

## 2. Control Considerations

a. For Tactical Air. As mentioned earlier, the two superpowers, if they are to maintain their power positions vis-a-vis Communist China, and other nations, require superiority over these nations in conventional tactical air forces. This superiority is one of the vital factors which would make it possible for both the US and USSR to match the conventional land power of Communist China and for the US to meet commitments in several areas of the world simultaneously with small land forces. First, the same vehicles used for conventional tactical air support are susceptible of use as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. This problem will be discussed in another section but the need of these vehicles for conventional power prevents their elimination as the solution to the nuclear threat. This dichotomy can be lessened by deployment constraints discussed in a later section.

The tactical air force requirements for NATO in Europe are, as elsewhere, related to the Army levels negotiated. If parity of NATO-Warsaw forces in Europe, west of the Bug, or if percentage reductions of current European force balance were negotiated, NATO would still require a superiority of tactical air to counterbalance the inferiority of exterior sea lines of reinforcement over Soviet landlines of communication. The protection against rapid redeployment of USSR tactical air forces from the USSR to Europe would have to rest on US capability to redeploy rapidly from the US mainland. This in turn would require approximate parity of tactical

air forces in the two heartlands. Beyond this, the US would require additional tactical air forces (perhaps naval air) to maintain a favorable balance of power against the Chinese Communist threat in the Pacific. This means that the overall balance of tactical airpower would have to rest with the West: some superiority in Europe; equality within the two mainlands (for this purpose the USSR mainland should be defined as USSR east of the line Leningrad-Smolensk-Odessa) and superiority in the Pacific. This requirement for a favorable balance of tactical air forces could be legitimized in several ways: (1) by insisting on percentage reductions in current levels of tactical air forces, including naval air, (2) by having the European powers provide a large portion of European NATO tactical air forces, while granting parity of US and Soviet tactical air forces excluding naval air; (3) by winning acceptance of the right to superior US tactical air forces as well as sea forces to compensate for superior Soviet land armies.

b. For Tactical Air Defense. The stabilizing aspects of tactical air defense forces, especially SAMs are: 1) these expensive installations are a protection to the conventional forces of each large power against the crude nuclear assault of smaller Nth powers; 2) they are stabilizing to the defense, against surprise attack by air forces of the other superpower; 3) they would, to some extent, reduce the advantage one superpower might gain by clandestine

retention of tactical nuclear weapons for use in tactical air assault.

The destabilizing aspects are: 1) the superpower which builds heavy tactical air defenses is in a better position to launch its own air attack with less concern for enemy retaliation in kind; 2) any allowed superiority of tactical air is partially negated by opposing air defenses. In this case the stabilizing aspects appear to be controlling. If the US were able to negotiate an arrangement which permitted tactical air superiority, substantial air defenses would still appear to be the desired situation.

c. Manpower. Notwithstanding the fact that the US might have to be prepared to grant higher manpower levels to the USSR to achieve the necessary preponderance in other conventional areas, sticky problems of control would remain. Within any agreed forces levels there would be complicated problems of definition. We would need to be sure that both sides interpreted force levels as applicable to all personnel engaged in agreed military chores. The use of civilians by one side to increase the virtual effectiveness of the uniformed personnel could not be unilateral. Similarly, there would have to be commonality of definition of reserve forces although not necessarily parity. If force levels were defined in terms of divisional strength there would have to be some agreed definition of what a division and division slice could be.

In the manpower area these problems would require

a high degree of inspection in order to achieve assurance against cheating. With lesser degrees of inspection, only very rough manpower controls would appear feasible.

d. Mobility and Firepower. It is necessary for both the US and USSR to retain a high degree of mobility and firepower in their conventional forces if they are to retain their power superiority over other potential rivals. Yet the equipment which makes this possible represents a threat to the opposing superpower by making it possible to overcome, suddenly, deployment constraints. Furthermore, such equipment is more easily produced clandestinely or cached than is the case with strategic weapons. The control over these categories of weapons which is feasible is directly related to the amount of inspection permitted. And since it is mobility and firepower which could be most dangerous during aggression in an arms control environment, the greater the limitations at the nuclear end of the spectrum of weaponry, the greater the control we would require over weapons providing conventional mobility and firepower to insure that negotiated balances are not overcome.

e. Bases. Bases have correctly been identified by the USSR as the Achilles heel of the US in arms control negotiations, because of a two-fold, distinct asymmetry in the US-USSR relationship: 1) As a continental land power the USSR does not need overseas bases to protect vital national interests with conventional power; 2) as an aggressive

ideology Communism uses subversion and indirect aggression rather than the overt forces and bases required by the more defensive free world. Elimination of US bases in any overseas area tends to sever that sea lane in the military sense. Under major reductions of conventional forces or thinning out in an area, some bases might be given up or reduced in strength but this would have to be the follow on of and not the substance of an arms control agreement. If, subject to the foregoing, the USSR insisted on a listing of the bases to be liquidated, the US should insist on a similar reckoning of bases within the satellite and Soviet areas which were being rolled up and should require inspection to make sure that such areas remained, in effect, demilitarized.

f. Deployment. The non-zero sum gains resulting from controls on deployment are: 1) the two blocs could reduce the extent of the confrontation in Europe, yet; 2) this could be done without decreasing and even while increasing conventional commitments elsewhere. As suggested earlier, overall US security could be enhanced if a "thin-out" of conventional forces in Europe, both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, resulted in a better relative balance for the West in Europe, an increased strategic reserve of troops in the US, and/or some greater deployment into the Pacific. If disarmament negotiations developed in such fashion that an overall reduction in the armed forces were essential to get an otherwise intelligent agreement, deployment constraints

in Europe which permitted stability at lower levels there probably would be mandatory. Whatever the approach, thinning out in Europe would surely require the US to retain superiority of tactical air forces and naval forces, together with sufficient airlift and stockpiling of additional sets of protected division equipment, to provide rapid response to a major Soviet conventional thrust in Europe.

Deployment constraints might be policed: by a border ADM field; by construction of a broad commercially useful canal along the border in the German plains; by stationing of fixed ground post observers at road and rail junctions and sea and air ports; by exchange of military missions between NATO and Warsaw headquarters units, and by reciprocal aerial surveillance.

Other variations of deployment constraints could be considered. It might be possible some day, if the satellites continue present political trends, to negotiate demilitarization of East Germany in exchange for an Austro-Hungary type "real-union" of the two Germanies which maintained two sovereign administrative systems and which kept FRG security forces out of the East German territory. Or a denuclearized zone extending a specified distance on either side of the iron curtain might improve the stability of the conventional force lineup, provided the zone were not so wide as to prevent stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for rapid re-entry into the zone if required. A variant which would appear to have

marked disadvantages would be to create a demilitarized zone-shorn of conventional as well as nuclear forces -- on both sides of the present iron curtain border. In general, for the foreseeable future, the West would have greater difficulty in sweeping back into a demilitarized zone with conventional forces than would the USSR, particularly if there is a debilitating effect on the NATO allies of a withdrawal of forces to their homelands.

g. Production Controls. The non-zero sum gains from controls on production would be: halting the expense and destabilizing effect of the conventional arms race; while preserving the superiority of both superpowers over other possible rivals. Curtailment of expenses and stabilization of the race could be accomplished by: prohibition of production of all armaments except agreed categories (such as are in the US GCD Treaty Outline) in which inventories would have to be reduced by specified amounts; replacement of weapons on a one-for-one basis; prohibition of testing and production of new types of armaments; prohibition of equipping or construction of new production facilities or expansion of existing ones. Preserving the superiority of the big two requires: setting inventories for these two at a level superior to any combination of rivals in which one superpower does not join; authorizing one-for-one replacement within category so that old production lines would not have to be restarted and so that each side could gradually improve the quality of its

force to the maximum state of the art at the time R&D were halted.

A disadvantage to the US in any reduction of active inventories is the superiority of the reserve stocks of conventional Soviet equipment, especially tanks. To minimize this fact the US should try to negotiate a correlation between personnel and inventories on a TO&E basis.

h. Budget Controls. The openness of the US society and the basic elements of the capitalistic system insure that budgetary control on US defense spending would be largely effective. In the USSR, the extent of secrecy of its closed society would present very real inspection obstacles. More significantly, the artificiality of the USSR's pricing system, in which unit prices may be set much lower than actual cost and the shortage made up by overpricing in other areas, and other "Socialist" stratagems could result in grossly higher production of military hardware than a true budget would permit. This control is therefore a zero sum disadvantage and should be avoided unless it can be effectively coupled with other controls which are effective.

### 3. Possible Solutions

a. Low Inspection. A low inspection case might consist of Soviet willingness to permit observers to witness bonfires of equipment, declared but uninspected inventories and perhaps an exchange of fixed ground observation points. Under such circumstances the US could place reasonable

assurance, using unilateral means, on USSR compliance with controls on: inventories of tactical air forces, tactical air defense and surface naval vessels, utilization of bases. Limited confidence could be placed on Soviet compliance with controls on deployment. Controls on total manpower, production, and budget would not be high confidence measures. This would make negotiated reductions in army strength dangerous. And in view of the need for the Free World Community to rely on superior air and sea strength, any reductions in these forces without inspected reductions in armies, could be dangerous and destabilizing.

b. Medium Inspection. This case might include (in addition to those elements of the low inspection case) inspection: of conventional production by stationing of resident inspectors in all plants declared to be engaged in final assembly of agreed armaments; plus a limited quota of inspections at plants not so declared, to check against clandestine production; plus some areas open to inspection by roving USMIM type patrols; plus aerial inspection of all of Europe, Western USSR and Eastern US. Under such criteria, and coupled with unilateral intelligence, the US could place reasonable confidence in controls on tactical air forces, tactical air defenses, naval forces, utilization of bases, deployment, and fair confidence in inventories of conventional army weapons and equipment. This would make some reductions in army (and possible naval) strength acceptable and equivalent reductions

in tactical air forces could therefore be risked.

c. High Inspection Case. In this case, to the elements of the two inspection cases above, we might add: inspection of declared inventories; stationing of resident inspectors at factories producing sub-assemblies for finished agreed armaments; a large quota of random inspections at undeclared factories suspected of clandestine production; relatively unlimited areas open to roving USMIM type patrols; and unrestricted aerial inspection. Access to production and budget data might in this case be of additional assistance. Under this rigorous inspection system the US could safely afford to negotiate major reductions in and deployment constraints upon all aspects of its conventional force, subject to the caveats discussed concerning area and exterior IOC problems.

### C. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

1. Context - Discussion of these weapons has to be treated in the light of a world which, in order to control the awful aspects of its strategic weapons, must arbitrate controls over conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Consideration of control over tactical nuclear weapons subsumes that there has been a comprehensive test ban treaty, a non-diffusion pact, some degree of control over strategic weapons, and sufficient political settlement between the superpowers to reduce tension at such pressure points as Laos, Berlin and Cuba.

The problem of Communist China would be a major factor in such considerations.

## 2. General Considerations

### a. What Can Contribute to Stability?

The overriding complexity introduced into a SFSDA by the consideration of tactical nuclear weapons is that modern conventional delivery systems (tactical air, artillery, rockets, mortars etc.) are capable of being nuclearized. This fact presents the greatest difficulty in constructing suitable controls over tactical weapons systems except with relatively intense inspection procedures. It seems necessary to require some degree of control over both the range and impact area which would be affected by their surreptitious conversion to nuclear use.

An important difficulty in the discussion of tactical nuclear weapons is the semantics problem as to what is meant by a "tactical nuclear system." As we consider stringent controls over a reduction of what are commonly accepted as strategic weapons, those delivery systems which have commonly been considered tactical could increasingly become the logical instruments of clandestine strategic surprise attack. Moreover, weapons which might not be considered, even after reduction in SDVs, to be strategic, by the US, might very well be considered strategic by our European allies who would see a reduced strategic umbrella in the US mainland and who also might see large numbers of

delivery vehicles in the Eastern Europe capable of reaching Western European targets. It may be necessary, in order to win allied support for arms control agreements limiting SDVs, to adopt as the definition of tactical nuclear delivery systems, those systems which are capable of attacking the urban-industrial complexes of any Nato-Warsaw nation from outside of its national boundaries.

These factors require consideration both under the strategic weapons analyses, discussed earlier, and also in this section.

Whatever the resolution of the peculiar semantics question, it seems basic to the consideration of the tactical nuclear weapons that the existence of nuclear warheads capable of being used by traditionally conventional delivery vehicles is stabilizing in two ways:

(1) Their existence dampens the temptation to initiate a conventional attack;

(2) They reinforce the overall power of the nuclear nations as opposed to that of the non-nuclear nations. Here again, the non-zero sum factors point to a retention of some tactical nuclear warheads. But the zero sum factors point toward a controlled situation in which effort is made to limit the numbers of such warheads, and/or the numbers of conventional delivery vehicles capable of firing them, and/or surprise offensive opportunities.

b. Rules or Assumptions of Engagement and Escalation.

The assumptions as to the use of tactical nuclear warheads would vary with the numbers retained, and the deployment limitations, range limitations, etc. of the related delivery systems. Working backwards from the assumptions we would choose in seeking an intelligent SFSDA, the optimum controls would be developed. First, for the foreseeable future, it would seem unnecessary and unwise to plan to use nuclear weapons in an arms controlled world environment against the nations of Africa, Latin American and the Middle East. Second, both superpowers would undoubtedly want a reserve of tactical nuclear weapons for possible use against Communist China. Third, it would appear to be to the advantage of both superpowers to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons in any confrontation between their forces around the periphery, although, again, geography may make them essential to the West for defensive purposes in certain areas. Fourth, in Europe there is a special case in which it may be to the benefit of both superpowers to retain the capability to use short range tactical nuclear weapons. The West might have to do so in order to retain a credible NATO deterrent after opposing strategic forces have been brought into a condition of controlled mutual deterrence. The extent to which this would be necessary would depend on the extent to which a relaxation of international tensions, under the political settlements that would be necessary to achieve a SFSDA, had occurred. The assumptions as to the use of tactical nuclear weapons which both sides might accept, then, would be:

(1) Neither would use tactical nuclear weapons against inferior non-nuclear nations;

(2) Both would be prepared to use such weapons against major non-nuclear powers - i.e., Communist China;

(3) Both would be prepared to escalate to the use of such weapons if attacked, especially in Europe, and perhaps in other areas, depending upon the political and military situation obtaining.

Under these assumptions, the problem of control becomes one of working out ways to minimize the opportunity for the attacker to use tactical nuclear weapons in an initial surprise attack, while preserving for the defense the capability to use tactical nuclear weapons after the attack has begun.

3. Control Considerations - The complexities of this problem are the ones on which meaningful disarmament negotiations are most likely to founder.

a. Delivery Vehicles

The primary problem with regard to conventional delivery problem was mentioned above - i.e., the fungibility of delivery means. Yet, the need to retain some tactical nuclear weapons capability requires that there be a meaningful approach to the control of tactical delivery vehicles. Restated, the problem is to preserve conventional delivery means for the defense, to handicap their use as nuclear delivery vehicles in the offense, yet to retain the possibility of their use for delivery of tactical nuclear

weapons in the defense.

As suggested above, each super power would need enough delivery vehicles to remain superior to non-nuclear rivals and to deter super power attack. For use against Communist China's land armies and other targets, aircraft would appear to be optimum delivery vehicles. Ideally both sides would retain sufficient tactical aircraft, configured for tactical nuclear weapons (say 500), deployed against China, range-limited to prevent surprise use against the opposing super power, to suit this need. Ideally the tactical aircraft reserved for conventional air battle in Europe would be estopped, by configuration and inspection, from using tactical nuclear weapons. In keeping with the concept that Europe should be defense-oriented, in addition to a border ADM screen, each side might be authorized sufficient (say 500) very short range (say 10 to 50 km) tactical missiles in hardened, immobile positions to be used against an attacker, but located far enough behind the border that they could not serve as offensive tactical weapons. Both sides could be allowed to determine for themselves the accuracy and yield restraints they would place on such missiles since their warheads would, of course, explode in own territory.

This concept of immobile positions for tactical missiles would be optimized by an agreement to provide controls over the deployment of artillery of ranges larger than 30 miles. Roving inspectors could be used to assure that all

artillery of greater range remained deployed behind lines several hundred miles either side of the Iron Curtain. This would provide maximum utility in the use of immobile tactical nuclear missiles against invasion and, beyond that, artillery for defense in depth or for reinforcement of the invaded area.

Another real problem with regard to delivery vehicles is the possibility of use of commercial vehicles with clandestine warheads for surprise attack. The extent of this threat is a direct function of the degree of inspection allowed.

b. Warheads

If the foregoing ideal situation with regard to delivery vehicles could be negotiated, constraints on warheads would be less of a problem. Warhead controls, as a sole constraint, are infeasible. Both superpowers have produced so much material from which such weapons may be fabricated and have stockpiled so many tactical nuclear warheads that it would be difficult to preclude clandestine assembly and use, without controls over delivery vehicles. This fact, in addition to those cited above, argues for the retention by both sides of a reserve of tactical nuclear weapons, to denigrate the importance of clandestine stockpiling by the other side. This reserve (of say 1000 tactical weapons, in addition to the 500 warheads retained for European fixed tactical missiles) would have to be deployed away from Europe, in the vicinity of the 500 aircraft deployed by each

side for possible use against China.

If the ideal situation with regard to a fixed European tactical missile were not negotiable, then some form of physical separation of tactical nuclear weapons from tactical aircraft in Europe would have to be negotiated together with controls on the numbers, range, and yield of mobile tactical missiles in that theater. This is inherently less stable than the ideal situation.

c. Fissile Materials

A significant aspect of assurance against clandestine stockpiling of tactical nuclear weapons would be the negotiation of a cutoff of production of fissionable materials. This would have other non-zero sum factors. It would serve to inhibit the opportunity of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons, if they signed the agreement before they attained a nuclear capability and provided controls over peaceful uses of nuclear materials were carefully monitored. It would also slacken the strategic weapons race. This is an easily policed control although the great quantities of fissile material already produced would leave important loopholes for clandestine stockpiling of warheads. One might add that in situations where ABM is legitimate, a constraint on fissile materials (mainly plutonium) would favor the US -- large numbers of ABM warheads consuming substantial amounts of Pu would be necessary for an "effective" ABM deployment, and here the asymmetry in stockpiles would favor us.

#### 4. Possible Solutions

##### a. Low Inspection Case

This might be the case in which the only "arms control" information on the tactical nuclear delivery vehicles of the other side would be the declaration of inventories of tactical weapons (and therefore of the tactical aircraft which could serve as potential tactical nuclear delivery vehicles). To this published accounting, there might be added the occasional information as to the movement of potential nuclear delivery vehicles, received from fixed ground post observers.

With this limited control, very little change in the status quo regarding tactical nuclear weapons would be feasible - although the degree of risk acceptable in this area would depend on the strategic force relationship and other force relationships which had been negotiated.

##### b. Medium Inspection Case

This might be the case in which, in addition to the elements of the low inspection case, the following controls were achieved: inventories of all tactical delivery vehicles and warheads were declared; occasional random inspection of geographical areas (Europe and portions of the US and USSR) were allowed; resident inspection were permitted at factories producing authorized replacement tactical nuclear missiles and aircraft.

In this case, some control over numbers and deployment, but not over yield, would be feasible. The uncertainties would be such as to require substantial permitted forces.

Reduction in numbers might be on a percentage basis (of tactical aircraft plus tactical missiles) the extent of which (in the range of 10% to 50%) would depend on the controls on and the relationship of retained strategic and conventional forces. Deployment constraints would have to be such that NATO's preponderance of tactical aircraft in Europe was not destroyed. Removal of or reduction of numbers of tactical nuclear missiles from Europe could be feasible.

c. High Inspection Case

In this case, to the elements of the other two cases, we might add: cutoff of production of fissionable material (which in any event would have to have been negotiated for strategic weapons to create the kind of military relationship in which major constraints on tactical nuclear weapons would be feasible); controls on numbers of warheads in production and stockpiles; inspection of declared inventories; resident inspectors at nuclear reactors; on-site inspection of suspected clandestine production facilities; "USMLM-type" roving inspection, on a frequent basis, in all of Europe, and large parts of the US and USSR; and aerial inspection.

In this case, some more significant tactical nuclear arrangement might be feasible. This could constitute the deployment and number constraints discussed in III C 3. To achieve the emplaced tactical missile situation in Europe in which tactical aircraft did not remain a nuclear threat in

that area, inspectors would have to have sufficient access to tactical aircraft to insure that tactical nuclear weapons were not loaded and sufficient geographical access to insure that nuclear bombs were not stored nearby or brought in. In the mainlands of the USSR (east of Leningrad, Smolensk, Odessa line) and of the US, tactical aircraft would be subject to different rules. Here, storage of tactical nuclear bombs in the areas nearby to tactical air bases should be permitted but subject to the control that observers would be able to note any deployment of the bombs to the aircraft. Here again, a possible transitional step might be to permit stockpiles of warheads sufficient to supply the permitted systems with a reserve plus continually inspected additional stockpiles in some state of remoteness from delivery systems or in some state of incomplete fabrication so that there would be a time delay in their availability sufficient to make them useless for surprise attack but short enough to make clandestine withholding or concealment of little value to the other side.

D. BEARING OF CONCURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. General. Remembering that the Communist bloc is essentially an offensive alliance while the Free World is a defensive one, the USG must insist on certain political conditions in conjunction with any major arms control agreement. Moreover, the USG would have to proceed on the basis that arms control agreements must not limit US capability to rebuild to and surpass present armament levels if limited political

settlements are violated. Within this general parameter, the extent to which the US might reduce its arms through negotiation would be directly related to: the development of political depolarization of the satellites; the threat and extent of the Sino-Soviet rift; development of effective domestic pressures on the Soviet regime for improved standard of living and freedom from fear of war; the extent to which the offensive alliance limits its aggression to the sub-limited portion of the offensive spectrum; and the degree of success which the Free World experiences in containing that degree of aggression. Arms Control agreements should not be negotiated which would permit the US to be faced by superior power of a re-allied Sino-Soviet bloc or which made possible continuing communist victory in par-military confrontation. In the present time frame, there are 3 areas of the world in which the pressures of the Communist-Free World are so critical as to require special mention in connection with arms control agreements.

2. Southeast Asia

Political developments here, especially in Laos and South Vietnam, have an important relationship to the tactical nuclear and conventional portions of the arms control spectrum. It is conceivable that the U.S. and the USSR might achieve an understanding on controls of strategic weapons without a resolution of political problems in Southeast Asia. However, it is difficult to visualize controls at less than the present

levels in tactical nuclear and conventional forces if the Chinese Communists are continuing their direct and indirect para-military efforts in these regions. One exception could be that reductions in tactical nuclear and conventional forces in the European area might result in a net overall reduction for both the U.S. and the USSR rather than resulting in redeployment against the Chinese Communist.

Even the achievement of strategic weapons agreements and certainly the achievement of agreements in the other two arms control categories would require satisfaction on the part of the U.S. that the USSR was not cooperating with the Chinese Communist in the latter's para-military effort in Southeast Asia. The minimum political requirement upon which the US should insist as a prerequisite to major arms control agreements with the USSR in any of the three categories, then, would have to be the practical assurance that the USSR had accepted the status quo in Southeast Asia.

If the day should come when the Chinese Communist were willing to curtail such para-military effort, conventional forces and tactical nuclear forces cuts on a broader basis could be considered.

### 3. Cuba

Agreements with the USSR in the strategic weapons category would have to incorporate a prohibition against the deployment of such weapons by the USSR in Cuba, in order to have any possibility of domestic US acceptance. More important, the achievement of any major arms control reductions in

any category of forces, would certainly require greater disengagement from Cuba by Soviet forces than has taken place to date. This is not to say that Castro would have had to be deposed or that the regime returned to the Western Hemisphere orbit but merely that USSR forces with the exception of a few scores of military advisers had been removed. On the other hand, greater likelihood of significant arms control arrangements would exist if the first major Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere had been repulsed by the elimination of the Castro regime and severance of the Cuban ties to the USSR. Therefore, US political efforts to bring this situation about, provided they are conducted with sophistication, are not inconsistent with the arms control negotiations.

#### 4. Berlin and Europe

This pressure point is the most significant of all. Without the agreement between the two super powers as to the future of Berlin, and indeed, of Germany, no major political detente is foreseeable and therefore significant arms control reductions would be unlikely. The interrelationship of political settlement and arms control agreements is more readily apparent in this area than any other. It is particularly important to continue to explore fully with our NATO allies and the USSR all combinations of political and arms control agreements which could reduce the dangers of confrontation in Europe. The achievement of a non-zero sum settlement,

however, in this area is more difficult to foresee than in any other aspect of US-USSR relations. This means that the breakthrough in the European area may quite likely require a longer waiting period than in any other aspect. It is the long term reorientation of political relationships -- e.g., closer integration in Western Europe and closer cooperation within the Atlantic Community; greater dis-affiliation within the Communist satellites; etc. -- which offers the best hope for a zero sum settlement which the USSR would accept. That is, it will require a certain sense of the inevitability of the Soviet leadership before there will be a willingness to accept a European settlement also acceptable to the West. Conversely, for the US to proceed too rapidly with arms control negotiations could have a disintegrative effect within the Atlantic community and this in turn could lead the USSR to exploit arms control negotiations primarily for their disruptive effect rather than for stabilization and detente.

##### 5. Reflections

The arms control considerations that have been summarized in this entire discussion may be considered to be "reduction -- control" at the strategic end of the forces spectrum, with primarily "deployment -- use" controls of one kind or another at the middle and lower ends of the spectrum -- all pending the time when political tensions have resolved enough to make fuller disarmament possible.

But in a larger perspective the very fact of being

able to negotiate and agree on the rather elaborate arrangements covered in this paper (on the strategic "reduction" level, and/or the tactical nuclear conventional force "deployment --use" level) would imply the achievement of a stage where political problems were in fact being resolved, as registered by the arms control agreements. Whether great power rivalry is yet quite this susceptible to amelioration and sublimation -- even though the impulse for common interest (non zero settlements) is certainly increasing in the kind of world we live in -- remains moot.

This paper attempts to raise the issues, decision on which is necessary for the conduct of those negotiations required to determine whether that rivalry can be circumvented. Nothing in this paper should give great optimism. But the problems delineated should not be a cause for undue pessimism or abatement of our efforts. The 17 years of apparently meaningless propaganda exchanges in the arms control field finally gave birth to two arms control agreements. The fact that these agreements came about at a time when political detente suited the needs of the Soviet leadership should not obscure the fact that a great body of common language and dogma in the arms control field made it possible for relatively quick agreement when the political circumstances were appropriate. A future struggle to succeed Khrushchev could well result in the seizure of arms control issues by one of the aspiring lieutenants as a tool for the winning of possible support

necessary to achieve power. Or increasing problems in the allocation of economic resources or with the Chinese Communist could drive the Soviet leadership toward the acceptance of such packages. The detailed, painstaking, years - long spelling out of the details of a mutually acceptable first stage agreement with the USSR, to which this document attempts to make a contribution, should continue.