred weapons, would be possible. If ABM and substantial shelter construction are prohibited, numbers approximating 500 would seem appropriate. If there is no prohibition on ABM's and shelter construction, numbers approximating 1,000 would seem appropriate. Particularly in the latter case, we would have to assume the Soviets would be striving for large yield, hardened multiple warheads, etc., etc. We would therefore have to compete strenuously in the

same direction as well as deploying an ABM system and engaging in a substantial shelter construction program.

In either of these cases the Class II Deterrent effect of our strategic nuclear capability would be small and would be seen to be small by our allies. There would be no credibility in our adopting a counter-force strategy and a city-busting strategy would be clearly and totally ruinous. The same would apply equally to the Soviet Union. The correlation of forces in the conventional and tactical nuclear fields would then become even more significant to both sides.

b. Medium Inspection

If it were possible to negotiate a declaration of retained and replacement delivery vehicles, plus periodic inspection of such vehicles, plus a reasonable program of random inspections to provide a check against clandestine production or deployment, a more useful arrangement should be possible.

In addition to prohibition of ABM systems, and shelter construction and a limitation on numbers, it would then be possible to control weight lifting capacity, range, and possible accuracy if observation of test firings or physical inspection of missiles were permitted. Whereas under a above, there could be no assurance by either side that the other would not build up to a megatonnage in excess of 10 or 20 thousand, under this alternative one could have

reasonable assurance that megatonnage of permitted systems could be kept below one thousand for each side and could perhaps be reduced below one hundred.

With no control over nuclear materials, warhead production or warhead stockpiles, there would, however, always be the threat of the deployment of large weapons in ships, civil air craft, etc. While such deployment would be unlikely to have significant counter-force potentials, it would continue as an unsettling and suspicion arousing possibility.

c. Optimum solutions with high degree of inspection

If in addition to the controls suggested under b above, it were possible to negotiate controls over nuclear materials, warhead production, and warhead stockpiles, further possibilities of designing a system maximizing the non-zero sum advantages to both sides might, over time, become possible. There seems to be no scientific way in which one could have high confidence that nuclear materials or warheads had not been secreted in some remote or subtly concealed storage area, in magnitudes perhaps as great as ten or twenty per cent of existing Soviet stockpiles. Security in the United States is not such that we could have confidence in executing such an operation ourselves. It is possible, should the Soviet leaders desire to do so, that ways could be found to give confidence that they also were no longer in a position to do so. Transitional arrangements would undoubtedly be necessary to cover the period during which such confidence was being

established. Even such transitional steps would, however, seem useful in getting on toward the objectives stated in III A 2 a.

A possible transitional step might permit stockpiles of warheads sufficient to supply the permitted systems with a reserve, plus continuously inspected additional stockpiles in some state of remoteness from delivery systems or in some stage of incomplete fabrication so that there would be a time delay in their availability sufficient to make them useless in a counter-force role, but short enough to make clandestine withholding or concealment of little value to the other side.

8. Relationship of control among strategic, conventional, and tactical systems

a. General

Control over strategic weapons increases the importance of tactical nuclear weapons to deterrence of the use of conventional forces while at the same time the problem of control in the tactical nuclear and conventional forces area get more complicated.

b. Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Systems

In surveying the controls of strategic nuclear weapons, which have been discussed under the low, medium, and high inspection cases, it becomes apparent that the more stringent the limits and controls under this category of weapons, the greater would be the degree of control required

over tactical nuclear forces. The reason for this correlation is that the more stringent the limits and controls over strategic weapons the greater would be the pay-off to a potential aggressor in "pocket battleship" developments within the tactical category. Moreover, the more stringent the limits over strategic weapons, the more destabilizing would be the disparities in tactical nuclear weapons which would be possible without controls.

c. Relationship of Conventional to Nuclear Forces

The greater the degree of control over strategic and tactical nuclear forces, the greater the importance of conventional forces and therefore the greater the need for controls over these conventional forces which would assure that negotiated balances are not violated. The history of conventional arms races needs no recounting. The achievement of agreements for controls over nuclear weapons is most likely to be observed if both sides are able to achieve a non-zero sum agreement on their conventional forces which achieves certain political objectives for each. (This in turn implies a degree of political settlement which will be discussed later).

B. Conventional Weapons

1. Area Considerations

a. NATO-Warsaw Pact Relationship

This is the key area of the world. The vital interests of both blocs confront here. For that reason it is here that it is most difficult and most important to

achieve a non-zero sum settlement. Until the political environment has changed appreciably (such as might eventuate if EEC integration continues or if the European satellites achieve significant disorientation from the USSR) the best hope for a balance of conventional forces in this area is a limited rapprochement and disengagement as part of a broader arms control package. For example, should the U.S. give up its preponderance of strategic weapons with its concomitant Class II deterrence, the USSR IRBM threat to Europe would have to be eliminated, and some conventional balance would have to be negotiated. This could not be a simple numerical parity. The interior, continental lines along which the USSR forces operate (as opposed to the sea lanes over which the U.S. must support Europe) are an advantage which would require compensation in a stable settlement. This might be achieved by permitting appropriately larger NATO land forces in Europe, than the Warsaw nations would be allowed to have West of the Bug River or West of a Leningrad-Smolensk-Odessa line. Alternatively, a formula might be worked out which allowed the NATO powers to continue to have larger tactical air forces while the Warsaw-NATO nations had parity of land armies within a defined area in Europe. Still another alternative, or an added element of security, might be to negate offensive opportunities for conventional forces by creating a "nuclearized" zone -- a jointly planted, jointly policed, jointly controlled ADM zone, half of which either side could set off at will.

The balance to be sought is that the advantage should lie with the defending forces regardless of which side initiates the offensive. The higher the controls over the strategic and tactical nuclear forces, the more critical the European conventional balance becomes.

b. China

Here both superpowers have potential problems.

(1) The U.S. relationship

It is difficult to visualize the lineup of U.S. conventional forces which could handle the problem of China in Asia. While U.S. seapower could insure the defense of Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and other Pacific islands, and, with land forces, could make a creditable defense in the Korean peninsula, the problem of Southeast Asia would have to be met: a) by depending on superior US conventional airpower and the manpower of allies; b) by resort to a retained superiority in tactical nuclear weapons; c) by increasing the size of U.S. conventional forces by an amount which might be difficult to sustain, politically; d) by relinquishing Southeast Asia to the Chinese Communist (India, with US support, and given adequate Indian motivation might still be defensible); e) by insisting upon a reduction in the land and air forces of China. Of these possibilities, the retention of tactical nuclear weapons seems to be the most feasible alternative for the foreseeable future.

2) The USSR relationship

The increasing preoccupation of the Soviet

leadership with the problem of China and the differential in manpower resources give evidence of a similar need for the USSR to retain tactical nuclear weapons to redress the potential imbalance in conventional forces.

3) US-USSR Non-Zero Sum

Both superpowers have a mutual interest not only in redressing potential manpower imbalances vis-a-vis China, with tactical nuclear weapons but also would gain advantage by maintaining mechanized land forces of greatly superior mobility and firepower to the Chinese. The tactical air forces of the USSR, deployed well eastward to honor a European settlement, and the Pacific sea forces of the U.S. would be indirectly supporting a common mission in many respects. More important, any detente in Europe, with force levels reduced within European geographical limits, would free land forces from both sides to be deployed against the threat of China.

Over the long haul, the military facts of life might persuade the Chinese Communists to ease their burden by joining in a second generation series of arms control measures but this could only come if those measures negotiated in the first generation had permitted a good margin for containment of China's aspirations.

4) The Zero Sum Aspect

The great hazard of Communist China to the U.S. is the potentiality that would exist for the USSR and

Chinese Communists to patch up ideological differences and jointly concert against U.S. security interests.

c. Middle East-Africa-Latin America

The conventional forces of these areas are relatively insignificant in comparison to the forces of the major powers. With the exception of the Israeli-Arab strife, the peacekeeping record of the overt forces of the nations of these areas in recent years is a reasonably enlightened one. Within this framework, a reduction in indigenous forces would be likely to retain present power balances and to free increasing proportions of limited national incomes for economic improvement. If properly monitored, such reductions should not increase political instability. Thus, arms control constraints on the conventional forces of the superpowers would have an important relationship to the power balance in these areas, thus producing a zero sum advantage to the U.S. in the increasing degree to which these areas would be dependent on sea lines of communication. A settlement on conventional forces which merely resulted in European deployment constraints, and which left sizeable forces in the USSR strategic reserve, would make it possible for the USSR to deploy into the Middle East or Africa unless the U.S. retained a preponderance of conventional sea forces and equality of strategic reserve land and conventional air forces.

d. US-USSR relationships

Beyond the discussion of the US-USSR relationship

in Europe, China, Middle East-Africa-Latin America, there remains to be discussed their respective capabilities as the heartland bases of conventional weapons and forces. Given the achievement of a balanced power situation around these two nuclei, and given a European mainland in which the advantage would lie with the defense, the resulting overall advantage would lie with the US on three counts. First, the power balance would contribute, by the neutralization of military forces as a tool of aggression, to the US strategy of maintenance of a relatively stable world order in which orderly changes can occur, and would be in contraposition to that required for the Communist concept of the destruction and reordering of political patterns. Second, the U.S. for the foreseeable future would retain the greater industrial capability with which to be able to mass produce to regain a larger power plateau -- conventional or nuclear -- should that become necessary for such fundamental reasons as Communist abrogation of arms control agreements or restoration of military cooperation between the USSR and China. The third reason follows.

e. Freedom of the Seas

The stability postulated in a lineup of forces along the foregoing lines, depends on the tying together of the remaining forces of the U.S. and her allies throughout the world. This binding together of conventional forces of the FreeWorld, in contraposition to the retained forces of a

potentially united continental Communism can only be affected by insuring the freedom of the seas. The present preponderance in seapower is a function of superior naval forces and possession of adequate bases within the sea community of the Free World. Arms Control settlements which negotiated parity of military seapower as between the continental landpower of the USSR and the sea community of the U.S. and NATO would result in a basic reduction in the relative balance of power by denying redeployment of the U.S. strategic reserve land forces and denying logistic support to any point under pressure from Communist lower order conflict. This vital need of the U.S. to retain a preponderance of surface seapower and air power may require us, in equity, to concede the right of the USSR to a net superiority of ground forces, under suitable deployment constraints. In a world in which the threat of nuclear war had been tamped down, the power advantage to the US, in such circumstances, could be considerable, depending upon the relative balance struck. The extent to which an overall preponderance of U.S. conventional air and seapower would require careful calculation and would be difficult to define since two very different things would have to be balanced. The imbalance must be sufficient to provide security to the continents of the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Australia, but not so great as to prevent the necessary US support of NATO land armies and occasional support of US allies in South and Southeast Asia.